ML20149N015
| ML20149N015 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 02/23/1988 |
| From: | Watson R CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM) |
| References | |
| HO-880024-(O), NUDOCS 8802290389 | |
| Download: ML20149N015 (15) | |
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Cp&L Carolina Power & Light Company HARRIS NUCLEAR PROJECT P.O. Box 165 New Hill, NC 27562
,EEB 2 51988 File Number: SHF/10-13510C 10CFR50.59 Letter. Number: HO-880024 (0)
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN NRC Document Control Desk Washington, DC-20555 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1 DOCKET No. 50-400 LICENSE NO. NPF-63 QUARTERLY REPORT IN ACCORDANCE WITH 10CFR50.59 Centlemen:
In cecordance with 10CFR50.59 and CP&L Letter (NLS-86-454) of commitment dated December 9,
- 1986, the following report is submitted for the fourth quarter of 1987.
This report contains brief summaries of changes to procedures and/or plant modifications, which change the plant as it is described in the FSAR.
There were no tests or experiments conducted during this interval, which are not described in the FSAR which require reporting in this report.
Very truly yours, fby R. A. Watson Vice President Harris Nuclear Project MGW:mdt Enclosure cc:
Dr. J. Nelson Grace (NRC - RII)
Mr. C. Maxwell (NRC - SHNPP) 1 I
l 8802290389 880223 PDR ADOCK 05000400 R
PDR MEM/HO-8800240/Page 1/0S1
CHANGE TO FACILITY AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR TITLE:
Lighting cnd Communications Cable Routing in Fire Zone 1-A-5-HVB FUNCTIONAL
SUMMARY
The FSAR Fire Protection description has been revised to allow non IEEE-383 rated, lighting and communications cable not to be routed in separate conduits in Fire Zone 1-A-5-HVB Elevation 286.
SAFETY
SUMMARY
Lighting and communication cable which are not enclosed in condait are located in Fire Zone 1-A-5-HVB Elevation 286 which is bounded by three hour barriers. Smoke detectors are provided to shutdown the air handler servicing this area to limit the products of combustion from being transmitted to other fire areas.
This change will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety or reduce the margin of safety.
A fire protection review has been completed and has detarmined that this program change will not adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire.
REFERENCE:
Section 9.5A.3.9 l
MEM/HO-8800240/Page 1/0S1
CHANGE TO FACILITY AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR TITLE:
PCR-002150, Cooling Tower Flow Taps on Circulating Water System (CWS) Return Lines FUNCTIONAL
SUMMARY
This plant modification installs 2" taps and gate valves in the 120" diameter circulating water pipe return to the cooling tower basin.
These taps will provide the capability to obtain flow measurements of the hot water return to the cooling tower basin.
SAFETY
SUMMARY
If a failure of the added 2" taps occurred, the impact would be minimum due to the low header pressure (18-28 PSIC) and the relative small diameter of the taps compared to the circulating water piping (120").
The operability of the circulating Water System is therefore not impacted.
Furthermore, the circulating Water System is not safety related nor is it required for safe shutdown of the plant.
This change does not increase the probability or consequences of analyzed accidents, not introduce a different type of accident or equipment malfunction than already evaluated in the FSAR. Thus, no unreviewed safety. question exists.
REFERENCE:
Figure 9.2.1-2 MEM/HO-8800240/Page 2/OSI
CHANCE TO FACILITY AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR TITLE:
PCR-001829, Main Feedwater Recirculation Valve Reducers FUNCTIONAL
SUMMARY
This change modified the Main Feedwater Pump (MFP)
Recirculation Lines and logic for flow control valves FCV-2200A &
B.
The downstream side and reducers from these valves have experienced cavitation due to the sudden drop from MFP discharge pressure / temperature to condenser vacuum.
This modification installs restrictive orifices (RO's) downstream of the FCV's which will cause the flashing to occur on the downstream side of the RO's.
The R0's can easily be monitored for erosion and can be inexpensively replaced when necessary. The RO's also limit the amount of recirculation flow to the condenser when the FCV's are fully open.
This modification also makes changes to the wiring and logic to flow control valves FCV-2200A & B.
The operation of the FCVs has been changed from a modulating control to a binary control.
