ML20151C328
| ML20151C328 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hatch  |
| Issue date: | 07/11/1988 |
| From: | GEORGIA POWER CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20151C320 | List: |
| References | |
| TAC-68893, NUDOCS 8807210318 | |
| Download: ML20151C328 (7) | |
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4 Georgia PowerI ENCLOSURE 3 PLANT HATCH - UNIT 1
.NRC DOCKETS 50-321' OPERATING LICENSE DPR-57 REQUEST TO REVISE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS:
SECONDARY CONTAINMENT BOUNDARY REQUIREMENTS PAGE CHANGE INSTRUCTIONS The proposed changes ~ to the Unit. 1 Technical Specifications (Appendix A to Operating License DPR-57) would be incorporated as follows:
Remove Paae Insert Paae l
3.7-12 3.7-12 3.7-12a 3.7-12a 3.7-13 3.7-13 3.7-34a 3.7-34a i
3.7-40 3.7-40 5.0-1a 5.0-la i
8807210318 880711 PDR ADOCK 05000321 P
PDC 2074C E3-1 7/11/68 SL-4769 mns
e LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS lC. Secondary Containment C.
Nonnal Unit 1 Secondary 1.
Surveillance While Integrity Containment
- Inteority Maintain 1d a.
Normal Unit I secondary con-Normal Unit 1 secondary containment l
tainment integrity shall be surveillance shall be performed as maintained during all nedes indicated below:
of Unit 1 plant operation except when all of the following conditions are met:
A normal Unit I secondary contain-l a.
(1) The reactor is suberitical and ment capability test shall be Specification 3.3.A. is met, conducted after isolating the andplacingthestandbygastreat-l normal Unit i secondary containment (2) The reactor water temperature is below 212'F and the reactor ment system filter trains in opera-coolant system is vented.
tion. Such tests shall demonstrate the capability to maintain a mini-(3) No activity is being performed mum 1/4-inch of water vacuum under which can reduce the shutdown calm wind (< 5 mph) conditions with margin below that stated in each filter train flow rate not Specification 3.3.A.
more than 4000 cim.
(4) The fuel cask or irradiated fuel b.
Normal Unit I secondary containment l is not being moved in the re-capability to maintain a minimum actor building.
1/4-inch nf water vacuum under calm wind (< 5 mph) conditions with each (5)Allhatchesbetweenthenormall filter train flow rate not more Unit i secondary containment than 4000 cfm shall be demonstrated and Unit 2 econdary contalq-at each refueling outage, prior to ment are closed and sealed, refueling.
(6) At least one door in each access path between the normal l Unit 1 secondary containment and Unit 2 secondary containment is clnsed, b.
Integrity of the normal Unit 1 l
secondary containment shall be maintained during all modes of Unit 2 plant operations except Operational Condition 4 as defined Jn,the Unit'2 Technical Specifiestions.
- Normal Unit I secondary containment includes the Unit 1 reactor building area below the refueling floor and the connon Unit 1 and Unit 2 area above the refueling floor. For modified Unit 1 secondary containment conditions see Specification 3.7.C.2.
HATCH - UNIT 1 3.7-12 Proposed TS/0202q/116-91
4 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 2.
Modified Unit 1 Secondary Centainment*
2.
Surveillance While Integrity Maintained Integrity a.
Operation with modified Unit 1 Modified Unit 1 secondary containment
)
secondary containment integrity surveillance shall be performed is permissible provided all of as indicated below:
the following conditions are met:
A modified Unit 1 secondary contain-l a.
(1) The reactor is suberitical and ment capability test shall be per-Specification 3.3.A. is met.
formed af ter isolating the modified Unit I secondary containment and (2) The reactor water temnerature is placing the standby gas treatment below 212'F and the reactor system filtar trains in operation.
coolsnt system is vented.
Such tests shall demonstrate the capability to nuintain a minimum (3)Allhatchesbetweenthemodifiedl 1/4-inch of water vacuuta under Unit I secondary containment calm wind (< S mph) conditions and Unit 2 secondary containment with each filter train flow rate are closed aiid sealed, not more than 4000 cfm.
(4) At least one door in each access b.
If nonnal Unit 1 secondary contain-I path between the modified Unit 1 l ment integrity should be required as secondary containment and Unit 2 stated in Specification 3.7.C.l.,
secondary containment is closed.
perform surveillance as stated in Specification 4.7.C.I.a.
