ML20138F354

Package of Info Re 53 SALP Rept Const Deficiency Repts from 840210-850607

ML20138F354
Person / Time
Site:	Perry
Issue date:	12/03/1985
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20138F346	List: IA-85-658, Package of Info Re 53 SALP Rept Const Deficiency Repts from 840210-850607 ML20138F342 ML20138F354
References
FOIA-85-658 NUDOCS 8512160069
Download: ML20138F354 (7)

Text

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Rill RESPONSE F0IA 85-658 SUBSITTED FOR RELEASE Attached is a copy of pages 32 through 37 of the Perry SALP 5 report. We have added the following infornation to help you correlate the licensee's Deviation Analysis Report (DAR) Numbers with their formal written 10 CFR 50.55(e) reports:

RDC N0. This Number is the licensee's record data control nunber used on all correspondence concerning the 50.55(e) report (note: see the copy of a formal report we have included for your information).

LETTEP. TYPE AND DATE .

The letter type is I (interim report) and F (final report). There can be more than one interim or final report. An interim report is not required if the licensee can write a final report,within the required 30 days from when the finding is called in'and when a formal written report either interim or final is due to the NRC.

The date is the date the letter is sent to the NRC.

NRC ITEM NO.

This is the number the NRC assigns to the 50.55(e) report when called in for internal tracking.

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If the licensee calls us back prior to the 30 day period and withdraws the item we still review

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the item but do not receive a written report. We did not include withdrawn 50.55(e) reports in the SALP because they are considering a NON item unless we find during our review that they were improperly withdrawn, which would result, among other things, in the licensee reopening the item. The item number is preceded by the docket number (i.e., 440/5001-EE).

NRC INSPECTION REPORT If an inspection has been conducted to date we included the report number. The actual report number will be precedad by the docket number (i .e. , 440/85001). Note: All 50.55(e) reports will be reviewed prior to fuel load. "

8512160069 851203 PDR FOIA LAWLESS 85- 58 PDR 4

l D. Escalated Enforcement Action There were no escalated enforcement actions during this assessment period.

E. Management Conferences

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The following management meetings were conducted during this period:

April 10, 1984 A management meeting to present and discuss the results of the SALP 4 evaluation.

October 30, 1984 The "Second Corporate Management Meeting" was held by Region III at

- Perry to discuss with licensee a management their preoperational test program and lessons learned from preoperational tests at other plants.

March 21, 1985 A management meeting was held to dis-cuss matters relating to Perry schedule and performance. The meeting was requested by CEI.

June 3, 1985 A management meeting was held to discuss

- the status and recent inspection findings of the Perry Preoperational Test Pro-gram, including failure to properly implement the Test Program.

F. Licensee Report Data Construction Deficiency Reports (CDRs)

During this SALP period, seventy 10 CFR 50.55(e) items were reported by the licensee. Eighteen were vendor related. Of the seventy

• reported, seventeen were subsequently withdrawn prior to the end of the thirty day reporting period. Corrective actions were initiated by the licensee on the remainir.g 53 reportable items and all but 22 were reviewed and documented as closed in Region III inspection db/ A iM /y. reports. Below is a list of the fifty-three 50.55(e) items:

ze rfe w Licensee's ,,

jvge n,,, ,,. 7, , ,

Roc No TYPE 4 CATe DAR No. us e, n,,,, ,m, Descr1ption Repa.rs (pe o.,.y. )

21(Fo) : o 2./to /34 N153 Borg Warner MOV shaft keys too long stroo3 F oc. I : A IVA Qo,2y(84 yy o* l'8E ) SScalSooAR /.

90(3 0 I oz ho / F4N 154 O'4cet-EO ASME Class 1, 2 and 3 material installed on s'4 017 F aq , a:r/ 7%9eanon3 ASME Class 1 piping supports Nyo so 4e339 %410090025 /

g(,q p at j io f g4 155 (sico' -EfC Pullma'n (site contractor) accepted materials 'J80IO N g y oggy ostig that were not manufactured to NA-3700 s4oGeSo223 ,

N\ O cpiM k it, ,p (de\K.i A u,

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t'Af A m hr Avr J '

V-s.e tte r . Licensee,s ge age yy34 RDcNo. TrFF 4 04TE DAR No. Iwm ao. Description a epoer E Problems with Diesel Generator flexible coupling F Soo3j 42(se) I o F/17/r4 N drive hubs s goa l sooag I.

