ML20151G772
| ML20151G772 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 07/22/1988 |
| From: | Littlefield P PUBLIC SERVICE CO. OF NEW HAMPSHIRE |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20151G732 | List: |
| References | |
| OL-1, NUDOCS 8807290213 | |
| Download: ML20151G772 (20) | |
Text
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i UNITED STATES OF AMERICA UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION before the ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD
)
In the Matter of
)
)
PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY'
)
Docket Nos.
50-443 OL-1 NEW HAMPSHIRE, et al.
)
50-444 OL-1
)
(Seabrook Station, Units 1
)
(On-site Emergency and 2)
)
Planning Issues)
)
AFFIDAVIT OF PETER S. LITTLEFIELD I, PETER S. LITTLEFIELD, being on oath, depose and say as follows:
1.
I am employed by Yankee Atomic Electric Company as Manager of the Radiological Engineering Group.
A statement of my professional qualifications is attached and marked as "A".
2.
A number of design basis accidents are analyzed prior to the operation of a nuclear power station.
The Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) and the Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR) are bounding for Seabrook Station in terms of both on-site and off-site consequences.
As specified in 10 CFR 100.11, the design limit for this analysis is 25 rem wholebody or 300 rem to the thyroid to an individual located at any point on the exclusion area boundary for two (2) hours immediately following onset of the postulated reic3se.
3.
The analysis of the LOCA for the Seabrook Station at full power operation is found in Section 15.6 of the FSAR.
The 2-hour l
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8807290213 880722 i
PDR ADOCK 05CK)D443 o
Exclusion Area Boundary (EAB) doses reported in the FSAR are 79 rem thyroid and 1.7 rem whole body versus the design limits of 300 rem and 25 rem respectively.
The critical radiological assumptions made in the FS AR include the following:
a.
.The fission product activity airborne inside the con-tainment and available for release to the environment at the time of accident initiation consists of:
o 100% of the equilibrium core inventory of noble gases o
25% of the equilibrium core iodine inven-tory b.
50% of the core iodine inventory is assumed to mix with the containment sump water volume.
Engineered Safety Features (EST) equipment recycles this water volume and is assumed to develop leaks within 0.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> after the event.
Iodine released from the ESF area is processed through emergency exhaust filters and released to the environment.
c.
The containment is assumed to leak at its Technical Specification limit for 24-hours following accident initiation.
Negative pressure within the containment annulus area is assumed to be established within 8-minutes.
Prior to this, all containment leakage is assumed to be released directly to the environment.
After 8-minutes, 40% of the airborne leakage is pro-cessed by the annulus filters and 60% is released directly to the environment.
d.
One train of the redundant contai nme nt spray system is assumed to function to reduce airborne iodine con-centration in the containment.
4.
The only significant impact, on the LOCA consequences, of oper-ation at 0-5% power, is to reduce the core inventory of radioactive fission products.
All offsite doses are directly related to the inven-tory present at the time the accident occurs.
All safety systems re-quired to achieve, maintain and monitor safe shutdown from low power will be operational and available to perform their function in the event of an accidental release of radioactivity from the core.
See --
Affidavit of Bruce E. Beuchel.
5.
A realistic assessment of the core power history during the low power testing program would be as follows:
13-days of operation at or below 0.1% of full power followed by 2-days at or below 4% of full powe r.
This history would result in iodine isotope inventories of 1-5%,
and noble gas nuclide inventories of 0.02-17% of their full power equilibrium values.
6.
The 2-hour LOCA doses reported in the FSAR for full power operation will be reduced as a result of the lower core inventories.
The thyroid dose at the Exclusion Area Boundary (EAB) will be reduced by approximately a f actor of 65 to a value of 1.2 rem for the low power case.
The whole body dose, for this same case, will be reduced by approximately a factor of 17 to a value of 0.1 rem.
7.
Likewise on-site doses from a LOCA would also be reduced sub-stantially for low power operation.
