ML20148Q455
| ML20148Q455 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 06/30/1997 |
| From: | NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20148Q453 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9707070097 | |
| Download: ML20148Q455 (21) | |
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i April 10, 1997 e
PL8MI SYSTEMS BASES l
3/4.7.1.5 MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVES fcontinued)
EQ This LCO requires that four MSIVs in the steam lines be OPERABLE. The MSIVs are considered OPERABLE when the isolation times are within limits, and they close on an isolation actuation signal.
This LCO provides assurance that the MSIVs will' perform their design safety function to mitigate the consequences of accidents that could result in i
offsite exposures comparable to the 10CFR100 limits or the NRC Staff approved licensing basis.
APPLICABILITY o,44 1 The MSIVs must be OPERABLE in MODE 1 and in MODES 2, 3, except when closed and deactinted when there is significant mass and energy in the RCS and stea generators-When the MSIVs are closed, they are already performing the safet function.
3._mts/B orenergyis,!ow,theMS[smustbe In M E 4, e n thoug steam gener ope able in ODE 4eceptwhencisedanddeactpated.
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In MODE S or 6, the steam generators do not contain much energy because their temperature is below the boiling point of water; therefore, the MSIVs are not required for isolation of potential high energy secondary system pipe breaks j
in these MODES.
ACTIONS MODE 1 l
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With one MSIV inoperable in MODE I, action must be taken to restore OPERABLE status within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />. Some repairs to the MSIV can be made with the unit hot. The 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> Completion Time is reasonable, considering the low probability of an accident occurring during this time period that would L
require a closure of the MSIVs.
The 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> Completion Time is greater than that normally allowed for containment isolation valves because the MSIVs are valves that isolate a closed system penetrating containment. These valves differ from other containment isolation valves in that the closed system provides a passive barrier for containment isolation.
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MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 B 3/4 7-5 Amendment No. 117, 136 of.oo 9707070097 970630 PDR ADOCK 05000423 l
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@SK6. b The MSIVs must be OPERABLE in MODE 4 except when closed and deactivated. In i-MODE 4 with Reactor Coolant System temperature greater than or equal to 320 F, the j
L MSIVs shall close within 120 seconds to ensure that the accident anelysis assumptions are met.. A' temperature greater than or equal to 320 F has been specified because the steam energy is sufficient to provide the motive force to operate the MSIVs.
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PLANT SYSTEMS April 10, 1997
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BASES 3
4 3/4.7.1.5 MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVES (continued) l If the MSIV cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />, the plant i
must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply.
To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in MODE 2 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. The Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 2 and to l
close the MSIVs in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
3-MODES 2. 3. and 4 i
Since the MSIVs are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 2, 3, and 4, the i
inoperable MSIVs may either be restored to OPERABLE status or closed. When closed, the MSIVs are already in the position required by the assumptions in i
the safety analysis.
4 The 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> Completion Time is consistent with that allowed in Mode 1.
l For inoperable MSIVs that cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the specified Completion Time, but are closed, the inoperable MSIVs must be i
verified on a periodic basis to be closed. This is necessary to ensure that i
the assumptions in the safety analysis remain valid. The 7 day verification 3
time is reasonablerbased on engineering judgment, in view of MSIV status indications available in the control room, and other administrative controls, j
to ensure that these valves are in the closed position.
If the MSIVs cannot be restored to OPERABLE status or are not closed within J
the associated Completion Time, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply.
To achieve this status, the unit must be placed at least i
in MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, and in MODE 5 within the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
The allowe i
Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from MODE 2 conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems. The Action Statement is modified by a note j
indicating that separate condition entry is allowed for each MSIV.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
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10 seconds on an actual or simulated actuation signal in MODES 1, 2, and 3 when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.
