ML20135G498
| ML20135G498 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | River Bend  |
| Issue date: | 09/11/1985 |
| From: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | |
| References | |
| ACRS-T-1445, NUDOCS 8509190312 | |
| Download: ML20135G498 (323) | |
Text
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ORIGINAL
'O UNITEDSTA?d3Of' AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the matter of:
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS Subcommittee on River Bend Station Docket No.
kJ Location: Washington, D. C. 1 - 197 Date: Wednesday, September 11, 1985 Pages:
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888'%8Rs T-1445 PDR r6 rs t y
isu' 3 e x p
V 4ft :o No': Remove rom ACRSTicq ANN RILEY & ASSOCIATES Court Reporters
( 1625 I St., N.W.
Suite 921 Washington, D.C. 20006 (202) 293-3950
1 1
,,x_,) 1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3
4 ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS 5 SUBCOMMITTEE ON RIVER BEND STATION 6
7 Nuclear Regulatory Commission Room 1046 8 1717 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C.
9 Wednesday, September 11, 1985 10 11 The subcommittee convened, pursuant to notice, at 12 3:48 p.m., David Okrent, Chairman of the Subcommittee, 13 presiding.
i O 14 ACRS MEMBERS PRESENT:
15 D. OKRENT, Chairman i 16 C. MARK
- J. EBERSOLE 17 ACRS CONSULTANTS PRESENIL 18 C. WYLIE 19 J. SHEPHERD 20 COGNIZANT STAFF MEMBERt 21 R. SAVIO 22 NRC STAFF ann PDERENTERS PRESENTr 23 B. REED J. BOOKER 24 J. DEDDENS S. STERN 25 W. HOUSTON i F. ELTAWILA O
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2 1 A. NOTAFRANCESCO J. JAUDON 2 C. BERLINGER G. MAZETIS '
! 3 W. BULTER l J. GLAZAR a
4 E. 50CH
- M. MORRIS
! 5 M. FULLS I
J. RIDGELEY 6 J. ROSENTHAL D. REYNERSON i
7 B. EVANS l H. GARG i 8 l
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3 i PROCEEDINGS 2 MR. MARK: The meeting will now come to order.
3 This is a meeting of the Advisory Committee on 4 Reactor Safeguards, Subcommittee on River Bend.
5 I am Carson Mark, temporarily acting as chairman 6 of the subcommittee pending Dave Okrent's arrival. He 7 should be in in less than two hours.
.e Other ACRS members in attendance at the moment are 9 just Charles Wylie on my left and Dr. Sheperd from Sandia to Lab in Albuquerque is here as our consultant for the it subcommittee. Dr. Savio is the cognizant ACRS staf f member 12 for the purpose of this meeting.
33 The meeting is to continue the review of the i4 application of Gulf States Utilities to operate the River is Bend station up, I believe, to full power.
16
- The rules for participation in today's meeting 17 have been announced as part of the notice previously is published in the Federal Register on Tuesday, August 20. A 3, transcript of the meeting is being kept and will be made 20 available as stated in the Federal Register notice.
21 It is requested that each speaker first identify 22 himself or herself and speak with suf ficient clarity and 23 volume so that he or she can be readily heard. I guess to 24 the extent possible, I would suggest, that people try to 25 get to a microphone.
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We have received no written comments from members of the public. We have received no requests for time to 2
3 make oral statements by members of the public.
4 I think just before going on, I should explain 5
that Dr. Okrent has urged that some of the items on the 6
agenda be put back so that he may take part in the 7
discussion. This has particularly to do with the items mentioned in the committee's letter of a year ago where a a
4 l 9 number of questions were identified, and with the hydrogen
' r j 30 control pr'ovisions specifically with respect to River Bend.
it We will open the meeting by calling on the project I
12 manager from the NRC staf f, Stephen Stern, who can perhaps i3 begin his remarks by telling us how he got that lettering i,
up there.
(Laughter) 15 16 MR. STERN: A large investment in my own I i7 MacIntosch computer.
1 is (Laughter) i, MR. STERN: Thank you , Mr. Chairman. I am Stephen
! Stern. I am with the staff, the Office of Nuclear Reactor 20 21 Regulation, Division of Licensing, t.nd my current 22 assignment is the project manager of River Bend.
i 2)
In response to the schedule that you have sent, if You Will flip to the next graph.
24 i 25 (Slides) i i
5 7-
[3) i MR. STERN: I have structured a part of the 2 presentation on Item 2 around the following agenda:
3 First, I will give you an overview of the River 4
Bend schedule and then hit the three high points. There 5
were three key issues in my mind that were key in the River 6
Bend review, the TDI diesels, which are the same diesels 7
that ACRS and the Commission has been dealing with at g Shoreham.
9 An interesting problem arose on the reactor to protection system, hydrogen control, which is obviously si being deferred to the 6 o' clock time frame.
12 I will give you a very brief review of what the i3 changes were in the open items from the time of the ACRS O; ~_ i4 meeting last summer. I run down the license conditions 15 and, again, River Bend in the next to last item was rather 16 unique in that there were several construction items that 17 were deferred until af ter the low power license. So, I is think we ought to spend some time on that.
i, The last one which you had requested in the agenda 20 was the inatter that you had entitled the " Investigation 21 matte.r" that had delayed the license. I'll use the phrase, 22
" Administrative matter" when I discuss it -- although my 2?
slides will say " Investigative matter."
24 As for the schedule, I have taken a look at the 25 utility's input on what their current schedule is and, as O.
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shown on the board, I have various parameters in here.
2 (Slide) 3 The license was issued on the af ternoon of -- and
, again, when we are dealing with River Bend, everything has 5
happened very quickly. So, I will be dealing occasionally 6
with a.m.s and p.m.s -- but the license was issued on the 1
7 afternoon of August 29.
- 3 As of early Saturday morning, on the 31st, the
, fuel-loading process had begun. I am titling that time 10 Zero.
ii The utility expects to complete the fuel load 12 after 18 days. Their initial projection was 18 days, which j
33 would be September 18. The report I received from our i,
resident this morning was, 317 fuel bundles had been inserted, which is approximately half the core. We would 15 16 project the utility is four or five days behind schedule.
i7 They are running into very, very minor problems, l
18 nothing major right now. But again, it is possible for i
3, them to make the 18th but they will probably be a few days 20 late.
21 The key item in here is, they will be ready to t 22 m ve above five percent power probably the middle of 23 October. That, again, is the reason that we have requested 24 the meeting now and we are prepared to go to the Commission 25 the week of October 7.
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i The utility would expect, if I have interpreted 2
the schedule correctly, to be ready for commercial 3 operation in the early part of February on that schedule, 4
and the intermediate milestones are put in accordingly.
5 Let me flip back to the first chart if I could, 6 not the schedule but the initial one.
7 In discussing the principal issues, TDI diesels were a problem. The TDI diesels have a name-plate rating a
9 of 3,500 KWP, so we have two emergency TDI diesels. I to believe they are identical to the ones at Shoreham.
in There were two aspects of this review. What was 12 the load -- obviously they would not have the name-plate 33 rating. What was the qualification of the diesel in terms s i, of how many kilowatts would we allow under emergency i3 conditions, and what was the emergency load that the g utility would require.
37 The utility has gotten their load -- we are at is five percent. Their load will be under 2,900 KW on each 39 diesel . In fact, one diesel will be under 2,800.
20 To discuss the qualification, this has been reviewed by the staff and staff is quite satisfied. To 21 22 discuss the qualification of the TDI diesels and exactly 23 what load we feel they could handle, I'd like at this point 24 to turn the mike over to Carl Berlinger who is the head of 25 our TDI Task Force. I believe you heard from Carl several (O
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(_,h) ; times in the past.
2 Carl?
MR. BERLINGER: My name is Carl Berlinger. I am 3
the group chief or project leader for the TDI Task Force.
The task force was formed in January of '84.
5 The River Bend review -- just to reiterate a 6
7 couple of important facts that' Steve Stern has already g
mentioned -- River Bend has two DSR-48 TDI engines. These 9
are eight-cylinder in-line engines, and the engines ja themselves are identifical to those engines installed at n the Shoreham facility.
12 The review of the River Bend diesels was conducted
- in parallel with the licensee's or the applicant's program 33
\v i, which was carried forward consistent with the Owners Group i 15 Prog ram. I have been before ACRS previously where I have 16 described the owners Group program and their entire program 37 plan, and how they have gone about to implement that 4 18 Program.
39 At River Bend, that program was carried forward in I
20 a manner consistent with the Owners Group recommendations 21 and the staff's recommendations.
i 22 To briefly describe the program as it was carried ut at River Bend, I'll divide it into several different 23 24 Phases. The first phases is called Phase 1.
Phase 1 concerns 16 critical components that had .
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() i been identified based on past operating experience in both nuclear and non-nuclear application as having potential 2
3 generic concerns.
4 These components are -- the major, most critical 5 components -- the engine including the crank shaf t,; engine 6 block, cylinder heads , bearings , pistons, piston skirts, et 7 cetera.
g As part of the Phase 1 program that was carried 9
out at River Bend, all of the Phase 1 components were io thoroughly inspected and those that did not meet acceptance in criteria establiehed -- established by the Owners Group and 12 approved by the staf f and its consultants -- these
,__ i3 particular components were replaced as necessary.
k._ / i4 In particular, at River Bend, the replacements is included high pressure fuel injection tubing, cylinder 16 heads, cylinder liners, piston skirts, push rods, jacket-i7 water pumps, and there may be other components which, as is part of their inspection, were replaced. But these are the i9 significant Phase 1 components.
20 These replacements were done in accordance with 21 the recommendations of the Owners Group with the 22 concurrence of the staf f and its consultants.
23 In addition, there were certain modifications to 24 the Phase 1 components. One modification involved a 25 machining modification of the cylinder liners such that the i
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height at which the liners extended above the block top, 2
which is termed the " proudness" of the liner, was reduced 3
by machining in order to reduce some block top stresses that had been identified earlier during a design analysis.
5 In addition, stiffening of turbo-charger mounting 6
brackets was accomplished. Again, there may have been other modifications made at the facility on their engines, 7
g but these are only the Phase 1 modifications that I am 9 discussing at this time.
io In addition, Phase 2 of the Owners Group program n was carried forward at River Bend. That part of the 12 pr gram, the Owners Group program, involves the review both y.s of design and/or a quality revalidation review which was 33 i,
conducted on between 170 and 200 dif ferent components in the engine.
15 16 These are components that have been identified by n technical specialists working with the Owners Group, as 3g part of 'the Owners Group, as being critical components to 39 engine operation, and a major portion of the Phase 2 review 20 involved a complete engine inspection.
21 S me of those inspections were what I call hundred-22
' Percent inspections. Some of the inspections were sample
?3 inspections.
24 The result of that inspection was, one and most 25 significant, to verify the "as manufactured" quality of the lO i
).
i 11 f;) i commponents which constitute that TDI engine.
2 This, by the way, this inspection which is called 3
the DRQR Phase 2 inspection, was conducted out of what we 4 call the normal sequence, which has been carried forward by j 5 other utilities.
6 The normal sequence would be, you run your pre-7 operational test, then you do a total tear-down on the a
engine and you replace parts that need to be replaced --
9 either because of recommendations from the. Owners Group or to TDI, or. from the staff; or if there were' defective ii components that were found. ;
l 12 In this particular. case, the inspection was I 13 actually conducted before the pre-operational tests were I
i4 undertaken and, as a result, the staf f recommended that a 15 Post-reassembly or post-test inspection be conducted. It 16 was a very limited inspection, primarily aimed at s
i7 identifying if any of the potential concerns that the staf f i is had with regard to running the crank shaft in that engine i, above the qualified load of 3130 had surfaced. :
l 20 The engine, during the pre-op test, had been ' run 21 for a number of hours at loads up to 3,500 KW.
I 22 That inspection was conducted on the three most l 23 heavily stressed bearing journals and in ' the area of the 24 oil holes and the fillets, and no negative indications were 25 found.
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- (3, 3 In addition to the normal pre-operational tests that are conducted on diesels in general, additional tests 2
3 which had been recommended by our consultants and required
, by the staff were conducted at River Bend.
5 These included hot and cold crank shaf t deflection i
6 measurements; detailed torsiograph testing and analyses, 7
and a series of tests which have been identified in the g
August 13, 1984 staff SER as recommended post-reassembly 9 inspections, These were conducted to confirm that the engines in n had been properly reassembled and that there were no ,
, 12 Perating problems with the engines as they were put back .
together.
As part of the staff's review of the Phase 1 15 components the most critical component, the one on which we had most of our concerns and ef forts concentrated on, was g
37 the crank shaft.
The review that had been done on Shoreham approved !
ig j,
Shoreham operation at leads up to 3,300 KW. That approval 20 was based on extended operating tests at loads in excess of 21 3,300 for somewhere in excess of 740 hours0.00856 days <br />0.206 hours <br />0.00122 weeks <br />2.8157e-4 months <br />. j That endurance test was followed by inspections 22 [
23 which proved that the critical components in this engine I l
24 were able to go through that type of test program without j any negative ef fects.
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- ,) i Based on that qualified load which was determined 2
on the basis of the testing to ten to the seventh stress 3 cycles, we had approved Shoreham at loads up to 3,300.
4 Since the River Bend engines are identical, we did 5
look at the torsiograph test results which indicated that 6
the difference that exists in the engine generator set, in 7
the combination -- including the fly wheel, differences in a
the fly wheel and in the generator itself between the two
, plant installations -- would reduce the margin of safety or io factor of safety inherent in the TDI design as it is it applied at River Bend.
12 In essence, the staf f reviewed an analysis that 33 was submitted by the licensee which clearly indicated that O_~
34 equivalent stress levels between River Bend and Shoreham 15 were accomplished when the load at River Bend was limited 16 to 3,130 as compared to 3,300 at Shoreham.
i7 In addition to the torsional characteristic is effects of different components such as the fly wheel and 39 the generator, other differences were identified. These 20 included -- were identified during a comparison of the 21 ultimate tensile strength of the material that the crank shafts were manufactured from, and River Bend had a lower 22 23 tensile strength. I think the difference was somewhere in 24 the five to seven-percent range.
In addition, the Shoreham engines had what has 25 (v
14 been considered to be additional margin due to the fact
(] 3 2
that their fillets, the fillet radius area of those crank shafts have been shot peened. But yet, we had no way of 3
4 directly quantifying the benefit to be derived from shot 5
peening.
MR. WYLIE: Carl, could I ask you a question?
6 7
MR. BERLINGER: Yes.
g MR. WYLIE: You referred to the Shoreham shaf ts.
9 You are referring to the replacement shaf ts?
in MR. BERLINGER: That's correct.
ii MR. WYLIE: Okay, thank you.
MR. BERLINGER: The staff review and approval was 12
, 33 of the replacement shaf ts, the originals, having broken, 3,
were not qualified.
15 An ther significant portion of our review stemmed r was concerned with maintenance and surveillance programs 16 as identified in the staf f SER, which is a generic SER,
- 37 18 issued August 13, 1984, we had identified the significance i,
of the importance of developing and putting into effect an enhanced maintenance and surveillance program.
20 This is deemed extremely important to assure 21 22 through the life of the plant the TDI diesels at each and 23 every. one of these installations would continue to meet GDC-24 1 and GDC-17.
The maintenance and surveillance programs that 25 v
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,) i have been put forth at River Bend basically adopt all of 2 the recommendations or the great majority of the 3 recommendations put forth by the Owners Group, and the 4 staf f has accepted that program.
5 There is no generic report which the staff has 6
issued to date, but there are many plant-specific safety 7 evaluation reports in which the Owners Group recommended a
maintenance and surveillance programs, and several 9 exceptions or modifications to that program have been to reviewed and approved.
ii In addition, during the review of the crank 12 shafts, we did identify a 5th order harmonic at 450 RPM.
33 That is very close to the normal operating speed of this O
km/ engine of 450 RPM, and that particular harmonic has a i4 33 tortional response which is relatively small. The only 16 time that it could become significant or of potential i7 concern is if cylinder firing or engine imbalance is corditions -- excuse me, cylinder misfiring or engine ig imbalance Conditions actually occurred during operation of 20 the engine -- whether it be through tests or whatever.
2i Therefore, there were certain steps taken in 22 response to the staf f'c recommendations on this issue to 23 monitor both the speed of the engine through generator 24 frequency monitoring and also to monitor engine exhaust 25 temperatures, or engine cylinder exhaust temperatures, to T~1 V
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i 16 (g i make sure that misfiring was in fact not taking place. We felt that that was a reasonable approach to take and we 2
3 approved that and required that it be implemented.
I believe that those have been implemented into 4
5 River Bend procedures.
6 There were certain other license conditions which are stated in our SER. There is one that was inadvertently 7
3 left out. That one pertains to the applicability of 50.59 9
to the potential future changes or modifications to the in maintenance and surveillance programs that have been n implemented on River Bend.
12 Based on future operating experience and 13 inf rmation gained not only at River Bend but at other TDI i,
owners facilities, justification nay be developed which is w uld obviate the need for some of these maintenance and 16 surveillance programs or permit extending out of schedules 37 for these programs.
The staff believes that as long as the experience 18 3,
is there to justify a modification to the Owners Group 20 Program and their recommendations regarding maintenance and surveillance, that it can be handled under 50.59 of the 21 22 regulations.
MR. STERN: I would emphasize that it was in the 23 license and unfortunately omitted from the SER. It will be 24 25 addended to the next SER.
D/
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) i MR. BERLINGER: Thank you, Steve.
2 The approval at River Bend for use of these TDI 3 engines has a load restriction placed within the license 4 conditions. That is a load of 3,130. Procedures have been 5 developed by the utility and will be in place to provide 6 9uidance to the operator to avoid unnecessarily overloading 7
the engines and to help him unload the engine if it were a
for some reason -- unexpected reason -- to be loaded above 9 3,130.
io In addition, the tech specs do provide, re-n inspection of the crank shaf t if an unanticipated load in 12 excess of 3,130 does occur.
I i3 In addition, all planned tests in the future will i, be pre]ube. In other words, they will be preceded by a 15 Prelube procedure, and the engined will be warmed up such 16 that they will be brought up to speed gradually an opposed i7 to the less than ten-second. requirement that we normally is P l ace on these engines, and that they will be loaded over a 39 period of approximately 150 seconds or less.
20 One exception to that statement is the periodic i
21 tests that will be conducted every six months, about.184 days. That will be a fast-start and fast-load test, and 22 23 the loading test that would be normally run during 24 refueling outages 25 MR. MARK: Will these be cold fast starts?
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18 MR. BERLINGER: These engines, as long as they are i
in an operable status, are preheated. The oil and the 2
- 3 water have preheat systems.
4 MR. MARK: Rig ht . So there is no occasion for a 5
fast startup cold.
MR. BERLINGER: That's correct.
6 MR. MARK: Do the things you are describing also 7
g apply to the other TDI diesels that are in the nuclear 9 service?
MR. BERLINGER: The type of review the staff has 10 33 already conducted and is conducting on some of these applications is the same. In this particular case, River 12 Bend crank shaft is unique to River Bend, as it is 33 i,
different than even Shoreham which is an identical engine.
15 The concerns that have been identified on the g " straight 8" engines for this plant do not necessarily 37 apply to the V-16 engines and they do not apply to the V-20 is engine at San Onof re Unit 1.
39 MR. MARK: Thank you.
20 Y u said the crank shaft would be re-examined if the machine ran up above 3,130. What kind of an operation 21 is that? Does it take a week or an af ternoon, or what?
22 MR. BERLINGER: To inspect the crank shaft?
23 24 MR. MARK: To inspect the crank shaf t.
MR. BERLINGER: The inspection that we have 25 l
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19 (m) i specified as part of the proposed tech spec was limited to 2
the three most heavily loaded journals, crank pin journals, t 3
and the main-bearing journals between those three; there 4 are two main bearings.
5 Those are located away from the ends of the engine 6 crank shaft. And what's involved there is the removal of a 7 bearing cap. There are some pretty good-sized nuts that 8
have to be removed. It's not something that can be done in 9 a few minutes or a few hours. But I would say within a few io days it could be accomplished.
11 MR. MARK: Thank you . l 12 MR. BERLINGER: I have no. other informal or formal 33 presentation, and I will answer any other questions. ;
(s_-) a MR. MARK: Well, I have one that you may not be 15 able to answer. We have talked about diesels -- not g specifically TDI but in connection with loss of off-site 37 power and station blackout so far. There, diesels are la graded according to the probability that is assigned to i, them for failing to start on demand. !
20 After all of the fine-combing that has been put on i 21 this diesel, would you expect it would be of a very high 22 grade in that connection or do you have to wait for six l months to find that out? :
23 :
24 MR. BERLINGER: No. I think I could- have answered f f
25 that almost two years ago. The TDI diesels have never been l I
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d 20 a problem with regards to their ability to start. The 3
concerns that have been evaluated really are more narrowly
. 2 3
addressed to their ability to continue running.
4 MR. MARK: Oh, I have read about the Alaska Flag 5
Ship and so forth.
(Laughter) 6 i
MR. BERLINGER: Rig ht . Well, it turns out with 7
TDI diesels, their reliability to start is somewhere in the 8
j 9 98 percent range, and it has always been. i MR. MARK: That's in the quite high bracket. .
in ii MR. BERLINGER: Yes.
12 MR. MARK: Thank you.
MR. WYLIE: I have a question. Did you mention j q 13 D i, what the block inspection turned up on this machine? l MR. BERLINGER: I did not. I would have to refer 15 back to the TDR to give you the specifics. But the TDR I ;
16 - 1 am referring to is the P&L report which was attached as an i7 f 18 appendix to our safety evaluation report. I t
I think in there they do discuss the results of j i,
the block inspections.
20 l MR. WYLIE: You didn't find the same problem you .
21 22 had at Shoreham. [
MR. BERLINGER: No.
23 24 MR . WYLIE : Okay. Another question. Did they 25 m dify the lube system on these to improve the lube to the f O ;
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) i turbo charger bearings on starting?
- 2 MR. BERLINGER
- Yes. I believe that River Bend 3
has installed both a drip system and an auxiliary pump for t
4 prelub rication.
J
$ MR. WYLIE: Okay.
6 MR. BERLINGER: And essentially, they have all of 7
the different design modifications that have been a
recommended by TDI, including the latest and what appears 9 to be the one that solved the problem.
io MR. WYLIE: Okay, thank you ,
11 MR. STERN: Carl, thank you.
12 Again, let me emphasize that at River Bend there i3 is a pad of several hundred KW on each diesel.between the 34 qualification of the diesel generator and the maximum i3 emergency load. That gives the staf f a lot more assurance, g MR. WYLIE: What was the original rating on this i7 machine?
is MR. STERN: 3,500.
i9 MR. WYLIE: 3,500? Thank you.
4 l 20 MR. STERN: I believe Shoreham was rated at 3,300, i 21 MR. STERN: Well, based on its tests it was rated i
22 3,300, it was limited to 3,300. But it has the same name 23 P l ate rating of 3,500.
24 MR. STERN: Now, the next significant issue that 25 was identified during the review was on the reactor 9
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i 22 (yD g i protection system. Obviously, in the event a seismic event 1
2 occurs, we don't want the reactor licensed unless we are 3
going to have an assurance that the reactor protection 4
system is going to work.
We ran into a very interesting problem that is of 5
6 generic nature, and I'd like to call on Faust Rosa who is the chief of the Instrumentation and Control Systems Branch 7
8 at NRR to describe that.
MR. ROSA: I'm Faust Rosa, as you have already 9
io heard, and I have here a slide, a simplified schematic of ii the reactor protection system which identifies the concern 12 that we have talked about.
13 (Slide) i, I'll give a brief description. The system itself 15 is composed of two reactor protection system MG sets -- A i and B -- each feeding a distribution bus through two ETA 16 37 or electrical protection assemblies in series.
18 The distribution bus itself feeds the reactor 39 protection system logic plus some other loads which I'll 20 identify later. Only one other load here is presently shown, that's the MSIV 1-B and 0-B solenoids.
21 22 Now, during the course of the review, this portion here was determined to be non-seismic, non Class 1-E. The 23 24 reactor protection system MG sets had been known to be non Class 1-E and that is the reason the staf f some years ago 25 O
. .. . . . . - _ _ _- . =. - . .
23 g
t, required the EPAs to be inserted.
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Now, the EPAs protect the downstream circuitry 3
from degradation of the voltage put out by the non Class 1-4 E MG sets. Each EPA consists of voltage and frequency l
sensors logic and a breaker. The breaker will open given 5
, 6 that the sensors sense over-voltage, under-voltage, or 7 under-frequency.
g Now, the concern here with this portion of the 9 system not being Class 1-E is in regard to its seismic 4
to qualification. If something happened in here to degrade n the voltage fed to the Class 1-E reactor protection system t 12 logic and rod, scram rod pilot solenoids, it may affect the ,
-~ 33 ability of the system to scram. ,
i4 Again, some years ago at another plant, it was is found that an over-voltage condition on relays and :
i g solenoids would cause -- a sustained over-voltage i7 condition -- would cause such equipment, such component to is seize. And since these components are required to change
, i, state on de-energization, if they seized they would be 20 unable to perform their safety function. ;
t 21 Now, likewise it was also found that if these rod 22 scram pilot solenoids were subjected to an under-voltage 23 condition, a chattering would occur and over a period of 24 time, the chattering would cause heating and also cause the solenoids to seize and therefore, our concern.
25 t
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_ . _ . .. _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ a_________ - _ - .
24 im In response to the staff request, the applicant
(] 3 did a failure modes and effects analysis to demonstrate 2
3 that the reactor protection system is fully capable of 4
performing its safety function given a seismic event.
5 Now, the system itself is fail-safe from loss of 6
Power, there is no question about that. The failure modes 7
and ef fects analysis looked at a short -- a seismically a
called short-to ground, an open circuit condition, and the 9
failure of the breakers to trip -- that's these breakers 10 here and there -- or a degraded voltage condition on either ij bus.
12 Now, for an open circuit condition or a short-to-13 gr und, or a failure of the breaker to trip, there was no j, unsafe failure mode established. I think that's fairly bvi us. I can go through that in detail if you care.
15 16 Now, the degraded voltage condition, of course, is 37 possible. Now, if you have a degraded voltage condition on la ne bus, you would get a half scram. But if you will note 39 here, there are Group 1-A solenoids on this breaker, Group 20 3-A solenoids are on this breaker. Group 4-C solenoids are 21 n this breaker, and Group 2-B solenoids are on this 22 breaker. There is a Group 3 here and a Group 4 solenoids 23 there.
So, in order to fail all of the rods, you would 24 25 have to have something happen in the non-seismic portion, O
s
L 25
) ) i these distribution buses here, that would degrade voltage 2 on both buses. Not only that, but whatever happened in
-3 these components that caused the degraded voltage would j 4
-have to occur at a particular point -- for instance, right l
-5 at this point here in order to affect all of these circuits t
6 at the same time, on both buses.
!. 7 Also, there is circuit protection, circuit a
protection breakers and fuses downstream of this point in 9 the various safety-related instrumentations. :
in Therefore, we concluded ~that there was a u reasonable assurance that a seismic event would not prevent i
-12 a scram due to whatever might happen in this portion of the i 33 circuit.
, ) . i4 Now, there is one other feature of the reactor u protection system that protect's against anything - that might
, a happen here. There is-back-up scram solenoids -- two i
! 17 ' solenoids - powered from Class A/DC power', and either one -
-g of those solenoids which is actuated by its own logic is
! i, capable of producing a scram. So that in case anything did
- 20 happen, in the unlikely event that anything did happen to
! 21 Prevent the scram due to the de-energization of the rod, 22 individual rod solenoids, the back-up scram solenoids would 23 scram the' plant.
l l
24 Now, with regard to the other loads, the other.
25 part of the problem had to do with these other loads.
0 P
, . - - - , , , , . , , ory..w. m m- my ,,,,., , . ---- -- - . , - -, ,. --,----r- , -,es,m. .,,--m-,-7w c-,,e
i 26 3
These other loads, the NSIV solenoid loads are shown there.
The other loads consisted of the leak detection system, the 2
3 neutron monitoring system, and the process radiation 4
monitoring system.
5 Now, we ' requested the applicant to verify that 6
none of these systems were required for safe shutdown i
7 during or following a seismic event.
g He provided this verification, saying that none of
, 9 these loads were required for a safe shutdown for- any
. ,o design basis event, including a seismic event. -
j ii On the basis of the failure mode and effects -
i 12 analysis.results presented to us and confirmation that these other loads were not required for a safe shutdown, we 13 accepted this design.. However, we are identifying it' as a f 3, generic issue and are submitting it to our in-house process i is f r evaluati n and prioritization.
l 16 37 All the other BWRs, except one, have the same is configuration.
I don't have anything more. I'll answer any <
39 20 questions put forth.
21 MR. MARK: Faust, you know from previous
- 22 experience that I find many things in electrical 23 engineering quite mysterious.
[ 24 MR. ROSA: Yes. ,
l MR. MARK: Why are you worried only about under-25 ,
I LO l
t
- . , , , . ~ . , _ _ , . -
~ , . _ . . . _ , _ - - - _ _ . - _ . _ _ _ , . . _ _ _ . _ _ . , . _ _ . - , . . . . . . _ - _ _ , . . . _ _
27
' () i frequency and not over-frequency >
2 MR. ROSA: Under-frequency results in over current 3
in an electromagnetic piece of equipment and therefore,
?
4 that results in over heating.
5 Over-frequency would result in under current and 6
therefore less heating.
7 MR. MARK: That might not be entirely desirable, 8
nevertheless.
9 MR. WYLIE: Well, isn't it also true you can't get jo over frequency with these because you are driving with an j n induction motor or sync motor?
12 MR. ROSA: Well, we are protected against any 33 frequency variation outside of normal by these EPAs here, u which are Class 1-E. Under frequency can oply come from 15 here.
16 MR. WYLIE: But what I am saying, though, is, 37 isn't the driver a sync motor?
is MR. ROSA: Yes.
39 MR. MARK: It can't go under frequency either, 20 then.
- 21 MR. WYLIE
- Not too well.
22 (Laughter) 23 MR. MARK: Do you have any questions, Charlie?
74 MR. WYLIE: No.
25 MR. MARK: Thank you.
O
28 l
/~'T I see I am rapidly using up my time. I dj s i MR. STERN:
What I'd like to do is really get into the license 2
conditions and the investigative matters. So, I'll zip 3
4 through the next couple of slides very quickly.
5 (Slide) 6 Since the last ACRS meeting, I added about eleven new outstanding issues. The last one, hydrogen control, is 7
g an upgrade of a confirmative issue because for the low
, 9 power license, hydrogen control -- at least from the i
jo staff's point of view -- was not that significant, it was i
n only confirming the existence of, you know, compliance with 12 the Owners Group plan under the rule, et cetera.
However, for the full power issue, for the full 13 O u Power license, this has got to be identified as a major issue. It is in that category right now. I have it listed 15 16 as under review.
, 37 SSER-4-4 will be issued shortly. You have the draft of it. SSER-4 will close it out. The only thing 18 3,
that's nissing from SER-4 is a staff review of the schedule fI impl ementation of the schedule. But, again, let's 20 defer that until the 6 o' clock part of the meeting.
21 The other items on that are basically the result 22 f m difications to the applicant's FSAR which occurred at 23 a fairly furious pace. This is not in any way intended as 24 a criticism, it's a reflection on the fact that when we 25 f
ln v
29 went on this accelerated licensing schedule, we were faced h- ~)
2 with some very large last-minute changes, as manifested in :
3 the FSAR. a lot of issues were open and they were closed t
i 4 fairly quickly.
5 If you'll excuse my misspelling on 20-C, that 6 should be an "of" not an "od." ;
7 Several of them wound up being closed by license conditions such as the SPDS, which will be implemented 8
i-9 about a year from now. There are some human engineering j io discrepancies which will be implemented before exceeding it five-percent power, et cetera.
12 Again, none of these things represented an -- you 33 know, the main challenge that we faced was the compressed <
(_ h
's 2 y amount of time to resolve this, is (Slide) i 16 If we flip to the next page, there is ;
i7 approximately a similar listing on the confirmatory items, '
r la a group of confirmatory items were added.
39 A lot of these were as a result of changes in the i
20 FSAR that staf f had already bought off on a particular 2: concept and they suddenly saw a change. So, we would add a l 22 confirmatory item ur.til it was closed. [
The last item, No. 75, was a mini ordered on j 23 t equipment qualificatior. . The staff was slightly unhappy j 24 25 with the original equipment qualification work. This was
/~~] l.
I
~ _ _ _ _
30 closed as of 10 o' clock this morning.
i 2
The applicant submitted a letter earlier this week and it is now closed. This was my last remaining issue on 3
4 my full power license -- again, provided we have agreement 5
on hydrogen control.
6 By the way, that was not on low power.
7 (Slide) g This is just a graph to show you how the 9 outstanding issues were closed. Most of them were closed to in SER-2 and 3. We wound up with a total of 30, and I'm i ii counting these little sub-issues as full issues. And if 12 you look at the confirmatory issues, you've got the same Pattern. You had about, I think, around 73 confirmatory 13 3, issues. So, in total we had about a little over a hundred confirmatory and outstanding issues.