For example, the long-term inte-grated dose inside the primary containment building would be reduced by at least a factor of 50.
8.
The analysis of the SGTR accident for the Seabrook Station at full power operation is also found in Eection 15.6 of the FSAR.
The critical thermal hydraulic and radiological assumptions made in the FSAR include the following:
a.
The total mass of reactor coolant transferred to the secondary side of the ruptured steam generator prior to preusure equalization is 101,000 lbs.
b.
Seventeen percent of the reactor coolant transferred to the secondary side flashes to steam.
All of the radioactive iodine in this flashing fraction is re-leased immediately to the environuent.,
l c.
A pre-existing spike has occurred which has raised the dose equivalent I-131 concentration of the reactor coolant to the Technical Specification limit of 60 UCi/gm.
The dose equivalent I-131 concentration accounts for the other radioactive isotopes of iodine.
9.
The only significant radiological effect of the SGTR is the thyroid dose produced by the release of radioiodine.
The FS AR analysis resulted in a thyroid dose of 66 rem at the exclusion area boundary.
The design limit as specified by 10 CFR 100 is 300 rem.
The whole body dose reported in the FSAR for this accident is only 120 mrem (0.12 rem) and is therefore of little concern from the standpoint of public health risk and emergency planning.
10.
The FSAR also analyzes'the SGTR for an iodine spike that occurs coincidentally with the tube rupture.
This event, however, produces lower radiation doses than the pre-existing spike case described above.
11.
Operation of the plant during low power testing results in sub-stantially decreasing the potential consequences of design basis acci-dents.
The impact of this low power operation on the FSAR SGTR assump-tions is discussed below.
l 12.
The mass of reactor coolant that could be transferred to the secondary side increases at low power as a result of density changes, reactor trip timing and other thermal hydraulic considerations.
A conservative analysis of this mass flow at low power has resulted in an upper bound estimate of 140,000 lbs.
(Affidavit of Ping Huang, dated November 20, 1987, attached and ma rked "B").
This would increase the thyroid dose by approximately 40%.
13.
The reactor coolant entering the steam generator is at a lowe r temperature during low power operation (approximately 70'F lower), and therefore the flashing fraction of this coolant in the secondary side.
is reduced to less than 7.5% (See Attachment "B").
This reduces the potential iodine release to the environment and results in reducing the thyroid dose by approximately a factor of 2.
14.
The greatest impact of low power operation, however, is that the potential quantity of iodine available for release to the environment is significantly less.
This is due to:
a.
A reactor core iodine inventory of at least a factor of 20 less than full power operation, b.
A lower fuel gap iodine fraction available for release to the coolant due to low fuel burnup and low fuel temperatu"e (USNRC 82).
c.
A low potential for cladding failure during early core life.
15.
A study has been completed of iodine concentration in reactor coolant during first fuel cycle operations ( Af fidavit of Kenneth Rubin, dated November 20, 1987 attached and marked "C").
The study included 35 nuclear power stations and over 100 individual measurements.
The reactor coolant results are shown below:
1-131 Concentration, UCi/gm Normalized Corrected to 100% Power 5% Power Maximum 0.065 0.00325 Average 0.0043 0.00022 Minimum 0.00006
< 0.00001 16.
A second study of iodine spiking source terms for accident analysis has analyzed the characteristics of 70 iodine spikes in operating reactors (Lu 81). This study reported the equilibrium con-centration prior to the start of the spike, and the peak concentration following the spike for each event. The highest reported ratio of peak-to-equilibrium concentrations was 170.
If this maximum ratio is -
multiplied by the highest equilibrium reactor coolant concentration shown above, the result would be a bounding spike reactor coolant con-centration of 1-131 of 0.55 Uci/gm (170 x 0.00325 = 0.55).
Accounting for the other isotopes of iodine results in a dose equivalent 1-131 concentration of approximately 1.4 UCi/gm.
This low pre-existing spike concentration would raduce the thyroid dose by approximately a factor of 40.
i 17.