erlzele4Q#o6 9 158 (g4 coS-EE) Surface cracks found on actuator mounting 8402.7 9 3(84) I o5/ot/sq-syo3taoosa brackets for 24 motor operated exhaust louvers ggofogI F c 1127194 - g4o sovo ara associated with diesel room HVAC system I c3/og/F4 159 ( 71 oo6-EE) Pacific: Air Products Part 21 - Linear converters 85030 NCS4) p o7/jo/rq.5 94oM9o Si A ,qo7 8904:S may wear excessively (HVAC) 2500'Vo39g r o3//I./8 9 N160h43 o 57-EE) Disagreement between logic and FSAR drawing for 940o6 the Standby Diesel Generator gqgo /oa sy F e4l36/8'i N h as 77(r4) r oJ /16/y4 161h4 oos-EE) Problems with synchronizing the. standby diesel en co 6 g o4; gojr4 4#3# generator from the diesel generator room s q or,of oasy 9,s ,o gr(74) g o3ff 6/ rg 162 (84 co9 -i8) HPCS System - No power monitor downstream of the Fro 3o 84o34Go2 C fuses that supply some centrol relays g g , 4 g ,,,,

g,(ea) I o3/st/ r q q163 (s4 o/o-EE) HPCS System - MOV E-22-F001 shuts before ggoy o p e43 3o/s q 9403430/0I E-22-F015 is fully open, which could result in gqo s iloo 19 less than specified flow $ 5o419o318 -

r, o3//ctriK 164 (54 c//-EE) HPCS System - Suppression pool cleanup suction g,s o/9 ycy/). 4 5/5*/84 does not isolate between reactor levels 1 and 2 F 04/07/84 'yyo34 3coS3 g4011oo4I9 which ciould result in less than specified flow 85 438#89 34o518001'l soz(eq') p c4/a7/99 171 ( 94ot3 -EE) ASME Code Class I pipe tees were found to have 2Foo3 0 Silo; n discontinuity in thickness g soa,soo3 I cilZ7/#iN172 ( S40/1-EE) HPCS power supply - drawings do not indicate 85030 4 FSAR required logic for switch 5-26 g o6/2o/79 9 9 yso 6,q o39g '

I#'(s+') F osl24/ v4 175 (siotS-EE) Transamerica Delaval Part 21 potential problem sroo3 q' s o l sr/ r4 84p3p[ with 2 spare piston skirt castings , ,29

'o4(,4)

, I osAq /s4 178 (sa oi?-EE) Licensee discovered that failure of a K-70 relay 87 30 p ,7 j j3 /,94N4060584/l contact could result in both the inboard and ssor,lvo395

. N4012 50 3a7 outboard Main Steam Isolation Valves not closing

' O#(8 I, or/ 31/ fig 182 ( 8-Io21-EE) Inadequate weld documentation and questionable B S CCO'

3-gov / M /fA f g5,0$ welds on equipment hatch of drywell Sso2t5cN p )2ll3.l8A~ksolo40HS 183 ( s 4 oll-FE) During loss of critical '20 VAC and 24 VDC, 95 #7 i

Ioc(r4') I o7/o7/.f 9 systems, the systems would not annunciate in the l

F oi}84/#4 control room F 504388'1 2 7(eg) p c6/o ? /E9s 185 (31 o24 -EE) MCC units 1 and 2 R4250015 were found missing 12 74OC S4062foaag rear bracing pa~nels rendering the seismic qualification of the MCCs indeterminate ""#3###3 33

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W eb/ f.no}fs l te fle( Licensee's nae #4c. Iaspect4 ace no. Twg 4 047c DAR No. De ,so. Description Aeoost s ros(s4 I 06/N /84 186 b 4 015-38) Brown Boveri Part 21 - 480 volt circuit on R23 eSo39 F, o91 o7 / 74 9 t/ob 210Al4 system may contain silicon controlled rectifiers Pz, /o/t3 / f 4 3409290037 which exhibit excessive leakage that would S4 tilbo395 result in false circuit breaker trips F5c707 @

foq(gq) p 189 (Si 28 EE) Incorrect electrical design, which if it had gone 25o3c' os/o7/94'\pqoga go qqs uncorrected, would not have allowed the diesel groceve3,g.

generators to synchronize to the grid in certain switch positions g,o(gy) r os/f7/g4 190 ("Mo'1-f6) Johnson Controls 3/4" socket welds were found to 84o0 F :t/04) 9 have improper welds 15orofoo75

