ML20197G755
| ML20197G755 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | River Bend  |
| Issue date: | 06/08/1984 |
| From: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | |
| References | |
| ACRS-T-1320, NUDOCS 8406180148 | |
| Download: ML20197G755 (438) | |
Text
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218 1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3 4 ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS 6 Subcommittee on the River Bend Station 8 9 Prince Charles Room 10 Oak Manor Motor Hotel 8181 Airline Highway Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70815 Friday, June 8, 1984 12 13 The meeting of the Subcommittee on the River 11 () Bend Station convened at 1:00 p.m., David Okrent, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding. 17 ACRS Members Present: 18 D. OKRENT 19 J. EBERSOLE 20 ACRS Consultants Present: 21 M. TRIFUNAC 22 DESIGNATED FEDERAL EMPLOYEE: 23 G. QUITTSCHREIBER 21 25 f l 1 O TAYLOE ASSOCIATES I l
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l l^ 219 1 MEETING PARTICIPANTS: 2 E. WEINKAM T. NOVAK 3 R. KENDALL J. KIRKEBO 4 P. FREEHILL _ J. DEDDENS B. REED J. BOOKER 6 C. BOGOLIN B. McMORELAND B. CULP C. LAMBERT ; 8 P. PORTER T. SZABO
- 9 B. RAUGHLEY '
10 J. QUIRK , M. SHA i D. SHARP i II J. McGEE 1 E. TRASK 12 R. HOWELL f A. MELANCON 13 L. SCHELL i 4 J. CADWALLADER fi
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P. PORTER ! 15 B. ODELL P. GRAHAM 16 J. GLAZER ! l 17 , b 18 ; PUBLIC PARTICIPANTS: 19 l D. MADDEN l
- t. 20 C. WILCOX W. HALL 21 D. McNEILL n,
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A , I l 220 1 PROCEEDINGS ('~) ,
\- / 2 MR. OKRENT: The meeting will now cc. Tie to ,
3 order. 4 This is a continuation of the Advisory 5 Committee on Reactor Safeguards Subcommittee on River
- 6 Bend.
7 I am David Okrent, the Subcommittee Chairman. a We will proceed with the agenda as if we had 9 finithed yesterday for now and picking that up at some 10 later time, 11 I call upon Mr. Cahill of Gulf States : 12 Utilities. 13 MR. CAHILL: Good morning. (g 11 I feel a little more in sequence this morning. ! 15 This is something that we had planned to present earlier 16 to get, as I mentioned before, into the ball park. 17 (Slide.) l 18 I have on the screen the organization of Gulf 19 States. I have focused on the River Bend group. Of course, ; 20 the corporation is managed on the top by a Board of ! 21 Directors. The Chairman and the Chief Executive Officer is ! i' 22 Dr. Paul Murrill and reporting to him are the major i 23 corporate functions under Executive Vice Presidents and ! et Senior Vice Presidents. 25 My group of the corporation is devoted to this !i I
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i i 221 l' project, to the design, construction, licensing and ! [~)h (_ 2 operation of the River Bend plant. It is focused, of l 3 course, on just the one unit now, but the principal which ! I we are trying to maintain in this corporate structure is j 5 that nuclear power is different from the ordinary - r 6 operations of power plants and other functions of the < 7 utility and requires the attention'of the top officers. ! i 8 It happens to be the Chairman. It could be 9 under our concept the President, but for detailed reasons 10 it goes directly to the Chairman. I do work closely with 11 the President on related map.ters'that we discussed. 12 We also are careful to see that the Board of 13 Directors is-kept informed about all the matters relating f- 14 to the safety, cost'and efficiency of the nuclear x/ 15 activities. This is done directly. I report at every Board 16 meeting on the progress on this job and the problems with 17 it. 18 We also have, and this is I think unusual, it 19 certainly-was a few years ago in the utility industry, a l. 20 Board Committee. This consists of Board members who have 21 technical background or related background. 22 In our case there are several engineers and 3 one physician who meet directly with me and my group and et who meet also with an Advisory Committee which consists of 25 people from universities with backgrounds in the nuclear L TAYLOE ASSOCIATES N 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950 k
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- l Jj 222 1 area and with our corporate Nuclear Review Committee which 2 is a group'of people, some from the River Bend group and 3 some'from outside, which is independent of my directors.
4 It comes under Lynn Draper, who I think most of you know 5 is experienced in the nuclear engineering and nuclear 6 safety matters. 7 These three committees work together in an 8 analogy that was developed by the Chairman of this group. 9 Every corporation has an internal auditor and that to corresponds to this group. 11' Every company has an independent auditor that 12 looks at-things from a different perspective. That 13 corresponds to that group. Then most companies have a
-s 18 committee of their Board of Directors that is devoted to \> 15 auditing-and listens to these people and these people, and 16 that is that.
17 So there is an analogy there and it shows. You la 'know, corporations, the dearest thing to their heart is 19 supposedly money and that is why they have these auditing 20 committees. 21 In this case we realize that nuclear safety is
-22 a special thing that can affect this corporation in ways 23 that no other operation can. So there is an organization et that focuses attention by the top level of management on 25 nuclear that can't be lost with the other 7,000 megawatts TAYLOE ASSOCIATES % 16251 STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
223 , i 1 of generating capacity. '
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( j 2 We intend to maintain that, although the 3 details of this chart would change, such as I, or my I r 4 successor, the President or the Chairman, but the idea is [ 5 that this group, the Nuclear Operating Group, has direct ! 6 access to the chief management level of the company. 7 Under me, Quality Assurance reports directly 8 to me. Tom Crousb, whom you will meet later, is the 9 Manager of Quality Assurance. He has got a nuclear Navy 10 background with 15 years of experience, and also a utility 11 background. 12 We have done several things that are unique 13 here, but one of them is that Crouse, who was Manager of _ 11 Quality Assurance, and when I needed a Construction
\
w/ 13 Manager to oversee Stone and Webster for a few years, I 16 put him in that job to inject a different attitude about 17 quality into construction. 18 He has come back in charge of Quality. He has ' 19 a different perspective about how Quality fits and so do 20 the construction people. We try to move people around like 21 that to give them different experiences. l 22 This committee, which will eventually become a Il safety committee, advises me, but it is independent. . 21 Now we are trying to manage the project 25 intensively. I am physically at the site most of the time. i l l TAYLOE ASSOCIATES ' 1625 i STREET, N.W. - $UITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950 e
T-I l 224 1 I spend all of my time, I have no other concern in GSU I, \
\ss/ 2 other than to get this plant built, designed and built 3 right and then operate it efficiently and safely. That i takes a lot of time and spreads a person thin.
5 We have arranged to get a man of similar 6 background, Mr. Deddens, who has about 30 years of 7 experience mostly with Babcock and Wilcox, in the design, 8 construction, manufacturing, startup and advice to 9 operation and organizations type of experience. 10 He and I are both generally at the site and 11 work together to impose our experience and perspective 12 onto the line functions in the project. They of course 13 include GSU and Stone and Webster is underneath this group f-sg it under GSU's general surveillance, although they are an t
\ - I 15 independent contractor who has responsibility to design 16 and censtruct the project.
17 We have Gary Wiegand as the Vice President, he la is experienced in nuclear Navy, Captain of a submarine, 19 who is in charge of training and environmental protection, 20 security and other administrative services. 21 We have a Plant Manager who just recently left 22 us for another job. We have several candidates. We are 11 looking for people with experience who are ready to move 21 in. We have several that we have interviewed and are 23 expecting to make a selection within a few weeks. TAYLOE ASSOCIATES k 16251 $TREET, N.W. - $UITE 1004 WA$HINGTON, D.C. 20006 (2021 293 3950
225 1 John Curless is here. He is the Project (~N (s I
- Manager. He is concerned with primarily cost and schedule 3 aspects of the project. He is physically located at the
& Corporate Headquarters. We make use of air transport and 5
telecommunications to make sure that he is both at the site and Beaumont enough. Beaumont is our company 7 headquarters. 8 He being there with the experience and 9 information on cost, schedule and details which concern 10 our chairman and the financial and other management people 11 makes it a big help while Deddens and I stay right on the 12 site to see that the technical quality of the work is 13 done, Mr. Booker, who I think you all know, is in O il \- 15 charge the Engineering, Fuels and Licensing area. He has 16 got many years of experience with Gulf States and in the 17 nuclear field. 18 MR. OKRENT: Before you take the viewgraph off, 19 is the Board Committee up on top and the Nuclear Safety 20 Advisory Committee over to the left, are those two 21 entities formed and active right now? 22 MR. CAHILL: Yes. 21 MR. OKRENT: Can you give me any examples of ci significant input they had into what has been going on? 25 MR. CAHILL: This Advisory Committee consists p) \._ TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 1625 i STREET, N.W. - $UlTE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
it l 4 226 1 of Tom Pickford, who is a Professor of Nuclear Engineering O (_) 2 at-Berkley, Herb Woodson, who is a Professor of 3 Engineering at the University of Texas and Ned Lambermont 4 who is a Professor oi Health Physics Related Subjects at 5 LSU here. They have been meeting with us for going on four 6 years and about three to four times a year. 7 They have had presentations by the different 8 groups that are participating in the project. GE presented 9 information about the nuclear steam supply, their 10 manufacturing capabilities and the nuclear fuel, and these 11 groups have visited the shops of GE. 12 Stone and Webster has presented two that group 13 the details of our design and the balance of plant and the f3 11 integration of that with the nuclear steam supply. ( l
*# 13 GSU has presented to them information on our 16 training program, on our organization and its evolution on 17 the progress of the plant. They have from time to time la asked questions and made suggestions, particularly have 19 they been helpful in pointing out areas where we need s 20 additional experience in the form of staff which we have 21 responded to by hiring people with that type of 22 experience. They have pointed out to us what they saw 21 could have been deficiencies in our training program which 21 we have adjusted.
25 The Board Safety Committee listens very O d TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SulTE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
r 227 I carefully to them and has basically urged that we adopt O k ,) 2 their suggestions. 3 MR. EBERSOLE: I take it that later on we will i be talking about some technical aspects in the design i 5 related to ATWS and related to some of your auxiliary 6 shutdowns centers and the ultimate cooling logic and 7 things like that. 8 Where in this organization would I find the 9 focus or the resolution of technical issues which are 10 fairly sensitive? For instance, like who decides to put 11 the aux shutdown centers where they have been put in the 12 context of whether there is adequate isolation from 13 potential fire hazards, et cetera. fs 11 MR. CAHILL: In this case with this engineering A- 15 group here is concerned more with the technical substance 16 of issues. They are the design and control group. There is 17 a private engineering group in here which is concerned la with cost and schedule. There both work with Stone and ; 19 Webster who would,in the instance you are referring to, t 20 would have proposed the location because they are doing 21 the detailed design, and these groups would concur. 22 MR. EBERSOLE: Well, suppose the decision is 21 made at that point, but it was a subjective judgment 2 perhaps with a few questions about it. Would it get pumped 25 upstrairs for confirmation that that was an adequate p TAYLOE ASSOCIATES ' V 1625 l $TREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
l 228 1 decision?
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\/ 2 MR. CAHILL: It would come certainly up to 3 here. l l
1 MR. EBERSOLE: For instance, I can take it that i 5 you have satisfied yourself that the aux shutdown centers ; 6 are adequate? ; 7 MR. CAHILL: I believe so. We originally had 8 one aux shutdown center, and then in discussions with the 9 NRC staff and watching other projects develop realized to that two would be needed. We worked to find what we 11 thought was a reasonably good location. 12 MR. EBERSOLE: Would it be this same group that 13 would perform independent designs subsequently or GE g-wg It designs and Stone and Webster designs.
\'~'] 15 MR. CAHILL: Well, I intend to get to that a 16 little later, but we could go through that right now.
17 Of course these groups do not get into the la detail that you would call for in any kind of design 19 review. Our own people in the early years of the project [ 20 was the predecessor of this group, or both of these 21 groups, and now almost all of the design is complete, ; 22 except for some details. l 23 But the general design was reviewed by GSU I 2: from the viewpoint of meeting commitments to the NRC from 23 meeting GSU requirements and from a viewpoint of necessity 1 (Q y/ TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 l WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
229 1 because these designs keep changing, as well as though the -(-p) ' 2 Stone and Webster control process. l 3 Now tha principal reliance for avoiding i interferences and keeping consistent with code 5 requirements for meeting NRC criteria is imposed on Stone 6 and Webster with their corporate experience and design , 7 control experience. , 8 We also have, and I did not mention it, 9 advising this group and me, an independent consultant, the < 10 Management Analysis Corporation that audits our QA 11 annually, it may be annually now, I think it was 12 semi-annually, who also have some personnel in continued 13 surveillance of our QA which is in surveillance of Stone it and Webster QA. They have also done some special review,
\g w) 15 not so much of the detailed design, but of the systems to 16 control the design for our corporation.