A simulated signal is defined as any of the following engineered safety features actuation system instrumentation functional units per Technical Specification Table 4.3-2:
4.a.1) manual initiation, individual, 4.a.2) manual initiation, system, 4.c.
containment pressure high-2, 4.d. steam line pressure low, and 4.e. steam line pressure - negative rate high. The MSIV closure time is assumed in the accident analyses. This surveillance is normally performed upon returning the i
plant to o>eration following a refueling outage. The test is conducted in MODE 3 wit t the plant at suitable (appropriate) conditions (e.g., pressure and temperature). This surveillance requirement is modified by an exception which allows a delay of testing until MODE 3, to establish conditions consistent with those under which the acceptance criterion was generated. This exception 4
MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 8 3/4 7-6 Amendment No. JJ7.136 m
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PLANT SYSTEMS April 10, 1997 g
BASES i
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i SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS (continued) j o Specification 4.0.4 would also allow the MSIVs to be cycled to demonstrate post repair OPERABILITY. Action requirements shall not apply until i
OPERABILITY has been verified.
In addition, if the closure time of the MSIV is less than 10 seconds when verified in accordance with Specification 4.7.1.5.2, the OPERABILITY demonstration of the MSIV in MODES 1, 2, or 3 is
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not required per Specification 4.7.1.5.1.
2 4.7.1.5.2 This surveillance verifies that MSIV closure time is less than i
j 120 seconds on an actual or simulated actuation' signal in MODE 4 when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.
A simulated signal is defined as any of the
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following engineered safety features actuation system instrumentation functional units per Technical Specification Table 4.3-2:
4.a.1) manual i
initiation, individual, 4.a.2) manual initiation, system, 4.c. containment pressure high-2, 4.d. steam line pressure low, and 4.e. steam line pressure -
negative rate high. This MSIV closure time is assumed in the analyses. This surveillance is normally performed upon returning the plant to operation
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following a refueling outage. The test is conducted in MODE 4 with the plant
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at suitable (appropriate) conditions (e.g., pressure and temperature). This i
surveillance requirement is modified by an exception which allows a delay of testing until MODE 4, to establish conditions consistent with those under l
which the acceptance criterion was generated. This exception to Specification i
4.0.4 would also allow the MSIVs to be cycled to demonstrate post repair j
OPERABILITY. Action requirements shall not apply until OPERABILITY has been j
g verified.
3/4.7.2 STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITATION l
The limitation on steam generator pressure and temperature ensures that the pressure-induced stresses in the steam generators do not exceed the maximum allowable fracture toughness stress limits. The limitations of 70*F and j
200 psig are. based on a steam generator RTuor of 60*F and are sufficient to prevent brittle fracture.
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i 3/4.7.3 REACTOR PLANT COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the Reactor Plant Component Cooling Water System ensur i
that sufficient cooling capacity is available for continued operation of safet -
related equipment during normal and accident conditions.
The redundant coolin capacity of this system, assuming a single failure, is consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.
f 3/4.7.4 SERVICE WATER SYSTEM i
The OPERABILITY of the Service Water System ensures that sufficient i-cooling capacity is available for continued operation of safety-related equip-ment dering normal and accident conditions. The redundant cooling capacity of k
this system, assuming a single failure, is consistent with the assumptions I
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used in the safety analyses.
MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 8 3/4 7-7 Amendment No. 136 0509 D6Y3
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'4.7.1.5.1 This surveillance performs a partial stroke test in MODES 1 or 2. Tbc partial stroke test shows that the MSIV's actuation solenoid valves operate in the proper amount of time.
In addition, the part stroke test shows that the main valve is free to move. *Ihis provides reasonable assurance that the MSIV will operate as assumed in the accident analysis. " Ibis surveillance is normally performed during full power operation with the plant at suitable (appropriate) conditions (e.g. pressure and temperature). In addition, if the closure time of the 4
MSIV is less than 10 seconds when veri 6ed in awd.we with Specification 4.7.1.5.2, the i
OPERABILITY i===*ation of the MSIV in MODES 1 or 2 is not required per Speci6 cation 4.7.1.5.1.
