ML20137K854
| ML20137K854 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | McGuire, Mcguire  |
| Issue date: | 01/10/1986 |
| From: | DUKE POWER CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20137K843 | List: |
| References | |
| TAC-59623, TAC-59624, NUDOCS 8601240246 | |
| Download: ML20137K854 (5) | |
Text
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Attachment I REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM HOT STANDBY LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.4.1.2 At least three of the reactor coolant loops listed below shall be OPERABLE and at least two of these reactor coolant loops shall be in operation:*
a.
Reactor Coolant Loop A and its associated stcam generator and reactor coolant pump, b.
Reactor Coolant Lo.op B and its associated steam generator and reactor coolant pump, c.
Reactor Coolant Loop C and its associated steam generator and reactor coolant pump, and d.
Reactor Coolant Loop D and its associated steam generator and reactor coolant pump.
APPLICABILITY:
MODE 3.
ACTION:
a.
With less than the above required reactor coolant loops OPERABLE, restore the required loops to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
b.
With only one reactor coolant loop in operation, restore at least two loops to operation within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or open the Reactor Trip System breakers.
c.
With no reactor coolant loop in operation, suspend all operations involving a reduction in boron concentration of the Reactor Coolant j
System and immediately initiate corrective action to return the required reactor coolant loops to operation.
t SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS l
4.4.1.2.1 At least the above required reactor coolant pumps, if not in operation, shall be determined OPERABLE once per 7 days by verifying correct breaker alignments and indicated power availability.
i 4.4.1.2.2 The required steam generators shall be determined OPERABLE by verifying secondary side water level to be greater than or equal to 12% at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
4.4'.l.2.3 At least two reactor coolant loops shall be verified in operation and circulating reactor coolant at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
l
- All reactor coolant pumps may be deenergized for up to 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> provided:
l (1) no operations are permitted that would cause dilution of the Reactor Coolant System boron concentration, and (2) core outlet temperature is maintained at least 10*F below saturation temperature.
i McGUIRE-UNITS 1 and 2 3/4 4-2 Amendment No, (Unit 2) 8601240246 84d31101 Amendment No.
(Unit 1)
PDR ADOCK 05000369 l
P PM
3/4.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BASES 3/4.4.1 REACTOR COOLANT LOOPS AND COOLANT CIRCULATION The plant is designed to operate with all reactor coolant loops in operation and maintain DNBR above the design Ifmit during all normal operations and antici-pated transients.
In MODES 1 and 2 with one reactor coolant loop not in oper-ation this specification requires that the plant be in at least HOT STANDBY 4
within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.
In MODE 3, two reactor coolant loops provide sufficient heat removal capability for removing decay heat; however, single failure considerations require that three loops be OPERA 8LE.
l
~
In MODE 4, and in MODE 5 with reactor coolant loops filled, a single reactor coolant loop or RHR loop provides sufficient heat removal capability-for renoving decay heat; but single failure considerations require that at least two loops (either RHR or RCS) be OPERA 8LE.
In MODE 5 with reactor coolant loops not filled, a single RHR loop provides sufficient heat removal capability for removing decay heat; but single failure considerations, and the unavailability of the steam generators as a heat removing component, require that at least two RHR loops be OPERA 8LE.
I The operation of one reactor coolant pump (RCP) or one RHR pump provides adequate flow to ensure mixing, prevent stratification and produce gradual reactivity changes during boron concentration reductions in the Reactor Coolant System.
The reactivity change rate associated with boron reduction will, therefore, be within the capability of operator recognition and control.
l Tae restrictions on starting a reactor coolant pump with one or more RCS cold legs less than or equal to 300*F are provided to prevent RCS pressure transients, caused by energy additions tros the Secondary Coolant System, i
which could exceed the limits of Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50.
The RCS will be protected against overpressure transients and will not exceed the limits of Appendix G by either:
(1) restricting the water volume in the pressurizer i
and thereby providing a volume for the reactor coolant to expand into, or l
(2) by restricting starting of the RCPs to when the secondary water tempera-ture of each steam generator is less than 50*F aboye each of the RCS cold leg temperatures.
9 McGUIRE - UNITS 1 and 2 B 3/4 4-1 Amendment No.
(Unit 1)
Amendment No.
(Unit 2)
ATTACHMENT 11 Technical Justification and Safety Analysis Technical Specification 3.4.1.2 is intended to ensure that sufficient coolant flow is available when operating in Mode 3 so that the DNB design basis are met for all operating conditions and limiting acci-dents in Mode 3.