17 In addition to that, we have gone through, and 18 I must say with good marks, the two INPO, Phase I and 19 Phase II of the INPO evaluation program, which again looks 20 at systems for control, but does spot check. In looking at 21 systems they look at specific issues. 22 We also, as you heard yesterday, had at least a three SALP reviews since 1980, and in each of those area et the design control aspects were evaluated highly. The most 25 recent is the NRC independent design review that was (] v TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 1625 i STREET, N.W. - $UITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
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1 cummarized to you yesterday. Now we have to wait for the (O
\_ !. 2 results of that, as was mentioned yesterday.
3 From what I have heard, they have to, as the P 1 person who summarized it said, dwell on the mistakes they 5 found, but they worked very hard with independent 6 consultants and competent engineering firms that spent a 7 great many hours, and I think from my own experience, ' 8 which includes design, that wasn't bad. 9 Any any rate, at this time we believe that w? 10 have adequate control of the design. We have nec run into, 11 now that the plant is almost complete, with problems and 12 with interferences. We have a relatively low number of 13 interferences. We have had very few, and I could say no
-~ 11 serious quality defects. We are only beginning our startup \# 15 program, but in the walhdowns and the early test results 16 it is going good.
17 MR. EBERSOLE: Physical interferences will la sooner or later manifest themselves by conflicts. However, 19 there is another kind --- 20 MR. CAHILL: But we have had very few of those 21 because we caught them on our model and we have also got 22 an electronic graphics model, n MR. EBERSOLE: In the same context, but in the 2i matter of interferences which you can't see, who is i 23 responsible for system interactive studies here that dig i O)
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231 1 up unwanted system relationships just by atmospheric (- ( ,j 2 coupling or whatever. 3 MR. CAHILL: Well, this is primarily Stone and i Webster with our engineering people working closely with 5 them to detect that kind of thing. 6 MR. EBERSOLE: This independent team that you 7 had, I understood they made what is called a. vertical cut a through the system, and how many systems did they look at? 9 MR. CAHILL: I would have to ask maybe Tom 10 Crouse. 11 MR. CROUSE: The IDI team looked at one system, 12 the RHR system. 13 MR. EBERSOLE: Or.e out of how many potential it candidates? O's_.- 15 MR. CROUSE: Well, there are dozens of systems 16 in the plant. 17 MR. KIRKEBO: Maybe I can clarify. This is John la Kirkebo from Stone and Webster. I assisted and was 19 involved with the IDI for its entire duration. The initial 20 scope of the IDI was identified as starting with the RHR 21 system in its low-pressure coolant injection mode. In 22 addition, the automatic depressurization system was s identified as part of the scope of the inspection. 2 During the inspection the scope was expanded 25 to include portions of the standby service water system, (~) TAYLOE ASSOCIATES () 16251 STitEET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
3 l 232 1 portions of the standby power systems. In other words, the i (8 ( ( ,/ 2 independent inspection was a vertical slice focused s 3 initially on the RHP system in one particular mode of 1 operation. 5 But during the course of the inspection, due 6 to the fact of the intertie of the systems and the safety 7 ' functions, the inspection team did broaden their scope. 8 MR. EBERSOLE: Thank you. 9 MR. OKRENT: How long have the Corporate 10 Nuclear Review teams been meeting? 11 MR. CAHILL: Excuse me? 12 MR. OKRENT: For how long a period has the 13 Corporate Nuclear Review Committee / Nuclear Review Board, fg 11 E. L. Draper, Chairman been meeting? (# ! 15 MR. CAHILL: How long has it been meeting? 16 MR. OKRENT: In other words, it is an ongoing 17 thing and, if so, for how long? 18 MR. CAHILL: It has been ongoing for at least 19 the last four years. Our plans are to evolve that into the 20 Nuclear Review Board Safety Committee, the offsite safety 21 committee. 22 MR. OKRENT: Can you tell me some significant 23 recommendations that they have made? 21 MR. CAHILL: At this time their recommendations 25 have been melded generally in with this as far as this O TAYLOE ASSOCIATES C. 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
233 1 committee comes administratively. The arrangements for the
./~5< -( i
(_,/ ' 2 meetings and so on come through this committee here, and 3 the recommendations out of the Safety Advisory Committee 4 are also adopted by the Corporate Review Committee. 5 Likewise, the management analysis independent 6 QA audits are referred here, and those recommendations, 7 which there have been many of those, and they have i 8 generally been finding areas where we need to put more ' 9 attention, more people and sometimes different 10 organizational arrangements or simply just to check a 11 particular area. Those things have been recommended by MAC 12 and adopted as recommendations by the Corporate Nuclear r 13 Review Board. i 11 MR. OKRENT: Could I ask, would you expect that (73) l
'v *' 15 at least some of the members of the Corporate Nuclear i
16 Review Committee are familiar in some detail with the 17 existing probaoilistic risk assessments on other boiling 18 -water reactors? , 19 MR. CAHILL: Yes. ; 20 MR. OKRENT: So they should be able to 21 summarize the results of these, what they have found and 3 22 so forth? [ 11 MR. CAHILL: I would think so, yes.
- 21 MR. OKRENT: Are any members of that Board here
$5 -today?
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l 234 7_ 1 MR. CAHILL: Yes. Jim, do you know. ( ) N/ 2 MR. OKRENT: We will come to the PRA period 3 later. I would like to get a feeling for just what kinds i of things they look at, and I am just using that as an ? 5 example. 6 Let me ask a seemingly different question. How 7 do you judge the depth of knowledge that Gulf States 8 Utilities should have in-house about the design of the 9 plant and why it was designed that way? 10 MR. CAHILL: I would judge it out of my own 11 experience. I think tnat the utility responsible for i 12 operating a nuclear power plant should have within its own 13 organization sufficient knowledge of the plant to gr it understand the major functional systems and the safety j i . 15 systems from the viewpoint of the reasoning behind the 16 design and the needs for and reasons for the maintenance r 17 of the system, the operating characteristics and why they i la have such characteristics, all on a level of engineering knowlege as well as on the level of operating. 19 ( 20 We are developing such a group. We have more 21 than a nucleus now. We have a significant number of 22 people. They are not all trained on this plant yet, but a they have the background from other plants. They are to be et able to work with the plant with all of its day-in and 23 day-out vagaries and operating events in such a say that
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235 1 they understand what the indications from the plant mean (D (,,/ 2 from the viewpoint of safety and reliability and economy, 3 but not necessarily to be able to, if a change is de.-ired, ! I to accomplish that all within the GSU organization, ! 5 We intend to rely for detailed design, special 6 techniques and special knowledge about equipment on 7 manufacturers, on A/E's and other specialists. But we do i 8 intend to have an organization with technical competence 9 to handle. the routine events that occur, including 10 abnormal events, in a nuclear plant. 11 We have over the last three years, in addition 12 to training the people who were here, GSU employees, some 13 of them with a lot of experience in the utility, and some 18 hired from the Navy or other utilities, in the last x' 15 three years we have brought on a significant number of 16 people from manufacturers, A/E's and other utilities that 17 have condensed their nuclear programs. la We have a very good I think for this stage, a 19 very good organization still in development, but I would 20 say much better than many other utilities that have been 21 running plants for quite a while. 22 MR. OKRENT: When do you think you will have 21 what, in your opinion, constitutes an adequate in-house 28 knowlede of plant design? 3 MR. CAHILL: 1 think to a good extent we have (O ( ,) TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 1625 i STRitT, N.W. = $UlTE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
e F 236 1 it now. We probably, before we go into service, would have (_) 2 what I want, but I don't intend to stop at that point 3 either. I think it is a developing pursuit of excellence in this area. , 5 MR. EBERSOLE: Mr. Cahill, I heard yesterday, ; 6 and this is sort of a philosophy, and I am talking about 7 managerial or engineering decisions. The plant has 8 equipment which is protected by protective interlocks in 9 lots of places, but under duress these are bypassed in a 10 systematic way in the automatic context. 11 The same sort of picture exists in the manual 12 context here of protective interlocks that keep the 13 operator from running it, and I asked the question what
,,-~3 1 was the general philosophy about the privilege of i' -) 15 operators in bypassing particular interlocks on equipment, r
16 and the answer I got was he can't do it. 17 I am interested in where that decision was la made and what the implications are in preventing operators i9 to say get some critical shutdown heat removal function ! 20 working because there is some blasted bunch of wires 21 keeping it from doing it? ; 22 MR. CAHILL: Well, I will have to say I don't 21 know that. I presume that was said as a policy by our 28 Operating Management. I can conceive of some cases where 25 it would be right to do that. That may be too sweeping a i-O\v TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 1625 i STRftT, N.W. - $UITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
237 1 prohibition and what we really need is a systematic way of
)
(_/ 2 controlling those matters like that without losing track 3 of them. 4 MR. EBERSOLE: Let me ask you another question. 5 There was a colorful incident not long ago at Browns Ferry 6 which hit the newspapers and created a lot of public 7 blackballing and you have the same feature. You will 8 recall they lost the suction pumps, the RHR pumps. They 9 couldn't get the valves open, and that was an anticipated to accident. It was built into the design, and there are 11 plenty of other ways of cooling the reactor through the 12 SAR's, et ceter, et cetera. In other words, it was 13 programmed to occur anyway. s 1: But when it occurred, of course it hit the / S I 15 headlines and another piece of disfavor of the business 16 came into being. It was years ago known when that happened 17 there was going to be a big flap and there should have 18 been something like NPSH, trip protection or whatever, or 19 some mechanism to admittedly face that little accident or 20 else put a valve matrix in which probably would have been 21 better. 22 You have that same design, don't you, a common Il suction to the RHR pumps, and you face the possible same 2 public flap when they stay closed when you want them to 25 open. >O TAYLOE ASSOCIATES k,/ 1625 i STitEET, N.W. - $UITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
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_ 1 MR. CAHILL: I am not familiar with the Browns
-- 2 Ferry incident.
3 MR. EBERSOLE: But it is the same as yours. 1 MR. CAHILL: It is the same as ours? 5 MR. EBERSOLE: Do you have suction interlocks 6 or NPSH trips for the RHR pumps? 7 MR. CAHILL: I don't know. I would have to see 8 if somebody else knows. 9 MR. EBERSOLE: You know you run a risk of to damaging those pumps if the --- 11 MR. CAHILL: Oh, I understand that. 12 MR. EBERSOLE: But you don't know if you have 13 them?
-w Il MR. CAHILL: I don't know. We will get that 15 information for you. This is is Pete Freehill, our 16 Assistant Plant Manager.
17 MR. FREEHILL: Let me give a little bit on our la operating philosophy that we have implemented with the use 19 of jumpers. Surely we do not have a lot of use of jumpers 20 regarding our safety systems. However, our emergency 21 implementing procedures and operating procedures permit 22 and direct the use of manual jumpers. Such an instance has a been the automatic depressurization system. Under certain 2: conditions we have to install manual jumpers to keep that 25 system from operating. TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 16251 STREET, N.W. - $UITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
239 1 I think on the RHR systems for NPSH, I don't (Q), 2 believe we have an NPSH interlock. However, in the 3 emergency operating procedures, if we needed water to put 1 in the reactor and the valve was shut, we would install a 3 jumper to get the valve open. If we had the choice between 6 putting water in the reactor to raise the level or to 7 gavitate the pump, we have procedures and were trained to 8 jumper the interlock and run the pump and put water in the 9 reactor. 10 MR. EBERSOLE: Th.ank you. 11 MR. OKRENT: One other general kind of 12 question. What level of in-house ability to perform 13 technical analysis do you feel is appropriate? It MR. CAHILL: I feel that we should have the w/ 15 ability to understand and check the manufacturers' and 16 other industry analyses independently, although not 17 necessarily to generate new forms of analyses. 18 We are developing such a group and have one in 19 being. It works closely with the EPRI developed RETRAN 20 type of analyses. We are checking more now for the 21 training as opposed to the technical substance, but 22 checking the GE and Stone and Webster analyses. Il This group has recently been reinforced by a 26 man that we brought in from Babcock and Wilcox, Mel 25 Sankovitch, who has about 25 years experience in this type p g TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 1625 l STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950 p._
m-I 'l 240 1 of work on the direct work in developing fuel cores and on (7 3 l_/ 2 the manufacturer's level, and I anticipate that this will 3 lead to the evolvement that is as capable as any in the i utility industry for this kind of work. 5 MR. OKRENT: I must confess I can't really tell 6 from what you have said what system behavior prediction 7 capability that you want. 8 MR. CAHILL: We want to be able to run codes 9 and do analyses of tranients resulting from disturbances 10 from steadystate operation in the main power trane. We 11 want to be able to do on a check basis ECCS performance 12 and other types of abnormal event transients using codes 13 like RETRAN. We may or may not, certainly not at this It time, be in a position to develop new codes or do our 7- -
\ \ ') 15 analyses, but we intend to be able to do analyses of the 16 type that you see in the FSAR, and be able to, if somebody 17 says that the analysis is wrong and you nave to change the la way you are_ operating, to be able to make our own 19 independent judgment of that, at least enough to say it 20 doesn't make sense and ask for another more independent 21 viewpoint.