4.7.1.5.2
.This surveillance demonstrates that MSIV closure time is less than 10 weana n o
an actual or simulated actuation signal in MODE 3, when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.
j A simulated signal is defined as any of the followmg engmeering safety features actuation system l
instrumentation fWaa=1 units per Technical Specifications Table 4.3-2: 4.a.1) manual initiatiaa.
individual, 4.a.2) manual initiation, system, 4.c. containment pressure high-2, 4.d. steam line
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pressure low, or 4.c. steam line pressure - negative rate high. "Ihe MSIV closure time is assumed in the accident analyses. This surveillance is normally performed upon retuming the plant to operation following a refueling outage. The test is normally conducted in MODES 3 or 4 with the l
plant at suitable (appropriate) conditions (e.g. pressure and temperature). This surveillance i
requirement is modi 6ed by an exception which allows a delay of testing until the proper operatmg
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conditions are met, or until it is desired to operate the valves. 'Ihis exception to Speci6 cation 4.0.4 would also allow the MSIVs to be cycled to demonstrate post repair OPERABIIIIY. In addition, 4
i if the closure time of the MSIV is less than 10 seconds wtan verified in accordance with Specification 4.7.1.5.2, the OPERABILITY demonstration of the MSIV in MODES 1 or 2 is not 2
required per Specification 4.7.1.5.1.
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4.7.1.5.3-This surveillance verifies that MSIV closure time is less than 120 seconds on an actual or simulated actuation signal in MODE 4, with the RCS temperature greater than or equal to 320 degrees Fahrenheit, when tested pursuant to Specifiution 4.0.5. The MSIVs are required to 4
j be closed and deactivated with the RCS less than 320 degrees Fahrenheit in MODE 4. A simulated signal is defined as any of the following engineering safety features actuation system j
instrumentation functional units per Technical Specifications Table 4.3 2: 4.a.1) manual initiation, i
individual, 4.a.2) manual initiation, system, 4.c. containment pressure high-2, 4.d. steam line pressure low, or 4.e. steam line pressure - negative rate high. The MSIV closure time is assumed in the accident analyses.
This surveillance only applies in MODE 4, at an RCS temperature greater than or equal to 320 degrees Fahrenheit, because the MSIVs are steam operated and a mmimum steam pressure is j
required to operate the valve. 'Ihe test is normally conducted in MODE 4 with the plant at suitable (appropriate) conditions (e.g. pressure and temperature). If the valves are not to be opened or amergized in MODE 4 the surveillance is not performed. This surveillance requirement is modified by an exception which allows a delay of testing until the proper operating conditions are met, or until it is desired to operate tiie valves. This exception to Specification 4.0.4 would also allow the MSIVs to be cycled to demonstrate post repair OPERABILTIY. In addition, if the closure time of
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the MSIV is less than 10 seconds when veri 6ed in accordance with Specification 4.7.1.5.3, the j
OPERABILi!Y &==+ tion of the MSIV in MODES 1,2, or 3 is not required per Speci6 cation
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4.7.1.5.1 and 4.7.1.5.2.
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I April 10, 1997
.s PLANT SYSTEMS 5'
MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVES LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.1.5 Each main steam line isolation valve (MSIV) shall be OPERABLE.
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APPLICABILITY:
MODE 1 MODES 2, 3, and V, except when MSI eee closed and deactivated.
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t MODE 1:
With one MSIV inoperable, POWER OPERATION may continue provided the l
inoperable valve is restored to OPERABLE status within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />; otherwise be in MODE 2 within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> MODES 2, 3, and 4:
s With one or more HSIVs inoperable, subsequent operation in MODE 2, or 3 or 4 may proceed provided the inoperable isolation valve (s) are closed b
8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> and verified closed once per 7 days. Otherwise, be in HOT STANDB i
within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 i
hours. Separate condition entry is allowed for each MSIV.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.1.5.1 Each MSIV within 10 seconds on an actual or simulated act ation signal in MODES 1, 2, and 3 when tested pursua t to Specification 4.0 The provisions of S ification j
4.0.4 are not ap cable for entry into E 3.
I 4.7.1.5.2 ch MSIV shall be dem trated OPERABLE by ifying full closure within I seconds on an actual r simulated actuati signal in MODE 4 when tested ursuant to Specificat n 4.0.5.
The provisi ns of Specification 4.0.4 are n t applicable for entry into MODE 4.
