IR 05000277/1985041

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Safety Insp Rept 50-277/85-41 on 851113-14.No Violation or Deviation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Cause & Corrective Actions Re 851110 Fire in Radwaste Bldg
ML20136J328
Person / Time
Site: Peach Bottom Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 12/26/1985
From: Anderson C, Krasopoulos A
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20136J310 List:
References
50-277-85-41, NUDOCS 8601130328
Download: ML20136J328 (4)


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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Report No. 50-277/85-41 Docket No.

50-277

. License No. -DPR-44 Priority

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Category C

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~ Licensee: Philadelphia Electric Company 2301 Market Street Philadelphia, PA 19101 Facility Name:

Peach Bottom-Unit 2

. Inspection At: Delta, PA and Philadelphia,'PA Inspection Conducted:

November 13-14, 1985 Inspector:

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A'. - Krabopoulos, Reat:t Engineer date

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Approved by:

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C.J.Anjerso(, Chief,

'date Plant Systems Section, DRSS Inspection Summary:

Inspection on November 13-14, 1985 (Report No. 50-277/85-41)

Areas Inspected:

Special, reactive inspection to investigate the cause and corrective actions associated with a fire in the Radwaste Building. The inspection-involved 13 inspector hours on-site by one region based inspector.

Results: No violations or deviations were identified. The cause of the fire remains undetermined.

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J DETAILS

-Persons Contacted 1.1 Philadelphia Electric Company (PECO)

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R. Fleischmann, Manager PBAPS C. Gerdes, Mechanical Engineer M. Lohr, Engineer.,

G. Reid, Mechanical Engineer D. Spaner, Engineer S.'Spitko, Administrative Engineer

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W.'Sproat, Electrical Project Engineer

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1.2 Nuclear Regulatory Commission R. Gallo, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 2A T. Johnson, Senior Resident Inspector H. Williams, Resident Inspector 2.

Background On November 10, 1985 at 4:02 p.m. a fire was reported burning in the 150 foot elevation of the Radwaste Building.

The fire was discovered by a roving fire watchman patrolling on Elevation 165.

Because of the smoke,

'the fire watch could not establish the location of the fire. He reported to the Control Room that the fire was on Elevation 165. The plant's fire brigade responded to the scene, located the fire on Elevation 150 and extinguished it using portable extinguishers.

The fire damage was confined to a section of an electrical tray located at the ceiling of Elevation 150 and also damaged miscellaneous divers equipment located in a cage-like enclosure directly underneath the affected tray.

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Discussion and Observations The inspector surveyed the scene of the fire, interviewed personnel and reviewed the licensee's fire hazard analysis to determine the cause of the fire and its possible effects on safety related and safe shutdown systems.

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As mentioned above the fire was confined to the 150 foot elevation of the Radwaste Building.

It damaged an electrical tray loaded with about 40

- non-safety related control and power cables.

The cables invcived were of the self extinguishing type. Also damaged was diver's equipment located in a caged area under the tray.

The affected tray is located at the ceiling of Elevation 150.

It rises thru the 165 foot Elevation floor straight thru a penetration that has an unrated seal. An adjacent penetration did not have a seal.

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-3 The affected tray rises to the ceiling of Elevation 165 where it joins a bank of trays within the Fan Room..The Fan Room is located above, but offset from the area where the fire originated.

The unprotected openings provide a path for potentially propagating the fire at the 150 foot elevation to the Fan Room. The Fan Room contains both, safety related and safe shutdown systems. Because of the safe shut-

-down components in this room the licensee is providing alternative shut-down capability for this area in accordance with the requirements of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50.

The licensee in the fire hazard analysis recog-nized the need to isolate the Fan ~ Room from other plant areas.

Pending completion of a wall to separate the Fan Room from other fire areas a fire watch was established.

This fire watch discovered the fire.

The inspector noted that the Fan Room does not have automatic suppression and the existing detection does not meet the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) guidelines. However, the licensee has plans to provide additional detection capability using line type heat detectors in all cable trays in this area to enhance detection.

In interviews with per-sonnel it was determined that the installed fire detectors alarmed the Control Room after the fire watch discovered the fire.

The precise time, this alarm came in, could not be determined and there was no entry in the Control Room log.

During the inspection it could not be determined whether the origin of the fire was from an electrical source because the fire brigade had electri-cally isolated all power cables in the affected tray by pulling fuses or tripping breakers in order to safely fight the fire. A subsequent exami-nation of the electrical systems by the-licensee, after the fire, did not

' identify any malfunctions. The inspector did not identify any unaccept-able conditions except as follows:

Licensee Actions after the Fire The cause of the fire was not established. Because the modifications for alternative shutdown for the Fan Room area have not yet been implemented, the licensee established a continuous fire watch for this area. The con-tinuous fire watch will remain until the barrier and the additional fire detection are installed.

The licensee also committed to pursue the investigation of the fire and promptly inform the NRC of the results. The above are collectivelly identified as unresolved items pending completion of the modifications and review of the investigation performed by the licensee (50-277/85-41-01).

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Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters for which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable, violations, or deviations.

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Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee's representatives at the end of the inspection to discuss the findings.

(see paragraph I for attendees)

At that time the inspector informed the licensee that additional interviews withLlicensee personnel located at the licensee's headquarters would be required. The inspector agreed to notify the licensee by phone of any other findings.

Subsequently, the inspector called the licensee (Mr. Fleischmann received the call) on November 27, 1985 and summarized the inspection findings.

The inspector discussed with the licensee the contents of the inspection report and ascertained that it would not contain any proprietary infor-mation. The licensee agreed that the inspection report may be placed in the Public Document Room without prior licensee review for proprietary information (10 CFR 2.790).

At no tiue during this inspection was written material provided to the licensee by the inspector.

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