ML20137F298

Revised, Restart Assessment Plan

ML20137F298
Person / Time
Site:	Millstone
Issue date:	03/24/1997
From:	Travers W NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
To:
Shared Package
ML20137F277	List: ML20137F273 ML20137F298
References
PROC-970324, NUDOCS 9704010053
Download: ML20137F298 (58)

Text

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L MILLSTONE RESTART ASSESSMENT PLAN i

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" William D. fr%

avers, Director Special Program Office h

Revision 03/24/97

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MILLSTONE RESTART ASSESSMENT PLAN

1.0 BACKGROUND

The three Millstone units are shut down to formulate responses to a series of 10 CFR 50.54 (f) letters requiring them to affirm their compliance with the 4

conditions of each unit's license and the regulations. The NRC performed a series of inspections at Units 2 and 3 with a 20-person Specialinspection Team (SIT) to ascertain the extent of their compliance. Currently, the results of those inspections are under assessment by the team and NRC management. The licensee initially focussed on Unit 3 as the lead plant for restart. However, as a result of a licensee reorganization which occurred on October 1,1996, each Millstone unit was l

assigned a recovery manager who was an executive on temporary loan from another nuclear utility. Resources originally assigned to Unit 3 from the other units were returned to their respective units. Each unit has been tasked with establishing their own restart plan and whichever unit is ready will apply to restart first. Hence this restart assessment plan has been expanded to include Manual Chapter (MC)-0350 evaluations (see paragraph 3.0) for all three units.

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l On June 28,1996, the Executive Director for Operations (EDO) issued a letter to the licensee that stated the Commission had decided to make the three Millstone units a Category 3 on the Watch List and would vote on the restart of the Millstone units. It is the intent to implement the appropriate aspects of NRC Manual Chapter 0350, " Staff Guidelines for Restart Approval" for the restart of all three units. The NRC will schedule and implement its inspection program after the licensee has indicated that the individual activities necessary for restart are complete and ready for inspection.

The NRC has been dealing with Northeast Utilities on broader performance issues which go beyond the 10 CFR 50.54(f) concerns. These broader concerns are considered contributory causes for the current poor performance, which the 10 CFR 50.54(f) issues are a subset. These issues have been formalized by the licensee in a program titled " improving Station Performance" (ISP) and are topics that will be addressed by the licensee and reviewed by the NRC Millstone Restart Assessment Panel. A meeting was conducted on April 30,1996, and disclosed that the licensee was not adequately managing the program or tracking progress.

The salient concerns embodied in the ISP include leadership, communications (employee concerns), the corrective action program, procedural adherence and procedure upgrades, work planning and control, and operational enhancements.

The NRC Restart Assessment Plan will focus on the broader issues of the ISP and REVISION - MARCH 24,1997 i

2 licensee self-assessments and management oversight, recognizing the necessity to ensure adequate closure of the 10 CFR 50.54(f) process. The NRC plan for inspection of the improving Station Performance issues is discussed in more detail in Section,3 of this plan.

On November 3,1996, the agency established the Special Projects Office (SPO) to consolidate NRC efforts under a single Senior Executive Service (SES) manager, who reports to the Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR). The Director, SPO assumed the authority and responsibiliies of the Regional Administrator and the Associate Director of Projects.

2.0 10 CFR 50.54(f) Activities Each Millstone unit has been requested to submit information describing actions taken to ensure that future operations will be conducted in accordance with the terms and conditions of the operating license, the Commission's regulations, and the Final Safety Analysis Report. In a May 21,1996, letter, the NRC requested Northeast Utilities (NU) to provide for each unit its plan for completing the licensing bases reviews.

j To aid in NRC understanding of how deficiencies were identified and dispos.tioned, the NRC's May 21,1996, letter also requested that NU provide for each Millstone unit a comprehensive list of design and configuration deficiencies and information related to how each deficiency was identified and will be dispositioned.

d On August 14,1996, the NRC issued a Confirmatory Order establishing an Independent Corrective Action Verification Program (ICAVP). The independent effort will verify the adequacy of NU's efforts to establish adequate design bases i

and design controls, including translation of the design bases into operating procedures and maintenance and testing practices, verification of system performance, and implementation of modifications since issuance of the initial facility operating licenses. The NRC oversight of the ICAVP and activities will be in addition to the activities described in this Restart Assessment Plan. The results from this program will be incorporated into this restart plan and considered a significant part of the decision regarding recommended restart. The deficiencies found by the licensee as a result of the 50.54(f) letters will be evaluated by the i

Millstone Restart Assessment Panel to identify restart issues.

3.0 MC 0350 Process Millstone Unit 1 entered a routine refueling outage on November 3,1995. On December 13,1995, the NRC sent a 10 CFR 50.54(f) letter requiring the licensee to certify compliance with the regulatory requirements before restarting the unit.

At the January 1996 Senior Management Meeting, the site was placed on the

" Watch List" for various reasons, including a concern for regulatory compliance.

Subsequently, Millstone Units 2 and 3 were sent similar letters which required responses before restart.

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The NRC Inspection Manual, Manual Chapter (MC) --0350, " Staff Guidelines For 4

Restart Approval", provides guidelines and a list of tasks and activities that must be considered before a plant that has been shutdown for cause can restart. Because of NRC concerns relating to the licensee's management effectiveness, the appropriate aspects of MC 0350 will be applied to the restart of Units 1,2, and 3 to ensure applicable requirements have been met (Enclosure (4).

i The Director, SPO, in coordination with the Deputy Executive Director for Regulatory Programs, and the Director of NRR, will make a recommendation regarding restart. NRR and the SPO willinform the Commission of the staff's and licensee's restart activities through Commission papers, or communications to the EDO. The Commission will then vote on whether to approve the restart of each Millstone unit.

3.1 SPECIAL PROJECTS OFFICE The SPO was created on November 3,1996, to oversee the restart of the Millstone i

units. The plan was to consolidate the NRC resources devoted to the restart efforts j

under one SES manager. The office is organized into three primary elements, j

licensing, inspection, and independent corrective action oversight. The Licensing Branch will administer the typical licensing actions performed in NRR; the Inspection Branch will implement the inspection programs, normally managed from the region, and the Independent Corrective Action Verification Program Oversight Branch will oversee the licensee's licensing and design bases review process.

Within the SPO, the Restart Assessment Panel (RAP) will meet to assess the licensee's performance and their progress in completing the designated restart activities. The RAP is composed of the Director, SPO (chairman); the Deputy Directors of Licensing, inspections, and independent Corrective Actions Verification i

Program Oversight; the Project Managers for the three Millstone units; the Inspection Branch Chief, the Senior Resident inspectors for the three Millstone units, and the appointed Division of Reactor Safety representative. The function of the Millstone RAP is described in MC-0350.

3.2 MILLSTONE OPERATIONAL READINESS PLAN On July 2,1996, NU submitted the Unit 3 Operational Readiness Plan, which was discussed at the July 24,1996, meeting and updated at the August 19,1996, meeting. However, the licensee has replaced all of the line managers (President, Vice Presidents, and two of the three unit directors) in the recent past. With this replacement, the submitted plans for Unit 3 and the proposed plans for Units 1 and 2 are being changed substantially. The RAP will review these plans and hold periodic meetings with NU, open to the public, to discuss the schedule for implementation and coordination of NRC restart activities.

The deficiency lists associated with the restart plans for each unit, which will be updated periodically by the licensee, includes restart and deferred items, and will be

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audited by the NRC to verify the acceptability of the criteria used to defer items j.

from the restart list.

3.3 CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM

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1 The NU corrective action program has been weak in ensuring comprehensive and effective corrective actions. There are many instances of narrowly focused 4

corrective actions that failed to embrace all aspects of the underlying problem.

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Additionally, the licensee has failed to follow up.on corrective actions to ensure -

they were effective. Consequently, the RAP has determined that any restart effort should examine the current state of the licensees corrective action program.

Because of the large number of Adverse Condition Reports (ACR) being identified i

by the licensee's staff, the resident and regional inspection staff will concentrate on l

issues for each unit identified by the ACR process and audit the licensees corrective ections for completeness. The staff is periodically selecting ACRs for review, based j

on the licensee's assigned level of importance, or their risk significance, as perceived by the resident staff. Additionally, other ACR's will be examined to j-provide a spectrum of safety significant and lessor risk issues. These selected ACRs j

will be added to the SIL for each unit, which are Enclosures 1, 2, and 3 to this plan.

The intent is to primarily assess the corrective action program while dealing with

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the safety significant technicalissues. Examination of the corrective action i

program needs to review the Action Requests (AR) from the Action item Tracking and Trending System (AITTS) program, which is an extension of the ACR process, and commitments regarding violations and inspection items. Further, a significant input to assessing the licensee's corrective action prograrr, is derived from the i

normal inspection program where valuable insights recading the effectiveness of' corrective actions are routinely collected from the technical safety inspections.

i Additionally, the NRC Independent Corrective Action Verification Oversight Branch will assess the licensee's corrective actions for degraded and non-conforming j

conditions. Finally, the Operational Safety Team inspection (OSTI) will audit portions of the corrective action process during the course of its activities.

Demonstration of improvements in the process will be judged by the completeness I

of the licensee's corrective actions for each cf the inspected ACR's. There must be a high ratio of successfully completed ACR's to the total population inspected.

There should only be minor comments regarding the processing, evaluation, j-directed corrective actions and closure of in issue.

4 3.4 WORK PLANNING AND CONTROLS (C.4.l' i

Work planning and controls are other areas that the licensee has shown a j

weakness. The ability to plan, control, and complete work is fundamental to i

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' Reference to applicable MC-0350 section 1-

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achieving adequate corrective actions. Effective work planning and controls are prerequisites for reducing and managing backlogs. Weak work planning and control was demonstrated during the Unit 2 outage, wherein, tagging boundary violations resulted in an extensive effort by the licensee to correct. Work control and planning were also issues at Unit 1, which resulted in a management meeting.

There will be a complete review of the Automated Work Order (AWO) process by the resident or regional staffs. The automated work order process is an integral part of the work planning and control system and is instrumental in establishing the scope of,,he work, providing the appropriate procedures, and establishing the t

tagging boundaries. Consequently, the Unit 1 resident staff has been directed to use the available initiative inspection hours to do a comprehensive inspection of the AWO process, which is a site-wide process.

The OSTI will assess the engineering and maintenance backlogs during its operational readiness inspection. The OSTI will determine if there are safety significant issues that must be resolved before restart.

3.5 PROCEDURE UPGRADE PROGRAM (C.3.3.el The quality and adherence to procedures has been a chronic problem at the Millstone site. The issue was an element in " improving Station Performance" and was one of the subjects of discussion at the periodic meetings between NU and the NRC. In response to NRC concerns, the licensee developed the Procedure Upgrade Program in the early 1990's to improve station procedures.