$#5

d til(54) l' c918* y, 194 q33(84 ,38 3g i ) Lack of leakage acceptance criteria in fuel pool ssos$

13 I p( gognfggag,,oseg my y gW M 4I' l Nl j

3,-

197 34 o33 -Es) gate testing

,go g, gospec qg ,ificationggogoyy3 Emergency service water pump will start with

'f7(,4)

F o'll *# jgkgys(of(,o.277 either LOCA or loss of offsite power signal but gypf g not both 8584388tf/

4) F;fo/ss/f4 \200 (54'o35-EE) Carrier fans for the control complex auxiliary F 2 es/is/7F S4 toA9ollio building vent system may have. error in seismic ## b

. h sot t 3cos70 report due to the use of wrong natural frequency 1504W8T data T i lo/do /84 il4 (84) It otl2o/YSN201o2 (s 4 o,37-EE) Conex Part 21 concerning 821 defective power gyo30 F o3/27/2 % g[ifogogg9 N lead gland sealing assemblies at Perry Units 1 and 2 eso4W3w y fe/g/s4 202 (g4 o32-Ed Rosemount Part 21 - Rosemount transmitters Model 6'5o39 lif(70 g o,j jyy\ 4,gosoat:1 1153 Series B have a potential environmertal 8

Ft 07/ 7jE85051 lo SIA s s o2o t,os 73 leakage into transmitters which could result in ggo rogo 23' an electrical failure p to/:t./24 203(34039 'EE) Delaval Standby Diesel Generators could have 95031 117 C84) \gy,1,3oaty field resistors overheat during coastdown

g ) I so/Ja/r4 204 ( 74 4o-Es) FSAR design evaluation revealed that a F n/84 /84 yqqtlao37o non-safety related moisture detector was used in g fo3 9 5o1o 30385 the HVAC for the control complex ggoyo9023(

,,, ( 4 C is/sr/P 209 (31035-EE) Incorrectly installed Hilti drop in anchors by 9 7c'8' F o3 J 49 [IS yll2t,co st fire protection system contractor 5 oqlloaN 86#0"#81'l ool*A) I o<la2/se\ lfoq ( SA 027-EE)g ;g,g$e g r, ,g e,- k L;& M gue op e ,-a, Toys du e k em F oc,12n 12A N p m te, s q,vaj a, ,,4: e a ,i,1 ,

\g4cy23ea29 v50318o048 94o~l t004 SS 34 4 n;s OM wn ln a al v e + Tea ky le 4 + o u y- og s e s .- < - o-a - .

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' 1r 50,u 2o 190 Cbl A g go qogo gg5 gget,y agg5 Pe e ey y[,,/s Le flek Licensee's n,tc S5oy 23045 f [ tion Nitc raspuf4 A 0c N o. 7har f onre DAR No. I 6 svo. Descrip _,

Aeposis

8. 1/arh q/

2ocv4) r,oilieles 211 (840'%- @ General Electric Part 21 - Class IE inverters 73 o2/o/er p, o 4 /.,f ry were not supplied with proper low voltage cutoff d d' p, on)ositS ss oll' alt 3 adjustment sq(ri) I./3/21 212 (g4 O-EG) Containment isolation valves stick closed when N ors c le08/'#/# I, or/J'/ " they should be wide open 55o6olorect 13 oil 'r/u- Nylat10375 T5cl3coS70 ' 950607c455 las Cri) ' T,Is/Jo/ yg 213 (sq o41-EE) Borg Warner Part 21 - 20" Class 1 gate valve 77003 r, o3/ff/tr . ' og fjfj pg. would not fully open due to gate binding on body ssoalgooy I3 oS / /f/f# E*so/o'I ,, -

m unted s', guide railsFSoS3Io68( $5013o0281 85o3290292 .G FSlo.220 3fl I /2/o7/N 216 (s 404'l-EE) Gilbert Part'21 - Jet impingement design for 8501/

12t(#4 g og j f 4 j ys- g4: 1aco421 feedwater system was nonconservative p M 333[

15oS210MT y5al.090239 I 8 //## 218(,a4 oSo-Es)

