ML20155A392
| ML20155A392 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hatch  |
| Issue date: | 09/29/1988 |
| From: | Matthews D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20155A394 | List: |
| References | |
| TAC-68893, NUDOCS 8810050306 | |
| Download: ML20155A392 (9) | |
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o UNITED $TATES
!~3w NUCLE AR HEGULATORY COMMISSION e
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GEORGIA POWER C0t4PANY j
OGLETHORPE POWER CORPORATION I
MUklCIPAL FtrtTRIC AUTHORITY OF GEORGIA j
CITV 0F DALTON, GEORGIA 9
1 DOCKET NO. 50 321 ECWIN 1. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT N0. 1 AKENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE I
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The Nuclear Pegulatory Ccmission (the Comission) has found that:
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A.
The application for a.4ndsent to the Edwin 1. Hatch Nuclear Plant, i
j Unit 1 (the factitty) Facility Operating License No. OFR-57 filed l
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by Georgia Power Company, acting for itself Oglethorpe Power Corporation, Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia, and City of Dalton, Georgia, (the licensee) dated July 11, 1988, complies with l
the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as arended (the Act), and the Cormission's rules and regulations set i
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fcrth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
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B.
The f acility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the q
Comission*
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C.
There is reasonable assurance (1) that the activities authorized by l
this amendment can be conducted without endangeriny the health and i
safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will te conducted
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in coegliance with the Coit 'sion's regulaticns set forth in 16 CFR 1
Chapter I l
D.
The issuance of this amendr4nt will ret be inimical to the coseon j
defense and security or to the hesith and safety of the pubitc; and j
E.
The issuance of this amendrent is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 j
of the Comission's regulations and all applicable requirements have
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been satisfied.
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i 8910050306 800?29 I
PDR ADOCK 05000321 1
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Accordingly}ndicated in the attachment to t is licerse amendment, andthe license cations as I
I paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. OPR-57 is hereby I
amended to read as follows:
(2) Technical Specifications j
1 The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as I
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revised through Amendment No.158, are heresy incorporated in the j
license.
The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications, l
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3.
This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall
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I be implenented within 60 days of issuance.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY C0hMISS!0N
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original signed By:
David B. Matthews, Directer l
Project Directorate !!-3
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Division of Reactor Projects-!/II
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Attachrent:
j Changes to the Technical
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Specifications Date of issuance: September 29, 1988
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ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDHENT N0. 158 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE N0. DPR-57 DOCKET NO. 50-321 Replace the folicwing pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages.
71e revised page is identified by amendment nunber and contains a vertical line indicating the area of change.
l Remove Page Insert Paga 3.7-12 3.7-12 i
3.7-12a 3.7-12a 3.7-13 3.7-13 3.7-34a 3.7-34a 3.7-40 3.7-40 i
5.0-la 5.0 ta I
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LIN17146 C0aOITIons FOR OPERATION sutvtILLANCt t[QuitEMEN15 lC. Secondary containannt C.
Nerna" Unit 1 secondary 1.
Surveillance While Inteerite conta< nnent* Inteer< tv Maintained 4.
Normal Unit I secondary con-Normal Unit 1 tecendary containment l
tainment integrity shall be surveillance shall be performed at maintained during all modes indicated bel w t of Unit 1 plant operation except when all of the following conditions are mett A normal Unit I stcondary contain-l a.
(1) The reactor is subtritical and ment capability test that) be Specification 3.3.A. 11 met.
conducted after 1: elating the normal Unit 1 secondary containment l (2) 1he reactor water temperature
.nd piacing the iianoy gai treet-is below 212*F and the reactor maat system filter trains in opera-Coolant systee is vented.
tion. Such telt: thall deacnttrate the capabtlity to maintain a eint-(3) No activity it being performed mum 1/4-inch of water vacuum under which can reduce the shutdow cale wind (< 5 mph) conditions with margin below that stated in each filter train flow rate not
$pecification 3.3.A.
more than 4000 cfe.
(4) The fuel cast or irradiated fuel b.