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%*If the el e time of the IV is less than 10>econds when ver fied in l
accordan ith Specificati 4.7.1.5.2,thenthfeperability dem ration of
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the MSI in MODES 1, 2, o 3 is not required per Specification
.7.1.5.1.
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MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 3/4 7-9 Amendment No. pp, pp, Jpf, 136 5%
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I ZusE 6 i4 4.7.1.5.1 In MODES I and 2, each MSIV shall be demonstrated OPERABLE, pursuant to Specification 4.0.5, by verifying a partial stroke in MODES 1 or 2, or a full closure per Surveillance l
4.7.1.5.2.
l 4.7.1.5.2 In MODE 3, each MSIV shall be demonstrated OPERABLE, pursuant to Specification 4.0.5, by verifying full closure within 10 seconds on an actual or simulated actuation signal when full l
stroke tested in MODES 3 or 4. The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 3.
4.7.1.5.3 In MODE 4 with the RCS temperature greater than or equal to 320 degrees Fahrenheit *,
i cach MSIV shall be demonstrated OPERABLE, pursuant to Specification 4.0.5, by verifying full closure within 120 seconds on an actual or simulated actuation signal when full stroke tested in l
MODE 4. The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 4.
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l Wb In MODE 4, the MSIVs are required to be closed and deactivated with RCS temperature less than 320 degrees Fahrenheit.
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l Docket No. 50-423 B16570 l
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Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit No. 3 Proposed Revision to Technical Specification l
Main Steam Isolation Valve Surveillances l
(PTSCR 3-25-97)
Retvoed Paaes i
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June 1997 f
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U.S. Nuclear R::gulttory Commission l
B16570\\ Attachment 3\\Page 1 J
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RETYPE OF PROPOSED REVISION l
l Refer to the attached retype of the proposed revision to the Technical Specifications.
l The attached retype reflects the currently issued version of the Technical Specifications. Pending Technical Specification revisions or Technical Specification revisions issued subsequent to this submittal are not reflected in the enclosed retype.
The enclosed retype should be checked for continuity with Technical Specifications prior to issuance.
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2 PLANT SYSTEMS BASES-i 3/4.7.1.5 HAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVES (continued)
LCD This LCO requires that four MSIVs in the steam lines be OPERABLE. The MSIVs are considered OPERABLE when the isolation times are within limits, and they close on an. isolation actuation signal.
This LC0 provides assurance that the MSIVs will perform their design safety function to mitigate'the consequences of accidents that could result in offsite exposures comparable to the 10CFR100 limits or the NRC Staff approved licensing basis.
j APPLICABILITY The MSIVs must be OPERABLE in MODE I and in MODES 2, 3, and 4 except when closed l J
and deactivated when there is significant mass and energy in the RCS and steam generators. When the MSIVs are closed, they are already performing the safety function.
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The MSIVs must be OPERABLE in MODE 4 except when closed and deactivated.
In MODE 4 with Reactor Coolant System temperature greater than or equal to 320*F, the MSIVs shall close within 120 seconds to ensure that the accident analysis assumptions are met.
A temperature greater than or equal to 320*F has been specified because the steam energy is sufficient to provide the motive force to operate the MSIVs.
In MODE 5 or 6, the steam generators do not contain much energy because their temperature is below the boiling point of water; therefore, the MSIVs are not required for isolation of potential high energy secondary system pipe breaks in these MODES.
ACTIONS MODE 1 With one MSIV inoperable in MODE 1, action must be taken to restore OPERABLE status within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />. Some repairs to the MSIV can be made with the unit hot.
The 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> Completion Time is reasonable, considering the low probability of an accident occurring during this time period that would require a closure of the MSIVs.
The 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> Completion Time is greater than that normally allowed for containment isolation valves because the KSIVs are valves - that isolate a closed system penetrating containment. These vulves differ from other containment isolation valves in that the closed system provides a passive barrier for containment isolation.
MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 B 3/4 7-5 Amendment No. JJJ, JJJ, 0643 l
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PLANT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.7.1.5 MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVES (continued)
If the MSIV cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />, the plant must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply.