The overal] result of adjusting the SGTR critical assumptions dis-cussed above for operation at low power is to produce an exclusion area boundary thyroid dose of approximately 1.1 rem.
This should be considered a bounding value for SGTR since conservative assumptions regarding mass transfer, coolant flashing, iodine concentration, and spiking ratio have all been compounded.
s 16.
Based on the above results it is concluded that design basis LOCA and SGTR events, during initial low power testing, produce an exceedingly small risk to the health and safety of the public and require no off-site protective actions (i.e. projected doses below EPA protective action guides; EPA-520/1-75-001, Revised June 1980, Table 5.1).
Pete r S. ' Lit tlefi[d ~
~
STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE Rockingham, ss.
July 22, 1988 The above-subscribed Peter S. Littlefield appeared before me and made oath that he had read the foregoing af fidavit and that the statements set forth therein are true to the best of his knowledge.
Before me, 5 W $_v hrthu
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Beverly EJ. ill'oway[Wotkrf PubU c My Commission Expires: Ma rch 6,1990 !
l
REFERENCES-Lu 81'
-Lutz, R. J., Jr., "Iodine and Cesium Spiking ~ Source Te rms for Accident. Analysis," WCAP 9964 (Proprietary Class 2),
1981.
USNRC 82 "Background and Derivation of ANS-5.4 Standard Fission Produs: Release Model," NUREG/CR-2507,.1982.
1
. l i
s i
7
.n "A"
PF.TER S. LITTLEFIELD HANAGER, RADIOLIGICAL ENGINEERING GROUP EDUCATION BS Chemical Engineering, Northeastern University, 1962.
MS Radiation Biology University of Rochester, 1963.
Health Physics Training Program, U. S. AEC, Brookhaven National Lab-oratory, summer of 1963.
Mr. Littlefield was employed by Brookhaven National Laboratory from 1963 to 1967 with a 2 year leave of absence to serve in the U. S.
Army.
While at Brookhaven, he worked in the Applied Research Section of the Health Physics Department on such projects as mixed field dosimetry, linear energy transfer analysis and low-level radioactive gas monitoring. He co-authored a paper on the continuous environmental monitoring of noble gases and currently holds a patent on a high pres-sure monitor associated with this project.
In 1967 Mr. Littlefield joined the General Dynamics Corporation, Quincy, Massachusetts as a Radiological Engineer.
He became the Health Physics Supervisor in 1967.
In that position, Mr. Littlefield was responsible for 8 Health Physics technicians and for providing continuous Health Physics coverage to the shipyard. He was also the Shield Survey Engi-neer on 2 new construction nuclear submarines.
As such, he was res pon-sible for the training of the shield survey, the evaluation of the data and the preparation of the sinal report on the acceptability of the nuclear shielding.
In 1968 Mr. Littlefield joined Yankee Atomic Electric Company as a l
Safety Analysis Engineer in the Nuclear Services Division.
In this position, he was responsible for the analysis of engineered safety systems intended to mitigate the release of fission products following an accident, and for the analysis _of primary coolant leakage detection systems and post-accident hydrogen control systems. He was also re-sponsible for preparing safety analysis report sections dealing with process radiation monitoring radioactive waste processing, accident analysis and environmental monitoring.
In 1973 Mr. Littlefield was appointed Kanager of the Radiological Engineering Group at Yankee with racsponsibilities for radiological dose analyses, radiation environmental surveillance, meteorological monitoring, radi> active waste processing, and special siting studies.
He is also responsible for performing design basis accident radio-logical analyses and consequence analyses in support of probabalistic risk assessment s.
He is currently carrying out these responsibilities for 3 operating nuclear power stations (2 PWR, 1 BVR) and 1 PWR under construction.
Mr. Littlefield is a member of the Health Physics Society and has i
served in several offices, including Prestcent of the New England Chapter of this society.
He was certified in Health Physics by the American Board of Health Physics in 1977.
