ML20148P160

Advises of Provisions of 10CFR50,App R,That Are Applicable to Fire Protection Features of Facility.Fr Notice & Summary of Staff Requirements to Resolve Open Items Encl

ML20148P160
Person / Time
Site:	Maine Yankee
Issue date:	11/24/1980
From:	Eisenhut D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Maine Yankee
References
NUDOCS 8101130132
Download: ML20148P160 (4)

Text

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1. p Ne w lY 'h 8 5, . UNITED STATES

[? ej [{ NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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WASHINGTON. O C. 20555

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TO ALL POWER REACTOR LICENSEES WITH PLANTS LICENSED PRIOR TO JANUARY 1,1979 The Comission published on November t9,1980 (45 FR 76002), a revised Section 10 CFR 50.48 and a new Appendix R to 10 CFR 50 regarding fire protection features of nuclear power plants. The revised Section 50.48 and Appendix P. will become effective February 17, 1981, which is 90 days after publication. A copy of the Federal Registe- Notice is enclosed (Enclosure 1).

The provisions of Appendix R that are applicible to the fire protection features of your f acility can be divided into two categories. The first category consists of those provisions of the Appendix that are required to be backfit in their entirety by the new rule, regarcisss of whether or not-alternatives to the specific requirements of these Sections have been previously approved by the NRC staff. These requirements are set forth in Sections III.G, Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Capability; III-J, Emergency Lighting; and III-0, Oil Collection Systems for Reactor Coolant Pump. The fire protection featuras of your f acility must satisfy the specific requirements of these three Sections by the dates established by Paragraph 50.48(c), unless an exemption from the Appendix R requirements ' -~ -

is approved by the Commission. You should note the provisions for tolling the time for completing the modifications required by these three Sections of Appendix R set forth in Paragraph 50.48(c)(6).

The second category of Appendix R provisions applicable to the fire protection <

features of your f acility consists of requirements concerning the "open" items of previous NRC staff fire protection reviews of your f acility. An open item is defined as a fire protection feature that has not been previously approved by the NRC staff as satisfying the provisions of Appendix A to Branch Technical Position BTP FCSB 9.5-1, as reflected in a staff fire protet. tion safety evaluation report. The fire protection features of your f acility that are in this category must satisfy the specific requirements of Appendix R by the dates established by Paragraph 50.48(c), unless an ev.emp-tion f rom the Appendix R requirements on those features is approved by the Conmission.

Enclosure 2 is a summary listing of the open items concerning the fire protection features of your f acility based on a review of our records. Also included is our position on the specific requirements that nust be satisfied in order to resolve these open items. If you have an" questions or disagree- l ments with this enclosure, please advise us within 3C days of your receipt of I this letter, 8M 11bU g THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS POOR QUAUTY PAGES 1

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. 1 With regard to the fire protection modifications that have been previously I approved by the NRC staf f, Paragraph 50.48(d) specifies a new schedule for their conpletion. This paragraph, when it becomes effective, will supersede the currentl) affective section of the regulations that temporarily suspends conpletion dates for previously approved fire protection modifications that are given in f acility license conditions (45 FR 71569, October 29,1980).

The Coninission expects that all such modifications will be completed in accordance with this new scnedule, unless an extension has been requested and granted by the Director of the Of fice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

[see Paragraph 50.48(d)], or an exenotion has been requested and granted by the Comission pursuant to Section 50.12 of the Conrnission's regulations.

If you have previously requested extensions of dates for completion of modifications that are required by license conditions for your facility which were not approved, and you have determined that these extensions are still necessary and justifiable, it will be necessary for you to reapply for any such extensions in accordance with the provisions of Paragraph 50.43(d).

All requests for Comission action resulting f rom this rule are subject to the schedule of fees specified in 10 CFR 170.21. I f you ha ve any questions concerning the subject matters of this latter, please contact the NRC Project Manager for your facility.

Sincerely,

'O , . . .

[ mm x m y<w Darrell G. Eisenhut, Director Division of Licensing Of fice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:

1. Notice - Fire Protection Rule

2. Summary of Staff Require-ments to Resolve Open i tems cc w/ enclosure::

See next page t

Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company cc: firs. L. Patricia Doyle, President '

E. W. Thurlow, President SAFE POWER FOR MAINE Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company Post Of fice Box 774 Edison Drive Camden, Maine 04843 Augusta, Maine 04336 First Selectman of Wiscasset Mr. Donald E. Vandenburgh Municipal Building 1 Vice President - Engineering U. S. Route 1 Yankee Atomic Electric Company Wiscasset, Maine 04578 20 Turnpike Road

-Westboro, Massachusetts 01581 Di. rector, Criteria and Standards Division Cffice of Radiation Programs (ANR-L60)

John A. Ritsher, Esquire U.S. Erwircrhental Protection Agency  :

Ropes & Gray Washington, D.C. 20460 225 Franklin Street Boston, Massachusetts 02110 U. S. Environmental Protection Agency  !

Region 1 Of fice Mr. John fl. R. Paterson ATIN: Els COORDINATOR Assistant Attorney General JFK Federal Building State of Maine Boston, tiassachusetts 02203 Augusta, Maine 04330 Stanley R. Tupper, Esq. ,

Mr. Nicholas Barth Tupper and Bradley Executive Director 102 Townsend Avenue Sheepscot Valley Conservation Boothbay Harbor, Maine 04538 Association, Inc. -

P. O. Box 125 David Santee Miller, Esq.

, Alan, Maine 04535 213 Morgan Street, N. W.

Wiscassett Public Library Association High Street Mr. Paul Swetland Wiscasset. Maine 04578 Resident inspector / Maine Yankee Mr. Torbert H. Macdonald, Jr. c/o U.S. NRC Office of Energy Resources P. O. Box E State House Station #53 Wiscasset, Maine 04578 Augusta, Maine 04333 Mr. Charles B. Brinkman Robert M. Lazo, Esq., Chairman Manager - Washington Nuclear Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Operations U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission C-E Power Systems Washington, D. C. 20555 Combustion Engineering, Inc. >

l 4853 Cordell Ave., Suite A-1 l I Dr. Cadet H. Hand, Jr. , Director Bethesda, Maryland 20014 l Bodega Marine Laboratory University of California Bodega Bay, California 94923 I Mr. Gustave A. Linonberger State Planning Officer i' Executive Department I Atomic Safety and Licensing Board V. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission State of Maine Washington, D. C. 20555 189 State Street l Augusta, Maine 04330 l

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Enclosure 1 ove e 19,1980

' l 9

l Part 11 Nuclear Regulatory Commission ~ - - - -

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766f)2 Federal RcXl ster / Vol. 45. No. 225 / Wminesday, November 19,1960 / Rulen and Regulations NUCLEAR HEOut.ATORY th st the comment penno snould nave ar already w: mrth .n General Design COMMISSION been extended Culrnon 3 of Appendn A to R CFR 1he Commission does not agree. The Part 50 and in the NRC guidance 10 CFR Part 50 NRC has been des elopmg fire protection da uments These general provisions rerporements sim e 1975 The NRC gave rise to a number of disputes over .

Fire Protection Program for Operating pubbshed comprehensis e fire ptotection whether specific methods adequately Nuclear Power Plants guidehnen, liranch Technical Position accomplished the intended goal. The ActNCv: Nuclear Regulator, in P ApCsil 9 5-1 and its Appendu A in pr aposed rule is intended to provide lum Licensees have compared their fire sufficient specific guidance to ensure .

Comnussion. satisfactory resolutmn of these issues.

protection programs against these ACTION: Immal rule. dtMr TI ut reverting to generalI7ed guidance suuuAny: The Nuclear Regulatory deviations from these guldehnen with would not accomplish the intended Commission is amending its regubitions the NRC stuff for the past four year, purpose of the proposed rule.

to require certain prmisions for fire during the NHC's fire protection reviews lhe second issue mvolved some protectwn in operating nuclear power of operating . r tors A Safety instances in wM the spen wonhng Evaluation Rep .t and,in most cases, used resultml in unnecessary and plants. This action is being taken to unintended restrictions.1 or example, l u > grade hre protection at nuclear power supplements to the Safety Evalualion p ants hcensed to operate prior to Report, have been issued for each the prgposed rule called for a " fresh January 1,1979. by requiring resolution operating reactor. These reports water' supply. M firefighting purposes, of a ertain contested generic issues in describe hre protecuon alternatives that r ickish water is satisfactory and a have been proposed by the licensee and

,('hesh" water supply is unnecessary.

fire protection safety evaluation reports.

found acceptable by the staff as Well as Sundarly, the proposed rule called for EFF t*CTIVE DATE: February 19,1981. an underground ' yard fire main loop, Note.-The Nuclear Reguhitory unresolved fire protection issues Commission has submitted this rule to remaining between the staff and the C b "" P"T h"" 8 "I " h f" "'"i" I""P f""

licensee. Proposed Appendix R provided "h"V" Nf"""d in and as Ihey enter the Comptroller General for review as ,

• I'uctures. I.he Commission had not may be appropriate under the Federal the Commission's requirements for resolving those issues. Thus, it concerns intended to protabit running portions of Reports Act, as amended (44 U.S.C. a kn main loop above ground. Other

- 3512). The date on which the reporting only a limited number of issues derived from the use of the earlier guides. The sinilar changes are discussed in Section requirement of this rule becomes W ,,5pecinc Reqmrements, of this effective, unless advised to the contrary, Commission believes that a 30-day reflects inclusion of the 45-day period comment period was adequate under that statute nilows for such review (44 these circumstances.

Pf!$"e d he ein b bmode d irements on plants with presently U.S C. 3512(c)(2)). 2. Many licensees questioned the need installed or with existing commitments FOR FURTHEM INFORMATION CONTACT: for backfitting all the requirements of to install fire protection features David P. Nodey, Office of Standards Appendix H. They cnmmented that they previously determined by the staff to Development, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory had previously complied with staff fir" satisfy the guidance of Appendix A to Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555. protection recommendationti in " good HTP APCSil 9.5-1.The Commission phone 301-4434921 or Robert L faith' and have committed to or generally agrees that, except for three Ferguson. Office of Nucinar Reacto; completed certain modifications. They sections that will be back fitted.

Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory contend that the riaff has properly Appendix R should not be retroactively Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555, determmed that these modifications applied to features that have been phone 301-4924tm provido at least the level of fire previously approved by the NRC staff as cureteMcNTARY INFORM ATION: On May protection described by the guidance satisfying the provisions of Appendix A 2R 19H0, the ductuar Regulatory contamed in Appendix A tollranch to HTP APCSil o 5-1.