The resident inspectors will relate procedural inspection findings back to the procedural upgrade program (PUP), identifying whether the procedures reviewed during the course of an inspection have been upgraded and characterize the quality of the document. This will establish a basis for assessing the effectiveness of the licensee's PUP. The NRC staff will develop an inspection plan for examining selected portions of each unit's individual efforts.

3.6 OVERSIGHT (C.1.4 )

The licensee has identified its oversight function as deficient through self-assessments and external and internal audits and as a contributing factor in the licensee's declining performance. The report of Assessment of Past ineffectiveness of Indeoendent Oversicht by the Yankee Atomic Electric Company (YAEC),

examined the failure of Quality Assessment Services, the Independent Safety Evaluation Group, and the Nuclear Review Board (NRB) to identify the deficient FSAR control process and the radioactive waste conditions. They found that management did not support these functions adequately.

In addition, the Joint Utilities Management Association (JUMA) issued its report on July 17,1996. One conclusion was that the quality assurance (QA) program audits, surveillances, and inspections were not effective in the implementation of their

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mission and resolution of identified problems. In addition, the JUMA audit found 4

that recommendations for improving QA effectiveness identified in previous QA 1

internal and external assessments have not been addressed.

The NRC assessment of the nuclear oversight function is addressed as part of the RAP's review of.the ISP program and through insights gained from the normal

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inspection program, in addition, the NRC will perform a specialinspection of the oversight function using the services of its Human Factors Assessment group. Late l

in the restart process for each unit, there will be an inspection to evaluate the j

effectiveness of the oversight groups and management's utilization of the oversight i

process. There should be positive indications that the oversight function has been made an integral part of the licensee's management team assessment process. The 1

oversight function should result in meaningful findings, have access to line

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management, and provide assessments of process and program effectiveness through periodic reports. There should be evidence that the reports are forwarded i

to _the responsible manager and that they have dealt with the contents appropriately. Oversight should be adequately staffed with qualified and experienced personnel. The audit and surveillance programs need to be clearly j

defined, proceduralized, and implemented with established schedules, j

3.7 ENFORCEMENT l

Outstanding enforcement items will be reviewed by the resident inspectors to

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determine if any issues require closure before plant restart. The agency is currently accumulating escalated enforcement items concerning the spent fuel pool and j

design bases issues which may require licensee response before recommending i

restart of each unit. There are also potential enforcement items that will result from the efforts of the Office of Investigations, the allegation process review group, the Office of the inspector General, the Special Inspection Team, routine resident j

and regional inspection efforts, and the 10 CFR 2.026 petition process.

A Pre-decisional Enforcement Conference was held with the licensee on December 5,1996, to discuss 64 individual apparent violations. The licensee did q

not contest any of the violations at the conference, and the staff is in the process of finalizing the enforcement package. Once enforcement actions have been taken, j_

the NRC will evaluate the licensee's corrective action to those enforcement actions l

which are determined to impact restart of each unit.

3.8 EMPLOYEE CONCERNS The Millstone site has had a chronic problem in dealing effectively with employee concerns. The NRC continues to receive an inordinate quantity of allegations from 1

the staff at the Millstone site. The current series of 10 CFR 50.54(f) letters were initiated due to NRC concerns regarding design basis issues at MHistone, as well as an allegation, and a subsequent Millstone 10 CFR 2.206 petitirn, dealing with the i

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j Unit 1 spent fuel pool. The NRC has issued two enforcement actions for j

' harassment and intimidation to NU in the past three years and has a current i

escalated enforcement action pending.

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The NRC initiated two task groups to examine the Northeast Utilities handling of -

i employee concerns, and the recent layoffs that affected several previous allegers.

l The task group examined NU's handling of employee concerns and identified a number of root causes for the licensee's problems in this area. The task group also

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concluded that past problems and their root causes still remain. Subsequently, the i

NRC issued an order, dated October 24,1996, requiring NU to establish a j

comprehensive program to address employee concerns, and hire an independent party to oversee the implementation of the program. The output from these two task groups and the licensee's response to the order will be reviewed for restart 1

issues.

3.9 SIGNIFICANT ISSUES LIST The technique to be used for the restart will be to reach agreement with the i

licensee on its restart issues list, have it impose controls on adding or deferring i

items from the list, have the resident inspectors review the list to ensure it includes issues of interest to the NRC, and have the residents review the deferred list to ensure appropriate rationales for deferral have been documented (see item B.4.3. of MC 0350). As a result of the 10 CFR 50.54(f) activities, the licensee initially determined that, for all three Millstone units, hundreds of items did not meet criteria 3

i for inclusion as a restart item. The resl dent inspectors, augmented by headquarters j

staff, are reviewing these lists periodically and confirming that the licensee is performing an adequate assessment of the discrepancies. This process will be used 1

in the restart assessment of each unit. The RAP will determine that licensee's restart issues list includes appropriate restart items from the licensee's programs l'

such as ACR, AR (AITTS), engineering work requests, and commitments.

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The enclosed NRC Significant issues Lists for all Millstone units (Enclosure 1,2 and l

3) contain some of the items that are being used to audit and evaluate licensee i

programs such as the corrective action process and significant safety / regulatory technical issues.

i Restart issues will meet at least one of the following criteria:

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Resolution of the issue is required to ensure safe operation of the facility to j

include satisfaction of the technical specifications or licensing basis.

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Inspection of the issue will provide an insight to an identified programmatic I

deficiency such as the corrective action system.

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Inspection of the issue will provide assessment of management effectiveness or personnel performance.

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8 3.10 RESTART INSPECTION i

Selected portions of NRC MC-93802, " Operational Safety Team Inspection," will provide the framework for a team inspection of each unit during the restart process.

The procedure scope will be modified to address the pertinent issues at Millstone.

i The inspection will cover self assessments by the licensee, the licensee's I

implementation of its startup plan, control room observations during the approach to criticality and power ascension, selected systems readiness inspection and i

observation of management oversight.

The resident inspectors will provide close monitoring of each unit during mode changes to ensure compliance with each unit's technical specifications and FSAR design bases.

3.11 PLANT PERFORMANCE REVIEW On March 19,1997, the Millstone Oversight Team conducted a Plant Performance r

Review (PPR). The PPR was used to identify the issues that needed to be inspected for the Millstone station. The review identified severalissues that warrant NRC inspection before plant restart of the unit. The unit specific issues, as well as station wide issues identified by the PPR, are contained in the SIL for each unit as inspection items.

3.12 LICENSING ISSUES I

j Each Millstone unit plans to submit or has submitted licensing issues (amendments, -

unresolved safety questions, relief rc, quests, etc.) which will impact the restart.

3 process. The SPO Licensing Branch will disposition each applicable issue prior to restart. The status of NRR actions concerning each issue is documented in Enclosure (5) of this plan.

Enclosures:

(1)

Significant items List - Millstone Unit 1 (2)

Significant items List - Millstone Unit 2 (3)

Significant items List - Millstone Unit 3 (4)

MC-0350 - Restart Approval Checklist - All Millstone Units (5)

Licensing Iseues Required for Restart

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ENCLOSURE 1 J

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l MILLSTONE RESTART ASSESSMENT PLAN Millstone Unit 1 Sianificant items List REFERENCE MILLSTONE UNIT 1 INSPECTION ITEM RESP STATUS 1

ACR 0114a Determine FSAR status before restart SPO (L) i 2

ACR 01535 While de watering spent resin, the waste temperature DRS in the liner raised from 90 to 310*F 3

ORDER Review expectations and standards for employee SPO Hannon Report concerns (L)

M 96-0921 eSenior management has created difficult working i

EA 96-59 environment MC 0350 C.1.4.e, C.5.d. C.2.2.b 4

MC 0350 Review enforcement and unresolved items for restart SPO (1) l C.5

• issues i

5 MC 0350 C.S.f Review allegations for restart issues SPO(l)

SPO(L) 6 Review all operability determinations and by-pass SPO (1)

Jumpers before restart 7

LER 96-22 Fatigue cycle open items DRS URI 92 30-2 s

New fuel security (IP 81064)

DRS 9

Review licensee event reports for restart issues SPO (1) 10 ACR 05373 Material, equipment and parts SPO M1-97-0358 list (MEPL) program (L) evaluation 11 ACR 961068 RPS System SPO (1) eScram solenoid pilot valve replacement 12 LER 96-48 Overlap testing of RPS/ESF DRS GL 96-01 ACR M1 045

i REFERENCE MILLSTONE UNIT 1 INSPECTION ITEM RESP STATUS 13 Tl 2515/109 Motor operated valve DRS URl94-oos-02 program GL89-10 closure URI94405-04 i

URl95-001-01 J

UR196405-05 LER96-52 i

ACR 03689 M1 97-0397, 0364 j

13 ACR Surveillances Program Review SPO (1) i M1-964992 LER 96-18 VIO95-007-02 LER 96-42 15 ACR Control and use of vendor information DRS 10790 (U-3) 16 ACR Radweste recovery / configuration.

DRS M196-0915

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M1j974240, einsufficient management support for maintenance of eel redweste j

2 96-o03-01

• RW effluent isolation valve QA classification LER 97-001 s

l MC 0350 C.2.2.c 17 eel 9649-05 Corrective Actions SPO (1)

IR 9644

$CR eReview licensee corrective action programs for 96 0922 effectiveness to include ACR's.

ACR 7007 eCorrective actions have been ineffective in resolving ACR 13318 problems M1-964823,

M1961035, M1-97-0342, 0343 MC 0350 C.1.1, C.1.3, C.1.4.d, C.2.1.h, C.3.1.d 18 Review 0737 action items for completion and SPO (1) adequacy 19 Review engineering backlogs SPO (1) for restart issues (U1)-4

REFERENCE MILLSTONE UNIT 1 INSPECTION ITEM RESP STAYUS 20 ORDER Phase ll of the ICAVP SPO MC 0360 C.s.d (L) 21 ACR 03117

• Single fcilure can disable both trains of emergency DRS vioss-3143/

i power source-LNP lockout relay

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• Review LNP integrated procedure and results 0323,0417

• LNP post testing does not meet RG 1.41 Requirements 22 ACR 04187 SRV's DRS URio4414-01 e setpoint drift resolution

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• accelerated testing os22,1120 e electric lift moulfication adequacy e electric lift setpoints not fully evaluated 23 ACR 8264 Configuration Management SPO ACR 06239 (ll/SPO 1

^CR

• Review 50.54 issues for restart issues (0)

,,,s ACR M1

• Unit 1 design deficiencies and issues trends j

esosas eReview open D8DP items for startup issues ACR IA1-eReview station blackout self assessment items for soeus startup issues 7,'['343

• Significant differences between design bases and as-eel 96-04-03 built ACR ut es-eField changes to plant modifications nez reviewed for 1008' cause MC C360 C.2.1.g,f C.3J!.f C.S.d 24 Review FME SPO (I)

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e FME deficiencies trend for SFP and RX cavity u s.ne.072s'

• Debris identified in spant fuel pool

M19ses13,

• Adverse trend identified in Unit 1 FME program j

M1474221 e Fuel Pool foreign material and storage controls

• LP-24D stuck open due to foreign material 26 ACri 0747s, inadequate design modifications '

DRS i

064s2 e installed wrong material (pressure rating) for LLRT m 96-24

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i REERENCE MILLSTONE UNIT 1 INSPECTION ITEM RESP STATUS 26 ACR 03622 Current CWDs do not show modifications to equipment SPO (I) 27 ACR 06463 Fuse control program inadequate DRS LER96-31 LER9617

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URl96 004-06 26-AcR 12663 LOCA analysis does not account for instrument DRS uncertainty during surveillance testing 29 PPR E.1 Operator acceptance of degraded conditions, lack of SPO (I)

Mc 0350 ownership, O.D.'s accept degraded conditions, C 8*8'd temporary mods, etc.