22 MR. OKRENT: This is an existing capability or 21 one under development? 21 MR. CAHILL: Well, we have the people, and some Zi of them are learning to do this, but we also brought O TAYLOE ASSOCIATES V 1625 l STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
241 1 somebody in who does know how to do it and has done many O 2 of them. 3 MR. OKRENT: Okay. We will probably come back 8 -to aspects of this later. 5 (Slide.) 6 MR. CAHILL: This just goes over Nuclear Review 7 Board membership, and that of course is Lynn Draper. We 8 intend this kind of thing to be a pattern for the future 9 operation of the plant. The individuals will change, but to -the principles is that this Chairman should be independent 11 of the Executive in charge of ruhning the plant. In this 12 case Lynn Draper, he reports to the Chairman, too. He does
'13 not report to me.' He is completely independent.
It The Alternate Chairman does report to me. Most 13 of these people do report to me. All of these people 16 report to me. You can't find enough experienced people in 17 the nuclear field that are not working on the plant, but 18 .they have independence through keeping the Chairman out of 19 that. 20 MR. OKRENT: I wonder how many of those people 21 and which currently are what you would call up to date in 22 the PRA field as far as the results of the PRA's that have 21 come out in the last few years? 21 MR. CAHILL: Well, this individual, and we are 3 looking to fill this place. O TAYLOE A$$CH: LATE 5 1628 i STRfff, N.W. - SUlff 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20004 , (202) 293 3990 i L- - _ _ _ - - _ - _ _ - _ _ _ . - - _ -
l 242
,- 1 MR. OKRENT: That is an non-existent I }
\_/ 2 individual. So we don't know.
3 MR. CAHILL: This individual and possibly this ! t one in varying degrees of detail. 5 That is all I have. 6 MR. REED: The next item on the agenda in going l 7 through the organization will be presented by Jim Deddens, a Vice President of River Bend Nuclear Group. 9 MR. DEDDENS: Good morning. I am going to take 10 up where Bill Cahill left off and discuss in a little bit 11 more detail the seganization below my level. 12 My presentation will be followed up by others 13 who will give still more detail under their respective
, -~3 18 organizations, and in particular that will be Jim Booker, \' '] 15 the Engineering Nuclear Fuels and Licensing Manager, the 16 Assistant Plant Manager for Operations, Pete Freehill, and 17 the Assistant Plant Manager for Services, Phil Graham, and la under the Vice President for Administration's organization i9 we will also have some detail about training. i 20 (Slide.)
21 So let me briefly review the organization 22 chart which you see here on the slide starting from the 23 right. , i 21 The basic day-to-day design f an.iliarity which l n you asked questions about earlier will reside in the Il - TAYLOE ASSOCIATES i Cl 1435 i STAIIf, N.W. = SUlff ?004 WASMW0f0N,D.C. 30004 (303) 393 3980
l 243 1 Engineering, Nuclear Fuels and Licensing Department under \ f) x 2 Jim Booker. The responsibilities of that organization are 3 listed on this slide, basically being nuclear plant i engineering, nuclear licensing, fuels and for the present 5 time emergency planning. l 6 At a later point in time, once we are 7 operational and the emergency plan is in place, then the a maintenance of that emergency preparedness and readiness 9 for an emergency will be transferred to the administrative 10 function under Dr. Weigand. 11 At this point I would like also to say that wo 12 are in the process of developing a configuration 1.1 management schemo for the River Bend project, and that la configuration management will involve design control as a 15 most important function of that, although it will also 10 involve many other aspects that we will include under the 17 general category of configuration management. In The responsibility for the configuration 19 management function, and especially that related to design 20 control, will be a responsibility of the Nuclear Plant 21 Engineering Group under Mr. Booker. 22 I would like to also add that while the 21 Nuclear Plant Engineering Group is headquartered in 2: Beaumont, Texas, there will be a branch of tbst group 25 which will be full time in residence at the River Bond TAYLOE ASSOCIATES O+ 14391 lfettf. N.W. = $Ulft 1004 WAlMeN4foN, O C. 20000 (803) 393 3000
'l ' i 244 r i project. l l O) (_ 2 MR. OMRENT: How many technical people do you 3 anticipate in the group iider Mr. Brooker? 4 MR. DEDDENS: By the end of this year we expect 5 to have 85 people in Mr. Booker's department. By the end 6 of 1985 we expect to have about 106. Most of those will be l l
; degreed engineers and some will be clerical and so forth, a but the bulk of them vill be degreed engineers.
4 MR. OKRENT: Can you roughly distribute them to among various major tasha in your own mind? 11 MR. DEDDENS: I am sorry, I didn't understand 12 that. 11 MR. OKRENT: In other words, let me assume 11 there are 80 engineers, what, 20 on licensing, 20 on fuels li management or what? 16 MR. DEDDENS: I don't have a breakdown. 17 Do you have that breakdown, Jim? Ill MR. BOOKER: Yes. Out of the 106 about 70 of in them will be part of Nuclear Plant Engineering, about 14 20 in Licensing and about 13 in the Fuels and Engineering 21 Analysis area and about three or four in Emergency 22 Planning. The majority of them will be in Nuclear Plant at Engineering. 21 MR. DEDDENS: Before I pass over that, let me l 21 again review for yota Mr. Booker's background, and when Mr. TAYLOE ASSOCIATES ( - lett i St#Hf, N W. = $Ulft 1004 WASMINOfoN. O C. 20004 (303) 393 3964 W__. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - - - . _ - - _ - - - -
l 245 i Booker u .ses his presentation he will address the
- O
. (_,/ 2 background and capabilities of the principal managers 3 under him. 4 We did this before, I would just like to go 5 over it one more time for refresher purposes. Jim Booker o has a BS in industrial engineering from Lamar University 7 which he obtained in 1956. He has a BS degree in 8 mechanical engineering from Lamar University which he 9 obtained in 1956. He has 28 years of engineering 10 experience at Gulf States Utilities and 12 of those years 11 have been with the River Bend project. 12 He is active in many professional 13 organizations. He is a member of the American Nuclear
.s 11 Society and the ASME.' He is an AIF member and member on - 15 the Committee for Reactor Licensing and Safety, a member 16 on the Committee for Environmental Projects and he is a 17 member of the Edison Electric Institute Prime Movers 18 Committee on Nuclear Power.
19 The next organization which I would like to 20 review with you is the Project Management function under 21 John Curless. 22 Bill Cahill addressed some aspects of that 23 which are related to the overall control of the project, 21 especially with regard to how much it is going to cost us Zi to build this project, the schedule and the principal A TAYLOE ASSOCIATtS j 16251 STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTOf f, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
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- I 246 t
p_ ' 1 interface with Stone and Webster and with General Electric
\- / 2 regarding contractual matters on the project.
3 There are also a couple of other very 1 important functions under that project manager that I 5 would like to touch on briefly. 6 One of those is the startup. We have the 7 Startup Superintendent, Mr. Pete Freehill, who is also the 8 Assistant Plant Manager for Operations. He is in a dual ; 9 role at this point, but as the Startup Manager he reports 10 to Mr.Curless, and as the Assistant Plant Manager for 11 Operations will report to the Plant Manager. When the 12 startup is finished, then of course that aspect of it will 13 go out of existence. x It The other major point of that which I would ('~) 15 like to touch on is the project engineering function under 16 Mr. Curless, which is our primary interface with Stone and 17 Webster construction and with Stone and Webster at Cherry 18 Hill in the design aspects of the project. It-consists of to a group of full-time engineers who are in residence at 20 River Bendd and in day-to-day contact with the progress of i 21 construction and engineering. l 22 They also hava a very strong interface with l 21 Stone and Webster's site engineering group which is a 1 l 21 large group of engineers in full-time residence at River i 1 Bend. 25 They also perform a role in support of the startup l !
\
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,a 1 in assisting in the resolution of problems that develop
( ,) 2 during the startup process such as component problems and 3 things of that nature, t one other important aspect of that is site 5 that the site engineering group will form the nucleus of 6 the full-time resident engineering group reporting to Mr. 7 Booker's Beaumont engineering group and will remain in 8 residence at River Bend. So by participating in the 9 startup they are getting valuable onsite experience and 10 knowledge about the plant. 11 The third organization is that under the Plant 12 Manager. As Mr. Cahill mentioned, we are actively 13 recruiting a replacement plant manager. In the meantime I
- 18 am acting in the capacity of Acting Plant Manager working ~-] 13 closely with Mr. Freehill and Mr. Graham in the day-to-day 16 activities of the plant. That is basically divided into 17 two organizations under Mr. Freehill, the operations, la maintenance and radiation protection and chemistry.
19 I would like to give you a little background 20 on Mr. Freehill with regard to his experience in the field 21 of plant operations. Pete Freehill has 24 years with total 22 nuclear power experience. He has eight years with the 23 nuclear Navy as an electronic technician and was qualified 21 as an SRO on three naval power plants. 23 After that he had 13 years experience with
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nr I I 248 1 General Electric in startup and test and operations of (m., (-) 2 many commerical boiling water reactors, including an SRO 3 license on one reactor and an SRO certification on four i others. He joined Gulf States Utilities in 1980 as a 5 startup superintendent and was appointed Assistant Plant 6 Manager for Operations in 1983. Mr. Freehill is a member 7 of the American Nuclear Society. 8 Under the Assistant Plant Manager for Services 9 we have grouped the technical support function for the 10 support of the plant, and that will be staffed almost 11 exclusively with degreed engineers. 12 Phil Graham will report in detail on the 13 activities of that group in his later presentation. There
-s it is-also an administrative function under Phil Graham,
\- 15 which its most important aspect will be day-to-day 16 maintenance and correction modifications to the station 17 operating procedures.
la Also under Phil G'raham we have grouped 19 materials management which is the spare parts function and 20 warehousing and care and maintenance of spare parts for 21 the plant. 22 MR. OKRENT: Excuse me. I missed something. If 23 a change in operating procedures of whatever type is 21 indicated, whose responsibility is it to agree that the 25 change should be made? (~}
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249 1 MR. DEDDENS: For review of procedures? (a_,) 2 MR. OKRENT: Well, for considering possible 3 changes and adoption of changes, whose responsibility is a that? 5 MR. DEDDENS: The technical support or 6 technical staff function which we call it, is in the 7 technical review chain for procedures as well as things 8 such as technical and quality requirements for replacement 9 parts. They also input and membership on the Facilities 10 Review Committee which is a permanently estabished 11 committee for review of any safety related aspect of the 12 plant on a frequent and continuing basis. So there is an 13 in-line review function which is the responsibility of the ,-s 18 technical staff.
- 13 MR. OKRENT: I am sorry. I really didn't 16 understand your answer.