"B" Dated November 20, 1987 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY 'OW.ISSION before tne ATCHIC SAFTTY AND LICENSING BOARD J
l In the Matter of:
)
)
PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF
)
Dacket Nos. 50 33-OL NEW HAMPSHIRE, et al.
)
Docket Nos. 50-444-OL
)
Seabrook Station, Units
)
On-site Dnergency Planning 1 and 2)
)
and Safety Issues AFFIDAVIT OF Pill 3 HUANG CN MASS TRANSFER AND FLASHING FRACTION FOR A STEA" OENERATOR TUEE RUPTURE AT 5 PEROE';! PC'iER I, Ping Huang, being duly sworn, depose and state:
1.
I a= exployed by Wastinghouse Electrio Corporation as a Senior Engineer in Operational Safeguards Engineering in the Nuclear Technolgy Systems Division in the Power Systems Business Unit.
2.
My professional qualifications are attached hereto and marked "A".
3 The pu pose of cy affidavit is to present the integrated break flow and flashing fraction free an analysis of a stea: generator tube 1
rupture du-ing steady state reactor operatim at 5% of full power when the reactor has not operated above that power level.
4 T:4e values for these parameters were deterrined for the reactor coolant system (RCS) and stea n generator conditions at 5% of full power using the break flow model in the LOFTRAN program for a thirty An_'
h/
cdnute transient as was,used in the stea: generator tube ruptu'e analysis reported in the FSAR.
l 5.
Conservative values of the depressu-ization rate prior to reactor trip and RCS pres.su' e and break flow rate after reactor trip were used.
6.
Prior to reactor trip, the full power PCS depressurization rate which is lower than the depressurization rate at 55 power prior to reactor trip was used. This lower depressurization rate, which takes no credit for the effects of higher break flow rates resulting froc lower tecperatures in the hot and cold legs of the RCS at 5%
power, is conservative because it results in in higher mass transfer j
free the RCS to the faulted steam generator.
7.
In order to simplify the analysis, the equilibrium RCS pressu e and break flow rate corresponding to the condition for which the flow out of the break equals the Safety Injection flow into the RCS was used throughout the transient after rea0 tor trip until the event is terminated at thirty minutes rather than to model the pressure and flow rate transients as was done in the FSAR analysis. This is conservative because it does not take credit for the transient that would occur after reactor trip. The depressurization of the RCS due to the loss of RCS inventory will result in a safety injection (SI) actuation signal shortly after reactor trip. SI flow causes the an increase in RCS pressure until the equilibrium conditions are reached. Thus the mass transfer frcre the RCS to the faulted steam generator based on asstr:ing the equilibrium conditions throughout
the transient after reactor trip is higher than the value that would hava been obtained if the pressure and flow rate transients had been explicitly r,sodeled.
8.
The integrated mass transfer froc the Reactor Coolant Syste (RCS) l to the faulted steam generator resulting from the analysis of a steam generator tube rupture for the Seabrook Nuclear Power Plant for steady state operation at 55 of full power does not exceed 140,000 lbs. The break flow flashing fraction does not exceed 7.5%.
Further affiant sayeth not
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Ping Hoang SJBSCRIBED AND RN to b9 ore,me f
this g day o (N' elm lA937.
. LilltYLL A/MkJ
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M _H. Huars b' r.a.e is ?ird F. H ang. My tusia:ess address is P.O. Sex 355, Fittsturgh, Per.ns..'.vania 1523').
- a em;Myed 'cy Wes:tr4h:ase E.*e:tria 2rpra:i:r as a Ser. ice Egineer 1r. Operati nal Safeguards Er.gineerir.g :f :ne Nuclear Te:h. ology Syste:.M. vision. : 3. c.
registered Tr:ressi:r.a1 Egir.eer in the State of Punsylvar.ia.
gradme. f u Nati:na' Tsinghuc Ur.iverhity of Te.ivs. h 19 5 V.th A S.S. tegree it. N;: lear &gineering. In 1930, I received a M.S.
egree in Nuclear Egineerir.g fr0: Pennsylvania S: ate University.