30 AcR Work Control Process Review l

M1-96-0343 SPO (1)

M 96-0923 eAudit the AWO process PPR E.2

• Significant long standing work management eel 96-06-01 Weaknesses ACR M1 eFailure to completely implement and document 1057 recommendations of AWO task force report of 1/1995 MC 0350 eTroubleshooting 31 PPR E.2 Post maintenance testing / maintenance F/U inspection SPO vio96-001-02 VIO94-031-01 (1)/DRS MC 0350 C.4.h 32-URI 96-005-04 Rework SPO (l) 33 ACR 07454 Seismic issues DRS LER 96-40

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eSeismic review seismic modifications (FWCl, A-46, l

IF196-005-06 79-02/79 14, NUSOER)

ACRM1-96 eSeismic 11/l i

0643 eVerify resolution of A-46 outliers EEI96-06-03 eCRD operability

$l' eSEP Topic 1116 Close out

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ACR M196-0696, M197-0345,0412 4

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l REFERENCE MILLSTONE UNIT 1 INSPECTION ITEM RESP STATUS 34 m 9542 Spent Fuel Pool DRS I

IF196 004-02 i

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• 18 eSFP Cleanup mi.96 e46

• Review resolution of Spent Fuel Pool issues i

M197 0040

• Assess and disposition numerous open itoms in IR95-0016.0053, 82

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M 57,m 68, eUnanalyzed condition due to indeterminate boraflex 0062.0035, degradation M197-0355, 0356,0466,

• Load drop analysis (Fuel)

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35 Review Reg Guide 1.97 modifications DRS 36 ACR NRC Information Notices IENS have incomplete or SPO (1)

M1964106 inaccurate responses l

l 37 ACR Control rod blades in spent fuel pool lifted inadvertently SPO (1) i M1964247.

with tri-nuc filter UR196-00642 3s ACR ineffective program to monitor and control fasteners DRS 1

M1-96 0546 j

LER 96-27

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EE196-0445 39 ACR Adverse trend identified in the control of contracted DRS l

M1-96-0664 services 40 ACR M&TE program is ineffective SPO (1)

M196-0614 41 ACR Process for controlling distribution and use of SPO (1)

M1964716 documents (procedures) is ineffective M197 0168 f

42 ACR Potential deviation from tech specs when changes SPO (1)

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made to Unit 1 organizational structure M1964610 43 ACR Multiple weaknesses identified during recent E-plan DRS 4

M1-964s4s

• E-Plan key position staffing

$','7 ePerformance of dose assessments 1

NU lenw

B18195, 2/10/97 MC 0350 C.3.1.m C.2.2.g C.2.2.h (U1)-7

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RERiRENCE MILLSTONE UNIT 1 INSPECTION ITEM RESP STATUS 1

1 44 ACR Potential weaknesses in EEQ program DRS 3

M1-96-0976 1

45 ACR Components in control rod drive system (suction filters DRS l

M14ses3s and associated piping, valves and fittings) may not i

meet the original design requirements f

48 ACR insufficient personnel for key leadership programs SPO (l) j M1964924 47 ACR PM tasks on plant equipment not performed -

SPO (1)

M1464926 MC 0350 C.4.3 48 ACR Management direction insufficient for system DRS M1-964926 engineering MC 0350 j

C.2.1.s 1

49 ACR System and design engineering work management SPO M1-064927 weaknesses (OS)

MC 0350 C.2.1 50 ACR Training for engineering personnel not effectively SPO M196-0929 implemented MC 9350 C.3.1.e 51 ACR lmprovements needed in TLD process and program DRS M1464933 52 ACR Chemistry issues DRS I

M 96 4934 eAdverse chemistry conditions increase potential for

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M1964938 m9e404-1s

• Weaknesses in chemistry monitoring, trending and evaluation 53 uni 96-1241 Procedure adequacy / quality of V&V process &

SPO (1)

ACR implementation e Operating procedure deficiencies hinder operators MC 0350 e Deviation from operations procedures during C.3.1.k simulator transients C.3.3.e e Verify off-normal and general operating procedures C.3.3.f revisions / adequacy C.2.2.d

• EOP's C.2.1.b

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54 ACR Component and system degradation during plant SPO (1)

M14s4911 shutdown (U1)-8

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1 REFERENCE MILLSTONE UNIT 1 INSPiECTION ITEM RESP STATUS 55 ACR Degraded instrument air system quality SPO (l) 4 j

M196-0912

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se vioS5-007-04 Appendix J resolution Aca DRS einadequate testing

"'y"'$*8' elmplementation of Appendix J modifications g

i M197-0387 eVerify the basis for not Appendix "J" testing the M197-0349 ECCS suction valves

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eAdequacy of the basis for the shutdown cooling system classification as a closed loop system e'

57 LER 96426 LLRT Program Review DRS LER 96-012

• Feedwater system configuration not allow complete

,"3,,',,f,24 drain, accept LLRT "8

1 eContainment isolation check valve fails inform LLRT i

eHistorical LLRT results/ repeat failures of MSIVs, MSlV drains, FWlVs sa eReview ILRT (required due to the replacement of DRS inboard containment isolation valves LP-14A & LP 148) 59 AcR SBGT issues resolution DRS j

M196 0995, j

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almplementation of a low flow isolation mod!ficaibn vio05-3104 eResolution of all outstanding issues that could affe-t 177-02 operability (ACR 03735,08248,03403,03402)

• Technical Specification restriction to prevent the use vio95 44-of both standby gas trains when venting the drywell 02/ EASE eUse of a dedicated operator while venting the drywell via SGTS j

LER96-11 eDraw down time criteria / testing during a LNP j

eel 96-06-02 LER 96-62 60 uniS5-31-01 Verify resolution of ATWS issues, lack of LCO and SPO (1) turning off the ATWS system to perform battery voltage adjustments 61 LER 96-56 Verify resolution of IPEEE walkdown issues DRS/S eDetermine the need for the licensee to complete the PO (L)

{

IPEEE 1

l 4

4 (U11-0

i i

i i

1 REFERENCE MILLSTONE UNIT 1 INSPECTION ITEM RESP STATUS 1

s2 AcR M147-Verify implementation of setpoint changes identified by DRS 3

021s the setpoint verification program j

"1474880 eincorrect RPS setpoints j

eYarways - 7" Error Low Low Water Level Calculation 4

i e3 Verify HELB program completion DRS j

e4 Verify drywell temperature profile, DRS PDCR completion and closeout necessary to update the plant design basis es umss 24-04 Fire Protection / Appendix R Program Review DRS l

IFl9s-CD143 eReview fire detection and suppression system code l

compliance issues resolution j

oAppendix R equipment, test, maintenance program,

{

j and surveillance program I

se Review commitment modification program for startup S P O (l) j issues i

e7 ACR Core reload DRS j

M1-se-osas

• Error in LOCA model input data for GE11 fuel eSIL 581

• The LOCA results are expected to reduce the j

}

operating margin for MAPLHGR below the normal value (10%)

e3D monicore heat balance error correction

• Review reload 15/ core design for cycle 16 including the PDCR, safety evaluation and reload report.

T i

es Core spray suction valves receives a seal-in accident SPO (1) j signal and can not be shut for leak isolation during an accident es SD valves (1,2A,28) may not close under HELS SPO (l) conditions if open with greater than 300 degrees Rx water temperature 70 Review relief valve reliability DRS ACR trend 71 Modifications installed prior to NRC approval and SPO sometimes before the TSAR submitted. (shutdown (L) cooling, SRVs)

(U1)-10

i i

1 1

I i

l REFERENCE MILLSTONE UfMT 1 INSPECTION ITEM RESP STATUS t

72 ACR 8254 lsolation condenser thermal shock operability / service DRS j

life issue 73 Leaker fuel bundle root cause SPO (1) 4 74 CRD scram solenoid pilot valve elastomer degradation SPO (1) i j

75 eel 96-094s Service water inspection (GL89-13)

DRS eel 964444 eArcor issue resolution "CR

, 96-09st

• SW and ESW system operability l

ACR 02372

{

ACM M1 ;

1058 4

j 76 M1-97-0331 Electrical separation DRS/S i -

ACR 8250 eRX high level trip powered from the same source PO (L) f oCable Separation in Swl1chgear um9 4*

5 j

PIR95 048 ACR l

M196-0859 4

M1-97-0144

}

LER 96-30 77 ACR Seismic concem with 4KV breaker racked out SPO (1)

M1964845 j

LER 96-57 4

j 7E ACR 07454 IGSCC Program weaknesses DRS I

LER 96-14

}

eel 96-09-06 LER 95-29 LER 96-35 l

i URt96-005-03 i

URIS6-005-02 79 ACR 7304 Review failure to meet technical specifications root SPO (1)

ACR 7402 cause and corrective actions i

LER 95 31 j

Numerous j

LERs S0 ACR M196-Review TRM for technical specification interpretations SPO (1) i 1011 eMethod to track conditional LCO's

.1 s1 UR 90401-02 Seismic qualification of FWCl valve air supply SPO (1) i s2 um90-00103 FWCl test results SPO (1) i s3 URI S14st-04 Availability of short circuit / voltage drop celcs DRS 4

4 (U1)-11 i

I A

. ~.... - -.