15 M st of the closure occurred in the last couple of 16 ,
37 months.
18 (Slide) j9 Now, license conditions, I have divided the 20 Presentation in two pieces. One is the license conditions 21 and the license per se; the other, in Attachment 1, which
! are the regional items. Mr. Jaudon from the region will 22 1
23 foll w me and he will discuss Attachment 1.
Again, I am going o move through on this one very 24 25 quick to get to what I consider the main thing, which is r
l
31 ra the construction completion and this administrative matter.
Q i 2 Five-percent rated power obviously was a 3 limitation of the license. Many of these other issues are 4 general generic issues. A couple of exceptions to that.
5 The TDI, Mr. Berlinger has explained. Fire 6 Protection, you have standard license conditions on fire 7 p ro tection. The only additions to those were a requirement g that cable wraps in the main control room be complete by 9
five percent, and I believe in Attachment I there is also 10 something that cable wraps in the fuel building be complete ii by October 31, 1985.
12 October 31 was the soonest feasible date if the i3 utility put maximum pressure from the time the staff truly i4 recognized that, that this was something that had to be is done.
Turbine maintenance, environmental qualification, 16 i7 are all generic license conditions, and we have reasonable is assurance that on environmental qualification the applicant '
39 will have all his equipment qualified by November 30, 1985; 20 Possibly in advance of that.
I think we had -- what was it, 15 or 16 categories 21 22 of equipment that were not, and a good number of those have 23 Probably been qualified already.
24 Carl, do you want to move on?
25 (81108) i L.
32 i Again, in these license conditions there was 2
nothing that was out of the ordinary for any one of our 3 Pl ans. The emergency planning, emergency response,, et 4
cetera, are all standard license conditions, the same with 5
Operating staff.
6 Now, here is where we begin to get the unique 7
features of the plan -- oh, I'm sorry.
MR. MARK: Excuse me. On the emergency planning, 8
, do you have anything unique and special at River Bend, 10 Possible floods or stuff of that kind?
11 MR. STERN: Well, there was a concern that was at 1 12 Unit 2. There was an excavation for Unit 2 and the j3 licensee, possibly with the gentle persuasion of the staf f, i,
has agreed to build a berm around the Unit 2 excavation to 15 av id upsetting the hydrology of the area in the event of a fl d.
16 4
Outside of that -- John, are you aware of any? I 37 3, don't think there were any other unique circumstances.
39 MR. MARK: Well, up in the north you have snow.
20 I'm sure you don't have snow down here --
MR. STERN: No.
21 22 MR. MARK: -- which impedes people trying to get -
23 al ng the highway. Having looked at such horror with Elena 24 in a rather flat piece of country, I guess, where River Bend is, it wouldn't be snow that you would fear, but you 25 O
i V
i . _ . , _ _ _ .__ _ . - _ _ _ _ _ _
. _ . . . . _ _ _ _ . . _ __ _ . __.__-._ . _ __._._ _ _ _ m___ .. - -._.
i, .
33
) i might fear --
2 MR. STERN: Flooding.
3 MR. MARK: -- three feet of water. t 4 MR. STERN: Yes. I can 't recall of f-hand any 5
unusual feature having to do with -- I know it was 6 thoroughly examined and in fact --
7 MR. MARK: 'Whatever it seemed necessary, has been a gone over and things are in acceptable shape. l 9 MR. STERN: Yes. And if I can make a 10 parenthetical comment. We have been taken to task by some over this berm which, I understand, was quite expensive.
f si
- 12 But again, the staf f felt it was required.
j3 Now, here is the unusual feature. There were 29 ,
.. u items of construction and testing that would not be 15 complete at the time of -- that were not projected to be 4
16 complete at the-time of fuel load.
i7 The staff went through a fairly exhaustive review '
i a of these items to determine safety significance, where ,
i, exemption is required or exemption is not required.
I
! 20 Again, the utility must be complimented. They I
21 came in to me with Denton and senior management at NRR on i
j several occasions where the staf f had indicated a major 22 i
! 23 Problem like, for example, on high and ' moderate energy line i
! 24 breaks where the utility proposed to go out to a certain Point -- I don't remember what it was now. We indicated it i-25 O
- - - - - - . ~ . . . - . . , - - , . _ - . . . - - , , - - - . - . - - - - . - . , - ~- . - . . _ - - . . = . - . . - - - - . . - . . . -- .
~
l i
34 g(h i was a major problem.
2 The utility was able to accelerate construction.
3 They were able to change their priorities and move the
, construction up. So, for example, high and moderate energy 5
line breaks were complete before the fuel load license was 6
issued.
The TDI diesel loading, in order to reduce the 7
a load, the emergency load, on one of the diesels the load is 9
presently at 2,940 and it will be reduced down to 2,884.
10 Again, the staff had no concern with-that because it was below the 3,130 which is the diesel qualification. So, the n
utility is breaking that down. That, I believe, will be 12 done by five percent, 13 i,
Control room design review. There were some human 15 err r -- human engineering discrepancies and there is a license condition imposed on that, that requires a 16 37 resolution of these things primarily before five percent.
18 Reg Guide 147, which is the bypass and inoperable i,
status is again subject of a license condition. This must be complete prior to the first refueling outage. But 20 21 again, the staf f felt that there were adequate compensory measures or alternative measures that this did not present 22 a problem.
23 24 Safe and alternate shutdown for the main control 25 r m fire will be complete. The construction is now o
t
_ _ . _ - _ . . _ . . _ - _ _ - _ . _ . _ _ . , . ~
w 35 4
m) i complete. The testing will be complete before exceeding 2 five-Percent power.
3 The next one, the lighting system, is a non-safety 4 item, having to do with evacuation of the building. This, 5 again, is a subject of Licence Condition Attachment 1. The 6 utility has an alternate method of evacuating personnel.
7 How this basically occurred, apparently the a
utility standard was a half-a-foot candle, our standard was 9 three-foot candle . So, the utility has some time to get it to up to standard. But in the interim they do have ii alternative procedures available.
12 The fire wrapping of electrical raceways, there i3 are two of them that were of concern. One was in the u control building and this we insisted had to be complete by is fiVe Percent. Again, the staff in general has allowed 16 applicants to go to five percent before the fire control is 37 fully in effect. But there is a fire watch in place.
i is Compensory measures are in place.
The second one had to do with the fuel building.
39 20 At the time the utility and NRC met on it, the quickest 21 that fire wraps could be put in the fuel building would bed 13 weeks from the time that we met in the early part of 22 August. That came out to October 31, and that is an 23 absolute license condition. So, if the utility exceeds 24 25 five Percent power in January doesn't change the condition 0
1 l
l
36 3
of their licenses . They have to have the wraps in.
2 In all probability, that will occur after five 3
Percent power. But again, the probability that we are 4
going to have to unload fuel elements and put them into the 5
fuel building is probably very limited in that two or three-6 week period of time.
Asiatic clam control, this will be put into effect 7
g prior to the introduction of Mississippi River water into 9
the system. Again, asiatic clam control is a concern in in that area. Right now the utility, I believe, is using well n water as their make-up water. So, this is not a problem.
Condenser and normal service water, these are the 12 cooling towers. These are not safety related at all. If 13 3,
the utility is not able to complete its last cooling tower, is that simply means they are not going to be able to generate g the full complement of power. They are going to have to 37 operate at lesser power as required by the tech specs.
ig But again, from the safety point of view there is 39 a seismic cooling tower and that is what is required for 20 safe shutdown. So, that's in place.
21 S lid radwaste. These are scheduled to be installed and tested. They are in the process of being 22 installed and tested right now. But in the interim, a 23 24 p rtable system that is operated by a contractor is in 25 Plac e .
i
37
.q So again, we are running into this system that g i
/2 every time we have one of these items, there is an 3
alternative in place and the staf f is satisfied.
4 The elevators are not of concern. These are in 5
the 'radwaste turbine auxiliary and control buildings.
These are not a safety item, it's a convenience. There is 6
7 a staircase. -
3 I skipped over the fuel building sampling system.
9 There is a compensory measure involving the use of graph
! io samples rather than the full system in the interim.
n Control rod drive maintenance facility. In the 12 interim, if it has to be used, rather than use a dedicated 13 facility, there is a hot machine shop that can be used.
i4 So again, River Bend has been unique in terms of, y u do have these deferred items. But in our opinion, none is of the deferred items -- with the exception of the first 16 37 item up there which is now complete -- were of real safety is significance. We were able to negotiate a schedule with 39 the utility that they were done either before they were 20 used or before five percent power when it was felt to be 21 acceptable.
There is a similar list of items that are _already 22 23 in P lace, but the testing has been deferred. I could very 24 quickly run down this.
25 (Slide)
O l
, - ,. y -n.-.,
l 38 l l
1 y) i Containment atmospheric monitoring has been 2
complete.
3 The HVAC testing in the reactor and auxiliary 4
buildings. Most of the testing will be completed at fuel 5
load, the remaining will be done prior to criticality.
6 Again, I would ask the utility, please correct me if any of 7
these things are done or erroneous on this.
8 On the post-accident sampling system, the residual 9
work, again, is only testing.
The SPDS, the safety parameter display system, we in ij are looking for this thing to be operational no later than 12 February of 1986, I believe we have an audit scheduled in the latter part of this month. Again, this is fairly 7 33 14 standard. The SPDS is not operational.
The intake structure and the clarifier, again, 15 alternate sources of water are being used prior to five 16 37 percent power. This is Mississippi River water, isn't it?
ig So again, it is not needed. Therefore, the i,
testing is not complete.
Cranes and hoists, we are not discussing the 20 safety grade crane in the fuel building. We are discussing 21 22
-- whoops, I've lost my place, excuse me.
The reactor building polar crane has been 23 l completed. What we are discussing, I believe, is some 24 cranes in the aux building, and these are not going to be 25 O
V i
4 39
() i used during normal maintenance. They were not needed for 2 low Power.
3 Of f-gas system. The off-gas system, the off-gas 4 refrigeration I think may already be operational.
5 MR. DEDDENS: It's in testing.
6 MR. STERN: It's in testing now.
7 MR. DEDDENS: My name is Jim Deddens, vice a
president of River Bend Nuclear Group, Gulf States 9 Utilities.
10 The of f-gas system is currently in the pre-j in operational test phase, and that testing is scheduled to be
- 12 completed before we install the head on the reactor vessel.
~s i3 MR. STERN: Now, let me do a little selective I
-- l a jumping. Liquid radwaste, on its face it could be 15 significant . But this is a duplicate "B" train. There is 16 an "A" train system in place, and this one is also 37 scheduled to be complete fairly soon if it's not already is complete.
39 HVAC testing. This will be complete prior to 20 criticality. The hardware, again, is already in place and 21
-what we are talking about is balancing. Balancing is the 22 part that will be stretched out. .
23 Verification of station electric distribution 24 voltage, the last item, has to be done after the station is fully operational. We have to have the station operational 25 t
/""}
s_-
?
i r
40 A
Q i so we can really determine if the voltage is correctly I 2
distributed.
3 Now, what the staff has done is, we have screened this. We have looked at ALARA considerations. When we 4
5 1 oked at exemptions, we determined whether the equipment 6
was not specifically required by the GDC regulations; 7
whether the existing design met the GDC, and whether this g
just was a provision of enhancement, for example , the "B" 9
train; whether there were compensory measures in place until final construction, or whether the GDC did not even in 33 require testing.
In balance, we concluded that on these items no 12 13 exemptions were required.
9 Now, most of these have wound up as listed in the license condition.
is 16 (Slide) 37 The administrative matter as identified in the --
18 Dick, was this your letter or Dr. Okrent's letter, the 39 subsequent letter?
20 MR. SAVIO: I signed the letter.
21 MR. STERN: Okay. Dick Savio did send us an 22 amplifying letter on the agenda and indicated the license 23 had been delayed a substantial amount of time. I think the 24 correct amount of time would have been two weeks. From our 25 p int of view it was the universe since we were rushing --
O ;
l 5
41
() i not rushing but we had completed the license.
APParently, there was an investigation done by the 2
3 Office of Investigation on DEA, the Drug Enforcement 4
Administration, which identified twelve individuals that 5
were doing some design-related work.
6 Basically, the utility has examined using their 7 quality concern program, they have examined the work, and a we have concluded -- based on extensive work where the 9 utility followed up by audit by Region IV -- that there was
- io no dilatorious ef fect on River Bend.
it I would like to go through individual by 12 individual -- again, Dr. Okrent did request that we spend a little time on the results of this, of how we reached this 33 a conclusion.
15 So, Ron, do you want to --
16 (Slide) 37 Individual A had various assignments. The one of i is most significance was preliminary testing. The bottom line i
19
-- and John Jaudon from Region IV will probably join me at 20 this point and provide any amplifying comments.
MR. JOURDONS: Our individual on testing did very 21 22 little testing, and the testing that this individual did was on floor drains and also in some of the preliminary 23 24 testing in the fire system, but primarily as a witness of 25 flush points and kind of low-level work like that.
O
l l
42 The test work done -- subsequent tests were done i
2 in every case -- was the test engineer in charge.
3 MR. MARK: In my ignorance it isn't clear to me 4
how you test a floor drain.
5 MR. JAUDON: I guess you watch the water run out, 6
make sure it goes away.
7 (Laughter) g MR. STERN: But again, this overlay of two or
, three subsequent inspections does provide a sense of to reliability.
n Also, there were approximately 107 job logs that 12 were reviews and there was considerable review of this
- individual's work.
33 i,
I have the figure here. The utility, I believe, expended -- I'll look it up as we are talking -- an 15 en rm us amount of time, several thousand hours, I believe.
16 Jim, do you have the actual -- it was.3,500 hours0.00579 days <br />0.139 hours <br />8.267196e-4 weeks <br />1.9025e-4 months <br /> 37 la in this evaluation of the work done by these individuals.
3, So it was not something where it was just, "Oh, don't worry about it," they weren't doing anything. I mean, this was a 20 21 bona fide investigation. The region was there with them at 22 the time.
MR. WYLIE: These individuals were identified by 23 24 the Gulf States Utility quality concerns program?
MR. JAUDON: No, sir.
25 O
V f
43 n)_
i MR. WYLIE: They were not?
2 MR. JAUDON: No. They were not identified. This 3
identification of individuals happened by another 4 government agency.
5 MR. WYLIE: I see.
6 MR. JAUDON: However, there were at least two 7
people in there who had already been identified by Gulf g
States sometime in the past, and this type of review was
, conducted on them at that time. That was part of their to quality concern program. We were aware of that, they had ii briefed us on it.
12 MR. STERN: The next three groups of individuals i
i3 fell into the category of pipe fitters and iron workers.
Oo -
34 Again we had this pattern of subsequent inspection on the 15 work.
MR. JAUDON: None of these three were welders, 16 i7 they were pipe toters and in ef fect manual labor. They is were not responsible for any safety-grade work unless you 39 count pushing the pipe in place. They might do a fit-up, 20 but the fit-up had to be inspected by somebody else. They
. 21 were not welders.
MR. STERN: Individual K was a mechanic's helper 22 23 on a cable wrap and, again we had the immediate supervision 24 of another mechanic or a journeyman.
25 (Slide)
44 ,
() 3 Now, the next slide, six individuals were field .
quality control inspectors. This did present some 2
i ,- concern. They were inspecting welds.
j 4
'I believe the population was approximately 3,000 5
welds per these _ control inspectors. Mil Standard 105D was 6
used which, I understand, basically gives us a 95 percent (
7 confidence. Again, I won't pretend that I understand the
, a statistics.
But apparently, this puts-us at the 95-percent, e
1 and under the Mil Standard 720 total welds were selected, l in J
ii or 120_per inspector.
12 MR. JAUDON: Sixty hanger and 60 pipe welds were
! r I selected for inspection.
MR. STERN: .Now, 314 had, after reviewing these
! 15 welds, 314 had been re-inspected, so they were eliminated. ;
MR. JAUDON: .It's a little more than that. They g
37 were either being re-inspected by somebody else or had been a eliminated by design change, or we didn't think they were I i,
of significance because the inspector in question that made 20 the final inspection, the weld no longer existed.
1 MR. STERN: Now, that left us 406 welds. Now,
! 21 under the MIL Standard the utility would have been required i 22 i
to examine 50, and 57 were re-inspected, a little larger.
23 I
Two minor defects were uncovered. John?
f 24 MR. JAUDON: The sample taken by the utility i 25 i
i ;
4 45 l
) i initially covered the entire work period of each 2 individual. We suggested, I think , a few welds to them '
3 from periods wc considered of higher interest in the 4
individual's time at the utility based on attendance
! 5 records and other things that might show a breakdown in 6 behavior.
7 MR. STERN: The conclusion was that the inspection a
met the acceptance criteria for the Mil Standard at a 1.5 ,
, percent acceptance quality level. We have had the staff in to Bethesda go over that briefly. They concluded that this n was an acceptable level. The region felt the same way. :
i7 , MR. JAUDON: I might add on the two minor defects, 33 one was a very minor linear indication in an unusual
, i4 configuration between the toe of two welds, and it was is removed by very slight surface filing, very light filing.
The other one was a filler weld. It was slightly 16 ,
- 17 under size, and that was evaluated as " accept as is" in the is review. These were really minor defects.
l i, They also looked at the reject data rates for all 20 six of these compared to all other field quality control 21 inspectors and didn't find any anomalies there; they were roughly the same. In other words, the reject rate that 22 i 1 23 these six found was really the same as the other group of 24 inspectors, the big group of 40-some other FTC inspectors {
25 doing similar work.
i n bi t
i r
I 46 o
Q j MR. MARK: I get the impression that if you had i 2
not had your suspicions either aroused or confirmed, these 3
people would, on the basis of their performance, be still
, employable.
5 MR. STERN: I don't know how to answer that. I 6
know in looking at the utility's submittal, one of them 7
struck me as very high quality.
g (Laughter)
MR. STERN: I would have to allow the utility to 9
respond to that one. I wouldn't hazard a guess.
in y MR. DEDDENS: Jim Deddens, Gulf States Utilities.
12 The overall summary of the results which we found after re-inspecting these individuals was that the work 33 C 3, that they performed was of comparable quality to all the other inspectors' who were on the job, who were not under 15 l 16 suspicion.
i7 MR. STERN: That's interesting.
, gg MR. MARK: Did you have something else?
l
- 3, MR. JAUDON
- No, sir. I have the next 20 Presentation, that's all.
21 MR. MARK: Well, tile examination is now complete 22 n this point as far as the state of the plant is 23 concerned?
MR. STERN: As far as we know, it is.
24 25 At this point, I'd like to turn the balance of l
I i
?
47 i this agenda over to Region IV who will discuss the 2 management ratings as well as Attachment 1 of the license, 3 and the allegation situation with River Bend. John?
4 (Slide) 5 MR. JAUDON: This slide summarizes the SALP 6 ratings for Gulf States Utilities for the last three years, 7 in which there have been two SALP evaluations.
1 g The most significant point is that we have found 9 no generically weak areas. The findings of the to construction assessment or CAT team and the independent it design inspection or IDI team also supported this 12 conclusion.
13 We have found that GSU management has been u responsive. When items have been identified which the NRC 15 believed may be a problem, they have been prompt and 16 thorough in their follow-up.
17 When they have identified potential problems, they is have been quick to inform the staf f and to follow on with a i9 resolution.
20 GSU management has been involved and active in the 21 construction and test programs. If there were another SALP 22 evaluation issued today, I believe GSU would continue as a 23 Performance Category 1 in management controls.
24 Now, as far as their licensed people to operate 25 the plant, they have six shifts -- Do you have a question,
. l 48 O
.Q 3 sir?
-- with a minimum of five licensed operators for 2
each shift. For fuel load, they are operating in a five-3 shift rotation with one shif t doing administrative work.
4 5
After completion of the most recent license 6
examination, the BWR experience level on each shift is such
~
7 that there are no longer any shif t advisors in use.
Additionally, the licensee has trained sufficient senior 3
9 reactor operators to a level which qualifies them to act as 30 shift technical advisors.
ii GSU has elected to use licensed operators as shift 12 technical advisors and to man shifts at the level of five 33 licensed personnel instead of the minimum of four licenses, j,
two SRO and two RO as required by regulations.
' We have concluded that for a newly-licensed plant, 15 16 River Bend operating personnel are comparatively 37 experienced and that there are a sufficient number of is qualified operators to conduct the start-up.
i, In fact, we wish all of the licensees in our 20 region had 40 licensed operators on board right now, or 38 21 Pl us two instructors.
This summarizes the inspections that we have done 22 23 through licensing, which is ef fectively the 25, 11, 12 and 24 13 programs. The large totals for 1984 do include the construction assessment team and IDI inspections.
25
- O l
49
[) i I ran a comparison with Grand Gulf and Wolf Creek 2
and Callaway-I and these hours are very comparable to the 3 hours we spent on those plants. I would say, to make it 4
more exact, the 766 printout I got had a few glitches in 5 it. I'm sure the hours are comparable, but the number of 6 inspections got very large on those. They had a recall 7 problem.
g The actual numbers I got were Grand Gulf-l was 9 19,477 hours0.00552 days <br />0.133 hours <br />7.886905e-4 weeks <br />1.814985e-4 months <br />, and Wolf Creek, 22,977. But that picked up io part of the 2214 program and Callaway-I, 22,587 inspection in hou rs .
12 As of last Friday, we had had a total of 37 i3 allegations made to the NRC concerning the River Bend O
\_ / plant. Twenty-eight of those have been closed and nine
, u 15 Were OPen. None have resulted in an escalated enforcement g action.
i7 I said as of last Friday because Monday we got a
! is new one. So, the total is now 38, with 28 closed and ten
! i, open.
20 Now, the allegations that are open, there are 21 marked " sensitive," and that means they are under the
' Purview of the Office of Investigations. Items No. 3, 4, 22 and 8 are in the process of being closed. Items 5 and 6, 23 24 and 9 are being investigated by the licensee, and Item 10 I 25 is the one we just got. We are still taking a preliminary l
l 50 m
i look at it. I'd just as soon not discuss that right now in 2
any detail.
3 Do you have any questions about the allegations?
4 (No response)
MR. JAUDON: This is comparatively few allegations 5
6 compared to our recent experience at other sites.
7 MR. MARK: Why, it's not even 600.
8 (Laughter) ,
9 MR. JAUDON: No , s i r .
10 MR. MARK: Going back to the point -- I don't know ii if this thing that talked about the Individuals A through J j 12 overlaps with this list or not.
MR. JAUDON: No, sir; it does not. That was not
- 33 an allegation. That was a fact that was brought to us. It
- i, is was an on-going investigation by DEA and they informed the to Office of Investigation about it. That's not considered an 37 allegation.
ig MR. MARK: On that point, either you or the i,
applicant might know, is that thing closed or is there i
20 likely to be a burst of publicity connected with it yet?
i 21 MR. JAUDON: They have made a couple of 22 statements. I have brought along a recent newspaper i
f article from that Baton Rouge paper I think I've got 23 24 somewhere in my notes here, which was a DEA statement on 25 the subject.
i
, . -- + , _ , , , , --,n-----,---n-m -- - - - -nn- ~ , . , , - - - - - . - ~ . , - , . , - , - -, - , , . . ,
- - - e - - - - - - - . . . , .
1 51 i I believe there is an on-goir.g investigation, l
still, or a continuing investigation. There certainly has 2
3 been some publicity in, I think, the Baton Rouge area about 4 it, some of which was, I think, rather colorful and not 3 perhaps factual, about people who are being arrested and so 6
on, j 7 MR. MARK: Would you judge that that has passed l 8 its peak, or is it a time bomb there?
1 i 9 MR. DEDDENS: Jim Deddens, Gulf States Utilities.
in No. Our judgment is that it has passed its peak.
There was publicity both on television and in the Baton
)a ti 12 Rouge area newspapers at the beginning of the i3 investigation, and follow-up articles at the conclusion of u the investigation, which reported comments by DEA and NRC
! 15 officials.
I We believe the matter is substantially put to 16
! 17 rest.
d
- 18 (Slide)
MR. JAUDON: In a somewhat similar vein, the i9 licensee does have a fitness-for-duty program. From our l 20 1
21 inspections we have concluded that Gulf States Utilities f
22 meets or exceeds all of the EEI revised guidelines for such 23 Programs, except that the imposition of the program on 24 contract personnel was not committed to be complete until 25 88Ptember 15. We know they have started, and September 15
52 3
is rather close at hand.
2 You maybe can say where you stand. I know you 3
were sampling a bunch of people last week.
4 MR. DEDDENS: All GSU personnel have completed the fitness-for-duty prog ram requirements. All of our 5
contractors were notified several weeks ago that they would 6
7 have to be in compliance with our fitness-for-duty policy for contractors by September 15. Any individuals who were
- a
, not certified by the contractor to be in compliance would in be denied access to the protected area.
ii So, we expect that program to be completed by 12 September 15.
i3 MR. MARK: The program for your people and the 3,
contractors, you might remind me what it consists of.
' The~re is a background check --
15 MR. DEDDENS: The complete program, in order to 16 37 gain unescorted access to the protected area includes is background screening and now drug screening for any 3,
individual, whether GSU or contractor, to obtain unescorted 20 access to the protected area.
21 If a contract person does not pass either the 22 background test or the drug screening portion of the fitness-for-duty, then they will be denied access.
23 24 MR. MARK: Is there a psychological assessment in ,
25 this picture too, or not?
I l
53 '
l q
g ,) i MR. DEDDENS: Pardon me?
i 2 MR. MARK: Is there a sort of a psychological 3
. assessment in the picture also?
4 MR. DEDDENS: Yes, there is.
t 5 MR. JAUDON: I believe they used the Minnesota 6
Multi-Phase Personality Test, or whatever it is, the one 1
7 our licensees have used.
8 MR. DEDDENS: I might also add that for GSU 9 employees there is a fairly substantial physical io examination, and for contractor employees a more limited physical examination, depending upon what their duties n
12 might be. For example, if they are required to wear l i3 respirators, they would be subjected to a cardio-pulmonary -
4
(~')
u examination.
MR. JAUDON: They have also conducted training for f
15 i a supervisors, about two days worth, on aberrant behavior and
! 37 detection, how to handle it and what to do with it. I is guess company policy and procedure is in place for that.
i, They have company, a GSU counseling program, l 20 though I understand nobody has ever been entered into it i
21 from the site yet, for alcohol and drug abuse, and so on.
22 The elements of the program as described in the i
23 EEI guidelines are in fact all in place, except for the 24 contractor.
25 I was going to talk on the special inspection we
. . - - =
I 54
() i conducted, and we pretty much covered that. I will say The inspection team, regional inspection 2
only one thing.
i 3
team, consisted of a deputy director of the division who
, was experienced both in reactor operations and 5
construction, and is a former enforcement officer in the 6
region and somewhat familiar with inspection techniques.
7 A construction generalist of great experience, a g
non-destructive examination man, and we used a resident 9
inspector for the test portions of it, plant testing io portions. They stayed, I believe, very close with the i utility for several days.
The last item was Attachment 1 to the license or, 12 as Mr. Stern put it, the region's licensing conditions. I 33 ON i, don't have a slide on that, but I was going to talk about 15 each one.
The first one, items that must be completed prior 16 to installing the reactor vessel head. That was complete 37 18 the testing of the off-gas systems and the off-gas 3,
refrigeration system. That testing has in fact started.
20 It appears to us -- it is our estimate it may be a critical 21 path item for the licensee on its schedule.
22 The next are a group of six items to be done prior t initial criticality. The first one is to modify some 23 i
24 Operating procedures, to require the monitoring of cooling water in the control room ventilation chillers when cooling 25
- y. ,r - --- ,, .,,-------g_ ..,---,--,%,., - ,, . _ _ _ y w- ,-------- , - ,w-..-- -- - ,,..,. -
55
() i is from stand-by service water, and it comes of f a 50.55 E report they had made.
2 3
That has been done, we just haven't finished 4 verifying and documenting reports yet.
5 The next was a similar item, to modify emergency 6 Procedures relative to some limitorque operators, as 7
identified in a 50.55 E report, and that procedure as of a
Monday was in word processing, I believe, with the 9 licensee. So, we have not verified the procedure is 3o actually modified yet.
ii The third one was to verify plant air-flow 12 characteristics such that air flow from areas of 13 Potentially low radioactive concentrations to potentially n(_; 34 high radioactive concentrations. That is scheduled to be is completed, I believe, on the.14th and we will have 16 in8Pectors in to verify it very shortly thereafter.
37 The fourth item was to place in service as tested is and calibrated, including install process instrumentation i, turbine plant sampling panel, condensate demineralization 20 and radwaste sampling panels. That is essentially done and 21 it is going to be verified in the very near future by 22 inspections.
23 The next one had to do with the conduct of some 24 surveillance on all three diesel generators, the two TDIs 1
25 and the Division III diesel generator. They started last 7
56 i week and had a problem with a recorder on the Division III 2
and they are going to, I think, reschedule it for this weekend, the last I heard. Is that right, Jim?
3 4
MR. DEDDENS: Yes.
MR. JAUDON: It is going again this weckend. The 5
6 resident thanks you for that.
$ And the last initial criticality item was 7
a completion of some pre-operational testing on the loading of charcoal and verification by laboratory analysis of its in characteristics. They had a problem the first time around
~
n with that, and I understand they've got some new charcoal 12 that they are going to try and load now, which I think is i3 going to pass.
O 1
- i, The first load of charcoal they had to throw out; they got another load of charcoal and put it in. It didn't 15 pass the laboratory analysis. So now they've got a third 16 i
37 set of charcoal going in.
g The next group of items are five items which must
- i, be done prior to exceeding five-percent power.
[ The first one are some fire protection items, of 20 which there are four individual items. They are testing of 21 22 the CO-2 fire protection system for the turbine generator, and I understand that's scheduled to be done by September 23 21 and we will verify when it is done or shortly 24 25 thereafter.
O
' - - - ->,~-r - ,, . _ . _ . , . _ , _ _ , , .._ _
57 i
(m,) i Wrapping of electric raceways in the control 2 building, which Steve Stern has already mentioned. That 3 has been done.
4 The safe shutdown modifications, that's supposed 5
to be all wrapped up by Sunday, I think.
6 The revision of plant procedures and retraining of 7
operators for control room -- because of fire, including a
resolution of communication requirements -- I don't think
, the procedures on that are out yet and the training is not io complete, I don't believe, on that yet, n The second item was the completion of the liquid 12 gaseous and solid radwaste systems and place them in i3 service. Mr. Stern already talked about those, in effect.
i4 The third one was the complete modification is necessary, including providing qualified operators for 16 valves AOV-144 and 145, and to prevent draining of the 17 suppression pool in the event of a failure of suction is piping, as delineated in one of the 50.54 Es.
39 This problem has to do with a cresnat area through 20 which pipes penetrate the containment area, and a passive 21 failure in there could lead to flooding that area. They 22 had a pump-back system and they've got a couple of valves 23 that aren't qualified. The system is in place, but it's 24 not qualified.
MR. STERN: If I could add, this was the only 25 O
b
58 i exemption from the GDC for the entire license. We felt l 2
that an exemption from GDC up to five percent was 3
natisfactory.
MR. JAUDON: This item, I think your schedule 4
5 calls for completion of it by Friday, if that's still 6
valid.
MR. DEDDENS: If I might comment on that. The 7
3 operators are installed and in the process of being re-9 tested. That should be completed within the next few to days. That would complete all the requirements for that n one licensing exemption.
i MR. JAUDON: The fourth item for exceeding five-12 33 percent power was, complete the installation and testing of the post-accident sampling system and place in service.
15 That is scheduled to be completed in two days also. We 16 will have people on site to verify its completion shortly 37 thereafter.
is The final one was, complete the remaining modifications described in GSU's letter dated May 16 to g reduce the maximum emergency service load to 2,084 KW for 21 the Division 1 diesel generator and 2,780 for Division 2.
We believe they meet that right now. We have not 22 g
verified -- I think there may be a slight problem, they
.i 24 didn't drop quite the same loads they described in that l 25 letter. There may be an FSAR change involved in this. Am O
l l
- . - .-- ---- _ _ . . _ . . __ -. _ - . _ _ _ - - , , - . - - . ~ . . - _ = .
59
[9 g i I correct on that?
I 2 MR. BOOKER: Jim Booker. We do have those loads 4
3 reduced down to the initial load that we were talking about 4 to load fuel. We do have some additional load reductions 5
that will be completed prior to going to five-percent 6 power.
I 7
MR. JAUDON: All right.
8 That's all I had, gentlemen. Do you have any
, 9 questions?
e to MR. WYLIE: You have covered it. Thank you very si much.
12 Mr. Booker, you were going to tell us what you
- i3 disagreed with about what the staff said.
i, (Laughte r)
! 15 MR. REED: My name is Bill Reed. I am with Gulf j j 16 States Utilities, the director of licensing.
i7 I guess item "d" under No. 2 on the agenda, if I l 18 could take this time, yes, we would like to provide some i, comments.