,g(,f) Overpressurizationofsomeisola[tedpipesystems rJo d e I t 01/l*/## during a LOCA inside drywell r, c&I cr/cS p o,p4fg,sog agotoco gsoq3avo23 sgosacosso ystoo 8 sos 1 g zq(gs) y o2At/ S 220 (. Siml -66) Two locations were found where condensate can None collect in the RCIC steam supply line and Do a o4 / f r / rs-Ssoso20 tS7 os// 7/fS 750'e03080T potentially disable the system g(,f) I,ot/27/r5 221 (SToot-er e Rdskin Part 21 Concerning fire dampers 5' 7038 e4f ao/sS sso 3'30078 supplied to Perry that are unable to function 85018too443 gso Sog o463 properly under normal duct pressure or operating conditions

1. 2.,(gy) I, o z / 2 P/FFg222 (55m3-EE) Concerns starting voltage drops in the power 65037 j ,g /gy S503t403of feeder cables for motor operated valves

$ s Go1*#"qy 7((/n/F#[5 4 associated with the RCIC system 24(75) p afas/es 223 (8 5 4-8E) Concerns voltage drops in control circuits (M32 8# 3 system) that may be large enough to result in gg,9 gout the loss of Division I and II pump ventilation fans gg(gs) r o 2/27 /as 224(SScoT-EE) The voltage drops in some P45 power and control none circuits may cause loss of Division I, II and j- o4/ir/es 95o 3tsots$ III emergency service water pumps and/or

$ 5os o 2o2,g o discharge valves 225(s Sam-EE) Delaval Part 21 - Filter on TDI diesels not 65039 12c(ps) F .ol l MC rated for pressure used in service

$ 503I5oas'l 55o1o90231 G

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l Leh Licensee's note N A c rarg er. W o n l Ruc no. TYPF 4 Oarc DAR No. Item 2o. Description Repours f3o(gs) r, o3/ 22/ Fs 226 (. 85*7-EE) Perry may not be in compliance with Appendix R Noae re os/ic t sy 75o4oSo3tA due to lack of adequate separation of associated

$5053 fob 94 Division I and II circuitry

7. c4/3 /sS 230 (gsco4-EE) A review of the 4160 and 480 volt power systems N d'

'32C8d '

indicated that a LOCA in combination with a degraded off-site power supply conditio'n could result' in'a loss o.f starting vultage to motors

1. 3 (95)

F CS/D 3 /## ' 23'2 (.8So8D-EE) Brown Boveri Part 21 - Concerns 480 volt circuit von e breakers that may have damaged. control ~ wire sso5AAooss insulation

, 33 (rs) r or//7/rs 234 (dyoll-E6) Gilbert Part 21 - Design err r where the floor vowe g o; fen /rrNg5000 M O response spectra was not considered during the design of the diesel generator building j3S(cr) r or/ 3o/Fr 238 (85 11 -EE)

Tubing clamps made by Basic Engineering do not rSoro*

L g5oquogy prov.ide enough seismic restraint ,to. meet, specification -

+ n;s is a coa , a n e m ye4,w

,.e,3, y, ge. .h clee4

• was a Jois-EE 134C55) I es/23/rf 239(850'*~IE) Gilbert Part 21 - Potential f1'o#o d1ncfoNe #

F s olos f FS S5o6A 40 44to turbine building due to design problem of under voNe g5t atoom9 drain system I in the turbine building A3 r3c,(es) r oc/o&/75 240 C.ff#/3~##) Licensee unable to identify the seismic 8 50fa d #579 850F6 F m/,qfry qualification of the emergency service water 8680D U backwash strainers 137(cr) F oc/27/,fy 241 @ ##'# Potential excess off-site releases due to single sso cc.

g 507 po3i7 isolation valve between post-accident sample system and primary containment

,g) p oy/c,y / rs 242 (Sf##dE) Brown Boveri Part 21 - Low voltage (480V) K-line 7 f*9 7 go33 yc4m circuit breakers potentially have incorrect short time delay band levers installed in electro-mechanical overcurrent trip devices r 39(,4 g 7/,, /rs 243 (sr /?-EE) During a review of as-built seismic support N '"

spacing criteria for instrument and control 850131o 2 11 piping, the AE noted that spacing criteria had not always been properly interpreted by the installation contractor l 4} 34ec Yo'oMW' WW '

g ot ; $ $ t s t~ t;l 36

Cbf fn /nst S_

.q ger Licensee's uAC ,

"f Roc wo, Type 4 04rc DAR No. Ifen A.