__.____..._...._...m.

.,__.m._._

l l

1 1

l REFERENCE MILLSTONE UNIT 1 INSPECTION ITEM RESP STATUS s4 VIO 95-00741 Control room habitability SPO LER 96-003 oUse of SC8As (1)/SPO (L) ss URi95-02s42 Refueling evolutions contrary to design basis SPO (1) s6 vio0543102 Cros, connecting 480V safety related buses SPO (1) a7 URs 96-006-01 Drywell fire / Technical Specifications violation SPO (l)

LER 96441 LER 96-043 as LER 96-008 Nonconservative ATWS low low water level setpoint SPO (1) 89 LER 96-015 Recirc pump flow mismatch sury not perf in SPO (1) accordance with TS 90 LER 96-024 Temporary Modification to the scram air header SPO (1) pressure switch instrument not removed 91 LER 96-032 Unqualified components in drywell preclude long term SPO (1) operability 92 LER 96-036 Potential to bypass turbine stop valve when required to SPO (1) be operable 93 LER 96-037 Automatic depressurization system may not be singl0 SPO (1) failure proof 94 LER 96-029 IST/ISI Program Review DRS LER 96-039 ACR M1-97 0276,0400 95 LER 96-045 LPCI sys inop due to stuck open injection check valve SPO (1) 96 LER 96-061 LOCA concurrent with LNP loss DC power prevents SPO (1)

LER 96450 closure of LPCl torus cooling valve AR 6-0941 ACR M196-0550 97 URISS-8141 NCR Program ineffective SPO (1) eel 96-006-04 ACR M1 0454 (U1)-12

1 a

j REFERENCE MILLSTONE UNIT 1 INSPECTION ITEM RESP STATUS i

96 IR 96-12 Licensed Operator Training Program DRS URI 96-05-01 AcR Mi,,

g, eLOIT/ LOUT program requirement discrepancies i

M197-0117,0146,

)

0186,0223, 0259,0396, 0437 Mc 0350 f

c.3.1.e C.3 3.c 99 eel 96 0101 Inoperable Gas Turbine Fuel Pump SPO (1)

LER 96-10 i

100 IFt96-06-21 Material Condition Program SPO (I)

Mc 0350 c.4.f 101 LER 96 53 Radiation Effluents Monitoring Program Review DRS 4

LER 96-54 LER 96-65 LER 97-05 i

ACR M196-1042,1060, 1059,M1 '

4 i

0242,0424 a

i 102 AcR M1 EDG Air Start System Review SPO (1) 0424 i

eel 96-09-07 LER 96-55 LER 96 56 l

LER 96-60 103 AcR M1 Use of "Non-Q" parts in "Q" applications SPO (1) 0292,0207, 0028,ACR M1961097

}

104 ACR M197-GT Air Start System Review SPO (i) 0260 4

l 105 ACR M1 Single failure vulnerability of FWC1/APR historical SPO (1) 0277 failure to meet ECCS acceptance criteria 106 ACR M197-Containment isolation valves exceed allowable stroke SPO (1) 0200 time 107 Review deferred restart items list SPO (1) i (U1)-13 b

k

i REFERENCE MILLSTONE UNIT 1 INSPECTION ITEM RESP STATUS 108 MC 350 Security issues Corrective Actions DRS C.3.1.1 eel 96-0515 eel 97-1 i

oi xx VIO 9649 20

?

j I

l (U1)-14

l ENCLOSURE 2

.=_ -

i i

MILLSTONE RESTART ASSESSMENT PLAN Millstone Unit 2 Sianificant items List i

The following is a list of the Millstone issues that, as a minimum, require an NRC inspection and evaluation prior to restart.

I REFERENCE MILLSTONE UNIT 2 INSPECTION ITEM RESP STATUS 1

MC 0350 SECTION C.1.3, MANAGEMENT OVERSIGHT AND EFFECTIVENESS; SPO(l)

C.2.1, C.2.2.a,d,e, C.3.1,a,b,c,d LICENSEE STAFF SAFETY CULTURE 2

MC 0350 SECTION C.1.1, 10 CFR 50.54(f)

SPO(O)

C.1.3, C.1.4.g, C.3.2, C.4.f; CONFIRMATORY ORDER DATED 4

08/14/96 I

3 MC 0350 SECTION C.1.1 AND DESIGN CONTROL PROCESS CHANGES TO ADDRESS SPO(O)

C.1.3; C.2.2.d; UNIT 1 ACR 7007 UNIT 1 ACR 7007; UNIT 2 ACR i

8761 NUMEROUS EXAMPLES OF DRAWINGS NOT REFLECTING ACTUAL PLANT CONFIGURATION 1

i 4

MC 0350 ITEM C.1.4.e, EMPLOYEE CONCERNS PROGRAM SPO(L) i C.2.2.b,e; CONFIRMATORY ORDER DATED OCTOBER 24,1996 5

MC 0350 SECTION C.1.1, CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM TIMELINESS AND SPO(l)

C.1.3, C.1.4.d-l, C.2.1, EFFECTIVENESS; C.2.2.c.e, C.3.1.d,m; C.4.f; IR 96-04 & 08 SELF ASSESSMENT PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION AND eel 336/96-201-30 EFFECTIVENESS; COMMITMENT TRACKING 6

MC 0350 ITEMS C.2.2.d, WORK PLANNING AND CONTROL: PLANT MAINTENANCE DRS C.4.e,f,h,1,1 PROGRAM EFFECTIVENESS; SIGNIFICANT HARDWARE (OL)

ISSUES RESOLVED; MAINTENANCE BACKLOG MANAGED AND IMPACT ON OPERATION ASSESSED; SURVEILLANCE TESTING; PLANT HOUSEKEEPING 7

MC 0350 ITEMS C.I.3.f, BYPASS JUMPERS, OPERATOR WORK-AROUNDS &

SPO(l),

C.2.1.e, C.3.2.e, C.4.f,i; CONTROL BOARD DEFICIENCIES OSTI (U2)-16 Revised 3/24/97 e

~...~.. _ _. _

i REFERENCE MILLSTONE UNIT 2 INSPECTION ITEM RESP STATUS 8

MC 0350 ITEMS C.2.1.b, PROCEDURE QUALITY AND ADHERENCE SPO(0)

C.2.2.d, C.3.1.k. C.3.3.e,f; SPO(1)

URI 336/96-01-04; IFl 336/95-SURVEILLANCE QUAUTY - NUMEROUS OSTI 201-03; URI 336/96-06-08 EXAMPLES OF INADEQUATE PROCEDURES REFLECTED IN LERs AND NRC INSPECTION REPORTS ESTABLISHMENT OF ALL PROCEDURES REQUIRED BY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 6.8.1 i

REVIEW OPERATING PROCEDURES TO PRECLUDE WATER HAMMER EVENTS 9

MC 0350 ITEMS C.1.4.g, OPERATING PROCEDURES CONSISTENT WITH FSAR SPO(O)

C.2.2.g, C.3.3.e,f; DESCRIPTION OF SYSTEM OPERATION eel 336/96-08-13 eel 336/96 06-05, eel 336/96-08-06; ADEQUACY OF PROCEDURE CHANGE PROCESS TO LER 336/97-02, ACR 11104, ENSURE OPERATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH LICENSE 10 MC 0350 ITEMS C.2.1.g, PROGRESS OF EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURE DRS C.3.3.e,f; UPGRADES; (OL)

IR 336/95 21 ACCEPTABILITY OF DEFERRING ABNORMAL OPERATING PROCEDURE UPGRADES

~

11 MC 0350 ITEMS C.1.4.a,b,c, QUAUTY ASSURANCE AND OVERSIGHT SPO(1)

C.2.1.c NRR 12 MC 0350 SECTION C.1.1 C.1.3, UCENSEE RESTART PUNCH LIST - REVIEW OF ITEMS SPO(l)

C.1.4.e, C.2.1.f-g, C.4.f,i DEFERRED UNTIL AFTER RESTART 13 MC 0350 ITEMS C.3.1.g,h,1,j,I, UCENSED OPERATOR STAFFING: CONTROL ROOM SPO(l)

C.3.3.a,b,d,g FORMAUTY; ATTENTIVENESS TO DUTY; ATTENTION TO OSTI DETAIL; OFF-HOUR PLANT STAFFING; OVERTIME USAGE; AWARENESS TO PLANT SECURITY; AWARENESS OF EQUIPMENT STATUS; LOG KEEPING PRACTICES; 14 MC 0350 ITEMS C.3.1.e, INACCURATE LICENSE APPLICATION FORMS SUBMITTED DRS C.3.3.c; TO THE NRC FOR 12 OPERATOR UCENSES; (OL)

CONFIRMATORY ACTION LETTER DATED MARCH 7,1997 ADEQUACY OF LICENSED OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM; (U2) 17 Revised 3/24/97 i

-)

REFERENCE MILLSTONE UNIT 2 INSPECTION ITEM RESP STATUS 15 MC 0350 ITEMS C.4.a,b,c,d,e,g AUGMENTED INSPECTION COVERAGE DURING RESTART SPO(l)

NOTE 1 INSPECTION: OPERABILITY OF TECHNICAL OSTI l

SPECIFICATION SYSTEMS; OPERABILITY OF SECONDARY AND SUPPORT SYSTEMS; SYSTEM LINEUPS; RESULTS OF PRE-STARTUP TESTING POWER ASCENSION TESTING 1

i 16 MC 0350 ITEMS C.2.2.g-h, EFFECTIVENESS OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE DRS(EP)

C.3.1.m, C.3.2.h; ORGANIZATION; COORDINATION WITH OFFSITE NU LETTER (B16195) DATED EMERGENCY PLANNING OFFICIALS; FEBRUARY 10,1997 ON-SHIFT DOSE ASSESSMENT CAPABILITY 17 MC 0350 SECTION C.5 AND DISPOSITION OF REGULATORY ISSUES: LICENSE

NRR, C.6 AMENDMENTS; EXEMPTIONS; RELIEFS; ORDERS; SPO(L),

SIGNIFICANT ENFORCEMENT ISSUES; ALLEGATIONS; OE, 01, AND 10 CFR 2.206 PETITIONS. COORDINATION WITH

DRS, INTERESTED AGENCIES AND PARTIES.