Normal Unit 1 secondary containment l 15 not being moved in the re-capability to maintain a minimum actor building.
1/4 inch of water vacuus under cale wind (< $ mph) condittent with each
($) All hatches between the normall filter train flow rate not more i
Unit i secondary containment than 4000 cfm shall be demonstrated and Unit 2 secondary contain-at tech refueling outag6, prior to 3
ment are closed and sealed, refueling.
I (6) At least one door in each l
access path between the normall Unit I secondary contair.mont 1
and Unit 2 secondary containment is closed.
l b.
Integrity of the normal Unit 1 l
t secondary containment sha11 be meintained during 41) oodes of Unit 2 plant operations oncept Operation 41 Condition 4 45 defined 1
,14, tMG1t'2 Technical l
fpecifications.
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- moraal Unit 1 secondary containment includes the Unit i reactor butiding area below the refueling floor and the common Unit 1 and Unit 2 area above the refueling floor. For modified Unit i secondary containment conditions see Specification 3.7.C.2.
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HATCH - UNIT 1 3.1-12 A-enhent W. 153
LIMITle6 C0mDITION5 FOR OP[eATION SURVEILLANCE e[00le[ MENT 5 2.
Modified Unit 1 Secondary Conta1Neent*
2.
Surveillance While Intterity maintained Inteerity 4.
Operation with modified Unit 1 Modified Unit 1 secondary containment j
secondary containment integrity surveillance shall be performed is persistible provided all of as indicated belwt the following conditions are mett l
a.
A modified Unit I secondary contain-l (1) The reactor is subtritical and ment capability test shall be per-
$pecification 3.3.A. is met.
formed after isolating the modified Unit I secondary containment and (2) The reactor water temperature is placing the standby gas treatment below 212'F and the reactor system filter treint in operation, coolant system is vented.
Such tests shall demonstrate the capability to maintain a sinimum (3) A11 hatches between the modified l 1/4-inch of water vacuum under Unit I secondary containment calm wind (< $ ach) conditions and Unit 2 secondary containsent with each filter train flow rate are closed and sealed.
not more than 4000 cfm.
(4) At least one door in each access D.
If normal Unit I secondary contain-l pathbetweenthemodifiedUnit1\\
ment integrity should be required 41 secondary containment and Unit 2 stated in Specification 3.7.C.1..
secondary containment 11 closed, perfore surveillance as stated in Specification 4.7.C.t.a.
(5) All hatchet separating the mod-If modified Unit I secondary con-l ified Unit I secondary contain-tainment 11 subsequently required ment from the Unit I reactor at stated in Specification 3.1.C.2..
building area below the refueling perfone surveillnte at stated in floor are closed and sealed.
Specification 4.7.'.2.a.
(6) At least one door in each access path separating the modified Unit 1 secondary containment from the Unit 1 reactor building area below the refueling flo.r it closed.
(1) The SETS valves to the Unit i reactor bu11 ding area below the refueling floor, to the Unit I dr M 11. and to the Unit I torus are secured closed.
b.
Integrity of the modified Unit 1 secoedary containment shall be maintained during all mo/.es of Unit 2 plant operations except Operational Condition a at defined in the Vnit 2 Technical j
Specifications.
c.
Refueling operations may t:ntinue i
in the modified Unit I secondary containment provide,1 all condit'ons in Specification 3.7.C.2.a. are 'et.
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- notified unit i secondary containment includes the conseca Unit 1 and Unit 2 area above the refueling floor. For normal Unit 1 secondary containment conditions. See Specification 3.1.C.I.
MATCH - UNIT 1 3.7-12e A-endt'ent No. 15'
e LIMITIltG CONOITIONS F04 opt 4ATION Sijay[ILLANC[ I!OUIRENENT5 3.1.C.3.
Violanisa of Secondarv l4.7.C.3.
l Weillance after Inteerity Violat((
Conta' nannt Inteerity 1
1 a.
