ML20137W893
| ML20137W893 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | River Bend  |
| Issue date: | 09/18/1985 |
| From: | Bennett W, Bess J, Bundy H, Chamberlain D, Craig Harbuck, Jaudon J, Mcneill W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20137W835 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-458-85-51, NUDOCS 8510040415 | |
| Download: ML20137W893 (19) | |
See also: IR 05000458/1985051
Text
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APPENDIX C
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
NRC Inspection Report: 50-458/85-51
CP:
CPPR-145
Docket: 50-458
Licensee: Gulf States Utilities (GSU)
P. O. Box 2951
Beaumont, Texas
77704
Facility Name:
River Bend Station (RBS)
Inspection At: River Bend Station, St. Francisville, Louisiana
Inspection Conducted: June 16 through August 15, 1985
Inspector -
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7 8 85
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rlain, Se(ior Resident Inspector
Date
(pdrs.1,
,3,4,5,5',7,8,9,and15)
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sh/tc
W. R. Bennett, Reactor Inspector
Date
(pars. 1, 2, 10, and 11)
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C.
{arbu
,~ Reactor Inspector.
Date
(pa
. 1,
, 12, and 14)
bh/l
9//8/85
W. M. KcNbill, Reactor Inspector
Dtite /
(pars.Iand13)
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J. E. Bess, Reactor Inspector /
Eate '
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(pars. I and 9)
W3M
MWrs
H. F. Bundy, Reactor 4Wspector
Date
(pars. l' and 2)
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Approved:
.
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J./P. (daud
, chief,tProject Section A,
Date
"
IReactor
ojects Branch
Inspection Summary
Inspection Conducted June 16 through August 15, 1985 (Report 50-458/85-51)
Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of licensee action on
previous inspection findings, site tours, fuel transfer operations witness,
preoperational test program implementation, initial fuel loading procedure
review, River Bend Unit 2 site restoration work implementation, pipe supports
anti restraints system testing, allegation follow up, maintenance procedures
review, preoperational test results evaluation, high energy / moderate energy
line break system review, reactor vessel and internals record review, licensee
identified construction deficiency review, and facility review committee (FRC)
system operability review. The inspection involved 325 inspector-hours onsite
by six inspectors.
Results: Within the areas inspected, one violation was issued in the area of
fuel transfer operations witness (failure to follow an administrative
procedure, paragraph '4)' and one deviation was identified in the area of
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preoperational test results evaluation (failure to meet FSAR test commitment,
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paragraph 11).
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Details
1.
Persons Contacted
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Principal Licensee Employees
K. Arnstedt, Quality Assurance (QA) Engineer
- W. H. Cahill, Jr. , Senior Vice President,~ River Bend Nuclear Group
- T. F. Crouse, QA Manager
P. J. Dautel,' Licensing Staff Assistant
,J. C.:Deddens, Vice President, River Bend Nuclear Group
- D. R. Derbonne, Supervisor, Startup and Test
- S. L.-Driscoll, Supervisor, Radiological Engineering
S. Finnegan, Control Operating Foreman
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.P. E. Freehill, Superintendent, Startup and Test
.
- D. R. Gipson, Assistant Plant Manager, Operations
P. D. Graham, Assistant Plant Manager, Services
R. W. Helmick, Director, Projects
- B. E. Hey, Licensing Engineer
K. C. Hodges, Supervisor, Quality Systems
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D.~ Jernigan, Engineer, Startup and Test
- G. R. Kimmell, Supervisor, Operations QA
- G. V. King, Supervisor, Plant Services
- A. D. Kowalczuk, Assistant Plant Manager, Maintenance
- T. L. Plunkett, Plant Manager
J. G. Propson, Electrical Supervisor, Nuclear Plant Engineering
S. R. Radebaugh, Assistant Superintendent, Startup & Test
S. F. Sawa, Control Superintendent, Startup & Test
- W. M. Searcy, QA Engineer
- J. E. Spivey, QA Engineer
R. B. Stafford, Director, Quality Services
K. E. Suhrke, Manager Project Planning & Coordination
L. Sutton, QA Engineer
- P. F. Tomlinson, Director, Operations QA
R. West, Supervisor, Startup and Test
Stone and Webster
D. P. Barry, Superintendent of Engineering
F. W. Finger, III, Project Manager, Preliminary Test Organization (PTO)
P. H. Griffin, Site Advisory Manager
- B. R. Hall, Assistant Superintendent, Field Quality Control (FQC)
R. L. Spence, Superintendent, FQC
S. Garg, Principal Engineer
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The NRC senior resident inspector (SRI) also interviewed additional
licensee, Stone and Webster (S&W), and other contractor persor.nel during
the inspection period.