Commission published in the Federal Technical Position HTP APCSU as-1. The NRC staff had intended,in its Register (45 FH amm2) a notice of They also contend that these original proposal for Appendix R, that proposed rulemaking inviting written modifications provide a level of the requirements be applicable only for huggestions or comments on the protection at least equivalent to that the resolution of unresolved disputed proposed rule by June 30,19mt The contained in the proposed rule. They r fire protection features. Thus, the staff notice concerned proposed amendments express the concern that the proposed had not intended the provisions of to 10 CFR Part 51, " Domestic IJcensing rule was written in such specific Appendix R to require modification of of Production and Utilization Facilities," language that fire protection issues that previously approved features. This was which would require certain minimum were thought closed would be reopened not clear!y described in the proposei' proviuona for fire protection in nuclear and new, but not necessarily better- rule as published for comment. In fact, power plants operatmg prior to lunuary modifications would be required. These the Supplementary information '

1,1979. Fifty one comment letters were modifications could be accornplished published with the proposed arule received regarding the proposed only by the expenditure of considerable explicitly indicated that "lujil licensees amendments. A number of comments engineering. design, and construction will be expected to meet the

• pertained to specific reqmrements in the affort and at great undue expense. The requiremc::ts of this rule,in its effective proposed Appendix R. and these wiu be commenters request that the form, includmg whatever changes result dealt with below. However, there were requBements in the proposed rule be from pubhc comments!

three substantive contentions which rewritten to specify only the general in determining whether the specific were raised by many of the commenters. require:nents of what needs to be regmrements of Appendix R should be These three comments are summarized accomplished. imposed on licensees with presently as follows: These comments raise three related installed or existing commitments to

! 1. Most commenters stated that the 30 issues. The first relates lo the need for install fire protection features previously day c6mment period was too short to specific n quirements. The general determined to satisfy Appendix A to permit adequate detailed response and requirements relating to fire protection Hranch Technical Position HTP APCSH

Federal Registor / Vol. n No. m / Wednesday. November la 1980 / Rules and Regulations 76603 11'- 1, it is important to recogn ze that air mgements were accepted m some permitted eiths r un od collection system Appent l iv R addresses only u portion of ecly fire protection reviews As a result or a fire supprnsion system.The staff thupo cfic ltems contained in the more of sonm vparate effects tests. the staff has also accepbd an automatic fire r omprehensive document, Branch CNinged its position on this suppression system as an ucceptable Technical Davition HTP APCSD u b1 configurahon. and subsequent plans method of fire protectfon for this and ils Appenda A, Appendix A to HTp have been required to provide application. The Commission has APCSB 0.5-1 has been the basic fire additional protechan m the form of fire concluded that fire suppression systems prmection guidance used by the stuff in b,uners or substantial physical do not give adequate protection for fires their fire protection reviews conducted separahon for nafe shutdown systems. that may be induced by seismic events.

for all operating plants during the past No creibt for such coatings as fire The Commission therefore believes that severul years For many plants. barriers is allowed by Section 111 G of prestously approved suppression bcensees proposed systems and features Appenda R. Appendix A to branch s) stems should be replaced with oil Techn ca position 1)TP APCSB 0 51 and collection systems that can withstand that satisfactorily achieved the fire protection criteria set forth in Appendix the pro;msed Appendix R recognized seismic events.

A to llTP APCSi10 5-t und begun to that there were plant un que The techmeal basis on which these configurations that required fire three sections are based are further promptly implement such features and systems. protection features that are not identical discussed in Section IH, " Specific Requirements," of this preamble.

l Satisfactory features and systems are to those hated in Section 111 G of already in place and in operation in Appendix R. For these cases. fire 3 Most commenters stated that the protection features were developed by implementation schedule contained in many plants.There is a reasonable the proposed rule is impossible to meet degree of uniformity among most of the licensee and described in a fire hazards analysis Some of these for any of the operating plants. The them approved features for all facilities commenters further stated that if the since they were reviewed against the arrangements were accepted by the staff same criteria of Appendix A to DTP as providing equivalent protection to the implementation schedule in the effective rule is the same as that in the proposed APCSli o.5-1. In general, the features requirements of Section lil.G to rule. the Commission must be prepared previously approved by the NRC staffin Appendix R.

to either shutdown each operating its reviews of fire protection using the Requirements that account for all of nuclear power plant, or process cnteria of Appendix A to DTP APCSD the parameters that are important to fire exemption requests, 9 51 provide an equivalent level of fire protection and consistent with safety The commenters then concluded that protection safety to that provided under requirements for all plant unique the implementation schedule should be the specific provisions of Appendix R. configurations have not been deseloped. rewritten to allow an adequate time Thus, the further benefit that might be in light of the experience gained in fire pHod for comphance.The proposed rule provided by requiring that previously protection evaluations over the past four stated that , au fire protection and approved features be modified to ears, the Commission believes that the modifications identified by the staff as conform to the specific language set icensees should reexamine those nmssary to satisfy Criterion 3 of forth in Appendix R is outweighed by previously approved configurations of Appendix A to this part, whether the overall benefit of the early fire protection that do not meet the requirements as specified in Section p ntained in Appendix R to this part or implementation of such previously in ther staff fire protection guidance approved features, which in many cases Ill.G to Appendix R. Ilased on this '

are currently being installed. reexamination the licensee must either ($$Po nc ji ) sh I e mpleted Nevertheless, as a result of its meet the requirements of Section Ill.G of by November 1,1980 unless, for good conimuing revicw of fire protection Appendix R or apply for an exemption cause shown, the Commission approves matters, the NRC staff has indicated to that justifies alternatives by a fire an extension." (proposed paragraph the Comnussion that there are hazard analysis. Ilowever, based on 50A01.(c)). The Commission went on to iequirements in three sections in which present information, the Commission state its intention in the Statement of the protection afforded by Appendix R does not expect to be able to approve Consideration to the rule that " .no met and above that previously exemptions for fire retardant coatmgs plant would be u!! owed to continue to accepted, may be desirable. The used as fire barriers. operate after November 1,1980, or Commission has decided that these The secono relates to emergency beyond an extended date approved by requirements should be retroactively lighting. Section 111.] of Appendix R calls the Comission, unless all modifications

, appied to all facilities. This decision is for 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> emergency lighting, whereas (except for alternate or dedicated not meant to reflect adversely on in some cases less than 8-hour shutdown capability) have been previous licensee or staff evaluations; emergency hghting has been accepted as implemented."

rather its purpose is to take fully into satisfying Appendix A to BTP ApCSB The Commission has reconsidered the

- account the increased knowledge and 9.51. While un adequate level of safety implementation schedule and has experience developed on fire protection may be provided by less than un 8-hour determined that it should be modified matters over the last several years, supply, un 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> system would provide for the following reasons:

The first of these sections is related to added protection and would generally . After reviewing the comments and fire protection features for ensuring that involve only a small cost.The the information developed as a result of systems and associated circuits used to Commission therefore beheves that completion of fire reviews over the past achieve and maintain safe shutdown are licensees should upgrade the previously 6 months, the staff has informed the free from fire damage. Appendix A to approved facilities to satisfy the 8-hour Commission that the date of November 11TP APCSB U 51 permits a combination hghting requirement of Appendix R. 1,1980, is not possible because the of fire retardant coatmgs and fire The third relates to protection against effective date of the rule will be af ter detection and supression systems fires in nonmerted containments that date.

without specifying a physical separation involvmg reactor coolant pump + The staff has informed the distance to protection redundant lubncation oil (Section 111.0 of Commission that it would expect systems (Appendix A D.1(2)), and such Appendix R). The proposed rule virtually alllicensees to request

76604 Federal Register / Vol. 45, No. 225 / Wednesday, November 19. 1980 / Rules and Regulations

• exemptions if the new implementation Section ill, we provide a summary of the automatic water suppression system dates do not provide an appropriate Technical fusis for each requirement, throughout the plant.

period of time for complying with the followed by a summary of the public An ensured mmimum volume of water requirements of Appendix R.The time comments and a statement of the staff's is set aside and dedicated for fire and manpower resources needed by the disposition of those comments. protection ases to be available at all . I licensees to prepare such requests and times regardless of other simultaneous  !

S"##"" # I"#* "di## "* C"P" water uses in the plant.This water by the staff to formulate recornmendations on these requests in This section has been revised us a volume is dedicated for fire service by not warrented from the standpoint of resuh of comments to include a means of separate storage tanks or .

timely fire protection improvement. discussion of the importance of rafe separate pump suctions from a large

• The revised implementation shutdown capability and the disdm.ibn body of water. When common tankage schedule provides a careful balance of between requirements for " safety. la employed for fire service needs and these considerations, calling for the related" equipment and equipment other water services, the fire pump remaining fire protection modifications needed for " safe shutdown." sactions must be at the bottom of the to be implemented and installed on a Secticn //. Genero/ Requirements tad and other water supply suctions phased schedule that is as prompt as must be located at a higher level to can be reasonably achieved. This section has been substantially ensure that the minimum dedicated The revised schedules distinguish rewritten as a result of comments to water volume is set aside for fire l between requirements imposed for the provide a concise summary of general protection needs. Administrative i first time on the licensee by Appendix R requirements. The specific requirements controls by themselves, such as locked (

and those requirements already imposed were consolidated with the appropriate valves to ensure adequate water supply j in license conditions or Technical parts of Section Ill. " Specific for fire fighting needs, are deemed i Specifications issued prior to the Requirements." except that the credit unacceptable at nuclear power plants. j effective date of the rule. For }iven for 50-foot separation has been Comment Resolution requirements imposed by Appendix R, roppe<.

Including the items "backfit" to all Secff,m ///. Specific Requirements Many commenters stated that we plants, tue schedule provides a werc being too restrictive by stipulating reasonable time after publication of the The requirements in this rule are an underground yard fire main loop and rule for completion of required based upon principles long accepted fre i wa ., . upplies. Our intent was modifications. For requirernents already within that portion of American industry only that a yard fire main loop be imposed by license conditions providing that has been classified by their furnished. We have deleted the for implemention after November 1, insurance carriers as " Improved Risk" specification for an underground loop 19a0, the Commission has reviewed or "flighly Protected Risk". In each of since special conditions may dictate that ,

these schedules and has found that in these cases. the Commission hen part of the loop be above ground or j some instances the allotted time for decided that the overallinterest of inside safety related buildings. Such completion of the required modifications public safety is best served by arrangements are acceptable.

may be excessive. Thus, for fire establishing some conservative level of With regard to the specification for a protection features other than those fire protection and ensuring that level of fresh water supply, the staff was covered by Appendix R, although the compliance exists at all plants. The attempting to avoid potential plant Commission has extended the following is a list of the specific problems that are not assoced with compliance dates beyond the November technical bases and resolution of public f;re protection. From a fire e otion 1,1980, date in the proposed rule, the comments for each of the specific standpoint, salt or brackish ater is Commission has added a requirement requirements in Appendix R. acceptable for fire suppression provided that limits the compliance schedule in A WaterSuppliesforFire the fire protection system is designed existing licenses if such schedules Suppression Systems TechnicalBasis. and maintained for salt or brackish extend beyond what we now believe one of the basic fire protection water. The requirement for fresh water should have been a reasonable schedule requirements for a modern industrial supplies is therefore dropped. Other initially. Relief from such limitation may site in the IJnited States is a separate oporational problems unrelated to fire be granted by the Director of Nuclear water distribution system for fire pr,tection that may result from the use Reactor Regulation upon a showing that protection with dual water supplies. of s alt or brackish water for fire there is good cause for extending such Duplicate water supplies are required to su .pression activities are outside the I date and that public health and safety is ensure uninterrupted fire suppression scope of this regulation. i not adversely affected by such capability allowing for single failures Seveal commenters took issue with extension. and periodic maintenance and repair of the requirement for two separate It should also be noted that for vital portions of the systems. Duplicate redundant suctions, stating that some licensees whose license conditions water supplies may consist of separate plais t.se a single large intake structure '

imposed a schedule with a compliance suctions for fire pumps from a large on a lake or a river for all water date of November 1,1980, or other date body of water such as lake, river, or requirenants. The requirement for prior to the effective date of I 50.48, the pond or from two water storage tanks. separate intake structures was not  !

Commission has suspended such l'or nuclear power plurits, the intended and the rule has been clarified.

compliance dates by promulgating on distribution system is required to consist Several comments called for deleting October 29,1980, a temporary rule of a loop around the plant with suitable the requirements for dedicated tanks or j 50.48 (45 l'R 71569), which will be valves for isolating portions of the use of vertical standpipe for other water superseded by this rule, syHtem for maintenance or repair services when storage tanks are used for To better understand the nature of the without interrupt;ng the water supply to combined service-water / fire-water uses, public comments received and the staff's the various fire suppression systems in on the baris that this is overly restrictive resolution of these comments, the the plant. Thus, with dual supplies and a and other ways are available to ensure following section will consider each loop concept, an adequate water supply a dedicated supply such as weirs, section of Appendix R to this part. In can be ensured to each manual or suction location, etc. Two separate but

Federal Register / Vol. 45, No. 225 / Wednesday, November 19, 1980 / Rules and Regulations 76605 related issues are involved here. The hour water supply is considered by a visually indicating or key operated first is the requirement for dedicated adequate. It should also be noted that (curb) valve," and there was an water storage tanks for fire fighting this minimum dedicated water volu;ne is opportunity to comment on this purposes. The suggestion that the based on maximum flow rates. Since document.