. M C. . L sj e c f ,'c-Description Fe po t-

/40 & 4 F 0 7 /2F/PS 244 (750/g-EE)'

Level detector transmitter output had an error gone 55o807o'f 5y band above that allowed by G.E. specification for the standby liquid control system tank s4)(sd ' o?]2s/CS 245 (sSos4 -cE) ~

Ia o c/2e/tr Incorrect logic for the vacuum relief valves No ^'e

$S0$o,lo%4 between containment and the suppression pool g(es-) ;: o7/2r/3r 246 Csso?o-E6)

,Approximately fifty components and five motor w ed e.

ISoSo7oqqg perated valves may have inadequate voltages under certain conditions such ps degraded grid voltage' The number of CDRs identified during.the assessment per.iod was approxiinately SALP period. 250% of of the number identified ~ during the previous This rise was in part a result of the IDI and licensee initiated pre-IDI review of Perry's design. Increased activities in the preoperational testing area have also resulted in increased identification of construction deficiencies. A review of the nature and details of the items reported and the timeliness of the' reporting indicates that the licensee maintains a. proper reporting' threshold

.and is responsive to the 10 CFR 50.55(e) reporting requirements. The

' quality' of the written reports and associated analysis and relative

- ' ease with which Region III staff have been able to review and close these construction Deficiency Reports reflects favorably on the licensee's management and staff.

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THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING COMPANY P O B OE 5000

• CLEVELAND. OHIO 44101

- TELEPHONE (216) 622-9800 - ILLUMINATING BLOG - SS PUBLfCSOUAR Serving The Best Location in the Nation MURRAY R. EDELMAN A A D) 2 7 DO3 -EE U) *lli '"5 VICE PRf$10ENT Nuc LE^ a May 22, 1985 PY-CEI/OIE-0046 LQ Mr. James' G. Keppler Regional Administrator, Region III .

Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Jegulatory Commission ..

799 Roosevelt Road .

Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137 -

RE: Perry Nuclear Power Plant Docket Nos. 50-440; 50-441 Voltage Drop Affecting RCIC Valves [RDC 127 (85)]

Dear Mr. Keppler:

This let'ter is the final report pursuant to 10CFR50.55(e) on the potential significant deficiency regarding starting voltage drops in power Cooling Isolation feeder cables for three valves in the Reactor Core (RCIC) System. Mr. J. McCormick-Barger of your office was notified on January 30, 1985, by Mr. T. A. Boss of The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company that this problem was being evaluated per our Deviation Analysis Report Number 222.

Interim reports were submitted on February 28, and April 18, 1985.

We have a significant determined deficiency per that the this condition does not constitute requirements of 10CFR50.55 (e) .

Description of Potential Deficiency Calculations had indicated that various DC powered valves within the RCIC system voltage.at the valve might be incapable of operating due to reduced operators. This condition results upon loss of a battery charger coupled with the voltage drop in the valves' motor circuit conductors.

Results of Evaluation Section 5.4.6.1 of our FSAR currently states that the RCIC system Dropbe can utilized Accident to mitigate the consequences of a Control Rod (CRDA).

However, in the event that RCIC system b;hc,tlibt,},

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hr..Jcmes G. Kcppler May 22, 1985 operation becomes impaired due to the loss of a battery charger, the High Pressure Core Spray system would be available to ~

respond. Additionally, the Automatic Depressurization System initiates upon Low Low Reactor Water level, enabling the Low Pressure Core Spray and Lcw Pressure Core Injection to provide core cooling and reactor inventory make-up.

Discussions with our Nuclear Steam Supply System supplier, General Electric (GE), indicate that they are in agreement with our determination that RCIC is not required to function to mitigate.the consequences of a CRD'. A Documentation from GE is forthcoming and we' will notify you should our position change.

The documen~tation will be evaluated to determine if any changes to our FSAR are required.

• In light of the above, the identified condition would not have had a significant' impact on the safe operation of-the-Perry Nuclear Power Plant. '

Please call if there are any questions.

Sincerely, Murray R. Ede n Vice President Nuclear Group MRE:sab cc: Mr. J. A. Grobe USNRC, Site Office Mr. D. E. Keating USNRC, Site Office Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 U.S." Nuclear Regulatory Commission c/o Document Management Branch Washington, D.C. 20555 Records Center, SEE-IN Institute of Nuclear Power Operations 1100 Circle 75 Parkway, Suite 1500 l Atlanta, Georgia 30339 m

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