- Denotes those persons that attended the exit interview conducted on
August 22, 1985.
NRC inspector, W. B. Jones, also attended the exit
interview.
2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings
a.
(Closed) Open Item (458/8408-01):
Determine if and how the diesel
generator loading restrictions of calculation 12210-E-122 are
implemented in plant' operating procedures.
Calculation 12210-E-122 was superseded by calculation 12210-E-192,
" Standby Diesel Generator Loading Calculation." Revision 1 to
calculation E-192 was issued on August 7, 1985, to determine the
maximum continuous loads to be supplied by the Division I and II
standby diesel generators (EG1A and EG1B) during a loss of coolant
accident (LOCA) concurrent with a loss of offsite power (LOP) and
assuming a single failure of Division I, II or III. diesel generators.
Three load profile curves were generated and all three require
operator action to drop certain loads 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> after LOCA initiation
prior to the adding of certain~ manually initiated loads.
The SRI reviewed Abnormal Operating Procedure A0P-0004, " Loss of
Offsite Power," Revision 2, to determine that the diesel generator
loading restrictions of calculation E-192 were implemented.
All of
the load restrictions from the load profile curves were implemented
by A0P-0004.
This item is closed.
b.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (458/8408-04):
Review of licensee program
for tracking of commitments to the NRC.
This item remained open for the SRI to evaluate the GSU method of
identifying commitments that require closure prior to fuel 1 cad.
Many commitments made to the NRC include a committed date for
completion and the committed date becomes the internal action
completion date for tracking purposes.
For items with no committed
completion date, GSU nuclear licensing makes the determination
whether the item requires closure prior to fuel load.
The SRI
reviewed the list of items that GSU nuclear licensing has determined
can be completed after fuel load and no concerns were identified.
This item is closed.
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c.
(Closed) Open Item (458/8415-01):
Development of a. qualification
matrix for project engineering and nuclear plant engineering personnel.
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The SRI was provided copies of the qualification matrixes for selected
project engineering and nuclear plant engineering personnel and back
up documentation for completed training.
The qualification matrixes
included education,. experience, and training requirements. All
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records reviewed were in order.
This item is closed.
d.
(Closed) Open item (458/8424-02):
Concern with the seismic adequacy
of plastic tie wire supports used in combination with ~ spade type
terminations in the control room.
General Electric letter GSS-4676 dated June 13, 1985, confirms that
the seismic testing of control room and other panels utilizing the
spade lug with plastic tie wrap supports has been verified for
seismic adequacy. The letter refers to design record file A00-579
for qualification documentation.
This item is closed,
e.
(Closed) Violation (458/8512-02):
Control of temporary alterations.
Corrective action included auditing of all temporary alterations and
. assigning dedicated personnel to control entries to the temporary
alteration log and to verify correct installation and/or removal of
temporary alterations. The NRC inspector verified the implementation
of these corrective actions.
This item is closed.
f.
(Closed) Open Item (458/8513-02):
Issuance and approval of
procedures for scheduling preventive maintenance.
The NRC inspector reviewed procedures for scheduling' preventive
maintenance and discussed the system with licensee personnel. The
preventive maintenance system is considered adequate at this time.
This item is closed.
g.
(Closed) Open Item (458/8522-02):
Requirement for notification of
quality control (QC) prior to the start of safety-related maintenance
work.
Administrative Procedure ADM-0028, " Maintenance Work Request,"
Revision 4, now states that "Q.C. shall be notified prior to
performing safety-related "Q" maintenance and maintenance on the
Radwaste, Radiation Monitoring and Fire Protection Systems."
This item is closed.
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h.
(Closed) Open Item (458/8522-03):
A program has not yet been
established for reviewing completed corrective maintenance records to
assess the adequacy of the preventative maintenance program, to
identify repetitive failures of parts and components, and to identify
design deficiencies.
Administrative Procedure ADM-0048, " Performance Monitoring and Trend
Analysis. Program," Revision 0, was issued on July 29, 1985, to
establish "the program for monitoring plant, system or component
performance and trending data as necessary to identify losses in MWe
output, optimize plant performance and meet various performance
monitoring and trending commitments." This monitoring includes such
things as performance evaluations of power system efficiencies,
vibration monitoring, and monitoring of failures of specific plant
components.
This. item is closed.
i.
(Closed) Open Item (458/8522-04):
Licensee has not established a
definition of acceptable locking devices for valves and circuit
breakers.