. requirement for dedicated tanks be most fires are controlled and D. Manua/ Fire Suppression Technical deleted was rejected for the reasons extinguished with much smaller flow Basis. Considerable reliance is placed stated in the preceding Technical Basis, rates, this requirement realistically on automatic fire suppression systems The other point deals with ensuring represents a dedicated water volume far throughout a nuclear power plant.

minimum water storage capacity for fire in excess of two hours. However, manual fire fighting activities suppression activities when storage B. Sectional / solation Valves. often can control and extinguish slowly tanks are used for combined service. C.HydrantIsolation Valves developing fires before an automatic fire water / fire. water uses. The term Technica/ Basis. These two suppression system is actuated. In

" vertical standpipe for other water requirements are similar and can be addition,ilres that are controlled or service" simply taeans that the suction treated together. Proper valving is extinguished by automatic systems for other water uses in common storage required to isolate portions of the water require a certain amount of manual tanks will be located sufficiently high to distribution system for maintenance or responsa. Also, some areas of the plant ensure the minimum water volume repair without interrupting the water do not warrant the installation of needs for fire suppression activities. If supply to manual or automatic fire automatic fire suppression systems.

the commenters were assuming that suppression systems inside the plant- Manual response is the only fire

" vertical standpipe" referred only to Valves are similarly required to permit suppression available for these areas; pipes inside the tank, this is not the isolation of outside yard hydrants from thus, it is important that manual fire ,

case. In fact a standpipe exterior to the the water distribution system for fighting capability be present in all storage tank is more desirable since any maintenance or repair without areas of the plant, and that standpipe leakage would be immediately evident. interrupting water supply to fire and hose stations be located throughout On an internal standpipe a leak in the suppression systems inside the plant. the plant. The standpipe and hose pipe could actually allow depletion of Visually indicating valves such as post stations are to be locatd so that at least the water otherwise to be reserved for indicator valves are preferred so that one effective hose stream an be fire uses.The rule has been clarified to the position of the valve can be readily brought to bear at any location in the allow physical alternatives for water r e o ev r key opera ed plant containing or presenting a hazard sup ly dedication but to preclude 9gY to structures, systems, or components et usive use of administrative controls a es are accep a o se important to safety. They are to be for this purpose. 9 , e e supplied from the fire water supply Some commenters objected to the conditions warrant their use.

system except for those inside requirement that other water systems B. Section Control Volves-Comment Resolution. Many commenters stated containment, which may be connected used as a backup water supply for fire to other reliable water supplies if a that the re frement for " approved protection should be permanently 8eparate penetration into containment visually in cating" sectional control connected to the fire main system and valves was overly restrictive, cannot be made for fire water service suggested that it would be sufficient to needs.

unnecessary, and not specific with provide a water supply capable of being respect to who should give the approval. Comment Resolution connected to the fire main system within The Commission has accepted this ten minutes of the loss of normal water suggestion the rule now requires that Several commenters suggested sdding supply or pumps. The rule does not a sentence reading " Standpipe and hose sectional control valves shall be address backup water supplies. The stations are not required if suffNent provided to isolats portions of the fire requirement means that,if another justification can be provided that main for maintenance er repair without water system is used as one of the adequate fire protection features have shutting off the entire system. Post redundant water supplles, it must satisfy indicator or key-operated valves are been providad to account for a given fire all of the requirements of the fire mentioned as two examples of area." This suggestion was rejectci The protection water supplies. Additional acceptable valves, staff has taken the position that the backup supplies need not meet these C. Hydront Block Volves-Comment minimum requirements are that at least requirements. ne effective hose stream that will be Resolut/on. A number of comrnenters One commenter asked why only a made suggestions for rewording this able to reach any location that contains two.hccr water supply is required when section. This section has been clarified or could present an exposure fire hazard the Drowns Ferry Fire lasted well over to state the requirement for capability to to the safety-related eqdpment. The two hours. All of the investigations of isolate hydrants from the fire main Comminion concluded uat no analyses the Browns Ferry Fire clearly show that without disrupting the water su; ply to can identify hazards so carefully that if water had been used immediately, the automatic or manual fire suppresJion this minimum requirement can be fire would have been extinguished much systems in any area containing or further reduced.

earlier. Indeed once the manual fire presenting a fire hazard to safety related E. Hydrostoric Hose Test Technical fighting activities were started with the or safe shutdown equipment. Bosis. Fire hoses should be use of only one fire hose stream, tne f5 One commenter suggested that this hydrostatically tested pafodically to was extinguished within one. half hour, requirement la dropped in its entirety ensure that they will not rupture during The staff would find unacceptable any since it "is a now requirement which has use. The requirement for a minimum test condition in which a postulated fire that not been sublocted to t a peer review pressure of 300 pai comes from NFPA could threaten safe shutdown capability process." This suggestion was rejected No.196 (National Fire Protection could not be controlled and extinguished on the bas's that Appendix A to BTP Association Standard No.196-within two hours with any combination ApCSB p.5-1 contains the following Standard for Fire Hose), a nationally of manual and automatic fire sentr. ,ce: "The lateral to each hydrant recognized consensus standard. This suppression activities. Therefore, a two- from the yard main should be controlled standard contains other guidance for the

76606 rederal Register / Vol. 45, No. 225 / Wednesday, November 19, 1980 / Rules and Regulations i

i use and care of fire hose that most system in all such areas should be I. Fire neigade 7' raining Technical industries find useful. retained. The fire hazards analysis may Basis. Most modern industrial plants can foy a separate suppression system, whh rephmement cost values Co,riment hesolutia r ,

but this would be in addition to the fire approachm, gthose of a modern nuclear Many commenters pointed out the detection system. powered electric generating station have erroneous usage of the term "servic" G. Protection of Safe Shutdown a full time fully equipped fire pressure" rather than "operatinH Capabl/ity Technical nasis. The department, including motorized fire ,

pressure" in this requirement. The objective for the piotection of safe apparatus. Ilecause of the reduced intended meaning for this requirement is shutdown capability is to ensure that at severity of fire hazards in a nuclear that all hoses would be tested at a least one means of achieving and generating station as compared to a pressure greater than the maximum maintaining safe shutdown conditions manufacturing phint, the Commission

- pressure Iound in the fire protection wdl remain available during and after believes that it is not necessary to water distribution systems. The correct any poseted fire in the plant. Because mandate a fully staffed fire department.

termmology is " operating pressare." The it is not possible to predict the specific f lowever, manual fire response rule has been so changed. In addition. conditions under which fires may occur capability is required at a nuclear plant 6

the staff added a specific minimum test and propagate, the design basis and a proMy eq@ ped and My pressure requirement oI 300 psi to meet protective Icalures are specified rather trained fire brigade will satisfy this the NFl% standard. than the design basis fire. Three need.The Commission has determined One commenter Elso pointed out that dlIIerent means for protecting the safe that a brigade of five persons constitutes hoses should be mspected for mildew. shutdown capability outside or the minimum size sufficient to perform rot, cuts, or other damage. Although th.is mnlainment are acceptable. The first the actions that may be required by the is a valid comment,it is not an brigade during the fire and to provide unresolved hisue with any licensee no il d Mion of mdedd ufe some maigin for unanticipated eventsJ shutdown trains and associated circuits need not be covered by this rule. In by means of 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire rated barriers. Similarly, the training requirements addition, such inspections are already listed are considered the minimum The second means is a combination of being performed in accordance with the needed to ensure that the fire brigade separation of redundant safe shutdown pla,nl,a Technical Specificuitons. tra ns and associated circuits by a 1, will be able to function effectively I . Automatic hre Detection Technical hour fire rated birrier and automatic fire during a fire emergency.

Basis. t he requirement th,at automatic suppression and detection capability for The proposed rule required emergency fire detection systems be matulled in all g gg breathing apperatus without specifying areas that contam safe shutdown or the numlav of such pieces of apparatus.

which may be used only when safety related systems or components The rule has been modified to specify follows generally accepted fire redundant trains and associded circuits g the personnel for whom such apparatus protection practice. Installation of such is to be provided and to specify reserve fire detection capability is independent space, requires automatic fire  ; ,

supprecaion and detection systems in of auy requirements for automatic or RF ' #rinde-Comment manual fire suppression capability !n an the area. An nhernative or dedicated Rede Wny comem me d area.The purpose of these detection 8"I" shutdown capatnlity independent of changing this requirement to a simple systems is to give early warning of fire the fire area is required if fire protection statement that a trained and equipped, conditions in an area 80 thut the fire for safe shutdown capability cannot be nominal size, site fire brigade of five brigade can initiate prompt actions to provided as auth,ned above,1 or cables persons be provided on each shift unless minimize fire damage within the plant. and equipment needed for safe a lesser number 19 lustified. This shutdown located inside of noninerted Comment Resolution containments, a lesser degree of fire

" " * *C"d" U!"" # ""*

• d i* i lhe Commission for the recons stated 1 Many commenters suggested that the protection is permitted because in the Technical flasis.

words " automatic fire detection transient exposure fires are less likely Some commenters objected to the capability" he substituted for inside containment during plant exclusion of the shift supervisor from

" automatic fire detection systems" on operation. Section Ill Af. ' Fire !!arriers,,, the fire brigade. The commenters felt the basis that, as worded, the discusses the technical basis for the a' that the shifi supervisor should go to the requirements are too limiting. They hour barrier, and Section lil.la fire and provide the benefit of his stated that an automatic sprinkler " Alternative and Dedicated Shutdown opedise and adhomy. The rule would system with appropriate alarm check Capahdity," discusses the technical not prevent this. Ifowever, the shift valves and central alarm features basis for safe shutdown capability, supervisor may have to go elsewhere provides acceptable detection /alarnung Comment Resolution duria the course of a fire that adversely capabdity. heveral commenters claimed aIIccts plant operation.The fire b-igade that a separate detection system is not Many cornmenters suggested that the leader must stay with the fire brigade needed in areas covered by sprinkler first paragraph be changed slightly and and be assigned no other nyutems equipped with fusible link the rest of this section deleted.The responsibilities during a fire emergency.

sprinkler heads. A fusible link has a basis for their contention is that the rule therefore, the shift supervisor must be time delay before it actuates. Ilowever, should state simply the requirement to excluded from membership on the fire more importantly, a smoldering protect cables or equipment of systems brigade.

localized fire that could do damage ma.c necessary for safe shutdown of the plant 1 F#c Brigade Training-Comment not generate enough heat to melt the and leave specific implementation Resolutmn. Many commenters have fusible link. While we do not disagree details in some other type of document, that the alarm from an automatic fire We have modified this section by i Thi i. di cu..,d ai lengih in the Nac .i.rre removing the listing of considerations, Tvuhmwn of Mmimum bre Hogade Shift Sd.

suppression nystem serves as dd'*d lune s. nmt < npie. nre av a.ble from David notification that a fire exists, we deleting Table 1, and revising the

( conduded that the minimum wording to provide clarification. [{'j[i[,$"d,d(""M'njiIc , ,

requirement for a separate fire detection 11. Fire Brigade. 20sss I

l t

--r - - _ __ , .-

- =- . .- __ - - . - - - _. - _ - _- ._.