20 I would like to introduce the people at the head 21 table and then we'll go ahead from that point on.
22 Again, I am the director of nuclear licensing. I have been involved in River Bend for the last ten years in 23 24 licensing and have been with Gulf States for 13 years. I have a bachelor of science and a master of science degrees i 25 lo
i 60 i
3 in mechanical engineering from the University of Arkansas.
with me at the head table today are Jim Booker and 2
] -3 Jim Doddens who introduced themselves previously, s
4 Mr. Booker is the manager of engineering nuclear l I
i i 5 fuels and licensing. He has BS degrees in mechanical i i
6 engineering and industrial engineering from Lamar ;
7 University with over 20 years experience, and has worked for the past 13 years on the River Bend project.
f a
! , Then, Mr. Doddens is vice president of the River j in Bend nuclear group. He has bachelor of science and master f j
ii of science degrees in mechanical engineering from the f j 12 Jniversity of Louisville. He has over 30 years experience i t
i i3 in the nuclear industry and has been with us at River Bend I
j i, for the past three years.
i With that, then, I would like to pass it to Mr. ,
33 ;
i
,3 Doddens who would make his opening comments, g MR. BOOKER: For the record, we essentially agree f
l is with what the staf f has presented here today to the ACRS, i9 and we have no comments on their presentation.
I 20 But Mr. Doddens would like to make a few comments.
j MR. MARK: I didn't think they have said anything 21 22 particularly rude or damaging.
(Laughter)
! 23 l MR. DEDDENS: I would just like to make a few l 24 i 25 opening comments by way of bringing the subcommittee up to i 4 !
lO
! l i
i en.--,--,n.. , . ,- ,m- -.---n-,--n..- n-, ;n-,,r------, ,-. ~ -. -,n.nm,,..,,,,._,,.v,,--- ,,,,, _y-,-r-,m-- --,- ,,--n.,---.-., - - - - - - - -
i 61 i date on the current status of the River Bend project.
2 As Mr. Stern mentioned, on August 29 in the 3
af ternoon, we received our low power license. And at l 4 approximately 3:55 a.m. on Saturday, August 31, the first 5
fuel assembly went into the reactor vessel.
, 6 That is a construction schedule from the start of 7
construction to the start of fuel loading of almost exactly e
72 months, which is a record that we are quite proud of,
, and is quite an achievement from our viewpoint for a io utility building its first nuclear power plant and for the n first unit at this particular site.
12 MR. MARK: I think you could go on and say, for i3 almost anybody.
i4 MR. DEDDENS: Yes, thank you. ,
15 Since that time, fuel loading has progressed at a 16 satisfactory rate. As of about two hours ago, we had i
i7 loaded 330 of the fuel assemblies into the reactor. That
! 18 is slightly over 50 percent of the total of 624.
I i, The oporation is going quite well and we are 20 pleased with the progress we are making on it.
I would also comment that reviewing Mr. Stern's 21 22 schedule forecast for what is to happen in the future, I am 23 in substantial agreement with the dates and the events that 24 he has outlined on his schedule. We believe that that also 25 is somewhat aggressive in terms of power escalation. But 6
l
62 we believe that it is achievable and, based on our past i
2 history, we think we can achieve one-hundred percent power 3
by the end of this year.
4 MR. BOOKER: That concludes the comments we had at 5
this point.
MR. MARK: Charlie, do you have any comments or 6
7 questions?
i a
We heard about the re-inspection, extensive re-
, inspection of your diesel generators. You must have been 10 much involved in that. I got the impression from the staf f is that they were fairly content with the way those now look.
Is that also the company's view of this?
12
,3 And how has TDI responded to the sort of intensive
\ i, look that they have had to undergo?
I MR. DEDDENS: First of all, with regard to the re-is inspection of the two diesel generators that we have, we are satisfied with the results of that inspection. We 37
- is were, of course, very active participants in the Owners i,
Group. I, myself, am a member of the Executive Committee 20 of the Owners Group and have followed that process very 4
closely.
21 22 We have been very dedicated in accepting the recommendations of the TDI Owners Group and have made the 23 24 changes to our engines that were recommended by the Owners 25 Group.
l O
, , _ . , , e -- .-.--. ,.- ----,- , , , - - .
63 l 3
We believe that we have put these engines in 2
Pretty much state-of-the-art for that particular model of
- 3 engine. We are satisfied that we have done just about j 4 everything that can be done, and that they have been tested 5
and have weathered the results of those tests in very good 1 6 condition.
I 7 With regard to TDI, of course, I can't speak for
! g them, but I can say that they have been cooperative in
! 9 helping us to resolve the problems on the engines. They in have cooperated in furnishing us with replacement parts on i it a rather tight schedule.
12 So, where we have needed them to help resolve 13 these problems, they have been cooperative.
MR. MARK: That was the kind of comment I hoped f: 3, I 15 applied.
16 I guess that we have covered what we have on this i7 agenda, unless someone has something.
I would like to declare a break, then, to find out 18 if we can get Mr. Okrent.
l 39 20 (Whereupon, at 5:30 p.m., a recess was taken until 21 5:45 p.m.)
22 23 j 24 25 lo l
l l --__.- - - .-_--
i 64
) 1 MR. OKRENT: The meeting will reconvene.
2 I apologize for my tardiness to the meeting here.
3 I, unfortunately, had to have two meetings at the same 4 time.
5 I guess we are on agenda item 3, Summary of 6 actions by NRC and Applicant related to the ACRS Interim 7 Report.
! 8 Who is up first?
9 MR. BOOKER: We will start off. Jim Brook, Gulf i
10 State Utilities.
11 My remarks pertain to the status of the items in
! 12 regard to the July 17th,1984 ACRS interim report on River i
13 Bend.
14 In the report the ACRS made comments pertaining to 15 five areas.
16 The first one was you asked us to look at a 17 dependence of the HPCS diesel generator on cooling water 18 supplied by pumps which were powered by the division one i
19 and two diesel generators.
20 You asked us to provide our plans for continued 1
21 limited PRA work.
22 You asked us to look into the seismic capability 23 of decay heat removal system components.
24 You asked to be kept updated on our procedures for 25 containment venting and then hydrogen control. ;
- 0 I
l l
65
() 1 GSU has taken action in all of these items. We 2 have submitted our preliminary analysis of the hydrogen 3 control system for River Bend. This analysis shows i 4 compliance with the hydrogen control rule that is 5 achievable with the igniter system.
6 Three of these items are going to be here for 7 further detail later on, and hydrogen is one of those.
8 The next item is containment venting. We have 9 been working with the NRC staff on a containment venting 10 procedure that we have developed in accordance with the 11 industry emergency procedure guidelines. This also will be 12 covered in greater detail later on.
s 13 The third item is the River Bend site specific 14 PRA. As we reported last year, we had conducted a mini-PRA is based on the Grand Gulf RISSMAP, and this was accomplished 16 for the licensing requirem,ent to satisfy the environmental 17 report.
18 We also talked about our future work of Phase II 19 and the future long-term work and future long-term plans 20 that GSU has in the area of PRA. This is the third item 21 which will be an official detailed presentation later on.
22 This leaves two other items that we will cover at '
23 this time.
24 You asked us on the HPCS diesel generators to look 25 at the dependence of the cooling water being supplied on l m I
i 66 1 the other two diesel generators to look at the dependence of the cooling water being supplied on the other two diesel 2
3 generators.
4 We went back and we looked at our design which had 5 two 50 percent standby service water pumps supplied off the !
6 division one generator and two 50 percent standby service l
7 water pumps supplied off the division two generator, which l l
8 we felt, and we still feel like met the requirements for i 9 the regulations for single failure criteria. ,
i i 10 But we also looked at your suggestions that maybe [
t
]
i 11 we should try to provide some cooling water to the HPCS 12 diesel generator which was powered by that in the event f i
13 that we lost all offsite power in division one and division l
! I
' ' 14 two diesels and then we could not use the HPCS diesel I t
is generator and its pump because of lack of cooling water. f 16 We proposed and did go through a design change.
17 And what we did is we took one of the 50 percent service j 18 water pumps off the division one diesel generator, and that 19' is now powered with the HPCS diesel generator.
20 But we do have complete independent cooling water 21 to the HPCS diesel generator in the event that. we lost (
t 22 offsite power in the division one and division two diesel 23 generators. ,
24 MR. MARK: This 50 percent pump that is run by the [
i i 25 special diesel --- l l
t I
67 1 MR. BOOKER: The HPCS diesel.
2 MR. MARK: Yes. How long could that keep that 3 system alive?
4 MR. BOOKER: For the HPCS diesel it provides 5 adequate cooling just for that system by itself.
6 MR. MARK: And so it could run indefinitely 7 providing spay with that pump, and then of course you have a diesel tie-ins to the main generators 9 MR. BOOKER: That is correct.
10 MR. STERN: I would like John Ridgeley from the 11 Auxiliary Systems Branch of NRR to call for any comments on 12 the staff review of this item.
g-s) 13 MR. RIDGELEY: This is John Ridgeley of the 14 Auxiliary Systems Branch. We were concerned about the is ability of the HPCS diesel providing power to that single 16 pump as being the only load on there. The applicant has 17 taken that into consideration and has committing to is maintaining the minimum loadings on that diesel so that 19 ' that pump will remain operative for as long as they need 20 it.
21 MR. BOOKER: The other item that you asked us ---
! 22 MR. OKRENT: Excuse me. Just so I am sure I 23 understand what was said in case I am asked tomorrow or l
24 Friday, with the change that you have made, the high-25 pressure core spray system can run indefinitely just with 1
68 1
1 its own diesel; is that correct?
l 2 MR. BOOKER: That is correct.
3 MR. OKRENT: I just wanted to make sure I hadn't 4 misunderstood. Thank you.
5 MR. EBERSOLE: May I ask about that. Is the high-6 pressure core spray system fitted with alternating current 7 valving and other accessory apparatus that pertains to 8 servicing the HPCS system? ,
9 MR. BOOKER: At this time I would like to call on 1 .
j 10 Joanne Morris who can probably answer some of the details .
Il you are asking for.
]
12 MRS. MORRIS: Could you repeat your question, 13 please? 6
?
l 14 MR. EBERSOLE: I am only trying to find out if the 15 HPCS system in respect to such things as valving and the i 16 pipelines, that the AC power is derived only from the HPCS
! 17 generator and not from any other AC source.
18 MRS. MORRIS: Are you referring to the valving in 19 the service wster system?
20 MR. EBERSOLE: Anything that serves and makes an 21 entity out of HPCS, does it derive its power just from the 22 HPCS diesel generator?
23 MRS. MORRIS: The motor operated valve on the 24 discharge of the service water pump that is now powered by 25 the division three diesel is also powered by the division C:::
- ,,,,,-..,,v.-,, g-- -n---_--. ,n,. , , - , , , - . - - , , , , , ,
69
() i three diesel.
2 MR. EBERSOLE: Can it be fairly said that any AC 3
3 function which is demanded to serve ---
4 MRS. MORRIS: That is my understanding , yes.
5 MR. EBERSOLE: --- is derived from its own source?
6 MRS. MORRIS: Right.
7 MR. EBERSOLS: Ok ay. Thank you . It is just that.
8 MR. BOOKER: The other item that you asked us to 9 look into is the seismic margin and the seismic capability to of equipment, instruments and supports for the decay heat 2 11 removal system, and Mr. Jim Glazar of Gulf States will give 12 that presentation.
13 MR. BLAZAR: In response to the ACRS concern on i
14 the seismic margin decay heat removal equipment, we 15 performed a study to investigate the margins available on 1
16 various equipment and supports within the decay heat 4
17 removal system.
18 (Slide.)
19 This slide basically shows the results that were 20 obtained from a selected sample of equipment within the 21 decay heat removal systems and, as you can see, it is 22 comprised of about eight equipment types and 21 selected 23 pieces of equipment.
24 The minimum margin of safety that is listed there 25 is based on the margin that is in excess of that that is lO y -rriw---v-e-*-'-'--erv w ymrwry ww - w -w.v -- rryv-
70 b.s I required to support River Bend's design basis earthquake, 2 which is a .lG ground acceleration earthquake.
3 The margins were determined basically by comparing 4 the response spectra that was utilized during the testing 5 for the equipment for seismic qualification of that 6 equipment, and it was compared with the actual plant 7 specific response spectra at the equipment location, and 8 this was developed by taking the .lG ground acceleration 9 and amplifying it through the plant structure. .
10 And as you can see, there are sufficient margins 11 in that representative sample for equipment.
12 (Slide.)
~~ 13 In addition, we looked at cable tray supports, 14 small bore pipe supports and instrument supports, and this is study was a little different than equipment in that we 16 looked at the margins based on generic conservatism built 17 into the calculational methodology used to determine the 18 seismic loadings and stresses in these supports.
19 As an example, the code allows for certain 20 increases in the allowables due to occasional loads which 21 is used for seismic determination. The design essentially 22 was done to about a .15 ground acceleration versus the .1, 23 and certain generic calculational methodology included 24 reduced allowables even over the code allowables.
25 When you take all those into account, we
71
() I essentially came up with the margins of safety that are 2 included on the chart.
3 We have also done some limited sampling of actual 4 supports and looked at the calculation of those supports to 5 determine that in fact that in actual calculational 6 experience they fall at least within, or they exceed that 7 margin that is in this chart and the results were positive.
8 MR. BOOKER: Tliat concludes our presentation on
-9 Item No. 3 of the agenda.
i 10 MR. OKRENT: Any questions?
11 (No response.)
12 I guess we are ready for agenda Item 4. Is the
[ ~ 13 staff going to start?
l 14 MR. STERN: Yes.
15 Are there any comments on Item 3?
16 MR. STERN: No, sir. The staff has this under 17 review, very, very preliminary review having just received i 18 this, but no problems. -
l 19 Mr. Mazetis is a Section Leader with our Division j 20 of Human Factors, and he will lead the discussion on 21 containment venting procedures.
22 23 24 l
! 25 r
! L),
i
-e, , , - -
~. - - _ _ . . - -
72 P !
L 1 EVENING SESSION l 2 (6:00 p.m.)
3 MR. MAZETIS: My name is Gerry Mazetis, and I am member of 4 the Procedures and Systems Review Branch in the Division of 5 Human Factors Safety.
3 I 6 As background, and before I get to my one slide, I i
7 should point out that the Division of Human Factors Safety 8 < is responsible for coordinating the -implementation of 9 emergency guidelines, and of course ultimately the
~
10 translation of guidelines to emergency operating 11 procedures.
12 By reviewing each applicant's or licensee's !
1
) 13 proposal for what they plan to base their emergency i
~
O 14 , procedures upon, in particular the technical basis, if an is app 5Icant indicates that they are following approved 16 generic owners group technical guidelines, then obviously i
17 our technical review would be minimal.
i
, 18 However, if departures or deviations from the l 19 approved technical guidelines are proposed and justified, 20 or if individual emergency technical guidelines are 21 submitted and justified, then our review would be more
!' 22 extensively technically.
i 23 River Bend .has indicated that they have generally
!- 24 followed the approved General Electric Owners Group l 25 technical guidelines as the basis for their emergency
~7 l
l
73 i operating procedures. However, a plant specific area is 2 still under review by the staff for River Bend is the 3 subject at the moment, and that is containment venting.
4 If I my put up my slide.
5 (Slide.)
6 This slide shows an overview of the venting issue 7 in two particular areas. One is the origin of the venting a strategy and also key objectives of the venting strategy.
9 If I may, I would like to correct the first -- I to inadvertently put up the wrong reference. The dates for 11 the first reference, if you would please make a correction, 12 is 1983 staff SER, and the generic letter is 83-05.
13 During 1981 and 1982, particularly throughout the 14 year 1982, a review of the owners group's submittal of a is emergency technical guidelines was made by the staff, and 16 it was in 1983, the beginning of 1983 that the staff
. 17 published their findings in the form of a safety is evaluation.
19 It was in this safety evaluation report, this 20 generic SER, that the staff the approved the concept of BWR
! 21 containment venting for beyond design basis accidents.
22 MR. OKRENT: That was for any BWR?
23 MR. MAZETIS: BWR 1 through 6, yes, sir.
24 The purpose at the time during the review and 25 indicated in the safety evaluation was this strategy was to O
74
. I serve as a last resort for last remaining containment 2 pressure control action. You would expect that by this 3 time the operator had already exhausted the normal means of 4 pressure control in the containment and multiply failures 5 had taken place.
6 The philosophy was based on allowing -- the ,
7 preference would be to allow a controlled release of 8 containment environment in order to prevent an uncontrolled 9 release through containment rupture.
10 In the body of the staff SER it was suggested that i
11 an interim venting pressure of twice the design pressure be 12 used with plant specific demonstration of containment 13 integrity.
~
14 It was acknowledged in the staf f SER also that
. 15 continued owners group's efforts should take place during 16 the longer term to better define the limit or the methods 17 for defining the containnent venting pressure rather than 18 arbitrarily the two times design pressure.
19 MR. EBERSOLE: May I ask a question?
20 MR. MAZETIS: Yes, sir.
21 MR. EBERSOLE: To what extent are you familiar now i 22 with a system which GESSAR has called a UPPS?
l l 23 MR. OKRENT: That is on the agenda.
24 MR. EBERSOLE: Oh, is it later on?
25 MR. OKRENT: It is later on.
O
75
() 1 MR. MAZETIS: Shall I go on?
2 MR. OKRENT: Yes.
3 MR. MAZETIS: To my knowledge, there has been no 4 additional follow up in this area of c0ntainment venting by 5 the General Electric Owners Group with the staff since 6 1983. However, it is our understanding that the Owners 7 Group has been contemplating an update of the guidelines a perhaps to be submitted towards the end of the year.
9 With regard to River Bend specifically, I think to there have been several productive discussions with the 11 applicant for the past couple of months in this area, one 12 as recent as this morning, and I think there may be another i
13 one tomorrow.
- 14 We have seen several informal proposals over the
- 15 past couple of months for a procedure, a venting procedure, 16 and this has resulted in 1,nformal feedback from the staf f 17 reviewe rs .
18 The technical review of this particular area has 19 been assisted primarily by the Containment Systems Branch l 20 and the reviewer is available in the audience for any l
- 21 detailed questions.
(
22 But I think it is fair at this point to suggest 23 that the licensee should submit his latest proposal 24 formally to update the docket, and I could also mention
'25 that more recent discussions have proposed a two-level l
O
76 1 venting strategy where the first level would vent at 20 2 pounds per square inch gauge through a small filtered line, 3 a three-inch filtered line, and the second level would vent 4 through a larger line, a larger 36-inch line at about 45 5 psig.
6 I think that the staff would conclude that this 1
7 latest dialogue reflects an improvement over the initial 8 drafts we saw which proposed a first-level vent well below 9 the design pressure, the containment design pressure.
10 As the applicant is aware, I believe, the specific 11 areas we are usually interested in with regard to this area 12 are listed in the August SER supplement, Supplement No. 3 I 13 believe it is. And we have included areas that need
(-~,
'- 14 addressing to consider such things as operability of the 15 vent valves used for venting.
16 Other desirable attributes that we would like to 17 have addressed that are identified in the safety evaluation 18 are considerations of operability of safety relief for our 19 ADS, consideration of depressurization rates and whether 20 any consideration was given to controlling releases by 21 selective use of vent paths.
22 All these areas have been under discussion with 23 the licensee for the past couple of months, and I would 24 expect that his submittal, once formalized, would address 25 these areas.
!O
77
( 1 This is the completion of my presentation, and if 2 there are any questions, I could try to answer or ask the 3 Containment Systems Branch to assist.
4 MR. OKRENT: I have a few questions myself.
5 First, I am sorry to say, my memory doesn't tell 6 me whether or not the ACRS reviewed this 1983 staff SER 7 generic letter 83-05. Did it review and comment on this?
8 MR. MAZETIS: Yes. In the expectation that you 9 would ask the question, I went to the author the other day i
10 and he reminded me that there were two ACRS presentations 11 at the time of publishing our findings soliciting the 12 committee's comments. So in answer to your questions, yes,
- 13 there were apparently two presentations which discussed the
~ 14 findings that the staff was to publish in their safety ;
is evaluation.
16 MR. OKRENT: My question is did the ACRS ever i 17 comment in writing on the substance of the staf f's approval is of BWR containment venting for beyond design basis ;
t 19 scenarios?
20 MR. MAZETIS: Not to my knowledge. In writing, ;
i 21 not to my knowledge.
22 MR. OKRdNT: Se e , it is a little bit hard to know 23 what is meant by a statement of there was a presentation ,
24 before the ACRS. Usually or frequently that is just a list 25 of dates, you know, we started on this date and we are
' l I
1 l
, _ . , . ,y-, _ - --. _ . - _ _ - .
78 I going to do something on another date and so forth.
2 Okay. A different question. How many reactors 3 currently have an emergency procedure guideline which would 4 permit containment venting for beyond design basis
'5 scenarios?
6 MR. MAZETIS: I don't have that number in front of 7 me, but there has been one reactor through the committee at 8 Limerick recently that has that procedure, and all 9 operating reactors are post-implementation reviewed. So it to wouldn't surprise me that the operating reactors have i 11 existing procedures that have this strategy in this their 12 procedu res .
13 MR. OKRENT: So they could implement this without 14 checking back with you?
15 MR. MAZETIS: This and the other strategies that 16 have been approved, including the severe accident 17 strategies in the generic emergency technical guidelines is safety evaluation, yes, sir.
19 MR. OKRENT: Okay. Now do you recall a more 20 detailed requirement of how venting would be done and with 21 what and so forth than is illustrated on this viewgraph in 22 generic letter 83-05, or is this pretty much it, twice the 23 design pressure?
24 MR. MAZETIS: In the generic guideline, yes.
25 There is not much guidance beyond that criteria in the
, ,~,
s i
i i
I 79 1 generic guideline. However, for specific plant 2 implementation of the guideline there is more detail, and 3 in particular River Bend Station of course.
4 MR. OKRENT: But as far as you are concerned, 5 plant "X", and it could be a Mark I or a Mark II, could go 6 ahead and the fact that they did it at twice the design 7 pressure, that wouldn't matter from which part of the 8 containment and so forth and so on they would be meeting 9 your requirements?
10 MR. MAZETIS: They are post-implementation review.
ii MR. OKRENT: What is post-implementation review?
12 MR. MAZETIS: Post-implementation means operating 13 reactors. It was decided that af ter the review of the 14 emergency technical guidelines that there was enough is improvement in these strategies compared with the previous 16 procedures that operating reactors can go ahead and 17 implement and we would review post-implementation.
18 Applicants, applications and near-term operating 19 licenses, we try to get the reviews completed prior to 20 ope rating of the plant. But for operating licenses we 21 allowed implementation of the approved generic technical
^
22 guidelines. So in answer to your questions, yes, they 23 could have implemented two times design.
24 MR. OKRENT: Well, I will offer a personal comment 25 and not a committee comment.
O
. . - . . -~- .- _ . . _ . . __ - _.
80 m)
(, 1 In the first place, I am a little surprised that :
2 the staf f didn't ask for a written committee comment on 3 this particular generic approval. It is not a small step.
4 I will just leave it at that for the moment because I am 5 going to recommend that the committee in fact examine the
- 6 problem quite broadly to see just what is being done and so 7 forth. This is aside from what we talk about at River 8 Bend.
1 9 I thought that we had been assured that before 10 containment venting was approved there would be such a
- 11 review, and maybe there was a misunderstanding in what 12 people thought when they came in.
i 13 But in any event, let's see what other questions 14 members may have of the staff on this.
15 (No response.)
16 Okay. I guess we can - hear f rom the applicant what 17 his current proposal or concept or whatever is the right f 18 noun is regarding containment venting for beyond design i
1 19 basis scenarios.
20 MR. REED: Dr. Okrent, would you like to go over i
21 that now? It is scheduled a little bit later in the 4
l 22 ag enda.
I~
23 MR. OKRENT: We might as well. I saw it'was later 24 on the agenda, but why we pick it up while we are thinking 25 about it.
O l
i
.= - --
.-. ... -- . _ = . . . _ - . - _ _ = _ _ .
81
() 1 MR. REED: Okay. At this time, Mr. Don Reynerson, 2 who is the Director of our Nuclear Plant Engineering will 3 give that presentation.
4 Briefly, Mr. Reynerson has masters's degrees in
, 5 electrical engineering from North Carolina State and in. i 6 mechanical engineering from MIT and an advanced degree in t 7 naval architecture from MIT with over 16 years experience, a and he has been with us at River RBend for the last year.
9 So, Don, if you would proceed on that.
i 10 MR. REYNERSON: As the staff just reported, and I i
it will. expound on that just a little bit. River Bend 12 currently has a procedure in place and under review with I
! 13 the staff in area of containment venting.
! 14 Our commitment is to have this particular is Procedure reviewed and all questions resolved with the NRC 16 staff prior to exceeding five percent power.
17 (Slide.)
is There is one topic I would like to cover very l 19 quickly, which is actually without a sequence, and that l 20 topic is the responsibility for venting.
21 The responsibility for venting the containment 22 lies with Gulf States Utilities. Our emergency operating 23 procedure requires that the operating prior to venting the 24 containment seek ' permission from the Emergency Director, 25 and the Emergency is the Plant Manager who in this O
t
82 p)
L, I particular venting scenario will be on site.
2 The Emergency Director is in continuous 3 communication with our Recovery Manager, and the Recovery 4 Manager currently assigned is Mr. Lou Cahill or Mr. Jim 5 Deddens, who will be in our emergency operating facility.
6 We anticipate that most events would transpire 7 over a time frame which would permit consultation between 8 the Emergency Director, the Plant Manager located very near 9 the control room, as a matter of fact, adjacent to the 10 control room, and our Recovery Manager, and the titles are il not as important as the areas of responsibility. This 12 would be done with input on it from local and federal 13 officials. The responsibility though will lie with Gulf O 14 State Utilities.
15 Slide.)
16 Now since this procedure is still evolving, :: will 17 develop a very rudimentary schematic of the venting pa ths.
18 Now we have selected two paths, and we have 19 selected two containment pressures at which to initiatn 20 venting.
21 The initial path for venting selected is through ,
I l 22 the hydrogen purge system, through the standby gas l l
23 treatment system, which is a filtered vent path, and that :
24 particular pressure which we selected is 20 pounds gauge in '
l 25 the containment.
I
( .
i
t 83 b)
(_/ 1 The containment design pressure is 15 pounds, and .
2 our best analysis to date of containment rupture pressure l I
3 is 53 pounds. Our initial path will be through the i
4 hydrogen purge system, which is a three-inch line at about !
5 2500 SCFM. ,
t 6 Our procedure requires that the Emergency Director i 7 consider venting at 45 pounds pressure, three times f a des ign. The vent path we selected at 45 pounds is via the 9 containment purge system. We have verified that our valves j 10 will open at that pressure. We have done an analysis of j j
li the stresses on the components in the valves and that ;
t 12 verification is complete. Forty-five pounds will vent the 13 containment into the auxiliary building's normal 14 ventilation system. >
15 Prior to 45 pounds, at 30 as our procedure is ;
16 currently written, we will remove, physically remove a vent !
17 plug at the top of the auxiliary building. That will give !
l 18 us an alternative path which may or may not be needed, our f 19 analysis is continuing, in case we have a rupture of the 20 duct work in the aux building. .
21 Again let me emphasize that the Emergency j 22 Director, the person who makes this decision on site, would ,
23 be making the decision in direct communication with the j 24 Recovery Manager who has communication with all the state !
- 25 and local and federal of ficials.
I !
i I 84 r !
L 1 MR. OKRENT: What does it take to remove that roof 2 plug?
3 MR. REYNERSON: The roof plug has " pat" eyes on i 4 the surface, and the roof plug will be removed with a chain 5 fall and swing arm arrangement at the top of the aux 6 building.
7 MR. EBERSOLE: Let me ask a question. In other k
8 words, you contemplate that you may discharga vapor, air, 9 et cetera into the aux building because you have lost some 10 cooling function and you are at high pressure?
11 MR. REYNERSON: Yes, sir. Our analysis and limited 12 testing that we have done indicates that if we reached 45 '
! 13 pounds pressure, again leaving us some margin for i
O 14 containment failure as you have to rely on the ability of 15 the containment failure analysis to give you a reasonably i 16 accurate number, our analysis tell us that this duct work i
17 would probably fail if we made it 45 pounds.
18 MR. EBERSOLE: What I see here is you have 3
19 accommodated the hypothesis of mechanical failure of the 20 building by taking the plug out.
21 MR. REYNERSON: Yes, sir.
l I
22 MR. EBERSOLE: But, on the other hand, you have 23 introduced an atmosphere, a hostile atmosphere into the i
24 auxiliary building which permanently defeats any hope of 25 recovery of equipment because of condensation on electrical O
85 r\
( ,) I apparatus, high temperature and so forth, and you have 2 locked yourself into a one-way path from which you can't 3 escape. You have destroyed the guts of the aux building by 4 permitting the egress or ingress of this vapor, air, et 5 cetera mix into the aux building. It would appear that you 6 should block a path to the aux building expressly not to do 7 that.
8 We have constrained ourselves in this particular 9 procedure to using existing equipments. We evaluated other 10 alternative paths in the reactor building and we found that 11 those particular paths would not accommodate at that 12 pressure an adequate flow volume to vent the containment 13 properly.
14 MR. EBERSOLE: What is the operative condition of ,
is equipment inside the aux building af ter you invoke this i 16 condition? .
17 MR. REYNERSON: This scenario was based on a scram is with all power sources available, ECCS is still available 19 to maintain cooling water to the core and the condition of 20 that equipment in the aux building is that it would be 21 operable. And we have done no additional analysis to 22 determine failure of equipments in the aux building at this I
23 time.
24 MR. EBERSOLE: Well, you had better look at 25 surface condensation on exposed electrical apparatus, the
4 i
86 I
i 1 ambient temperature rising above that which is allowed for f
- 2 and environmental conditions and a whole host of .other 3 things which I think you would rather not face.
4 MR. REYNERSON: Again, this accident scenario, the
- 5 time line is around 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />. Our analysis using a three-1 6 inch purge at 20 pounds and admitting at 45 pounds extends 7 up to 30 hou rs .
8 Now we have the option in the path that we 9 selected, the three-inch purge line, to extend that time an
.i 10 additional five hours.. So this scenario is not a rapidly '
11 evolving scenario. We feel that we would be able to t
i 12 restore RHR systems within that period of time.
13 MR. EBERSOLE: How are you going to do that when [
s O 14 they have all been wet down by condensate condensed off on [
15 the surfaces of the apparatus in the electrical network? ]
16 MR. REYNERSON: Again, the venting itself would not ;
l 17 occur until approximately 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> after the initiation of l
~ T 18 the accident. j 19 MR. EBERSOLE: Yes.
I 20 MR. REYNERSON: And there is a possibility that j 21 some other parallel scenario would have caused degradation ,
i j 22 of equipment in the aux building. ;
~
23 MR. EBERSOLE: No. What I am saying is your l, l 24 ingress of this vapor mixture is going to guarantee it. ;
> 25 MR. REYNERSON: At the point of 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />, yes, sir. l
?
f l
= .. . __ .- - . _ _ . - _ _ = . -
87
) 1 MR. EBERSOLE: And so you are on a one-way path 2 with no recourse for recovery.
3 MR. REYNERSON: Well, you would lost that 4 equipment, yes, sir, you would.
5 MR. BOOKER: Mr. Ebersole, what we had to do here 6 is look at a means of venting the containment in the event 7 We get in this beyond the design basis accident for the a existing plant that is designed here.
9 MR. EBERSOLE: Yes, I understand.
10 MR. BOOKER: This is the vent path that we were 11 able to determine that we could vent the containment to 12 keep it from rupturing further.
13 MR. EBERSOLE: Rig ht . But what you have done in 14 the course of doing this is permit any equipment which is might survive or help you out later has now been disabled.
16 MR. BOOKER: That is correct, yes, sir.
17 MR. EBERSOLE: And that strikes me as imprudent.
18 MR. OKRENT: Can I understand something. In all 19 of the scenario that you have been discussing now, the core 20 has not suffered damage? It is just that you have been 21 unable to remove heat from the suppression pool, or do you 22 also include scenarios in which the core has been even 23 melted?
24 MR. REYNERSON: This scenario does not address a 25 degraded core.
13 U
i 88 sy Ls,) 1 MR. OKRENT: So the core has been successfully 2 cooled in this scenario?
3 MR. REYNERSON: And we have water available to the d Core.
5 MR. OKRENT: Okay. That wasn't clear in the 6 beginning of your presentation, and I just wanted to make 7 sure it was not ambiguous.
8 MR. REYNERSON: We selected this scenario because 9 it is in accordance with the mini-PRA conducted at River i 10 Bend. It was the most likely accident scenario in which 11 the containment would be come overpressurized.
12 MR. EBERSOLE: Couldn't you install a damper to
-~ 13 preclude that backflow to the aux building?