Administrative Procedure ADM-0020, " Plant' Key Control," Revision 1,
establishes definitions of acceptable locking devices for valves and
circuit breakers.
These include a chain and padlock for locked
valves, a padlock or other key locked restraining device for locked
' breakers and wired for sealed valves.
This item is closed.
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(Closed) Open Item (458/8522-05):
The procedure which provides for
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. tabulating performance data for motor operated valves was still in
draft form.
Procedure CMP-1253, "Limitorque Motor Operated Valves'," Revision 2,
was issued on July 25,-1985.
Appendix A of this procedure provides a
tabulation of motor operated valve data which includes torque to open
and close valves, torque switch type, motor size, motor voltage,. full
load amps, locked rotor amps, and valve stroke time.
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This item is~ closed.
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k.
(Closed) Open Item (458/8522-06):
Procedure CMP-1026 is currently
being revised to provide for tabulation of data pertinent to elec-
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trical breaker overload relays, heater size, breaker size, and. trip
setting.
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Procedure CMP-1026, " Corrective Maintenance of MCC Starters,"
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Revision 2, was issued on July 25, 1985.
Appendix A of this
procedure provides a tabulation of data for electrical breakers which
' includes overload relay NEMA size, heater size, breaker size, and
breaker trip setting.
This item is closed.
1.
(Closed) Open Item (458/8522-08):
GSU has not identified which
motor operated valves have operators with nonlocking gears or brake
assemblies.
GSU conducted a review of all motor operated valves at River Bend and
determined that they all have self-locking gears and none of the
valves have brake assemblies.
This item is clcsed.
m.
(Closed) Open Item (458/8522-09):
Establishing a master schedule
for preventive maintenance.
The NRC inspector determined that a master schedule for preventative
maintenance is being utilized at this time.
This item is closed.
n.
(Closed) Open Item (458/8522-11):
Cleanness classifications of
plent systems have not been established.
This item involved a failure to establish cleanliness grades for all
systems and inclusion of these grades in ADM-0018.
This was accom-
plished in ADM-0018, Revision 1.
However, the NRC inspector ident-
ified several apparent discrepancies in the program for the cleaning.
of fluid systems and associated components as follows:
Section 4.2 of ADM-0018 states that the mechanical maintenance
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supervisor assigns cleanness grades.
Section 5.1.1 of GM-0062,
Revision 0, states that the general maintenance supervisor or
designee assigns cleanness grades.
There appears to be a
potential conflict of interest in either instance in that an
individual who may be responsible for cleaning has been author-
ized to establish acceptance criteria.
Also, it appears that
assignment of cleanness grades should be an engineering function.
Grades of cleanness are defined in procedures ADM-0018, MSP-0013,
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and GMP-0062.
These definitions are not identical.
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ANSI N45.2.1-1973 requires that cleanness inspection personnel
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be qualified per ..NSI N45.2.6.
Procedure GMP-0062 is not clear
on who.should sign for inspections and what qualifications the
inspectors should have.
Open item 8522-11 is closed with the resolution of the above noted
discrepancies considered an open item.
(458/8551-03)
o.
(Closed) Open Item (458/8522-13):
Surveillance testing and calibra-
tion control program'does not yet include the inservice testing /inspec
tion requirements of 10 CFR Part 50.55(a).
,
There are two major testing / inspection programs scheduled to be in
place at River Bend. One is the surveillance test procedure (STP)
program and the other is the in service inspection (ISI) program.
The STP program deals with the functional performance and operability
of systems and components required by technical specifications and
the ISI program deals with nondestructive examination of components
and pump and valve testing required by 10 CFR Part 50.55(a).
activities are generally covered by ISI procedures, however, 'there
are some activities required by the ISI plan that are covered by
STPs. These activities would include visual inspections, functional
testing of' mechanical snubbers, and inspections of certain pumps and
valves.
In these instances, performance of the activities would be
tracked in both the ISI and STP programs. As noted previously, a
master schedule for surveillance testing / calibration has been
established, but the River Bend 10 year ISI plan has not been
submitted to the NRC.
Per discussions with NRC licensing, the SRI
was informed that the submittal of the ISI plan will be made.a low
power testing license condition for River Bend.
Since the submittal of the ISI plan will be tracked as a license
condition, this open item is closed,
p.
(Closed) Open Item (458/8522-31):
Responsibility for reporting
design changes and modifications to the NRC has not been established.