Federal Register / Vol. 45, No. 225 / Wednesday, November 19, 1980 / Rules and Regulations 76607 stated that NRC used unnecessary detail fire emergency and operators involved modifications to provide alternative

, in spelling out specific requirements for in safe plant shutdown should not also shutewn systems are extensive, e classroorn instruction, fire fighting have to be concerned with lighting in the dedicated system thet is essentially a practice, and fire drills. Some area.The small cost differential minimum capability safe shutdown train commenters felt thu these requirements between 2-hour supply and the and is independent of those already

. were more detailed than anything the 'ubstantial additional protection existing may be provided. This minimum Commission has publishes with regard .fforded by the 8-hour supply does not capability is required to maintain the to operator training. The Commission warrant reducing this requirement. The process variables within those values here points out that most of the Commission has decided to require an a- predicted for a lois of offsite power. The investigations of the TMi accident hour battery power supply in all areas case ofloss of offsite poweris assumed 1 identified inadequately trained needed for operation of safe shutdown because fires in certain circumstances '

operators as Ln important factor and equipment and in access and egress (e.g., electrical distribution systems) that work is now being done in this routes. could cause or be related to such a loss.

area. The fact is not that the training K. Administrative Controls Technical Fire damage to cold shutdown capability i requirements sp'elled out here for the fire Basis. The fire protection program uses is limited to damage that can be '

brigade members are excessive when administrative controls for fire repaired within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> to provide a compared to training requirements for pre vention and prefire planning. The margin in achieving cold shutdown reactor operators, but that fire brigade items listed in this section are generally conditions. Consideration is given to training is further along in development, accepted within the fire protection associated circuits because most plants and training parameters that are community as minimum requirements were not designed with this concept in essential to a comprehensive program for an effective administration of the fire mind. Should either the aliernative or have been identified. protection program. Controls are placed dedicated rapability be required to J. Emergency Lighting Technical on the storage and use of combustible function because of a fire,it must not be Basis. Emergency lighting is required in materials to reduce the fire loading in disabled by fire damage to associated all nuclear power plants. Battery- safety related are.ss and on ist.ition circuits. Also, this capability does not powered lights with capacities of1% to sources to avoid careless operations. have to meet the single failure criterion 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> is usually sufficient for Procedures are used to control actions because it is on'y one of severallevels emergency egress. However, the postfire to be taken by individuals who discover of defense. Seismic Category I criteria is emergency lighting requirements in a a fire and by the fire brigade for the not imposed because fires that would nuclear power plant are of a different development of preplanned fire fighting require the installation of alternative or kind. The need is for lighting that aids strategies and actual fire fighting dedicated shutdown capability are not the access to equipment and techniques. seismically induced.

components that must be manually c,,,,,, g,,,j ,,j,,

operated by plant personnel to effect g,,,,,, g,,,7y,j,,

safeplant shutdown during plant Many commenters stated that this Many of the commenters stated that emeqdacies. Because such activities requirement was much too detailed for a this requirement exceeded the scope of may extend over a considerable period regulaticn. Some stated that the Appendix R by defining alternative of time both durtra and after the fhe,it requirements should apply only to those shutdown requirements. They stated is prudent to provide 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> battery areas having safe shutdown equipment. that the time requirements are excessive emergency lighting capabGity to allow Other commenters stated that a simple and should be dropped. They also sufficient time for normal lighting to be statement that administrative contend that this regulation does not restored with a margin for unanticipated procedures should be 9stablished to take into account the many plant events. contral the various fw hazards reviews being conducted under the throughout the plant was sufficient, and Systematic Evalcanon Program (SEP).

Comment Resolution that the details could be spelled out in a It is generally understood that cold Many commenters stated that the regulatory guide or some other similar shutdown is the ultimate safe shutdown requirement for emergency lighting is document. condition and that, for each fire area, overly restrictive in three specifics: first, Minor changes have been made in the different means rr.ay be used and may that emergency lighting is unnecessary wording of this requirement for be necessary to achieve cold shutdown, in many of the designated areas: second, clarificat3n. Because a fire in certain areas at some that the requirement for see'ed beam or L Alten.ative andDedicated plants would have the capability of I fluorescent units is overly restrictive; Shutdown Capability. disabling systems required to achieve j . third, that the requirement forindividual TechnicalBasis. In some locations both hot and cold shutdown,it is t 8-hour battery power supply is (such as the cable spreading room) necessary to specify the minimum excessive. Three commenters within operating nuclear power plants, it capability and time regirement for each recommended a 2. hour battery power is not alwa> s possible or practicable to condition necessary to achieve safe supply; five commenters recommended a protact redundant safe shutdown shutdown. We agree that evaluations plant specific power supply; and one systems against adverse effects of fire or being made under the Systematic commenter recommended that there be fire suppression activities only through Evaluation Program (SEP) may also call no permanent installation. the use of fire protection features for alternative or dedicated shutdown These suggestions have been accepted because the redundant safe shutdown capability for reasons other than fire in part. Lighting units with 8. hour systems in a given fire area are too close protection. For example, seismic, battery supplies are to be provided in all to each oN. Alternative shutdown flooding, or emergency core cooling areas needed for operation of safe capability has usually been required to requirements resulting f om the SEP may shutdown equipment and in access and be independent of the control room, require additional modificatiern. Each egress routes thereto, The reasoning cable spreading room, switchgear rooms licensee should be aware of the status of behind the requirement for sn 8-hour and cable riser areas because reoundant the SEP so that the requirements battery power supply is that there can systems in these areas are nut resulting from SEP can be effectively be a great deal of other activity during a adequately separated. When plant it,tegrated with those relating to fire

4 2 76608 Federal Register / Vol. 45, No. 225 / Wednesday, Novernber 19. 1980 / Rules and Regulations protection to the extent possible. equired to ensure safe shutdown the national consensus standard used l{ owes er, the Commission has decided capabihty. The use of a 1-hour barrier in for testing and rating these cable that the modifications required to conjunction with automatic fire penetration seals. Since the cables complete the fire prc tection program suppression and detection capability for conduct the heat through the barrier, ,

i should not be deferred until the SEP cach redundant train of safe shutdown and since the cable insulation is t review is completed. equipment is based on the following combustible, the acceptance criteria of M. Fire Barriers. considerations. Automatic suppression the ASTM Standard L119 relating to Technica/ Basis. The best fire is required to ensure prompt, effective temperature on the unexposed side must .

protection for redundant trains of safe application of suppressant to a fire that be appropriately modified.

shutdown systems is separation by could endanger safe shutdown gg,,ggf gy,gfyfjyy

, unpierced fire barriers-walls and capability. T,he activation of an ceiling floor assemblies. Ilecause these automatic fire detection or suppression Some commenters suggested that this barriers are passive fire protection system does not occur until sufficient entire section he deleted and replaced Icatures, they are inherently reliable smoke or heat has been developed by with the following two sentences:

provided they are properly installed and the fire. Therefore, the Commission is " Penetration seals shall provide the maintained. Fire barriers have been requiring a 1. hour barrier to ensure that equivalent protection which is required  ;

used successfully for many years to fire damage will be limited to one train of the fire barrier. Evaluauon of ths j subdivide large potential fire k,sses into until the fire is extinguished. penetration seals based upon a design smaller, more acceptable risks. Even fire These requirements have now been review and relevant test data or

. barriers with openings have successfully incorporated in Section til.C. " Fire qualification tests may be made." The interrupted th progress of many fires Protection of Safety Functions.' commenters felt that sufficient test data prcvided the openings were properly .

are available to permit evaluation of Co**PU' N#80 "## # design requirements without full. scale protected by fire doors or other acceptable means. Several commenters made a number mockup testing and that many of the Fire barriers are " rated" for fire of suggestions of an editorial nature. items spelled out in the regulation, such resistance by being exposed to a One suggestion was to add "or unless as the water hose stream test, were too

" standard test fire", This standard test other fire protection features have been detailed and did not belong in the

+ fire is defined by the American Society provided to ens"re equivalent regulation. The Commissien has for Testing and Materials in ASTN D protection" in the first paragraph, where reconsidered this issue and revised the 119. " Standard for Fire Resistance of three-hour rated fire barriers were rule to (a) require the use of

! iluilding Materials." Fire barriers are stipulated unless a lower rating was noncombustible materials onlj in the i commonly rated as having a fire justified by the fire hanrds analysir construction of fire b9rrier penetration resistance of from 1 to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />. Most The Commission feels that this adds seals, (b) require fire Nrrier penetration

> " Improved Risk" or "llighly Protected nothing in the way of clarification and seals to be qualified by test; and (c)

Risk" (as classified by insurance the suggestion was not adopted.The require such tests to satisfy certain carriers) industrial properties in the second paragraph requires that acceptance criteria.

United States require fire barriers to structural steel forming a part of or O. Fire Doors.

i

~

have a resistance rating of 2 to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. supporting any fire barrier have a fire Technica/ Basis. Door openings in fee While a nuclear power plant has a resistance equivalent to that required of walls constitute another breach that l low fire load, the potential the barrier. An example was given of must be protected. Fire doors that have consequences of fire are serious. metal lath at ! plaster covering as being been tested and rated for certain fire Thereft the Commission has selected one means of providing equivalent exposures are installed to protect thase

! 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> ho been as an acceptable protection. Several commenters stated openings. Fire doors frequently fail to j minimum fire resistaMe ratmg for fire that they thought this was too corrow protect the openings in which they are I i barriers separating redundant trains for and would be interpreted by some installed because they are not fu!]y l nafe shutdown systems. This will give people as the only acceptable method closed. Various methods are avaHable to j ample time fon aubmatic and manual permitted Since the example seemed to licensees to ensure that fire doors are in fire suppression activities to control any be confusing,1 decision has been made proper operating condition and that they potential fire and for safe shutdown to eliminate it. Other comments to the will be closed during a fire. These activities to properly control the reactor. effect that the requirement was options are listed in Appendix R.

Many operating plants, or plants that excessively restrictive with regard to .

are already built but that are not yet fire barrier penetrations, including fire Comment Resolution j operating, have both trains of safe doors and their associated frames and Many commsnters stated that this .

shutdown equipment located in close hardware, and ventilation systems have requirement is too detailed and should proximity and a single fire could been acted upon by the staff and the be deleted. Minor editorial changes have

• damage or destroy the functional requirement, as it had affected these been made in order to more clearly state capability of botn redundant trains. If items, was deleted. the requirements.

. specific plant conditions preclude the N. Fire Barrier Cable Penetration Seal P. Reactor Coolant Pump Lubrication installation of a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire barner to Qualif; cation. System.

separate the redundant trains, a 1. hour TechnicalBe.is. Unpierced fire TechnicalBasis. Each reactor coolant fire barrier and automatic fire barriers offer ine best protection for pump motor assembly typically contains f suppression system for each redundant separating redundant trains of safety- 140 to 220 gallons of tube oil. Oilleaking train will be considered the equivalent reh ed or safe shutdown equipment. from some portions of the tube oil

of 3. hour barrier. Ilowever, there barriers must be pierced system may come in contact with if the 1-hour fire barrint and automatic for both control and power cables. surfaces that are hot enough to ignite the fire suppression for each redundant These penetrations must be sealed to oil. The resulting fire could be large, and

.' train cannot be provided because of achieve a degree of fire resistance access to the fire would be delayed

! plant specific conditions, alternative or equivalent to that requ ~ i of -he barrier because of the time required to enter the dedicated shutdowns capability will be that is pierced. ASTM ? 'dard E-119 is containment. Containent air temperature

Federal Register / Vo!. 45, No. 225 / Wednesday, November 19, 1980 / Rules and Regulations 76609 would increase, severe localized pump oil collection system is covered by Capability.")In the fire hazards analysis

- environments would d-velop in the area paragraph C.2 because its function is for a plant, the equipment relied upon to of the fire, and a large amount of smoke required to protect safety related perform both functions must be would be generated. These conditions systems rather than to perform a safety identified for each fire area. it follows could affect operabliity of safety related function. Because the failure of the oil that any associated non-safety circuits equipment inside containment, collection system for a seismically in the fire area that could adverse'y Therefore, an oil collection system is induced oil fire should not prevent a affect the identified shutdown necessary to confine any oil discharged safety related system from perfonnin8 equipment by feeding back potentially due to leadkage or failure of the its safety function (Regulatory Guide disabling conditions (e.g., hot shorts or lubrication system and to prevent it 1.29, " Seismic Design Classification." shorts to ground) to the power supplies from becoming a fire hazard by draining paragraph C.2), the oil collection system or control circuits of that (quipment it to a safe locatfor.. These occurrences should be designed, engineered, and must also be evaluated. Of course such could be random or could be seismically installed so that its failure will not lead disabling co~nditions must be p.evented induced because the existing lube ol] to a fire affecting safety-related to provide assurance that the identified system piping and oil collection systems equipment as a result of an earthquake. safe shutdown equipment will function may not be designed to withstand a The proposed rule permitted tw dmign basis seimic event. siternatives-an oil collection system or as designed. These requirements have a a oma sup es s ste cow been incorporated in Section 111.L.

