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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER PAGE 0l5l0l0l0l2l9l5 1l0Fl0l4 ZION NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT 1 1
TITLE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION RIOUIRED REACTOR SHUTDOWN l
EVENT DATE LER NUMBER REPORT DATE OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR sE0 REV.
MONTH DAY YEAR FACILITY NAMES DOCKET NUMBER (5) l IIIIII i
t 012i 211 9
7 917 01014 1
oln 01, 214 917 I I I I I I I THis REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS Or 10 CFR $: (CHECK ONE OR MORE OF THE FOLLOWING)
OPERATING MODE 1
20.402(b) 20.405(e) 50.73(a)(2)(iv) 73.71(b)
POWER 20.405(a)(1)(1) 50 36(c)(1) 50.73(a)(2)(v) 73.71(c) 0l4l2 20.405(a)(1)(11) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(vit)
OTHER (Specify in LEVEL 20.405(a)(1)(111)
X 50.73(a)(2)(1) 50.73(a)(2)(viti)(A)
Abstract below 20.405(a)(1)(tv) 50.73(a)(2)(11) 50.73(a)(2)(v111)(B) 36) 20.405(a)(1)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(111) 50.73(a)(2)(x)
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER NAME TELEPHnNE NUMRER Neil Brennan. Regulatory Assurance Ext. 2380 slal7 vlaisl-12lnisl4 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT I
CAUSE
SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
CAUSE
SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER I
I I I I II I
I I I I I l 1
1 I I l l l l l
l l 1 I I I i
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR SUBMISSION 4
M YES (If ves. complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) l NO DATE Ol5 3l0 9l7 ABSTRACT (L1mit to 1400 spaces, i.e.
approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines).
The IC containment spray pump was taken out of service (005) for a planned maintenance work window. Upon returning the equipment to service. several problems were encountered. The initial problem, failure to start on one battery, allowed the pump to be declared operable but degraded.
Subsequent testing on February 19.1997, at 10:20 identified a failure to start the pump in the required time and led to declaring the IC containment spray pump inoperable. The Unit entered a Technical Specification Limiting l
Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.6.1.C which allows 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> for repair or commencement of shutdown. The problem I
was identified as a clogged fuel strainer. Another problem arose and was narrowed to a starting circuit relay and/or the battery starting solenoids. These components were replaced and the pump was successfully tested.
l However, the equipment was unable to be declared operable in the required LCO timeframe and the reactor was shutdown in compliance with LCO 3.6.1.0 which requires the unit be in hot shutdown within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> upon expiration of LCO 3.6.1.C.
The cause of the first event was a clogged fuel filter. The cause of the second event was defective components as identified above. However, the specific component and the cause of 4ts failure is still undn investigation and l
will be provided in a supplemental report.
j Corrective actions included cleaning the fuel strainer, performing fuel analysis replacing the starting circuit j
relay and battery starting solenoids, and successfully testing the pump.
There was minimal impact on plant safety as a result of this event.
9703280296 970324 ZLER\\97004 ler(1)
PDR ADOCK 05000295 S
PDR 1
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITV tM DOCKET NUMBER IFR NUMBER FAGE YEAR SEO REV ZION NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT I 0l5l0l0l0l2l9l5 9l7 0l0l4 0l0 0l2 0l4
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0F TEXT Energy Industry identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as [XX)
A.
PL ANT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO EVENT Unit 1 MODE 1 - Power Oos Rx Power 42% RCS [AB] Temperature / Pressure 559 F/2235 osi.g B.
DESCRIPTION OF EVENT
Prior to the event of concern on February 19th, the 1C containment spray pump was taken out of service (005) for a planned maintenance work window on February 11. 1997.
The DOS included securing power to the pump's diesel battery chargers. On February 12.
1997, the pump work was complete and post maintenance testing was being performed.