10 CFR Part 50.59 requires an annual report to the NRC of changes to
the facility as described in the safety analysis report,
River Bend
Administrative Procedure ADM-0010, " Station Reporting Requirements",
identifies the requirement for an annual written report per 10 CFR Part 50.59(b) to be submitted to NRC Region IV and the Director of
Inspection and Enforcement.
This item is closed.
q.
(Closed) Open Item (458/8523-01):
"Q list" was not inclusive and
the procedures for control and use of the "Q list" were not approved.
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The following nuclear plant engineering (NUPE) procedures for control
and.use of the "Q list" have been approved and issued:
NUPE AA-64, Revision 0, " River Bend Station Instructions and
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Requirements for Use of th_e~ River Bend Q-List"
NUPE-AA-63, Revision 0, " Control and Maintenance of the River
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Bend Q-List"
The procedures state that all River Bend project personnel are
responsible for using the Q-list to determine whether a system',
structure, component or an activity relating to a system, structure,
or component is safety-related.
Activities which may be safety-
related, and therefore shall include use of the Q-list to determine
such,' include designing, purchasing, fabricating, handling, shipping,
storing, cleaning, erecting, installing, inspecting, testing,
operating, maintaining, repairing, refueling, and modifying.
Revision 0 of the Q-list has been issued and the list is still not
all inclusive.
However, Q-list users are required to contact NUPE.if
a desired mark number is not located in the Q-list to determine
whether the component is safety-related or not.
This item is closed.
r.
(Closed) Violation (458/8523-02):
Preoperational test procedure
-1-PT-210 was approved for performance without the procedure being
stamped to establish notification points for operations quality
assurance.
The test procedure was immediately stamped to establish notification
points for operations quality assurance.
Although the procedure was
not stamped, project quality test group personnel were notified and
were present during the conduct of testing.
Also, in order to
prevent recurrence of this violation, startup and test personnel-
received special training on the requirements of test instruction
-(TI) -8, " Conduct of Testing.
-This item is closed.
s.
(Closed) Violation (458/8523-03):
The procedure used for the
conduct of the HVAC systems duct leakage testing at River Bend did
not require the use of a temperature indicating device and no
temperature monitoring was conducted during leak testing performance.
S&W mechanical test procedure 1.MPGEN.003, "HVAC Pressure and Leak
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Test Procedure for ANSI 509/510 Ductwork," was written to include the
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requirement for use of a " temperature indicating device accurate and
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readable to + or - 0.5 F.
All previously tested safety-related
ductwork is being retested utilizing the new procedure.
This 100%
retest of safety-related ductwork is being monitored by the SRI as an
NRC open item (458/8523-05).
This item is closed.
t.
(Closed) Violation (458/8523-04):
The gas meter used for HVAC duct
' air leakage testing at River Bend was not calibrated in the range of
use.
All safety-related ductwork is being retested utilizing mechanical
test procedure 1.MPGEN.003, "HVAC Pressure and Leak Test Procedure
for ANSI 509/510 Ductwork," which uses the pressure decay method for
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determining the leakage rate instead of the gas meter method. . This
100% retest of safety-related ductwork is being monitored by the
SRI as an NRC open item (458/8523-05).
This item is closed.
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'3.
Site Tours
The SRI toured areas of the site during the inspection period to gain
knowledge of the plant and to observe general job practices.
The site
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tours conducted-included special tours on separate occasions with
Mr. R. P. Denise (NRC Region IV Division Director) and Mr. R. D. Martin
_(NRC Region IV Regional' Administrator).
The SRI also made several tours
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of.the-containment and toured the suppression pool while it was drained
for cleaning.
During the tours it was noted that a number of tags remain
on system components (e.g.,' jurisdictional tags', hanger as built tags,
caution tags', etc.).
The SRI discussed this with licensee management and
action has been initiated to remove all tags that are no longer required
for the operational phase activities.
The removal of unnecessary equipment
tagging will be an open item (458/8551-04).
No violations or deviations were identified in this
area of inspection.
4.
Fuel Transfer Operations Witness
The SRI witnessed portions of the new fuel transfer from the spent fu'el
pit to the containment refueling floor storage area.
The licensee trans-
ferred 200 fuel bundles through the inclined fuel transfer system in
preparation for fuel loading of the reactor.
During the witness of the
fuel transfer operation, the SRI reviewed procedural documentation for
TCN 85-1131 to procedure FHP-0005, " Fuel Transfer Tube Operations," which
was required for conduct of fuel transfer operations.