The current Technical Specification states that when operating in Mode 3 two reactor coolant loops must be operable, but only one of these two loops is required to actually be operating.
analysis in the McGuire FSAR assumes that either two or all four ofHowever, the sa the reactor coolant pumps are operating.
in Mode 3 operation are steamline break, rodThe limiting accidents when ejection, and bank with-drawal from subcritical.
which show that Westinghouse has performed calculations Technical Specification 3.4.1.2 does notthe inconsistency between the safety impact the conclusions pre-sented in the FSAR for the steamline break and rod ejection accidents Westinghouse has also performed calculations which show that the DNB design basis may not be met with only one of the reactor coolant pumps in operation for the bank withdrawal from suberitical event.
the margin of safety as defined in the basis for the Technical Specifi Therefore, cations may be reduced.
The proposed changes to Technical Specification 3.4.1.2 and Base 3/4 4 1:
1)
Ensure that in the event of any limiting accident at ze be met; and 2)
Correct an inconsistency between the accident analysis in the McGuire FSAR and the McGuire's Technical Specifications.
McGuire Nuclear Station has always operated with at least two pumps running (not just operable) because of administrative controls imple-mented by Duke Power Company when in Mode 3.
has been consistent with the safety analysis assumptions regarding theThu number of operating reactor coolant pumps while in hot standby (Mode 3)
T.te proposed Technical Specification will provide added assurance that the reactor coolant pumps during operation in Mode 3 will functi accordance with the FSAR and the Technical Specifications.
on in Technical Specification and Basesare identical to the ones currently in The proposed use at Catawba Nuclear Station.
tive operating conditions when in Mode 3 and would not have an adThe safety impact.
verse
ATTACHMENT III ANALYSIS OF SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION Pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.91, this analysis provides a deter-mination that the proposed amendment of the Technical Specification does not involve any significant hazards consideration, as defined by 10 CFR 50.92.
The proposed changes are intended to ensure that in the event of any limiting accident at zero power the design basis will be met.
The new Technical Specification also eliminates an inconsistency between the safety analysis presented in McGuire's FSAR for operation in Mode 3 and McGuire's Technical Specification 3.4.1.2 and Bases 3/4.4.1.
The proposed changes would thus not involve any reduction in a margin of safety.
In addition, the proposed changes do not involve hardware modifications or design changes and would not impact adversely the probability or consequences of any accident previously evaluated.
10 CFR 50.92 states that a proposed amendment involves no significant hazards considerations if operation in accordance with the proposed amendment meets the three following criteria.
A.
Criterion 1 The proposed amendment does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
The proposed changes impose more restrictive conditions on the operation of the Reactor Coolant System when in Mode 3.
The proposed changes requit e an additional loop to be operating and an additional loop to be operable when in Mode 3.
Therefore, the increase in coolant flow available when operating in Mode 3 assures tnat the DNB design basis are met for all of the limiting accidents and reduces the consequences of those accidents previously evaluated. Also, since McGuire Nuclear Station has always operated with at least two pumps running when in Mode 3 because of administrative controls, the proposed changes have no effect on the probability of any accident previously evaluated as the actual operating conditions are unaffected.
B.
Criterion 2 The proposed amendment does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident than any previously evaluated.
The proposed changes do not involve any physical changes to any plant system other than the addition of more restrictive operating conditions when in Mode 3.
No new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated could be created since such a change can have no effect on causal mechanisms.
r
' ATTACHMENT III Page 2 C.
Criterion 3 The proposed amendment does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
The proposed changes result in more restrictive operating conditions when in Mode 3.
The increase in coolant flow resulting from the proposed operating conditicas increase the margins of safety for all the limiting accidents with respect to'the existing Technical Specification and ensures that the DNB design basis are met.
Further, since operation in McGuire has always been in accordance with the proposed more restrictive operating conditions, this amendment does not involve a reduction in a margin of safety since the actual operating conditions with respect to the number of loops in operation are unaffected.
D.
Summary The proposed amendment would not:
1.
Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or 2.
Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or 3.
Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
The proposed changes result in more restrictive operating conditions when in Mode 3 than currently required in the Technical Specifications. Example (ii) of commission provided (48 FR 14870) examples of amendments likely to involve no significant hazards consideration-states:
"A change that con-stitutes an additional limitation, restriction, or control not presently included in the Technical Specifications: For example, a more stringent surveillance requirement". Since the proposed changes are more restrictive than the current operating conditions in the Technical Specifications, the above cited example can be applied to this aspect of_the amendment.
Based upon the preceding analysis, Duke Power Company concludes that the proposed amendments do not involve a significant hazards consideration.
.