Appendix A to IITP APCSB 9.5-1 " Alternative and Dedicated Shutdown 9g e states that for operating plants, Capability."

postulated fires or fire protection suppression system because system failures need not be considered unacceptable damage may result to the Comment Roo/ution concurrent with other plant accidents or a eiy elat' st ^

e{9 e '[s s 9 fjom '

n sys e s Many commenters stated that this actuated and because the fire water requirement should be deleted becuuse he as s or that et t nent is o old. supply system is not designed to many older plant designs did not m we 1a a a e massive withstand seismic events. In addition,

, consider associated circuits and this it.

these pumps are located within the therefore, a new design requirement.

biolo ical shield inside containment, The commenters felt that the analysis hInst a he omena econd,t there ore, timely fire brigade action that will be required to satisfy this history of many fires associated with would be difficult if the suppression requirement will be both long and

, rec ea "

system malfunctions. Further,if the complicated and the reguliement should

, d e eva uations showed 8uppression system becomes inoperable therefore be deleted.

that such fires usually are due to failure dwing operation, a fire watch er patrol The Commission rejected these of iping or tanks of flammable gasses or fiquids such as municipal natural gas cann t enter the area dwing operatim. Suggestions for the following reasons.

distribution systams or gasoline storage Comment Resolution 1. Virtually all of the fire protection and/or dmpenshig stations. Where such A number of commenters suggested niodifications made to date have been potential fire hazards exist in nuclear that this section is too detailed and re,uired to correct deficiencies that power plants (e g., hydresen for should be substantially modified. This resulted from lack of consideration of generator cooling, or oil fuel for the requirement was changed to delete the certain specific items during initial emergency diesel generator or station option of protecting the reactor coolant design and construction.

space heating boilers) they are designed pump lubrication systein with an 2.The Browns Ferry fire showed the and installed to withstand the damagin8 automatic fire suppression system. We necessity of divisional separation of the effects of various natural phenomena. have modified the rule to indicate that associated circuit of the control cables and other special fire protection features the requirement that the oil collection to prevent the disabling of safety are provided as necessary. liowever. system be designed to provide systems by a single fire. This has been General Design Criterion 2 Design Bases reasonable assurance that it will dwussed with licensees during for Pmtection Against Natumi withstand the Safe Shutdown evaluations of alternative and dedicated Phenomena requires that structures. Earthquake can be met by satisfying shutdown capability and is necessary to systems, and components important to paragraph C.2. of Regulatory Guide 1.29. ensure that safe shutdown systems will esfety h designed ta withstand the " Seismic Design Classification," as be able to function properly in the event effects ct earthquakes without loss of described above.

• of fire' capability to peric em their safe'y Q. Associated Circuits.

function. Regulatory Guide 1.29 TechnicalBasis. When considering 1 b d* b " d'" EC " M "8"Y

" Seismic Design Classification," the consequences of a fire in a given fire fire hazard analysis that does not describes an a ceptable meSod for e*ea during the evaluation of safe consider the effects of fire damage to identifying and clasdfying those shutdown capabilities of a plant, the circuits that are associated with safe features oflight water-cooled nuclear ataff must be able to conclude that one shutdown systems.

power plants that should be designed to train of equipment that can be used As indicated v.bove, as a result of the wit!. stand the effects of the Safe immediately to bring the reactor to a hot comments received on this issue, it is Shutdown Earthquake. In this guide, shutdown condition remains unafiected unclear that associated circuits have in paragraph C.'t applies to systems ! hat by that fire. The staff must also be able fact been adequately considered by are required to remain function't to licer. sees in their reviews using the

)

to conclude that damage to one tisin of ensure heat removal capability; equipment used for achieving cold guidance of Appendix A to BTP APCSB l paragraph C.2 applies to systens that do shutdown will be limited so that the 9.5-1. To ensure that *he associated I not have to remain frunctional for that equipraent can be returned to an circuits are considered, all operating purpose, but whose failure could reduce operable condition witMn 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. (See nuclear power plants will be required to the functioning of those systems covered Technical Basis for Section III.G. meet the requirements of Section III.G of by paragraph C.1. The reactor coolant " Protection of Se fe Shutdown Appendix R.

76610 Federal Keger / Vol. 45, No. 225 / Wednesday, November 19, 1980 / Rules and Regulations General Comments Resolution shutdown capability. The Commission comments received on the proposed does not agree. We believe that the regulations, other commenters Several commenters contended that demonstrated a thororgh understanding Commission regulations mandate that Commission's overall fire protection ,

program involving extensive plant. of the proposed requiremects.

an adjudicatory hearing be conducted Pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of rior to a final decision. One commenter specific fire protection modifications that are based on guidance set forth in 1954. as amended the Energy abeled the regulation an " order" within Reorganization Act of1974, as amended.

the meaning of the Administrative Branch Technical Position BTP APCSil -

9.5-1 and its Appendix A and the and Sectio is 552 and 553 of Tit ie 5 of the Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. 551(6))(APA) specific requirements of Appendix R to United States Code, notice is hereby and asserted that to CFR 2.204 of the given that the following amendments to Commiaion's regulations, " Order for resolve disputed issues provide adequate fire protection. Title 10. Chapter 1. Code of Federal Modification of 1.icense," applies to this Regulations, Part 50, are published as a rulemaking proceeding. One commenter stated that the ambiguity of the proposed regulation document subject to codification.

The Commission disagrees with these with regard to criticalitems requires 1. A new I 50.48 is added to read as comments. A rule"is defined in the follows:

APA to mean "the whole or a part of an that it be renoticed. The commenter

" d agency statement of general or g] ae ples of 9 50.48 Fire Protect 6on.

particular applicability and future effect (a) Each operating nuclear power oesigned to implement , , or suc ambiguity. They were Section  !!! G, Section Ill.N, and Section Ill.Q. We have plant shall have a fire protection plan prescribe law or policy , , (5U.S.C. that satisfies Criterion 3 of Appendix A reviewed these examples.

551(4)). The agency action questioned to this part. This fire protection plan In reference to the i;rst example, the h,ere is clearly one that treats similarly commenter stated that the first shall describe the oven d fire protection situated licensees equally and that program for the facility, identify the aragraph of Section ill.G identifies alternative shutdown capability as an various positiens within the licensee's ur nts. I or i ose licensees who organization that are responsibile for the ptional protective feature and that have not already provided an egiivalent paragraph !!!.G.2.c then identifies program, state the authorities that are level of fire protection, certain specif.ic alternative shutdown capability as a delegated to each of these positions to fire protection features are required. minimura fire protection feature. We do implement those responsibilities, and 4 Various of these requirements would outline the plans for fire protection, fire '

not agree with thu statement.The first apply to approximately 40, facilities. The aragraph of Section lil.G identifies detection and suppression capability, commenter,s characterization of the rule and limitation of fire damage. The plan alternative shutdown capability as one as an order, along with the a:sertion option in a combination of fire shall also describe specific fee tures that to CFR 2.204 raandates a hearing necessary to implement the program protection features for a specific fire area. Paragraph Ill.G.3 indicates when described above, such as administrative c r ec . On ta a e iat reguiction this option shond be used. controls and personnel requirements for t

(which does grant a hearmg right) In reference to the second example, f,re i prevention arid manual fire l

applies only to Commission orders that the commenter stated that Section Ill.N suppression activities, automatic and modify a license.81t does not apply t requires a pressure differential across manually operated fire detection and requirements promu.sated through a the test specimen during the testing of supprusion systems, and the means to rulemaking action conducted in fire ban.er penetration seals but fails to time nie damage to structures, systems, j accordance with the requirements of ddine the press 2re differential. This or components important to safety su j applicable law, comment is incorrect.The pressure that the capability to safely shut down l Several comrr'entera contended that differential called for by the proposed the plant is ensured.'  !

the environment.ilimpact had not been provision was the maximum pressure (b) Ar.mendix R to this part establishes 1 adequately addressed. One comm:nter, differential that the barrier would fire protection features required to i

citing tla requirements in Section Ill.A experience in the specific plant satisfy Criterion 3 of Appendix A to this of Appendix R for two water supplies installation. In any event, the part with respect to certain generic and two separate redundant sections as requireretit for pressure differential issues for nuclear power plants licensed examples of requirements irivolving during such testing has been deleted to operate prior to January 1,1979.

envitonmental issues, antended that since only noncombustible material in Except for the requirements of Sections the Commission relied upon its stafra now being used for such seals. III.G 1111. and 111.0, the provisions of

' unsupported determination that- In reference to the third example, the Appendix k to this part shall not be pursuant to 10 CFR I 51.5(d), an commenter stated that Section Ill.Q is applicable to nuclear power plants environmental impact statement, totally lacking in definition. We do not licensed to operate prior to lanuary 1, appraisal, or negative rkclaration is not agree. Footnote 6 references Regulatory 1979, to the extent that fire protection required. The Commission has Guide 1.75 and IEEE Std,3y-1974. The features proposed or implemented by considered Sectbn III.A and has further latter document is a commonly used considered the remaining requirements industry standard that defines s aasic fire protection suidance for nuclear power of Appendix R and remains convinced associated circuits and provides piants is contained in two NRC documents:

that the regulations are not substantive guidance for ensuring that such circuits

• DranchTechnical Position Auxiliary Power and are insignificant from the standpoint do not compromise the independence of Conversion System Branch IrrP APCS 8 9 bl.

of environmentalimpact, %uidehnes f mndr tecti n f r Nudear Powu the shutdown circuita fhey are One commenter suggested that all associated with. ' 'Ny'1E '"

dai plants be required to install dedicated Ilased on the above examples and our . Appendix A to BTP APcss e.51. "cuidelmes review of the other provisions of the for Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants

'll should also be noted that 12.204 is codified in proposed rule, we do not believe that Docketed Pnor to luly 1.1976." for plants that were Subpart H of to CFR Pari 2. The scope of Subpart B perstmg or under various stages of design or lhe !e as proposed Was ambiguous so construction before July 1,197s, dated August 23.

l.a spenfically bmited to " cases inihated by the staff as to require renoticing. Moreover,it me.