It was noted by
the SRI that the TCN was not stamped "TCN SHIFT SUPERVISOR APPROVED COPY"
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in red ink and the fuel transfer evolution was being conducted even though
the TCN was not followed exactly , which is in violation of administrative
procedure ADM-003, " Development, Control and Use of Procedures,"
Revision 6.
This failure to follow an administrative procedure was
identified as a violation (458/8551-01).
The licensee took immediate
action to halt fuel transfer operations and to correct the procedural
deficiencies identified.
No other problems were identified with the fuel
transfer operation.
5.
Preoperational Test Program Implementation
This area of inspection was conducted to assure that current design
documents were being.used by test personnel for test development and
conduct and to review the control of design change packages.
The licensee
startup program requires that all preoperational test procedure reference
revisions be identified at the time of procedure development and that the
latest revision be noted and checked for test impact at the time of test
performance.
This revision check is then administratively performed again
during the review of test results.
The SRI checked 30 document references
for the reactor protection system preoperational test and the correct
revisions were verified at the time of test performance.
The review of design change control packages revealed that in addition to
the design requirements for review, approval and control of engineering
and design coordination reports (E&DCR), the licensee has established a
method of assembling design modification packages (DMP) to assure that all
required actions are implemented.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area of inspection.
- 6.
Initial Fuel Loading Procedure Review
The SRI reviewed procedure 1-ST-3, " Fuel Loading," Revision 0.
Several
concerns and questions were generated as a. result.of this review primarily
relating to the general prerequisites of the procedure.
All of the
concerns and questions were discussed with the responsible startup and
test personnel, and it was noted during these discussions that Major
Change Request (MCR) No. 1 to the procedure had been issued and some of
the concerns were already addressed by MCR-1.
Subsequent to the discus-
sions, MRC-2 to the procedure was issued to address the remaining concerns
and questions of the SRI.
MCR-1 and 2 addressed such concerns as:
Composition of fuel handling crew
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Clarification of prerequisites for radiation
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monitoring and nuclear instrumentation
Prerequisite for inspection of fuel
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Prerequisite for containment status
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Prerequisite for reactor pressure vessel status
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Prerequisite for cleanliness requirements
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Addressed moderator temperature monitoring
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Addressed action for unexpected neutron flux or
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detector response behavior
Referenced procedure for lowering of SRM setpoints
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The SRI believes that the initial Fuel Loading Procedure 1-ST-3, Revision
0, as amended by MCR 1 and 2, is consistent with licensee commitments,
regulatory requirements, and applicable codes and standards.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area of inspection.
7.
River Bend Unit 2 Site Restoration Work Implementation
A Board Order dated November 20, 1984, states, "That applicants' request
to withdraw without prejudice the application to operate River Bend
Station Unit 2 is granted, and the proceeding is terminated as to Unit 2,
subject to.NRC. Staff approval of the implementation of site restoration
work described in applicants' June 1984 Report on Termination of Construc-
-tion."
NRC Region IV will monitor GSU implementation of the Unit 2 site restora-
tion work and will notify the NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation,
Division of Licensing, upon completion of the verification.
NRC Region IV
will track this activity as an open item (458/8551-05).
8.
Pipe Supports and Restraints System Testing
This area of inspection was conducted to review the licensee programs
pertaining to the examination and testing of safety-related pipe support
and restraint systems.
The SRI review of this area revealed that two
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separate programs exist at River Bend, one for the General Electric.(GE)
scope of supply and one for the S&W scope of supply.
A review of these
programs. revealed that they both covered the following elements:
a.
Examination of piping support systems at various temperatures to
detect interference to thermal expansion.
b.
Setting and calibration of snubbers, restraints, and vibration
arrestors at predetermined temperatures.
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c.
Examination of pipe support and restraint systems during transient
testing to ascertain that pipe motion and vibration are within design
limits.
d.
Conduct af vibration tests, including resolution of high vibration.
e.
Displacement measurements at ambient and operating temperature.
It was noted during this review that the GE program contained limits for
expected minimum and maximum pipe movement and the S&W program only
contained limits for expected maximum pipe movement. This was discussed
by the SRI with responsible personnel, and the S&W program was modified to
include expected minimum and maximum pipe movement.
Any pipe movements
that. exceed the expected minimum or maximum limits must be evaluated by
GE or S&W engineering.
.No violations or deviations were identified in this area of inspection.
9.
Allegation Follow Up
(Closed) Allegation:
The NRC inspector reviewed and conducted a followup
inspection on the concerns of an allegation made to GSU which could have
an impact on plant safety.