Testing was done in accordance with Periodic Test PT-6C-ST " Containment Spray C Pump System Tests and Checks." The pump failed to start from the #2 battery but started successfully from the #1 battery when by desi n, the ratchet relay switched battery alignment. The shift reviewed Zion Operabilit Determination Manual ZODM-CS-3.3 for operability determination and concluded that he inability to start with the #2 battery did not render the pump inoperable. However. ZODM-CS-3.3 specifically states "the pum seconds.p shall be demonstrated o)erable if it achieves full running speed within five Any start time greater tlan five seconds shall be subject to System Engineering review to determine operability" during the performance of any PT-6C series procedure.
PT-6C-ST does not require timing to be performed when starting the pump. Therefore, the shift contacted System Engineering for guidance on the need to time the pump start. System Engineering responded that the requirement is satisfied by PT-6C-ST-RT
" Containment Spray C Pump System Tests and Checks" and is performed on an 18 month cycle. The shift declared the 1C containment spray pump operable, but entered the pump in the degraded equipment log (DEL) for the #2 battery 1ssue.
Engineering determined that the #2 battery was aligned to supply the various starting circuit loads during the ~20 hours of the 00S. This discharge is believed to have caused a low voltage condition which would by design cause the ratchet relay to switch to the #1 battery. The #2 battery was charced and tested successfully per PT-32
" Containment Spray / Fire Pump Battery Recorc - Monthly Quarterly Equah. ze Charge for Fire Pump Batteries.
On February 19. 1997 at 10:20 PT-6C-ST and PT-10-2 " Safeguards Actuation of Containment Spray System" were being performed because it was due and to demonstrate operability of the #2 battery to remove the pump from the DEL. There was a significant delay noticed in the start time of the pump. The engine cranked for an excessive period of time on the #2 battery and then per design switched to the #1 battery which cranked for an extended period of time and again per design switched to #2 battery at which time it started. At 12:30 the shift discussed this start time delay with System Engineering and determined that the pump was inoperable. As a consequence at 10:20 on l
February 19. 1997, the Unit entered a Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.6.1.C which allows 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> of continued operation to facilitate a t
repair or commencement of an orderly shutdown.
l ZLER\\97004.ler(2) l
{
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUAT10N FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER lFR NUMRTR PAGF YEAR SEO PEV Zl0N NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT 1 0l5l0l0l0l2l9l5 9l7 0l0l4 0l0 0l3 0l4
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0F TEXT Energy Industry Identification System (Ells) codes are identified in the text as [XX]
B.
DESCRIPTION OF EVENT (Continued)
System Engineering developed a troubleshooting plan and ultimately determined that the cause of the slow start was a clogged fuel stralner. As part of the plan the fuel supply day tank was drained flushed. and refilled using a new source of fuel. The underground fuel supply tank has been isolated and remains quarantined until the investigation is complete. The pump was run for maintenance and started successfully from the #1 battery.
Operations initiated PT-6C-ST and had a successful start from the #2 battery.
However, when the pump was started from the #1 battery there was a 15-20 second delay. This delay is significantly longer than the typical 5 second delay and needed to be evalueted before declaring operability. During this delay the engine failed to respond to the start signal.
No engine cranking or relay switching occurred during the delay.
This was a distinctly different problem from the problem experienced on February 19.1997.
System Engineering developed another troubleshooting plan. A starting circuit relay was found with burnt contacts and was replaced.
The starting solenoids for both batteries were also replaced. These parts are quarantined and will be fully inspected and analyzed for potential failure modes. Operations initiated PT-6C-PT and PT-10-2 and had 5 successful starts, three on the #2 battery and two on the #1 battery. On February 21, 1997, at 13:58 the pump had been demonstrated operable. However post test lineup and verification needed to be complete prior to declaring the system operable.
It was determined that the LCO would expire 3rior to accomplishing this task. The reactor was shut down in compliance with Tec1nical Specification 3.6.1.C.
C.
CAUSE OF EVENT
This event had two failures, separate in time and in cause.
The first failure was caused by insufficient delivery of fuel to the engine.
