ML20136E249

Proposed Summary of ACRS Subcommittee on Regulatory Policies & Practices 851101 Meeting in Washington,Dc to Discuss SECY-85-208, Incident Investigation Program & Process Used to Investigate 850609 Event at Facility

ML20136E249
Person / Time
Site:	Davis Besse
Issue date:	11/07/1985
From:	Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards
To:	Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards
References
ACRS-2369, NUDOCS 8601060477
Download: ML20136E249 (3)

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p3 MTE ISSUED: 11/7/85 nmes PROPOSED MINUTES /

SUMMARY

OF THE REGULATORY POLICIES ~AND PRACTICES SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING NOVEMBER 1, 1985 WASHINGTON, D.C.

Purpose:

The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the SECY-85-208, " Incident Investigation Program" and the process used to investigate the June 9, 1985 total loss of feedwater event at the Davis-Besse Plant. The Subcommittee very briefly discussed alternate proposals for event investigation. Proposed full Committee action was also discussed.

Meeting Attendees:

ACRS NRC STAFF H. Lewis, Chairman C. J. Heltemes, AE0D C. Michelson, Member W. Lanning, AE0D A. Cappucci, Staff Highlights, Agreements, and Requests:

1. Mr. C. J. Heltemes, Director, AE0D discussed the NRC Staff proposal (SECY-85-208) for an Incident Investigation Program. He stated that the program has two new initiatives. One is the establishment of an interoffice, interdisciplinary team (on an ad hoc basis) to investigate events with clear and serious implications regarding safety. The team will determine what happened and what are the principal cause(s) of the event and to develop findings for possi-bleaction(s). He indicated that the team would focus on the event and not violation:; of NRC requirements. Secondly, events cor-sidered to be less sigairicant in terms of safety but could provide "important safety lessons" would be handled by an augmented 0601060477 851107 PDR ACrtS pr;c' c a 2 W CAL 2369 PDR Certified B;7 2h -

, Regulatory Pol':ies & Practices Mtg November 1, 1985 regional investigation (augmented by Headquarters Personnel) where generic implications will be emphasized. (NOTE: SECY-85-208 has been approved by the Commission.)

2. Mr. Heltemes indicated that estimates suggested the Headquarter Incident Investigation Team (IIT) would investigate about three incidents per year. About 20 to 30 investigations per year.were estimated for the Regional Augmented Inspection Review Team (AIRT).

3. Mr. Michelson suggested that the whole SECY-85-208 package does not address the question of independence. He indicated that the IIT for Davis-Besse was not an independent team and was closely wed to the NRC and its practices in that all the IIT members were NRC personnel. He suggested that " independent" means not having an association with the decision making processes which approved what was there. He suggested that having outside personnel would help alleviate this concern. Dr. Lewis indicated that independence was important and suggested that what is needed are people who don't have incentives to " pull the wagons in a circle" whether or not they had prior involvement.

4. Dr. Lewis expressed concern that determining the actual root cause(s) of the Davis-Besse event could~be lost in the parcelling

-out of the 41 action items identified in the August 5, 1985 ED0 letter.- He suggested that at thtt point all coherence of the agency's response to the accident goes away. He expressed concern that the things which caused the event could become lost in the backgrcind of things which are genu ally wrong with the plant. Mr.

Heltemes indicated that in the case of Davis-Besse the IIT only focused on the event. The Staff did not look at everything wrong with the plant, but that the focus of the investigation was very carrow.

, Regulatory Policies & Practices Mtg November 1, 1985

5. Mr. Michelson suggested that the EDO issue a final report which would close out the Davis-Besse event and define the actual root cause(s). This report could be a complete and coherent document outlining the results of investigations documenting the actual root causes as stated above.

6. The Subcommittee pointed out that the statement in SECY-85-208 which suggests that the incident investigation program outlined in that document meets the intent of previous ACRS coments is incor-rect. The ACRS agreed with the BNL recommendation that the Comis-sion establish an Office of Nuclear Safety which would report to the Commission for investigating significant events. This was not recomended in SECY-85-208.

7. The Subcomittee suggested that the Comission address trade-offs.

between the independence of IIT members vs. their level of techni-cal expertise. As an example _they discussed the use of a resident inspector on the IIT where the expertise of the team would be enhanced but the required objectivity to make independent judgements could be sacrificed.

8. The Subcomittee agreed to present a proposed letter for Comittee review outlining some of the above coments. Dr. Lewis would prepare the first draft, t

f l NOTE: Additional meeting details can be obtained from a transcript of this meeting available in the NRC Public Document Room, l 1717 H Street, N.W., Washington, D.C., or can be purchased '

l from ACE-Federal Reporters, 444 North Capitol Street, Wash-ington, D.C. 20001, (202) 347-3700.

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