. . io ,mpo., ,,9,,,,,,ni, by o, der on a bcenser tto CFR 2 20n(s)),(F.mphasis supphed i should be noted that, based on other Also see Note 4

Federal Register / Vol. 45 No. 225 / Wednesday, Nomber 19, 1980 / Rules en:1 Regulations 76611 the licensee have been accepted by the after the effective date of this section determines, upon a showing by the NRC staff as satisfying the provisions of and Appendix R to this part: licensee, tnat there is good cause for Appendix A to Branch Technical (1) the first refueling outage; exter.dtng such date and that the public Position BTP APCSD 9.5-1* reflected in (11) another planned outage that lasts health and safety is not adversely

, staff fire protection safety evaluation for at inst 00 days: or affected by such extension. Extensions reports issued prior to the effective date (111) an unplanned outage the lasts for of such date shall not exceed the dates of this rule. or to the extent that fire at least 120 days. determined by paragraphs (c)(1) through protection features were accepted by (4) Those fire protection features that (c)(4) of this section.

the staff in comprehensive fire require prior NRC approval by (1) Those fire protection features that protection safety evaluation reports partgraph (c)(5) of this section, shall be involve revisions of administrative issued before Appendix A to Branch imphmented within the following controls, manpower changes, and Technical Position DTP APCSB 9.5-1 schedule: Dedicated shutdown training anall be implemented within 4 was published in August 1970. With systems-30 months after NRC months after the date of the NRC staff respect to all other fire protection approval; ma lifications requiring plant Fire Protection Evaluation Report features covered by Appendix R all shutdown-before startup after the accmting or requiring such features.

nuclear power plants licensed to operate earliest of the events given in paragraph (y Those fire protection features prior to january 1,1979 shall satisfy the (c)(3) commencing 180 days after NRC involving installation of modifications applicable requirements of Appendix R approval: modifications not r quiring not requiring prior approval or plant to this part. including specifically the plant ahutdown-0 months after NRC shutdown shall be implemented within requirements of Sections IILG, III.J. and approval. 12 months after tb date of the NRC

!!!.O. (5) Licensees shall make any atoff Fire Protectior Safety Evaluation m difications necessary to cornp'y with Report accepting or requiring such (c) All fire peotection modifications these requirements in accordance with features.

rc quire to satisfy the provisions of the above schedule without prior review '3) Thue fire protection features, Appendlx R to this part or directly and approval by NRC except for including siternative shutdown affected by such re ultements shall be m difications required by Section Ill.G.3 capability, involving installation of completed on the fo lowing schedule:

of Appendix R to this part. Licensees modifications requiring plant shutdown (1)Those fire protection features that shall submit plans and schedules for shall be implemented before the startup involve revisions of administrative meeting the provisions of paragraphs after the earliest of the following events controls, nunpower changes, and (c)(2), (c)(3), and (c)(4) within 30 days commencing 9 months or more after the tralning, shall be implemented within 30 after the effective date of this section date of the NRC staff Fire Protection days after the effective date of this and Appendix R to this part. Licensees Safety Evaluation Report accepting or section and Appendix R to this part- shall submit design descriptio:a of '

requiring such faatures:

(2)Those fire protection features that modifications needed to satisfy Section (1)The first refueling outage; involve installation of modifications that Ill.G.3 of Appendix R to this part within (ii) Another planned outsge that lasts do not require prior f.dC approval or 30 days after the the effective date of for at least 60 days; or plant shutdorn shall be implemented this section and Appendix R to this part. (iii) An unplanned outage that lasts within 9 months after the effective date (6) In the event that a request for for at least 120 days.

of this section and Appendix R to this exemption from a requirement to comply (4) Those fire protection features p.rt. with one or more of the provisiona of involving dedicated shutdown capability (3) Thosa fire protection features, Appendix R filed within 30 days of the requiring new buildings and systems except for thoso requiring prior NRC effective date of this rule is based on an shall be implemented within 30 months upproval by paragraph (c)(5) of this assertion by the licensee that such of NRC approval. Other modifications section, that involee installation of required modifications would not requiring NRC approval prior to modifications that do req dre plant enhance fire protection safety in the installation shall be implemented within shutdown, the need for wiuch is lustifica facility or that such modifications may 6 months after NRC approval.

In the plans and scheJules required by be detrimental to overall facility safety, (e) Nuclear power plants licensed to the provisions of paragraph (c)(5) of this the schedule requirersents of paragraph operate after January 1,1979, shall section, shall be implemented before (c) shall be tolled until final Commission complete all fire protection startup after the earliest of the following acuan on the exemption request upon a modifications needed to satisfy events commencing 180 dayi. or more determinatico by the Director of Nuclear Critedon 3 of Appendix A to this part in Reactor Regulation that the licensee has accordance with the provisions of their

• ctartricauon and seidence with roepect to provided a sound technical basis for licensen.

permi .ibt, alternauves to atisfy Appendix A to such assertion that warrants further 2. A new Appendix R is added to trrP APC3D 9 S-1 has been provided in four other g[g(( review of the re uest. 10 CFR Part 50 to read as follows:

"SIpp om ntary Guidance on informat on e o gy ,fg g,gg gn Fi e Prote ti n Appendix R-Fire Protectico Ptogram for for Protecuon Evaluation." dated er Facilities Optrating Prior to Safety Evaluation Reports referred to in h"'ua*ry' 1 19

• Sample Technical Specincauon." dated May paragraph (b) cf this section and

u. ten. supplements to such reports, other than / Introduction and scope

. "Nuci ar riani rire Protectiva Functiona' features covered by pr agraph (c). shall This Appendix applies to licensed nuclear unponsibuiues. Ad,ministrouve control and be complated as soon as practicable but power electric generating stauons that were Quakty Assurance, dated lune 14.19n. operating prior to January 1.19M. excep' M no later inan the completion date the extent set forth in paragrapi 50.48(b) of .

Reactors ate May 1.1 s currently specified in license Conditions p '" 8 ' "

A Fire protection Safety Evatustion Report out or technical specificatiors for such IIue,a , rele

{ Qots fo h fi e I has been .asued for each operating plani sts ,e how facility, or the date determined by protection featura required to satisfy lasue th I paragraphs (d)(1) through (d)(4) of this Criterion 3 of Appendix A to ttle part.'

d ni e o n fire rol ct rnoived when the factitty sationes the appropneie section, whichever is sooner, unless the __

requirements of Appendia R to this part. Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation a sce footnote 4

76612 Federal Register / Vol. 45, No. 225 / Wednesday. November 19. 1980 / Rules und Hegulations Cntenon 3 of Appendix A to this part program shall estabbsh the hre protection IL A/ternative or DedicatedShutdown specifies that " Structures. systems. and pohry for the protection of structures, Capobihty components important to safety shall be sy stems. and components important to safety h areas where the hre pro'ection features ,

designed and located to mmimize, consistent at each plant and the procedures, equipment. cannot ensure safe shutdown capability la with other safety requirements. the and personnel required to implement the the event of a fire in that area, alternative or probabihty and effect of fires and program e' the plant site. dedicated safe shutdown capabihty shall be e xplosions " The hre protec tion program shall be under provided ,

When considering the effects of fire. those the direction of an individual who has been de.cgated authority commensurate with the

/// Specific /lequirements systems associated with chieving and mainte,ning safe shutdown conditions responsibihties of the position and who has A. Water Supplies for Fire Suppression assume major importance to safety because available staff personnel knowledgeable in Systems damage to them can lead to core damage both hre protection and nuclear safety. Two separate water supphes shall be resulting from loss of coolant through bmloff. The hre protection program shall extend provided to furnish necessary water volume The phrases "important to safety " or the concept of defense-m.debth to fire aci pressure to the fire main loop,

" safety related." will be used throughout this protection in hre areas important to safety, Each supply shall consist of a storage tank.

Appendix R as applying to all safety with the following objectives: pump piping, and appropriate isolation and functions. The phrase " safe shutdown" will e to prevent fires from starting, control valves. Two separate redundant be used throughout this Appendix R as e to detect rapidly, control, and extinguish suctions in one or more intake struttures applying to both hot and cold shutdown promptly those hres that do occur; from a large body of water [rtver. lake, etc.)

functions- a to provide protection for structures, will satisfy the requirement for two separated llecause fire may affect safe shutdown systems, and components important to safety water storage tanks.These aupplies shall be systems and because the loss of function of so that a fire that is not promptly separated so that a failure of one supply will systems used to mitigate the consequences of extinguished by the fire ,uppression activities not result in a failure of the other supply.

design basis accidente under postfire will not prevent the safe shutdown of the Each suppiv of the fire water distributmn condtilons does not per se irnpact public plant. system shall be capable of pro.iding for a.

safety, the need to hmit fire damage to 11 Mre //asan/s Analysis period of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> the maximurt expected systems required to achieve and mamtain A fire hazards analysis shall be peformed water demands as determined by the fire,,

safe shutdown conditions is greater than the by quahfied fire protection and reacwr hazards analysis for safety-related areas or need to hmit hre damage to those systems systems engineers to lli consider potentialin other areas that present a fire exposure "'

required to mitigate the consequences of situ and transient fire hnards,(2) determine hazard to safety related areas.

design basis accidents. Three levels of hre the consequences of fire la any location in When storage tanks are used for comb!ned damage hmits are estabhshed according to the plant on the abihty to safely shut down service water / fire water uses the minfmum the safely functions of the structure, system, the reactor or on the ability to minimize and volume for fire uses shall be ensored by or component: control the release of radioactivity to the means of dedicated tanks or by some environment; and (3) specify measures for physical means such as a vertical standpipe

_tweiv_funri_ne, _ - . _F _, demoge _ _ _ .imie ___. fire prevention, fire detection, fire for other water service. Administrative suppressien. and fier containment and controls, including locks for tank outlet Hossee kma , one tem W . sac-w neceu y to alternative shutdown capabihty as required valves, are unacceptable as the only means

• >"'de*****"*** for each hw area containing structures, to ensure minimum water volume.

[' ,7,",, , systems, and componecte important to safety Other water systems used as one of the hoe W ke demee t,y a mngw ke, in accordance with NRG guidelines and two fire water supplies shall be permanently nutne en egema be ' regulations. connected to the fire main system and shall y C. Fire Prevention Featuren R* *,*'* _ be capable of automatic alignment to the fire o ps e,, , ,,, w , muw, Iire protection Icatures shall meet the main system. pumps, contro!s, and power en enmeise me, tmA damage must following general regulH ments for all fire supphes in these systems shall satisfy the tie no ee ' areas that contain or presant a fire hazard to requirements Ier the main fire pumps. Tha j

• • wn r2 twwe unne onow cepshs structures, systems, or components important use of other water systems for fire protection ny to safety. shall not be incompatible with their functions Demon home Bom some W asgeneni neceese'Y l in situ hre hazards shall be identified required for safe plant shutdown. Failure of hewnie awhos W s and suitable protection provided. the other system shall not degrade the fi e i,,o.m. ,,t,, , , ,, ,y ,. 2, Transient nre hazards associated with main system.

=e normal operation, maintenance, repair, or IL Sectional / solation Valves modihcation activities shall be identified and Sectional isolation valves such as post r$i D U Ier*2 m"'eU *a" ** chminated where possible. Those transient indicator valves or key operated valves shall t

owv.i w miv einnun no w w emoeS/c'*rU.d*".3 nw treien fire hazards that can not be eliminated shall be installed in the fire main loop to permit ,

I. [ *eYr.* i$ "gY' emYc'en".*oN e5Ei n a contro d and suitable protection isolation of portions of the fire main loop for j einn.n n eyewme. e consoww imswine w sewey provided. maintenance or repair without interrupting

• N7m#e "E' NY,"$7 '*."' 3 hre detection systnns, portable the entire water supply, NSUu.T.

ex amo o e ume == exs a we mmuro comnuaiu.n cxtingmshers, and standpipe and hose n

C //ydrunt / solation volves .

NioEoeN 7mniYe N I7m"'[e*"u"fy y statmns shall be installed. Valves shall be installed to permit isolation

4. Hrc barners nr automatic suppression of outside hydrants from the fire main for The most stringent hre damage limit shall systems or both shall be installed as mainienance or repair without interrupting apply for those systems that fallinto more necessary to protect redundant systems or the water supply to automatic or manual fire ,

dan one category. Redundant sy1Irms used components necessary for safe shuidown, suppression systems in any area containing to miligate the consequences of ether design 5, A site fire brigade shali be established or presenting a fire hazard to safety-related basis so.idents but not necessary for safe trained, and equipped and shall be on site at or safe shutdown equipment, shutdown may be lost to a single exposure all times. Il Manual Fire Suppression hre. llowever, protecQn shall be prowided so it Fire detection and suppression systems Standpipe and hose systems shell be that a hre within only one such system will shall be designed, installed, maintained, and installed so that at least one effective home not damage the redundant system. tested by personnel properly qualified by stream will be able to reach any location that esperience and training in fire protection contains or presents an exposure fire hazard l // Cencru/ Requirements systems. to structures, systems or cnmponents l A Fire Prvicction Progtum 7. Surymllance procedures shall be important to safety.