The change will prevent the FCV's from cycling excessively while ensuring minimum flow through the MFP's.
SAFETY
SUMMARY
Operation of the Main Feedwater Pumps is not required for safe shutdown of the plant.
The Auxiliary Feedwater System will supply feedwater for safe-shutdown in the event of a total loss of condensate and feedwater flow.
Therefore, this change does not increase the probability or consequences of analyzed accidents, nor introduce a different type of accident er equipment malfunction than already evaluated in the FSAR.
Thus, no unreviewed safety question exists.
REFERENCE:
Figure 10.1.0-3 l
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CHANGE TO FACILITY AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR TITLE:
PCR-001777, Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 1A-SA & IB-SB Lube Oil Sampling FUNCTIONAL
SUMMARY
- This plant modification installs lube oil sample lines in the engine driven tube oil pump discharge piping between the pump and the lube oil filter for the 1A-SA and 1B-SB EDG's.
The EDG Maintenance and Surveillance Matrix requires periodic lube oil samples for each EDG be taken upstream of the luce cil filter.
Section 9.5.7.4 of 'he FSAR also commits to periodic sampling of the EDG lube oil.
The new sample lines will provide a convenient sample point to take the required samples.
Each new sample line installed per this modification basically consists of two valves with a short run of tubing between the valves.
One valve is located just downstream of the lube oil discharge piping tap and the other valve is located near the end of the tubing run (i.e. at the sample line discharge) to allow convenient shut-off and control of the lube oil when a sample is being taken.
The valve nearest the discharge piping tap will be normally open, the valve at the sample line discharge will remain normally closed, and a tubing esp will normally be installed on the open end of the tubing.
SAFETY
SUMMARY
This modification does not change the way the EDG's or any of its supporting systems function.
The modification does not impact the reliability or availability of the EDG's or their supporting systems.
The components used for the sample lines are stainless steel.
This is compatible and consistent with the remainder of the EDG lube oil system.
If a sample line failure were to occur and lead to the failure of its associated EDG, the other EDG would still be available to provide emergency power for safely shutting down the plant and maintaining it in a safe condition during an accident if required.
This change does not increase the probability or consequences of analyzed accidents, nor introduce a different type of accident or equipment malfunction than already evaluated in the FSAR.
Thus, no unreviewed safety question exists.
REFERENCE:
Figure 9.5.7-1 MEM/HO-8800240/Page 4/0S1
CHANGE TO FACILITY AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR TITLE:
PCR-002171, Main Feedwater Pump Total Developed Head (7DH)
Reduction.
PCR-002173, Heater Drain Pump Impeller Removal.
FUNCTIONAL SUMMAP.Y r These plant modifications to the Main Feedwater and Heater Drain Systems result in a reduction of pressure generated by the Main feedwater pumps (MPPs) by approximately 15%.
This was accomplished by removing one-impeller stage from each of the two heater drain pumps (HDPs) and trimming the impeller on each of the two MFPs.
Prior to these modifications, the secondary side of the plant had been subject to system instability in the form of pressure and flow esci11ations.
The cause of these instabilities in most cases was unstable control valve
. operation due to excessive pressure drop across the feedwater regulating valves and the HDP level control valves.
The excessive pressure drop across these valves indicated more pressure existed in the feedwater and heater drain systems than necessary for satisfactory operation.
SAFETY
SUMMARY
The modifications to the MFPs and HDPs will result in fewer trips of these systems and of the plant because the control valves in the systems will not be operating at pressure drops greater than design valves.
The reduction in secondary side trips also means a reduction in challenges to the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System. The reduction in challenges to AFW, one of the mitigating systems, results in a aet increase in plant safety.
The possibility of mechanical failure of the MDPs and HDPs has not been increased by these modifications.
This change does not increase the probability or consequences of analyzed accidents, nor introduce a different type of accident or equipment malfunction than already evaluated in the FSAR.
Thus, no unreviewed safety question exists.
REFERENCE:
Tables 10.4.7-1 and 10.4.7-4 i
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NEN/HO-8800240/Page S/OS1 l
CHANCE TO FACILITY AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR TITLE:
PCR-001389, Service Water Supply to Radiation Monitor REM 3542 Cooler.