OPA 18 ACRs 02621, M2 96-0239 MATERIAL, EQUIP. AND PARTS LIST (MEPL) PROGRAM

NRR, eel 336/96-201-42 & 43 DRS (SEB) 19 ACRs M2 96-0515 & 07958 ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT QUAllFICATION PROGRAM DRS eel 336/96-201-20; URl 336/93-(EEB) 19-02 HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAK PROGRAM 20 IFl 336/95-01-01 GENERIC LETTER 89-10 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE DRS PROGRAM; (SEB) eel 336/96-05-09 DYNAMIC TESTING OF AFW TERRY TURBINE STEAM ADMISSION MOV; eel 336/95-08-01,02,03 & 04 PRESSURE LOCKING OF CONTAINMENT SUMP RECIRCULATION VALVES 21 MC 0350 ITEM C.3.3.e; FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM:

DRS IR 336/96-08:

(EEB)

LICENSEE SELF-ASSESSMENTS APPENDIX R RELATED ABNORMAL OPERATING AND QA AUDITS; PROCEDURE;1; ACR M2-96-0460 APPENDIX R COMPLIANCE ASSOCIATED WITH THERMO-LAG (U2)-18 Revised 3/24/97

REFERENCE MILLSTONE UNIT 2 INSPECTION ITEM RESP STATUS 22 ACRs M2-96-051'3; CONTAINMENT SUMP SCREEN MESH SIZE & ECCS PUMP DRS eel 336/96-06-11 THROTTLE VALVE CLOGGING

[SEB) 23 ACRs 01991, M2-96-0449, HYDROGEN MONITORS AND POST-ACCIDENT SAMPLING SPO(l) 0467, 0654, 0655, & 0656 SYSTEM INOPERABLE AND FAILURE TO MEET DESIGN eel 336/96-08-13,14 & 15; eel BASIS AND LICENSING BASIS 336/96 201-03 & 41; URI 336/96-01-05 24 ACRs 08174,04047,06372 &

EXCESSIVE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM HEATUP AND SPO(l) 09739 COOLDOWN RATES; EVALUATION OF SIMULTANEOUS 4

URl 336/95-42-03 REACTOR COOLANT PUMP AND SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM OPERATION 25 NUMEROUS ACRs; ECCS PUMPS SUCTION LINE FROM RWST HAS DRS URI 336/96-06-08 NUMEROUS DEGRADED OR INOPERABLE PIPE (CMME)

SUPPORTS, MANY CAUSED BY WATER HAMMER 4

26 ACR 11252 "B" EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR FAtLURE -

SPO(l) eel 336/96-09-10 INADEQUATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 27 eel 336/96 201-09 INADEQUATE DESIGN CONTROL MEASURES FOR SPO(O)

VERIFYING ACCURACY OF INFORMATION CONTAINED IN DESIGN BASIS DOCUMENT PACKAGES 28 eel 336/96-201 11, FAILURE TO ADEQUATELY CONTROL INSTALLATION OF SPO(l) eel 336/96 201-31 TEMPORARY MODIFICATION TO THE RBCCW SURGE SPO(O)

TANK 29 eel 336/96-201-12 SEPARATION AND SINGLE FAILURE CONCERNS FOR SPO(l)

W10E RANGE NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTS SPO(O) 30 eel 336/96-20125 FAILURE TO IMPLEMENT CORRECTIVE ACTIONS SPO(l)

CONCERNING

• DUAL-FUNCTION

• ISOLATION VALVES SPO(O) 31 eel 336/96-201-28 FAILURE TO ADDRESS STATION BLACKOUT DIESEL SPOff)

ISSUES IDENTIFIED IN THE VECTRA ASSESSMENT SPO(O) 32 eel 336/96-201-29 FAILURE TO IMPLEMENT CORRECTIVE ACTIONS FOR SPO(l)

AUDIT ISSUES INVOLVING TRENDING AND SPO(O)

PRIORITIZATION OF NON-CONFORMANCE REPORTS (U2)-19 Revised 3/24/97 i

4 i

j REFERENCE MILLSTONE UNIT 2 INSPECTION ITEM RESP STATU$

33 eel 336/96-20136 INADEOUATE CORRECTIVE ACTION CONCERNING A DRS SEISMIC DESIGN DEFICIENCY OF A VITAL SWITCHGEAR (CMME)

ROOM COOLER

I

.i 34 eel 336/96-08-06 IMPLEMENTATION OF CORRECTIVE ACTION OF SPO(l) j CHANGING OPERATING PROCEDURE TO LOCK OPEN REFUELING POOL DRAIN VALVES, AS SPECIFIED IN THE FSAR, WAS INADEQUATE I

j.

35 eel 336/96-08-08 INADEQUATE CORRECTIVE ACTION IN LER 336/96-24 SPO(l) 3 36 eel 336/96-08-10 INADEQUATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO ADDRESS UNIT SPO(l) 1 HEAVY LOADS LIFTED OVER THE UNIT 2 VITAL SWITCHGEAR ROOM 37 eel 336/95-44-05 ICE BLOCKAGE OF SERVICE WATER STRAINER SPO(l)

BACKWASH LINE i

38 eel 336/96-05-11; SPENT FUEL POOL FSAR UPDATES SPO(O)

ENFORCEMENT LETTER DATED 11/13/96 i

39 eel 336/96-04-10 ERRONEOUS RBCCW FLOW VALUES IN CONTAINMENT DRS l

URI 336/96-20138 TEMPERATURE PROFILE ANALYSIS AND FAILURE TO (SEB) i CONSIDER POST-ACCIDENT FLUID TEMPERATURE IN HPSI FLOW EVALUATION l

40 LER 336/96-31 POTENTIAL STEAM GENERATOR OVERPRESSURE DUE TO DRS RESTRICTIVE MAIN STEAM SAFETY PlPING (SEB) 1 41 ACR M2-97-OO23 SEIMANS COMPUTER MODEL OF REACTOR CORE LARGE NRR AND SMALL BREAK LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENTS

/

\\

42 IR 336/94 201 EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR FUEL DAY TANK DOES SPO(L)

+

NOT SATISFY 7-DAY DESIGN BASIS CAPACITY 43 1R 336/96-08; INAPPROPRIATE REMOVAL OF S,TARTUP RATE TRIP SPO(l)

LER 336/96-24 (U2) 20 Revised 3/24/97

REFERENCE MILLSTONE UNIT 2 INSPECTION ITEM RESP STATUS 44 ACR 02797, ACR 09563, AFW REGULATING VALVE LEAKAGE FOLLOWING A MAIN SPO(l)

ACR M2-96-0153 STEAM LINE BREAK COULD RESULT IN EXCEEDING CONTAINMENT DESIGN PRESSURE

. AFW REGULATING VALVES FAILING OPEN FOLLOWING SINGLE FAILURE IN CONTROL CIRCUIT COULD PREVENT ISOLATING A RUPTURED STEAM GENERATOR AFFECTING CONTAINMENT PEAK PRESSURE 45 ACR M2-96-0296 FAILURE OF MAIN STEAM CHECK VALVE FOLLOWING A SPO(f)

MAIN STEAM LINE BREAK (MSLB) COULD CAUSE BOTH SPO(O)

STEAM GENERATORS TO BLOW DOWN RESULTING IN EXCEEDING CONTAINMENT DESIGN PRESSURE. THE CONTAINMENT HAS LESS THAN ONE PSI DESIGN MARGIN FOR MSLB. THE LICENSEE *S MEPL PROGRAM DESIGNATES THE MS CHECK VALVES AS NON-QA WHICH THE LICENSEE HAS EVALUATED AS ACCEPTABLE. FSAR DESCRIBES THAT THE IMPACT DURING CHECK VALVE CLOSURE WOULD CAUSE PORTIONS OF THE DISK AND BODY CASTING TO *GO PLASTIC."

46 LER 336/97-02 CONTROL ROOM AIR CONDITIONING COMMON INLET SPO(l)

DAMPER COULD BECOME STUCK CLOSED, DISABLING BOTH FACILITIES. DAMPER HAS NO MANUAL OPERATOR AS STATED IN FSAR.

47 URI 336/96-08-09 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM AND ENGINEERED SPO(l)

SAFETY FEATURE RESPONSE TIME TESTING 48 ACRs M2 96-0252 & 0542 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LIMITS FOR INOPERABLE SPO(l)

URI 336/96-08-16 MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVES NON-CONSERVATIVE Note 1: Since this inspection will occur following restart approval, the closure of this itern will not be reflected on this list.

(U2) 21 Revised 3/24/97

l l

e 0

a ENCLOSURE 3 i

l l

t

MILLSTONE RESTART ASSESSMENT PLAN Millstone Unit 3 Sionificant items List IEFEMMCE ME1STOGE UINT 3 BASPECTION ITEM IESP STATUS 1

ACR 10773 RSS AND 088 PIPING TEMPERATURE NRR Update eel 96-0613 MAYBE HIGHER THAN ANALYZED (NRR REVIEW ENG.

DRS R9646 LER 96-007-ANALYSIS, DRS MSPECT WSTALLATION) 01Si02 2

EEI 96 201-DETERMINE FSAR STATUS BEFORE RESTART 01 SPO(L) 3 ACR 06715 REACTOR POWER WCREASE WHEN UN80 RATED CATION DRP CLOSED DEMIN PLACED INTO SERVICE 3CHS-DEMIN2 IR9648 4

ACP. 01895 EDG SEOuENcER CDA SIGNAL OUTPUT *A" TRAIN DRS CLOSED COMPONENTS STARTED R96-09 5

ACR 01844 FAILURE TO ENTER AN ACTION STATEMENT WHEN MSIVS SPO(1)

VIO 94-24-01 WERE CLOSED 6

ACR 04199 RCP SEAL INJECTION FILTER *B" GASKET FAILED RESULTWG W DRP CLOSED SPILL OF COOLANT TO FLOOR DRAINS IR9648 7

ACR 06092 RCS CHECK VALVE BODY TO BONNET LEAK; 3 RCS*V146 DRP CLOSED IR96 06 B

ACR 01535 WHILE DEWATERING SPENT RESIN, THE WASTE TEMPERATURE DRP CLOSED IN THE LINER RAISED FROM 90 TO 310*F R9646 9

ACR 10543 NEED FOR ADDITIONAL REVIEW OF RESPONSE TIME TESTING SPO(0 FOR PROCEDURES 10 ACM 11322 CLOSURE OF PIR WITHOUT ADDRESSING DESIGN FEATURE OF DRP CLOSED AFFECTED COMPONENTS IR9649 11 NU LTR TUR8INE DRIVEN AUX FEEDWATER DESIGN CONCERNS SPO(l) -

(B15397) 11/1/95, ACR 10774 &

i 10780 eel 96-201-04,05 URI 96-201-l 12 ACR 97-0317 CONTAINMENT FOUNDATION EROSION NRR I

ACR 6323

~

URI 9644-13 URI 964414 UN 9644-15 IFl 941149 Revised 3/24/97

IEFUENCE ME1 STONE UNIT 3 BdSPECTION ITERA DESP STATUS 13 ACR 96-326 CCP SYSTEM OPERATION ABOVE DESIGN TEMPERATURE: 3 SPO(l)

Update RHS*HCV 606/607 FAILING OPEN; AND OTHER FAILURE MODES IR96 08 13427 URI 96-08-20 IR 96 201 4

LER 96-28 &

96 40 14 ACR 7745 SGCS OPERATIONAL CONFIGURATION CONTROL SPO(l) i URI 96-01-07 15 ACR 96-0159 LETDOWN HEAT EXCHANGER LEAKAGE AND DESIGN SPO(l)