17 MR. DEDDENS: Repeat your question, if you la don't mind. 19 MR. FREEHILL: Operating procedure revision was 20 your question? 21 MR. OKRENT: Operating procedures, normal 22 procedures, emergency procedures, all of them. 23 MR. FREEHILL: Changes to them may be submitted et by anybody on the staff who sees the need for the change, 3 but on each change they receive an independent review, and- /3 TAYLOE ASSOCIATES V 1625 i STREET, N.W. - IUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
T 1 250 1 in the case of operating procedures, it would be by a 2 senior member of the operations staff, perhaps a shift 3 supervisor for an independent review. There is also a 1 technical review by the plant tech staff in addition to 5 the independent review. So there are three views on any 6 changes to plant operating procedures. 7 MR. OKRENT: And this would hold for abnormal 8 conditions or emergency operating procedures, the same 9 review? 10 MR. FREEHILL: Yes. 11 MR. OKRENT: And it wouldn't go to some higher 12 level? 13 MR. FREEHILL: The emergency implementing la procedures do receive a higher level of approval by the (q* ') 15 Facility Review Committee that I will talk a little bit 16 about in my presentation. 17 MR. EBERSOLE: May I ask before you leave, la going a bit further ahead, can you describe how the ! 19 operating and particularly the emergency operating 20 procedures evol/ed. I want to find out just how strong the 21 juriadictional lines are between operations and the 7 22 technical groups. I , L 21 MR. FREEHILL: The emergency operating 21 procedures, basically they are based upon the BWR Owners f 25 Group emergency procedures guidelines, and we have l l
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251 1 followed those guidelines and the INPO guidelines and I [) (_) 2 tailored those to River Bend. , l 3 Each of those procedures, they receive a wide i review, including that by the technical staff and also by 5 General Electric. 6 MR. EBERSOLE: Thank you. l 7 MR. DEDDENS: Let me just give you a brief [ 8 rundown on Phil Graham's background. Phil has a BS in 9 electric engineering from Old Dominion University which he - I 10 obtained in 1973. He has six years of service in the r i 11 Nuclear Navy as an officer. He attended the Navy Nuclear 12 Power Prototype School and was a qualified Engineering i 13 Officer of the Watch on F5W and F5G power plants. He has 11 two and one-half years naval shipyard experience [-} N-15 conducting refuelings, overhauls and startup programs. 16 He has a year and a half with the Nuclear
]
17 Regulatory Commission as Operations Inspector for 18 refueling inspections, physics, startup inpections and 19 other operational activities. 20 He has been with Gulf States Utilities for 21 four years, initially as Operations Quality Assurance 22 Supervisor, later as a Technical Assistant to the Senior 23 Vice President, as Director of Quality Assurance and was 2t appointed to the Assistant Plant Manager for Services in 25 1983. He is a member of the American Nuclear Society and O TAYLOE ASSOCIATES l k.__/ 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 ! WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
~ l l 252 1 the American Society for Quality Control. r-( ,N) 2 The fourth organizational component which I 3 would like to review with you is that under Dr. Gary 1 Weigand, Vice President for Administration. 5 Under that organizational component we have 6 grouped a number of functions which you see here on the 7 slide. Perhaps the most significant of those at the 8 present time is the training aspects, and you visited our 9 training center yesterday. All of the training functions 10 are under Bill Odell who will go into some detail about 11 that at a later time. But we have had operational now for 12 almost a year our plant specific simulator, and of course, 13 it is our primary tool in training the reactor operating 7s 11 staff.
; l \- ' 15 That completes the description of the 16 organization under me.
17 MR. REED: The next item on the agenda then is la a description of the plant operations and also the Plant 19 Safety Review Committee. Mr. Pete Freehill, who is 20 currently the Assistant Plant Manager for Operations as 21 well as Superintendent of Startup and Tests will give chat 22 presentation. z) MR. FREEHILL: Good morning. 21 (Slide.) n I would like to present an overview c the i i I
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253 l_ plant operations organizations, our current and planned (m) (_/ 2 staffing levels and a profile of the experience levels in , i 3 each of these groups. 8 Our Operations Section is headed by Chuck 5 Bogolin. He has a total of 21 years nuclear operating 6 experience. It includes four years in the Navy, six years 7 at Lacrosse boiling water reactor and eight years at the ; 8 Farley plant where he was a Shift Supervisor. He has been 9 at River Bend for approximately three years. 10 Our General Maintenance Supervisor is Joe 11 Burton. 12 MR. OKRENT: Excuse me. 13 MR. FREEHILL: Yes. 11 MR. OKRENT: The PWR was Lacrosse? g-)w (
'- 15 MR. FREEHILL: Yes. Our General Maintenance 16 Supervisor is Joe Burton. He has a bachelor's and a master 17 of science degrees in nuclear engineering from Louisiana 18 State and he has been with Gu'1f States for nine and a half 19 years and has been in engineering and maintenance.
20 Our Radiation Protection and Chemistry 21 Supervisor is Max Cassada. He has a bachelor of science 22 degree from the Univer'sity of Nebraska. He has a total of Tl 21 years nuclear experience which includes ten years in 25 the Navy where he was a Chief Radiological Office at the
$5 New London Submarine Base and eight years at the Calhoun A TAYLOE ASSOCIATES \j 16251 STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 r
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,s I plant where he was a Radiation Protection Supervisor. He
\/ 2 has been four years at River Bend.
3 MR. OKRENT: Is he a member of the Health 4 Physics Society? 5 MR. FREEHILL: I believe he is. 6 MR. OKRENT: Dr. Moller always asks. 7 ( Laugh ter . ) ; 8 MR. OKRENT: Maybe he is trying to build up l l 9 membership. I don't know. 10 ( Laughter . ) ! 11 (Slide.) 12 MR. FREEHILL: Our Operations Organization 13 consists of a total of 67 personnel. It includes an 7-~ It Operations and Assistant Operations Supervisor, six Shift U) 15 Supervisort, six Control Operating Foremen, 18 Control 16 Operators and a total of 30 Nuclear Equipment Operators. 17 The shift complement consists of a Shift 18 ~ Supervisor and a Control Operating Foreman who are SRO 19 -licensed, three Control Operators who are RO licensed and 20 four Equipment Operators and one Rad Waste Equipment 21 Operator. 22 Our current staffing level, we have 60 of 67 ; 21 positions filled. The open positions are two shift et supervisors, one equipment operator and four shift clerks. 25 (Slide.) !
/s
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i 255 j_ 1 I would like to give you a brief overview of [(_,/ 1 2 the experience levels of the staff. 3 Our shift supervisors, and this is a weighted 4 level by an industry review group that takes into 5 consideratioa the correct weighting factors for Navy 6 experience, PWR experience and simulator training, and , 7 these numbers I will be giving you are approximately half [ 8 of what each one's individual total nuclear experience is. 9 Our shift supervisors have an average of six 10 years commercial operating experience and seven years j i 11 total nuclear equivalency. See, the total on those seven 12 years, it comes out not counting Navy factors and things 13 like that, it is a total average of 15 years experience. i
-~ 11 MR. OKRENT: The experience, is this as shift 15 supervisors? i 16 MR. FREEHILL: It is commercial operating ,
i 17 on-shift experience, post-fuel load and not necessarily as la a shift supervisor. 19 Of our four shift supervisors, three have been i 20 shift supervisors. All have been operators. 21 MR. OKRENT: And how many of them have been --- 22 MR. FREEHILL: I am sorry. Two of the four have 23 previously been shift supervisors and the others have been 25 foremen, in the foreman level, i 25 What was your question? (b TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 16251 STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 1 WASHINGTON, D.C. 2000A (202) 293 3950
T l l-i 256 ! 1 MR. OKRENT: How many of your shift supervisors
. (~'T l
'\ssl 2 have held responsible positions on commercial BWR's?
3 MR. FREEHILL: Three of the four, sir. One was 8 a sift supervisor I believe at Quad Cities, one was a 5 shift foreman and one was a reactor operator. The other 6 was a sift supervisor at EBR 2. He has 21 years of i 7 experience. : 8 MR. OKRENT: You said at EBR 2? 9 MR. FREEHILL: No, not all EBR 2, sir, some ' 10 Navi and some River Bend. 11 MR. OKRENT: I missed the initials to the last 12 one, but I don't think it is important. 13 MR. FREEHILL: That was River Bend, partially I It his last few years had been at River Bend. He had, I don't 15 know exactly the numbers, but perhaps six or eight years 16 in the Navy and anther 12 or so years at EBR. 17 Our control operating foremen have an average la of two years commercial operating experience and four 19 years total experience, with the equivalency factors 20 included. Without the equivalency factors, an average of 21 9.6 years each. 22 MR. EBERSOLE: At this level, has there been zl any boiling water reactor e arating experience? I am 21 trying to get a notion of how the experience level is of Is people who really work the switches and controls, s O TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
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257 1 MR. FREEHILL: Chuck, can you help me on that, ex (h 2 please? ; 3 This is Chuck Bogolin, our Operatior. s i Supervisor. l 5 MR. BOGOLIN: With the foremen we do have one 6 that has previous commerical BWR experience. The others 7 are ex-Navy that have been with Gulf States four or five 8 years, plus two of the gentlemen we have come from Zimmer. 9 They were at Zimmer for, one was nine years and the other 10 was ten years at Zimmer. 11 They both had attained their SRO licensing at 12 Zimmer, but that project is no longer alive, and we went 13 up there to get some of these there. They are extremely ! 11 competent people. 73 t k ') 15 MR. EBERSOLE: What about the one level below 16 that, the control operators themselves? 17 MR. BOGOLIN: Our control operators are mainly i 18 ex-Nuclear Navy with a few people that were initially 19 brought in from the GSU system. We are very well pleased 20 with them. We have a very stringent training program 21 before we bring these folks in, and so far it has proven 22 out that they have been able to pass all the criteria. 23 They have all been through the Memphis State SPA program. 21 So they are well educated and they are extremely helpful. 15 MR. EBERSOLE: I guess what all the heat is, /] b TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 1625 i STREET, N.W. - $UITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
7 1. I 258 1 you know, is the dirth of real operating experience with a 7N i ( ,/ 2 reactor of the type that is going to be operated. 3 MR. BOGOLIN: Yes, sir, and we are actively 4 seeking that. 5 MR. FREEHILL: Particularly at our shift 6 supervisor level we believe we have very good experience. 7 One of our shift supervisors has 16 years of BWR 8 experience and I believe another has 15 years. 9 MR. EBERSOLE: Will these people act as 10 teachers to the operators at the other levels? 11 MR. FREEHILL: They are on shift as teachers, 12 certainly. They are not assigned training functions per se 13 in our training staff, but on shift they will certainly 11 provide direction. ?
-~)
's 15 Our radiation protection and chemistry staff 16 consists of chemistry supervisor, a radiation protection 17 supervisor and health physics supervisor. The total staff la will consist of 39 individuals of which 26 are currently 19 on the staff.
20 Our shift complement will be one chemistry 21 technician and one radiation protection technician. Others 22 will be added to shift as necessary, and certainly during
$1 outages that will be a greater number.
et Our management employees, that is the Zi supervisors and foremen have eight bachelor of science h)
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259 e-1 degrees among them. Our technicians have 10 bachelor cf (_,/ 2 science degrees and two associate degrees. 3 Our radiation protection personnel have an i average of eight years total experience and six years 5 nuclcar experience. 6 Our chemistry personnel have an average of 7 seven years total experience and four and a half years of 8 nuclear experience. 9 'MR. OKRENT: It is a little hard sometimes when 10 you talk about the experienced people have to know how 11 much was actual experience and how much was waiting, if 12 you know what I mean. 13 MR. FREEHILL: Yes, I understand that. 11 (Slide.)
's /
13 Our maintenance section consists of a total of
, 16 93 personnel. There is a maintenance section, an 17 electrical section and an 1&C section. I think you will 18 understand everything you see on the chart here. Buildings 19 and grounds, that is our utility personnel, painters and 20 that sort of thing.
21 Of the 93 planned personnel, we currently have 22 59 of those persons on the staff. Our shift complement 21 will be one I&C technician and we expect that others will 28 be added from time to time perhaps full time for our I; preventative maintenance program. Our plan is to have at A TAYLOE ASSOCIATES
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260 1 least one I&C technician on shift. x- 2 MR. EBERSOLE: This maintenance business is 3 getting to be a sensitive matter. In some recent studies 1 it has been shown that maintenance or ma1 maintenance has 5 been a direct cause of lots of the' troubles at the 6 stations, the LER's. So there is coming into view the 7 shadow of something like certificated mechanics like the 8 FAA uses. 9 How do you control and obtain adequate 10 experience in the detailed technical context of your 11 maintenance men who take apart complex machines and put 12 them back together? 13 MR. FREEHILL: First of all, our initial hiring gN. 15 and screening process is very rigid. We have a basic
\ l 15 science and mathematics test to determine that the 16 individual will be capable of doing the job. !