To achieve this status, the Unit must be placed in MODE 2 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. The Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 2 and to close the MSIVs in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
MODES 2. 3. and 4 j
l Since the MSIVs are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 2, 3, and 4, the inoperable MSIVs may either be restored to OPERABLE status or closed. When closed, the MSIVs are already in the position required by the assumptions in the safety analysis.
i The 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> Completion Time is consistent with that allowed in MODE 1.
For inoperable MSIVs that cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the specified Completion Time, but are closed, the inoperable MSIVs must be verified on a periodic basis to be closed. This is necessary to ensure that the assumptions in the safety analysis remain valid. The 7 day verification i
time is reasonable, based on engineering judgment, in view of MSIV status indications available in the control room, and other administrative controls, to ensure that these valves are in the closed position.-
If the MSIVs cannot be restored to OPERABLE status or are not closed within l
the associated Completion Time, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the j
LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed at least 1
in MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, and in MODE 5 within the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from MODE 2 conditions in an orderly manner and l
without challenging unit systems. The Action Statement is modified by a note i
j indicating that separate condition entry is allowed for each MSIV.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.1.5.1 This surveillance performs a partial stroke test in MODES 1 or 2.
The partial stroke test shows that the MSIV's actuation solenoid valves operate in the proper amount of time.
In addition, the part stroke test shows that the main valve is free to move. This provides reasonable assurance that the MSIV will operate as assumed in the accident analysis. This surveillance is normally performed during full power operation with the plant at suitable (appropriate) conditions (e.g., pressure and temperature).
In addition, if the closure time of the MSIV is less than 10 seconds when verified in i
accordance with Specification 4.7.1.5.2, the OPERABILITY demonstration of the l
MSIV in MODES 1 or 2 is not required per Specification 4.7-.1.5.1.
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MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 B 3/4 7-6 Amendment No. /#, JM,
0643
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PLANT SYSTEMS j
BASES I
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS fcontinued) 4.7.1.5.2 This surveillance demonstrates that MSIV closure time is less than i
10 seconds on an actual or simulated actuation signal in MODE 3, when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.
A simulated signal is defined as any'of the following engineering safety features actuation system instrumentation
. functional units per Technical Specifications Table 4.3-2: 4.a.1) manual initiation, individual, 4.a.2) manual initiation system, 4.c. containment pressure high-2, 4.d. steam line pressure low, or 4.e. steam line pressure -
negative rate high. The MSIV closure time is assumed in the accident analyses. This surveillance is normally performed upon returning the plant to operation following a refueling outage. The test is normally conducted in MODES 3 or 4 with the plant at suitable (appropriate) conditions (e.g.,
i pressure and temperature). This surveillance requirement is modified by an i
exception which alicus a delay of testing until the proper operating conditions.are met, or until it is desired to operate the valves. This exception to Specification 4.0.4 would al:o allow the MSIVs to be cycled to 7
demonstrate post repair OPERABILITY.
In addition, if the closure time of the MSIV is less than 10 seconds when verified in accordance with Specification 4.7.1.5.2, the OPERABILITY demonstration of the MSIV in MODES 1 or 2 is not required per Specification 4.7.1.5.1.
4.7.1.5.3 This surveillance verifies that MSIV closure time is less than 120 seconds on an actual or simulated actuation signal in MODE 4, with the RCS temperature greater than or equal to 320 degrees Fahrenheit, when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.
The MSIVs are required to be closed and deactivated with the RCS less than 320 degrees Fahrenheit in MODE 4.
A simulated signal is defined as any of the following engineering safety features actuation system instrumentation functional units per Technical Specifications Table 3.4-2: 4.a.1) manual initiation, individual, 4.a.2) manual initiation, system 4.c. containment pressure high-2, 4.d steam line pressure low, or 4.e. steam line pressure - negative rate high. The MSIV closure time is assumed in the accident. analyses.
This surveillance only applies in MODE 4, at an RCS temperature greater than or equal to 320 degrees Fahrenheit, because the MSIVs are steam operated and a minimum steam pressure is required to operate the valve. The test is normally conducted in MODE 4 with the plant at suitable (appropriate) conditions (e.g., pressure and temperature).