Update

]

eel 96-06-15 DISCREPANCIES IR96-06 5

16 Unit 2 DUAL FUNCTION VALVE CONTROL AND TESTING SPO ACR 01935 NRR

)

i 17 ACR 7266 RCP SEAL HOUSING LEAKAGE AND BOLT CORROSION DRS 18 ACR 10562, CONTROL AND USE OF VENDOR INFORMATION DRS j

PPR G.2 eel 96-201-15 eel 96 201-18 eel 96-201-19 URI 96-201-17 19 URI 96 201-RESOLUTION OF AFW VALVES HELB CONCERN SPO(l) i 16 i

20 VIO 96-59-13 REVIEW OUTPUT FROM J. HANNON EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPO(L)

MC 0350 ITEMS C.1.4.e &

C.2.2.b 21 FATIGUE CYCLE OPEN ITEMS IP 37750 DRS CLOSED (UNIT 2 ISSUE)

IR96-01 22 PART 70 STORAGE AND INVENTORY IP 84750 (UNIT 1 ISSUE)

DRS CLOSED IR96-05 23 FORMALITY OF NON-ROUTINE SECURITY ACTIVITIES AND NEW DRS CLOSED FUEL SECURITY IP 81064 1R96-05 4

24 URI 96-01-08 OVERLAP TESTING OF RPS/ESF SPO(l)

Update LER 9717 IR97-01 25 ACR 912 MATERIAL, EQUIP. AND PARTS LIST (MEPL) PROGRAM DRS Update URI 95-0710 EVALUATION NRR 1R96-201 eel 96-201-4 43 (U3)-24 Revised 3/24/97

4 4

IWiFEIERICE MELSTOIE UNIT 3 58SPECTION ITEM fESP STATUS 26 ACR 96-277, MOTOR OPERATED VALVE PROGRAM GLB910 DRS 0278,627, 12862 LER 96-19,20 LER 96-35 URI 95-17-09 IFl 95-01-01 IFl 95-1741,

)

02,03,04, 05 f

27 PPR G.1.C, MISSED SURVEILLANCES/ TEST CONTROL SPO(l)

CLOSED G.2 MC 0350 BR96-08 ITEMS C.4.e 28 PPR G.1.C DILUTION EVENTS SPO(l)

CLOSED IR96-08 29 PPR G.1.C FEEDWATER HAMMER DRS CLOSED 1R96-01 30 1R 95 31, NU AFW CHECK VALVE LEAKAGE DRS LTR (815397) 11/1/95 PPR G.1.C, ACR 96-0855 31 PPR G.1.C, WORK-AROUNDS AND ABUSE OF USE-AS-IS DEFICIENCIES SPO(0 G.2 MC 0350 ITEMS C.1.3.f, C.2.1.e C.3.2.e, C.4.f.& 1 32 NOV 94 RESIDENT EMPHASIS: AWO QUALITY AND BACKLOG CONTROL DRS I

05 PPR G.2 MC 0350 ITEMS C.2.2.e C.4.f,h,I 33 1R 96-201 SEISMIC 11/1 DRS PPR G.2 34 EFFLUENT / ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLING AND ANALYTICAL DRS Update PROFICIENCY IR9649 35 RADWASTE SYSTEMS / CONTROLS DRS Opdate IR96-08 (U3)-25 rem 3/24/97

I BERIENCE RM.LSTORE UIET 3 50SPECTION ITEM IESP STATUS 36 HEAT EXCHANGER PERFORMANCE (GL 8913)

DRS j

37 1R 96-04 REVIEW LICENSEE CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAMS FOR SPO(l) i eel 96 201-EFFECTIVENESS TO INCLUDE ACR's AND NCR's 13,21,22, 23,24,26, 27,28,29 MC 0350 ITEMS C.1.1, C.1.3, C.1.4.d,e,g, C.2.1, C.2.2.c,e, C.3.1.d, C.4.f 38 REVIEW 0737 ACTION ITEMS FOR COMPLETION SPO(l) 39 MC 0350 REVIEW ENGINEERING BACKLOGS DRS ITEMS C.3.2.a,c 40 MC 0350 REVIEW 50.54F ISSUES FOR RESTART / REVIEW DEFFERED SPO Update ITEMS C.1.1, RESTART ITEMS LIST IR96-06 l

C.1.3, C.1.f,& g, C.4.f,1 41 ACR 7007 REVIEW SELF ASSESSMENT ROOT CAUSES AND VERIFY SPO(1)

URI 95-81-01 CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (IP40500)

VIO 96 09-04 MC 0350 C.1.4.1 42 FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM DRS 43 ORDER PHASE 11 OF THE ICAVP SPO(O) 44 ACR 12116, CYCLE 6 BORON DILUTION ANALYSIS POTENTIALLY NON-DRS 964325 CONSERVATIVE AND PGS FLOW RATE TO CHARGING PUMPS LER 96 26 MAY BE IN ERROR 45 ACR 96-INITIAL SETTINGS FOR ECCS THROTTLE VALVES INADEQUATE SPO(l)

Update 0524,08897 AND POTENTIAL CLOGGING 1R96-06 URI 96-0614 LER 96-29 &

96-39 46 ACR 96-0183 LOW PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION PENETRATIONS SPO(l) 47 ACR 96-0391 RHR HEAT EXCHANGER BOLTING SUSCEPTIBLE TO BORIC ACID DRS 48 ACR 10397 LLRT "AS FOUND" TOTAL LEAKAGE EXCEEDED MAX DRP CLOSED ALLOWABLE 1R96-08 1

(U3)-26 Revised 3/24/97

~-

-=

4 IEFEBENCE ME1 STONE UNIT 3 50SPECT10N ITERA RESP STATUS 43 ACR 96-0324 FUEL TRANSFER TUBE BELLOWS SEAL CONNECTION NOT DRP CLOSED TESTED IR96 08 50 ACR 96-0446 DOCUMENTATION OF CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS DRS DISCREPANCIES 51 ACR 96-WALWORTH VALVE YOKE GENERIC ISSUE DRS 0339,96-0389 52 ACR 10795 SWP TEMPERATURE SWITCHES DEFEATED BY BYPASS JUMPER SPO(l) eel 96-201 FOR SWP'P3A1B (BOOSTER PUMPS) 02,23 LER 96-005-01 53 ACR 96-0449 PIECES OF ARCOR FOUND IN 3RSS*E1 A AND 3RCC'E1C SPO Update i

URI 96-09-XX NRR IR96-09 LER 96 25 54 ACR 96-0181 NUMEROUS BOLTS ON BACK DOOR ON 4160V SWITCHGEAR DRP CLOSED MISSING IR96-06 55 ACR 964467 FAST TRANSFER TEST FAILURES DRS CLOSED IR96-09 56 ACR 12495 SHUTDOWN MARGIN MONITOR ALARM SETPOINT DRS CLOSED IR96-05 57 ACR 96-POTENTIAL ELECTRICAL SEPARATION VIOLATIONS DRS 0080,96-0081 LER 96-15, 45,49 LER 96-015-02 58 ACR 96-THERMAL RELIEF VALVE SETPOINTS SPO(l) 0557,96-0685 eel 96-201-33 59 ACR 96-USE OF BORAFLEX IN SFP RACKS SPO(L) 0775,9124, 0646 LER 96-33 60 ACR 96-ANALYSIS OF SOV FAILURE MODES DUE TO MOPD SPO(l)

Update 0718,0821 IR96 09 eel 96-09-XX 61 UNIT 2 EEQ PROCESS DRS ACR 7923 (U3)-27 Revised 3/24/97

_. ~. _ -. - -... -..

1 I

i fuiRNBBCE MSASTOfE! UNIT 3 BASPECTION ITEM IESP STATUS l

62 ACR 13788 TSP SASKET SAFETY EVALUATION POSSIBLY NOT VALID SPO(l) 63 ACR 96 0396 3 MSS *MOV17D MISSED IST SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT DRP CLOSED IR96 08 64 ACR 08614 REACTOR PROTECTION LEAD LAG CIRCulTS MAY BE SET DRS CLOSED NONCONSERVATIVELY IR96-05 i

65 ACR 96-SIL/SlH VALVES POWERED FROM NONSAFETY TRAIN SPO j

0745, CR 97-NRR 742 I

LER 96-36 i

66 ACR 96-0483 CCP AND CCE NON-Q COMPONENTS CAUSE O-COMPONENTS SPO(l) i, NOT TO Fall SAFE r

67 ACR 96-0621 SSO POSSIBLE OVERLOAD IN EVENT OF AN SIS ACTUATION &

j TAC No.

DESIGN ISSUES SPO M96054 URI 96-201-j 14 68 REVIEW ALLEGATIONS FOR RESTART ISSUES SPO j

69 REVIEW ALL OPERASILITY DETERMINATIONS AND BY-PASS SPO JUMPERS BEFORE RESTART 70 URI 96-08-16 REVIEW TRM FOR TECH. SPEC. INTERPRETATIONS: EVALUATE DRS LERs 96-002-TS AND OPER. LICENSE ISSUES 01, 96-37, 96-38,96-42, i

9643,9648, 1

CAL 197-010 a

71 MC 0350 REVIEW LICENSEE EVENT REPORTS FOR RESTART ISSUES SPO(l)

C.1.4.1 72 REVIEW ENFORCEMENT AND UNRESOLVED ITEMS FOR ITEMS SPO(l)

FOR RESTART ISSUES l

73 REVIEW OA PROGRAM FOR ADEQUACY AND IMPROVEMENT NRR OSTI NOV 96 12, l

IFl 96-06-17 MC 0350 C.1.4.a,b,c, C.2.1.c 74 UN 96-0818 ISI/IST PROGRAM CONTROL DRS LER 96-21 75 IFl 96-0815 TIA ISSUES (EDG EXHAUST & REQUIRED # OF SW PUMPS)

NRR IFl 96-0917 i

j (U3)-28 Revised 3/24/97 s

l fER5BfCE MELSTONE UNIT 3 50SPECTION ITEM RESP STATUS 76 IFl 96-08-17 CRACKING OF FUSE FERRULES DRS 77 IFl 95-44-06 POTENTIAL FREEZING OF SW BACKWASH LINES SPO(l) 78 URI 93 07-07, SAFETY ANALYSIS (50.59) PROCESS SPO(L) eel 96-201-02,04,05, 06,07,08 79 eel 96-201-DESIGN CONTROL PROCESS REVIEW SPO(O) 09,15,35, (PART OF PHASE I OF THE ICAVP) 37,39 MC 0350 C.3.2.f 80 ACR 97 348 PROCEDURE ADEQUACY AND ADHERENCE / PUP PROCESS SPO(l)

Update eel 96-201-OSTI 1R97-01 18,19 MC 0350 C.2.1.b, C.2.2.d, C.3.1.k, C.3.3.e,f 81 eel 96 201-TESTING OF SAFETY SYSTEMS DRS 32,33,34 82 eel 96 201-QUALITY ASSURANCE RECORDS SPO(l) 10 83 NU LETTER EFFECTIVLJESS OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE ORG; ORS (816195),

COORDINATION WITH OFFSITE EP OFFICIALS: DOSE l

2/10/97 ASSESSMENT CAPABILITY MC 0350 ITEMS C.2.2.g. h, C.3.1.m, C.3.2.h & IFl 95-36-01 84 MC 0350 SECURITY ISSUES - CORRECTIVE ACTION AND REVIEW DRS ITEM C.3.1.1 eel 96-05-15, eel 97 01-XX, U1 VIO 96-09-20 85 ACR 96 496, OTHER RSS AND RELATED DESIGN BASIS CONCERNS DP.S 497,620, NRR 1078,97-039,128, 409 LER 97-03, 97-15 (U3)-29 Revised 3/24/97

y.,

-,-. e a

.m n

x_

.u a.