( A fire protection program shall be estabbshed to ensure that fire barriers are in Access to permit effective functioning of l estabhshed at each nuclear power plant. The place and that fire suppression systems and the hre brigade shall be provided to all areas components are operable that contain or present an exposure fire

Federal Register / Vol. 45, No. 225 / Wednesday, November 19, 1980 / Rules and Regulations 76613 hazard to structures. systems, or components hour rating. In addition, fire detectors and an Institute for Occupational Safety and l Irnportant to safely automatic fire suppression system shall be llealth-approval forinerly given by the U.S.

Standpipe and huse stam,as shat! be inside installed in the fire area; Bureau of Mines) shall be pmvided for fire pWR containrnents and DWR containments inside noninerted containments one of the brigade, damage control, and control room that are not inerted. Standpipe and hose fire protection means specified above or one personnel. At least to masks shall be stations inside containment may be of the following fire protection means shall available for fire brigade personnel. Control connected to a high quch y water supply of be provided: room persormel may be furnished breathing  ;

sufficient quantity and pressure other than d. Separation of cables and equipment and air by a manifold system piped from a j the f re main loop if plant. specific features associated non.6,afety circuits of redundant storage reservoir if practical. Service or rated 4 p event extending the fire main supply inside tiains by a horiz mtel distance of more than operating life shall be a minimum of one-half i containment. For UWR drywells, standpipe 20 feet with no intervening combustibles or hour for the self. contained units.

and hose stations shall be placed outside the fire hazaMs: At least two extra air bottles shall be I dry well with adequate lengths of hose to e. Installation of firt. detectors and an located on site for each self. contained reach any location inside the dry well with automatic fire suppression system in the fire breathing unit in addition, an onsite e-hour an effective hose stream. area: or supply of reserve air shall be provided and E. //ydrostatic Hose Tests f. Separatioa of cables and equipment and arranged to permit quick and complete Fire hose shall be hydrostatically tested at associated non-safety circuits of redundant replenishment of exhausted supply air bottles a pressure of 300 psi or 50 psi above trains by u noncombustible radiant energy as they a e m*mned. If compressors are used maximum hre main operating pressure, shield. as e source of breathing air, only units whichever is greater Ifose stored in outside 3. Alternative or dedicated shutdown approved for breathing air shall be used hose houses shall be tested annaally. Interior capability and its associated circuits." compressors shall be operable enuming a standpipe hose shall be tested every three independent of cables, systems or loss of offsite power Special care must be years. components in the area, room or zone under taken to locate the compressor in areas free F. Automatic Fire Detection consideration, shall be provided of dust and contaminants.

Automatic fire detection systems shall be a.Where the protection of systems whose 1. rire Brigade Training matalled in all areas of the plant that contain function is required for hot shutdown does The fire brigade training program shall or present an exposure fire hazard to safe not satisfy the requirement of paragraph G.2 ensure that the capebility to fight potential shutdown or safety.related systems or of this section:or fires is established and maintained. %e components. These fire detection systems b. Where redundant trains of systems program shall cons!st of an initial claurocas shall b'e capable of operating with or without required for hot shutdown located in the instruction program followed by periodic offsite power. same fire area may be subject to damage classroom instruction, fire fighting praction, G. Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown om t' ire suppression activities or from the and fire drills:

Capabihty rupture or inadvertent operation of fire 1. instruction

1. Fire protection features shall be provided suppression systems. a. %e initial classroom instruction shall for structures, systems, and components In addition, fire detection and a fixed fire include:

important to safe shutdown. These features suppression system shall be installed in the (1) Indoctrination of the plant fire fighting shall be capable of limiting fire damage so area, room, or zone under consideration. plan with specific identification of each that: 11. Fire Brigade individual's responsibilities.

a. One train of systems necessary to A site fire brigade trained and equipped for (2) Identification of the type and location of achieve and maintain hot shutdown fire fighting shall be established to ensure fire hazards and associated types of fires that conditions from either the control room or adequate manual fire fighting capability for could occur in the plant.

emergency control station (s)is free of fire all areas of the plant containing structures. (3) The toxic and corrosive characteristics damage: and systems, or components important to safety. of expected products of combustion.

b. Systems necessary to achieve and The fire brigade shall be at least five (4) Identification of the location of fire maintain cold shutdown from either the members on each shift. The brigade leader fighting equipment for each fire . ires and control room or emergency control station (s) and at least two brigade members shall have familiarization with the layout of the plant, can be repaired within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. sufficient training in or knowledge of plant including access and egress routes to each

2. Except as provided for paragraph G.3 of safety-related systems to understand the area.

this section, where cables or equipment, effects of fire and fire suppressants on safe (5) he proper use of available fire fighting including associated non-o.fety circuits that shutdown capability. The qualification of fire equipment and the correct method of fighting brigade members shallinclude an annual each type of fire.%e types of fires covered could prevent operation or cause physical exarnination to determine their should include fires in energized electrical maloperation due to hot shorts, open circuits, or shorts to ground. or redundant trains of ability to perform stenuous fire fighting equipment, fires in cables and cable trays, activities. The shift supervisor shall not be a hydrogen fires, fires involving flammable and systems necessary to achieve and maintain member of the fire brigade.The brigade combustible liquids or hazardous process hot shutdown conditions are located withia leader shall be competent to assess the I

the same fire area outside of primary chemicals, fires resulting from construction or  ;

potential safety conserluences of a fire and modifications (welding), and record file fires.

containment, one of the folinwing means of l advise control room personnel. Such (e) The pruper use of communication.

ensuring that one of the redundant trains is I c mpetence by the brigade leader may be lighting, ventilation, and emergency breathing free of fire damage shall be provided: l evidenced by possession of an operator a equipment.

a. Separation of cables and equipment and license r equivalee knowledge of plant (7) The pruper rnethod for fighting fires l associated non safety circuits of redundant safety.related systems. Inside buildings and confined spaces.

trains by a fire barrier heving a 3-hour rating. The minimum equipment provided fvr the Structural steel forming a part of or (8) The direction and coordination of the brigade shall consist of personal protective fire fighting activities (fire brigade leaders supporting such fire batriers shall be equipment such as turnout coats, boots, prNected to provide fire resistance only).

gbu. had ha mergency communications (9) Detailed review of fire fighting equivalent to that tequired of the barrier: '9"i ment. porta e lights porta le

b. Separetion of cables and equipment and P strategies and procedures.

i" ** * "'

• associated non-safety circuits of r,edundant i guish a f or$ta ned r athing trains by a horizontal distance of more than ' "' " " 8 "

apparatus using full-face positive-pressure 20 feet with no intervening combustible or masks approved by NIOSit (National 8h "" E I"" * '

fire hasards in addition, fire detectors and an Noto-Items (9) ard (10) may be deleted automatic fire suppression system shall be "" "8 " " " * ""'*

installed in the fire area; or

• Alternative shutdown capabihty is provided by reroutmg. relocating or modificating of existing n n* perations personnel who may in

c. Enclosure of cable and equipment and systems; dedicated shutdown capab61 sty is provided assigned to the fire brigade.

associated non. safety circuits of one by installing new structures and systems for the b. The instruction shall be provided by redundant train in a fire barrier having a 1 function of postfire shutdown. qualified individuals who are knowledgeable,

7M14 Federal Register / Vol. 45. No 225 / Wednesday, November 19. 1980 / Rules and Regulations

'~*

e sperienced, and suitably trumed in fighting brigade, and selection placement and use of required additional fire protection in the the types of fires that could occur in the plani eqmpment. and fire fighting strategies. work attaity procedure.

and in usmg the types of equipment rvailable (2) Anaessment of each brinde member's 5. Govern the use of Ignition sources by use in the nuclear power planl. knowledge of his or her role in the fire of a llame permit system to control welding, i

c. Instruction shall be provided to all fire fightmg strategy for the area assumed to llame cutting. brazing. or soldering br6Hade members and Isre brigade leaders contain the fire. Assessmeni of the brigade operations. A separate permit shall be issued

d. Regular planned meetmas shall be held member's conformance with estabbshed fer each area where work in to be done. If al least every 3 months for all brigade plant fire fightmg procedures and une of fire work continues over more than one shift the rnembers to review changes in the fire hghting equipment. includmg self. contained permit shall be vahd for not more than 24 protechon program and other subjects as rmergency breathmg apparatus, hours when the plant is operating or for the necessary. L:mmunication equipment, and ventdation duration of a particular job during plant

e. Penodic refresher training sessions shall eq iipment. to the extent practicable, shutdown.

be held to repeat the classroom instruction (h The simulated use of fire fighting 6 Control the removal from the area of all program for all bngade members over a two- equipment required to cope with the situation waste. debris, scrap. oil spills. or other year penod. These sessions may be and type of fire selected for the dnll The combustibles resulting from the work activity concurrent with the regular p.anned area and type of fire chosen for the drill immediately following completion of the meetmgs should differ from those used in the previous activity or at the end of each work shift.

2. /% dire dri;l so that brigade members are trained in whichever comes first.

Practice sessions shall be held for each fighting fires in various plant areas. The 7. Maintain the periodic housekeeping shif t fire brigade on the ppcr method of situation selected should simulate lhe size inspecuons to ensure continued compliance fightmg the various types of fires that could and arrangement of a fire that could with these admimstrative controls.

occur m a nuclear power plant.These reasonably occur in the area selected. 8. Control the use of specific combustibles sessions shall provida brigade members with allowing for hre development due to the time in safer v-related areas. All wood used in experience m actual fire extinguishment and required to respond. to obtain equipment, and safety-related areas during maintenance, the une of rmergency breathing apparatus organize for the fire, assuming loss of modification. or refuehng operations (such as snder strenuous conditions encountered in automatic suppression capability, lay-down blocks or scaffolding) shall be hre fightmg.These practice sessions shall be (4) Assessment of brigade leader's treated with a flame retardant. Equipment or provided at least once per yaar for each fire direction of the fire fighting effort as to supplies (such as r.cw fuel) shipped in brigade member. thoroughness. accuracy, and effectiveness. untreated combustible packing containers u 1/>n//s 4. Recon /s may be unpacked in safety related areas if

a. Fire bngade drills shall be performed in Individual records of training provided to required for valid operating reasons.

the pla at so that tha fire brigade can practice cach fire brigade member, including drill However, all combustible matericts shall be as a team- critiques, shall be maintained for at least 3 removed from the area immediately following

, b. Drills shall be performed at regular years to ensure that each member receives the unpacking. Such tiansient combustible intervals not to exceed 3 months for each training in all parts of the training program. material. unless stored in approved shift fire brigade. F.ach fire brigade member These records c' training shall be available containers. shall not be left unattended should participate in each drill, but must for NRC review Retraimng or broadened during lunch breaks. shift changes, or other participate m at least two drills per year, training for fire fighting within buildmgs shall similar periods. Loose combustible packing A sufhcient number of these drdis. but not be scheduled for all those brigade members material such as wood or paper excelsior, or less than one for each shift fire brigade per whose performance records show polyethylene sheeting shall be placed in year, shall be unannounced to determine the deficiencies. metal containers with tight-fitting self-closing fire fighting readmess of the plant fire J. Emergency Lighting metal covers.

brigade, bngade leader, and fire protection Emergency lighting units with at least an 8- 9. Control actions to be taken by an systems and equipment. persons planning hour battery power supply shall be provided individual discovering a fire, for example, and authorizing an unannounced drill shall in all areas needed for operation of safe notification of control room, attempt to ensure that the responding shift fire brigade shutdown equipment and in access and extinguish fire, and actuation of local fire members are not aware that a drillin being egress routes thereto, suppression systems.