14 MR. REYNERSON: Install a damper where, in here?
15 MR. EBERSOLE: Anywhere to keep it from going into 16 the aux building.
17 MR. BOOKER: Mr. Ebersole, we have looked at i
18 containment venting paths to see if we could accommodate 19 and make some design changes, and they would be significant 20 changes to this plant.
21 MR. EBERSOLE: I might point out there is a 22 standing, generalized problem of allowing ingress of vapor 23 into the aux building already from other sources than this 24 degraded state, you know, like pipe breaks which you fail ,
25 to close and so forth, and this is just an extraordinary i
1 1
I l
- - - ,. r - . . . - - - , , - , - ,
89
) version of the sane thing.
1 2 It may be that you will be required sooner or 3 later to examine whether you need vapor proof apparatus in 4 the aux building for other reasons, in which case you might 5 survive.
6 I can see this would produce an enormous 7 overheating transient in the aux building, and in essence a just lock out all dynamic functions that you might 9 subsequently want to have to save your plant.
10 MR. REYNERSON: We recognize that as a possibility, j 11 yes, sir.
12 MR. EBERSOLE: It hardly does you any good. You 4
i3 are going to go to hell now for sure, because you have lost
> 14 whatever residual functions you had before you killed them 15 with vapo r.
16 MR. REYNERSON: Yes, sir. At this point in the 17 scenario the probability of losing equipments in the aux 16 building would be high.
19 MR. EBERSOLE: Now you are on a path to core melt 20 for sure.
I 21 MR. REYNERSON: In this particular scenario we 22 still have cooling water to the core.
23 MR. EBERSOLE: Oh, yes, but you just destroyed it 24 by firing vapor into the aux building where all the 25 equipment is located.
!O
1 l
1 90 p)
L, 1 MR. REYNERSON: Yes, sir, in this case ---
]
2 MR. EBERSOLE: It is regressive.
i 3 MR. OKRENT: Do we have any staff comments on Mr.
4 Ebersole's point?
5 MR. ELTAWILA: My name is Farouk Eltawila from the 6 Containment Systems Branch. Don't forget that at this 7 pressure you are headed for reaching the ultimate capacity 8 of the containment. So you have the choice between two 9 things, of either damaging some equipment in the auxiliary 10 building or failing the containment and have uncontrolled I
11 release.
12 MR. OKRENT: Of what? Uncontrolled release of 13 what?
4
' ' 14 MR. ELTAWILA: Of whatever is in the containment.
15 It can be steam and it can be radionuclides. That is not 16 distinguished between the,two.
17 MR. EBERSOLE: But you don't have to discharge 18 this vapor into the critical machinery rooms. You just did 19 it because it was cheap.
20 MR. ELTAWILA: I think the guideline of the 21 emergency procedure guideline, that you establish the 22 guideline based on what you have in the plant right now 23 without going into any ---
24 MR. EBERSOLE: To hell with that.
- 25 MR OKRENT
- I would like to understand something l
91 -
l
() i based on a comment you made. Does the staff letter, 83-05, 2 cover venting for when the core has melted?
3 MR. ELTAWILA: Yes, sir.
4 MR. OKRENT: So although the applicant is now i 5 talking only about venting before the core has melted, the i
6 staff's guideline is talking about both.
7 MR. ELTAWILA: Correct.
?
8 MR. OKRENT: And, furthermore, it doesn't provide 9 guidance beyond twice the design pressure.
l 10 MR. ELTAWILA: We are working with the licensee on i
11 . guidelines to find the best approach to maintaining 12 containment integrity, and that was the whole purpose of 13 the procedure.
14 MR. OKRENT: Well, I must say the problem becomes I
15 more interesting the more we talk about it.
16 MR. EBERSOLE: Did this procedure or this approach f
17 have the blessing of the General Electric Company?
18 MR. REYNERSON: I can't answer that for sure.
l 19 MR. EBERSOLE: Well, have they been asked?
20 MR. MAZETIS: Once again, in 1981-82 in the 21 Publishing of our safety evaluation was the result of a 22 raview of a General Electric Owners Group interfacing with 23 General Electric on these technical guidelines, these i
24 generic technical guidelines.
25 So, yes, the answer is that GE and the owners O
92 f'
L 1 collegially submitted this as well as a variety of other 2 strategies that were suggested for beyond contingencies or 3 beyond design basis accident scenarios.
4 MR. EBERSOLE: I can't believe that a system which 5 is regressive to the point of causing a core melt while you 6 are trying to protect the containment is anything other 7 than more damaging than otherwise.
8 MR. MAZETIS: Well, the premise at the time of the 9 guidelines was that for plants that have a capability to 10 vent and the plants that would be plant specific, what 11 lines would be available, how large the lines would be and 12 so forth, that they should look at these lines and evaluate 13 as-built components as to whether they could adopt the two-
-" 14 times design venting pressure or pressure limit.
15 MR. EBERSOLE: And they didn 't restrain the
.6 Venting process not to traverse Critical areas like, for 17 instance, I will say the control room. If you vented into l
18 that, that would produce some interesting results, wouldn't f 19 it? It would be a little faster than equipment 20 degradation, but ---
l 21 MR. REYNERSON: Our procedure was written in 22 accordance with the guidelines, and the procedure is 23 written on the premise that the containment will be 24 breached if the containment is not vented.
25 MR. EBERSOLE: Sure.
O
93 .
( ) MR. REYNERSON: We constrained ourselves to 2 existing systems in the plant as-built.
3 MR. EBERSOLE: That is the killing part right 4 there.
5 MR. REYNERSON: And we also recognize that most of
?
i 6 the venting scenarios would permit us with a very high 7 probability of restoring Containment Cooling prior to a having to initiate.
9 MR. EBERSOLE: Well, beyond a shadow of a doubt to that one will not, and I would ---
11 MR. BOOKER: We are talking about 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> here 12 when we get into that situation.
13 MR. EBERSOLE: Well, yes, but what you are doing 14 is you are going to kill your apparatus in the aux building is by venting into it I think.
16 MR.. BOOKER: There is a possibility that you ---
17 MR. EBERSOLE: And then if you haven't . had a core 1
18 melt, now you are assured of getting one, and that is a
- 19 costly process.
20 MR. OKRENT: Well, it looks like we are starting 21 to repeat ourselves.
22 Do you have addith;Asl information at this time?
23 MR. REYNERSO':1 33 ir, I don't. !
24 MR. OKRENT: Furthet questions?'
l l
! 25 MR. ~ MARK : Just a small one. You said your I
94 1 Emergency Director would have the responsibility. You also said he would be in touch with everybody and his brother I 2
3 outside.
4 MR. REYNERSON: Through our Recovery Manager.
5 MR MARK: Can he say I am going to do it period 6 and get off the phone while I do it, or does he expect that 7 the office in Washington will say oh, no, don't, don't. I 8 have got to speak to Congressman so and so.
9 MR. REYNE RSON: I don't think that the emergency 10 director is anticipating any outside non-GSU influence that 11 is not going to be technically responsible, and I know that 12 is a generality. He is not anticipating that. He will be 13 in contact with the Recovery Manger, and through 14 ' discussions with the Recovery Manager a decision to vent 15 will be made by the Emergency Director.
16 MR. MAZETIS: The role of the Emergency Director 17 is one of the areas that we are continuing discussions with is the licensee on.
19 I don't think the staff has a particular problem 20 with the procedure indicating that the operator is to get i 21 the okay from the Emergency Director.
22 I think at this point that one of our problems is 23 that perhaps better criteria or more definitive criteria is 24 needed for the Emergency Director as to what exactly he has 25 to do before saying no or yes to venting, because right now O
V i
l
95
() i the proposal, as we see it, it kind of leaves it vague. So 2 this is one of the areas that we have a concern with.
3 MR. MARK: I didn't have so much concern. I was 4 just wondering if the situation was clear. I can't picture 5 you guys taking the responsibility for saying either yes or 6 no.
7 MR. MAZETIS: Of course I remind the committee a that built into the regulations, and I think it is 50.54, 9 is it is always a utility's responsibility during an ic emergency that he has the flexibility during an emergency, 11 to depart from tech specs or licensed conditions, or in 12 this case emergency procedure, if it is in the public la health and interest, as I recall the words that are in the s)
- 14 regulation.
is so I think for all licensees there is that 16 stipulation and flexibility to run his plant during an 17 emergency and depart from licensed conditions.
18 MR. OKRENT: But if he does something wrong, there 19 will be an aftermath.
20 MR EBERSOLE: Are there any other venting plants, 21 such as Limerick or whoever, Grand Gulf, that have 22 regressive aspects of venting in the context of destroying 23 equipment functions like this? Am I looking at the only 24 one? You know, I like to think of venting as going to 25 atmosphere period and not killing your equipment on the O
96 O
V 1 way.
2 MR. MAZETIS: The one that comes to mind that we 3 have reviewed is the one I mentioned earlier, which is 4 Limerick, and our recollection is that they went directly 5 to atmosphere bypassing the building.
6 MR. EBERSOLE: Sure.
7 MR. OKRENT: Now the original Limerick concept was 8 one in which they would vent as a way of relieving pressure 9 prior to core melt if that was the way in effect they got 10 evaporative cooling, if you will. There was some source of 11 water for getting the core covered, but the RHR couldn't 12 take the heat out of the suppression pool. And at least in 13 the original concept they said this was not something that Ox"' 14 they were going to do given a core melt.
15 I must confess by now I don't recall what they 16 were proposing at the time the committee reviewed Limerick 17 last . In fact, I don't ---
18 MR. MAZETIS: My recollection is they are 19 proposing was to vent at one point three times design.
20 MR. OKRENT: That is different. It is pre or post 21 core melt or both?
12 MR. ROSENTHAL: My name is Jack Rosenthal, and I 23 am in the Reactor Systems Branch, DSI.
24 At the time that the original procedures were 25 developed, the sequence of concern was one in which you
97 i could project heat from the primary system to containment, 2 but you couldn't extract the heat from containment. That 3 is the sequence this gentleman is speaking about. It was 4 called the TW sequence in RSS and it was shown to be a 5 dominant sequence.
6 Subsequent to that in the course of discussions 7 with the BWR Owners Group on guidelines, and in discussion a with Limerick in particular, we asked them to consider a 9 full spectrum of core melt events or beyond design basis 10 events, including transients, ATWS, LOCA as well as the TW 11 in deriving their venting procedures.
12 As a result of that work, and Limerick did some l 13 work, at Limerick they changed the -- at one time they had 14 a concept of drywell and wetwell venting, and they went to is a wetwell venting priority concept because of the concern 16 over post-core melt venting in which you have the fission 17 product release.
is so it was surely at least a consideration at 19 Limerick.
20 MR. OKRENT: Well, as I said, I could remember the 21 original proposal quite well. I wasn't sure in what form l
22 it eventually was fashioned, and I must confess I don't l
- 23 remember whether it was fashioned before the last time the
{ 24 full committed reported on Limerick. I will have to go 25 back and refresh myself.
O l
98 1 MR. ROSENTHAL: At the time of the Limerick 2 licensing, the procedures had been revised to wetwell 3 venting. It was a priority given to which valves you d opened in which sequence, and it was for a full 5 consideration of various ways of reaching a severe 6 accident.
7 MR. EBERSOLE: We have learned that Limerick used 8 venting to open atmosphere and not through critical 9 equipment areas. What about Grand Gulf, has it got a 10 venting plan that resembles this by any chance? Does 13 anybody know?
12 MR. ELTAWILA: Grand Gulf did not have a venting 13 procedure at that time.
14 MR. EBERSOLE: Are there any other of these BWR's 15 that have venting systems that approximate this design, you 16 know, that have regressiv9 effects?
17 MR. ELTAWILA: I am not aware of it.
18 MR. BUTLENR: My name is Walt Butler. As indicated 19 earlier, we don't have an inventory of how other boilers 20 stack up at this time because it is a post-implementation 21 review.
22 MR. EBERSOLE: Okay.
23 MR. BUTLER: But with respect to your concern on 24 the regressive nature, I don't believe it is a direct cause 25 and effect situation. When you vent, and of course we have O
99 0 I to review the procedures, but the concept here is to vent 2 and lower the pressure, but then stop venting once the 3 pressure comes to a reasonable value.
4 We have not done a thermodynamic analysis of the 5 aux building, but I believe with a limited amount of steam 6 and air into the aux building, which then is terminated, I 7 don't think you will by definition failure essential 8 equipment in the aux building. But, of course, such 9 analysis should be done before we complete this kind of to activity.
11 MR. EBERSOLE: Yes, agreed. I am confident you 12 won't do it.
13 MR. REYNERSON: Yes, sir.
14 Are there any other questions?
15 MR. OKRENT: I have a question, just a timing 16 question. When did you complete this action on the 17 Limerick procedure, do you recall?
18 MR. ELTAWILA: Prior to full-power license.
19 MR. OKRENT: Yes, but when would that have been?
20 MR. ELTAWILA: The SER was published in October 1
21 '84.
22 MR. OKRENT: And you would have completed it by i
23 then?
i 24 MR. ELTAWILA: That is correct, yes.
25 MR. OKRENT: Well, because sometimes SER's -- this O
100 !
0 rd I is always an SER after an ACRS letter. Okay, let it go for 2 now.
3 MR. EBERSOLE: One related matter, Dave. There-is d supposed to be in place already what you call a 5 thermodynamic analysis which looks at transient evolution 6 of steam into the aux building as a result of pipe breaks, 7 which is then stopped by proper closing of Valves and on ,
8 schedule.
j 9 MR. BOOKER: Mr. Ebersole?
] 10 MR. EBERSOLE: Yes. l 13 MR. BOOKER: In fact, we do look at it for 12 equipment qualifications inside the aux building in case we have line break ---
O 13 i
l 14 MR. EBERSOLE: This is a gross case of the same 15 problem, isn't?
16 MR. BOdKER: Well, our equipment is qualified for
- 17 that event you are speaking of.
18 MR. OKRENT: Okay. I think we had better move I 19 along or the night will get later than scheduled.
I 20 I guess hydrogen control is the next issue. Maybe 21 that will be simpler than this.
22 MR. STERN: I have to pleasure to introduce Wayne
! 23 Houston, who is the Assistant Director for Reactor Safety 24 at NRR. ,
25 Dr. Houston.
. O j
i 101 1 MR. BOUSTON: I will begin the staff discussion on 2 the subject of hydrogen control. The meeting agenda calls 3 for the first item of discussion of the NRC generic 4 position on the implementation the hydrogen control rule 5 and the application of that position at River Bend, and I 6 have three viewgraphs here to address that particular
- 7 question.
8 (Slide.)
9 I would like to start by observing that the NRC 10 generic position on the implementation is at least to some 11 extent expressed explicitly in the rule itself, and you 12 will see on the first slide the sort of highlights of the 13 key features of the implementation aspects of the rule O 14 which was published in the January of this year and became is effective on February 25th.
16 It calls for a proposed schedule from applicants 17 and licensees for meeting the rule to be submitted to the 18 NRC by June 25th. I think all affected licensees or 19 applicants have done that. The staff response is supposed 20 to be done within 90 days, which is coming up very close 21 now on September 23rd.
22 It calls for in particular a provision which was
- 23 placed into the implementation section of the rule in order 24 to create a certain equity as well as a certain logic with 25 respect to providing a hydrogen control feature, a system, l
l _ _ . . , _ _ -_ _. _ _ _ _ . . _
. _ _ _ _ . . . _ . _ _ . _ _ __ .= . . . _ . - . .
102 1 within these plants before the exceed five percent power.
- 2 That particular feature calls for compliance with 3 the identified paragraph there, C-(3)(4)(a) of 50.44(c) 4 which calls for having provided in the plant a hydrogen
! 5 control system, which in the case of the River Bend and the 1
6 other Mark III utilities is a system of igniters.
4 7 It calls for a suitable program of experiment and
. 8 analysis to be in place, and the purpose of the hydrogen 9 control system is to demonstrate that containment integrity 10 can be maintained for what I note in a letter from the ACRS '
11 put in quotation marks as sort of a design basis situation .
12 for this particular rule. ,
O Another implementation feature is the submittal of 14 a preliminary analysis to support interim operation at full 15 power. It also calls for a final analysis to which would 16 then be added the Complete resolution of all the issues, 17 which would included the survivability of the hydrogen burn
[ 18 of equipment which is necessary to attain and maintain safe
! 19 shutdown and to assure the integrity of the containment.
l 20 Now as far as the application of these features to i 21 River Bend, they have submitted a proposed schedule for 22 meeting the rule. They have installed or will have 23 installed before exceeding five percent power their 24 hydrogen control system and their igniter system, which 25 will be described to you a little bit later.
O
._.. _ ._ _ ~ . _ . _ _ . .. _ _ _ _ ._ _._. _ _ _ . _ -. _ . _ _ _ _ _ .. _ . _ _ ._ -
103 i They have in place a suitable program of 2 experiment and analysis, the character of which is the 3 hydrogen control owners program, which Gulf States 4 Utilities is one of the four member utilities.
5 They have provided a preliminary analysis, the 6 nature of which and the staff evaluation of which is 7 described in the SSER No. 4, I believe it is, of which you a have been provided a draft and the final version will be 9 out very shortly.
10 A key feature of this does have to do with the 11 program of experiment and analysis. As you will recall in 12 the statement of recalling the history of the original of 13 the rules stemming of course originally from the character 14 of the Three Mile Island accident, although in an entirely 15 different type of reactor facility, the hydrogen control 16 rule has been made appliC4ble, not only to the ice 17 condenser PWR's, but the Mark III owners who, for a variety is of reasons, believe they are unable apparently or it is 19 infeasible to inert these ContainmentD, although they have 2a examined I think that possibility.
21 The hydrogen control owners program was 22 established quite a number of years ago, and I believe it 23 was about 1981. It has been in existence for a number of 24 years in anticipation of the publication and the approval 25 by the Commission of a regulation which would require O
I 104 g i L_sl I certain demonstrations and findings on the part of the !
2 applicants and licensees in order to deal with moderately 3 serious hydrogen generating events.
4 The particular rule goes part way into the beyond 5 design basis accident space and not into what we now call 6 severe accident space. It is sometimes referred to as a 7 degraded core rule, and one of the features of it is the a intent and the philosophy behind it is that one is dealing 9 with an accident situation in which, although substantial 10 quantities of hydrogen may be generated, the core is 11 recovered and does not proceed to core melt.
12 The hydrogen control owners group has established
- 13 a quite extensive program to deal with the many, many i
14 issues and technical questions that have arisen during the I
15 course of their analysis, their findings and during the 16 course of research that has been carried on in a number of 17 different places.
l 18 Back in the fall of 1984, recognizing that it was 19 necessary to bring some coherence into their efforts to 20 resolve the problems associated with what was still then 21 the perspective rule, the owners group formulated what was 22 really a revised program plan and one which went to 23 completion with respect to the identification of a number ,
l 24 of tasks and a number of subtasks which needed to be 25 performed.
r l (~)
(_
l l
105 1 I have two slide here which really identify by I
2 their title the essential nature of the tasks and a little 3 bit of indication of their status, whether they have been 4 completed at this or when the owners group contemplates 5 completing these particular tasks.
6 (Slide.)
- 7 Although there are 14 of them here, I haven't 8 counted the subtasks that are identified under them. I i 9 dare say there are about 10 times as many subtasks. So it
! 10 is a rather complex undertaking.
11 One of the features of particular interest and 12 concern to the staff of the program plan is the extensive 13 interaction with the staff during the execution of the lO 14 program.
Unlike many other things that the staff reviews, 15
- s i
16 an applicants proposes something and comes in with an FSAR i
17 or a vendor may come in with a topical report, and there is may have been relatively little interaction with the staff 19 prior to the formal submittal of the information that comes 20 in for review.
21 In this particular case, the interaction with the 22 staff is fairly extensive and continuing, and this the 23 staff finds acceptable. We devote as much as we can afford 24 in the way of resources to undertake reviews of particular 25 technical subject areas and concerns that arise during the
~-
106 1 course of the program.
2 The first one, I might say, here, establishing the 3 most probably hydrogen generation event, is to my way of 4 thinking perhaps of historical significance now than 5 anything else. I am inclined to note in this connection, 6 however, that the basic purpose it appears of the owners 7 with respect to this particular task was to demonstrate 8 their belief that it was not really credible in a BWR-6 to 9 achieve a hydrogenerating event that went to the extent of i 10 producing the amount of hydrogen required by the 75 percent i
! 11 equivalent metal water reaction. As I read it, that seemed j 12 to be the intent of that.
j 13 The question of credibility is sort of relevant 14 becauue the rule requires it, and they recognize this.
- 15 We have come to essential agreement and consensus, 1
16 if you will, on the fact that it is most probably in one of 17 these facilities if Core uncoVery occurs, that they are 18 most likely to recover at least one full ECCS flow pump, 19 and if the core has been uncovered for some period of time,
!l I 20 they will generate some hydrogen that will create a 21 hydiogen spike, and this is one of the hydrogen generation 4
22 release scenarios that is still not only under i
j 23 consideration, but being actively pursued in the process of 24 demonstrating the efficacy of the igniter system. Howeve r, l
i 25 that in and of itiself does not fully satisfy the
)
O
107 i requirements of the rule.
2 In task two they have selected a mitigation system 3 which, as I have indicated is an igniter system. They did 4 an analysis of other possibilities and discarded them. And 5 at at least on an interim basis as originally identified in 6 the SER for the Grand Gulf case, this was acceptable to the l
7 staff and that situation is now changed today.
i e On task three they carried out design of the 9 ignition system, and this is essentially Completed. They 10 incorporated in this task initially to plan to develop some 11 generic tech specs. Actually time has sort of caught up 12 with them in this particular case since we have been
- ia through the process of reviewing and approving proposed 14 tech specs for these systems, not only originally for Grand i5 Gulf, but now in River Bend and we have also done the same i
16 thing for Perry.
17 Task four is a completed task in which all of the
- 18 utility members have demonstrated to the satisfaection of 19 the staff that they have adequately calculated the ultimate 20 capacity of their containment systems.
21 In task five they have selected a containment 22 response analysis code, which is CLASIX 3, a variation of 23 one which, as I understand, was initially developed for an 24 ice condenser plant, particularly a barge mounted plant.
25 While we have some staff concerns about that
-- ,-,,--,,w-..- . . - - - ~ , - ..__.g..,,,,_ . _. - , - . ,. -_,-.._. ,,- -_._ , ,,,,ym, . . . _ . - ,., . .n _-.. _. , , . - - , , , - - . . . - , - - - - , - -
108 1 particular code, I think it is probably fair to say that it 2 is probably no better or not worse than the others that are 3 available to us.
4 There will be a little bit more description of 5 that code a little bit later.
6 with respect to task six, hydrogen combuntion 7 testing, which is virtually complete, basically this task 8 reflects the owners group's efforts to make sure that they 9 have encompassed essentially the full range of research 10 information that has been generated, not only by some parts 11 of their own program in some early 20th scale tests of 12 diffusion flame burning, some 5th scale tests with a single gs 13 sparger, but also test work that has been done by some NRC
\ "]
14 contractor personnel and tests actually throughout the 15 world.
16 So basically that was a task, the scope of which 17 was to encompass what is know about hydrogen burning i
18 phenomena that would be applicable to their situation.
19 Task seven, generation of hydrogen release i 20 histories. You will notice that that is indicated as an l 21 almost completed task. This is one which has been of 22 perhaps most interest and about which the staff has had 23 significant concerns over the past several months, but it 24 probably has an older history than that.
25 The owners group has elected to use a code called
(~7 V
109 i the BWR HEATUP code. The staff has not reviewed the code 1
- 2 in detail. It has been given an opportunity to understand 3 the essential features of it, and we have had in process I 4 for some time a comparison between calculations done by the i
5 BWR HEATUP code with those that have been sponsored by the 6 staff and conducted with the MARCH code.
- 7 It might be of interest to note in this connection '
i a that at least in a couple of scenarios there is reasonable ,
9 agreement between predictions of hydrogen generation ratss between the two codes when they are run in such a
) 10 ;
j 11 comparable way with comparable initial conditions and so
- 12 forth, that is a comparable scenario. l i
13 This is particularly the case for an unmitigated !
j O 14 event in which the core becomes uncovered and water is i is never restored. One gets a gradual buildup of hydrogen
- 16 generation, it peaks and decays as it becospes steam starved [
!, 17 and there is no further steam available to carry out the !
l 1a zirconium oxidation reaction. ;
i j 19 (Slide.)
20 Task eight deals with containment response f
l 21 analysis, and you will note that this has a completion date j
{
i 22 which is still pretty well into the future. The staff f i
23 still has a number of concerns about methodologies and j i
! 24 about certain assumptions, parameter utilization and the }
l i i 25 use of the CLASIX code to treat matters of deflagration !
!O i
l 5
I
. _ _ . . . , _ - . _ _ . . _ _ . _ . _ . , _ . , . . . _ _ _ . . _ . _ _ _ _ , - . _ _ _ _ _ _ , . . _ , _ , _ _ . , . _ _ , . , _ . _ . _ . . - - . . . _ , _ . _ _ _ _ __ I
110 4
1 burning. There are also questions that are tied up in this
- 2 particular task with regard to the phenomena of diffusion 3 burning and diffusion flames, which are basically the 4
4 subject to the next task which appears on the next slide.
- 5 (slide.) ,
)
6 With, I think it is fair to say, although my ;
i 7 institutional memory is not perfect, what I would call some 8 encouragement on the part of the staff, the owners group 9 did elect some time ago to have constructed a quarter scale 10 test facility and to carry out a set of tests or 11 experiments that initially was primarily aimed at a better 12 understanding of the phenomena of diffusion flames as might 13 occur in a facility which was constructed to mimmick in 14 large measure the full-scale facilities to which the 15 results would apply.
16 This test program is underway now. The facility 17 was completed some time ago. A set of so-called scoping i i 18 tests have, to the best of my knowledge, been largely 1
l 19 completed and we are not in the process of trying to i 20 understand and reach agreement between the staff and the
! 21 owners group as to the nature and character of what they
- 22 have termed their production test matrix.
i 23 I might just add at this point that at the present 24 time their production test matrix does call for a series of 1
25 tests to be run in this facility which is modified in each O
. .,_,..--,y.,-- - ---r-- . , _ . , _ _ _ , , , . . - _ _ . ,,,,____.,-,__-.,,,,,__.-,-..,,,_.-,_,____,w__ -
- . . . - , . . - . . _ - , _ . ~ , , , e..__,_%. ,--_,-..,wy,__-.-
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111 i case to represent or to simulate as best as they can in the 2 facility each of the four Mark III containments that they
! 3 represent.
4 Task ten is a special task involved with the 5 evaluation of the drywell response to degraded core 6 accidents. Much of the work, as I understand it, still 7 remains to be done in that particular area. It deals a primarily with a particular accident scenario in which one 9 postulates a loss of coolant accident occurring in the 10 drywell so that one has hydrcgen being directed not only it into the suppression pool, but also directly into the dry 12 well itself. So it represents potentially a different kind ;
13 of a threat to containment than other scenarios in which iO 14 all of the hydrogen is expected to come in through the is suppression pool.
16 Task eleven is the equipment survivcoility 17 analysis program. You will notice that I have indicated t
- la that it is expected to be completed, that is the analysis, 19 by December '86.
20 The word " conditional" I have taken the liberty of i
21 putting in there, and it does appear in effect on some of the submittals that have been received a couple of months f
i 22
~, 23 ago from the utilities.
24 And what that refers to is if the experimental l 25 program and the analysis do not support with sufficient i !
i i
_.._.____._._,,_.,-._.,.___._______,_____...____.j
i 112 l 1 margin a finding that some components or items of vital 2 equipment may not survive a hydrogen burn event, they may 3 have to make modifications in the plant such as adding some d insulation or some special shielding or possibly even in 5 some cases moving some items of equipment to avoid the 6 thermal environment. So there will be a higher degree of 7 assurance of survivability. So there is a conditional 8 possibility of some extension of the program beyond that 9 date.
10 MR. OKRENT: Excuse me. Would you mind 11 summarizing task ten again, what the accident was that in 12 different.
l 13
- MR. HOUSTON: I will, and I will try to say it in i
- ~ "
1 14 a different way this time also.
15 MR. OKRENT: Well, maybe in the same way and I 16 will be more alert.
17 MR. HOUSTON: In the quarter scale test program 18 the facility is a mockup that does not simulate the 19 drywell. What it does is simulate that scenario in which i
20 all of the hydrogen that would be generated actually is 21 released through the spargers in the suppression pool.
I 22 so as a companion to that they have proposed and 23 the staff has accepted a somewhat different scenario which i
24 does represent potentially a different kind of a threat in 25 which some of the hydrogen is directly released into the l C
i 113
_/ i drywell through the postulation of a LOCA type break in a 2 steamline or feedwater line inside the drywell.
3 So that you have hydrogen being introduced there 4 that does not come up through the water in the suppression 5 pool, and that requires a different kind of an approach to 6 an analysis.
7 Does that clarify it?
8 MR. OKRENT: Well, I would have thought that was 9 automatically one of the scenarios.
10 ,- MR. HOUSTON: It is. I mean they proposed it. I 1
t 11 don't know whether it is automatic, but is one of the i 12 scenarios that they have proposed.
15 MR. HOUSTON: I am not sure that I am prepared to 16 answer that question. .
I 17 MR. OKRENT: All right. Let it go.
i 18 MR. HOUSTON: That is part of the problem though.
19 If you examine the tasks that they have, there is a clear 20 recognition I think of it may have been, that is that 2i atmosphere within the drywell may have been substantially 22 depleted of oxygen prior to hydrogen getting into it.
23 So it does, for example, give rise to the 1
24 possibility of inverted diffusion flames in that, and this I
25 is something that they will be exploring.
i l l
- - , - - - . - . . , , , .,c. .--. - , . - . , . , - - . , . - - . - . ,
114 1 The balanced of these tasks I think are pretty 2 auch self-explanatory. They do have one that is devoted to 3 the validation of the analytical methods that they have 4 chosen to use.
5 Task thirteen, combustible gas control emergency 6 procedure guidelines. I might note of some interest here 7 that although for some years the Hydrogen Control Owners 8 Group utilities have attempted to persuade, I might say, 9 the BWR Owners Group subcommittee that deals with emergency 10 procedure guidelines to deal with combustible gas control 11 guidelines that would be specific for their utilities, 'they 12 have not met with much success and they have decided to 13 undertake that task themselves.
h~" 14 They always plan to interact with the other owners l
15 group, and now they will interact directly with the staff 16 on this one.
17 Finally, there is a task that they have identied is that they will look at and examine the data obtained from 19 the Nevada test site tests, and that is expected to be 20 completed also towards the end of this period.
21 In summary I think what I would like to say, 22 getting back to the initiating mechanism here of our 23 generic position regarding implementation of the hydrogen i
24 control rule and its application to River Bend, River Bend j 25 is complying with the rule, with the spirit with which it I
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115 l
- 1 is intended.
2 The staff, and I think all of the utilities i
3 involved recognize that we are dealing with some very
[. 4 complex phenomena. From the staff's point of view, we are {
4
) 5 dealing with the implementation of a rule for which there f t
i 6 is no standard review plan. We don't have a set of l j t 7 criteria. We did not start out with a set of criteria, do :
i a this, do this, do this and it is okay, and we are working j i
l 9 very closely with them. l e
4
{ 10 So our position is that through our mechanisms of it inte: action, the technical issues that arise are planned to j i
12 .be solved. There is a program plan in operation and there l i
13 is considerable periodic interaction between the hydrogen f 14 control owners group and the staff, and we are satisfied [
is that there is a valid technical basis for not coming to l i 16 final conclusions prematurely and at this stage t t
l 17 particularly for the River Bend plant.
l 18 We are satisfied that it is very likely that Gulf f l 19 States Utilities will be able to satisfy the requirements
! 20 of the rule. There is virtually no question in the minds l
21 of the staff at this point with respect to the matter of l i 22 containment integrity. There are questions regarding i
l 23 equipment survivability, and the reason that we can say we 24 are fairly certain they comply with it is because there is 25 a provision in our plan and we - have a mutual understanding O !
f i
i
1 116 1 that if they can't demonstrate survivability without 2 change, they will make the necessary changes to accomplish 3 survivability. ,
4 MR. OKRENT: Are you able now to define what you 5 might call bounding temperature and maybe pressure i
6 conditions in time I suppose, conditions that equipment 7 might be exposed to, or are you not that far along?
d 8 MR. HOUSTON: Well, there of course is some i
}
9 preliminary --
3l '
10 MR. OKRENT: You can always go very high on j ll bounding and that is of no use. ,
12 MR. BOUSTON: Of course.
13 MR. OKRENT: Okay.
" I think some of the information that 14 MR. HOUSTON:
, 15 has come about from preliminary analysis will be shown to i
16 you very shortly. Some of the results from the quarter 17 scale test program the staff has had some opportunity to i is look at, but it still is a number of months down the line .
i i 19 before we will have an opportunity to review their final l 20 report on the results of this scoping tests and even 2' farther on the results of their production tests.