17 In addition, each of our maintenance 18 personnel, we have a qualification matrix procedure where - L 19 he is not just blanketly qualified to be a mechanic or an 20 I&C technician, but he is checked off in each of the 21 individual aspects of his discipline. 22 For instance, an electrician, he will be 23 verified and/or trained and then verified on circuit 2 breakers, transformers, switch gear, relays and those i 23 sorts of things so that he is trained on each individual ( TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
261 1 aspect of the job. V,. 2 In addition, we have specific mechanical 3 training like on recirculation pumps, main steam isolation i valves and feed purp's where they go to the manufacturer, 5 to his factory and receive specific training on those 6 items. ' l 7 MR. EBERSOLE: In that aspect, there is always 8 an argument about the benefits and problems of preventive 9 maintenance, you know, the matter of don't fix it if it 10 ain't broken, or in lieu of that, certainly don't fix 11 everything at once like they did the L-10ll. What is your 12 philosophy about this sort of thing? I hear that some our 13 competitors abroad fix everything at one point in time so 11 they don't have any breakdowns while they are on line, p l 15 MR. FREEHILL: We are now developing an 16 integrated maintenance system and material management 17 system that will incorporate preventive maintenance. We 18 don't really subscribe to don't fix if it isn't broke. We 19 are planning a systematic maintenance program, r 20 instrumentation, electrical and mechanical based on i. 21 manufacturers' recommendations on the equipment. 22 MR. EBERSOLE: You have programs for 23 maintenance just for maintenance or do you capitalize on 21 downtime to keep things up? i 25 MR. FREEHILL: Well, we have some on-line i p TAYLOE ASSOCIATES ( 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293-3950
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y-I .I 262 1 maintenance, yes, sir, lubrication and those kinds of p-t 1 (,/ - 2 things. The tear-down bearing inspections of course would 3 be generally during the outage periods. Sometimes on some 4 of our redundant equipment we can do those kinds of 5 inspections while operating. 6 MR. EBERSOLE: In the matter of the active 7 activity, the concentration of radionuclide activation is 8 primarily in the primary coolant system. Do you have some 9 say as to how hot that is going to be in the context of 10 protecting yourself from future laydown problems? 11 MR. FREEHILL: Yes, sir. We are near the end of 12 a very detailed ALARA program. Our radiation protection 13 staff have gone through all of the potentially 7- It contaminated equipment and have made numerous , (# 15 recommendations. In a few cases we have made equipment 16 changes and in many, many cases those ALARA concerns have 17 been factored into our maintenance and operations la procedures. 19 MR. EBERSOLE: Are you happy with the size and 20 competence of the demineralizers to get to a point? 21 MR. FREEHILL: Yes. We have fairly large 22 condensate demineralizers. We have ten beds and they are z3 full-flow demineralizers. 21 MR. EBERSOLE: Thank you. 25 MR. OKRENT: I think we are going to have to TAYLOE ASSOCIATES L 1625 i STREET, N.W. - $UITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
l 263 ' I try to move through this section just a wee bit faster i D) (, 2 than we have been up to now, like about twice as fast. 3 ( Laughter . ) ! 4 (Slide.) l I 5 MR. FREEHILL: I guess I have already told you : 6 all about the Facility Review Committee before. This is 7 our committee that was referred that has the 8 responsibility of advising the Plant Manager on matters of 9 reactor safety, nuclear safety. f 10 I won't read the slide, but in addition to the ! 11 slide, they review and recommend approval or disapproval 12 of emergency operating procedures and plant administrative 13 procedures. This committee can also, if they have 14 concerns, may review or may submit concerns to the 73 t.] 15 Corporate Review Committee. ' 16 It consists of six senior members of the plant ; 17 staff, the Site Engineering Supervisor and the Operations 18 Quality Assurance Supervisor. 19 MR. OKRENT: Earlier I was asking about the l l 20 depth of knowledge Gulf States Utilities expected to have i I ! 21 about plant design and why it was designed that way. I l 22 guess I can't tell ultimately how much of that knowledge , i 23 will reside in this particular committee which you have i l 2 just given some fairly significant responsibilties. Can [. $; you enlighten me? I l l O TAYLOE ASSOCIATES ! 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SulTE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950 l 1
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'l l
264 1 MR. FREEHILL: Well, in addition to our nuclear em 2 plant engineering and project engineering groups who have 3 been participating in the design and construction, we have 1 a very strong starup and test group of which approximately 5 25 percent are Gulf States employees. These will be 6 retained on the plant staff and we believe in general we 7 will have a very knowledgeable plant staff on the design 8 of the power plant. 9 MR. OKRENT: Well, we will come back to that. 10 MR. FREEHILL: You know, sometimes in a 11 committee meeting like this it is difficult to talk to the 12 right expert at the right time to get the right technical 13 answer and perhaps you should think about that. s 11 Thank you. b 15 MR. REED: Moving on in the agenda, the next 16 discussion will be provided by Phil Graham who is Assitant 17 Plant Manager-Services. His qualifications were read 18 earlier by Mr. Deddens. 19 MR. GRAHAM: Good morning. 20 I think I can accommodate the need to regain j 21 the schedule. If you want me to move a little faster, just 22 give me a cue. 23 (Slide.) l 2 What I would like to briefly describe this l 25 morning is that part of the plant staff organization that l l O
' w,/
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265 p_ 1 reports to myself. That can be broken down into two /1 (_) 2 functional groups, the Technical Support Group and the I 3 Plant Services Material Management Groups, i I will start from the left of that slide with 5 the Technical Materials and Plant Services Supervisor. 6 We do have all the supervisor slots filled and ' 7 the individuals in those positions are the names given 8 there. 9 Mr. King has got approximately 26 years of to experience in aerospace and nuclear manufacturing, 11 construction, startup and tests and quality assurance and 12 quality control. 13 Jerry's primary responsibilities are in the 3 Il plant services administrative support within the plant i 15 coordinating the procedure development phase, material 16 managment activities, warehouse functions to support 17 maintenance activities and assuring that material is 18 available. 19 The principal responsibilities indicate the 20 present GSU direct personnel in the group followed by the 21 number of contract individuals that are currently in the 22 group with the planned level of staff at the operating 23 license stage. 21 You can see in that group that we have nine 25 GSU people supplemented by 20 ' contracts. Most of those TAYLOE ASSOC!ATES [] v 16251 STREET, N.W. - $UITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
,r-l l 266 1 contract individuals are warehouse support people for k-)s 2 moving material, the teamsters, the forklift operators and 3 things like that. 1 The Computer Systems Supervisor, Mr. Gaylor, 3 has got approximately 16 years of nuclear experience with 6 B&W in the computer systems area. His responsibilities 7 there were primarily computer system design, initial 8 startup and checkout of computer systems at the B&W plant. 9 Our responsibilities here are to maintain 10 systems software for the process computer, the ERA system, 11 the DR&S system security computers and provide general 12 plant staff support for some of the corporate computer 13 systems that tie us back to the corporate main frame. 7-s 11 As you can see, at OL we are planning to have
\J 13 six individuals in that group. We have five on staff right 16 now and no contract people in that group.
17 The Control Systems Supervisor, Mr. 18 Thibodeaux, has got approximately 11 years experience, 19 I&C and electrical. He is primarily responsible in that 20 group for the instrumentation electrical systems, ECCS 21 systems and I&C engineering. 22 We are planning to have 11 individuals in that z1 group. We have five onboard right now with one contractor. 2: The asterick there indicates, as Pete indicated earlier, 23 that we have approximately, I don't know the number. He l TAYLOE ASSOCIATES - ( (')T 1625 i sTaseT. N.W. - SUITE 1004 WA$HINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
267 I said 25 percent of the startup organization, but there are
) 2 plans right now to move ten individuals from the startup 3 organization into the plant staff technical services 4 group. Five of those individuals are tenatatively 5 scheduled to go into this systems group.
6 MR. OKRENT: Is Mr. Thibodeaux's experience 7 with operating plants or at River Bend or where? 8 MR. GRAHAM: He has got approximately six years 9 experience with River Bend. He has got no nuclear 10 operating experience. He has got fossile operating 11 experience in startup and tests. He has five years at 12 River Bend. 13 The Process Systems Supervisor, Terry Overlid, li has got approximately 12 years experience. He is Nuclear
}
N/ 13 Navy trained and was an RO and SRO on a research reactor 16 while going to college. He has five years of engineering 17 experience at Monticello and he is in charge of the 18 mechanical systems support, balance of plant, NSSS l 19 mechanical systems, turbine systems, rad waste systems, 20 fire protection and ISI. 21 We currently plan to have 13 individuals in 22 that group at OL with eight there now and supported with 23 six contractors. There again we plan on moving 28 approximately five of the startup test engineers when they 3 beccme available into that group, m TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950 L- _ -
~ l 268 1 The last group indicated there is the Reactor 7 (,,/ 2 Engineering Group. The Supervisor is Dan Williamson. Dan 3 has got approximately six years of nuclear BWR experience i at Hatch. He was an STA for three years and he is a 5 licensed senior reactor operator on Plant Hatch. 6 The principal responsibilities there are to 7 monitor the reactor maneuvers that the operators do, LER 8 evaluation, technical specification compliance and 9 surveillance test program implementation. We currently 10 plan to have eight engineers in that group. We have six 11 onboard right now and he is supplemented by five contract 12 individuals. 13 I think that is it, unless there are any p- 11 questions.
/
-- 15 MR. OKRENT: Have there been any changes made 16 in the River Bend design as a result of feedback from 17 industry experience?
18 MR. GRAHAM: Industrial experience? 19 MR. OKRENT: Yes. 20 MR. GRAHAM: That is my next slide. 21 MR. OKRENT: I know it is your next slide, but 22 I was wondering if there were any changes made? 21 MR. GRAHAM: Specifically I would defer that to 2: Stone and Webster. I would say Stone and Webster has as 25 part of their design input, they review industry TAYLOE ASSOCIATES
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269 I bulletins, NRC bulletins, information notices and they are i fm (_) 2 receipients of other industry experience. : 3 The plant has not initiated any design changes ! l 1 as far as I know based on this experience. I know Stone ' 5 and Webster may have, and I would have to refer that to , 6 the stone and Webster engineering people. 7 MR. OKRENT: I am just trying at the moment to 8 ascertain how deeply and how effectively and to what : 9 aspects the group you just referred to was working. You 10 said you had a man with quite some experience with five 11 people or four people working with him, and I was just i 12 trying to see how far they had gotten. 13 MR. GRAHAM: I am not sure what your question It is. 15 MR. OKRENT: Under Mr. 16 Williamson. They are supposed to look at LER's you said i 17 and this sort of thing. t 18 MR. GRAHAM: When we are operational. We are [9 not actively reviewing LER's now. I 20 MR. OKRENT: When did that group start?
- I MR. GRAHAM: That group has been in existence 21 22 for the last four years. We haven't had that number of i
l 23 people in that group. We presently at six. We hit six in ( i l 28 1983. Prior to that there were only a few engineers in i i , l 25 that group, i l e
/O TAYLOE ASSOCIATES b 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
nr I l 270 1 MR. KIRKEBO: There has been an active l ) (_/ 2 interface between this portion of the GSU plant staff and 3 the Stone and Webster Design and Enginering Organization 4 at Cherry Hill over the past three years. 5 We have correspondence routinly, what we call 6 a problem report system originated by the plant staff for 7 feedback as they review the design. We respond as the 8 designer and have an active dialogue. 9 I know that is not a direct answer to the 10 question, but I wanted to demonstrate for the record that 11 there is an active interface between the plant staff and 12 the design engineering process at Cherry Hill. 13 MR. FREEHILL: Perhaps I can expand a bit on fs it it. Through the preoperational test program preparation f
\ ') 15 every system was reviewed in detail, and along with those 16 systems the product experience reports from General 17 Electric and the service information letters were all la reviewed in a system context. Approximately 600 potential 19 problems or differences or Guggestions or improvements 20 were identified during that process, most of which were 21 incorporated as a result of those reviews. Each system has 22 been reviewed against previous BWR experience in system 21 details.