planned until it is begun. Unannounced dnlis K. Admimatratim Controls 10. Control actions to be taken by the shall not be scheduled closer than four Administrative controls shall be control room operator to determine the need week s established to minimize fire hazards la areas for brigade assistance upon report of a fire or At least une drdi per year shall be containing structures, systems. and receipt of alarm on control room annunciator perforravd on a "back shift" for each shift hre components important to safety. These panel, for example, announcing location of brigude controls shall establish procedures to: fire over pA system, sounding fire alarms,

c. The dn'Is shall be preplanned to 1. Govern the handling and hmitation of the and notifying the shift supervisor and the fire estabhsh the training objectives of the drd! use of ordinary combustible materials, brigade leader of the type, size. and location and shall be critiqued to determine how well combustible and flammable gases and of the fire.

the training objectives have been met. hquids. high efficiency particulate air and 11. Control actions to be taken by the hre linannounced drills shall be planned and charcoal fibers. dry ton exchange resins or brigade after notification by the control room critiqued by members of the management other combustible supplies in soiety related operator of a fire, for example, assembling in staff responsible for plant safety and fire areas a designated loc ition, receiving directions pndection performance deficiencies of a hre 2. prohibit the storage of combustibles in from the fire brigade leader, and discharging brigade or of individual fire brigade members safety-related areas or estabbsh designated specinc fire fighting responsibihties includmg shall be remedied by scheduhng additional storage areas with appropriate fire selection and transportation of fire fighting training for the brigade or members protection. equipment to fire location selection of Unnatisfactory drdi performance shall be 3. Govern the handhng of and limit protective equipment opesating instructions followed by a repeat drill within 30 days. transient fire loads such as combustible and for use of fire suppression systems, and use d At 3 year intervals, a randomly selected flammable liquius wood and plastic of preplanned strategies for fighting fires in unannounced dnll shall be cr!tiqued by products, or other combustible materials in specific areas, quahf ed individuals independent of the buildings containing safety.relot-d systems 12. Define the strategies for fighting fires in hrensee's staff. A copy of the written report or equipment during all phases of operating. all safety-related areas and arcar piesenting from such Individuals shall be available for and especially during maintenance. a hazard to safety related equipment. These NRC review.

modification. or refueling operations. strategies shall designate:

e. Drills shall ne a minimum include the 4 Designate the onsite staff member a. Fire hazards in each area covered by the following- responsible for 'br inplant fire protectu specific prehre plans.

(tl Assessment of fire alarm effectivewss. review of proposed work activities to identify b. Fire estinguishants best suited for time required w notify and assemble hro potential transient hre hazards and specify controlling the fires associated with the fire

Federal Register / Vol. 45,~ No. 225 / Wednesday, November 19, 1980 / Rules 'and Regulations 76615 hazards in that area and the nearest location coolant level above the top of the core for separation and barriers between trays and of these extinguishants. DWRs and be within the level indication in condu ts containing associated circuits of one

c. Most-favorable direction from which to the pressurizer for PWRs. safe shutdown division and treys and attack a fire in each area in view of the c. The reactor heat removal function shall conduits containing casociated circuits or ventilation direction. access hallways. stairs. be capable of achieving and maintaining safe shutdown cables from the redundant and doors that are most hkely to be free of decay heat removal. division, or the isolation of these asscciated

' fire, and the best station or elevation for d. The process monitoring function shall be circuits from the safe shutdown equipn ent, fighting the fire. All access and egress routes capable of providing direct readings of the shall be such that a postulated fire involving that involve locked doors should be process variables necessary to perform and associated circuits will not prevent safe "

specFically identified in the procedure with control the above functions. shutdown >

the appropriate precautions and methods for e. The supporting functions shall be M. Tim Barrier Cable Penetration Seal access specified. capable of providing the process cooling. Qualific nion

d. Plant systems that should be managed to lubrication, etc., necessary to permit the Penetration seal designs shall utilize only

. reduce the damage potential during a local operation of the equipnient used for safe noncombustible materials and shall be ,

fire and the location of local and remote shutdown functions. qualified by tests that are comparable to tests controls for such management (e.g. any 3. The shutdown capability for specific fire used to rate fire barriers.The acceptance hydraube or electrical systems in the zone areas may be unique for each such area, or it criteria for the test shall include:

covered by the specific fire fightmg procedure may be one unique combination of systems L The cable fire barrier penetration seal that could increase the hazards in the area for all such areas. In either case, the has withetood the fire endurance sest without because of overpressurization or electrical alternative shutdown capability shall be passage of flame or ignition of cables on the ha zards). independent of the specific fire area (s) and unexposed side for a period of time

e. Vital heat-sensitive system components shall accommodate postfire conditions where equivalent to the fire resistance rating that need to be kept cool while fighting a offsite power is available and where offsite required of the barrier; local fire. Particularly hazardous power is not available for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. 2. The temperature levels recorded for the combusubles that need cochng should be Procedures shall be in effect to implement unexposed side are analyzed and designated. this capability. demonstrate that the maximum temperature

f. Organization of fire fighting brigades and 4. If the capability to achieve and maintain is sufficiently below the cable insulation she aasignment of special duties according to cold shutdown will not be available because ignition temperature; and job title so that all fire fighting f mctions are of fire dt. mage. the equipment and systems 3. The fire barrier penetration seal remains covered by any complete shift personnel comprising the means to achieve and intact and does not allow projection of water complement. These dutjes include command maintain the hot standby or hot shutdown beyond the unexposed surface during the control of the brigade, transporting fire condition shall be capable of maintaining hose stream test.

suppression and support equipment to the fire such conditions until cold shutdown can be N. Fina Doors scenes, applying the extinguishant to the fire, achisved. If such equipment and systems will Fire doors shall be self-closing or provided communication with the control room, and not be capable of being powered by both with closing mechanisus and shall be coordination with outside fire departments. onsite and offsite electric power systems inspected semiannually to verify that

g. Potential radiological and toxic hazards because of fire damage, an independent automatic hcid-open, release, and closing in fire zones. onsite power system shall be provided. The mechanisms and latches are operable,

h. Ventilation system operation that number of operating shift personnel. One of the following measures shall be ensures desired plant air distribution when exclusive of fire brigade members, required provided to ensure they will protect the the sentilation flow is modified for fire to operate such equipment and systems shall opening as required in case of fire:

containment or smoke clearing operations. be on site at all times. t Fire doors shall be kept closed and

i. O i ,. u%ns requiring control room and $. Equipment and systems comprising the electrically supervised at a continuously shif+ ' %r coordc um or authorization. means to achieve and maintain cold manned location;

j. b auctkons for paSt operators and shutdown conditions shall not be damaged 2. Fire doors shall be locked closed and general plant personnel during fire. by fire; or the fire damage to such equipment ingscted weekly to verify that the doors are L Alternative and DedicatedShutdown and systems shall be limited so that the in the closed position; Capability systems can be made operable and cold 3. Fire doors shall be provided with t Alternative or dedicated shutdown shutdown achieved within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. automatic hold.open and release mechanisms capability provided for a specific fire area Materials for such repairs sh, ll be readily and inspected daily to verify that doorways shall be able to achieve and maintain available on site and procedares shall be in are free of obstructions: or subtritical reactivity conditions in the effect to implement such repairs. If such t Fire doors shall be kept closed and reactor. maintain reactor coolant inventory equipment and systems used prior to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> inspected daily to verify that they are in the achieve and maintain hot standb> ' after the fire will not be capabh of being closed positi n.

conditions for a PWR (hot shutdown ifor a powered by both onsite ad offsite electric The fire brigade leada phall have ready BWR) and achieve cold shutdown ' power systems because of fire damage, an access to keys for any kned fire doors, conditions within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> and maintain cold independnet onsite power systen shall be Areas protected by automatic total flooding i shutdowa conditions thereafter. During the provided. Equipment and systems used after gas suporession systems shall have postfire shutdown, the reactor coolant system n hours may be powered by offsite power electrically supervised self-closing fire doors process variables shall be maintained within only. r shall sa;isy option 1 above those predicted for a loss of normal a.c. 6. Shutdown systems installed to ensure O. OilCo//ection System for Reactor power, and the fission product boundary postfire shutdown capability need not be C o/on& ump integrity shall not be affected; l.e., there shall designed to meet seistqic Category I criteria, The reactor coolant pump shall be ,

be no fuel clad damage, rupture or any sin /e failure cr!Pria, or other design basis e9uipPed with an oil collection system if the primary coolant boundary, or rupture of the accident criteria. except where required for containment is not inerted during normal containment boundary. other reasons, e.g., because of interface with Peration. The oil collection system shall be

2. The performance goals for the shutdown so designed, engineered, and installad that or impart on existing safety systems.or functions shall be: because of adverse valve actions due to fire failure will not bad to fire during normal or

a. The reactivity control function shall be damage. design basis accident conditions and that

l. capable of achievmg and maintaining cold 7. The safe shutdown equipment and a An acceptable method of complying with this shutdown reactivity conditions. systems for each fire area shall be known to

b. The reactor coolant makeup function be isolated from associated non safety attemative w uld be to meet Regulatory cuide 1.7s sha3 be capable of maintaining the reactor circuits in the fire area so that hot shorts. [d

'r ni

[s'f oj open circuits, or shorts to ground in the redundant safety divisions are so prutected that

' As defined m the Standard Technical associated circuits will not prevent operation postulated fires affect trays from only one safety Specificetmns of the safe shutdown equipment.The division.

76616 Federal Register / Vol. 45. No. 225 / Wednesday November 19, 1980 / Rules and Regulations there is reasonable assurance that the system will withstand the Safe Shutdown

• Earthquake

• Such coll 6 uun systems shall be capable of j e collecting lube oil from all potential , c pressurized and unpressurtzed leakage sites in the reactor coolant pump lube oil systems.

leakage shall be collected and drained to a 1  !

vented closed container that can hold the entire tube oil system inventory. A flame arrester is required in the vent if the flash point characteristics of the oil present the hazard of fire flashback. l.cakage points to be protected sha!! include lift pump and piping, overflow lines, lube oil cooler, oil fill and ,

I drain lines and plugs, flanged connections on oil lines. and lube oil reservoirs where such features exist on the reactor coolant pumps.

The drain line shall be large enou# n to accommodate the largest potential oilleak.

(Sec.10tb. Pub. [ 8L703,68 Stat. 048; se;.

201. I%b.1. 91438,88 Stat.1242 (42 U.S.C.

2201(b). 5841))

Dated at Washington D.C.. this 17th day of  !

November 19fn For the Nuclear Regulatury Commission.

8:muel l. Chilk.

Socwtary of the Commission.

p1t tw sa astrs %d 1 bis at s 4s aml CLLeeG CODE 7:0441-48 J

r 1

o

• See Regulatory Guide 1.24 "Scismic Design ClassifirAlton" Paragraph C.2.

.. Enclosure 2 l

SUMMARY

OF STAFF REQUIREMENTS TO RESOLVE OPEN ITEMS Maine Yankee .

50-309 5

3.1.2 (c) Hose Stations In the Fire Protection Safety Evaluation Report, it was our concern that adequate manual fire suppression capability has net been provided. We request that 1-1/2 inch hose stations be added to ten areas.

The licensee has not provided us with the necessary information for us to complete our review.

3.1.17 Administrative Controls In the SER, it was our concern that the licensee's fire brigade was not trained and drilled adequately to provide assurance that the manual fire suppression capability would be adequate.

By letters dated June 21, 1978, August 14, 1978, and May 24, 1979, the licensee provided additional information regarding fire brigade leadership, training, and drills.

We informed the licensee that the proposed administrative controls were not acceptable for the following reasons:

1. Shift Supervisors should not be assigned as Fire Brigade Leaders.

The fire brigade leaders should meet the requirements of Section III, '- '-'

Paragraph H and I of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50.

3.2.7 Reactor Coolant Pump Lube Oil i

In the SER, it was our concern that the RCP oil system may leak and cause a fire.

By letter dated October 23, 1979, the licensee provided a description of their proposed oil collection system. We informed the licensee that the preposed oil collection system was not adequate to prevent a fire in the event of an oil leak.

The licensee should provide a RCP oil collection system which meets the requirements of Section III, Paragraph 0 of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50.

1 i

l

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