FUNCTIONAL
SUMMARY
- This plant modification provides non-safety service water at a 25 gpm rate to radiation monitor REM 3542 and then returns to the non-safety service water portion of the system.
The original installation of REM 3542 was continuously inoperable due to detector overheating.
The detector was supplied with a heat exchanger but was not anticipated to need source cooling.
The failure of REM 3542 resulted in the loss of enntrol room indication of the condition of Secondary Waste Sample Tank discharges.
The addition of service water cooling to REM 3542 will correct the deficiency.
SAFETY
SUMMARY
The addition of service water cooling will improve REM 3542 operability and reliability.
The additional load on the service water system has been factored into the overall system demand. The net affect was that the previously evaluated demand allowance of service water for radiation monitor cooling had not been surpassed by this modification.
Furthermore, the portion of the service water system affected by this modification is non-seismic Class I, non-safety related and is not considered available during accident and emergency condit. ions.
This change does not increase the probability or consequences of analyzed accidents, nor introduce a different type of accident or equipment malfinction than already evaluated in the FSAR.
Thus, no unreviewed safety question exists.
REFERENCE:
Section 9.2.1 l
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MEM/HO-8800240/Page 6/0S1
CHANCE TO FACILITY AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR TITLE:
PCR-001184, Deletion of Seal Water Piping to Essential Services Chilled Water System (ESCWS) Condenser Recirculating Pumps lA-SA and IB-SB.
FUNCTIONAL
SUMMARY
This plant modification deletes the seal water piping to the ESCWS condenser recirculating (P-7) pumps lA-SA and IB-SB.
The P-7 pumps function to maintain the temperature of the inlet water to the ESCWS condenser above 65'F by recirculation of the heated discharge water.
The seals used on the P-7 pumps are mechanical type which do not require seal water.
Plugs of the same material properties as the original system material have been installed in place of the seal water piping.
SAFETY
SUMMARY
An engineering evaluation was performed which demonstrated that ur. der maximum operating conditions, degradation of the P-7 pumps seals would not occur as a result of removing the seal water from the seals.
The maximum design temperature of the systems process fluid is 140*F.
The probability of a malfunction will not be increased since the mechanical seals are designed to function without seal water under the operating conditions of the P-7 pumps (< 160* F).
This change does not increase the probability or consequences of analyzed accidents, nor introduce a different type of accident or equipment mal functior. than already evaluated in the FSAR.
Thus no unreviewed safety question exists.
REFERENCE:
Figure 9.2.8-03 MEM/HO-8800240/Page 7/OSI
CHANCE TO FACILITY AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR TITLE:
PCR-000960, Essential Services Chilled Water System (ESCWS)
Condenser Side Changes.
FUNCTIONAL
SUMMARY
This plant modification relocates service water modulating valves (33W-B300 SA-1 and 33W-B303 SB-1) from the service water inlet side of the ESCWS condenser to the discharge side of the condenser on both "A" and "B" trains.
This modification also removed the SI signal from valves 3SW-B300 SA-1 and 3SW-B303 SB-1.
The previous design allowed an SI signal to remove AC power causing the valves to fail open allowing no modulating capability.
Removal of the SI signal allows the Class IE circuit to throttle service water as needed during an SI.
PCR-00960 also added local control switches for the ESCWS condenser recirculating (P-7) pumps.
The controls for P-7 pumps were modified to allow manual operation of the pumps from the local panels and to automatically start on low flow through the condensers.
Setpoint changes for condensing water low flow, leak detection, and condenser head pressure alarms were made also.
SAFETY
SUMMARY
- The subject modifications will enhence the reliability of the equipmenc by maintaining the system in a normal operating condition.
The relocation of valves 3SW-B300 SA-1 and 3SW-B303 SB-1 enhance chiller perfora.ance by increasing absolute pressure at the P-7 pump suction and dischtrge. reducing the possibility of cavitation at the pumps suction.
Scevice water flow through the condenser can still be maintained with the velve relocation.
The deletion of the SI signal from valve 3SW-B300 SA-1 and 3SW-B303 SB-1 signal.
This will re.M r s in the valves continuing to modulate post SI a11cv continued balance of heat transfer from plant HVAC loads on chiller to service water.