-~---

a d

ENCLOSURE 4

• • • '/ S s

l i

I c

MILLSTONE RESTART ASSESSMENT PLAN MILLSTONE UNIT ALL UNITS RESTART APPROVAL (MC0350)

The following items are considered applicable to the restart of all Millstone Units:

RESPONSISILITIES AND AUTHORITIES NEED STATUS RESP l

.a 4.0 Director. Snecial Projects Office (SPO). Notifies the X

C NRR 1

Executive Director for Operations (EDO) and the Commission, as appropriate, of the NRC actions taken concerning shutdown plants and the proposed followup plan.

4.0 Director. Special Prolects Office X

C DsPO 2

a. Discusses with the Deputy Executive Director for Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Regional Operations and Research, the Office of Enforcement (OE), and NRR, as appropriate, the need for an order or confirmatory action letter (CAL) specifying the s::tions required of the licensee to receive NRC approval to restart the plant and the proposed followup plan, b.

Decides, in consultation with the NRR X

C DSPO Associate Director for Projects, whether this.

manual chapter applies to a specific reactor restart.

c. In coordination with the NRR Associate Director for X

C DSPO Projects, decides whether to establish a Restart Panel.

d.

Develops a written Restart Assessment Plan, X

C RAP including a case-specific checklist, to assign responsibilities and schedules for restart actions and interactions with the licensee and outside organizations.

Revised 3/24/97 l

4 4

i i

1 NEED STATUS RESP

e. Coordinates and implements those actions X

RAP prescribed in the Restart Assessment Plan that i

have been determined to be the Office of Special i

Project's responsibility. These include, when

{

appropriate, interactions with State and local agencies and with regional offices of Federal i

i agencies.

i

f. In conjunction with NRR, reviews and determines X

RAP the acceptability of licensee's corrective action SR program.

g.

Approves restart of the shutdown plant, X

DSPO following consultation with the EDO and the Director of NRR, and approval / vote by the Commission.

4.03 Director SPO a.

Acts as the focal point for discussions within X

DSPO NRR to establish the appropriate followup actions for a plant that has been shut down.

4.04 Deputy Director, Licensing DS N a.

Coordinates participation in followup X

conference calls and management discussions to ensure that the Director SPO are directly involved, when appropriate, in followup action.

b.

Coordinates and implements actions x

DSPOL prescribed in the Restart Assessment Plan that have been determined to be Licensing's responsibility. These include, where applicable, appropriate NRC Office or NRR i

Division interaction with other Federal agencies (e.g., Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Department of i

Justice (DOJ)) pursuant to any applicable Memoranda of Understanding, j

(U3)-32 Revised 3/24/97

l 1

\\

i l

1 l

1 NEED STATUS RESP.

B.1 INITIAL NRC RESPONSE NA l

The facts, the causes, and their I

apparent impacts should be established 1

early in the process. This information i

l will assist the NRC in characterizing the I

problems, the safety significance, and l

the regulatory issues. Early management appraisal of the situation is also important to ensure the proper j

immediate actions are taken. The following items should have been I

completed or should be incorporated l

Into the CSC as appropriate. Refer to Section 5.02 of this manual chapter for additional information.

J a.

Initial notification and NRC NA management discussion of known facts and issues i

b.

Identify / implement additional NA inspections (i.e. AIT, ilT, or t

Special) (Region).

c.

Determine need for formal NA regulatory response (i.e. order or CAL).

d.

Identify other parties involved NA (i.e., NRC Organizations, other Federal agencies, industry organizations).

l 4

(U3)-33 Revised 3/24/97 t..-.

. -. _ ~ _

t NEED STATUS RESP.

l 4

B.2 NOTIFICATIONS NA initial notification of the event quickly communicates NRC's understanding of the event and its immediate response to the parties having an interest in the event.

Notification to regional and headquarters offices of cognizant Federal agencies may 4

be appropriate. As the review process 4

continues, additional and continuing notifications may be required.

a.

Issue Daily and Directors Highlight NA (NRR).

i j

b.

Issue preliminary notification NA 4,

(Region).

c.

Conduct Commissioner assistants' NA briefing.

1 j

d.

Issue Commission paper (NRR).

NA i

e.

Cognizant Federal agencies NA i

notified (i.e., FEMA, EPA, DOJ).

i I

I i

f. State and local officials notified (Region).

NA

)

d 1

g.

Congressional notification (NRR)

NA 4

4

?

4 j

9 (U3)-34 Revised 3/24/97

)

\\

PROCESS B.3 NEED STATUS RESP.

B.3 ESTABLISH AND ORGANIZE THE NRC REVIEW PROCES1 a.

Establish the Restart Panel.

X

\\

b.

Assess available information (i.e. Inspection X

RAP j

results, licensee self-assessments, industry reviews).

c.

Obtain input from involved parties both within X

RAP NRC and other Federal agencies such as i

FEMA, EPA, DOJ.

1 d.

Conduct Director SPO briefing.

X RAP i

e.

Conduct NRR Executive Team briefing (NRR).

X C

RAP i

f.

Develop the case-specific checklist (CSC).

X C

RAP g.

Develop the Restart Assessment Plan.

X C

RAP h.

Director SPO approves Restart Assessment X

C DSPO Plan.

l.

NRR Director approves Restart Assessment X

C DNRR I

Plan.

j.

Implement Restart Assessment Plan.

X RAP k.

Modify order as necessary X

NRR NEED STATUS RESP.

B.4 REVIEW IMPLEMENTATION j

B.4.1 Root Causes and Corrective Actions OSTI RAP a.

Evaluate findings of the special team X

inspection.

i b.

Licensee performs root cause analysis X

NU and develops corrective action plan OSri for root causes.

l (U3)-35 Revised 3/24/97

l 1

.i l

c.

NRC evaluates licensee's root cause X

RAP j

determination and corrective action osTi j

plan.

l 3

NEED STATU RESP j

8.4.2 8.4.2 Assessment of Ea"3 ament Dameee NA For events where equipment damage occurs, a thorough assessment of the extent of damage is necessary. A root cause determination will be necessary if the damage was the result of an intomal

{

event. The need for independent NRC assessment should be considered. The licensee will need to determine corrective actions to repair, test, inspect, and/or analyze affected systems and equipment.

These actions are required to restore or verify that the equipment will perform to design requirements.

Equipment modifications may also be required to ensure performance to design requirements.

Potential offsite emergency response impact for extemal events such as natural disasters, explosions, or riots should be considered. NRR should obtain information from FEMA headquarters reaffirming the adequacy of State and local offsite emergency plans and preparedness if an event raises reasonable doubts about emergency response capability.

Licensee assesses damage to systems and NA a.

components.

b.

NRC evaluates licensee damage assessment.

NA c.

Licensee determines corrective actions.

NA d.

NRC evaluates corrective actions.

NA (U3)-36 Revised 3/24/97

i NEED STATUS RESP.

B.4.3 Determine Restart issues and Resolution X

RAP The establishment of the restart issues that require resolution before restart demands a clear understanding of the issues and the actions required to address those issues by both the NRC and the licensee. This section outlines steps to determine the restart issues and NRC's evaluation of their resolution.

a.

Review / evaluate licensee generated restart X

RAP issues.

b.

Independent NRC identification of restart X

RAP issues c.

NRC/ licensee agreement on restart issues.

X RAP d.

Evaluate licensee's restart issues X

RAP implementation process, e.

Evaluate licensee's implementation X

sm verification process.

(U3) 37 Revised 3/24/97

-.. -. ~..

i l

]

}

NEED STATUS RESP.

i B.4.4 Obtain Comments Since some shutdowns involve a broad number of issues, solicitation of comments from diverse sources may be appropriate. The decision to solicit comments from a group and the level of participation should be made on a case-by-case basis, input from these groups should be factored into the restart process when they contribute positively to the review. Note:

If needed, comments concoming the adequacy of j

state and local emergency planning and preparedness must be obtained from FEMA headquarters through RAP NRR.

X s.

Obtain public comments.

b.

Obtain comments from State and Local X

Sto j

Officials (Region).

)

c.

Obtain comments from applicable X

RAP Federal agencies.

B.4.5 Closeout Actions i

When the actions to resolve the restart issues and significant concerns are substantially complete, closeout actions are needed to verify that planned inspections and verifications are complete. The d

licensee should certify that corrective actions required j

before restart are complete and that the plant is I

physically ready for restart. This section provides 4

actions associated with completion of significant NRC reviews and preparations for restart.

RAP l

oSTI a.

Evakiate licensee's restart readiness self-ussessment.

X i

b.

NRC evaluation of applicable items from X

RAP

{

Section C "lSSUES" complete.

a c.

Restart issues closed.

X RAP 3

SRI oSTI i

d.

Cenduct NRC restart readiness team X

oSTI inspection.

t (U3)-38 Revised 3/24/97

. = -

I Issue augmented restart coverage inspection X

OsTi e.

plan.

i NEED STATUS

RESP,

f. Comments from other parties considered.

X RAP

g. Determine that all conditions of the Order / CAL are X

RAP satisfied.

h. Re-review of Generic Restart Checklist complete.

X RAP SRI B.5 RESTART AUTHORIZATION (B.5)

When the restart review process has reached the point that the issues have been identified, corrected, and reviewed, a restart authorization process is begun. At this point the Restart Panel should think broadly and ask: "Are all actions substantially complete? Have we overlooked any items?"

1

a. Prepara restart recommendation document and basis for restart.

X RAP

b. NRC Restart Panel recommends restart X

RAP

c. No restart objections from other applicable HQ X

McK offices.

d. No restart objections from applicable Federal X

RAP agencies.

e. DSPO concurs in restart recommendation X

DSPO

f. NRR Director concurs in restart recommendation.

X DSF'0L

g. EDO concurs in restart recommendation when X

EDO required.

h. Conduct ACRS briefing when requested (NRR).