If the valves are not to be opened or energized in MODE 4, the surveillance is not performed. This surveillance requirement is modified by an aception which allows a delay of testing until the proper operating conditions. are met, or until it is desired to operate the valves. This exception to Specification 4.0.4 would also allow the MSIVs to l
be cycled to demonstrate post repair OPERABILITY.
In addition, if the closure time of the MSIV is less than 10 seconds when verified in accordance with Specification 4.7.1.5.3, the OPERABILITY demonstration of the MSIV in MODES 1, 2, or 3 is not required per Specification 4.7.1.5.1 and 4.7.1.5.2.
MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 8 3/4 7-6a Amendment No. J#,
0543
1 PLANT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.7.2 STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITATION The limitation on steam generator pressure and temperature ensures that i
the pressure-induced stresses in the steam generators do not exceed the maximum allowable fracture toughness stress limits. The limitations of 70*F and 200 psig are based on a steam generator RTwor of 60*F and are sufficient to prevent brittle fracture.
3/4.7.3 REACTOR PLANT COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the Reactor Plant Component Cooling Water System ensures that sufficient cooling capacity is available for continued operation of safety-related equipment during normal and accident conditions. The redundant cooling capacity of this system, assuming a single failure, is consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.
3/4.7.4 SERVICE WATER SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the Service Water System ensures that sufficient 1
cooling capacity is available for continued operation of safety-related equip-ment during normal and accident conditions. The redundant cooling capacity of this system, assuming a single failure, is consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.
l MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 B3/47-7 Amendment No. 177, 0643
J PLANT SYSTEMS MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVES LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.1.5 Each main steam line isolation valve (MSIV) shall be OPERABLE.
l APPLICABILITY:
MODE I r
MODES. 2, 3,
and 4*,
except when a MSIV is closed and l l
deactivated.
ACTION:
1 MODE 1:
With one MSIV inoperable, POWER OPERATION may continue provided the inoperable valve is restored to OPERABLE status within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />; otherwise be in MODE 2 within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> MODES 2, 3, and 4:
With one or more MSIVs inoperable, subsequent operation in MODE 2, or 3, i
or 4 may proceed provided the inoperable isolation valve (s) are closed within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> and verified closed once per 7 days. Otherwise,beinHOTl STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following i
30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
Separate conriition entry is allowed for each MSIV.
l SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.1.5.1 In MODES I and 2, each MSIV shall be demonstrated OPERABLE, pursuant to Specification 4.0.5, by verifying a partial stroke in MODES 1 or 2, or a full closure per Surveillance 4.7.1.5.2.
4.7.1.5.2 In MODE 3, each MSIV shall be demonstrated OPERABLE, pursuant to Specification 4.0.5, by verifying full closure within 10 seconds on an actual or simulated actuation signal when full stroke tested in MODES 3 or 4.
The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 3.
4.7.1.5.3 In MODE 4 with the RCS temperature greater than or equal to 320 degrees Fahrenheit *, each MSIV shall be demonstrated OPERABLE, pursuant to Specification 4.0.5, by verifying full closure within 120 seconds on an actual or simulated actuation signal when full stroke tested in MODE 4.
The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for ent-y into MODE 4.
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temperature less i.han 320 degrees Fahrenheit.
MILLSTONE - UNI'. '4 3/47-9 Amendment No. JJ, JJ, JJJ JJJ, osa
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Docket No. 50-423 l
816570
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.L Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit No. 3 i
Proposed Revision to Technical Specification Main Steam isolation Valve Surveillances e
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(PTSCR 3-25-97) i -
Backaround and Safety Assessment t
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June 1997
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U.S. Nucl:ar.R gulatory Commission B16570\\ Attachment 4\\Page 1 Backaround The Millstone Unit 3 Inservice Pump and Valve Test Program has received relief from the quarterly full stroke surveillance testing requirement. The accepted alternate testing method is to partially stroke test the MSIVs during power operation and full stroke test j
the valves during shutdowns pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.