The fuel strainer was found clogged.
The strainer was cleaned and the fuel sampled and tested.
The fuel sample met specifications.
Additionally the fuel supply day tank was drained, flushed and refilled using a new source of fuel.
The underground fuel supply tank has been isolated and remains quarantined until the investigation is complete.
The root cause of the strainer blockage is still under investigation.
The second failure to start was electrical in nature.
The apparent cause of this event was narrowed down to either a bad starting solenoid or a bad starting circuit relay. Both items were replaced and failure analysis of these components is ongoing.
ZLER\\97004.ler(3)
le ss LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY M iE DOCKET N'JMBER lER NUMBfR PAGF YEAR SEO REV ZION NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT I 0l5l0l0l0l2l9l6 9l7 0l0l4 0l0 0l4 0l4
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0F TEXT Energy Industry Identification System (Ells) codes are identified in the text as [XX)
D.
SAFETY ANALYSIS
This event is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) which requires a 30 day report when a plant shutdown required by the Technical Specifications is completed The containment spray system is designed to reduce containment pressure and to remove iodine from the containment atmosphere. Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO's) are established to allow for the performance of routine activities (i.e. surveillance's, tests, maintenance. etc.) during which the specified equipment could be rendered inoperable. All other equipment which is required to be operable in support of the specified LC0 was verified to be operable at the time of the event. At no time was the plant o)erating in an unanalyzed condition. Therefore, this event had minimal impact on the 'lealth and safety of the public.
E.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
1.
The1Ccontainmentspraypbferentsourceandthefuelstrainerwascleaned.
fuel tank was drained. flushed. refilled with bioside added fuel from a These same actions will be performed on Unit 2 prior to startup.
(29518097097901)
)
2.
System Engineering will investigate the cause of the fuel strainer clogging.
This investigation should be completed by April 30, 1997. The results of this investigation will be provided in a supplemental report.
(29518097097902) 3.
Electrical Maintenance replaced the starting circuit relay and the starting solenoids the 1C containment spray pump and operations tested the pump successfully and declared it operable.
These same actions will be performed on Unit 2 prior to startup.
(29518097097903) 4.
System Engineering will investigate the cause of the electrical start failure.
This includes the equipment failure analysis of the starting circuit relay and the starting solenolds. This investigation should be completed by April 30.1997.
The results of this investigation will be provided in a supplemental report.
(29518097097904)
F.
.P_R_EVIOUS EVENTS SEARCH AND ANALYSIS This will be provided in the supplemental report after determination of any equipment failures.
G.
COMPONENT FAILURE DATA
This will be provided in the supplemental report after determination of any equipment failures.
l l
?tER\\97004.ler(4)
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| 05000295/LER-1997-001-01, Forwards LER 97-001-01,which Clarifies Info on Root Cause,Safety Analysis & Event Description.Corrective Actions Updated to Show Status of Items | Forwards LER 97-001-01,which Clarifies Info on Root Cause,Safety Analysis & Event Description.Corrective Actions Updated to Show Status of Items | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000295/LER-1997-001, Forwards LER 97-001-00 Which Involved Discovery of Lack of Sump Cover Plate Holes Contrary to Plant Structural Drawing Details,Per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) | Forwards LER 97-001-00 Which Involved Discovery of Lack of Sump Cover Plate Holes Contrary to Plant Structural Drawing Details,Per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000295/LER-1997-001-14, :on 970110,recirculation Sump Cover Plate Holes Were Not Installed at Original Construction.Caused by Construction Error.Holes Installed IAW Emergency Exempt Change Prepared Prior to Ramp Down |