- have been a par: tir.e graduate studen; at Carnegie Me'1:r. University frer.
'951 :: present :: purs.:e a 20: Orate egree ir. Nu:'. ear S:ience an:
k gir.eering.
Tro. Marc. '950 :: Jar.uary '993, : vas e.r.;1cyed oy the Nuclear Fuel hvision Of West.ngn:use EN ;ri: Corpe ation a', a hu:'. ear E.gineer.
My respor.siti'i'.ies included cors desir.; ar.d it e; management for the fue'. rel: ads, ar.: de.e;0pter.t of new produe:s,o reduce fuci cy.'e ecs:s and 1.;r:ve tr.e.argir. tc safety limits.
3 Jar.aary 1953, ~ a::e;;ed a posi:10n in the Nuclear Safety Oe;artner.: Of ;r.e N;;; ear Te:h.01:gy Syste: ~1 vision of Wes:inghouse E' e:v 10 Oct;cratier. as a Safety A.alysis &qir.eer. My experier.ce in:Ndes Large r.d Sr.t'1 Sreu: Usa of Occiar.: A::1 der.: analysis, S:ea.. Ger.ers :r Tube ?.;;;re (SGTR) ar.a*.ysis ar.d deveic; tent of 1
i he. gency Optra-ing ?roce res. Sir.ce De: ember 1963 t: present, xy l
ta Or assigreer.:s at Westinghouse have beer. related te the tnalysis of the Stea Ger.r,: at:r Tate Fupture A::ider.t. I have regularly perforned SGTP ar.r. lysis ar.d evaluatier, fer Westingneuse pressurizer w er ree. Ors. I have als: teer. involved in the develepr.ent of a r.ew SGTR ar.a'ysis tethe::.'cgy o rescive al' the licenair.g issues related to the 30!F a: ice..
"he new S3!T. ana'.ysis methodol gy was ap;reved by r* e Nuc'. ear F.egu' atory Cec:e ssior, in Maren '987.
.A.
"C" Dated N:ve=ber 20, 1987 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA N'JCLEAR REDULATORY C0KW.ISSION before the ATOP.IC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOAP3 In the Matter of:
)
)
PUBLIC SERVICE. COMPANY OF
)
Ibeket Hos. 50 443-OL NEW HAMPSHIRE, et al.
)
D>cket Nos. 50-444-OL
)
Seabrook Station, Units
)
On-site Ehergency Planning 1 and 2)
)
and Safety Issues AFFIDAVIT OF KDMETH RUBIN ON REACT 0F CCOMST ACTIVITY AI 5 PUCD?T PCMER I, Kenneth Rubin, being duly sworn, depose and state:
1.
I am employed by Westinghouse Electric Corporation as a Senior Erfineer in Plant & Syster:s Licensing in the Nuclear Technology Syste.s Divisien of the Power Systems Business Unit.
2.
My professional qualifications are attached hereto and marked "A".
3 The purpose of cy affidavit is to present information which supports use of a reduced reactor coolant activity level at 55 power based l
upon c;erating data frx. 35 nuclear power plants with a siciliar fuel design.
4.
De primary para.eter in the determination of the radiological consequences of a Steam Generator Tube Rupture is the reactor coolant activity level (I-131).
5.
he design basis event, a steam generator tube rupture e MO%
power, presented in the FSAR asstnes that the a:tiv:- - lwel in the reactor coolant is at the maximum dose equivalent I-131 reactor corlant specific acivity for a pre-accident iodine spike, of 60
4 4 4
uCi/gm permitted by the. Technical Specifications. h e results show that the doses are within the 100FR100 guidelines.
6.
At 55 power, the rea ter coolant activity levels will be much lower than the maximum percitted by the Technical Specification limit.
7.