The following is a summary of this activity:
Allegation: The alleger stated that the "as wired" signal / ground circuit
configuration of Rosemount trip units located in the control room PGCC
panels does not comply with the Rosemount Instrument Manual Instruction
in that~ signal common is not electrically isolated from chassis common.
Signal common and earth common are tied together through a common earth
ground.
This condition is causing spurious tripping of trip units when an
adjacent unit is withdrawn from or inserted into a card file.
Followup In'spection:
The NRC inspector interviewed responsible personnel
and reviewed available_ data to ascertain if a problem or problems existed
which may have_an impact on plant safety.
The NRC inspector reviewed the
Rosemount Instrument Manual and examined the signal circuits in the
Rosemount instrument panels.
There were no discrepancies identified.
However, after talking to several S&W, Gulf States Utilities (GSU), and
GE personnel; it was noted that a conflict had been identified between a
GE drawing for grounding and the "as installed" conditions.
The conflict
appeared to be that the GE drawing required the instrumentation ground to
be isolated. The "as installed" configuration showed the instrument
ground bus, the signal common bus, and the chassis ground bus to be
connected to the floor section instrument ground bus.
The disposition of
this conflict involved revising the GE drawing to reflect the "as
installed" conditions of the panels.
The NRC inspector reviewed GE Field
Deviation Disposition Request (FDDR) No. LDI-3128, Revision 0, which was
>
issued to evaluate and resolve this conflict.
The NRC inspector also
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reviewed. documentation relating to instrument calibration problems.
The
problem according to the PGCC engineering groups resulted from grounding
busses being overloaded.
A total of 42 FDDRs were issued to break up the
busses, install larger wiring, and correct various cases of improper
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connections.
The NRC inspector randomly selected FDDRs to verify work
completion and no discrepancies were identified.
In' addition to the grounding problem, the NRC inspector inspected the
alleger's concerns pertaining to the spurious trips.
The NRC inspector
reviewed the following documentation for the Rosemount Trip / Calibration
System:
Instruction Manual - Trip / Calibration System Model 510 DV
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Elementary Wiring Diagram - Low Pressure Core Spray System
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Functional Block Diagram - Master Trip Unit
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The situation was also discussed with responsible GSU and GE personnel.
GSU conducted a number of bench tests of the Rosemount trip units with
various grounding arrangements in order to evaluate the spurious trip
problem.
As a result of these tests, it was determined that the Rosemount
trip units may produce random false trips and false alarms anytime one
of these units is pulled (unplugged) from service.
Isolation of the
signal common did not appear to correct the problem.
It should be noted
that the false trips occur in trip units of a single channel which alone
would not cause any plant trip, equipment trip or safety actuation.
The
NRC inspector reviewed the GE position (FDDR No. LDI-3178).which indicates
that this problem appears to be an inherent design characteristic of the'
Rosemount trip units and is not caused by improper signal / ground circuit
. configuration.
GSU action that is ongoing for this problem includes short
term action to establish administrative controls for corrective / preventive
maintenance of the Rosemount trips units ~which requires. installing the
calibration read out assembly or removing a card from a card file.
-Maintenance procedures will be revised to identify trip units that may be
affected during maintenance and to require the technician to notify the
~
nuclear control operator prior to start of the maintenance.
A long term
solution is being pursued through ongoing engineering evaluation.
Conclusion:
Based o_n the above, the alleger's concerns with the
grounding / bus problem was substantiated, but GSU was working ~to resolve
the problem.
The PGCC grounding problems have now been resolved and
verified as not being the cause of the spurious trips.
The spurious- trip problem does exist, but it is not considered a safety
problem due to the following:
Once a trip unit is initially calibrated and tested it is not
.
frequently removed.
.
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.
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Spurious trips occur in single channels only and single safety
.
channels do not cause any plant trips, equipment trips or safety
actuation.
Administrative controls are being implemented to provide technician
.
and operator awareness of the potential for spurious trips and alarms
,
during the conduct of maintenance.
i
Therefore, this allegation is closed, but the NRC inspector will monitor
'
the implementation of the administrative controls and monitor the
engineering evaluation for a long term solution to the spurious trip
problem. This will be tracked as an open item (458/8551-06).
4
10. Maintenance Procedures
,
The objective of this portion of the inspection was to confirm that the
plant maintenance procedures are prepared to adequately control maintenance
of safety-related systems within applicable regulatory requirements.