22 I think that rather than trying to answer your l 23 question directly, I think I would rather defer it to the .
! 24 subsequent discussions by the staff that describe the 25 methodology.
l l
l
. - =. .. --- __ - _ - _ _ _ ,___ _ .
117 1 But basically what the HCOG group is trying to set 2 out to do is to demonstrate that the thermal environments 3 produced by hydrogen burn are not likely to be more serious 4 than the environments to which the equipment has already 4 5 been qualified. And to some extent I think they will be 6 suCC,essful and possibly entirely successful. It All 7 depends upon the findings with respect to the diffusion
- 8 flame phenomena as we see it right now.
i 9 MR. MARK: Is there a fairly good consensus on 10 limits on the rate of hydrogen introduction into the 1
11 containment?
12 MR. HOUSTON: Yes and no.
, 13 MR. MARK: That is just what I thought.
14 (Laughter.)
is MR. HOUSTON: The staff has indicated HCOG, 16 basically what it considers would be appropriate for it to 17 demonstrate for the rule. This is a part of the rule in is which what it boils down to is it is a staff judgment on 19 the matter, which is basically that the staff has to 20 approve the scenarios. That is what the rule says.
21 The staff's philosophy in this respect is to treat 22 the situation not specifically in the same way that it 23 classically treats design basis accident situations and I
24 deliberately tries to be very conservative to really bound f 25 things.
'O
i 118 1 What we are striving for here is at least some 2 element of realism and some recognition of the origin of 3 the rule and the nature of the concern, that is it came out 4 of the experience from Three Mile Island.
5 Just to anticipate a possible question, for 6 example, the Three Mile Island experience tells us nothing 7 about station blackout. So it doesn't appear that it 8 follows logically that the intent of this rule is to 9 require applicants to address the question of station 4
10 blackout, except as such. qustions might impinge upon safety 11 considerations associated with the operation of the igniter 12 system. But it not intended to be some sort of a cure-all 13 for a station blackout situation.
14 MR. MARK: Well, there was a time when the staff
. 15 introduced what I felt to be absolutely incredible numbers 16 for the rate at which hydrogen might be generated. If you 17 were getting hydrogen at that rate, you were boiling enough 18 water to keep the reactor cool. So those numbers were 19 pretty high in some statements years ago. And I think the 20 numbers used now are very much in a smaller band, and yet a 21 lot depends upon that number, particularly if you have a 22 cooling rate that isn't the fastest cooling that can be 23 thought of.
24 MR. HOUSTON: That is correct.
25 MR. MARK: Because the temperature will coast off l
l l
119 O
v i if the rate is high and the cooling rate is low and so on, 2 and I think there is a big area that needs to have some 3 agreement on a good basis reached, and I am not prepared to 4
4 provide that basis of course.
5 MR. EBERSOLE: Let me ask a question about the one-6 quarter scale test. In that test do the ignitors have an 7 assigned volumetric space per igniter which they will have 8 in the real containment?
9 NR. HOUSTON: The igniters are distributed.
10 MR. EBERSOLE: Yes, but I didn't ask that.
11 MR. HOUSTON: I understand. I can't answer your !
l 12 question directly, because I don't know the basis on which 13 they simulated them. There are 54 of them.
14 MR. EBERSOLE: Well, see, you may be getting ---
15 MR. HOUSTON: Or maybe 52.
16 MR. EBERSOLE: You may be getting very enhanced !
17 simultaneous ignition in the test, but then you don't in is real life.. [
! 19 MR. HOUSTON: I am not really the best person to .
. 20 answer questions regarding the degree of how they do the I l-21 simulation. !
l !
! 22 MR. EBERSOLE: I am going back to the antique l 1
i 23 problem of a reciprocating engine in airplanes. If you 1
- 24 have got big cylinders, you have got to have lots of l
. L j 25 igniters before you get detonation. !
r
' f l
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t 120 f ~\ MR. SHEPHERD: There may be someone in the Lss/ 1 1
- l 2 audience who can answer this better than I, but I was 3 involved in some of those discussions, and the igniters are 4 scaled in the sense that I believe they reproduce 5 approximately the spacing you find in the actual j
6 containment, and the size of the ignitors is also reduced 7 because if you use the actual ignitors you had in the 1
8 containment, it would you a very substantial thermal input.
9 MR. EBERSOLE: I said though igniters per cubic
]
- 10 volumetric space assigned thereto. Is it the same in the ;
11 test?
l 12 MR. SHEPHERD: I think the number is smaller by 13 about a factor of two.
O 14 MR. EBERSOLE: You know why I am asking this.
4 15 MR. EVANS: I am Bob Evans from Intercon 16 Services. I am Program Manager for the Hydron Control 17 Owners Group. The scaling relationships which have been I
18 used to place the igniters assure that ignition will take i
19 place at roughly the same time in the quarter scale 20 facility on a scaling basis as it would occur in the full-l l
21 scale plants. And on that basis we believe that the 22 igniter spacing is adequate to assure representative 1 r l 23 simulation of the prototype.
- 24 MR. EBERSOLE
- Well, as a matter of interest, do 25 the ignitors in the full-scale case have a much greater O
121 I volume to ignite than they do in the scale model?
2 MR. EVANS: Well, of course, since it is a one-3 quarter linear scale, I guess the answer to your question 4 would probably be yes.
5 MR. EBERSOLE: Like four to one or even greater 6 than that? It is a cubic relationship? What is it?
7 MR. EVANS: Yes, volume is linked to the ---
8 MR. EBERSOLE: So the igniters in the real 9 containment have a much larger volume of combustible gas to 10 ignite than they do in the test?
11 MR. EVANS: But because the Fraud modeling assurs i 12 that the hydrogen concentration field is preserved, you are u going to get ignition at roughly the same time. We have 14 not contended in this program that we can scale adequately is the deflagrations that occur in the facility. The intent 16 of the facility to investigate diffusive combustion 17 phenomenon, and that is appropriate for what we are dealing 18 with.
l 19 MR. EBERSOLE: Is there a phenomenon here where 20 the post ignition compression of the unignited f ragment 21 leads to a detonative concentration?
22 MR. EVANS: No, sir, not in either the Mark III ,
23 containment or in the quarter scale.
24 MR. EBERSOLE: All right. That is what I was 25 after anyway.
l l 1 t
t
122 l
1 L 1 MR. HOUSTON: If I may, I would like to add two j 2 aore comments, one that I had meant to add during the 3 display of the tasks, because I think it may have some 4 interest in the present context. l
! 5 One of the present points of concern and 6 discussion between the owners group and the staff has to do !
7 with the question of in their production test matrix, which 8 sets forth the central character of the tests being run on 9 each of the four facilities, there is a question of the 10 availability of containment sprays.
11 At the present time the staff position is not 12 satisfied that BCOG has shown that it is appropriate for i
13 them to take full credit in those facilities that have 14 containment sprays for those sprays, and we have suggested is that they modify their test program to encompass more tests 16 without the sprays, 17 The second comment that I would like to make is 18 that it has occurred to us in the recent past, because of 19 the complexity of this program and because of the status 20 that it will have I think af ter a few months from now, it 21 might be very desirable and you might want to consider in 22 the ACRS having a special subcommittee meeting to deal and 23 hear a more complete description of the test with hopefully 24 participation by those that are directly involved in the 25 program representing the utilities as well as the staff.
123 i 1 MR. EBERSOLE: May I ask one further question 2 about the inition and tests, the quarter scale. Would it 3 be prudent to conduct a test with the combustible mixture 4 in it and have only one igniter, not lot of them, just one?
5 MR. HOUSTON: They have I know in the recent past 6 done some tests where they blocked out a substantial number 7 of igniters. I haVe no reason to believe they have done it 4
a with just one.
9 You might have some support in sone quarters for to that on the staff side, but we have not yet suggested that.
11 MR. EBERSOLE: I would be, you know, kind of happy 12 to find if I got one I would have detonation.
13 MR. HOUSTON: The indications are, the trends are, 14 as I understand them, are that hydrogen ignition occurs at is lower hydrogen concentrations than had been used, for 16 example, as --- ,
17 MR. EBERSOLE: Yes, if you get them going soon is enough.
19 MR. HOUSTON: Whether you can get down to one or i
20 not, I guess we really don't know.
21 MR. EBERSOLE: Well, wouldn't it be prudent to do 22 a test which minimizes the ignition function and then runs i
23 on up into the design base?
24 MR. HOUSTON: I guess I can't respond to that. I l 1
25 am sorry.
h i
124
?
- 1 At this time, if I may, I would like to turn it 2 over to another member of the staff, Allen Notafrancesco, 3 who is the specific reviewer for the River Bend facility i 4 preliminary analysis, who will give a summary description 5 of the findings in the SSER and some comparisons with some l l
6 other Mark III facilities.
7 MR. NOTAFRANCESCO: My name is Al Natafrancesco.
8 I am a member of the Containment Systems Branch of DSI. I 9 am the principal reviewer for.the River Bend hydrogen 10 ignition system.
II (Slide.)
12 1 am going to summarize the preliminary analisis,
13 or summarize the SER on the River Bend preliminary
14 analysis, and in particular the key points that we is requested the utilities to provide for the preliminary 13 analysis is a description of the igniter design, the peak 17 pressure capability of the containment, the peak l 18 containment pressure resulting from the consequences of
- 19 burning hydrogen and the preliminary equipment 20 survivability analysis.
! 21 (Slide.)
22 As a quick review of the River Bend hydrogen 23 ignition system, here is a cross-section of the River Bend 24 containment. There is a total of 104 igniter assemblies.
25 They are spaced throughout the containment and drywell.
C1
125 1 There are 18 in the drywell, 12 in the wetwell region, and 2 that is below the ACU floor and above the suppression pool, I
3 and there are 54 igniters between the refueling deck and- l 4 the top of the HCU floor, of which 23 of those 54 are i 5 located in enclosures or sub:ompartment rooms, and there l
6 are 20 igniters in the dome.
7 MR. EBERSOLE: Is the rough contribution of those !
! a to say that each igniter gets about the same number of f l
9 cubic feet to do its thing to?
10 MR. NOTAFRANCESCO: There is a design criteria for i 11 periodicity around the annulu's. So there is some thought j 12 behind the strategic locations of the igniters. f
[
13 MR. EBERSOLE: Is it about the same rationale you !
O 14 use for containment pressure testing using the absolute 15 technique, you know, where you are tracking temperatures
,' 16 and that sort of volumetric distribution?
17 MR. NOTAFRANCESCO: There is some thought that is is similar to that, yes. l 19 (Slide.)
2c This is the third plant in which the staff has l l
21 written up a safety evaluation report on a preliminary 22 analysis as required by the degraded core hydrogen rule, j i
23 And to put it in perspective with those other two plants, j t
24 Grand Gulf and Perry, some of the significant features of i 25 River Bend versus, let's say, Grand Gulf, and River Bend O
l
- . __ _ __ -_ _ _--_ o
126 l
~- 1 does have a smaller core, it is free-standing steel versus 4
2 reinforced concrete, ultimate pressure capacities are 3 approximately the same, 53 versus 56 or 50 for Perry and d relative volumes are similar.
5 One of the other features is River Bend has 6 Containment unit Collers, and Perry and Grand Gulf have a 7 spray Capability to mitigate temperatures inside 8 containment.
9 (Slidel.)
10 Gulf States has provided CLASIX-3 computer il predictions in an effort to predict the combustion of 12 hydrogen inside the containment.
13 As a quick review, CLASIX-3 is a multicompartment,
" 14 low-parameter code. The sole intent is to model is deflagrations or volumetric type burns inside the 16 containment.
17 The postulated events that would look at that were is the stuck open relief valve and the drywell brake case, 19 which is a brake inside the drywell.
20 (Slide.)
21 And the results of the CLASIX analysis predict 22 peak temperature of approximately 1300 degrees Fahrenheit 23 and peak pulses of approximately 8 to 12 psig.
24 At the end of the transient the whole containment 25 did not reach the ignition criteria set as an input C
V
127 O
k/
~ 1 assumption, and there was a force burn which induced the i
2 most severe pressure pulse.
3 (Slide.)
4 Here is an example of a CLASIX-3 plot of the 5 wetwell volume. Basically it is ---
6 MR. OKRENT: Excuse me. Is what you were saying 7 by your last sentence that much of the hydrogen had been i a burned up and there was some residual hydrogen which they 9 predicted they couldn't ignite?
10 MR. NOTAFRANCESCO: It did not reach the input 11 ignition criteria of eight percent. It was Jess than eight 12 percent, and the hydrogen release rate ceased at that 13 point. So the only way to get rid of it was to universally u ignite the whole volume.
is MR. OKRENT: Thank you. I just wanted to make 16 sure I understood correctly.
17 MR. NOTAFRANCESCO: This goes out to 75 percent 18 metal / water reaction also.
19 (Slide. ) i l
I 20 Just to give a frame of reference of Grand Gulf, 21 which did provide a CLASIX-3 analysis --- (
l 22 MR. OKRENT: By the way, at 75 percent metal / water !
t l '3 reaction, if none of it burned would you have more hydrogen !
i e
j 24 than the oxygen could handle or, if not, how much remaining 25 oxygen would there be approximately, do you recall?
[
l .
1 i
128 i MR. NOTAFRANCESCO: I would say it would have to 2 be under five percent, which is the ignition criteria. If l
3 all 75 percent of the Riber Bend core was placed inside 4 containment, it would be 25 volume percent hydrogen.
5 MR. OKRENT: Okay.
6 MR. NOTAFRANCESCO: I would just note that CLASIX-7 3 has discrete pulse burning, and then with the advent of 8 the quarter-scale test we have made some observations.
9 (Slide.)
10 First of all, I would like to lead in. The 20th il scale test, which was a previous HCOG sponsored test, illustrated.that for hydrogen release rates upon .4 pounds 12 13 per second, a standing diffusion flame existed on the 14 surface of the suppression pool.
15 Subsequent tests in the quarter scale have shown 16 that instead of .4 pounds per second as a threshold, it has 17 been lowered substantially to close to .07 to .035 pounds is per second. There is some type of flames dancing at the l pool at that low release rate.
10 l 20 And some of the observations from the preliminary
(
21 results of the scoping test to date showed global i
22 detonations or deflagrations do not occur. It was 23 compartmental light-off burns only. bulk hydrogen i
24 concentrations do not exceed five volume percent.
25 I don't think there was enough resolution in O
I j
129 O 1 hydrogen concentration ports to determine the gradients.
2 There are just bulk concentrations.
3 And, one based on this data, we have a preliminary 4 conclusion that CLASIX-3 predictions may not appropriately, 5 or may be only appropriate for a limited range of hydrogen 6 release rates from Mark III containments.
7 And another general conclusion is that igniters a are effective in managing hydrogen accumulation.
-9 (Slide. )
to Another staff member will discuss the equipment 11 qualification and equipment survivability analysis. But 12 what I will do here is state the overall conclusions as 13 written in the SER.
14 It is the staff position that GSU has conformed 15 and has provided an adequate preliminary anlaysis for 16 degraded core hydrogen control.
17 There is a program for long-term resolution in is place which will support the final analysis for River
- 19 Bend. Again, this BCOG program is dominated by the quarter-20 scale facility results.
2i In the final analysis schedule and completion is 22 December '86.
23 That completes my presentation.
24 Are there any questions?
25 (No response.) !
O l
l l
i i
130 n- 1 MR. OKRENT: Is there another part to the staff 2 presentation?
3 MR. STERN: The staff would prefer at this point, 4 Mr. Chairman, that the applicant lead with survivability 5 and we comment on survivability.
- 6 MR. OKRENT
- Okay. Let me ask, are there 1
7 questions or comments on the presentation we just heard? -
8 Dr. Shepherd.
9 MR. SHEPHERD: Allen, you seem to be satisfied l
10 with the preliminary report. These pulse burns, they are 11 something that have been predicted by this type of code for !
12 a number of. years, but haven't been seen in the 13 experiments, and you don't feel like that is a shortcoming 14 or that could be overcome later on? f t
i 15 MR. MARK: I wouldn't say they had been predicted ;
i 16 by the code. They have been imposed on the code. i 17 MR. SHEPHERD: Right. Calculated, simulated, !
- 18 predetermined. 6 4
i
! 19 MR. NOTAFRANCESCO Well, at this point in time, !
i
! 20 based on the observations of the quarter-scale test, in the 21 range of hydrogen release rates that are used in the 22 quarter-scale and that were provided in the CLASIX l 1
23 analysis, CLASIX may not model the phenomena appropriately 24 in the ranges of hydrogen release rates, j 25 MR. SHEPHERD: Are those release rates comparable? f f
. _ . . . - - _ - . - . -. - - .. w
131
( i MR. NOTAFRANCESCO: Those release rates were long-2 term release rates and after the front-end pulse would be 3 higher than the .07. As a matter of fact, I think it was 4 .078 constant. That is why there were these lines going up 5 and down. It is .078 pounds per second release rate, and 6 4CCording to the quarter-scale, there Will be some type of 7 localized flames.
8 MR. SHEPHERD: That is all I have.
9 MR. OKRENT: Can I ask a question just to help me 10 form a picture. I think I heard you say that in the 1: quarter scale there is a tendency to get a continuous 12 burning above the level of the pool. Is this correct?
w 13 MR. NOTAFRANCESCO: That is correct.
14 MR. OKRENT: I couldn't tell whether one should 15 expect it to be something that covered the 360 degrees or 16 100 percent of the surface, or whether one expected it or 17 had a basis for knowing, you know, whether it would be la portions of the surface.
19 MR. NOTAFRANCESCO: It would be portions of the j 20 surface.
21 (Slide.)
22 l This is a cross-section actually of the Perry
, 23 configuration. In particular this is actually the way the
- 24 quarter-scale is going to be scaled to this configuration 25 of Perry to represent the Perry configuration. And these
~J L
~
~ - ' ' ' r - - - - wv<
132 1 circles here are representations of active ADS sparges.
2 The intent is in an SORV case to have this one 3 active. So you will have a high flow rate in this 4 location, and that is where the flames will be seen, !
5 probably here and maybe over here next to these two.
6 So clearly it is not along the whole surface. It 7 is localized to the release of the hydrogen ports.
8 MR. OKRENT: Now I guess what isn't so clear to me 9 is whether you might have burning over part of the surface 10 where you have hydrogen release and no burning over part of 11 the surface where you hydrogen is escaping.
12 MR. NOTAFRANCESCO: Well, at least initially what 13 we see is where there is a high density of sparges, there C.) 14 is going to be definite flame formation. At other 15 locations, I think it is too early to call the height of 16 the flames.
17 MR. MARK: You probably don't have this in your is hand, and if you don't, just drop it. I did my own 19 arithmetic on how much oxygen there might be in all the air
- 20 spaces, the five air spaces there are, and get myself about l
21 a million cubic feet or a million and a half, but there is 22 only room for a certain amount of oxygen. And if I 23 interpret the reports on the hydrogen, they use the symbol 24 LBM. That means two pounds worth of hydrogen, does it?
25 MR. NOTAFRANCESCO: No. That is pound mass, not (s- b l
. ~;7 1 pound moles.
2 MR. MARK: What is the "M" about then? s 3 MR. HOUSTON: Mass. To distinguish from pounds 4 force, you know, engineers do that.
5 MR. MARK: LBM? '
6 MR. HOUSTON: Yes, pounds mass.
7 MR. MARK: Pounds mass? I s 1 8 MR. BOUSTON: Yes.
9 MR. MARK: So those are actual pounds. Then I 10 guess there is almost enough oxygen to burn all the 11 hydrogen that you put out, but they don't miss by much. Is 12 the oxygen depleted in CLASIX as you go through the 40th 13 burn?
O 14 MR. NOTAFRANCESCO: That is not the case. There 15 is usually enough oxygen to burn.
16 MR. MARK: Pardon?
17 MR. NOTAFRANCESCO: There is usually enough oxygen 18 to burn all the hydrogen at least in this case.
l
! 19 MR. MARK: Well, I am thinking the ignition 20 conditions have to change as the oxygen enrichment goes 21 down and it goes down considerably, i 22 MR. NOTAFRANCESCO: It is the assumption that if 23 oxygen is five percent or greater, if there is a burn in 24 progress, or even if it is five percent, it will go down to i
i 25 zero percent once the burn has started.
k 134 s
1 MR. MARK: If it is a diffusion flame, you will 2 continue to use oxygen. If you have to do CLASIX, then you 3 don't necessarily indefinitely continue to get a burn even 4 if you-have eight percent hydrogen.
5 MR. NOTAFRANCESCO: If it is below five percent,
-6 there will not be a burn.
7 MR. MARK: It won't start. -
8 MR. NOTAFRANCESCO: Right. But if it is in the 9 process of being 5.6 percent and it is o'n its way down, it to will go lower.
11 MR. MARK: I understand that. But the calculation 12 is rather schematic I would feel.
13 MR. NOTAFRANCESCO: It gives the user a lot of 14 flexibility. l 15 MR. MARK: Beautiful.
F 16 MR. OKRENT: Just so I can keep some of my I
17 references straight in my mind, when you . earlier said about I 18 25 percent by volume, was this at NTP or at some higher j 19 pressure? i 20 MR. NOTAFRANCESCO: Okay. What I am basically 21 doing is about 2000 pound moles of air and about 1,000 j 22 pound moles of hydrogen, and that is about 4,000 pound f 23 moles, and a thousand over four thousand is 25 percent. j 24 MR. ROSENTHAL: Jitst for perspective we did just a [
I 25 little ratio game and we said that there is about enough l 8% l s_- :
f
' l
E
' 135 O 1 oxygen to burn 75 percent zirc water equivalent clad. It 2 was about 65 percent in GESSAR just taking the ratio of 3 assembles and volumes and eyeballing it. There is about
~
4 enough oxygen to start out with to burn 75 percent 5 equivalent active clad.
6 MR. OKRENT: What bothers me when I just asked the 7 last question is my recollection is air is about 21 percent
~
8 oxygen. That just makes it worse because I only need one
- 9 oxyger per two hydrogens. I am trying to use up all this 10 oxygen and I can't with 25 percent hydrogen. But let it 11 go. It is not vital.
12 I guess it is the applicant up next.
') 13 14 MR. REED: Dr. Okrent, we nad intended to include addressing equipment survivability as part of our overall is program on hydrogen control. We can either make our 16 presentation now on hydrogen control, which will include 17 equipment survivability or we can try to separate it out j 18 and only talk about equipment survivability. I guess it l
19 would be your choice, sir.
20 MR. OKRENT: Why don't you just go through your 21 presentation. You will end at survivability ---
22 MR. REED: We would prefer to do that, sir.
23 MR. OKRENT: --- and then the staff will have 24 comments on survivability.
- 25 MR. REED
- We would prefer to do it that way.
lO
136 (dh b 1 MR. OKRENT: Okay. Do you want to take a short !
i 2 break?
3 (Laughter.)
4 MR. OKRENT: Maybe this is a convenient time. !
5 Let's try to be back in no more than ten minutes. .
i 6 (Recess.)
7
i 4 8 i 9
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10 1 11 i t
12 l
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17 l
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19
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20 f i
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22 [
23 24 25 1
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137
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(,,) : MR. OKRENT: The meeting will reconvene.
2 MR. REED: At this time, then, we will go ahead 3 and address the hydrogen issue from Gulf States Utilities' 4 perspective.
5 Mr. Erwin Zoch, who is the supervisor of 6 Mechanical Engineering -- excuse me, supervisor of Nuclear 7 Engineering in our Nuclear Plant Engineering Group, will a give the presentation.
9 Mr. Zoch has a bachelor of science degree in io nuclear engineering from Texas A&M University and a masters n in business administration from Lamar University. He has 12 twelve years experience on the River Bend project.
13 (Slide) 14 MR. ZOCH: Good afternoon, gentlemen. I am not is going to go into the kind of detail that I planned to on 16 the igniter system, it's been covered very well by the 17 staff.
is Our igniter system is similar to that of-Grand
- 19 Gulf's system. But I do want to cover the additional 20 analysis, preliminary analysis, that we have conducted for 21 our plant to demonstrate the adequacy of the igniter i 22 system. l 23 These are the major areas that I want to address l 24 today in this outline slide. The combustion response i
25 analysis, CLASIX analysis, that Al Notafrancisco addressed O
i f
138
() i also, the preliminary essential equipment survivability 2 analysis in particular, and then some of the quarter-scale !
3 test program results that we have applied to this analysis 4 and finally, our program to demonstrate compliance.
5 (Slide) 6 MR. ZOCH: We have analyzed two base cases with 7 CLASIX, the stuck-open relieve valve case and the drywell 8 break case. These represent two paths for release into the 9 containment, one into the drywell, one into the containment to through the suppression pool.
11 This analysis provides the temperature and
. 12 pressure time history resulting from the release of
, 13 hydrogen into these volumes.
14 The results that we have calculated -- again, this 15 is basically a restatement of what Al presented earlier --
16 we have calculated pressures for the stuck-open relief 17 valve case of about 7.3 PSIG during hydrogen release, and i
is about a 1,300 degree peaks for burns during the constant 1
i 19 hydrogen release history.
20 Results for the drywell break case are similar.
21 Again, the maximum pressure calculated there was 12.7 PSIG 22 during the release and 1,300 degree Fahrenheit peaks during f i
l 23 constant hydrogen release.
! 24 MR. OKRENT: Excuse me.
23 MR. ZOCH: Yes. ,
t l
l 139
() i MR. OKRENT: In the drywell break case, in this l 2 case you assumed no water addition to the vessel, or what 3 did you assume?
4 MR. ZOCH: The drywell break case simply releases 5 hydrogen and steam into the drywell volume through an 6 assumed small line break, and it pressurizes the drywell 7 area and then vents through the horizontal vents into the a suppression pool and is then, in turn, burned right at the 9 suppression pool level.
10 MR. OKRENT: No, that's a different question. I'm 11 trying to just understand, were you adding water at any 12 rate to the vessel, or did you just allow the vessel to 33 empty itself in your drywell break?
14 MR. ZOCH: You are referring to the release is history that we have used. In our analysis, we have 16 assumed that the temperature, I mean the core, there is no i 17 recovery of any ECCS system. So that the core heats up and is then at the time where you would maximize your hydrogen 39 production, you reflood that with one of your emergency 20 cere cooling systems.
21 For this particular analysis, we assumed reflood 22 at the 5,000 gallon-per-minute case. This maximizes the 23 amount of hydrogen produced during that initial hydrogen ,
24 spike. And then, for the rest of the release history we 25 assumed a constant tenth of a pound per second release O
l
140
- I rate.
2 Does that answer your question?
3 MR. OKRENT: Yes, it does.
4 (Slide) .
5 MR. ZOCH: These thermal environments that were i
6 calculated, then, in CLASIX were applied to an analysis to -
! 7 - wait a minute, I am getting ahead of myself.
i 8 We have analyzed the equipment to determine its 9 survivability for the deflagration burns that are 10 calculated by CLASIX-3. The results that we have obtained, ,
l! 11 that for equipment that is located in the intermediate
- 12 volumes and the upper containment regions, they all e
13 survived the entire 75-percent water reaction release j -~^ 14 history.
15 Equipment that is located in the wetwell volume,
. 16 that's the volume right above the suppression pool, namely
, 17 the igniters and its associated power cable survive a ,
is minimum of 70 percent of the entire release history.
19 In that particular case, based upon the predicted ,
- 20 results, we had some difficulty demonstrating survivability 21 of the wetwell igniters and its power cable. So, we felt
[
L
! 22 that it was necessary to go on and do some further analysis j i
! 23 and, at that time, we looked at the quarter scale test !
I 24 results that were available to us at that time and applied l
!. I i 25 some of those to this analysis to see what the results !
!O ,
I k
i
_~
. -~ .. - - .___ - -- - ~ . _ - _ = _ _ . . .. _
i 141 i would be.
2 MR. OKRENT: How long is the period of a release 4
3 history, about?
4 MR. ZOCH: It's about 24,000 seconds in our case, 5 I guess. That's to get the total 75 percent release 6 history.
7 MR. OKRENT: That's a mighty long time.
l s MR. ZOCH: Yes, it is.
i 9 Before I talk about that-analysis itself that we io have done, I wanted to give a little additional information s
! 13 here about the MARK III Owners Group program. This was 4
12 covered quite well by Dr. Houston's presentation.
3 i3 Our goal is to define the thermal environments i
O 34 that are produced by diffusion-type burning in a MARK-III is containment. The facility is modelled to represent '
i .
- 16 temperatures and pressures or Uhat we measure in the !
! 17 facility are representative of full-scale values. :
3 is The facility will scintillate each of the owner's f 19 geometric differences and ther.e is a large amount of 20 instrumentation in the facility to measure the results that {
> i l
21 are there. j i .
L 22 (Slid *) I 23 Some of the key results from current quarter-scale .
I l 24 testing is given in this slide. We have not seen the j 25 serial deflagrations that are predicted by the CLASIX. l
() f I
?
. _ _ _ . _ . . _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ , , , _ , _ _ _ _ , _ _ . _ _ _ . . - , , . _ . , _ . . - . _ _ - . . ~ ~ . . . . _ _ . . . .
142 n) kms 1 Instead, we see sustained diffusion burning on the 2 suppression pool level and even down to very low releaso 3 rates.
4 The quarter-scale thermal environment is 5 significantly less severe than that predicted by CLASIX, 6 and I have two slides that show a comparison of that.
7 (Slide) s This first slide you saw earlier. That is the 9 CLASIX-3 prediction for the wetwell temperature for the 10 stuck-open relief valve case. Here we see the initial peak 11 temperature of maybe 2,300 degrees, and then about 1,300 12 degrees for the constant release history.
i -~ i3 (Slide) 14 Compare that to an identical release history with is the exception that it did not go up to 75 percent metal-16 water reaction. We see temperatures for the initial peak 17 of about 800 degrees -- I guess that's a little bit low --
is and then for the constant release part of the history on l
19 the order of 300 degrees or less, around 250 degrees.
2c MR. MARK: Could I ask --
21 MR. ZOCH: Yes. ,
22 MR. MARK: Don't put the slide back. It is that 23 one with the uniform spikes stretching all the way across 24 the page. Well, the way it's drawn, it looks like very 25 rapid cooling.
O
l 143 (O,) i Is that mainly by heat transfer to the walls and 2 other things, or is it the little unit cooler that's doing 3 that? ,
1 3
4 MR. ZOCH: No, it's not due to the unit cooler.
5 The unit coolers are modelled in the upper region of the i 6 containment. It's simply due to -- well, maybe I should 7 refer the question to Dr. Fulls.
MR. MARK: Look, I don't want the details. I'm 8
9 just wondering, what mainly controls the cooling rate?
10 MR. FULLS: Dr. Fulls, GMF Associates.
11 The CLASIX-3 at the end of the burn, at the peak i
12 temperature you have a start of cooling. And as soon as 3 33 the start of cooling occurs, you have a big influx of the i4 cooler air from the upper containment and intermediate is volume, which just drives the temperature down very 16 rapidly. ,
n Some of it goes to heat transfer to the passive is heat sinks, but primarily it is because of the influx of i
39 Cold air.
20 MR. MARK: So if you really had en area-wide 21 deflagration, it wouldn't cool that way.
l 22 MR. FULLS:- That's co: rect.
23 MR. ZOCH: Okay, continuing on with, then, i- 24 applying some of the temperature profiles recorded in the l 25 quarter-scale test, we analyzed the two piece of equipment O
. I' i
. . . - . - - - - ~ . - - - - . - - . - - - - _ _ _ .
144 l l
1 in the wetwell region that are subjected to those more I
2 severe environments, and the igniter and the power cable. !
3 We use that quarter-scale data.
4 The results that we have obtained to date is that 5 we feel that that will clearly survive the combustion, or
. 6 the thermal environment there.
7 I have several slides here to show. both the 8 release history that was used in that analysis and the ;
9 Calculated results. For a test, recent test here, this is 18 the temperature profile for the wetwell region. Again, we l 11 have the initial high temperature peak of, in this case, 12 622 degrees, followed by a low release rate for, I think, i3 about an hour,'and then a higher release rate for about one
,O i
j 14 hour and a quarter, followed by another lower release rate.
15 (Slide) 16 The igniter response is shown in this slide here.
17 There are two curves of interest. One is the surface 18 temperature of the igniter assembly as shown by the l 19 squares, and that goes up like this, Corresponding to the '
20 initial release and then following on over here. !
l 21 The item of most interest to us is the transformer inside the igniter and its temperature response follows i l 22 23 this curve here. The line up here gives the qualification '
i
! 24 temperature for this piece of equipment.
25 In similar fashion, we have done the same thing O !
1 145 p,s_) i for the power cable for the igniter in this wetwell region i
2 to the same temperature profile. This is the result there.
l i
This item responds fairly rapidly to the
( 3 4 temperature spike. The conductor insulation and the jacket 5 all pretty much respond rather quickly because of the 6 conservative way that we have modelled this.