(5) All hatches separating the mod-If modified Unit I secondary con-ified Unit I secondary contain-tainment is subsequently required ment from the Unit I reactor as stated in Specification 3.7.C.2.,
building area below the refueling perform surveillance as stated in floor are closed and sealed.
Specification 4.7.C.2.a.
(6) At least one door in each access path separating the modified bnit 1 secondary containment from the Unit 1 reactor building area below the refueling flo.r l
15 closed.
(7) The SGTS valves to the Unit I reactor building area below the refueling floor, to the Unit I drywell, and to the Unit 1 torus are secured closed.
b.
Integrity of the modified Unit i secondary containment shall be maintained!during all modes of Unit 2 plant operations except Operational Condition 4 as defined in the Unit 2 Technical Spect'ications.
c.
Refueling operations may continue in the modified the Unit 1 secondary containment provided all conditions in Specification 3.7.C.2.a. are met.
- Modified Unit I secondary containment includes the comon Unit 1 and Unit 2
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area above the refueling floor. For normal Unit I secondary containment conditions, see Specification 3.7.C.1.
HATCH - UNIT 1 3.7-12a Proposed TS/0202q/096-91
e LIMlTING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS 3.7.C.3.
Violation of Secondary l4.7.C.3.
Surveillance Af ter Intearity Violated Containment Intearity x
a.
Without Hatch-Unit 1 Af ter a secondary containment viola-secondary containment tion is determined the standby gas integrity, restore treatment system will be operated Hatch-Unit I secondary immediately af ter the af fected zones containment integrity are isolated f rom the remainder of within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, or the secondary containment. The perform the following (ss ability to maintain the remainder applicable):
of the secondary containh*it at 1/4-inch of water vacuum pressure (1) Suspend irradiated fuel under calm (< 5 mph) wind conditions and/or fuel cask handling shall be confirned.
in the Hatch-Unit I secondary containment.
(2) Se in at least Hot Shutdown within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and meet the Conditions of 3.7.C.1.a. within the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
b.
Without Hatch-Unit I secondary containment, refer to the follow-ing Hatcl.-Unit 2 Technical Specification, for LCOs to be followed for Hatch-Unit 2:
(1) Section 3.6.5.1.
(2) Section 3.9.5.1.
D.
Primary Containment Isolation Valves D.
Primary Containment Isolation Valves 1.
Valves Reauired to be Operable 1.
Surveillance of Operable Valves During reactor power operation.
Surveillance of the primary con-all primary containment isolation tainment isolation valves shall be valves and all reactor coolant performed as follows:
system instrument line excess ficw check valves shall be operable except a.
At least once per operating as stated in Specification 3.7.D.2.
cycle the operable isolation valves that are power operated and automatically initiated shall be tested for simulated automatic initiation and tne closure times.
HATCH - UNIT 1 3.7-13 Proposed TS/02024/096-129
8 s
- N CONTA NMENT SYSTEMS BASES FOR LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 8.
Standbv Gas Treatment System (Continued)
The Unit I standby gas treatment system fans are designed to automatically start upon receipt of a high radiation signal from either the Unit 1 or Unit 2 refueling floor ventilation exhaust duct monitors or the Unit I reactor building ventilation exhaust duct monitors, or upon receipt of s signal from the Unit 1 primary j
containment isolation syst i. The Unit 2 standby gas treatment system fans are designed.o a lomatically start, to assist the Unit I fans to exhaust the Unit ' "andary containment atmosphere upon receipt of a high radiation signal from either the Unit 1 or Unit 2 refueling floor ventilation exhaust duct monitors or the Unit I reactor building ventilation exhaust duct monitors, or upon receipt of a signal f rom the Unit 1 primary containment isolation system. In addition, the systems may also be started manually, from the Main Control Room.
In case of the Unit I standby gas treatment system, upon receipt of any of the isolation signals, both fans start, isolation dampers opn and each fan draws air f rom the isolated Unit I secondary containment. In the modified Unit i secondary containment configurat.lon as defined in Specification 3.7.C.2, the Unit I standby gas treatment system valves to the Unit I reactor building area below
+he ref ueling floor, to the Unit I drywell, and to the Unit 1 torus that are needed to properly isolate the area will be secured closed.
Therefore, Unit I standby gas treatment systehi optration will be limited to suction from the area above the common Unit I and Unit 2 refueling floor only. With this arrangement, secondary containment integrity will continue to be properly maintained to support refueling operations and Unit 2 reactor operation.