>
The NRC inspector reviewed the following procedures:
Procedure
Title
Revision
Date
f
GMP-0077
Gasket Replacement and
0
1/16/85
Maintenance of Gasketed
Surfaces
TCn85-691
5/31/85
GMP-0081
Valve Maintenance
0
2//04/85
Program
CMP-1001
Corrective Maintenance
1
7/07/85
of Potential Transformers
CMP-1030
Battery Cell Jumpering
2
5/04/85
and Replacement
TCN 85-088 5/09/85
CMP-1031
Activation and Initial
1
4/15/85
Charging of Dry-Charged
Stationary Batteries.
CMP-1074
Corrective Maintenance of
1
7/06/85
RHR Pump Motors
CMP-1245
Corrective Maintenance of
0
3/29/85
Emergency Diesel
TCN 85-317 5/27/85
.
Generators
!
.
. . - -
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-
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-15-
CMP-9107
Emergency Diesel Starting
2
6/26/85
~ Air Compressor, Disassembly,
Inspection, Rework, and
Reassembly.
CMP _-9144 -
Main Steam Relief. Valve
2
6/26/85
Disassembly,. Inspection,
Rework, and Reassembly.
CMP-9033
C11-0001 Hydraulic Control
2
6/25/85
Unit Component Removal, Dis-
assembly, Inspection, Rework,
Reassembly, and Inspection.
MCP-4066
Calibration of Rosemount
1
3/28/85
.
Model 1151 Transmitter
MSP-0003
. Preventive Maintenance
2
5/01/85
-
'
Program
MSP-007
Maintenance Planning
1
6/07/85
!and Scheduling
The NRC inspector found several typographical errors in the maintenance
U
procedures and notified the licensee of these errors.
The maintenance
>
_ procedures were found to be adequate for the desired maintenance. .The_NRC
,
inspector, utilizing the procedure review and interviews with maintenance
personnel, determined that the preventive maintenance system is in the
process of being established and is working at this time.
No violations or deviations were identified in this portion of the
inspection.
+
11.
Preoperational Test Results Evaluation
The objective of this portion of the inspection was to assure that the
licensee is performing an adequate evaluation of test results and to
ascertain-that the licensee had adequately tested the remote shutdown
system with results as follows:
a.
The NRC inspector reviewed completed Preoperational Test Procedure
1-PT-210, " Integrated Emergency Core Cooling System and Loss of
Offsite Power." Review determined that the test did not ensure that
the RHR system would realign and inject to the reactor vessel from
the test mode as committed to in the River Bend FSAR.
This is an
apparent deviation (458/8551-02).
Subsequent discussion with startup
-and test personnel revealed that the realignment and injection from
the. test mode was not performed because of possible RHR pump'run out.
The NRC' inspector questioned if this was a concern during an actual
loss of coolant accident and if this was addressed in the accident
analysis.
This is considered an open item (458/8551-07).
,
-
-
.
.
.
-16-
b.
The NRC inspector reviewed the licensee's preoperational test results
documented in procedure 1-PT-200, " Remote Shutdown System," (RSS),
and in the RSS portions of procedures 1-PT-202, " Automatic Depressur-
ization System," and 1-PT-552, " Containment Monitoring System." It
was determined that the RSS appeared to have been tested in accordance
with the. requirements of-the licensee's startup manual (SUM), that
the acceptance criteria had been met, and that test exceptions had
been properly _dispositioned and closed with the following exception:
Test Exception - 21 and the corresponding acceptance criteria,
.
step 10.9, were still outstanding.
The problem is that an
interlock between two motor operated valves in the residual heat
removal (RHR) system mandatory flow path to the pressure
vessel, does not exist when control of these valves is trans-
ferred to the RSS panel.
The valves are 1E1Z*M0VF0278 (278) and
IE12*MOVF0428 (428).
The interlock is designed to prevent
over pressurization of the RHR system during routine surveillance
cycling of these valves by preventing the manual opening of
'
either valve if the other valve is not fully shut.
The NRC
inspector considered.this to be an open item (458/8551-08)
pending NRC review of the disposition and closure of this TE.
12.
High Energy / Moderate Energy Line Break System Review
The purpose of this area of inspection was to verify that the hardware
associated with the design modification package (DMP-4) based on the high
energy line break (HELB) detection and mitigation and the moderate energy
line break (MELB) detection and mitigation had been installed and tested.
The NRC inspector reviewed a sample of the completed work documents and
generic test data and visually inspected several temperature sensors and
level sensors in'the plant (comparing them to the documents reviewed).
It
was concluded that DMP-4 appeared to have been properly implemented.
The
NRC inspector also determined that the special situation test (SST-53) for
DMP-4 had been completed but was still undergoing licensee review.
. Completion of the licensee review of SST-53 test results will remain as an
open item (458/8551-09).