Actual Cycle 1 plant data for 35 reactor cores with the 17x17 fuel design (101 measurements) normalized to 100% power shows the following equilibrite RCS I-131 activity:
Righest reported reading........................... 0.06495 uC1/gm lowest reported reading............................ 0.00006 uCi/g=
Average reading.................................... 0.00429 uC1/gm 8.
'Ihe high readings are a result of small fuel defects. For the most part the operating data shows no fuel defects and the corresponding activity levels are less than 0.001 uCi/gm.
9.
Re reactor coolant activity levels at 5% are obtained by dividing the norcalized 100% p:wer values by 20 since reactor coolant syster:
activity is directly proportional to reactor power.
- 10. The highest activity level at 55 power becomes 0.00325 uCi/sm, the icwest is 0.000003 uC1/gm, and the average is 0.00021 uCi/gm. Since reactor coolant activity is reported to c:..y 5 significant figu es, the low level, when rounded to 5 figures, is ess than 0.00001 uCi/gm.
Further affiant sayeth not i
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//fder'iI Kennetn Rubfn SUBSCRIBED AND SWpRN te before me this I day orl/!t464F d987.
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Kenne? Nbin My na.e is yer.r.e:.. N:in. My business address is F.O. B:x 3c5, Pittsburgh, Per.nsy'vsnia 152N. : ar e.~.picyed by the k'estir.sh:use Ele: ric Ccr;cra.1:n at an Irgir.ner ir. the Plant & Sys; ens Evaluation 1.ieer. sing gro.p cf -he L::. ear Tec.te'.cgy Systens tivisi:n.
I bege c.y career with Westinghcusa in 19'O as a Ter.hnician in the System Engineerir4 Departner.t where : perf:med radiclogical anal.ysis. I transferred t: the W:'. ear Safety DepartNer.: in 1975 and was pr:r.oted to Associate Engir.eer ir.19 9 and E gir.eer in '954
- have c c;1sted numerous assigr.M.:s Of trereasing res;cr. sit:.lity in the areas of fissi n produ:. trar.s; r: and centrel.
- am ceren.'.y responsible fer previdir.g the technica'. '.ead for a'1 cesign basis radi:1;gica'. safety ar.alyses, which in:ludes stea.. generat:r tube ru;;re and s:u ce ter.s.
In this capa:ity, I was responsible for the develomer.: of the cu ren Westir.gr.cuse stea ger. erat:r tube ruptere ra:ica::ivity transport cetxd;1 gy whi:h was appre.e: ty the W lear Regu'.atery Oc. ~.issi n in
'957, tr.: I have been reg.Carly involved in the perfe:-.ance Of stea.
generat:r.ute.m;;.:re ar.alyses for Wes.ir.gh:tse pressurized wa er rea:: Ors. : was awarde: a 'ivisier. gr.gineering A:hieve ent Award in 1953 I nave ene '.'s ;a:er.: ir. the area of : r.: air..ent spray syste.
testing.
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'88 Je282 ASLE Q-(/[,n c;r UNITED STATES OF AMERICA e- %-
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION before the ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD
)
In the Matter of
)
)
PUP *uIC SERVICE COMPANY OF
)
Docket Nos. 50-443-OL-1 NEW RAMPSHIRE, et al.
)
50-444-OL-1
)
(Onsite Emergency (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2)
)
Planning Issues)
)
)
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Thomas G.
Dignan, Jr.,
one of the attorneys for the Applicants herein, hereby certify that on July 22, 1988, I made L
service of the documents listed belos by depositing copies thereof with Federal Express, prepaid, for delivery to (or where ind:lcated, by depositing 4,n the United States mail, first class pos: age paid, addressed to) the individuals listed below*
1.
Applicants' Memorandum in Support of Permitting Low Power Operation Prior to Resolution of '; Coaxial Cable" Issue; 2.
Affidavit of Richard Bergeron; 3.
Af fidavit of Bruce E.
Beuchel; 4.
Affidavit of Thomas W. Glowacky; 5.
Affidavit of Randy C. Jamison; 6.
Affidavit of Peter S.
Littlefield.