Safety Assessment The MSIVs are equipped with provisions for inservice testing by partial stroking. The partial stroking is accomplished by opening a solenoid valve to adrnit steam pressure into the lower piston chamber. After a time delay the solenoid valve for the upper piston chamber opens. After 10 percent travel the position indicating device vents both piston chambers and the valve fully opens to the back seat due to pressure acting on i
the valve plug.
Currently, Technical Specifications Surveillance 4.7.1.5.1 requires " verifying full closure within 10 seconds... in MODES 1, 2, and 3 when testod pursuant to Specification 4.0.5."
The current surveillance requirement to full stroke test the MSIVs is not performed during power operation as the Millstone Unit 3 Inservice Pump and Valve Test Program pursuant to Specification 4.0.5, has received relief from the quarterly full stroke surveillance testing requirement. The basis for the relief is that full stroking the MSIVs to the closed position during power operation would result in an unbalanced steam flow condition producing an abnormal power distribution in the reactor core, possibly causing a reactor trip. The accepted alternate testing method is to partially stroke test the MSIVs during power operation m full stroke test the valves during shutdowns.
The proposed changes to Technical Specifications Surveillances 4.7.1.5.1 and 4.7.1.5.2 are to clarify the testing of the MSIVs by rewording and separating the requirements into three surveillances. Surveillance 4.7.1.5.1 will identify a Mode 1 and 2 requirement to partial stroke test the MSIVs in Mode 1 and 2 unless a successful 10 second full stroke test was performed during the surveillance period. Surveillance 4.7.1.5.2 will identify a Mode 3 requirement to perform a 10 second full closure test of the MSIVs in Mode 3 or 4. Surveillance 4.7.1.5.3 will identify a Mode 4 requirement to perform a 120 second full closure test of the MSIVs in Mode 4 when the RCS
' temperature is greater than or equal to 320 degrees F. The 320 degree F restriction on testing the valves is consistent with recommendations from the valve manufacturer.
Additionally, a footnote is added to the LCO and the surveillance to identify that the MSIVs are required to be closed and deactivated when the RCS temperature is less than 320 degrees F. The footnote will eliminate the potential to declare the MSIVs operable in the upper range of Mode 4 and then allow the MSIVs to remain open during a cooldown into the lower range of Mode 4 where they may not be able to meet their
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U.S. Nucicar Rsgulatory Commission B16570\\ Attachment 4\\Page 2 required stroke time. The testing will be performed pursuant to Specification 4.0.5 and i
the provisions of Specification 4.0.4 will not be applicable for entry into Modes 3 and 4.
The other proposed changes to reword the Applicability and Action statements of Technical Specification 3.7.1.5 and Bases Section B3/4.7.1.5 are to clarify the testing of the MSIVs. These are considered administrative changes.
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Docket No. 50-423 B16570
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Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit No. 3 Proposed Revision to Technical Specification i
Main Steam isolation Valve Surveillances j-(PTSCR 3-25-97) 4 Sionificant Hazards Consideration and Environmental Considerations 3
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June 1997
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission B16570\\ Attachment 5\\Page 1 Sionificant Hazards Consideration l
l NNECO has reviewed the proposed revision in accordance with 10CFR50.92 and has concluded that the revision does not involve a significant hazards consideration (SHC).
The basis for this conclusion is that the three criteria of 10CFR50.92(c) are not p
satisfied. The proposed revision does not involve a SHC because the revision would not:
1.
Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequence of an accident j
previously evaluated.
I The proposed changes to Technical Specifications Surveillances 4.7.1.5.1 and j-4.7.1.5.2 are to clarify the testing of the MSIVs by rewording and separating the requirements into three surveillances. Currently, Technical Specifications i
Surveillance 4.7.1.5.1 requires " verifying full closure within 10 seconds... in MODES 1,2, and 3 when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5." The current surveillance requirement to full stroke test the MSIVs is not performed during power operation as the Millstone Unit 3 Inservice Pump and Valve Test Program i
pursuant to Specification 4.0.5, has received relief from the quarterly full stroke l
j surveillance testing requirement. The basis for the relief is that full stroking the l
MSIVs to the closed position during power operation would result in an l
unbalanced steam flow condition producing an abnormal power distribution in j
the reactor core, possibly causing a reactor trip. The MSIVs are equipped with provisions for inservice testing by partial stroking.