Without Match-Unit 1 Af ter a secondary containment viola-I secondary containment tion 15 determined the Standby tal
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integrity, restore t estment system will be operate 1 Match-Unit 1 secoP,dgry jgghediately af ter the ef f ected Iones containment integrity are isolated free the remainder of within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, or the secondary containment. The perform the following (as ability to maintain the remainder i
applicable):
of the secondary containment at 1/4 inch o'f water vacuus prellure (1) $.itpend irradiated fuel under cale (< $ neh) wind conditions and/or fuel cast handling shall be confirmed.
in the Hatch-Unit I secondary containment.
(2) le in at least Hot Shutdown withis the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and meet the ConditicT4 af 3.7 C.I.a. within the nest t
i 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
b.
Without Match-Unit 1 secondary containment, refer to the foll w-ing Hatch-Unit 2 Technical Specification, for LCOs to be q
followed for Hetch-Unit 2:
(1) Section 3.6.$.1.
(2) Section 3.9.5.1.
O.
Primarv Contairment Isolation Yalves D.
Pr%ary Containment fiolation Valvet 1.
Yalves teewired to tie Oserable 1.
Surveillance of Deerable Valves During reactor power operation.
Surveillance of the primary con-all primary containment inelation tainment isolation valvet shall be valves and 41) reacter coolant performed at fellows:
j system instrument line estets flow chett valves shall be operable except a.
At least once per operating as stated in Specification 3.1.0.2.
cycle the operable isolation valves that are power operated and automatically initiated shall be tested for sinalated automatic initiation and the
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closure times.
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'4ATCH - WIT 1 3.7-13 A endrent No. 155
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ConfAfhMENT SYSTEMS l
M}ll F00 LIMITING Comalflom FOR OpftAftom 1
B.
Standhv tan Treatment $wntes (Continued) 1 1
The Unit I standby gas treatment systee fans are designed to automatically start upon receipt of a high radiation signal free either the Unit 1 er Unit 2 refueling fleer ventilatten euhaust duct eenitors er the Unit I reacter tvilding ventilation enhaust duct monitors, or upon receipt of a signal free the Unit 1 primary I
containment isolatten systee. The Unit 2 standby gas treatment systee f ans are designed to automatically start, te assist the Unit 1 l
f ani to exhauit the unit i isceMary containment at oiphere upon receipt of a high radiation signal free either the Unit 1 er Unit 2 1
refueling fleer ventilatten euhaust duct monitors er the Unit 1 2
reacter building venttistion enhaust duct monitors, er veen receipt of a signal free the Unit 1 primary containment isolation system. In
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addition, the systems may also be started eenwally, free the main
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conteel nose.
1 In case of the Unit I standby gas treatment systee. Upon receipt of any of the isolation signals, both f ant start, isolation dagers open and each f an draws air free the isolated Unit 'I seceMary l
containment. In the modified Unit I secoedary containment i
j configurat. ion as defined in Specification 3.7.C.2. the Unit I sta Mby j
gas treatment systen valves to the Unit I reacter building area below the refueltag f1cer, to the Unit 1 dryvell. and to the Unit I torus that are needed to properly isolate the area will be secured cleted.
Therefore. Unit I staMby gas treatment systee operation will be limited-4 to suction f rom the area above the common Unit I and Unit 2 refueling floor only. With this arrangement, secondary containment integrity will continue to be properly esintained to support refueling operations aM j
Unit 2 reactor operation.
in case of the Unit 2 standby gas treatment systee, upon receipt j
of an isolation signal free the Unit 1 primary containment isolation j
systee, reactor building ventilation enhaust duct monitors, or the Unit 1 or Unit 2 refueling floor ventilation exhaust duct monitors.
l both f ans start, f an supply and discharge dagers open, and the f ant 3
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draw air f ree the isolated Unit I secoMary containment, in the i
modified Unit I seceMary containment configuration as defined in Specification 3.7.C.2. the Unit 2 staMby gas treatment system will 4
continue to operate as previously discussed since it is only capable of taking suction free the area above the consen Unit 1 and Unit 2 refueltag floor.
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Once the $475 tystems have been initiated autenstically, the operator I
i esy place any one of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 trains in the standby mode l
provided the receining train in each unit is operatie. Should a f ailure occur iN the receining oper4 ting trains resulting in air 4
flew reduction below a preset value, the standby systems will restart auteestically.