- on 970110,recirculation Sump Cover Plate Holes Were Not Installed at Original Construction.Caused by Construction Error.Holes Installed IAW Emergency Exempt Change Prepared Prior to Ramp Down
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) 10 CFR 50.73(e)(2) | | 05000295/LER-1997-001-03, :on 970110,recirculation Sump Covers Were Not Installed at Original Construction.Cause Is Unknown & Impact on Plant Operation Is Unknown.Sump Cover Was Removed,Holes Were Drilled & Cover Replaced Prior to Expiration of LCO |
- on 970110,recirculation Sump Covers Were Not Installed at Original Construction.Cause Is Unknown & Impact on Plant Operation Is Unknown.Sump Cover Was Removed,Holes Were Drilled & Cover Replaced Prior to Expiration of LCO
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000304/LER-1997-001-11, :on 970902,Unit 2 Instrument Bus Perturbation Occurred.Caused by Insufficient Policy/Guidelines. Development of Policy for Proper Use of Protective Gear, Equipment & Tools |
- on 970902,Unit 2 Instrument Bus Perturbation Occurred.Caused by Insufficient Policy/Guidelines. Development of Policy for Proper Use of Protective Gear, Equipment & Tools
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000304/LER-1997-001, Forwards LER 97-001-00 Per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv) Which Requires Written Rept Using NRC Form 366, License Event Rept, within 90 Days of Discovery of Event.Attachment a Contains Commitments Associated W/Ltr | Forwards LER 97-001-00 Per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv) Which Requires Written Rept Using NRC Form 366, License Event Rept, within 90 Days of Discovery of Event.Attachment a Contains Commitments Associated W/Ltr | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000295/LER-1997-002, Forwards LER 97-002-00.Commitments Made by Util Listed | Forwards LER 97-002-00.Commitments Made by Util Listed | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000295/LER-1997-002-01, :on 970117,containment Isolation Valves Were Not Tested Prior to Leaving Cold Shutdown.Caused by Mgt Deficiencies in TS Implementation Process.Containment Isolation Valves Will Be Verified Tested Prior to Mode 4 |
- on 970117,containment Isolation Valves Were Not Tested Prior to Leaving Cold Shutdown.Caused by Mgt Deficiencies in TS Implementation Process.Containment Isolation Valves Will Be Verified Tested Prior to Mode 4
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000304/LER-1997-002-09, :on 971012,inadvertent Isolation of Svc Water Cooling to 2B DG During Sys Alignment,Occurred.Caused by Shift Mgt Not Ensuring All Operability Requirements Met. Valve 2MOV-SW0023 Opened to Restore Flow to 2B EDG |
- on 971012,inadvertent Isolation of Svc Water Cooling to 2B DG During Sys Alignment,Occurred.Caused by Shift Mgt Not Ensuring All Operability Requirements Met. Valve 2MOV-SW0023 Opened to Restore Flow to 2B EDG
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000304/LER-1997-002, Forwards LER 97-002-00,per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(v)(B),which Requires 30 Day Written Rept.Commitments Associated W/Correspondence,Encl | Forwards LER 97-002-00,per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(v)(B),which Requires 30 Day Written Rept.Commitments Associated W/Correspondence,Encl | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat | | 05000295/LER-1997-003, :on 970117,determined That EDG Tests Completed in Previous Refueling Outages Failed to Meet TS Requirement. Caused by Programmatic Deficiencies.Corrected Deficient Procedures & Completed Tests on Operating Unit |
- on 970117,determined That EDG Tests Completed in Previous Refueling Outages Failed to Meet TS Requirement. Caused by Programmatic Deficiencies.Corrected Deficient Procedures & Completed Tests on Operating Unit