This results in an enhanced and stabilized heat transfer and chiller performance especially during winter operating conditions when reservoir temperature is low.
The control switches added to the chiller control panels are Clacs IE qualified.
The panel modifications were found acceptable for seismic and EQ concerns.
Failure of the additional switch is covered by the single failure criteria / design using the redundant train of equipment. These switch additions enable periodic testing. Set point changes were made to improve the operability of the system and eliminate meaningless alarms.
This change does not increase the probability or consequences of analyzed accidents, nor introduce a different type of accident or equipment l
l malfunction than already evaluated in the F3AR.
Thus, no unreviewed i,afety question exists.
REFERENCE:
Figures 7.3.1-16, 9.2.8-03 l
MEM/HO-8800240/Page 8/OSI
CHANGE TO FACILITY AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR TITLE:
PCR-002397, Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Target Rock Vent Block Valves 4
FUNCTIONAL
SUMMARY
This plant modification to the RCS Head Venting System Changes the orientation of the secondary isolation block valves.
Block valves 1RC-904 and IRC-905 have been rotated about their axis to a position 70 degrees below horizontal.
Valve IRC-904 provides a RCS vent path to containment atmosphere and IRC-905 provides a RCS vent path to the Pressurizer Relief Tank (PRT).
Also included as part of this mod is the addition of a check valve in the line between valve IRC-905 and the PRT.
As previously oriented, valves 1RC-904 and IRC-905 were subject to spurious openings due to pressure transients induced when upstream valves were cycled open for testing purposes.
As part of the corrective action to this matter, the valve manufacturer (Target Rock) recommended that valves 1RC-904 and IRC-905 be inverted such that the disc cavity would remain full of fluid at all times.
In addition, these valves were subject to spuriously open when subjected to small back pressures, such as exists when the RCS is depressurized and the PRT nitrogen pressure is present. The addition of a check valve installed between valve IRC-905 and the PRT will prevent back flow from the PRT under conditions when the RCS is depressurized and the PRT has a slight pressure.
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l SAFETY
SUMMARY
The purpose of this modification was to rectify the problem j
of spurious valve actuations.
The valve manufacturer has seen this problem eliminated after these changes at other plants.
These changes decrease the l
possibility for spurious actuation and in fact increase th.e safety margin of t
the system.
No increase in the possibility of a pipe' break due to the modifications exist.
Failure of the valves due to the new orientation is reduced also in that, l
Target-Rock qualified the equipment in the most limiting orientation which was l
vertical.
Having the operator inverted in fact cools the coil better and l
lengthens the electrical component lifetime.
l the addition of the check valve tu the piping downstream of valve IRC-905 is ithin the non-ASME portion of the vent system.
This valve will prevent flow from the PRT back through 1RC-905 during testing.
Since the PRT pressure varies this check valve should have been installed under the original design.
It's purpose is limited to preventing backflow during RCS fill and testing since all accident scenario PRT pressures are below reactor pressures.
Overall the valve's impact to the vent system is minimal because it cannot restrict flow to a point less than pressure boundary nozzles and even in the event it sticks closed it has no impact on the redundant vent path.
Since a i
vent path is always maintained the probability of failure of the whole vent system remains the same.
This change does not increase the probability or consequences of analyzed I
MEM/HO-8800240/Page 9/0S1
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accidents, nor introduce a'different-type of accident or equipment malfunction than ' aiready evaluated in the FSAR.
Thus, no unreviewed safety question
= exists.
FSAR REFERENCE - Figure 5.4.12-1 and 5.1.2.02 f
f i
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- MEM/HO-8800240/Page 10/0S1
CHANGE TO FACILITY AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR TITLE:
PCR-000943, Service Air In Hot Machine Shop FUNCTIONAL
SUMMARY
This plant modification completes the design of the service air piping into the hot machine shop located on the 236 elevation of the Reactor Auxiliary Building.
This change also provides valve tag numbers for service air valves previously designed and installed in the hot shop area.
SAFETY
SUMMARY
The piping and valve added to the service air system are of the same material and rating of the original system therefore, material compatibility is maintained.
The valve is a ball type which operates manually, full on/off. The probability of mechanical failure of this valve is negligible with the simplicity of the valve design and operation. The Service Air System is a part of the Compressed Air System which is not required for the initiation of any engineered safety feature systems, safe shutdown system or any other safety related system per FSAR Paragraph 9.3.1.3.