X sPO

i. Conduct Commission briefing when requested.

X DSPO

j. Commission approves in restart authorization.

X cOMM

k. DSPO authorizes restart.

X EDO (U3)-39 Revised 3/24/97

4 l

i 8.6 RESTART AUTHORIZATION NOTIFICATION (B.61 Notify the applicable parties of the restart authorization.

Notifications should generally be made using a 1

m9morandum or other format consistent with the level of formality required. Communication of planned actions is important at this stage to ensure that NRC intentions are clearly understood.

a. Commission (if the Commission did not concur in the Restart Authorization or as requested) (NRR).

NA RAP

b. EDO Ilf the EDO did not concur in the restart NA EDO recommendation or as requested) (NRR).

c. Congressional Affairs (RAP).

X OCA

d. ACRS (a briefing may be substituted for the written X

sPO notification if the ACRS requests a briefing) (NRR).

e. Applicable Federal agencies.

X RAP

f. Public Affairs.

X ora

g. State and local officials.

X SLO

h. Citizens or groups that expressed interest during the X

RAP restart approval process.

1 (U3)-40 Revised 3/24/97

l l

i ISSUES NEED STATUS RESP.

C.1.1 Root Cause Assessment l

a.

Conditions requiring the shutdown are X

RAP clearly understood.

b.

Root causes of the conditions requiring the X

RAP shutdown are clearly understood.

c.

Root causes of other significant problems X

RAP are clearly understood, d.

Effectiveness of the root cause analysis X

RAP program.

C.1.2 Demane Assessment Damage assessment was thorough and NA a.

comprehensive, b.

Corrective actions clearly restored systems NA and equipment or verified they can perform as designed.

C.1.3 Corrective Actions a.

Thoroughness of the corrective action plan X

RAP b.

Completeness of corrective action X

SRI programs for specific root causes.

c.

Control of corrective action item tracking.

X SRI osTI d.

Effective corrective actions for the X

SRI conditions requiring the shutdown have osTi been implemented.

e.

Effective corrective actions for other X

SRI significant problems have been osT1 Implemented.

f.

Control of long-term corrective actions.

X SRI osTI g.

Effectiveness of the corrective action X

SRI verification process, osTi i

I (U3)-41 Revised 3/24/97 l

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3 I

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NEED STATUS RESP.

i C.1.4 Self Assessment Canability l

The occurrence of an event may be indicative of potential weaknesses in the licensee's self assessment capability. A strong self assessment capability creates an environment where problems are readily identified, prioritized, and tracked. Effective corrective actions require problem root cause identification, solutions to correct the cause, and verification methods that ensure the issue is resolved. Senior licensee management effectiveness in ensuring effective self assessment is treated separately.

a.

Effectiveness of Quality Assurance Program.

X RAP b.

Effectiveness of industry Experience Review X

osTi

Program, c.

Effectiveness of licensee's independent X

SRI Review Groups, osTI d.

Effectiveness of deficiency reporting system.

X SRI osTi e.

Staff willingness to raise concerns.

X oE RAP f.

Effectiveness of PRA usage.

X osTi g.

Effectiveness of commitment tracking X

SRI program.

RAP h.

Review applicable extemal audits X

osTi 1.

Quality of 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73 X

SRI reports.

NEED STATUS RESP.

C.2.1 Manaaement Oversiaht and Effectiveness a.

Goals / expectations communicated to the X

osTi staff.

b.

Demonstrated expectation of adherence to X

SRI procedures, osTi c.

Management involvement in self-assessment X

RAP and independent self-assessment capability (U3)-42 Revised 3/24/97

i.

i i

d.

Effectiveness of management review X

SRI -

committees, osTI l

e.

Management's demonstrated awareness of X

SRI day-to-day operational concems.

osTI f.

Management's ability to identify and prioritize X

sR j

significant issues.

osTi g.

Management's ability to coordinate resolution X

sR of significant issues.

osTI h.

Management's ability to implement effective X

sR l

corrective actions.

osT C.2.2 Mananoment Suonort s.

Impact of any management reorganization.

X RAP l

b.

Effective and timely resolution of employee X

RAP concems.

c.

Adequate engineerinD support as demonstrated X

DRs by timely resolution of issues.

osTi 1

d.

Adequate plant administrative procedures.

X sR PE e.

Effective information exchange with other X

SRI utilities.

osTI f.

Participation in industry groups.

NA g.

Effectiveness of Emergency Response X

DRs Organization.

h.

Coordination with offsite emergency X

DRs planning officials.

NEED STATUS RESP.

C.3.1 Assessment of Staff RAP a.

Demonstrated commitment to achieving X

SRI osTI improved performance, b.

Demonstrated safety consciousness.

X osT sR c.

Understanding of management's expectations X

osTi and goals.

(U3)-43 Revised 3/24/97

I d.

Understanding of plant issues and corrective X

osTi

actions, SRI

~

e.

Qualifications and training of the staff.

X osTi I

f.

Staff's fitness for duty.

NA g.

Attentiveness to duty.

X osTi l

h.

Level of attention to detail.

X osTI 1.

Off-hour plant staffing.

X SRI l

J.

Staff overtime usage.

X sR SRI k.

Procedure usage / adherence.

X SRI PE 1.

Awareness of plant security.

X DRs m.

Understanding of offsite emergency planning X

DRS issues.

I C.3.2 Assessment of Cornorate Suonort and Site Enaineerina Support X

osTi a.

Corporate staff understanding of plant issues.

b.

Corporate staff site specific knowledge.

X osTI c.

Effectiveness of the corporate / plant interface X

osTI meetings.

i d.

Corporate involvement with plant activities.

X osTI e.

Effectiveness of site engineering support.

X DRs f.

Effectiveness of the site design modification X

DRs

process, g.

Effectiveness of licensing support.

X RAP NEED STATUS RESP.

h.

Coordination with offsite emergency planning X

RAP officials.

C.3.3 Operator issues i

l a.

Licensed operator staffing meets requirements l

and licensee goals.

X osTi I

l b.

Level of formality in the control room.

X osTI i

SRI (U3).44 Revised 3/24/97

j c.

Effectiveness of control room simulator X

DRs j

training.

d.

Control room / plant operator awareness of X

osT equipment status.

sri 1

e.

Adequacy of plant operating procedures.

X SRI I

f.

Procedure usage / adherence.

X SRI i

osTI g.

Log keeping practices.

X osTI IMIM j

C.4 ASSESSMENT OF PHYSICAL READINESS OF THE 1

PLANT.

a. Operability of technical specification systems.

X osTi j

b. Operability of required secondary and support X

osTi systems.

c. Results of pre-startup testing.

X sPo osTi

d. Adequacy of system lineups.

X osTI

e. Adequacy of surveillance tests / test program.

X osTi

f. Significant hardware issues resolved (i.e. damaged X

osTi equipment, equipment ageing, modifications).

g. Adequacy of the power ascension testing program.

X osTi 3

sri

h. Effectiveness of the plant maintenance program.

X osTi DRs l

l. Maintenance backlog managed and impact X

osTi on operation assessed.

J. Adequacy of plant housekeeping and equipment X

osTI 4

storage.

muumummmu NEED STATUS RESP.

4 C.5 ASSESSMENT OF COMPLIANCE WITH REGULATORY j

REQUIREMENTS i

a.

Applicable license amendments have been X

RAP issued.

]

b.

Applicable exemptions have been granted.

X RAP c.

Applicable reliefs have been granted.

X RAP j

i i

~

(U31-45 Revised 3/24/97 a

1 i

i j

d.

Imposed Orders have been modified or X

RAP rescinded.

l e.

Significant enforcement issues have been X

RAP i

resolved.

OE f.

Allegations have been appropriately X

RAP addressed.

sR 1

J PE g.

10 CFR 2.206 Petitions have been X

NRR appropriately addressed.

i h.

Atomic Safety and Licensing Board hearings NA have been completed.

C.6 COORDINATION WITH INTERESTED AGENCIES AND PARTIES a.

Federal Emergency Management Agency X

DRS j

b.

Environmental Protection Agency X

RAP c.

Department of Justice X

OE 01 d.

Department of Labor X

OE e.

Appropriate State and local officials X

SLO f.

Appropriate public interest groups X

RAP g.

Local news media X

3OPA 1

l i

(U3)-46 Revised 3/24/97 i

i

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i l

1 1

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l l

ENCLOSURE 5 d

4 4

e

LICENSING ISSUES REQUIRED FOR RESTART MILLSTONE UNIT 1 No.

TAC No.

Issue Status 1

M96062 Safety / Relief Valve Electrical Design Under staff review.

Modification 2

M97934 Response Time Testing Under staff review.

Clarification / Modification 3

M98123 Allowable Outage Times Revisions Under staff review.

Note: The licensee indicated they plan to submit two additional licensing issues which will be needed prior to restart.

(U3)-48 Revised 3/24/97

l 1

LICENSING ISSUES REQUIRED FOR RESTART MILLSTONE UNIT 2 No.

TAC No.

Issue Status l

1 M92879 Cont. Rm. Emer. Vent Sys.- TSs Under Review i

1 2

2 M94105 Steam Gen Blowdwn. Mont.- TSs Under Review i

3 M94623 Cont. Iso. Valves-TSs Need Add. Info.

4 M97741 Org Structure & Titles-TSs Under Review 5

M97746 Met. Tower inst.- TSs Need Add. Info.

6 M97680 Siemens LOCA Anal.- Evaluation Under Review 4

7 Ultimate Heat Sink-TSs Submit 03/31/97 8

Enclosure Bldg.- TSs Submit 03/31/97 l

9 ESFAS Time Delay-TSs Submit 04/14/97 10 EDG Fuel Oil-TS Basis Change Submit 04/21/97 11 Spent Fuel Vent Sys.- TSs Submit 04/30/97 l

12 Shut Dwn. Cooling-TSs Submit 04/30/97 13 Press. PORV-TSs Submit 04/30/97 l

14 DNS Parameters-TSs Submit 04/30/97 15 Rx Trip Setpoints SG Safety Valv.-TSs Submit 04/30/97

]

16 RCS P-T Curves-TSs Submit 04/30/97 1

4 i

l 4

l 4

1 a

^

(U3)-49 Revised 3/24/97 i

n

LICENSING ISSUES REQUIRED FOR RESTART MILLSTONE UNIT 3 No.

TAC No.

Issue Status j

1 M92798 Modifies MSIV surveillance and action Under staff reiview.

statements.

2 M95489 Modifies the description of the time Amendment No.134, constants associated with the issued March 11, Overtemperature and Overpressure Delta-T 1997.

calculations.

Note: The licensee has indicated that it plans to submit approximately 23 licensing issues which will be needed prior to restart.

l l

(U3)-50 Revised 3/24/97