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000304/LER-1997-003, Forwards LER 97-003-00 Re Unit 2 RHR Sys Declared Inoperable,Per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) | Forwards LER 97-003-00 Re Unit 2 RHR Sys Declared Inoperable,Per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000304/LER-1997-003-10, :on 971014,unit 2 RHR Sys Declared Inoperable. Caused by Oil Leak from Oil Bulb.Leak Coming from Oil Bulb on Ob CC Pump Stopped by Removing Bulb & Inspected |
- on 971014,unit 2 RHR Sys Declared Inoperable. Caused by Oil Leak from Oil Bulb.Leak Coming from Oil Bulb on Ob CC Pump Stopped by Removing Bulb & Inspected
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000304/LER-1997-004-08, :on 971015,small Bore Containment Penetration Line Inadequately Supported Since Plant Construction Was Noted.Cause Cannot Be determined.Non-destructive Exams Performed to Determine Condition & Integrity of Pipe |
- on 971015,small Bore Containment Penetration Line Inadequately Supported Since Plant Construction Was Noted.Cause Cannot Be determined.Non-destructive Exams Performed to Determine Condition & Integrity of Pipe
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000304/LER-1997-004, Forwards LER 97-004-00,per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i).Commitments Associated W/Correspondence,Encl | Forwards LER 97-004-00,per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i).Commitments Associated W/Correspondence,Encl | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000295/LER-1997-004, Forwards LER 97-004-00 Re Failure to Start Pump in Required Time & Led to Declaring 1C Containment Spray Pump Inoperable | Forwards LER 97-004-00 Re Failure to Start Pump in Required Time & Led to Declaring 1C Containment Spray Pump Inoperable | | | 05000295/LER-1997-004-04, :on 970221,identified Failure to Start Pump in Required Time & Led to Declaring 1C Containment Spray Inoperable.Caused by Clogged Fuel Filter & Defective components.1C Containment Spray Pump Fuel Drained & Flushed |
- on 970221,identified Failure to Start Pump in Required Time & Led to Declaring 1C Containment Spray Inoperable.Caused by Clogged Fuel Filter & Defective components.1C Containment Spray Pump Fuel Drained & Flushed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000295/LER-1997-004-01, :on 970221,reactor Was Shutdown,Per LCO 3.6.1 Due to One Inoperable Containment Spray pump.1C CS Pump Day Tank Was Drained,Flushed,Refilled w/biocide-added Fuel from Different Source |
- on 970221,reactor Was Shutdown,Per LCO 3.6.1 Due to One Inoperable Containment Spray pump.1C CS Pump Day Tank Was Drained,Flushed,Refilled w/biocide-added Fuel from Different Source
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown | | 05000295/LER-1997-005, Forwards LER 97-005-00 IAW 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).Actions Listed | Forwards LER 97-005-00 IAW 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).Actions Listed | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000304/LER-1997-005, Forwards LER 97-005-00 Which Documents Event That Occurred at Zion Nuclear Power Station,Unit 2.Commitment Made within Ltr,Encl | Forwards LER 97-005-00 Which Documents Event That Occurred at Zion Nuclear Power Station,Unit 2.Commitment Made within Ltr,Encl | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000304/LER-1997-005-07, :on 971021,failed to Test 2A SI Pump Suction Valve in Prescribed Periodicity.Caused by Inadequate Program to Ensure That TS IST Requirements for Each Component Are Met.Ist Group Will Include Second Check in Review |
- on 971021,failed to Test 2A SI Pump Suction Valve in Prescribed Periodicity.Caused by Inadequate Program to Ensure That TS IST Requirements for Each Component Are Met.Ist Group Will Include Second Check in Review
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), Submit an LER 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000295/LER-1997-005-03, :on 970221,supplement to Unapproved Mode Change W/Ts Required Equipment Inoperable Were Noted.Caused by Inadequate Planning & Briefing.Both Units Have Been Placed in Cold Shutdown W/Rcs at Atmospheric Pressure |
