05000458/LER-1985-003, :on 850904,full Reactor Protection Sys Actuation Occurred.Caused by Unintentional Shorting of Contact While Attempting to Install Jumper.Fuse C71-F7A Replaced & Jumpers Moved to Terminal Blocks

:on 850904,full Reactor Protection Sys Actuation Occurred.Caused by Unintentional Shorting of Contact While Attempting to Install Jumper.Fuse C71-F7A Replaced & Jumpers Moved to Terminal Blocks

ML20138A524
Person / Time
Site:	River Bend
Issue date:	09/30/1985
From:	West R GULF STATES UTILITIES CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20138A454	List: 05000458/LER-1985-001, :on 850831,reactor Protection Sys Actuated on High Source Range Monitor Counts.Caused by Core Geometry Change When Fuel Initial Bundle Placed in Core.Four Fuel Loading Chambers Relocated to Eliminate High Count 05000458/LER-1985-002, :on 850904,reactor Protection Sys Actuated on High Main Steam Line Radiation & High Scram Discharge Vol Level.Caused by Reactor Protection Sys Channel a Manual Trip During Calibr Coupled W/Inadvertent Noise Spikes 05000458/LER-1985-003, :on 850904,full Reactor Protection Sys Actuation Occurred.Caused by Unintentional Shorting of Contact While Attempting to Install Jumper.Fuse C71-F7A Replaced & Jumpers Moved to Terminal Blocks 05000458/LER-1985-004, :on 850906,discovered That APRM Weekly Reactor Protection Sys Tests for Channels B,D,E,G & H Unsatisfactory Per Requirements for Setdown Neutron Trip.Caused by Exclusion of Steps to Verify Half Scram 05000458/LER-1985-005, :on 850913,reactor Protection Sys Actuation Occurred.Caused by Operator Error When Intermediate Range Monitor Channel E Mode Switch Inadvertently Moved from Operate to Standby.Switch Placed in Operate Position RBG-22182, Forwards LERs 85-001-00,85-002-00,85-003-00,85-004-00 & 85-005-00
References
LER-85-003, LER-85-3, NUDOCS 8510080583
Download: ML20138A524 (2)

LER-1985-003, on 850904,full Reactor Protection Sys Actuation Occurred.Caused by Unintentional Shorting of Contact While Attempting to Install Jumper.Fuse C71-F7A Replaced & Jumpers Moved to Terminal Blocks

Event date:
Report date:
4581985003R00 - NRC Website

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At 2010 on 9-4-85, a full Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation occurred.

The plant was suberitical and in the initial Fuel Loading Process. Work was being performed in the RPS Logic B System, resulting in a half scran. Technicians unintentionally shorted a contact while attempting to install a jumper, causing RPS Logic A to trip thus initiating a full scram.

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.mm ame w mm.w nn At 2010 on 9-4-85, a full Reactor Protection System (RPS) actua t ion occurred when technicians installing a jumper in the RPS Logic shorted a contact resulting in a blown fuse. The jumpers were being installed to prevent inadvertent RPS actuation from the Main Steam Line Radiation Monitors, which were not in service and not required for the operating mode of the plant. The jumpers were being installed in all four logic channels while the plant was in a half scram condition in RPS Logic B.

The location in which the jumpers were installed was an area in which limited access made it difficult for the technician to properly install them. When the jumper for Logic A was being installed the inadvertent shorting of the contact caused Fuse C71-F7A to blow causing RPS Logic A to trip initiating a full scram.

Fuse C71-F7A was replaced and the jumpers were moved to terminal blocks which permitted easier installation. The scram was reset af ter the placement of the jumpers.

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