IR 05000277/1985043
| ML20140E215 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Peach Bottom  |
| Issue date: | 01/22/1986 |
| From: | Bailey R, Keimig R, Martin W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20140E174 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-277-85-43, 50-278-85-43, NUDOCS 8602030205 | |
| Download: ML20140E215 (4) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
50-277/85-43 Report No.
50-278/85-43 50-277 DPR-44 Docket No.
50-278 License No.
DPR-56 Licensee:
Philadelphia Electric Company 2301 Market Street Philadelphia, Pennsyvlania Facility Name:
Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2&3 Inspection At:
Delta, Pennsylvania Inspection Conducted: November 25-27, 1985 Date of Last Physical Security Inspection: August 5-9, 1985 Type of Inspection: Routine, Unann_ounced Physical Security Inspectors:
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/'028-/d R. J. Baileypysical Segrity Inspector date de $d pJ s-8
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KG. Martin / Physi purityInspector date
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Approved by:
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R /. Keim I hief afeguards Section, DRSS date Inspection Summary: Routine, Unannounced Physical Security Inspection on November 25-27, 1985 (Combined Report No. 50-277/85-43 and 50-278/85-43 Areas Inspected: Management Effectiveness; Training and Qualification Plan; Security Contingency Plan; and, follow-up on licensee action on previous inspection findings and inspector follow-up items.
The inspection involved 42 hours4.861111e-4 days <br />0.0117 hours <br />6.944444e-5 weeks <br />1.5981e-5 months <br /> on site by two NRC region-based inspectors.
Results: The licensee was found to be in compliance with NRC requirements in the areas examined.
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DETAILS 1.
Key Persons Contacted R. S. Fleischmann, Plant Manager S. A. Spitko, Administrative Engineer J. Oddo, Nuclear Security Specialist T. Johnson, Senior Resident Inspector, Region I The inspectors also interviewed other licensee personnel and members of the Burns International Security contract force.
2.
MC 30703 - Exit Interview The inspectors met with the licensee representatives listed in paragraph 1 at the conclusion of the inspection on November 27, 1985. At that time, the purpose, scope and results of the inspection were reviewed.
At no time during the inspection was written material provided to the licensee by the inspectors.
3.
MC 92701 - Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings a.
(Closed) Violation 50-277/85-16-01 and 50-278/85-16-02: Fai ; ra to control access to a vital area.
The inspector determined that tne licensee issued a letter to the security force contractor dated May 11, 1985, that provided specific instructions on controlling access of personnel to the containment drywell during maintenance outages. Additionally, the licensee revised Security Procedure 27 (Controlling Access to Drywell) on August 23, 1985. The inspectors reviewed this procedure and conducted interviews with security force members who were posted at the Unit 3 containment drywell entrance to determine their understanding of the revised procedure.
Personnel interviewed were knowledgeable of their duties and the instructions at the post were current.
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(Closed) Violation 50-277/85-16-03:
Failure to respond to alarms.
To prevent recurrence of similar events, the licensee discontinued the practice of alarm station attendants using the term "Immediate Reset". Also, the cause of those alarms were corrected by April 15, 1985.
The inspectors reviewed alarm history records for the period June thru November 1985 and observed that alarm station attendants no longer used the term "Immediate Reset",
and that each alarm was investigated as require.
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c.
(Closed) Violation 50-277/85-16-04:
The licensee had made a change to the Physical Security Plan that was not submitted to the NRC.
By letter dated April 15, 1985, the licensee rescinded the instruction involved in the change.
The inspectors determined that the licensee's corrective action was proper and effective.
d.
(Closed) Violation 50-278/84-07-06:
Failure to maintain a locked door to a vital area. To prevent recurrence, the licensee readjusted the door closure and repaired a faulty electrically operated lock trip switch; however, this did not fully correct the problem.
The inspectors observed the door during use and, in the company of licensee representatives, determined that the door would not completely close because of a differential air pressure in the areas separated by the door. The licensee committed to install a stronger closure, promptly.
In a telephone conversation with a licensee representative on December 12, 1985, the inspector determined that a stronger closure was installed on December 5 and that the problem has been fully corrected.
The licensee also took administrative actions to ensure that vital area doors are properly secured after each use.
e.
(Closed) Violation 50-277/84-19-10 and 50-278/84-10-10:
Failure to maintain on-site communications.
The licensee submitted a change to the physical security plan, under 10 CFR 50.54(p), that clarifies how security force members will maintain continuous communications with the alarm stations. That change was accepted by NRC on October 28, 1985.
The inspectors determined that on-site communi-cations are in accordance with the plan, f.
(Closed) Violation 50-277/84-19-07 and 50-278/84-10-07:
Failure to maintain an uninterruptable power system (OPS). To clarify the operations and functions of the UPS, the licensee submitted a change to the physical security plan, under 10 CFR 50.54(p).
That change was accepted by NRC on October 28, 1985, upon determi-nation that the UPS had been functioning, as designed and previously approved by NRC. Therefore, this violation is rescinded and will be deleted from the licensee's enforcement history.
g.
(Closed) Violation 50-277/84-19-11 and 50-278/84-10-11:
Failure to maintain a method of communication with the local law enforcement agency (LLEA). The licensee submitted a change to the physical security plan, under 10 CFR 50.54(p), that established an alternate method of communication with LLEA when the primary method cannot be used.
That change was approved by the NRC on October 28, 1985.
h.
(0 pen) Inspector Follow-up Item 50-277/85-02-01 and 50-278/85-02-01:
Two potential security weaknesses concerning the protected area barrier were identified by the inspector during Combined Inspection 85-02.
The licensee had initiated actions to correct the potential
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weaknesses, however, those actions had not yet been completed.
During this inspection, the licensee stated that completion of the actions would be expedited.
In a telephone conversation with a licensee representative on December 13, 16, and 17, 1985, the inspector was informed that the corrective actions would be completed on December 18, 1985.
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(0 pen) Inspector Followup Item 50-277/85-02-02 and 50-278/85-02-02:
During Combined Inspection 85-02, the inspector observed that Surveillance Test Procedure 7.8.7(ST) required revision because it did not provide sufficient information to conduct an adequate test of the perimeter intrusion detection system. During this inspection, the inspectors determined that a revision to the ST had been initiated, but that it had not yet been approved by the Plant Operations Review Committee.
That approval was expected by December 18, 1985.
4.
MC 81020 - Management Effectiveness During this inspection, the inspectors observed that the licensee had recently employed a Nuclear Security Specialist to assist the Administra-tive Engineer in managing and supervising the day-to-day operation of the contract security organization. The addition of this individual to the licensee's security staff responds to an NRC Region I concern documented in Combined Inspection Report Nos. 50-277/84-19 and 50-278/84-10, and in Enforcement Conference Report No. 50-277/85-20.
5.
MC 81501 - Training and Qualification Plan The inspectors reviewed a training program proposal submitted by the Burns International Security, (BURNS) District Manager to the licensee.
The proposal discussed the scope of training currently being administered to security force members for annual retraining and methods to enhance that training to meet future needs of the security program. The licensee stated that the proposal was under active consideration.
6.
MC 81601 - Security Contingency Plan The inspectors reviewed the results of the contingency plan event drills that were conducted since the last inspection. The licensee was advised that the use of performance evaluation sheets to grade the actions of drill participants was commendable, however, the drills are too short in duration to realistically simulate contingency events. The licensee acknowledged this observation and stated they would lengthen the drills.
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