- on 970221,supplement to Unapproved Mode Change W/Ts Required Equipment Inoperable Were Noted.Caused by Inadequate Planning & Briefing.Both Units Have Been Placed in Cold Shutdown W/Rcs at Atmospheric Pressure
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000304/LER-1997-006-07, :on 971028,informed of Potential to Exceed 10CFR50.46 ECCS Acceptance Criteria.Caused by Fuel Clad Gap re-opening & 17% Maximum Cladding Oxidation Limit.Performed Conservative Corrosion Calculations |
- on 971028,informed of Potential to Exceed 10CFR50.46 ECCS Acceptance Criteria.Caused by Fuel Clad Gap re-opening & 17% Maximum Cladding Oxidation Limit.Performed Conservative Corrosion Calculations
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000304/LER-1997-006, Forwards LER 97-006-00 Per 10CFR50.73(a)92)(ii)(B) Which Requires 30 Day Written Rept When Any Event or Condition Occurs That Resulted in Condition of Nuclear Power Plant. Regulatory Commitments Encl | Forwards LER 97-006-00 Per 10CFR50.73(a)92)(ii)(B) Which Requires 30 Day Written Rept When Any Event or Condition Occurs That Resulted in Condition of Nuclear Power Plant. Regulatory Commitments Encl | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000295/LER-1997-006, :on 970222,Zion Station Exceeded Limiting Condition for Operation Due to Inadequate Procedure Controls.Standing Order to Require Review of TS During OOS Procedure Implementation,Was Issued |
- on 970222,Zion Station Exceeded Limiting Condition for Operation Due to Inadequate Procedure Controls.Standing Order to Require Review of TS During OOS Procedure Implementation,Was Issued
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000304/LER-1997-007-06, :on 971030,failure to Maintain Required Number of Svc Water Pumps Operable Was Identified.Caused by Failure of Mgt Personnel to Adhere to Requirements for Reviewers to Use Applicable Drawings.Procedure Rev to Provide Guidanc |
- on 971030,failure to Maintain Required Number of Svc Water Pumps Operable Was Identified.Caused by Failure of Mgt Personnel to Adhere to Requirements for Reviewers to Use Applicable Drawings.Procedure Rev to Provide Guidance
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000295/LER-1997-007-02, :on 970311,operator Opened Local Sys Auxiliary Transformer Panel.Cause of Sys Auxiliary Transformer Trip Could Not Be Conclusively Determined.Unit 2 Sys Auxiliary Transformer Tested for Damage |
- on 970311,operator Opened Local Sys Auxiliary Transformer Panel.Cause of Sys Auxiliary Transformer Trip Could Not Be Conclusively Determined.Unit 2 Sys Auxiliary Transformer Tested for Damage
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(7)(ii) | | 05000295/LER-1997-007, Forwards LER 97-007-00 Re Automatic Actuation of Esf. Submitted Table Identifies Actions Committed to by Util | Forwards LER 97-007-00 Re Automatic Actuation of Esf. Submitted Table Identifies Actions Committed to by Util | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000304/LER-1997-007, Forwards LER 97-007-00 Per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) Which Requires Written Rept for Any Event or Condition That Could Prevent Fulfillment of Safety Function of Structures or Sys Needed to Remove Residual Heat.W/Commitments Attach | Forwards LER 97-007-00 Per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) Which Requires Written Rept for Any Event or Condition That Could Prevent Fulfillment of Safety Function of Structures or Sys Needed to Remove Residual Heat.W/Commitments Attached | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat | | 05000295/LER-1997-008, :on 970321,air Filters Containing Al Were Inadvertently Installed in Containment Due to Faulty Parts Selection Process.Hepa Filters Containing Al Will Be Removed or Replaced w/non-Al Containing Filters |
- on 970321,air Filters Containing Al Were Inadvertently Installed in Containment Due to Faulty Parts Selection Process.Hepa Filters Containing Al Will Be Removed or Replaced w/non-Al Containing Filters