As a sinima for operation, one of the two Unit I standby gas I
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treatment trains aN one of the two Unit 2 standby gas treatment i
trains is required to achieve the design dif ferential pressure, given 1
the design tvilding inft1tratten rate. Once this design difforential pressure 11 achieved, any leakage past the seceMary containeemt boundary shall be inleakage.
A detailed discussion of the staHby gas treatment systees any be f ouM in Section 5.3.3.3 of the Unit 1 FSAR, and in Section 6.2.3 of j
the Unit 2 f5A4.
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Any one of the four filter trains has sufficient atterstion capacity I
i to provide for cleanup of the Unit 1 secoMary containment atmosphere j
following containment isolation. Any one the four ava11stle a
f MATCH - Unif 1 3.7 34a eenhent No. 158
1 bA5[5 FOR SURy[ILLANCE t[0 ult [MNT5 4.7.8
}1ggdhv tan Trentaant Svitse and l
j 4.1.C.
Secondarv Conta< rusent (Continued)
Initiating reacter building isolation and operation of the standby gas treatment systes to esintain at least a 1/4-inch of water vacuum within the secondary containment provides an adequate test of the estration of the reactor building isolation valves, leak tightness of the reacter buildir.1 l
and performance of the standby gas treatment systee. Functionally testing tht initiating sensors and associated trip channels demonstrates the capa-bility for automatic actuation. Performing these tests prior to refueling will demonstrate seccMary containment capability prior to the time the n;
primary contair. ment is opened for refueling. Periodic testing gives suf f t-cient confidence of reactor building integrity and standby get treatment systes perf oneance capability.
1 In the modified Unit 1 secondary containment configuration as defined in
$pecification 3.7.C.2, the standby gas treatment system 15 fcctionally tested to demonstrate that secondary containment integrity can be i
maintoined. Also, den Unit I secondary containment is subsequently changed to its normal configuration 45 defined in Seecification 3.7.C.1, a standby gas treatment systee functional test 11 again performed to 4
demonstrate secondary containment integrity. Therefore, each time secondary containment configuration is changed, a functional telt of the standby gas treatment systeae is perfonned to demonstrate secondary containment integrity.
D.
Primary Containeemt Isolation valves 1
The maximum closure tinie for the automatic isolation valves of the primary containment and reactor vessel isolation control nyttee have been selected j
in consideration of the design intent to prevent core uncovering following l
pipe breaks out:1Ce the primary containment and the need to contain re-
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leased fission pros 1ucts following pipe breaks inside the primary contairunent, i
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&n additional margin has been included in specifying merimes closure times.
This mergin pensits identification of degraded valve perfoneance, prior 1
i to exceeding the design closure times.
1 These valves are highly reliable, have low service requirement and nett t
are normally closed. The initiating sensers and associated trip channelt I
are checket to demonstrate the capability for autoestic isolation. The i
i test interval of once per operating cycle for autoestic initiation results i
in a failure probability of 1.1 10** that a line wt11 not isolate. More i
f requent testing for valve operability results in a greater assurance that the valve will be operable den needed.
In order to assure that the deles that ma denotexceedthe10CFR100 guidelines,yresultfromasteselinebreak j
.t is necessary that ne fuel rod 1
perforations resulting f rom the accident occur prior to closure of the i
esin stese line isolation valvet. Analyses indicate that fuel rod cladding perforat*tes would be avoided for main state valve closure times, including i
I instrument delay, as long at 10.5 seconds.
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The asin stese line isolation valves are functionally tested on a more f re uent intervai to citabnih a high degree of reitabuity.
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Satandarv Containannt The Unit 1 Setendary contetheent shall consist of the esin stack, l
the Standby les treatment Systes, and the portion of the reacter building above the cameen Unit 1 and 2 refueling fleer provided the cenettions of Section 3.7.C.2 are est for the modified crAfiguration.
MATCM Velf 1 3.0 14 Amendeent No. 15S
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