The partial stroking is accomplished by opening a solenoid valve to admit steam pressure into the lower piston chamber. After a time delay the solenoid valve for the upper piston chamber opens. After 10 percent travel the position indicating device vents both piston chambers and the valve fully opens to the back seat due to pressure i
acting on the valve plug. The accepted alternate testing method is to partially
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stroke test the MSIVs during power operation and full stroke test thi valves t
during shutdowns.
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The proposed changes to Technical Specifications Surveillance 4.7.1.5.2 will identify a Mode 3 requirement to perform a 10 second full closure test of the MSIVs in Mode 3 or 4. Surveillance 4.7.1.5.3 will identify a Mode 4 requirement to perform a 120 second full closure test of the MSIVs in Mode 4 when the RCS temperature is greater than or equal to 320 degrees F. The 320 degree F restriction on testing the valves is consistent with recommendations from the valve manufacturer. Additionally, a footnote is added to the LCO and the surveillance to identify that the MSIVs are required to be closed and deactivated when the RCS temperature is less than 320 degrees F.
The proposed changes are consistent with equipment design and the surveillance testing of the MSIVs provides the necessary assurance that the valves will function consistent with accident analyses.
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.s e e'a U.S. Nuclear R:gulatory Commission B16570\\ Attachment 5\\Page 2 The other proposed changes to reword the Applicability and Action statements of Technical Specification 3.7.1.5 and Bases Section B3/4.7.1.5 are considered
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- administrative changes.
Therefore, the proposed revision does not involve a significant increase in the prcbability or consequence of an accident previously evaluated.
2.
Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.
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The proposed changes to the surveillance testing of the MSIVs does not change the operation of the valves as assumed for accident analyses. The MSIVs are currently equipped with provisions for partial stroking.
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Therefore, the proposed revision does not create the possibility of a new or i
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.
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Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
t The proposed changes to Technical Specifications Surveillances 4.7.1.5.1 and 2
4.7.1.5.2 are to clarify the testing of the MSIVs by rewording and separating the t
requirements into three surveillances. Surveillance 4.7.1.5.1 will identify a Mode 1 and 2 requirement to partial stroke test the MSIVs in Mode 1 and 2 unless a l
successful 10 second full stroke test was performed during the surveillance period. Surveillance 4.7.1.5.2 will identify a Mode 3 requirement to perform a 10 second full closure test of the MSIVs in Mode 3 or 4. Surveillance 4.7.1.5.3 will identify a Mode 4 requirement to perform a 120 second full closure test of the MSIVs in Mode 4 when the RCS temperature is greater than or equal to 320 i
degrees F. The 320 degree F restriction on testing the valves is consistent with recommendations from the valve manufacturer. Additionally, a footnote is added i
to the LCO and the surveillance to identify that the MSIVs are required to be closed and deactivated when the RCS temperature is less than 320 degrees F.
l The footnote will eliminate the potential to declare the MSIVs operable in the upper range of Mode 4 and then allow the MSIVs to remain open during a cooldown into the lower range of Mode 4 where they may not be able to meet their required stroke time. The full closure test times are consistent with the
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current MSIV surveillances and the partial stroke testing is consistent with the Millstone Unit 3 Inservice Pump and Valve Test Program.
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The other proposed changes to reword the Applicability and Action statements of Technical Specification 3.7.1.5 and Bases Section B3/4.7.1.5 are considered 4
administrative changes.
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Of U.S. Nucitar R:gul: tory Commission B16570%ttachment 5\\Page 3 Therefore, the proposed redsion does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
In conclusion, based on the information provided, it is determined that the proposed revision does not involve an SHC.
Environmental Considerations i
NNECO has reviewed the proposed license amendment against the criteria of 10CFR51.22 for environmental considerations. The proposed revision does not involve an SHC, does not significantly increase the type and amounts of effluents that may be released offsite, nor significantly increase individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposures. Based on the foregoing, NNECO concludes that the proposed revision meets the criteria delineated in 10CFR51.22(c)(9) for categorical exclusion from the requirements of an environmental considerations.
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