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000304/LER-1997-008-07, :on 971122,safety Related Snubber Not in Snubber Program & Subsequently Was Not Inspected Per Ts. Cause Unknown.Procedure TSS 15.6.48 Revised to Incorporate Unit 2 Snubber |
- on 971122,safety Related Snubber Not in Snubber Program & Subsequently Was Not Inspected Per Ts. Cause Unknown.Procedure TSS 15.6.48 Revised to Incorporate Unit 2 Snubber
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000304/LER-1997-008, Forwards LER 97-008-00 Per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B),which Requires 30 Day Written Rept.Attachment a Provides Commitments Associated W/Correspondence | Forwards LER 97-008-00 Per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B),which Requires 30 Day Written Rept.Attachment a Provides Commitments Associated W/Correspondence | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000295/LER-1997-009-01, :on 970114,1FCV-CS0002 Was Inoperable Between 970115 & 0208.Caused by Failure to Verify That Acceptance Criteria for Return to Service Was Met.Disciplined Unit Supervisor & Will Cover Event in Licensed Operator Training |
- on 970114,1FCV-CS0002 Was Inoperable Between 970115 & 0208.Caused by Failure to Verify That Acceptance Criteria for Return to Service Was Met.Disciplined Unit Supervisor & Will Cover Event in Licensed Operator Training
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000295/LER-1997-009, Forwards LER 97-009-00 IAW 10CFR50.73(A)(2)(i)(B) Which Requires Listed Corrective Actions | Forwards LER 97-009-00 IAW 10CFR50.73(A)(2)(i)(B) Which Requires Listed Corrective Actions | | | 05000304/LER-1997-009-08, :on 971202,test Relay SIX1-AX Did Not Unlatch as Required During Restoration of PT 10-3.Caused by Failure to Follow Procedures.Rewired Test Relay SIX1-AX |
- on 971202,test Relay SIX1-AX Did Not Unlatch as Required During Restoration of PT 10-3.Caused by Failure to Follow Procedures.Rewired Test Relay SIX1-AX
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000304/LER-1997-009, Forwards LER 97-009-00,re Event Which Occurred at Zion Nuclear Power Station,Unit 2.Commitments Made within Ltr Also Encl | Forwards LER 97-009-00,re Event Which Occurred at Zion Nuclear Power Station,Unit 2.Commitments Made within Ltr Also Encl | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000295/LER-1997-010, :on 960316,reactor Trip Due to Equipment Failure Occurred.Caused by New But Defective Pneumatic Vol Booster on Valve.Pneumatic Vol Booster for 1C Main FW Regulating Valve Replaced |
- on 960316,reactor Trip Due to Equipment Failure Occurred.Caused by New But Defective Pneumatic Vol Booster on Valve.Pneumatic Vol Booster for 1C Main FW Regulating Valve Replaced
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000295/LER-1997-010-01, :on 970404,radiation Area Surveys Were Missed. Caused by Inadequate TS Review.Nso,Unit Supervisor & Shift Engineer,Counseled |
- on 970404,radiation Area Surveys Were Missed. Caused by Inadequate TS Review.Nso,Unit Supervisor & Shift Engineer,Counseled
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000295/LER-1997-012-02, :on 970423,determined That Test Criteria for H Recombiner Was Inappropriate.Caused by Low Std for for Documentation of Changes to Vendor Recommendations. Will Review Results of 1995 TS Compliance Self Assessment |
- on 970423,determined That Test Criteria for H Recombiner Was Inappropriate.Caused by Low Std for for Documentation of Changes to Vendor Recommendations. Will Review Results of 1995 TS Compliance Self Assessment
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000295/LER-1997-012, Forwards LER 97-012-00,which Documents 970423 Event That Occurred at Zion Generating Station.Commitments Made by Util,Listed | Forwards LER 97-012-00,which Documents 970423 Event That Occurred at Zion Generating Station.Commitments Made by Util,Listed | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000295/LER-1997-013-02, :on 970412,VT-3 Insp Requirements of Relief Request CR-13 for Reactor Head Bolting Were Not Performed. Caused by Failure to Revise ISI Database After SER Received from Nrc.Procedure Revised |