This change does not increase the probability or consequences of analyzed accidents, nor introduce a different type of accident or equipment malfunction than already evaluated in the FSAR.
Thus, no unreviewed safety question exists.
REFERENCE:
Figure 9.3.1-2 l
MEM/H0-8800240/Page 11/OSI l
CHANGE TO FACILITY AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR TITLE:
PCR-001062, Delete Cain Control / Output for Noble Gas Radiation Monitors.
FUNCTIONAL
SUMMARY
This plant modification replaced the 2X2 inch NaI Noble gas detectors in radiation monitors REM-1LT-3502A-SA and REM-lLT-3502B with lb X 1 inch NaI detectors and deletes the gain control output function. This charge also results itg a decrease in typical sensitivity of t gas cpm /uci/cc to a sensitivity of 2.18 X 10pe noble cpm /uci/cc.
detectors from 4.6 X 10 As previously designed, the automatic gain control option (CCO) electronics associated with the noble gas channel had been exceedingly difficult to properly calibrate and resulted in unstable and inaccurate noble gas channel operation. The inaccuracy was due to changes in monitor sensitivity resulting from PM tube high voltage adjustments made by the gain control system.
SAFETY
SUMMARY
- The changes made by this mod have been tried and demonstrated to work satisfactorily in another monitor.
The change makes the affected monitors easier to maintain and restores monitor accuracy.
This change increases the nonitor stability and will also simplify the calibration procedure which was previously very complex due to the gain control function.
This change does not increase the probability or consequences of analyzed accidents, nor introduce a different type of accident or equipment malfunction than already evaluated in the FSAR.
Thus, no unreviewed safety question exists.
REFERENCE:
Section 11.5.2 and 12.3 i
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CHANGE TO FACILITY AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR TITLE:
PCR-002188, Snubber Reduction FUNCTIONAL
SUMMARY
This plant modification deletes mechanical snubber No. SI-H-1288 from the valve chamber at elevation 190' in the Reactor Auxiliary Building.
The snubber is being removed to eliminate maintenance since it is located in a non-accessible high radiation area.
SAFETY
SUMMARY
This modification does not affect the function or operation of safety injection, residual heat removal, or containment spray systems.
Stress analysis and structural acceptability are acceptable per design backup.
This change does not increase the probability or consequences of analyzed accidents, nor introduce a different type of accident or equipment malfunction than already evaluated in the FSAR.
Thus, no unreviewed safety question exists.
REFERENCE:
Table 3.9.3-16 4
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MEM/HO-8800240/Page 13/OS1 L
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- CHANCE TO PROCEDURE AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR~
TITLE:
PLP-106 Rev.0 Advance Change 5,
Technical Specification Equipment 1
List Program.
FUNCTIONAL
SUMMARY
This - procedure contains lists of equipment. previously maintained in the Technical Specifications.
These lists are duplicated in FSAR Chapter 16.3.
This change adds an additional group of valves which are to be administrative 1y-controlled to ensure they either remain able to close automatically or are closed.
The valves comprising this list are safety-related isolation valves in the I
secondary system, (steam generators,- feedwater and main steam), which are redundant in function to the containment irolation. valves, specified in FSAR Table 16.3-5.
Since the secondary system is classified as a closed system for containment isolation purposes, these additional valves are not containment isolation valves and are not, therefore, governed by specification 3.6.3 of Technical Specifications.. To ensure these valves are maintained. operable, they have been added to the procedure, and specific requirements for actions to be taken when they are not operable have been included.
SAFETY
SUMMARY
The change provides administrative control of safety-related valves for which the Technical Specifications do not provide explicit requirements.
These valves are unrelated to the probability of accidents or equipment malfunctions. This change administrative 1y ensures these valves are available to isolate the secondary system boundary and ensure its capability to mitigate the consequences of accidents.
No new components are being added to the plant, nor is the operation of the plant being altered, so the change does not introduce a different type of accident or equipment malfunction than already evaluated in the FSAR.
No unreviewed safety question exists.
REFERENCE:
Table 16.3-8 l
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t MEM/HO-8800240/Page 14/OS1
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