21 MR. OKRENT: I guess by now you can tell I am 25 trying to understand the depth of knowledge that exists O
's j TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 16251 STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950 1
L
271 l within the Gulf States organization or what I can (s / 2 anticipate it may become. It is clear to me that Stone and 3 Webster generally knows the design very well. I MR. FREEHILL: We have 15 members in the 5 startup and test organization that will go into Bill's 6 tech staff. They are all very deeply committed with the 7 nuclear steam supply system and the key balance of plant a systems and all our SRO's are certified. 9 MR. GRAHAM: Let me talk just briefly on the 10 program that we have in place for reviewing industry 11 experience and how we utilize that information. 12 (Slide.) 13 The Plant Services Group receives 7-~ 18 correspondence from external organizations, whether that
'# 15 is NRC, INPO, vendors supplying technical information, 16 tech manuals, et cetera. They do a preliminary review of 17 that information to try to ascertain which group is 18 primarily responsible for evaluating it and, if applicable 19 to River Bend, generating a response or a position that we 20 would like to take some action on. That is put under cover 21 of a report that is forwarded to that respective 22 organization, and in some cases, depending on the type of 21 information, more than one of the sections in the plant 24 staff have to review it for applicability to their 11 activities. So we get two or three responses generated.
(V ) TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 1625 i STREET, N.W. - $Ulft 1004 WASHINGTON. D.C. 20004 (202) 293 3950
]f I 272 1 Those responses are fed back to the Plant (_,/ 2 Services Group. They consolidate the response and we 3 provide the response to licensing. If it has to be has to 8 be forwarded external to the company, for instance if it 5 is a response to information or an I&C bulletin or I&E 6 bulletin, they generate the formal response back to the
? NRC.
8 If it is just for information like an 9 information notice, we provide that information to 10 licensing for their files, but we keep a record of that 11 response and ensure through the procedure development 12 process, maintenance procedure development, operating 13 procedure development, that that is incorporated into
,those procedures since that Plant Service Group also is 7-s 1 \- / 15 the coordinating activity for procedure development at 16 this time. That information also includes the INPO, SER's, 17 SOER's, GE service information letters, et cetera, that la come into the plant.
19 Unless there are any other questions, that is 20 n11 I have. 21 MR. REED: The next item on the agenda then 22 will be addressed by Mr. Tom Crouse, Manager of our l 21 Quality Assurance Program. I 28 MR. CROUSE: Good morning. 25 I would liks to provide you this morning with 1 1 j , TAYLOE ASSOCIATES i 16251 STRIET. M.W. - SulTE 1004 WASHINGTON, O C. 20004 l (202) 293 3950 l l
273
.I a brief familiarization with the quality casurance program r^s
(,) - 2 at River Bend. 3 (Slide.) ; I GSU recognized long ago that as the licensee L 5 we are ultimately responsible for the quality of the 6 project. Six years ago some significant decisions were 7 made that contributed to a very successful quality 8 project. 9 One, we chose to minimize communication 10 interfaces by having one organization be the A/E and 11 constructor. Associated with that is a minimization of 12 subcontractors on site. 13 Secondly, we decided to have GSU senior It manaement and the entire QA Department located on site to
\J 15 provide.for identification and swift resolution of 16 problems.
17 (Slide.) 18 This is the GSU QA organization. 19 As you can see, I report to the Senior Vice i 20 President. The functions of the QA Department are ' 21 organized into four areas. 22 Starting at the right, the quality systems 23 area provides audits of the project activities. In ; 25 addition, they have one activity that we started over the 25 last year and it is a quality concern program where we T TAYLOE ASSOCIATES _/ 1625 i STREET, N.W. - $UITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
l 274 I solicit concerns from departing employees from the 2 project. We interview them and remind them that they have 3 the right and obligation to report quality problems or 4 concerns to the NRC or to GSU. 5 Moving on to the quality engineering area, the 6 primary functions of that group is to provide surveillance 7 of the construction activities and to review the various 8 construction related engineering documents such as 9 nonconformance reports, design changes, potential 10 deficiency reports and the like. ) 11 Over in the operations area the quality 12 control group will provide receipt inspection and f i 13 maintenance inspection.
-- It . Finally, the operations QA group is presently a 15 providing surveillance of the of the startup and testing ,
16 activities. It is a member of the FRC and JTG and they , 17 review all the testing going on at this time. ! l 18 (Slide.) L 19 This will provide you a little information on i i , 20 the background of the QA personnel. I won't read it all to ( , I l ! 21 you. 22 The primary point here is that greater than 80 s percent have prior nuclear commercial construction or et operation experience. l 25 (Slide.) l O\_./ TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 1625 i STnEET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 l (202) 293 3950 l i
275 ' 1 Continuing on this theme, some seven, or eight
.O
(,/ 2 now I believe, of our individuals have nuclear training, -
'3 Navy Nuclear training. The average, typically middle aged 4 people have 17 years working experience with about seven 5 years QA or QC experience. The top level, or the 6 supervisors on up have an average of about 12 years 7 nuclear experience.
8 Some of our key individuals on the project 9 have prior QA experience, including Mr. Cahill, Booker, 10 Graham and Jerry King. 11 We also have two QA engineers in the SRO s > 12 training program. 13 (Slide.) It I will briefly discuss some of the Stone and (
\ 15 Webster QA program elements. There are five basic areas 16 that I will touch on.
17 The Engineering Assurance Department of Stone 18 and Webster provides audits an'd reviews of the Stone and 19 Webster project design activities. They are an independent 20 group of people that watch over Stone and Webster project 21 engineeering. l 22 The Procurement Quality Assurance Group 23 proviees for audits and inspections at the vendors' shops. 28 The construction, control and completion 25 program is a program administered by the construction TAYLOE ASSOCIATES Q'N _/ 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 j WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 l (202) 293-3950 L
m
'l 1
276 I forces themselves and provides for inspection of the work
'(A) 2 by the construction supervision and signoff that the work 3 is completed and done right and there is a high degree of 4 accountability. As a result of their efforts, greater than l 5 98 percent of the work is done right the first time.
6 MR. OKRENT: Are there any high-strength bolts 7 used for tying down pieces of equipment in this plant? , 8 MR. CROUSE: Yes. 9 MR. OKRENT: How is the quality control 10 maintained on these and how, if at all, have you < 11 benefitted from prior experience? j 12 MR. CROUSE: We have a complete bolting control 13 program. Typically any category of bolt is procured with a l p certair. amount of testing required and associated b
\/ 15 documentation. The bolts are maintained and there is a 16 very tight control of them on the site and control of i
17 their utilization is achieved. 18 Does that answer your question? 19 MR. OKRENT: Not really. What kind of prior , 20 experience at other sites do you recall with high-strenoth p 21 bolts, if any? ' l 22 MR. CROUSE: There have been a number of a bolting problems at other projects. There is one currently 25 arising that we are reacting to or just reacted to this i i 23 week involving Cardinal Industry bolting materials. It l l TAYLOE ASSOCIATES ' x 1625 i STREET, N.W. - $UITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293-3950
rv . 'l l 277 i I has been determined by NRC inspections that their i ( ,/ 2 materials are suspect and we have stopped utilizing them 3 as a result. 1 MR. OKRENT: Well, it seems to me that is a rather recent aspect. Have you decided that the sampling 6 program is adequate, for example, the ASDM sampling? - MR. CROUSE: Yes, I believe we have, and of ; 8 course we also sample various fasteners that we install t 9 ourselves on a sampling basis. Concrete anchors are 10 sampled by us during the construction phase and we have a 11 high confidence in that process on all of those concrete l 12 anchors. 13 MR. OKRENT: Well, let me put it this way.
- s. It Somewhere you have a list of experiences with i i
\J 15 high-strength volts at each of the nuclear plants under 16 construction or whose construction has been finished 17 recently.-
18 MR. CROUSE: Well, I don't think we have a , 39 specific list of all of the probldms of high-strength 20 bolts experienced by the industry. However, we have an 21 inspection planning process which includes the receipt of 22 all industry experience, all quality problems of vendors z) or at other. construction sites and feeds that into our 2 procurement inspection planning process and to our zs procurement documents themselves and into the field O TAYLOE ASSOCIATES ( 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202J 293 3950
278 1 inspection planning efforts. q k) 2 MR. OKRENT: Well, I can't tell what that 3 means. It was my impression that the ASTM sampling 4 ' requirement was modest and the experience was, assuming 5 that in once the bolts that were tested did pass, but a 6 surprising number of other bolts in the lot did not, and 7 you a moment age said you accepted the ASTM test. 8 MR. CROUSE: Perhaps we should research that 9 one and come back to you with a more complete answer at a 10 later time. 11 MR. OKRENT: I am only probing in this area as 12 a way of looking at what all these generalities on the 13 viewgraph mean and I guess I can't tell. 7-s 11 MR. EBERSOLE: May I ask a question. In the
)
( N/ 15 same probing context let me ask about the engineering 16 assurance aspects of Stone and Webster's activities. I was 17 somewhat fascinated yesterday to see the design la incorporating vertical cable chasers. 19 MR. CROUSE: In the control building. 20 MR. EBERSOLE: Yes. Vertical cable chasers to 21 me means something like chimneys, but I was told that you 22 are going to put fire stops at discrete levels and they a used to inhibit the vertical rise of hypothetical fires. 21 Cables burn bad enough on horizontal trays, but the 23 burning is exponential when they are vertical, pv TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
0-l Il 279 1 I was thinking about how you are going to do (3 kI 2 the fire scopping business and hear the fact that the 3 cables penetrate whatever the material is you are going to 4 use as a fire stop, as much as a fuse would go through a , 5 wall. How are you really going to contain the --- 6 MR. CROUSE: You are asking a design question 7 there and I would like to refer that to Bill. The cable chasers are one fire 8 MR. RAUGHLEY: 9 zone. 10 MR. EBERSOLE: Say that again. 11 MR. RAUGHLEY: The cable chasers are one fire 12 zone in the plant. The plant is divided up into individual 13 fire zones separated by three-hour fire batteries. The 7-~g it cable chasers themselves are a fire area. 15 MR. EBERSOLE: But the led into the terminal 16 board. < F 17 MR. RAUGHLEY: There will be sealant placed at 18 the top of that. 19 MR. EBERSOLE: How do you seal cables other > 20 than seal the open space not occupied by cables and how do 21 you prevent traverse of the fire stop right through the 22 cables which will just burn clear through, like a fuse 3 would burn through a brick wall? You have got a problem. gg MR. RAUGHLEY: There are tests that were 23 conducted and I can get you the specific test for that TAYLOE ASSOCIATES
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280 1 event.
. f}
( ,) 2 MR. EBERSOLE: Oh, you did have tests that 3 showed that you have --- 4 MR. RAUGHLEY: I want to confirm it, but EP-119 5 I think. 6 MR. EBERSOLE: Do you have some tests that show you can pour a horizontal seal around a group or set of 8 cables? 9 MR. RAUGHLEY: Yes. I can confirm that for you 10 today. 11 MR. EBERSOLE: Fine. Thank you. 12 MR. OKRENT: There is a related question 13 though. I understand that you have separation via a fire It wall between sets of vertical chasers, but it seems to me
\- 15 relevant to ask oneself do I have a configuration such 16 that if a fire starts it is not likely to spread through ;
17 all of the racks in this particular division. In other , I
-18 words, it is more likely to be restricted to one or two, 19 or in fact it may not even spread rapidly in the first 20 rack, or'does one have an arrangement which sort of lends 21 itself to any fire probably being fairly severe for that 22 division?
n If the situation is the latter, and I am only 2t postulating this, I don't know that that is the case, 25 there are some connotations that go with that, a variety (-}j TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950 a
.I
- l 281 1 of connotations, and they are, it seems to me, worth A .
k.,-) 2 thinking about and writing down and reflecting on whether 3 there are ameliorative measures that are of value. I will 4 'just leave it that,way. 9 5 MR. RAUGHLEY: The design has several aspects 6 in it that answers your questions. One is that the cables 7 are procured such that upon removal of the flame source, 8 they will self-extinguish. : 9 MR. EBERSOLE: Pardon me. I recall that those . 10 tests are carefully designed so that the convection , 11 currents carry the flame away from the cable and not above 12 me. 13 MR. RAUGHLEY: Those tests are performed on the g-ss it cables in the vertical configuration. The required test is
-)
15 that you apply 70,000 Btu's per hour of flame, and we have 16 exceeded that requirements by requiring 400,000 Btu's per 17 hour, la MR. EBERSOLE: You have got some vertical test 19 data on that? ' 20 MR. RAUGHLEY: Yes. On each cable specification that is required. ' 21 22 MR. EBERSOLE: Good. 23 MR. RAUGHLEY: In addition, to answer his 2: question about should they have a fire possibly damaging s redundant divisions, the plant fully complies to Reg. (O
\. )
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-- - .. - .-m- - . - - - ----,-,,-,,,-r-
282 1 Guide 1.75 which requires that we maintain certain spacial
. /3 '
1,,/ 2 distances between these redundant divisions. If we violate 3 that spacial distance, then we install a barrier to 4 preclude that. 5 MR. EBERSOLE: May I ask, these tests, they may 6 show satisfactory results on one cable, on two cables, on
; three cables, but they may not show satisfactory results P
a on 11 cables or some other number where you get sort of a , 9 critical array. How many cables were used in the test that to showed non-propagation in the vertical? 11 MR. RAUGHLEY: I would have to confirm that. , 12 MR. EBERSOLE: Do you follow me? 13 MR. RAUGHLEY: Yes. ,
, 11 MR. EBERSOLE: The heat balance is upset when ! /) 's / 15 you get more and more cables and you tend to develop a 16 propagating configuration. ;
17 MR. RAUGHLEY: This test was with the worst la cable for the cables of the lot, which would be five. 19 MR. EBERSOLE: I know, but is it tested in 20 group cables rather than singular cables? 21 MR. RAUGHLEY: Yes. 22 MR. EBERSOLE: And what is that group size? 23 MR. RAUGHLEY: I would have to get that exact 25 data for you. 3 MR. EBERSOLE: Okay. I wish you would do that. ; i (j) s TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
l-283 1 MR. RAUGHLEY: Yes, we will get that for you. (^N ( ,) 2 MR. CROUSE: Let me continue on here then.