1 7 We have assumed that the cable is in contact with e its conduit all around its surface when in fact the cable 9 lies inside of a larger conduit. But anyway, it shows a io close correlation there between -- or it follows the it temperature profile rather quickly for all of the 12 components.
i3 However, again it's significantly below its i4 maximum service temperature.
15 (Slide) 16 MR. EBERSOLE: Let me ask a question. In any of
- 17 these ignition sequences, are there pressures created which t
is drive open the air return, the vacuum relief valve drywell 39 to wetwell?
20 MR. ZOCH: There are no vacuum relief valves.
i 21 MR. EBERSOLE: None in your design, no vacuum .
22 reliefs? That's right, not in your design.
23 What's an air return fan doing in the picture 24 here? I didn't know of any such thing.
25 MR. ZOCH: I'm sorry, I'm not --
i O
l 146 I
l () 1 MR. EBERSOLE: I'm looking at Figure 1 of some 2 CLASIX-3 model calculations diagram that shows an air i 3 return fan.
4 MR. ZOCH: That is the hydrogen mixing system that 5 is located farther up in the containment.
6 MR. EBERSOLE: Oh, it's just a stir.
7 MR. ZO,CH: They hydrogen mixing system is not 8 initiated during this transient, is all. So there is no 9 correspondence. I guess the report that you have simply 10 indicates that we have the capability to model that feature 11 in the code.
12 MR. EBERSOLE: But you don't have it?
13 MR. ZOCH: It's not turned on during the release 14 history.
15 MR. EBERSOLE: Okay.
16 MR. BOOKER: The valves between the drywell and 17 the containment will be closed.
, is MR. EBERSOLE: Okay.
19 (Slide) 4 20 MR. ZOCH: The last slide here is our conclusion 21 slide and programmed to demonstrate final compliance. We 22 believe that the results that we have to date indicate that 23 all equipment will survive the hydrogen. burns based upon 24 quarter-scale testing.
! 25 There is additional testing and analysis to be f
147 r
O)
(, i done and scheduled for completion as shown here. We expect 2 to complete River Bend quarter-scale testing by the middle l 3 of 1986 and then complete the final analysis toward the end 4 of next year.
5 Our conclusions are simply that based upon this 6 preliminary analysis and using the quarter-scale results 7
that we have to date, we feel that all equipment would 8
survive the thermal environments that result from hydrogen 9 combustion, and that there is no threat to containment to integrity from a pressure standpoint. The pressures that 11 we see are very, very low compared to the ultimate 12 capacity.
. s i3 Finally, that the igniter system is an adequate i4 system for handling effectively and safely the generation 15 of large amounts of hydrogen.
16 MR. OKRENT: Let me ask you to imagine that you i7 are sitting where I am around this table and you want to is ascertain where there may be soft spots in the position i9 just presented, okay?
20 What kinds of questions would you ask?
21 (Laughter)
. , 22 MR. ZOCH: I wouldn't. I would have no further 23 questions.
24 (Laughter and applause) 25 MR. OKRENT: All right, I'll give it to you a s
O
148 4
() i different way. I am the president of the company and I 2 want to have it straight. Don't give me the story you give 3 to the staff when you are trying to persuade them. I want 4 to know where we may run into trouble in a year.
5 AUDIENCE: The real stuff.
6 MR. OKRENT: Give me the real stuff.
7 MR. ZOCH: The scoping tests that have been done a to date have not modelled River Bend geometry. So I think 9 that it would be prudent for US to continue on. We would to have to accept that there is some degree of doubt here. ,
11 But again, my feeling would be that the quarter-scale 12 results to date show that the environment is much less
_s i3 severe than predicted, and we can almost survive the 14 predicted environment.
15 The soft spots, it's difficult to address. It 16 would have to do with some of the concerns that we might 17 have that are identified in the quarter-scale program as is part of a program that will have to be resolved yet.
19 MR. OKRENT: And they are?
20 MR. ZOCH: Well, the items that were addressed by 21 Dr. Houston. I can't enumerate them off the top of my :
22 head. .
I 23 MR. OKRENT: Well, I must say, your last sentence i 24 bothers me. It seems to me you are in some way responsible 25 for this area at River Bend. In fact, you should be able 7 !
t I
l . _ _ , _ _- _
149
() 1 to enumerate the areas of -- If you want to call it --
2 greatest uncertainty off the top of your head.
l 3 MR. ZOCH: Well, I can list the areas. I don't 4 think I could list them in all 14 task descriptions by 5 their title and order.
6 We are concerned about some of the drywell 7 effects. We need to look at that area a little bit more a closely. We need to determine what effect the unit coolers 9 will reall'J have upon these environments.
to I would expect them perhaps to reduce it because 11 the thermal profile that I used here was a case that had 12 neither sprays nor unit coolers. I would be curious to i3 know how floor blockages, differences in floor blockages, i
u might affect the results, if any.
15 MR. EBERSOLE: Was the thermal transient extended 16 in time to accomodate this scale model being much smaller 17 than the --
is MR. ZOCH: Yes, that was done.
19 MR. MARK: Will there, in the quarter-scale tests, 20 be some variation in the rate at which hydrogen is injected 21 to cover all likely range of events?
l l
22 MR. ZOCH: Yes. There are three different release 23 scenarios proposed to be used in quarter-scale testing.
24 One represents a 300 gallon per minute reflood -- excuse 25 me, let me correct that, a 150 gallon per minute reflood I -_. . - . --_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
i l
150
- ) I rate, followed by a constant release history, and then a 2 5,000 gallon per minute release history, followed by the ,
3 constant release rate.
4 And the third one, Marvin, can you help me out 5 here?
6 MR. MORRIS: Marvin Morris, GSU.
7 The current plans for a production test, we have a 'done a series of scoping tests where we used different 9 release rates to see if they had an effect.
10 We have used 5,000 GPM reflood; we have used 300 11 GPM reflood; we have used 150. And current plans are to-12 conduct a production test with a 150-gallon GPM reflood, 13 followed by a long tail to get the 75 percent because that O 14 appears to be the most -- the release history that would 15 -give us the most limiting diffusion flamed thermal l
16 environment.
i 17 MR. MARK: You have assumed in the calculations is that the igniters waited, held back until there was eight
- 19 . Percent, and then ignited the hydrogen.
20 What is the experience with igniters, when do they l ~21 . start to flame?
22 MR. ZOCH: Our experience from quarter-scale 23 testing, and I think other tests too, seems to indicate {
24 that ignition may occur around five or six percent.
25 Certainly, around six percent or less, in the five to six- i i
. i
151 i percent range.
2 MR. MARK: That would moderate some of the spikes 3 that you have.
4 MR. ZOCH: Yes.
5 MR.' MARK: But also keep the heat source at a more 6 nearly Continuous level, or nearly continuous.
7 Do the quarter-scale tests show signs of having a diffusion flames?
9 MR. ZOCH: They were essentially all diffusion 10 flames, with the exception of the initial light-off which 11 is similar to lighting off a burner or something. You 12 might.say that that was similar to a deflagration..
13 But other than that, it appears that all the u burning is diffusion-type burning at the pool surface.
15 MR. MARK: Okay.
16 MR. OKRENT: Could I understand why the condition 17 you have named leads to a limiting case? I think you said is 300 GPM ard then some low rate which I didn't catch.
39 MR. MORRIS: The reason we are considering doing 20 the production test with a 150 GPM reflood rate is because 21 it gives us a high release rate for the longest period of 22 time, which would give us a stronger diffusion flame, which 23 would give us a more limiting thermal environment.
2.s MR. OKRENT: Is it limiting because it's over a 25 longer period of time, or because the temperature is O
152
() i higher, or what? In what way does it become limiting? I'm 2 trying to understand.
3 MR. MORRIS: It's expected that it would give us a 4 higher temperature over a longer period of time. It would 5 be more of a challenge to the equipment.
6 MR. OKRENT: Now, I'm trying to understand. It 7 wouldn't be as high a temperature as one would get if one 8 had a substantially higher release rate for a continuing 9 period which ended, you know, at 75 percent; would it?
10 MR. MORRIS: Well, the 150 GPM reflood case is the 11 case where we have a higher sustained diffusion flame, you 12 know, for a longer period of time. Some of the other i3 release histories like the 5,000 GPM reflood has a higher i4 rate but for a much shorter duration.
is MR. ROSENTHAL: Perhaps I can help.
i6 MR. OKRENT: Go ahead.
17 MR. ROSENTHAL: If you have an unmitigated case is you boil down the core, you don't start making hydrogen 19 until more than three-quarters of the core is uncovered.
20 You would eventually boil off the steam -- the 2i water, the liquid that is in the core. Heat production 22 would occur with about one to two foot covered, and you 23 would eventually run out of liquid to make steam, to make l 24 circ water and hence hydrogen. l 25 MR. OKRENT: And how much water -- :
[l I l x- > ;
i f
f
153
() i MR. ROSENTHAL: Now, what one does is then, looks How can I dribble in enough 2 at almost a perverse case.
3 water to make hydrogen and an insufficient amount of water 4 to cool the core?
5 As you recall, something in excess of 300 GPM or 6 slightly above is enough to balance the decay heat. So, 7 one looks at what I consider a perverse case. You might a get this from, let's say, enhanced CRDM flow of just enough 9 to make a lot of hydrogen and not enough to quench the io core.
11 Hence, that sort of case maximizes the amount of i
12 hydrogen you can get. You would like to pick an injection s i3 rate and time such that you think that you have not gone i4 beyond the scope of the rule in terms of core degradation is but have tried to maximize the hydrogen production. That 16 is how we have dealt with these various -- ,
17 MR. OKRENT: So you do not include scenarios where
.is the core has gone to large-scale melting and then water 19 cones in, making hydrogen, but cool. tag it off in the 20 Process; or you do?
21 MR. ROSENTHAL: You are correct, we do not.
22 MR. MARK: Can anyone say anything on the subject 4
23 of the efficiency of utilization if steam running up past 24 the fuel?
25 You are making reactions with the zirconium, but O
e
- , - - - , , , . . , , , - - . - - , , .,, ,--,,-,--,--,.,n.--,. ., ,---.--.---e., - - - , , , -,,-.,- - - - - ,-- . - - , - -- - , , . . . , , , , - - , , , . _
154 1 you are not using all'the steam that goes up the pipe.
2 What fraction of it, roughly, gets involved, half of it, a i '3 tenth of it?
4 MR. MORRIS: Marvin Morris.
5 We have done some calculations in which it is 6 actually steam starved. You know, you can get to that 7 point and it depends on the scenario that you are looking a at whether or not it will be steam starved and you are 9 consuming all of the steam and using that to produce i
io hydrogen, or whether there is some excess steam.
l
- li It really depends on the actual scenario. So it 12 could be either way.
13 MR. OKRENT: I have a question from Mr.
]
N.- 14 Rosenthal. Is there something in the rule that says you i
is should not consider that the core has undergone what I'll 16 call considerable departure from its original geometry 17 before you manage to start.getting substantial amounts of is water in; or is that a staff interpretation?
l 19 MR. HOUSTON: Wayne Houston of the staff.
20 The rule is kind of silent on that point. The 21 guidelines -- we call them guidelines -- the words in the 22 rule and the intent of the rule, again going back to its l
23 origin in the Three Mile Island event, was that it's a 24 degraded core situation but it is recovered, it's 1
25 recoverable.
l l
l
155
() i One of the problems we have, and I think in answer 2 to your question about the soft spot is what you are sort l
3 of holding in on here.
4 The rule does not provide ample guidance with 5 respect to a scenario other than the total amount of 6 hydrogen released. It is quite clear that you can 7 postulate out of whole cloth scenarios that can produce a higher and higher hydrogen rates and create -- by analysis 9 or possibly even by experiment -- serious problems. They to can produce high temperatures because you generate a lot of n heat when you burn hydrogen.
12 So the staff has the problem and the utilities is
-s i3 attempting to comply with the rule have the problem of I
14 trying to come to some sort of a common, mutual consensus 15 understanding of what basically seems to be a sensible kind 16 of system that will at least go to some extent to provide 17 litigation of hydrogen generation events.
- 18 Now, when it comes to the various codes that one 4
i, uses to try to physically model what goes on in a degraded
, 20 core, we run into trouble. We don't really have good, 21 Ph ysical models of situations of this character.
22 So r Principally we say that what we are dealing 23 with is a situation in which water gets into the core at a 24 sufficient rate to produce hydrogen and eventually produce 25 the amount required by.the rule. It's basically a non-i
-.- -._. , _~__ ._ _ _ - - . . . _ , - . _ _ ~ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - . . _ __ _- _ -__,
156
() 1 mechanistic consideration because when we use the codes 2 that attempt to model to the extent it can be done, the 3 mechanisms that go on, they tend to predict that you cannot :
j 4 get there where the rule requires.
5 MR. OKRENT: Well, I must say at the moment I find 6 it hard to know whether the scenario that is the basis for 7 what is called the limiting diffusion case, or whatever
-a word --
9 MR. HOUSTON: The term " limiting" is misleading in 10 that context.
I 11 MR. OKRENT: -- whether that scenario is more 12 probable than the one I suggested, that for a while in fact 4 .
i3 you are overheating and that you depart from core geometry ,
i u of melting or eutectic, or whatever formation has occurred, i
i is and then you recover water in some way, at some rate, so l 16 that you manage not to go through the bottom.
17 In that case, as I see it, you can have hydrogen is generation rates different than due to decay heat alone.
?
19 MR. HOUSTON: Yes. There is an infinite variety l
\ i
! 20 of scenarios that you can posture. I l l 21 MR. OKRENT: I don't know whether it leads to a j l ?
22 worse condition insofar as environmental qualification. f t
23 That, I am interested in learning. [
t
, 24 MR. HOUSTON: See, my response to the question !
l 25 about the soft spot would be, what we probably don't know ;
f
(] >
r
157
("h y ,/ i and probably never will know is an answer to the question, 2 just exactly how much does this buy you into degraded core 3 space. There is no way of knowing an answer to that 4 question.
5 MR. EVANS: If I may comment on that. Bob Evans 6 with Hydrogen Control Owners Group.
7 I think the Hydrogen Control Owners Group, in a
concert with the staff, has looked at a very broad spectrum 9 of accidents involving very severely damaged core states, io involving up to melting -- in some cases -- 60 percent of it the zircalloy inventory in the core.
12 The 150 GPM reflood case that we are dealing with 33 does involve that amount of core melt. That is a very, b
Ns/ i4 very severely damaged core. The 5,000 GFM reflood case is that we are dealing with involves melting 50 percent of the 16 active core zircalloy inventory.
17 So we are looking at very severely damaged cores is in the accidents that we have analyzed to date. We have i9 sort of focused in, we think, on what the more likely 20 recoverable degraded core accidents are in order to assess 2i the thermal environments that they produce.
22 MR. OKRENT: Well, it's interesting, but it didn't 23 answer the question I asked.
24 MR. MARK: Well, when the rule started, it had i 25 this peculiar feature that it must be recoverable. Nobody l
O .
i
158
-~
k s
I was prepared to say what would happen if everything melted 2 and fell into a very large tub of water. What one thought 3 would happen there is that you would quench the core and 4 you wouldn't know if you got any hydrogen at all or not 5 after the first flash.
6 MR. OKRENT: Well, let me agree that when the rule 7 was formed that they were reluctant to talk about core melt a going through the vessel and all the mechanisms of hydrogen 9 generation since one can get, let's say, twice the " metal-10 water" reaction if you use only the clad.
11 They took some number which was somewhat larger 12 than was thought to have occurred at Three Mile Island and 13 looked like a not unreasonable judgmental call, so far as I I u can see it.
15 At that time, I think, people's picture of Three 16 Mile Island is quite different than what their picture of 17 Three Mile Island is today, and their picture of what might is be recoverable inside the vessel has modified somewhat.
. 19 Again, it is of some interest for me to know at 20 some time -- but not today -- whether if one had a lot of 21 heat inside this core accumulated over some period of time 22 so there is a substantial part of it molten and then you 23 started adding water at various rates, so that at some 24 point you brought it under control and it didn't go through 25 the vessel, whether that leads to a worse environment in O
159 l
() i the containment or not from the qualification point of 2 view.
3 If it doesn't, then, you know, that's a good 4 situation, you don't have to worry about it. If it does, 5 then it requires a little more thought, maybe.
6 MR. ROSENTHALs Let me just offer that the 7 calculations have modelled an intact geometry, although a with a lot of melting. That gives you a large surface-0to-9 Volume ratio because the original design-has a large to surface-to-volume ratio.
11 As you progressively destroy this core and reform i
12 it into some unknown geometry, of all things the surface-to-i3 volume ratio of the zirc ought to decrease. So, one should i4 not assume that there are other ways of ending up with a is more damaged course with worse hydrogen production.
16 MR. OKRENT: You are answering a different 17 . question. But why don't we go on?
18 (Laughter) i9 MR. BROOKER: That concludes our presentation on 20 hydrogen.
21 MR. OKRENT: Okay. The staff, I think, has 22 comments and then we'll see what questions we have.
23 MR. STERN: I would like to introduce Hookum Garg l 24 from the Equipment Qualification Branch. l l
25 (Slides) ;
9
. t
160 l 1 MR. GARG: My name is Hookum Garg, I am from the 2 Equipment Qualification Branch of the Division of 3 Engineering in NRR.
4 Before I go into the equipment survivability 5 analysis which River Bend has presented, what is required 6 to demonstrate that the equipment survivability 7 requirements are made?
8 The first thing to demonstrate the equipment 9 survivability is that they have to establish a list of all
- to essential equipment required during and after the hydrogen 11 burn event to maintain the containment integrity and to 12 bring the plant to the safe shutdown condition.
13 The second thing they have to do is establish the v 14 thermal environment for the containment based on different is accident scenarios.
16 The third thing they have to do is establish the 17 equipment thermal response based no the worst case is containment environment.
i l 19 The fourth thing they have to do is establish that 20 equipment surface temperature during hydrogen burn did not
. 21 exceed the surface temperature of the equipment during 22 qualification testing.
l 23 In the case where the equipment surface l 24 temperature exceeds the surface temperature of the 25 equipment during qualification testing, then additional C
l l
161
() i justification for the acceptability of the equipment will 2 be required.
3 The fifth thing they need to do is establish that 4 equipment pressure spike predicted to occur during the 5 hydrogen burn is less than the pressure equipment was 6 exposed to during qualification testing, or they have to 7 provide additional justification for accepting it.
8 (Slide) 9 To meet this requirement, River Bend has used the 10 design criteria for selecting the essential equipment.
in They have selected the equipment and system which are 12 required to mitigate the consequences of the hydrogen burn i3 event.
i4 They included equipment and structures required to i3 maintain the integrity of the containment pressure 16 boundary, 17 They require the systems and components required is to re-cover the core, i, And they have included the instrumentation and 20 systems required to monitor the course of the hydrogen 21 burning rate.
22 (Slide) 23 Based on this criteria, the staff has developed a 24 list of equipment, and I'm not going to go through all of 25 the list but on the second column there is the location O
/
162
. [) I given where DW stands for the drywell; UIV is for the --
2 LIV is for the lower intermediate volume, and various means 3 the equipment is located all over the plant.
4 MR. EBERSOLE: Pardon me just a moment. You say 5 electrical penetration assemblies varies.
6 MR. GARG: Right. They are locating at the 7 wetwell and by intermediate Volume -- it's located all 8 over.
9 MR. EBERSOLE: In essence they all have to survive to from the integrity standpoint; don't they?
4 11 MR. GARG: Yes, they do.
12 (Slide)
- 13 Then the equipment. Applicant has done the k-- 14 analysis of the equipment based on the original CLASIX-3.
is By original CLASIX-3 I mean, the applicant has used the f
16 worst case, which was the wetwell environment, and most of 4
17 the equipments are located in the lower intermediate is volume, in the drywell or somewhere else.
19 In the original CLASIX-3 analysis, there was no 20 one predicted in the lower intermediate volume and the far i 21 intermediate volume.
l l 22 This was because of the ignition criteria which 23 was set at eight-percent volume concentration of hydrogen.
24 This did not include the worst case environment for the 25 equipment located in the lower intermediate volume.
0 l
163 i But their analysis indicated the last motor is 2 going to survive only 12 burns. Target Rock solenoid will 3 survive 17 burns. Rosemount transmitter will survive only 4 six burns. Okonite Power cable will survive 17 burns, and 5 hydrogen igniter will reach 600 degree Fahrenheit and its ,
6 temperature limit is 470 degrees.
7 MR. EBERSOLE: On that list that you just hung up 8 a while ago, why don't I see any radiation or neutron-9 measuring instrumentation or whatever it takes to tell me 10 I'm not critical and other funny things are happening in 11 the radiation context?
12 MR. GARG: Radiation monitor is not considered 13 essential equipment for this event. You don't need the IO i4 radiation monitoring --
15 MR. EBERSOLE: I don't know whether I'm descending 16 to another critical level or whatever. I don't have any
' 17 neutron monitoring and I have no radiation monitoring. If is I look at that list, I don't have anything like thats do I?
19 MR. GARG: Well, you have (inaudible) 20 MR. EBERSOLE: You know, I'm feeling a little bit l
21 exposed not knowing what's going on.
22 MR. BOOKER: Mr. Ebersole, this is not'a complete 23 list, this is a sample of equipment location in various 24 areas. ,
25 MR. EBERSOLE: Oh, it doesn't say that.
O
_ . - _ -_ a
I 4
164
) i MR. GARG: No, these are the equipment for which 2 they have analyzed it. But I don't think radiation monitor 3 is included in the list of the essential equipment.
4 MR. EBERSOLE: You mean it says here, systems and 5 equipment required to survive hydrogen burn events, and 6 then do something afterward, I guess.
7 And then you tell me, but that's only part of f ;
i j 8 them.
9 MR. GARG: No, there is no radiation monitor f
to included.
! 11 MR. OKRENT: Should it be? Do you want to know i 12 what the radiation level is inside following a hydrogen 13 burn?
t .
14 MR. GARG: Radiation monitor is not required for is the hydrogen burn event as such. It is required, maybe, to 16 know the consequences of something else. And that is one j 17 of the design criterion which is left open, which has
! is resulted in the final analysis which I will cover in my i 19 last slide, i
20 MR. EBERSOLE: Don't I need to know whether I've 21 got a reactor or not?
22 MR. GARG: No. What I'm saying is, there are f
- . . i I t 23 certain -- I mean, this list may not be complete as such.
24 MR. EBERSOLE: Well, it doesn't say that. You !
i 25 could say --
i I f
1 165
() i MR. GARG: Well, I'm going to cover that in what
- 2 are the softest spots, I.mean, what Dr. Okrent said, which I
3 are the things which we still need to --
4 MR. EBERSOLE: Well, this is a partial list of 5 systems and equipment. It doesn't say that.
6 MR. GARG: This has been accepted for the 7 preliminary analysis.
I a MR. EBERSOLE: To be expanded.
, 9 MR. HOUSTON: Can I add a comment to that? Wayne i
to Houston.
i 11 One of the statements that you find in the SSER we 12 have written is that there is still a residual uncertainty 33 as to whether all of the appropriate items of final j i4 equipment have in fact been identified. This is in that i3 sense an item that remains to be -- the staff remains to be i
! 16 satisfied on.
! 17 (Slide) l is MR. GARG: Okay, then based upon the original I
19 analysis, equipment survivability could not have been 20 demonstrated. So, the applicant has done the revised
! 21 analysis which used the criteria of six percent ignition at 22 t'he lower intermediate volume, which will predict a more i
23 realistic case for the location of the equipment.
- 24 And based on that environment, the applicant has 25 analyzed the two worst components, which was the Rosemount
.O l -
166 4
O) r, ,
i transmitter and the Reliance motor, and showed the 2 equipment temperature is below the qualification 3 temperature.
4 However, for the hydrogen igniter and the igniter 5 cable, which are located in the wetwell, the survivability 6 based on the wetwell environment has not been demonstrated.
7 (Slide)
! 8 Now to answer your question. These are the issues 9 which have been left open, which will be resolved in the to final analysis.
11 The first item is, assure completeness of the list 12 of equipment required based on failure modes and emergency i3 procedures.
14 MR. EBERSOLE: Okay.
! 15 MR. GARG: The second item is, establish that the i 16 thermal equilibrium temperature of the equipment is reached 17 during the equipment qualification testing.
is It has been assumed that the equipment reaches the i 19 equilibrium temperature during the qualification testing.
20 But in some of the tests, peak temperature may not be kept 21 for a long time. In those cases, they have to do the j
22 analysis to show what the equilibrium temperature is.
I 23 Third, establish the thermal environment created 24 by the diffusion flame produced by a continuous burn of 25 hydrogen released from the suppression pool. This is O
. _ . . . . . _ . _ ,. _ -. . _ . , _ _ . . , _ _ _ _ . _._.m. . _ . - . -__ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _
4 i
l 1
4 167 i addressed by --
2 MR. OKRENT: Can you explain to me what the term 3
" diffusion flame" means, if anything, with regard to i
i 4 hydrogen release rates? Is there some hydrogen release i
5 rate at which you don't expect a diffusion flame?
i l 6 MR. GARG: Well, like in the quarter scale testing i
7 the basis was that the hydrogen release rates exceeds --
a you will have the diffusion flame. Based on the quarter 9 scale testing that has been done so far, that rate has been i io reduced to 5,035.
4 l ti MR. OKRENT: Now, is there some rate at which you 12 will not have a diffusion flame?
i i3 MR. GARG: You will have a diffusion flame on ;
1 j 34 anything higher.
15 MR. OKRENT: Anything hither, okay. And how are
! 16 you going to decide what is the thermal environment that 17 should be the basis for comparison?
18 MR. GARG: Well, that is what they are going to --
!- 19 I mean, hydrogen release rate has to be agreed upon betWeen
- 20 the staff and --
l 21 MR. OKRENT: How will you decide on the hydrogen i
22 release rate? ,
23 MR. GARG: I'm not the right person to answer that ;
l 24 question.
i 25 MR. OKRENT: Okay.
1 0
I
168
() 1 MR. GARG: Okay. The applicant has to demonstrate the survivability of the equipment located in the wetwell.
2 3 Like we said, based on the CLASIX analysis so far, !
4 survivability of the equipment in the wetwell cannot be 5 demonstrated.
t 6 However, based on the scoping test and the quarter ,
7 scale, temperature of the equipment does not go beyond the 4
8 qualification. The staff has not reviewed the data and we 9 Cannot Comment on the adequacy of the tests. But they to provide enough justification at this time not to require l 11 any modification of the equipment like the thermal 12 shielding, the relocation of the equipment which may not be
, 13 required, which may have to be revised in the thermal
- u environment.
f is And the thermal diffusion, the staff thinks it's 16 okay at this time to go because the igniter cable will j ,
17 survive at least 70 percent of the burn, which is quite far is in the accident scenario.
19 MR. EBERSOLE: Will this burn light off a fire in 20 the lube oil of the main coolant pumps?
e 21 MR. GARG: I don't --
1 22 MR. EBERSOLE: I said, will it light off a fire in 23 the main lube oil system of the main coolant pumps, or will 24 that just --
i 25 That's not very -- it doesn't have a high vapor O .
, . ~ _ _ _ , . - , . . _ _ . - _ - - - - . . , - - , .,
\
169
() i pressure.
2 MR. GARG: I don't think --
3 MR. EBERSOLE: Well, it will already have been 4 made rather hot by other prior conditions.
5 MR. GARG: Yes, but I don't think we have looked 6 into it. But normally, the ignition temperature of the 7 lube oil or something is quite high, a MR. EBERSOLE: Maybe it would be a good thing 9 anyway, it would eat the oxygen up.
10 MR. MORRIS: Excuse me, Marvin Morris, GSU.
ii The diffusion flames that he is talking about are 12 occurring in the containment suppression pool. Our recirc i3 pumps are located in the drywells, they wouldn't not be t
i4 exposed to this environment.
i$ MR. EBERSOLE: Yes. Okay, right.
36 MR. OKRENT: Can you estimate what the difference 17 is in thermal environment that you are likely to agree to?
18 MR. GARG: Again, I'm not the right person to ask ig that.
20 MR. OKRENT: Well, I'll address this to the
. 21 staff. Is there a difference in thermal environment that 22 you will agree to if there are sprays in one MARK-III and 23 there are not sprays in another one?
24 Do you expect this to lead to a difference in the 25 thermal environment?
l O
l 1
i 170 i
1 MR HOUSTON: Let me attempt to respond to that.
2 One would logically expect that if one in some sense takes 3 credit for or conducts tests with sprays and the sprays 4 would be a mechanism for removing a substantial amount of 5 heat and therefore one might have a more mild thermal ,
j 6 environment than in a case without the sprays. I 7 That seems intuitively obvious to me.
j 8 MR. MARK: A bit more steam.
9 MR. HOUSTON: Yes.
i 10 MR. OKRENT: So, what was your answer?
11 MR. HOUSTON: I think my answer was, one would
' intuitively expect the thermal environment to be more 12 1
severe in a case without sprays than with sprays.
j 13 I
14 I'm not certain of that, I'm just saying that's my
} 15 intuition.
j 16 MR. OKRENT: Has one established a thermal i
i 17 environment for any of the plants with sprays?
! 18 MR. GARG: I think for the Grand Gulf --
l 19 MR. HOUSTON: Well, let me say this: Established, 20 no, that sounds too final.
l
. 21 (Laughter)
- 22 MR. HOUSTON: If you recall in the previous MARK-23 III case of Grand Gulf, the preliminary analysis that was i 24 submitted by Grand Gulf and performed by them did credit l 25 sprays in the treatment. They were trying to establish l
!O /
l a
-r.,-. m.. ~ . . , ,, .-,--.n --w, ,w-+-- . . . .n,e-w,-n-- n.--,-.w,, mn-- -----,--,-,-,,----.,---,-----,,v,-e-,-,we-,-,,,-,
171
() i what a thermal environment might look like.
2 In the case of River Bend, of course, they don't 3 have that opportunity because they don't have sprays.
4 Now, just to add to that -- and I'm sure others 5 can address this better than I -- I believe that the owners 6 in the quarter scale scoping test series have conducted --
7 although I believe most of the tests that they conducted in a
the series were without sprays -- I think they have 9 conducted some with sprays.
io Whether they are able to draw any conclusions of 11 the type to answer your question or not, I don't know.
12 MR. HOUSTON: One more word, and this has nothing 13 to do with River Bend, again. But for those plants that l i4 have sprays, I think they should do it both ways. This is is what we suggested.
16 MR. OKRENT: They should do what both ways?
17 MR. HOUSTON: Do the experiments with sprays and is without sprays.
i9 MR. OKRENT: I'm going to see if I can ascertain 20 if there is a physically possible scenario which is not 21 absolutely far-fetched probabilistically, which in the 22 staff's opinion would lead to a significantly more severe
?
23 environment for some of the equipment than what was 24 described as the limiting diffusion case.
25 MR. HOUSTON: I'm willing to go out on a limb and
, t i
, r
172
) i say, probably.
2 MR. OKRENT: But you don't have any in mind?
. 3 MR. HOUSTON: It isn't a question of whether you 4 have it in mind. It's whether you have real basis for 5 doing an analysis that, you know, has some degree of 6 credibility and reliability.
7 I can sense that you are trying to push the a requirement here to some sort of a limit --
9 MR. OKRENT: I'm not trying to push anything. I'm to trying to understand what the term " limiting" means when 11 they use it, and I'm also trying to see where it fits 12 within a spectrum of possible, physically possible 13 scenarios. I haven't been able to get that information v
)
14 yet.
15 MR. HOUSTON: I believe they are using the term 16 " limiting" within a relative basis of a number of scenarios 17 which they analyzed which, I think, was explained to you, I
18 that a particular scenario gave a longer period of hydrogen l
19 generation rates which would be expected to produce 1
20 diffusio., flame phenomena than other scenarios which were 21 analyzed.
22 I think that's the sense in which the word 23 " limiting" was used. And it's limited to a finite number
! 24 of scenarios that they looked at.
25 MR. OKRENT: You act like your lawyer is next to i 0
.- --. . .- .--._-=_._----. - - .. . . . . - . - . . -
l 173 i you. l 2 (Laughter) 3 MR. OKRENT: Other questions for the staff? Doas ,
l ;
j 4 Mr. Sheperd have any comments or questions?
5 MR. SHEPERD: No, not at this point.
f 6 MR. GARG: Okay. The last item is, for any 7 equipment for which survivability cannot be demonstrated, i
{ s alternate methods, such as equipment relocation, thermal I 9 insulation or shielding, should be considered.
i j io That is one of the conditional means, and then 11 after somebody -- where the survivability cannot be i 12 demonstrated, they have to consider one of these methods ,
i e i3 and a schedule has to be agreed upon by the staff.
j v i4 That concludes my presentation.