In case of the Unit 2 standby gas treatment system, upon receipt of an isolation signal from the Unit 1 primary containment isolation system, reactor building ventilation exhaust duct monitors, or the Unit 1 or Unit 2 refueling floor ventilation exhaust duct monitors, both f ans start, fan supply and discharge dampers open, and the fans draw air f rom the isolated Unit I secondary containment. In the modified Unit I secondary containment configuration as defined in Specification 3.7.C.2, the Unit 2 standby gas treatment system will continue to operate as previously discussed since it is only capable of taking suction from the area above the connon Unit I and Unit 2 refueling floce, Once the SGTS systems have been initiated automatically, the operator may place any one of the Unit I and Unit 2 trains in the standby mode provided the remaining train in each unit is operable.
Should a failure occur in the remaining operating trains, resulting in air flow reduction below 3 preset value, the standby systems will restart automatically.
As a minimum for operation, one of the two Unit I standby gas treatment trains and one of the two Unit 2 standby gas treatment trains is required to achieve the design differential pressure, given the design building infiltration rate. Once this design differential pressure is achieved, any leakage past the secondary containment boundary shall be inleakage.
A detailed discussion of the standby gas treatment systems may be found in Section 5.3.3.3 cf the Unit 1 FSAR, and in Section 6.2.3 of the Unit 2 FSAR.
Any one of the four filter trains has sufficient absorption capacity to provide for cleanup of the Unit I secondary containment atmosphere following containment isolation. Any one the four available HATCH - UNIT 1 3.7-344 Proposed T5/0202q/096-118
1 U
BASES FOR SURVElt.1 ICT REQUIREMENTS 4.7.8 Standby Gas Treatment System and 4.7.C.
Secondary Containment (Continued)
Initiating reactor butiding isolati en and oe* ration of the standby gas treatment system to maintain at least a 1/4-inch of water vacuum withi? the secondary containment provides an a: equate test of the operation of the
)
reactor building isolation valves, ieak tightness of the reactor bui1 Jing and performance of the standby gas treatment system. Functionally testing the initiating sensors and associated trip channels demonstrates the capa-bility for automatic actuation. Performing these tests prior to refuellig will demonstrate secondary containment capability prior to the time the primary containment is opened for refuel'.ng. Periodic testing gives suffi-I cient confidence of reactor building integrity and standby gas treatment system performance capability.
In the modified Unit I se&dary containment configuration as defined in Specification 3.7.C.2, the standby gas treatinent system is functionally tested to demonstrate that secondary containment integrity can be maintained. Also, when Unit I secondary containment is subsequently changed to its normal configuration as defined in Specificatior 1.7.C.1, a standby gas treatment s"st9m functionel test is again performed to demonstrat? secondary containment integrity. Therefore, each time secondary containment configuratio.1 is changed, a functional tesi of the star.dby gas treatment system is pceformed to o monstrate secondary containment integrity.
D.
Primary Containment Isolation Valves The maximum closure time for the automatic isolation valves of the primary containment and reactor vestel isolation control system have been selected in consideration of the design intent to prevent core uncovering following pipe breaks outside the primary containment and the need to contah re-leased fission products following pipe breaks inside the primary containment.
An additional margin has been included in specifying maximum closure times.
This margin permits identification of degraded valve perfortnance, prior to exceeding the design closure ^.imes.
These valves are highly reliable, have low tervice requirement and most are normally closed. The initiating tensors and associated trip channels are checked to demonstrate the capability for automatic isoM M.
Th6 tnt interval of ont.e per operating cycle for automatic iolat?on rest.lts t
in a f&1 lure probability of 1.1 x 10-' that a line will net iss,%e. More frequent testin2 for valve operability results in a greator assurance that the va he will be operaole when needed.
In order to assure that the dosss that may result from a steam line break do not exceed the 10 CFR 100 guidelines, it is necessary that no fuel rod i,erforations resulting f rF-
- accident occur prior to closure of the main steam line isolation a -
Analyses indicate that fael rod cladding t
perforations would be avo d d M. main steam valve closure times, including instrument delay, as long as ?!J sesonds.
The main steam line isolation valves are functionally tested on a more frequent interva'. to establish a high degree of reliability.
HATCH - UNIT 1 3.1-40 Proposed 15/0202q/066-22
2.
i The Unit i secondary sontaiheent shall consist of the main stack, l
the Standby Gas Treatment System, and the portion of the reactor building above the consnon Unit 1 and 2 refueling floor provided the conditions of Section 3.7.C.2 are met for the modified configuration.
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l HATCH - UNIT 1 S 0-14 Proposed TS/0203q/096-91 l
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