'3 The field quality control effort is an 4 inspection effort by about 300 Stone and Webster quality 5 control inspectors. They inspect all the work after it is 6 completed by construction, and I will repeat, they find
; the work done right 98 percent of the time, greater than 8 98 percent of the time.
9 Finally, another independent auditing measure. 10 The Quality Assurance Auditing Department out of Boston 11 comes down at least quarterly and provides thorough audits 12 of the project. 13 (Slide.)
-~ 11 GSU has had a very active involvement in k 15 ongoing activities, starting with our senior management 16 being on site and continuing with quality engineering and 17 project engineering reviews of nonconformance reports and la specifications. These are reviews and approvals or an gg in-line approval.
20 In addition, I would like to repeat what Pete 21 Freehill said, that the startup personnel in preparation 22 for their startup activities review many drawings and 3 other engineering data to debug their procedures to 21 facilitate a smooth startup. 25 The QA and FQC personnel have not hesitated to (~')
'w,,/
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284 l' stop work when it was necessary. We have found that this n ( ,) 2 is a good tool. When an. activity is in progress without a required procedures, we generally stop work, or when a problem requiring time to sort out is encountered, it is 5 generally productive to stop work. 6 (Slide.)
. Let me conclude by saying I believe we are a doing a very good job in building this plant. We have 9 inspection results that are very high for the industry, 98 10 percent.
11 We have no NRC stop work orders and no civil 12 penalties and no show cause orders. 13 We have had favorable SALP reports and s 18 favorable reports from third parties, including INPO, the
\
(\--) 15 Management Analysis Company and a joint utility audit 16 program. 17 That concludes my presentation, la MR. REED: The next item on the agenda is the
~
19 discussion of the engineering organization. Mr. Jim 20 Booker, the Manager of Fuels, Nuclear Plant Engineering 21 and Licensing will provide that presentation. 22 (Slide.) 21 MR. BOOKER: The three topics I have for 28 discussion this morning is the engineering organization of 25 Gulf States, the interface with General Electric, Stone (O (j TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 1625 i STREET, N.W. - $UITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006
, (202) 293 3950
m 1 4 285 1 and Webster and industry support groups and participation
-O\. ,/ 2 in industry groups, 3 (Slide.)
1 As on the slide that you were shown earlier by 5 Mr. Deddens, I am Manager of Engineering, Nuclear Fuels 6 and Licensing reporting directly to Mr. Deddens, the Vice 7 President of the Engineering Group. 8 (Slide.) 9 Specifically this is the engineering group to that reports to me. I have four areas of responsibility, 11 the emergency planning effort now, the nuclear licensing, 12 the plant engineering and nuclear fuels design and safety 13 analysis.
,-s it We presently have about 69 employees in our
\~ / 13 organization of a future staffing of about 105.
16 The experience of the four supervisors and c 17 directors reporting to me. Mr. Cadwallader has eight years la experience in emergency planning, Mr. Reed has nine 39 experience in the licensing effort, Mr. Glazer has a total 20 of 18 years of professional experience with 16 of that in 21 the nuclear field, and Mr. Sankovitch has a total of 33 22 years of nuclear experience. 21 MR. OKRENT: Could you tell me what Mr. 2 Glazer's experience is a little more? 23 MR. BOOKER: Mr. Glazer's experience, of those TAYLOE ASSOCIATES O) ( 16251 STRftT, N.W. - $UITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
286 1 16 years of nuclear experiennce, 6 of those have been on f% ( ,) 2 the River Bend project and 10 of those have been in other 3 organizations, with Omaha Power and also with General
& Atomic.
5 MR. OKRENT: Doing what kind of work? 6 MR. BOOKER: Engineering work in the design field. 8 MR. OKRENT: In the design field? 9 MR. BOOKER: Yes. 10 If we look at the experience of the overall 11 organization of our 69 people, and about 60 of those are 12 professional people, we have a total of 477 years of i t 13 professional exper'ience, of which 345 are nuclear ! it experience mostly in their particular field of design or i7-s)
\~/ 15 licensing or in the fuels area, and 215 of those years are t 16 outside Gulf States.
1 MR. OKRENT: Mr. Sankovitch and Mr. Kahn, what la is their professional experience? 19 MR. BOOKER: Mr. Sankovitch had 33 years [ 20 experience with the Babcock and Wilcox Company in the i 21 areas of safety analysis, fuels management and fuels 22 design. 21 MR. OKRENT: What was the safety analysis part i 21 of this? 25 MR. BOOKER: He was responsible in the B&W TAYLOE ASSOCIATES O( / 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUlit 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 I (202) 293 3950 i
T l l 287
- p. I organization for the preparation of their safety analysis t I k/ 2 reports to support their licensing effort.
3 MR. OKRENT: The full report? t MR. BOOKER: Well, probably the Chapter 15 5 type. 6 MR. DEDDENS: I am personally acquainted with 7 Mr. Sankovitch having worked with him for most of those 30 8 years at Babock and Wilcox and I can give you a little bit 9 more detail about his specific background. 10 He served'in various capacities which included 11 stress analysis, manager of the thermal hydraulic 12 engineering section, manager of the preliminary design la section and manager of field engineering. All of those e-~si is positions were responsible engineering management (
\~ 13 positions involving the use of design codes and the safety 16 analysis codes that go along with the design and nuclear 17 fuel.
n la MR. EBERSOLE: After a good many years I have g9 some problems with compartmentalized engineering 20 experience. The NRC did put in a division they called the 21 Division of System Integration which was supposed to be a 22 network that would integrate across the function groups 23 such as I see here, mechanical, electrical, civil, 21 structural and architectural. You know what I mean. 25 That sort of function has to be accomplished O TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 1625 i $TRitT, N.W. = Sulff 1004 I WASHINGTON, D.C. 20004 (202) 293 3950 O L
288 1 some place, whether you name it or not, and I am only (n) 2 talking about in the safety context. Can you tell me how 3 it happens here because I don't see a discrete or 1 identified function. 5 MR. BOOKER: What we are presently doing now is 6 we are assigning engineers who have the total 7 responsibility for a particular system, and we are in the 8 process of doing that right now, and those engineers could 9 be in either one of these groups. 10 MR. EBERSOLE: For a given functional system, 11 MR. BOOKER: Yes, sir. 12 MR. EBERSOLE: The problem of intersystem 13 relationships, how does that work?
,_ 18 MR. BOOKER: that would be the responsibility 15 of the systems engineer.
16 MR. EBERSOL8: Say that again. 17 MR. BOOKER: That would te the responsibility 18 of the systems engineer to be sure the other groups were 19 involved. 20 MR. EBERSOLE: Where is he? 21 MR. BOOKER: That will be part of the overall 22 engineering. We will have disciolines in each one at these z1 area or in the civil and electrical '.nd n'1: lear. Each one 21 of these groups will have people that are assigned 23 responsibility ror a particular safety system. It would be D TAYLOE ASSOCIATES ( 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
m ~l l-289 I nis responsibility that it any design changes or any
\s,,1 2 . problems occur in that system, then he will call on the 3 experts from either of those discipline groups to assist i him.
5 MR. EBERSOLE: But what is modifications or 6 changes to that system in a subtle way influence these
; other systems and how is that picked up?
8 MR. BOOKER: Would you repeat that please? 9 MR. EBERSOLE: Say that the modifications to proposed for that system in some subtle way impacted upon 11 other systems for which that engineer is not-responsible. 12 MR. BOOKER: Well, of course, all of our la engineering group who are responsible for design and g3 15 control are located in our corporate headquarters there in i3
\~ # ' 15 Beaumont and they have very close communications with one 16 another.
17 MR. EBERSOLE: Is there a formalized process la for them to get together? 19 MR. BOOKER: We are in the process right now of 20 setting up a configuration management program and as part 21 of that configuration management program will be design 22 control. So if we make a design change, then we will have zi a process so that the other departments, not only in 25 engineering, but also plant staff will be aware of those x; changes and look at their procedures. O
'L/
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290 1 MR. EBERSOLE: So you are in the process of
/~'s
( ,) 2 setting up such a system. 3 MR. BOOKER: Right. 1 MR. EBERSOLE: Well, that brings the next 5 question. You have a plan in being. Are you going to go 6 back and look at the plan with a new configuration and see what you have built? 8 MR. BOOKER: Well, as a part of our training 9 programwehaveassign!adthesesystemstotheengineers g to here, and these engineers who were assigned the systems 11 are reviewing startup procedures for these systems. They 12 are actually coming over to the site and participating in la the startup program so they will be familiar with these s li particular systems. So that is what we are doing right now s- h 15 is going back to be sure these system engineers understand 16 the plant as designed. 17 This is a process we have just started and we la are organizing that right now. Our goal is certainly to 19 have configuratien management and our engineers up to 20 speed on this by commercial operation. 21 MR. EBERSOLE: Thank you. 22 MR. OKRENT: Are some of the individuals you a have named there quite familiar with the PRA techniques 23 and the results of recent PRA's? s MR. BOOKER: We have a presentation later on p Q TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 1625 i STREET. N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
y l' 4 291 1 today by Jim Glazer, Director of Nuclear Plant Engineering
' 's_,/
(D 2 on the PRA. 3 MR. OKRENT: Okay. 1 (Slide.) 5 MR. BOOKER: To give you a more detailed view 6 of strictly the nuclear plant engineering group, as Mr. 7 Deddens said, we will have most of these engineers in 8 Beaumont, but we will have some of these engineers here on 9 site to interface with the plant staff on a day-to-day 10 basis. As a part of that engineering group here on site
'll will be the Independent Safety Engineering Group reporting 12' off site for their functions.
13 Two other' areas that I was gcing to speak on 73 la this morning is the interface with the Stone and i 1
'\ '
15 Webster /GE and industry support groups. 16 (Slide.) 17 During the design and construction phase the la interface with these organizations had been through the 39 GSU project engineering group design related activities. 20 They have been through our licensing group for licensing 21 activities and through our startup group during the 22 startup phase. 23 Once we go operational interface with Stone 21 and Webster and GE on design changes will be through our y; nuclear plant engineering group and licensing will O
'(j TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 1625 i STRfET, N.W. - $Ulft 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
292 1 continue through our licensing group.
. ;m
- 1) 2 The interface with the industry support groups 3 have been by whichever organization as the responsibility
.: for that particular function, whether it be operations or 5 QA or engineering or licensing or design.
6 The last topic for discussion is participation 7 in industry groups. Gulf States has been very active from 8 the inception of River Bend in participating in many of 9 the industry groups. We are a member of INPO. We are a 10 member of EPRI, we have a lot of people who are on 11 committees and EEI and ANS and committees of that sort. , 12 We plan to continue to be very active in that i la because we feel like that is very useful to keeping i
,- It abreast of the current practices and the current problems \ 15 and the current improvements that are being made in the 16 nuclear industry.