15 MR. OKRENT: Any further comments-or questions at i6 this time on hydrogen?
I 17 MR. MARK: Just to make sure I have the right l
s .
is picture. Some of the questions which have been raised !
f I 19 about equipment survivability are not_ going to have final f l !
i 20 answers until the experiments have been analyzed and so '
I ,
{ 21 forth. (
1 !
i 22 It is thought.by the staff that it's reasonable to i t
! 23 allow a plant to proceed pending getting such information l
! l i 24 together. :
I l 25 The ignitors will nevertheless be operable and j
- C) .
i
.. _ _ . _ . . . _ _ _ . . . . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . . _ _ . . _ _ _ _ . _ _. t
1 l 174 1
1 present whenever --
i 2 MR. BOOKER: The igniter system is installed right i
3 now.
i 4 MR. MARK: That was all I had.
- 5 MR. OKRENT
- I guess we are ready for the next 1
I 6 agenda item, if I can find an agenda. Thank you.
i 7 Oh, yes, Item 6 -- Jesce, stay awake.
1 l 8 (Laughter) 9 MR. HOUSTON: Mr. Chairman, I would like to make a i
i 10 few preliminary remarks with respect to both Items C and 7, i
i 11 and then Jack will add something.
{ 12 When the agenda for this meeting was first made i
i3 available to us some one to two weeks ago, it was with some l
- 14 surprise to most of us on the staff to see these two items.
l is I think for the record I would like to make it I 16 clear that these are not, of course, requirements that are
! 17 required by the regulations for either the applicant or is anybody else to do a severe accident assessment of this j 19 plant. There is no regulation that would require the i 20 consideration of that system which has been described on 21 the GESSAR docket in that connection.
i 22 The staff has in fact done no severe accident
! I 23 assessment of the River Bend plant. The staff has not 24 given any consideration whatsoever to the advantages, the I
25 disadvantages, or the feasibility of adding an " ops" type l
l l
_ _ . . _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ ~ . . - . _ . _ . _ . , _ _ . , . . _ _ _ _ . . _ _ - _ . _ . _ _ . _ . - - _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ .
175 i system to the River Bend plant specifically.
2 The staff has over a number of years, as I am sure 3 you are well aware, worked with the Commission to develop a 4 Severe Accident Policy Statenient which has now been issued 5 and it does identify a path by which the staff and 6 operators of nuclear power plants that are licensed in this 7 Country are expected to explore severe accident issues.
g River Bend will take its turn at some due time in the 9 future in this respect.
t 10 Now, with those comments, I think we do have some 11 constructive things to add, and Jack Rosenthal will 12 Proceed. Thank you.
13 MR. ROSENTHAL: What I would like to do is
+
u indicate what we know about a plant that we think a fair i
15 amount, and that's GESSAR which we discussed in another a forum all day.
17 And then to indicate how we might attempt to bring
, is River Bend under the umbrella that the surrogate plants i9 that we are looking at represent.
l 20 Let me remind you that a PRA is a holistic process 21 in which you look at consequences, ways of containment l 22 failure and initiating events, and I would like to start
- l 23 and work my way backwards this time. {
24 (Slide) 25 Let's take GESSAR. What I'm showing here is a ;
i
176
( ). i number of events which we consider a GESSAR and showing the 2 conditional consequences of those events at what turns out 3 to be the Shippingport site. These are staff estimates.
4 GE estimates are an order of magnitude lower. IDCOR 5 estimates are even lower for consequences.
We can consider a long term of a pressurization of
~
6 j 7 the containment. The first event, early failure of the a containment due to hydrogen, assuming no igniters, but with 9 a fully-scrubbed release of the fission products through to the pool.
11 Intermediate failures, long-term failure, that 2TB-12 3 is the event that was discussed earlier with venting 13 where you can reject decay heat from the primary system to
, 14 containment, but you have no way of dumping the heat from is containment to the ultimate sink, so it eventually fails.
16 ATWS and small break LOCA, the bottom one.
17 I would like to make some points here, and that is is that for the MARK-3 containment the conditional i
19 consequences of ATWS are not dramatically greater than 20 other transients in which you melt the core and in turn
)
21 fail the containment. That is different from the view of a I
22 MARK-I or a MARK-II.
I 23 The next thing is that it looks like the pool is i 24 an efficient scrubber of radionuclides and it's hard to 25 bypass the pool.
(
I
177 i We don't have a risk profile for -- even if these 2
conditional consequences were true, we don't have a risk 3 profile for the River Bend facility because we don't know 4 how we can get to core melt.
5 But that answer is that for a wide variety of ways 6 the early fatalities seemed very low to us, these 7 conditional consequences. And the latent fatalities which a
scale is the person rem are less than we have seen in a 9 number of prior exercises.
10 So we would have every expectation that if River 11 Bend in fact looked like GEESAR, that it would be well 12 within the safety goal as a plant. The game is, how does 33 one assure that.
14 Let me just go on from there. I'd like to talk 15 about long-term over-pressure failure of containment we 16 would view to the core-concrete' reactions depending on if 17 you believe INTER or CORCON, you end up with ten to twenty is hours until you would over-pressurize the containment.
39 In the TW event we typically see numbers like 30 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br />, as stated earlier. But surely, we are talking about 21 long-term failure modes.
22 MR. OKRENT: Could I ask one question? Is there a 23 difference between GESSAR and River Bend with regard to the 24
-- with what's in the drywell -- the drywell arrangement.
25 In other words, below the vessel are they both the same, or O
l
178 m
y ) i is one different from the other?
2 MR. HOUSTON: We would want to look at that as the 3 kind of thing that we look at. We would want to look at 4 the kind of core -- this is -- well, it's GESSAR concrete 5 which looks more like limestone concrete than it looks like 6 basalted Concrete.
7 We would want to see if it's basalted concrete.
8 We would want to see if it's limestone, what the 9 Composition is. That would affect the rates.
10 But the conclusion we have here is that it looks 11 like long-term failure. I mean, it's ten or twenty hours, 12 it's not a rapid failure. But that's the sort of detail 13 that we would want to look at.
14 MR. OKRENT: Do they both have basically the same is geometry below the vessel?
16 MR. HOUSTON: I would want to confirm that.
17 MR. OKRENT: Is there somebody who can answer 18 that?
19 MR. REYNERSON: Don Reynerson, Gulf States 20 Utilities.
21 No, sir, we don't have the same configuration, at i
22 least in one aspect. It's my understanding -- and the GE 23 people can reinforce this -- that the pedestal on the 24 GESSAR design has a steel can -- the exact dimensions I am 25 not sure of -- and River-Bend does not. Our pedestal is O
179 i
~
/N
(_,/ i all concrete with some metal plates associated.
2 I think that's the primary difference from our 3 briefing you the last week or so.
4 MR. OKRENT: And below the vessel it looks pretty 5 much the same, the thicknesses of concrete and so forth?
6 MR. REYNORSON: Our thicknesses are -- I think 7
corium is three feet and the mats ten, the soil beneath. I B
can't comment any further than that. But I believe they 9 are very similar.
10 MR. ROSENTHAL: The mat is half the size and half it the thickness.
12 MR. OKRENT: Their mat.
< 13 MR. ROSENTHAL: Their mat.
ja MR. OKRENT: It's thinner.
15 MR. ROSENTHAL: It's thinner.
- 16 MR. OKRENT
- So there are some differences.
17 MR. ROSENTHAL: We would like to look at that.
is MR. OKRENT: All right.
39 MR. ROSENTHAL: The other thing that I wanted to 20 Point out is that we did a calculation, 3,000 pounds of 21 hydrogen, 50 pounds -- at Grand Gulf in the Containment 22 Load Working Group effort. This is meant as a bounding 23 calculation.
24 And the point that we have is that the pressure 25 due to burning all that hydrogen with passive heat sinks O
180
) I but no active heat sinks, is 40 PSI. And then the rest of 2 the slough here is due to core-concrete reaction.
3 So we feel reasonably comfortable about pressure 4 due to hydrogen burns not failing containment. CLASIX or 5 HECTOR might be a better way to do heat calculations. With 6 MARCH we calculated roughly 650 containment atmospheric 7 temperature due to the burn, and it drops off to passive 1 8 decay.
9 What we did in the Containment Load Group is to extracted --
11 MR. OKRENT: Excuse me, that last figure where you 12 show temperature --
13 MR. ROSENTHAL: Yes. And this is a continuous a burn in a two-volume representation of a containment. You 15 effectively tell MARCH that you have added so much energy 16 to the system. You take passive heat sinks and you 17 calculate the response.
is MR. OKRENT: And you are burning at 300 and 400 l
19 minutes still at 50 pounds a minute?
20 MR. ROSENTHAL: At 50 pounds a minute, 3,000 21 Pounds of hydrogen -- this is Grand Gulf -- and you will 22 eventually run out of air, about 3,000 pounds, out of 23 oxygen.
24 And I only mean to put this up to say that this l 25 would be representative of the kind of response that one m
l
4 l
181
() i would expect if one did a River Bend-specific analysis.
Now, that's the containment air temperature. To 2
3 do it right what one has to do is look at the heat flux to 4 critical components. We did an exercise where we took t 3 HECTOR results, looked at the heat fluxes to the wetwell-6 drywell equipment hatch and calculated the seal 7 temperatures as a function of time. They were modest.
8 So based on that, we have reasonable expectation 9 that the heat load from this now severe case would not fail 10 the containment integrity. And I leave it to other il analysts, as you heard earlier today, to worry about 12 equipment survivability.
33 MR. OKRENT: Again just so I understand, it's 50 i4 pounds a minute', 3,000 pounds total.
I 15 MR. ROSENTHAL: Yes, sir.'
I 16 MR. OKRENT: So it's being generated for 60 i
17 minutes; is that it?
I
- .is MR. ROSENTHAL: Yes, starting at about a hundred.
19 MR. OKRENT: Starting at a hundred. So, between 20 100 and 160 generation period.
l 21 MR. ROSENTHAL: Right.
1 22 MR. OKRENT: Okay, thank you.
23 MR. ROSENTHAL: Now we get a little bit stickier i 24 because for this hypothetical plant we can attempt to 25 relate conditional consequences, containment failure modes, <
L 1
1 i
I
182
.m i and the relative probabilities of their occurrences.
2 For GESSAR we have a picture that station blackout 3 dominates core melt frequency. LOCA is a small 4 contributor. Loss of containment heat removal is ten 5 percent or so, and ATWS is eight percent.
6 The RSS showed a loss of containment heat removal 7 at about a third, a different profile.
8 Station blackout looks important in GESSAR. We 9 would want to look specifically at River Bend to see what io its contribution was.
11 Now, where do we go from here? The staff is 12 developing -- the severe accident policy directs the staff s 33 to develop a plan within two years of publication of the 14 Severe Accident Policy Statement to do some sort of is examination of outliers and form an attempt to bring all is plants in the country under an umbrella in terms of risk 17 perspective as described at the surrogate plants.
is What we would want to look at are things like the 19 relative core melt frequency; the relative contribution of 20 seismic events at this plant relative to other plants. We 21 would want to look, from my perspective, at things like the 22 piping runs. It's very fortuitous on this plant that the 23 SRV line is inside the drywell and comes out below the 24 pool.
25 MR. EBERSOLE: I thought that was deliberate.
7
]
l l
183
() i MR. ROSENTHAL: Excuses me?
2 MR. EBERSOLE: I thought that was always 3
deliberate, not fortuitous. I thought it was deliberate 4 not fortuitous.
5 MR. ROSENTHAL: Well, it's surely deliberate that -
6
-fortuitous from a severe accident standpoint.
7 MR. EBERSOLE: Oh, okay, a MR. ROSENTHAL: The plant was designed without a 9 criterion. Now you are looking at it to see how it would
~
io perform.
11 We would want to look at the pedestal region. We ,
12 would want to look at the hatch between the wetwell and the i3 drywell. We would not do the kind of detailed assessment u that we did for GESSAR to look at the relative strength.
15 We would not do a finite element analysis sort of a calculations. ,
17 But we would want to assure that the wetwell is ,
- is weaker than the drywell such that you have high expectation 19 that an over-pressure failure would result in wetwell 20 failure and not drywell failure. l 21 We would want to look at lines that penetrate that 22 plant, such as the RBCW line that we discussed this morning, and look at its iso ation capability.
23 {
! 24 We are attempting to develop a checklist of things 25 that we would like to look at. IDCOR has a similar effort t
5 t
184
[) i underway. We imagine that that review will be more 2 hardware-oriented than a typical PRA, going out and looking 3 at equipment and the location of the equipment, and the 4 qualification of the equipment to a greater extent than 5 doing repeated MARCH or MAP calculations.
6 We would like to have some sort of surrogate to 7 say under what conditions does the River Bend drywell look -
8 - or cavity -- look enough like the GESSAR cavity or the 9 Grand Gulf cavity so we don't have to do analyses, and in to what conditions might we be required to do more analyses.
11 But we see it essentially as a checklist process.
12 On the front-end side of the game, things are a i3 little bit less definite. There are proposals to do at
)
14 least availability studies on the systems level in is boilers. For things like RCIC and HPCS we probably have 16 enough data, systems data from actuations, that we can 17 estimate reliability. The story is the same for diesels.
18 For systems which are seldom initiated, we have 19 relatively little systems-level availability data and there
, 20 we may have to go deeper into the construction of mini 21 fault trees. We don't imagine this effort going to the l
l 22 extent of a Level 1 PRA.
23 MR. OKRENT: Can I ask a guess from you? And you l
24 can say "no" after you hear the question and I won't be 25 mad.
O
,_]
185 p)
( ,
i I'm just looking at the picture and trying to 2 envisage whether if there were a core melt that went 3 through the vessel the particular configuration leaves the 4
wall between the wetwell -- or wherever you want to put the 5 pool -- and the central cavity.
6 Would that be thick enough that it's relatively 7
invulnerable, or is it a potential place where you could a have a rupture so that the wetwell, the water in the anulus 9 could get into the metal? I don't know if that would be 10 good or bad.
ii MR. ROSENTHAL: Can this water get into here?
12 MR. OKRENT: Okay. No.
MR. ROSENTHAL: I mean, there are ways. All 33 i4 you've got to do is raise the pressure here and you'll slop 15 it over the --
16 MR. OKRENT: But it would take that much, okay.
17 MR. ROSENTHAL: Well, it's just a few PSI.
is MR. OKRENT: But that's not different between any 39 of them, substantially.
20 MR. ROSENTHAL: No.
2i 22 23 24 25 l
O
i 186 1 MR. OKRENT: Any questions on this?
2 (No response.)
3 Mr. Mark reminds me that there was an opening 4 statement by Mr. Houston. I think one of the roles that 5 the ACRS may play that is different from what the staff 6 plays, since we are advisory only and not those who have 7 to, if you will, enforce the rules, we can afford to in a fact look at the rules themselves to see whether we.think 9 they are adequate. For example, we have looked at seismic
- 10 protection in the past and come up after a while with some 11 suggestions.
12 And so, as you well know, we try to get educated 13 at subcommittee meetings and sometimes on things that are a 14 little futuristic.
15 In any event, I think certainly the topic just 16 covered was in that spirit. I will see where the next f
17 topic lies when we finish the discussion, f 18 Okay, No. 7, UPPS. Was the applicant or the staff l
! 19 going to offer comments?
20 MR. DEDDENS: Our position with regard to the UPPS 21 system for the GESSAR is that the GESSAR is a proposed 22 -plant, a proposed design for a sometime in the future, 23 whereas River Bend is a plant in existence and very nearly 24 ready for plant operation.
25 We currently meet all of the requirements that O
I 187 l
C have been laid down in the regulatory process for that 1
2 plant. There are some features in existence on the River 3 Bend plant which satisfy some of the requirements of the i 4 UPPS system, although all of them. And we are prepared to 5 review some of those with you at this time. I 6 MR. OKRENT: Could you?
7 MR. DEDDENS: Yes.
8 MR. OKRENT: " ank you.
9 MR. REED: Don Reynerson, who we introduced to previously, will provide that discussion for us.
11 MR. OKRENT: In, and I won't say by way of 12 introduction, but in France they have looked at their 13 plants and tried to see could they develop what I might Os u call last ditch methods of getting water into either the is vessel or the containment, as the case may be, and in fact 16 are I think implementing certain kinds of things that are 17 now overly difficult. They are doing it on existing plants 18 on a schedule that doesn't interrupt their operation and so 19 forth.
20 (Slide.)
21 MR. REYNERSON: Now my exposure to UPPS has been rather 22 limited and quite recent. I did have the opportunity this 23 afternoon to sit in on the subcommittee's review of some of 24 the GE work in that area. My best information indicates 25 that UPPS is essentially a backup system of energy to O
l
188 l
l 1 provide water and control systems to prevent core melt, 2 control systems being air only. Energy supplies are 3 bottled energy and bottled air, and an offsite source of 4 water through portable pumps on a fire truck.
5 Now we have briefly explored containment venting 6 tonight. River Bend, in terms of the UPPS system does not 7 have an air only operated contain purge system. We have 8 some control power to our purge valves and some AC 9 solenoids.
10 Our backup water supply, we have the ability to 11 put fire main into the service water system and into LPCI 12 that exists. There is no question about that. We have to, 13 in terms of using a fire truck, we would have to make some O' 14 modifications to at least two check valves that we know of 15 currently.
16 MR. BOOKER: I just want to mention that the fire 17 system is provided by two diesel driven power plants.
I 18 MR. REYNERSON: Yes, we have that also. That is l
19 in existence. But we also have the ability with some minor 20 modifications to put fire truck water into the LPCI system.
21 The other features, air-only-operated SRV's and 22 air-only-operated containme'nt vent valves, we do not have 23 that capability currently.
24 We also do not have mechanical pressure and level 25 gauges installed at this time.
5 y - _
- - . . _ - - - .... . .- . . - .. . . . . - _ . ~- .- - - ..
189 1 MR. OKRENT: Jesse, any questions?
2 MR. EBERSOLE: Well, in this big brotherhood of 3 utilities relationships are not always so congenial. Some of your companion utilities are making some substantial i
4 5 efforts I guess I should say to augment the simplicity and 6 reasonability and believability in the terminal process of 7 Cooling the core when these vast and complex systems a somehow fail to execute the predictions of the PRA studies.
9 I can point to several Cases that exhibit these i io sort of things, notably the last Davis-Besse event, and 11 prior to that the Hatch event in which there were a number 12 of coincident common mode failures. I don't know. I just 13 think we have kind of a yardstick of conservatism here with O 14 which to compare utilities at large as-to whether they will l 15 voluntarily invoke, not being forced by the staff, greatly 16 8implified methods to achieve terminal cooling at what I 17 would Call modest incremental expense Considering the is enormous investment that you have got in these plants 19 already. You can't even find these small increments that I 20 think we are talking about.
21 And to not consider them on a cost basis against 22 these huge investments I think would be a rash approach to 23 the problem.
24 MR. BOOKER: Well, Mr. Ebersole, we certainly will 25 be considering those and we need to look at those. We O
- =- .- . - .---. __
i 190 4
) I haven't had time right now to look at them.
2 MR. BOOKER: Well, if it is a time problem, I 3 sympathize with that, j d MR. BOOKER: But we will certainly continue to 5 look at our design and certainly in areas where we can add 6 equipment that is a non-safety related area that can i
-lI 7 improve the availability of the decay heat removal system, e and we will look at incorporating those.
9 MR. EBERSOLE: One of the merits of this system is 10 I think you and I and the man on the street, and virtually 11 anybody, including these ferocious intervenors can hardly 12 deny the efficacy and reliability of this approach to 13 cooling a boiler. You can't do it for the PWR. You are 14 fortunate to have a boiler.
! 15 And, therefore, I think it would be rash not to 16 exploit this characteristic of this plant.
17 MR. BOOKER: We certainly intend to look at that.
i 18 MR. EBERSOLE: Was that what you wanted?
! 19 (Laughter.)
20 MR. OKRENT: Any other questions?
21 (Laughter.)
22 All right. Thank you. j
, i l 23 Does anybody have any questions or comments on any i 24 prior topics? ;
25 MR. HOUSTON: I would like to go back momentarily m I i i i
y --
- p. - - - - -g p m.. -
--pw ,-y-w- w , m., , - - e . .-_,,, _ _r^-
191 !
( 1 to the subject of containment venting procedures and 2 acknowledge Jesse's remarks which caused me a little bit of 3 concern.
4 I want to end this with a question to you which I 5 hope you might be able to respond to either now or later.
6 At the present time, as I understand it, the River 7 Bend license has a condition on it which requires that they 8 have a staff approved emergency venting procedure before 9 they exceed full power.
10 I believe that the staff in effect imposed that 11 condition on the River Bend licensee in good faith with 12 the expectation that it was a readily resolvable problem.
13 I think that the question that has been raised 14 here would suggest that that may not be the case.
15 So the question that I would like to put to you is 16 do you think it would be more prudent for the staff to 17 approve a procedure about which you and we'may have is legitimate residual concerns, or would it be better to 19 license the plant without an approved emergency venting 20 procedure for containment?
21 MR. OKRENT: Why don't we assume that the l 22 committee will try to address this question. I think that 23 would be more helpful to you than individuals offering 24 individual opinions. As you know, it is the subcommittee's 25 job to try to collect information and to some extent i
l
192 1 suggest to the committee where they should focus their 2 limited time, but not to offer opinions on behalf of the 3 full committee.
4 Are there any other comments or questions at this 5 time?
6 (No response.) I 7 Well, if not, let me provide you with a -- let's a see, you didn't talk about PRA, but if you will not object, f 9 I will suggest that we not go into it in view of the 10 lateness of the hour. j 11 Is that okay. l t
12 MR. BOOKER: That is fine. l 13 MR. OKRENT: It won't hurt your feelings?
14 (Laughter.) ,
15 MR. BOOKER: No, sir. f 16 MR. OKRENT: Okay. ,
It is only 20 to 7 for me, but 17 some of these people woke up on eastern time. j 18 (Laughte r. ) l l !
19 MR. WYLIE: But you got up early. l 20 MR. OKRENT: Well, I got up early, you are right.
21 (Laughter.)
I r 22 In any event, I think what we are going to try to ;
i 23 do is cover the first portion of this subcommittee meeting !
24 via a subcommittee report and then see what comments either f 25 the applicant or the staff want to make specifically in O i l
i r I !
I s
.e . . ,
193 f
1 that area.
2 But Mr. Mark is going to try to summarize it to 3 the full committee briefly in order that we leave more time 4 for what I think are probably the two principal areas aside 5 from anything else the staff wants to tell us, namely, the 6 hydrogen control and the question of containment venting 7 and whether or not you are ready for a procedure and so a forth.
9 MR. MARK: I would just like to get a response 10 from Mr. Stern and Mr. Booker.
11 I would propose to mention the things which I 12 thought were likely to be of definite interest to the full 13 committee. There didn't seem to be very much of a 14 difference of opinion between the applicant and the staff, is and I believe I could tell them that rather than have you 16 separately bring that point out again.
17 So I would like to make a very brief reference to is the work we heard about on the diesels and the state of 19 things as they now are.
20 I would like to make a brief reference also to the 21 fact that the investigation has been covered very 22 thoroughly by the applicant and that it is not got the 23 appearance of a thing that is likely to blow up in a big 24 public flap.
25 I would like to report that Region IV finds the O
194 b
t,,/ 1 staffing plans to their liking.
2 And I would like to bring up the remark that you 3 people brought to us that this is a project which has moved 4 from its start to its present state in 72 months, which I 5 think will surprise everybody and certainly interest them, 6 but not say much more than I have already said about those 7 things, perhaps a little bit just to put them in context of 8 Course.
9 The other thing is I would perhaps like Mr. Stern 10 just to mention those outstanding issues which I regard as 11 open or which would take some time to resolve and not go 12 down the list of things which have been outstanding or r 13 things which won't really come up again, but what are the 14 things which have yet to have comment. I think you could 15 do that better ---
16 MR. STERN: If I could answer it now. Apparently 17 everything, with the exception of -- well containment la venting is a licensed condition -- everything is now 19 closed, if we presume hydrogen control is closed.
20 MR. MARK: Well, there is hydrogen control which 21 is going to get resolved.
22 MR. STERN: Yes.
23 MR. MARK: But only after a period of a year or 24 perhaps a year and a half. I don't if there is anything 25 else in that same situation. But it was just to have you O
(G
195 i
l' confirm that things are on a clear deck so they know that.
2 MR. STERN: We will be happy to.
3 MR. MARK: Now then I would of course, after I 4 have gone through this, invite any explanatory or 5 correctional comments from either you or you people as to 6 the way I may have put something, and the other members of 4 7 the committee may have questions that they would like to 8 hear you comment on.
9 That I think would get over the stuff that we did 10 before we got to the points that Dave just mentioned, which 11 I believe will deserve much more discussion.
12 MR. OKRENT: Okay. So if we assume 20 minutes for 13 what Dr. Mark just discussed and if we need 15 minutes or O 14 so margin at the end, that gives us like I have got 85 is minutes. So let's assume we are going to use about 50 or 16 55 minutes on hydrogen or 60 minutes or so. So the staff 17 should perhaps have a presentation, including committee l 1B questions, that uses two-thirds of that time, and the 19 applicant would have a half of a third because always you '
l 20 have to figure half of your time the committee is going to 21 use up for your comments in the hydrogen control area.
22 And that would leave us on the order of about 25 23 minutes for the containment venting business. So we can j 24 assume that the staff introduces it as they did here, not 25 using more than 12 minutes, and the applicant uses the :
196 l l
I L~s/ 1 remainder roughly and then we have this small cushion.
2 And you might, since we didn't talk about PRA 3 today, give us one minute on your use of PRA or whatever 4 you were going to say about it. l 5 MR. STERN: Excuse me. Could I just clarify. The 6 55 minutes on hydrogen control, that was what, one third 7 staff ---
8 MR. OKRENT: I said two-thirds for the staff, 9 including questions by the committee, and one-third for the 10 applicant, including questions by the committee. In other 11 words, you don't set up a presentation that uses two-12 thirds.
13 MR. MARK: Would you think it proper for you in 14 your introductory remarks to tell the committee members is what you think has happened to the comments made ---
16 MR. OKRENT: Yes. I will try to briefly discuss 17 the other -- not the hydrogen and not the venting thing, I la will let those develop, but I will mention what we were 19 told on seismic and whatever else ---
20 MR. BOOKER: The HPCS diesel generator.
21 MR. OKRENT: Yes, the diesel.
22 Any other questions?
l 23 MR. STERN: One comment. I think it would be an l
24 underestimate, speaking for the staff and for the utility, 25 to express our appreciation for your scheduling this 0
1
197 1 meeting at these hours and under very short notice.
2 MR. OKRENT: Well, anyway, thank you all for this l
3 late but nevertheless interesting meeting, and I will 4 adjourn it.
5 (Whereupon, at 9:50 p.m., the meeting adjourned.)
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I O\ 1 CERT lFiCATE OF OFFlClAL REPORTER 2
3 4
5 This is to certify that the attached proceedings 6 before the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the 7 matter of: ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS
- e 9 Name of Proceeding
- Subcommittee on River Bend Station 10 11 Docket No.
12 Place: Washington, D. C.
13 Date: Wednesday, September 11, 1985 14 j 15 were held as herein appears and that this is the original 16 transeript thereof for the file of the United States. Nuclear 17 Regulatory Commission.
18 ,
(Signature) g g%
(Typed Name of Reporter) Mary C2 Simons 20 21 22 ,
23 O 24 Ann Riley & Associates, Ltd.
I i
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l
/
NRR STAFF PRESENTATION TO THE
. O ACRS l
l l
SUBJECT:
EMERGENCY CONTAINMENT VENTING i
DATE: SEPTEMBER 11, 1985 l !
PRESENTER: GERALD R. MAZETIS f r
!O~
l PRESENTER'S TITLE / BRANCH /DIV: SECTION LEADER PROCEDURES AND SYSTEMS REVIEW BRANCH l DIVISION OF HUMAN FACTORS SAFETY ;
l PRESENTER'S NRC TEL. NO.: (301)492-7254 SUBCOMMITTEE: ACRS SUBCOMITTEE ON RIVER BEND STATION I
I f f
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O O O .
CONTAINMENT VENTING S 1982 STAFF SER (GENERIC LETTER 82-33)
APPROVED BWR CONTAINMENT VENTING FOR BEYOND DESIGN BASIS SCE .
O PURPOSE LAST REMAINING CONTAINMENT PRESSURE CONTROL ACTION ALLOW A CONTROLLED RELEASE OF CONTAINMENT ENVIRONMENT TO PREVENT AN UNCONTROLLED RELEASE O GENERIC STAFF SER SUGGESTED AN INTERIM VENTING PRESSURE OF TWICE THE DESIGN PRESSURE WITH PLANT-SPECIFIC DEMONSTRATION
,0F CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY 0 GENERIC STAFF SER ENC 0URAGED CONTINUED BWR OWNERS GROUP EFFORT DURING THE LONGER TERM TO BETTER DEFINE METHODS FOR DEFINING CONTAINMENT VENTING PRESSURE
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g 0)I Q IA I evenvoerner, EPA EPA umm, xtoecunww:y I I N8c"' ,
ca. Ass.tE EPA l Epp ______________.
- _ ,_ .f. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ________________
< i j/ 'RPS SJS A
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! AGS SUBCOMMITE 1
on
! River Band Statloa ,
D. Okrent, Chairman September 11.1985 -
i Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Stephen M. Stern !
Project Manager
~ ~
O O O i ASEERDA e RIVER BEND SCHEDULE
- PRINCIPAL REVIEW ISSUES ,
- Qualification of TDI Diesels j
- Hydrogen Control-Degraded Core e OPEN ITEMS 1 - Changes from last ACRS Meeting i
e LICENSE CONDITIONS ll e DEFFr JD CONSTRUCTION e INVESTIGATION MATTER 1
EEEbEE EEEEb5 l Miestmo Th"e f.dtn) latta Begin Fuel Load 0 8/31 l C(Dan [pSesca Funcea kDe(B 18 9/18 l Complete Testing 22 9/22 Enter Mode 4 23 9/23 Install Head / enter Mode 2 25 9/25 l Reactor Critical 26 9/26 55 F(DUF(a(r/ Enter Mode 1 4I I0/11 ;
20% Power 48 10/18 25% Power 61 10/31 35% Power 70 11/09 50% Power 84 11/23 '
75% Power 94 12/03 100% Power 123 1/01
@ SED (DS(BS(B BSS 730Sa 154 2/01
~ ~
O O O G1GTRTAMBHMS IRSmtB i
Changes from the Last A CRSMeeting
(( H E ET/ATalm 19 Separation of Electric Cire. Closed 20a SPDS Lic. Cond.
20b Control Room Survey Closed 20c Resolution od HEDs Lic. Cond.
21a Standby Service Water Closed 21b Standby Liquid Control Closed 21c Low-Pres Interface Leakage Closed 21d Equipment & Floor Drains Closed 21e Control Build Ventilation Closed .
I 2if Misc HVAC Systems Closed 22 Start Volt-Class IE Motors Closed 23 Hydrogen Control Under Review
~
O' O O CGERNRM4\ TORY 271RMB Changes from the Last A CRSMeeting fl2 E E 9EP/ARTl191 65 UHS w/ delayed fan start Closed 66 DCRD Lic. Cond.
67 Tast Anal. Documentation Closed 68 Control Room Modifications Closed 69 Containment Venting Proced Lic. Cond.
70 Monitor Instr for HPCS ac Closed t 7i Protect-Lighting Penetration Closed 72 Process Control Program Interim Apprv 73 Subcompart Pressure Anal Closed ,
74 Cable Derating Closed 75 Equip Qualification-Audit Awaiting Info.
o O
o o 'l River Bend SER l
Outstanding Issue Resolution Status Low Power License 30 25 =--
20 = -
No.
issues j 15 - -
/ -
10 - - - -
5-- - -
0-- --+- I i i
SER SSER1 SSER2 SSER3 I
O Issues Open E Issues Resolved i
~ '
O O O River Bend SER
- Confirmatory item Resolution Status l
Low Power License 80 t
70 'ti '
l qi l j{f i!!!n l .
. 5gi
! 60 - -
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SER SSERI SSER2 SSER3 1
1 1 8 Items Open items Resolved
~ '
O' O O LHERMER HBMBHTIGMB e 5% Rated Power .
l e Turbine Maintenance
! = Seismic & Dynamic Qualification
- Environmental Qualification
- e Mark III Related Issues l
- Inservice Inspection Program e Bypassed & Inoperable Status
- TDI Diesel Engines e Ultimate Heat Sink -
.
- Fire Protection l
LISIGEB1R GMEBITIGREE femmm_n
~
! e Operating Staff Experience
- Post Fuel Loading Test Program l e Partial Feedwater Heating ,
e Emergency Response Capability e Salem ATWS l
- Emergency Planning I
REIWRREID GDNETRRL*!fHOW l
= HIGH & MODERATE ENERGY LINE BREAK
= TDI DIESEL LOADING ,
= CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW l = BYPASSED & INOPERABLE STATUS
= SAFE / ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN
= LIGHTING SYSTEM
! = FIRE WRAPPING OF ELECTRIC RACEWAYS i
= ASIATIC CLAM CONTROL 1
= CONDENSER & NORMAL SERVICE WATER
= SOLID RADWASTE ,
! = FUEL BUILDING SAMPLING SYSTEM
= ELEVATORS l = CONTROL ROD DRIVE MAINT. FACILITY L- . ___ _- - -. _- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .
3,,,,g,upg,,
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= CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERIC MONITORING
= HVAC-REACTOR & AUXILIARY BUILDINGS
= POST ACCIDENT M NITORING SYSTEM
= SPDS 4
i = INTAKE STRUCTURE & CLARIFIER
= OFF-GAS SYSTEM
= CRANES & HOISTS
= GENERATOR H 2 AND CO 2
= MISC. BUILDING FLOOR DRAINS i = LIQUID RADWASTE (B-TRAIN)
= C0 FIRE PROTECT-TURBINE GENERATOR
, _2 e; -.
= HVAC TESTING ,
= STATION ELECTRIC DISTRIB. VOLT. ANAL.
NSE(( $U
= GSU Quality Concern Program I
- -350 concerns previously investigated
= At NRC request, work of 12 individuals i reviewed i
i = GSU Concluded:
- River Bend Station has been j constructed in substantial agreement l with docketed commitments and
! applicable regulatory requirements including 10CFR50 Appendix B..."
i
= Region IV Inspection concluded:
...no deleterious effect on the River Bend design... River Bend Station has
--- ~ been constructed in substantial e.
agreement with docketed commitments and regulatory requirements..."
. f i
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I O O O l RMmqWHEEAIL A l
Job: Preliminary Testing l!
J
! All work underwent 2 or 3 subsequent j inspections I
ilmmHWHEEAILfl m_ E & E Job: pipefitter apprentice /pipefitter l
ironworker apprentice / ironworker i All work performed with subsequent inspections 1
llMmqWHERAIL lY Job: mechanics helper-cable wrap All work performed under immediate supervision of a qualified mechanic or journeyman
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j ammawamEAa. m p i
l Job: Field Qualify Control Inspectors l Revelavation of work based on Mit Std 105D i
i
-720 welds selected (GSU & Reg IV) 1
-314 welds had been reinspected
-406 welds
! 57 reinspected 2 minor defects Conclude: Inspections meet acceptance criteria of Mit Std 105D for a 1.5% Acceptable Quality Level.
RWBHWHEMAIL IL <-
No record of this individual employed at River Bend
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I GULF STATES UTILITIES RIVER BEND STATION SALP RATINGS CATEGORY PERIOD ENDING l
7/31/83 12/31/84 1 1 ;
MANAGEMENT CONTROL 2 1
- CORRECTIVE ACTION AND REPORTING l
DESIGN CONTROL 1 2 i
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i ALL OTHER CATEGORIES i i t
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O RIVER BEND INSPECTION HISTORY NO. OF INSPECTIONS INSPECTOR HOURS YEAR 3 41 1975 52 1976 2 l 98 1977 7 6 71 l: 1978 1979 8 335 1980 14 766 f
15 1,535 j
1981 1982 16 1,653 l
1983 22 1,827 l
- 1984 38 8,688 '
i 1985* 59 6,734 TOTALS 21,800 i
! 'TO DATE (2511, 2512, AND 2513 PROGRAMS) l i
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TOTAL 37 :
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! CLOSED 28 4
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i NO ALLEGATION AT RIVER BEND HAS RESULTED IN ESCALATED ENFORCEMENT i
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1 O ACRS SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING <
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! AND AC AND DC EQUIPMENT POWER SUPPLIES TYPE EQUIPMENT ID DESCRIPTION
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OF SAFETY i 1 1 E 12* MOVO8 7 A,B MOTOR-OPERATED VALVE l 1 E 12 *M O V 47 A,B WITH LIMITORQUE 500%
ACTUATOR
!O2 1ENB* BAT 01 A,B BATTERIES AND BATTERY RACKS 6.16%
3 1 RH S* RTD55 A,B THERMOCOUPLES 900%
1 R H S* RTD47 A,B 4 1RHS* LT119 PRESSURE TRANSMITTER 450%
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- SWG1 A,8 4.16ky SWITCHGEAR 675%
6 1E12*PVF051 A,B 4*-900* GLOBE 453%
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'7 1 E 12*RVF025 A,8 RELIEF VALVE l )900%
'""S*"CC2 A,B,C,D' MOTOR CONTROL O' CENTER 300%
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O ADDITIONAL STRUCTURAL l 1
DESIGN MARGINS MARGIN OF SAFETY
.O CAT 1 CABLE TRAY / SUPPORTS 250%
i SMALL BORE PIPE / SUPPORTS 350%
l INSTRUMENT SUPPORTS 300% .
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RBS PRELIMINARY ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT SURVIVABILITY ANALYSIS 1
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EQUIPMENT SURVIVABILITY BASED CN 1/4 SCALE ENVIRCMENTS PROGRAM 'IO DEMNSTRATE FINAL CCNPLIANCE 1
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o RESULTS - SCRV CASE ;
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MAXINE CAICULATED PRESSURE CF 7.3 PSIG DURING 2H RE2ASE 1300 F PEAKS ITR BURNS DURING CCNSTANT HYDROGEN RE2ASE t
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- MAXIMM CAICUIATED PRESSURE CF 12.7 PSIG DURING H2RELEASE i
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1 1
RBS HYDROGEN CCNTRCL PROGRAM i
EQUIINENT SURVIVABILITY BASED CN 1/4 SCALE DNIRO@ENTS l
o ANALYZED RESPCNSE CF 2 CCMPCNENTS TO 1/4 SCALE !!NVIRCtWENT i
IGTITER IGiITER POWER CABLE o USED ACIUAL DATA FRN 1/4 SCALE TEST FOR THIS ANALYSIS j
o BCTIH CCNPCNENTS SURVIVE WI'IH CCNSIDERABLE MAIGIN 1
O
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O O O RBS HYDROGEN IGNITER ASSEMBLY EXPOSED TO QSTF S-15 T203 400 350 -
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120 -
100 , , , , , , ,,,,,,,,
O 4 8 12 18 20 24 28 (Thous an ds)
FULL SCALE TIME (SECONDS)
D SOX SURFACE + TRANS FORMER 340 F Figure 6. Thermal response of a Power Systems hydrogen igniter, as predicted by IIEATING-6 for QSTF test S.15.
O O O IGNITER SMALL POWER CABLE EXPOSED TO QSTP TEST S.15 T203 500 450 400 -
C O 350 -
e w
@ 300 -
3 y 250 - ,
2 e
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I
,' 150 - j _- _ _
l 100 l
O 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 (Thous an ds)
FULL SCALE T!ME (SECONDS)
D CONDUCTOR + INSUL C JACK ET A50 F
, Figure 5. 'Ihermal resy.nm of the River Bend Station conduited small power cable, as predicted by HEATING-6 l for QSIT test S.15.
l
RBS HYDROGEN CCNTROL PROGRAM PROGRAM 'IO DENCNSTRATE FINAL CCNPLIANCE o RESULTS INDICATE '1 EAT ALL EQUIPMENT WILL SURVIVE HYDROGEN i
BURNS BASED UPOi CURRENT 1/4 SGLE TESTING o ADDITICNAL TESTING AND ANALYSIS ARE SCHEDULED FOR CCEPIETICH IN ORDER TO DENCESTRATE CCNPLIANCE WrIE 'IEE HYDROGEN RUIE CCEPIETE RBS 1/4 SCALE MCDEL TESTING (EXPECTED JULY,1986)
CCNm FINAL ANALYSIS (EXPECTED DECDEER,1986) l l
l O
I
r CONTAlWENT VENTING ;
t h
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O CONTAlftENT MIE ACRS LETTER IRlE 7-17-8I4 GSU HAS PROPOSED TO INCUJDE IN TE RIVER BEND EERGENCY PROQIVE A PROEDUE FOR VENTING TE CONTAlffENT LNDER &RTAIN ACCIIHT CONDITIONS. TE BASIS FOR TE ECISION TO TAIE THIS ACTION ARE NOT YET OfAR. TE NRC STAFF HAS NOT CDFLETED ITS EVIEW 0F THISPROPOSAL.
TE ACRS WISHES TO E ADVISED-WKN TE NRC STAFF HAS READED A POSITim ON THIS MATTER AND TO HAVE TE OPPORTINITY TO CMENT GEERICAl.l.Y OR SPECIFICALLY.
l O
O ~~
P90mEE STATIE I
o VENTIE PRD&IEE IDELDPED l
i o PPDEDUE llNDER NRC STAFF EVIEW o ESOLIIIIM PRIOR TO EXCEEDIE St i
O l
l i
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, t O ,
i
O ESPONSIBILITY RR VENTING ECISION o GSU BERGENCY DIECTOR IS ESPONSIBLE FOR ECISION TO VENT CMTAlt!M o ECISION MaK IN CONJLtLTION HITH IFRIT FIOi ECWEPY MEER O
1 O
O O O
'l PLANT CONTAINMENT ANNULUS .
STACK i
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TREATMENT AUXILI ARY BUILDING l SU,3gg_SS10N
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O PROBABILISTIC RISK ASSESSENT O
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, O RIVER BEND PRA l t
i i
i PHASE 1 - PRA 4
4 .
o WASH-II400 i o RSSMAP 1
i o GRAf0 GULF-1
" O o SITE SPECIFIC CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS h
i i .
l i
I l
,,-..,,-,--,.,--.---,_,-------,.,-..---,an.,-.----. - - - - , . - . - , - , , - - . . - . . . - - , - , , , . - - . - - , , - - . . . , - - - - . - - .
O RIVER BEND PRA PHASE 2 - PRA o GRAND GULF ACCIDENT AND CONTAINTNT EVENT TREES o PLANT SPECIFIC i
FAULT TREES O COPMON CAUSE FAILUE OF ELECTRICAL POWER SUPPLY AND SERVICE WATER SUPPLY o INP0 NPRDS + NRC LER DATA SUFMARY l
o OPERATOR ACTION - SWAIN'S HANDBOOK o DRAFT REPORT IS tNDER EVIEW PREDICTED COE ELT FEQUENCY LOWER THAN LIE RICK & GRAND GILF
RIVER BEND PRA 4
O PHASE 2 - SEISMIC o BENIGN SITE RIVER BEND INCLUDED IN " SEISMICITY OWNERS GROUP" STUDY EARTliOUAKE EXCEEDING DESIGN BASE 10-5/YR.
o CONTRIBUTION TO A?NUAL ELT FEQUENCY FROM EARTHQUAKES AT LIERICK EARi}0 JAKES 0.3 E-6 INTERNAL INITIATORS 9.2 E-6 FIE AND OTER CONTRIBUTORS 7.5 E-6 TOTAL APNUAL COE ELT FEQUENCY 17.0 E-6 o CONCLUSION NO FURTHER ANALYSIS EQUIRED O
i P
RIVER BEND PRA !
r i
O !
PHASE 2 - FIRES !
o GESSAR-II PRA i EVENT AND FAULT TREES I o RIVER BEND FIE PROTECTION EASURES i i
APPENDIX R i
o ESTIMATED FIE INDUCED COE DAMAGE FEQUENCY FIE INDUCED O TOTAL MM MM l
i GESSAR-II -
9.4E-8 i
RIVER BEND 3.4E-5 3.6E-7 ' !
4 LIERICK 1.7E-5 1.3E-6 l 4
o CONCLUSION: ;
L NO FURTER ANALYSIS EQUIRED i O j I
.I P
, , -. n. -- - ,,- ,--,.v ,- - - - , - , - - - - , - , - - , . - - > , - - , ,,---r , -, --- - - , -. ---, "
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, RIVER BEND PRA !
< l l
PHASE 3 - FUTURE PRA o DEVELOP PRA CAPABILITY AT GSU AS NEEDED FOR:
COPPARISON OF ALTERNATIVES PROCEDURES MAINTENANCE PLAfEING O TRAINING /SivutATOR DESIGN CONTROL i
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l i Figure 15.1 Principal features of MARK III containment /
Q l
i I
1 1
GESSAR II SSER 2 15-44 !
Table 15.1 Conditional consequence's predicted by the staff for internally initiated events and probability of i occurrence with and withest UPPS, per reacter year
- Probability Release Early Early Latent Person-category
- fatality injury fatality rems w/o UPP$ w/UPP5 1-T-L3 0 0 40 7 x E5** 3 x E-6 9 x E-7 1-T-E3 0 0.0006 200 3 x E6 0 x E-6 1 x E-6 1-T-12Q 0 3 200 3 x E6 1 x E-5 1 x E-6 i l 2-T.-03 0 0 300 5 x E6 4 x E-6 4 x E-7 l ATWS 0 1 400 6 x E6 3 x E-6 3 x E-6 1-T-12 0 6 500 0 x E6 3 x E-6 3 x E-7 1-58-El 0.006 10 600 9 x E6 1 x E-9 1 x E-9
- See definitions in Table 15.15.
- 7 x E5 = 7 x los, t i
Notes:
(1) All conditional mean consequences were calculated using the upper i
i range BNL source tare values described in SS.ER 2. -
(2) The calculations assumed the Shippingport site, with public evacuation within 10 miles and relocation 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> after plume passage.
(3) Mean consequences were computed over 91 different weather conditions.
i l
I GESSAA II SSER 4 15-31
\ ._ -
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==..........=m._ -
GESSAR2 TQUXLF CORCON-MARCH 2-151 5-21-85 u __ . - - - . _ _ _ - _ - - _ - - _ - - - . - . - - - - - . _ - - - - - - - _ - .
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\O l i
NRR STAFF PRESENTATION TO THE o ACRS V ,
SUBJECT:
RIVER BE!1D HYDR 0 GEN IGillTION SYSTEll -
Suit 1ARY OF RESULTS OF SSER N0. 4 DATE: SEPTEllBER IL 1985 PRESENTER: ALLEN NOTAFRANCESCO O
PRESENTER'S TITLE / BRANCH /DIV: C0;lTAINNENT SYSTB1S BP#lCH/CSB/DSI/flf',R PRESENTER'S NRC TEL. NO.: 492-9487 s SUBCOMMITTEE: REGARDIilG RIVER BEllD STATIO!!
l O
O i
SUMMARY
OF THE STAFF EVALUATION REGARDING THE RIVER BEND PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS
! s HYDROGEN IGNITION SYSTEM DESIGN DESCRIPTION e PEAK PRESSURE CAPABILITY OF CONTAINMENT
,Qe PEAK CONTAINMENT PRESSURE RESULTING FROM HYDR 0 GEN COMBUSTION i
e PRELIMINARY EQUIPMENT SURVIVABILITY ANALYSIS O
r O
1 l
l O RIVER BEND STATION MARK 111 CONTAINMENT .
- DOME (20 IGN \TERS) n n
.,i G
b
\ SHIELD BLOG
~
a - El 166'3" s
b r STEEL
[ / CONTMT
. - El /t 2 '.1
H -
- i - PRIM ARY
, f t/ isa,rn: 'y SHIELD WALL 23 e.eu ;; p l
- EL ft/j' N}, , t A A,
,. g -~ _-s n /-HCU FLOOR -Et ne' 7- '
/
[ _.
.cn ente I- -(
l d b N
N DRYWELL-(18 JGverE45)
.! y -)9
- w .
Jf WEIR WALL [ f, h row -tc4' ismrrn l
l O eLANT NAMe GRAND GUtF esaRY river send THERMAL POWER, MWT 3,833 3,579 2,894 NUFSER FUEL BUNDLES 800 748 624 75% MWR EQUIVALENT +2,500 -2,350 -2,000 (LBM 0F HYDROGEN) i CONTAINMENT TYPE REINFORCED FREE STANDING FREE STANDING CONCRETE STEEL STEEL CONTAINMENT CHARACTERISTICS DESIGN PRESS (PSIG) 15 15 15 ULT PRESS CAP (PSIG) 56 50 53 REV. DESIGN PRESS (PSIG) 3.0 0.8 0.6 REV. PRESS CAP (PSIG) >5 VAC. BRKERS. 4.8 FREE AIR V0L (FT') 1.4E6 1.141E6 1.192E6 SPRAY FLOW RATE l (GPM) 5,650 5,250 N/A l
l O
l
1 O '
RIVER BEND CONTAINMENT RESPONSE ANALYSIS 1 l
e CLASIX-3 COMPUTER CODE USED
- MULTI-COMPARTMENT
- LUMP-PARAMETER 1
- - MODELS DEFLAGRATION TYPE H2 COMBUSTION 1
e POSTULATED EVENTS CONSIDERED
- SORV
- DRYWELL BREAK
\ -
e RESULTS OF CLASIX ANALYSES l .
l
- NUMEROUS DISCRETE WETWELL BURNS
- PEAK TEMP - 1300*F
- PEAK PRESS PULSES 12 PSIG l
- FORCED GLOBAL BURN PRODUCES SORV - 24 PSIG
({])
DWB - 35 PSIG
' ' TIGURE 3
/ .
O GSU/ RIVER BEND 5 VOL. AUG.85 WETWELL TEMPERATURE 2.4 2.2 -
2-1.E -
p 1.6 -
+
l'!S 1.4 -
$c g! 1.2 -
1-
., Ek i
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o.6 - [
i o.4 -
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12 16 20 24 28 TIME (1000 SECOND5)
)
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O
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- ll.
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G 700.0 ,
ll ,
ll !
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$ ! MEl I ;- :
- f .
300.0 ~
l 100.0 . . Y ~b .
0.0 2.0 en l h 40 6.0 TIME (SECONOS) X 1000 GCNS BASE CASE SORV j VETVELL TEMPERATURE l r
i i
i i
i l
O Figure 42 l i
PRELIMINARY RESULTS FROM 1/4 SCALE
() FACILITY SCOPING TESTS e FORMATION OF DIFFUSION FLAMES ON THE P0OL SURFACE AT LOW l
HYDR 0 GEN RELEASE RATES I
e GLOBAL DEFLAGRATIONS DID NOT OCCUR COMPARTMENTAL LIGHT-0FF BURNS e BULK HYDR 0 GEN CONCENTRATION DID NOT EXCEED 5 V/0 e PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS - CLASIX-3 PREDICTIONS MAY BE
)
i APPROPRIATE FOR A LIMITED RANGE OF HYDR 0 GEN RELEASE RATES FOR MARK III CONTAINMENTS e IGNITERS ARE EFFECTIVE IN CONTROLLING HYDR 0 GEN ACCUMULATION
~ _ _ , . , - _ _ _ __ -- .. _.
1 O
OVERALL. STAFF CONCLUSIONS ,
J e CONFORMANCE TO HYDR 0 GEN RULE
- ADEQUATE PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS B
1 l
- PROGRAM FOR LONG TERM RESOLUTION IN PLACE l e FINAL ANALYSIS FOR RIVER BEND
!O j - HC0G PROGRAM e DOMINATED BY TEST PATA FROM 1/4 SCALE i FACILITY
- FINAL ANALYSIS SCHEDULE FOR COMPLETION l
l
! e DEC 1986 l
O
IMPLEMENTATION FEATURES OF HYDROGEN CONTROL RULE 10CFR50,44(c)(3)(IV)-(VII) e EFFECTIVE DATE OF RULE - FEB, 25~, 1985 e PROPOSED SCHEDULE FOR MEETING RULE - BY JUNE 25, 1985 e STAFF RESPONSE - FINAL SCHEDULE - BY SEPT, 23, 1985 e COMPLIANCE WITH PARA, (C)(3)(Iv)(A) - BEFORE EXCEEDING 5% POWER HYDR 0 GEN CONTROL SYSTEM PROVIDED (IGNITERS)
O -
SUITABLE PROGRAM 0F EXPERIMENT AND ANALYSIS CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY MAINTAINED - 75% MWR i
e PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS TO SUPPORT INTERIM OPERATION AT FULL POWER e FINAL ANALYSIS i
HYDROGEN BURN SURVIVABILITY OF EQUIPMENT NECESSARY FOR .
(1) SAFE SHUTDOWN (2) CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY e APPLICATION TO RIVER BEND O -
09/11/85 l
I l
HC0G PROGRAM TASKS - SCHEDULE / STATUS
[)
TASK 1 - ESTABLISH MOST PROBABLE HYDR 0 GEN GENERATION EVENT COMPLETE 9/85 TASK 2 - SELECT MITIGATION SYSTEM COMPLETED TASK 3 - DESIGN HYDROGEN IGNITION SYSTEM COMPLETED; TECH. SPECS, 10/85-12/85 TASK 4 - CONTAINMENT ULTIMATE CAPACITY ANALYSIS COMPLETED
({])
TASK 5 - SELECTION'0F CONTAINMENT RESPONSE ANALYSIS CODE COMPLETED TASK 6 - HYDROGEN COMBUSTION TESTING COMPLETE 10/85 I
TASK 7 - GENERATION OF HYDR 0 GEN RELEASE HISTORIES COMPLETE 11/85 i
, TASK 8 - CONTAINMENT RESPONSE ANALYSIS COMPLETE 6/86
, () 09/11/85 1
1:
I 1
L LO HC0G PROGRAM TASKS - SCHEDULE / STATUS (CONT'D.)
i 4
TASK 9 - DIFFUSION FLAME THERMAL ENVIRONMENT P
(1/4 SCALE TEST PROGRAM)
COMPLETE 9/86 J
TASK 10 - EVALUATION OF DRYWELL RESPONSE TO DEGRADED CORE I ACCIDENTS 1
COMPLETE 12/86 l TASK 11 - EQUIPMENT SURVIVABILITY ANALYSIS PROGRAM {
COMPLETE 12/86 (CONDITIONAL)
O l TASK 12 - VALIDATION OF ANALYTICAL METHODS i COMPLETE 6/86 j I
TASK 13 - COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL EPG i l
COMPLETE 12/86 l A
TASK 14 - NEVADA TEST SITE DATA EVALUATION t i COMPLETE 11/86 I
i t
!O 09/11/85 l
l I
[ ,
i
t O
EQUIPMENT SURVIVABILITY REQUIREMENTS o ESTABLISH LIST OF ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT REQUIRED DURING AND AFTER THE HYDR 0 GEN BURN EVENT TO MAINTAIN CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY AND BRING THE PLANT TO SAFE SHUTDOWN CONDITION o ESTABLISH THE THERMAL ENVIRONMENT FOR THE CONTAINMENT BASED ON DIFFERENT ACCIDENT SCENARIOS J
o ESTABLISH THE EQUIPMENT THERMAL RESPONSE BASED ON THE WORST CASE CONTAINMENT ENVIRONMENT o ESTABLISH THAT EQUIPMENT SURFACE TEMPERATURE DURING HYDROGEN O BURN DID NOT EXCEED THE SURFACE TEMPERATURE OF THE EQUIPMENT DURING QUALIFICATION TESTING o IF EQUIPMENT SURFACE TEMPERATURE EXCEEDS THE SURFACE TEMPERATURE OF THE EQUIPMENT DURING QUALIFICATION TESTING, PROVIDE ADDITIONAL JUSTIFICATION FOR THE ACCEPTABILITY OF THE EQUIPMENT o ESTABLISH THAT EQUIPMENT PRESSURE SPIKE PREDICTED TO OCCUR DURING HYDR 0 GEN BURN IS LESS THAN THE PRESSURE EQUIPMENT WAS EXPOSED TO DURING QUALIFICATION TESTING OR PROVIDE ADDITIONAL JUSTIFICATION FOR IT, O
O CRITERIA FOR SELECTING ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT o EQUIPMENT AND SYSTEMS REQUIRED TO MITIGATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE EVENT 1
o EQUIPMENT AND STRUCTURES REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN THE INTEGRITY OF THE CONTAINMENT PRESSURE BOUNDARY
~
i o SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS REQUIRED TO RE-COVER THE CORE Oo INSTRUMENTATION AND SYSTEMS REQUIRED TO MONITOR THE COURSE OF THE ACCIDENT i
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o ELECTRICAL PENETRATION ASSEMBLIES VARIOUS 4
,o HYDROGEN IGNITER SYSTEM VARIOUS
~
o CABLES AND TERMINAL BLOCKS VARIOUS o CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE MONITORING UIV, UC O o CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN MIXING UIV, LIV o RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL LIV 4
! o REACTOR PLANT VENTILATION UIV j o CONTAINMENT AND DRYWELL PERSONNEL AIRLOCK AND VARIOUS EQUIPMENT HATCH o REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL LEVEL & PRESSURE LIV TRANSMITTERS o DRYWELL PRESSURE TRANSMITTERS LIV o RHR/LPCI PERMISSIVE PRESSURE TRANSMITTERS LIV
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o TEMPERATURE MONITORING LIV, VIV, DW
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NO. OF WETWELL BURNS TEMP. PRIOR TO EXCEEDING ;
EQUIPMENT LOCATION LIMIT TEMP. LIMIT ;
RELIANCE MOTOR LIV 340*F 12 l (0.13 HP) !
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l O. ROSEMOUNT LIV 303*F 6 l
I TRANSMITTER 400*F 29 OKONITE POWER VARIOUS 440*F 17 l CABLE ,
HYDROGEN IGNITER VARIOUS 470*F* 600*F* l
- ESTIMATED VALUE .
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l THERMAL RESPONSE ANALYSIS OF EQUIPMENT BASED ON REVISED LOWER INTERMEDIATE VOLUME ENVIRONMENT EQUIPMENT PREDICTED TEMPERATURE QUALIFICATION SENSITIVE EQUIPMENT TEMPERATURE CASING COMP 0NENT ROSEMOUNT 320*F 311*F 290*F -
TRANSMITTER
() RELIANCE MOTOR 345*F 347'F 311*F l
- HYDR 0 GEN 340*F 410*F IGNITER l
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- HYDR 0 GEN IGNITER AND CABLE WERE EVALUATED FOR THE WETWELL ENVIRONMENT
() ** QUALIFICATION TEMPERATURE (CASING) IS EXCEEDED AFTER ABOUT 70%
OF TOTAL HYDROGEN EQUIVALENT TO 75% MWR HAS BEEN BURNED
O ISSUES TO BE RESOLVED IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS o ASSURE COMPLETENESS OF LIST OF EQUPIMENT REQUIRED BASED ON FAILURE MODES AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES o ESTABLISH THAT THE THERMAL EQUILBRIUM TEMPERATURE OF THE
- EQUIPMENT IS REACHED DURING THE EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATION TESTING
~
o ESTABLISH THE THERMAL ENVIRONMENT CREATED BY THE DIFFUSION FLAME PRODUCED BY A CONTINUOUS BURN OF HYDROGEN RELEASED FROM THE SUPPRESSION P0OL O
o DEMONSTRATE THE SURVIVABILITY OF EQUIPMENT LOCATED IN THE WETWELL o ANY EQUIPMENT FOR WHICH SURVIVABILITY CANNOT BE
- DEMONSTRATED, ALTERNATE METHODS, E.G., EQUIPMENT RELOCATION,
! THERMAL INSULATION OR SHIELDING, SHOULD BE CONSIDERED.
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i ACRS SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING SEPTEMBER 11,1985
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9/5/85 O PROPOSED AGENDA ACRS Subcommittee on River Bend Station 1717 H Street, N.W. - Room 1946 September 11, 1985 !
- 1. Executive Session - D. Okrent 10 inin 3:45 - 3:55 pn
- 2. NRC Staff Status Report (a) Status of MRC Staff review and anticipated schedule 15 min 3:55 - 4:10 pm (b) Sunnary of principle review
- issues, differing professional opinions and allegations, if any, and likely resolution 20 min 4:10 - 4:30 pm (c) Region IV report on significant plant experiences and ; &E assessaent of the River Bend Station, management and operation personnel 30 min 4:30 - 5:00 pm ;
(d) Connents by Applicant 15 min 5:00 - 5:15 pm (e) General discussion 30 min 5:15 - 5:45 pn
- Break *** 15 min 5:45 - 6:00 pm
- 3. NRC Staff / Applicant - Summary of NRC ar.d Applicant actions related to the ACRS July 17, 1984 Interim l Report on River Bend 30 min 6:00 - 6:30 pm
- 4. NRC Staff Report on BWR containment venting emergency procedures 15 min 6:30 - 6:45 pm
position on the implementation of the Hydrogen Control Rule and application to River Send 15 min 6:45 - 7:00 pm ACRS Subcommittee Chairman: Dr. D. Okrent ACRS Staff
Contact:
Dr. Richard Savio - 202-634-3268 NRC Staff Contacts: Ronald Hernan - 301-492-4735 Steve Stern - 301-492-7480 I
.i
River Bend Agenda September 11. 1985
,O (b) NRC Staff suumary of NRC evaluation f of hydrogen control design margins for River Bend relation to other '
Mark III containments and the !
risk significance of design i differences 15 min 7:00 - 7:15 pm l (c) Susmary of the NRC evaluation of hydrogen control issues for River Bend i
(1) NRC Staff swmary of results of SSER.4 15 min 7:15 - 7:30 pm l
(2) NRC Staff / Applicant assess- I ment of system survivability l l with a ranking of affected ;
- systems as to the certainty l with which critical system functions are assured and en indentification of the issues !
to be resclved and a MRC Staff i O summary of the technical reso-lution and schedule by which
[
i the issues will be resolved 30 min 7:30 - 8:00 pm !
i
- 6. NRC Staff sumary of the NRC assessment of the severe accident behavior of the River Bend contai ment with a l.
discussion of differences as compared to other Mark III contain-ments with Applicant causents 15 min 8:00 - 8:15 pm i
- 7. MRC/ Applicant comments as to the j advantages, disadvantages, and feasibility of using a UPPS-type system on River Bend (a) NRC Staff Cossents 10 min 8:15 - 8:25 pm (b) Applicant Cossents 10 min 8:25 - 8:35 pm j I
- 8. Cosseents and Report by the Applicant on hydrogen control, contai ment, venting, and probabilistic risk assessment 20 min 8:35 - 8:55 pm ,
l
- 9. Sunnary, conclusions, and future i ACRS action 5 min 8:55 -- 9:00 pu f
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'A PPDEDU[ FOR VENTIE TE CONTAlffelT lNDER ERTAIN ACCIENT CONDITIONS.' TE BASIS FOR TE ECISION TO TAE THIS ACTION ARE NOT YET ClfAR. TE NRC STAFF HAS NOT CORETED ITS EVIEW E THISPPDPOSAL.
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. .- _ . _ - _ .. . .. .- - - _. - _ . _- . . =.
O RIVER BEND PRA PHASE 2 - PRA l
1 o GRAND GULF ACCIDENT AND CONTAliffNT EVENT TREES
.i o PLANT SPECIFIC FAULT TREES O C0ff0N CAUSE FAILUE OF ELECTRICAL POWER SUPPLY AND SERVICE WATER SUPPLY o INP0 NPRDS + NRC'LER DATA SUWARY a
o OPERATOR ACTION -- SWAIN'S HANDBOOK o DRAFT REPORT IS [MDER REVIEW t
PREDICTED CORE ELT FECUENCY LOWER THAN i LIE RICK & GRAND GULF O
I 5
, - . . , , ,-,-,n. .,,, _, -
,, ,n,y.-_.. - , ,,..~,..,.en., - ., ..,,e,-,_,,. .c.n,,- w,-w,-
RIVER BEND PRA PHASE 2 - SEISMIC o BENIGN SITE RIVER BEND INCLUDED IN " SEISMICITY OWNERS GROUP" STUDY
]
EART}iOUAKE EXCEEDING DESIGN BASE 10-5/YR.
o CONTRIBIRION TO A?NUAL ELT FREQUENCY FROM EARTHOUAKES P
Q AT LIERICK j 1
EARTliGJAKES 0.3 E-6 i
INTERNAL INITIATORS 9.2 E-6
- FIE Af0 OTER CONTRIBUTORS 7.5 E-6 I
TOTAL APNUAL CORE ELT FEQUENCY 17.0 E-6 :
i i
- o CONCLUSION ;
f NO FURTER ANALYSIS EQUIRED
[
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1 . :
L _ - -
RIVER BEND PRA
- 'O 4 PHASE 2 - FIRES i
o GESSAR-II PRA I
1 EVENT Af0 FAULT TREES o RIVER BEND FIE PROTECTION EASURES f
j APPENDIX R 4
o ESTIMATED FIE If0VCED CORE DAMAGE FEC1JENCY l i
TOTAL FIE INDUCED CDF/YR CDF/YR
- GESSAR-II -
9.4E-8 i RIVER BEND 3.4E-5 3.6E-7 '
i 1
LIERICK 1.7E-5 1.3E-6 l
l
[ o CONCLUSION:
I 'i
- NO FURTER ANALYSIS REQUIRED O
. - _ - - . _ . - - - . - . - - _ . . . . . . _ . - - - - . - _ - . . . _ . _ = _ -
5 t
O ,
i f
RIVER BEND PRA l
I i
1 PHASE 3 - FUTURE PRA
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o DEVELOP PRA CAPABILITY AT GSU AS NEEDED FOR:
i .
- i i COPPARISON OF ALTERNATIVES
!, PROCEDURES a
MAINTENANCE PLAfEING
- O TRAINING < Sin;LA10R
- DESICW CONTROL i
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