- on 970412,VT-3 Insp Requirements of Relief Request CR-13 for Reactor Head Bolting Were Not Performed. Caused by Failure to Revise ISI Database After SER Received from Nrc.Procedure Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000295/LER-1997-014-02, :on 970502,TS Surveillances on Radiation Monitors Were Missed Because Technical Interpretation That Kept 1(2)RT-PR15 Operable Was Inoperable.Revised Station Procedures |
- on 970502,TS Surveillances on Radiation Monitors Were Missed Because Technical Interpretation That Kept 1(2)RT-PR15 Operable Was Inoperable.Revised Station Procedures
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000295/LER-1997-015-01, :on 970724,Unit 1 EDGs & Unit 2 RHR Sys Was Declared Inoperable Which Resulted in Inadvertent ESF While Performing TS Related Surveillance.Caused by Unclear Expectations.Declared EDG Operable on 970729 |
- on 970724,Unit 1 EDGs & Unit 2 RHR Sys Was Declared Inoperable Which Resulted in Inadvertent ESF While Performing TS Related Surveillance.Caused by Unclear Expectations.Declared EDG Operable on 970729
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000295/LER-1997-015-02, :on 970724,Unit 1 EDGs & Unit 2 RHR Sys Were Declared Inoperable & Inadvertent Esg Actuation Was Noted While Performing TS Related Surveillances.Cause Is Under Investigation.Restored ESF Equipment |
- on 970724,Unit 1 EDGs & Unit 2 RHR Sys Were Declared Inoperable & Inadvertent Esg Actuation Was Noted While Performing TS Related Surveillances.Cause Is Under Investigation.Restored ESF Equipment
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000295/LER-1997-016-01, Forwards LER 97-016-01,which Clarifies Info on Event Description,Root Causes & Safety Analysis.Cas Have Been Updated.Attachment a Provides Commitments Associated W/ Correspondence | Forwards LER 97-016-01,which Clarifies Info on Event Description,Root Causes & Safety Analysis.Cas Have Been Updated.Attachment a Provides Commitments Associated W/ Correspondence | | | 05000295/LER-1997-016, Forwards LER 97-016-00 Re Failure to Recognize That 125 Vdc Buses Were Inoperable During Inter Unit cross-tie.Event Investigation Is Ongoing & Corrective Actions Will Be Provided in Supplemental LER | Forwards LER 97-016-00 Re Failure to Recognize That 125 Vdc Buses Were Inoperable During Inter Unit cross-tie.Event Investigation Is Ongoing & Corrective Actions Will Be Provided in Supplemental LER | | | 05000295/LER-1997-016-02, :on 970905,failed to Recognize That 125 Vdc Buses Were Inoperable During Inter Unit cross-tie.Cause Indeterminate.Corrective Actions Will Provided in Supplemental Response to LER |
- on 970905,failed to Recognize That 125 Vdc Buses Were Inoperable During Inter Unit cross-tie.Cause Indeterminate.Corrective Actions Will Provided in Supplemental Response to LER
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000295/LER-1997-017-02, :on 970806,TS Surveillance on Containment Isolation Valve Operability Was Missed After Maint.Cause Undetermined.Revised & Performed PT-306 for Affected Valves Prior to Units 1 & 2 Reaching Mode 4 |
- on 970806,TS Surveillance on Containment Isolation Valve Operability Was Missed After Maint.Cause Undetermined.Revised & Performed PT-306 for Affected Valves Prior to Units 1 & 2 Reaching Mode 4
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000295/LER-1997-017, Forwards LER 97-017-00,informing That TS Surveillance Containment Isolation Valve Operability Was Missed After Maint.Commitments Made within Ltr,Encl | Forwards LER 97-017-00,informing That TS Surveillance Containment Isolation Valve Operability Was Missed After Maint.Commitments Made within Ltr,Encl | | | 05000295/LER-1997-017-01, :on 970806,TS Surveillance on Containment Isolation Valve Operability After Maint Was Missed.Caused by Personnel Error.Procedure Writer Who Failed to Identify Remaining Procedures by 1993 UFSAR Rev Has Been Counseled |
- on 970806,TS Surveillance on Containment Isolation Valve Operability After Maint Was Missed.Caused by Personnel Error.Procedure Writer Who Failed to Identify Remaining Procedures by 1993 UFSAR Rev Has Been Counseled
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