~
No violations or deviations were identified in this area of inspection.
13.
Reactor Vessel and Internals Record Review
The objectives of this inspection were'to review a sample of reactor
vessel and internals records and determine whether (a) the licensee system
forfpreparing, reviewing, and maintaining records is functioning properly;
(b) the selected records reflect work accomplishment consistent with NRC
requirements and SAR commitments; and'(c) the records indicate any
potentially generic problems, management control inadequacies,'or other
weakness that could have safety significance.
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The sample established for the inspection included steam separators, steam
dryers, shroud,- jet pumps, control rod drive (CRD) housings, in-core
housings, core plate and top guide in addition to the reactor vessel (RV).
The material certifications and receipt inspection of these components
were reviewed. The records found on file were a~ GE product quality
certification, ASME code reports, deviation report, certified material
test reports (CMTRs) and NDE reports of welds. A number of errors were
identified in these records. GE certification No.2645 was found to have
an erroneous serial number (2007) for an in-core housing. A revised
certification, No.10868, was issued by GE to correct these errors. The
Sun Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company data packages were found to have
some errors. The shroud package did not have penetrant test (PT) reports
for long seams L1 through L3 of the top flange rings (piece No. 5) although
r6diographic test (RT) reports were on file for the same welds. The top
guide package had a report on the repair of cubicle side walls.
It
documented that two heats of weld metal had been used (12051 and 16004C);
although the package had a CMTR for heat No. 16004C, it did not have a
CMTR for heat No. 12051. Also in the same package were RT reports for long
seams LS1 through LS8, but PT reports for only six seams for the water
seal ring. The steam dryer had only a product quality certification and
no additional data (e.g., CMTRs).
It was noted that there was no product
quality certification on file for the steam separator (non-code part) nor
were there code forms, CMTRs, etc. for the CRD housing (code parts). CRD
housing records are reportedly on file at GE, Wilmington, North Carolina.
The installation and inspection of installation records were reviewed.
These records were inspection reports of the RV and internals alignment,
bolting, cleanliness, rigging and etc.
It was noted that the RV was
received with much of the internals installed (e.g., core plate, top
guide, jet pumps CRD, and in-core housings.
Storage records of the RV
were reviewed to verify proper storage of the RV.
In this regard the
equipment storage history cards, maintenance check records and warm air
system check logs were reviewed.
It was noted that logs of the tempera-
ture checks covered a time period from June 1981 to August 1983, however,
the filter checks went on to June 1984 with a break in these filter
records from January 1984 to April 1984.
The RV was subsequently installed
and inspected.
This inspection indicated that the RV had been properly
stored.
In regard to the record problems identified above, open item
(458/8551-10) was issued. The errors above are being followed by GSU QA.
The NRC shall review in a later inspection GSU review of NSSS records
supplied by GE and the NSSS records to assure that no significant problems
exist in these records.
14. Licensee Identified Construction Deficiency Review
This area of inspection was conducted to review action taken on the
following licensee identified construction deficiency.
~ - - -
.
,
-
, . . . -
-18-
(Closed) Construction Deficiency Report DR-295: '"GE AKD-6 480 V
Switchgear".
Initial NRC notification date:
March 27, 1985.
F
.
Final - report:
GSU letter RBG-21680 of July 24, 1985.
.
The corrective action for this reportable deficiency was to inspect the
charging mechanisms. on the 28 breakers in question and-to correct any
problems found.
Part of this corrective action was to functionally test
the breakers after repairs were made.
A review of rework documentation by
the NRC inspector revealed that all 28 breakers had been inspected,
repaired, and tested as required.
. This item is closed.
15.
Facility Review Committee (FRC) System Operability Review
-This area of inspection was conducted to determine how the licensee was
evaluating any remaining system related open items to determine the
potential effect on system operability.
The licensee has established a
program for. the FRC to review outstanding system open items and to identify
any~ items that potentially effect system operability.
These FRC identified
system operability items then require resolution prior to declaring the-
system operable.
The SRI reviewed several systems that had received the
FRC: operability review and the program for system operability review is
commendable.
The potential sources of system open items (e.g., master
punch _ list, nonconformance reports, engineering and design coordination
reports, etc.) are being reviewed and any work items and/or paper items
- that could~effect system operability are being identified for resolution.
,
-
I
'No violations or deviations were identified in this area of inspection.
16.
Exit Interview
t
-
An exit interview was conducted on August 22, 1985, with licensee
'
representatives (identified in paragraph 1).
During this interview, the
~
SRI reviewed the scope and findings of the inspection.
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