--.r.._
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1 Administrative Judge Sheldon J.
Robert Carrigg, Chairman Wolfe, Esq., Chairman, Atomic Board of Selectmen Safety and Licensing Board Panel Town Office U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Atlantic Avenue Commission North Hampton, NH 03862 East West Towers Building 4350 East West Highway Bethesda, MD 20814 Administrative Judge Emmeth A.
Diane Curran, Esquire Luebke Andrea C.
Ferster, Esquire 4515 Willard Avenue Harmon & Weiss chevy Chase, MD 20815 Suite 430 2001 S Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20009 Dr. Jerry Harbour Stephen E. Merrill Atomic Safety and Licensing Attorney General Board Panel George Dana Bisbee U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Assistant Attorney General Commission Office of the Attorney General East West Towers Building 25 Capitol Street 4350 East West Highway Concord, NH 03301-6397 Bethesda, MD 20814 Adjudic tory File Sherwin E. Turk, Esquire Atomic Safety and Licensing Office of General Counsel Board Panel Docket (2 copies)
U.S.
Nuclesr Regulatory U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comr.iss; m Commission One khite Flint North, 15th Fl.
East West Towers Building 11555 Rockville Pike 4350 East West Highway Rockv411e, MD 20852 i
Bethesda, MD 20814
- Atomic Safety and Licensing Robert A.
Backus, Esquire Appeal Board Panel Backus, Meyer & Solomon U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 116 Lowell Street Commission P.O.
Box 516 Washington, DC 20555 Manchester, NH 03105 i
Philip Ahrens, Esquire Mr. J. P. Nadeau Assistant Attorney General Selectmen's Office, Department of the Attorney 10 Central Road 4
General Rye, NH 03870 Augusta, ME 04333 -
i Paul McEachern, Eequire Carol S.
Sneider, Esquire Matthew T.
Brock,.3Pquire Assistant Attorney General Shaines & McEachern Department of the Attorney General 25 Maplewood Avenut one Ashburton Place, 19th Floor P.O.
Box 360 Boston, MA 02108 Portsmouth, NH 03801 Mrs. Sandra Gavutis Mr. Calvin A. Canney Chairman, Board of Selectmon City Manager
)
RFD 1 - Box 1154 City Hall Route 107 126 Dani6. Street Kensington, NH 03827 Portsmouth, NH 03801
- Senator Gordon J. Humphrey R. Scott Hill-Whilton, Esquire U.S. Senate Lagoulis, Clark, Hill-Whilton &
Washington, DC 2051C McQuire (Attn:
Tom Burack) 79 State Street Newburyport, MA 01950
- Senator Gordon J. Humphrey Mr. Peter J. Matthews One Eagle Square, Suite 507 Mayor Concord, NH 03301 City Hall (Attn:
Herb Boynton)
Newburyport, MA 01950 Mr. Thomas F.
Powers, III Mr. William S.
Lord Town Manager Board of Selectmen Town of Exeter Town Hall - Friend Street 10 Front Street Amesbury, MA 01913 Exeter, NH 03833 H. Joseph Flynn, Esquire Brentwood Biard of Selectmen Office of General Counsel RFD Dalton Road Federal Emergency Management Brentwood, NH 03833 Agency 500 C *trcet, S.W.
Washington, DC 20472 Gary W.
Holmes, Esquire Richard A. Hampe, Esquire Holmes & Ells Hampe and McNicholas 47 Winnacunnet Road 35 Pleasant Street Hampton, NH 03841 Concord, NH 03301 Mr. Ed Thomas Judith H. Mizner, Esquire FEMA, Region I 79 State Street 442 John W. McCormack Post Second Floor Office and Court House Newburyport, MA 01950 Post Of fice Square Boston, MA 02109
Charles P. Graham, Esquire
. Murphy and Graham 33 Low Street Newburyport,.MA 01950
[
WN Th{ gad'G, Dignan, Jr.
(*= Ordinary U.S. First Class Mail.)
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