17 MR. OKRENT: Thank you. la I guess this may be an appropriate time to 19 take a 10-minute break and then we will get into training 20 programs. Let's try to keep it to 10 minutes. 21 (Recess.) 22 MR. OKRENT: The meeting will reconvene. II It is clear that we are running a little late 25 this morning and we also have some things that we didn't 23 finish from yesterday. p/ y TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 1625 i STRffT, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3930
'l l 293 _ _ 1 As a tentative operating basis, subject to
\s-) 2 change, I am going to assume that Items H, I and K on 3 today's agenda will be deferred toward the end of the
-t meeting and that we will bring in the material not covered 5 last night at some appropriate time prior to these.
6 Mr. Ebersole is driving, and so he has no 7 constraints imposed by' airlines. So he will be able to a continue the meeting going well after the originally 9 planned ending. I myself will probably have to leave by 10 3:30. 11 Do that pose any problems to the staff or the , 12 applicant? 13 MR. BOOKER: Not from the applicant. (w 16 MR. OKRENT: Well, I will assume it is okay. 15 Why don't we go ahead then with training 16 programs. 17 MR. REED: The next item on the agenda then is la the training program discussion. Mr. Bill Odell, Director gg of Nuclear Training has been with Gulf States Utilities a 20 little over a year. He brings with him 14 years prior 21 experience with B&W and the Nuclear Navy. He has BS 22 degree majoring in physics and mathematics from the 21 University of Nebraska. 28 MR. ODELL: Good morning. 23 I would like to talk about the training ih V TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 1625 i StaffT, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950 m
294 I programs in general with specific attention on operating ((),; 2 and maintenance training. 3 (Slide.) 1 The general approach to training at Gulf 5 States Utilities uses a systems approach to training, and 6 that is to do a comprehensive needs analysis normally 7 through the job and task analysis methods to determine 8 what each person needs specifically to perform his job. 9 This work has been done for all the plant to staff positions and training is in progress for all of 11 those positions. 12 In addition to Gulf States Utilities' staff, 13 we use two large training organizations, the NUS 15 Corporation and General Physics Corporations to supplement O \) s 15 that staff for operations traini~ng, for maintenance 16 training, for rad
- protection and chsmistry training.
17 The Training Department is separate from the 18 plant staff and reports, as you saw before, to the Vice 19 President of Administration. 20 MR. OKRENT: Excuse me. Do you think that after 21 you are operational you will still be relying heavily on 22 large contractors? 2'l MR. ODELL: No, sir. Those contracts are built 25 to phase down as the GSU staff increases. 25 (Slide.)
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v.
'l Ll 295 1 The training facilities you walked through f( ,/ 2 yesterday, you did not see the maintenance facility which 3 is down on site. It includes adequate classroom training i spaces and hands-on laboratory facilities for all the 5 separate crafts that needs hands-on performance based 6 training.
7 For the operators the performance based a training is designed around the plant specific simulator. 9 This was built by the Singer / Link Company and has been 10 operational for approximately a year. 11 (Slide. 12 This shows that training organization. The GSU 13 organization has four groups broken into functional la training areas and it shows how the NUS Corporation and O
\-) 13 General Physics Company interfaces with that. Each of 16 those two companies has a Project Manager that reports to 17 me.
la (Slide.) 19 Moving into the operator training area, I will 20 first talk about selection. 21 We use comprehensive rigorous selection that 22 has been very successful for us so far. The basic criteria a is high school education and we apply several different 21 screening vehicles in order to be certain that each of 23 these persons will have the potential for completing the i (] (,- TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 16251 STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950 i
t 296
., I program and will perform reliably.
2 For the operators the Gulf States Utilities 3 basic battery course, which is a learning ability, verbal 4 reasoning and mechanical aptitutde test, is the first 5 screening test and is followed up by basic math and 6 science tests. 7 MR. EBERSOLE: May I ask a question. 8 MR. ODELL: Yes, sir. 9 MR. EBERSOLE: We have another member who is - 10 not here today, but he keeps hammering on all of us about t il the importance of what he calls mechanical physical J e
-12 aptitude rather than a preference for working on computers 13 and paperwork. Do you do some sort of a survey of ,r g la screening to determine that people have some feel for the y)
15 physical realities that they are working on? , 16 MR. ODELL: Yes, sir. Part of the basic battery 17 test is that mechanical aptitude test. It is really an la associative type test, but it does screen very well and it i 39 has served the company as a whole extremely well.
- 20 (Slide.)
21 This shows the operator progression at Gulf 22 States Utilities. This is fairly typical of most other ; 8 n companies. : f 2: (Slide.) ' s For the initial phase of training this shows.
- TAYLOE ASSOCIATES !
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y 1 q 297 1 the cold license training program that is used at Gulf {^\
\_) 2 States Utilities. Particular emphasis is to the simulator 3 training period, and since we have a plant specific 4 simulator we use.that simulator extensively in order to 5 provide adequate training for our people.
6 I will come back to the simulator aspects. You
; had some questions abcut that before and I will come back 8 to that.
9 (Slide.) 10 This slide shows the hot license training that 11 will occur once the plant is operational. 12 Another aspect of our training program is the la comprehensive training for the nuclear equipment g-s\ It operators. It includes six weeks of fundame'ntal technical 15 training and is followed on by 11 weeks of study on the 16 individual systems in a rigorous qualification system 17 using performance based qualification cards. 18 (Slide.) ; i 19 The integration of the simulator into the 20 training program has these objectives. The simulator is a 21 supero tool, since it is plant specific, for both 22 manipulative skills and conceptual skills. a About 70 percent of the time spent on the ; i 2; simulator is on normal plant operations. This is n individual system startup, comprehensive system startup, TAYLOE ASSOCIATES i 1625 i STRIET, N.W. - $UITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950 i e
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298 1 and that is the integration of the system altogether in a (
'()
,y 2 comprehensive system, operations startup and shutdown, and 3 about 30 percent of the time is spent in the training in i abnormal conditions.
5 (Slide.) 6 This slide shows the typical simulator day. As 7 we discussed with you yesterday, we brief each crew that e comes in_for the simulator on the training objectives that 9 day and, depending upon where they are at in their 10 training cycle, is whether or not they are prewarned about 11 the evolutions that are going to take place. Later in 12 their training those are unscheduled, at least for them 13 they are unscheduled training exercises. 7_s it (Slide.) t i (/ 15 Another question that was asked was in the 16 training in an accident or abnormal conditions scenarios. 17 We use two approaches. One is in what I call preventative, la and that is the teaching of the design. You need to know 19 the basis of the system and why it was designed the way it 20 is and then teach how it operates. The basis of the 2I procedures is taught the same way, what it means and how 22 it is used. 21 Then we do do the procedural training of 28 administrative controls like the technical specifications 25 of the boundaries of your operation. TAYLOE ASSOCIATES O() 1625 i STRitT, N.W. - Sulft 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950 w_
i 299 1 l I
,_ Then the simulator scenarios are used to show I \~/ 2 how the various systems can be used to prevent getting l 3
into situations that would lead to severe abnormal I conditions.
. f 3
Finally, we do also teach that if enough [ 6 systems fail what the response of the plant would be in 7 i the core damage scenarios, 8 MR. OKRENT: How do you teach that? , 9 MR. ODELL: It is mainly done in the classroom, 10 The simulator of course is not programed to deal with a II damaged --- t
. 12 MR. OKRENT: Who teaches that?
II M3. ODELL: Our own people teach the systems (-'( Il and the have two consultants that come in and teach the I5 J' mitigation of cora damage. It is done by General Physics. 16 MR. OKRENT: How many people who work full time 17 for Gulf Statet really understand that aspect of plant 18 behavior would you say? 19 MR. ODELL: That are Gulf States employees or l 20 the contractors'? l 21 MR. OKRENT: Gulf States employees and not f 22 contractor personnel, l 21 MR. ODELL: In the operations training area --- 4 28 MR. OKRENT: Anywhere in Gulf States at the 25 moment. (]
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1 MR. ODELL: I can't address that specifically. C/ 2 We have supplied training in abnormal and accident 3 scenarios for about.18 people,15 of which were in the 8 Nuclear Plant Engineering Group and three which were of r 3 the onsite staff. 6 MR. OKRENT: You mean they took this course? I MR. ODELL: A separate more rigorous course 8 from General Electric. In addition, all the operating 9 staff will get this particular course. 10 MR. OKRENT: What was this course? Il MR. ODELL: It is the General Electric course l 12 on abnormal plant transients and acciden.t scenarios. . 11 MR. OKRENT: Well, that sounds like a very n li useful course, but I am not sure it goes heavily into ( )
' 15 post-core damage situations. I would assume not in any 16 event.
17 MR. ODELL: That is absolutely right. The la mitigating core damage course which is given to the [ 19 operators and selected members of the technical staff is 29 what the configuration and core cooling mechanics is for. 21 the damaged core. We just call it mitigating core dams.ge 22 course. ! 21 MR. OKRENT: I am still trying to understand 28 how many people who work for Gulf States are familiar and 25 knowledgeable and not just have heard about possible ! O U TAYLOE ASSOCIATES in ,iit. r. .... .r.i00. WASMlNGroN, D.C. 20004 (303) 293 3990 ,
l 301 I courses of events for A suitable range of scenarios'that - ...
\
(\~,/ 2 have led to core damage or melt, because you called on an 3 outside group to teach it, and that is one sign. I How about the Senior Vice President for 5 I know you had an early exposure for a PWR. Nuclear? 6 MR. CAHILL: I don't know what you mean. 7 MR. OKRENT: I mean back many years ago 8 questions like this were talked about. 9 MR. CAHILL: Oh, we certainly asked questions. l 10 I am generally familiar with the types of accidents that 11 could lead to core damage, and these of course are 12 extensively described in the Rasmusen Report in all its 13 volumes and they are discussed for PWR's and BWR's. I am
~ 11 generally familiar with both of those.
G 15 I haven't taken this course, but the senior w - 16 management of the company, Mr. Deddens, and certainly i 17 whoever we have as Plant Manager. The managers of the 18 functional groups, engineering, QA and the other assistant 19 managers and operating supervisors, all will be familiar 20 and genrally are. You get this just by being in the 21 industry, the general problems of keeping a shutdown core 22 cool. 11 For each specific plant, of course, there are 28 different systems that are used, but I think that each of 25 the people who have nuclear experience in our group or in [j 3 TAYLOE ASSOCIATES \ 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293-3950
m i
\
302 1 any company's group are familiar with core damage (~_)
\m / 2 potential and the types of steps it takes to mitigate.
3 MR. OKRENT: Well, the emergency operating 4 procedures really are designed to prevent core damage. I 3 think that is a fair statement, and actually I think it is 6 a very good development. I I am not aware at the moment of a place where 8 I could find a single document that would give me a good 9 feel for how a BWR-6 MARK III having the features of River 10 Bend was likely to behave in what the different potential 11 behavior patterns are and so forth and so on, assuming we 12 weren't successful in keeping the core cool and that it 13 overheated and melted.
~3 11 If you have such a document or if the staff l
13 has such a document I would like to know of it, but rig".it 16 now I don't think I have one. 17 Dr. Theofanous when he was here, for example, 18 mentioned casually that there could lxn dif ferences 19 introduced between MARK III and another just in how you 20 were handling the region below the vessel in these 21 postulated accidents. 22 So I am wondering really two things, whether 23 there is sufficient knowledge of this general type 21 available and, secondly, whether enough people within the 25 organization will have knowledge of this kind for their TAYLOE ASSOCIATES V 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 292 3950
303 1 plant before.it_gets up to any serious levels of power? (/ 2 MR. ODELL: We have put together sets of 3 training materials to cover these particular issues. 4 MR. OKRENT: I don't believe General Physics 5 has that information either frankly. I would be happy for 6 them to show me I am wrong, but it takes a kind of I analysis that uses certain degrees of sophistication. 8 MR. CAHILL: What you are bringing up is if the 9 emergency operating procedures and emergency procedures 10 are not effective and you have a damaged core are there 11 procedures, and I don't --- 12 MR. OKRENT: Well, first is the knowledge of 13 what might be going on because it seems to me that if I 11 were the Plant Manger I might like to have some. intuition 13 about what might be the possible courses of events if I 16 have to talk to the Senior Vice President or the Governor 17 or whoever. You know, you can declare a plant emergency or 18 something, but that is only a beginning. 19 MR. CAHILL: Of course there is, as I 20 mentioned, general knowledge, and the Rasmusen Report is 21 an example of that. I think this is something that all of 22 us have to give additional thought to. 23 One of the things that I would offhand be 21 concerned with is that the handling of such situations not 25 be reduced to a step-by-step type procedure. Situations /7 TAYLOE ASSOCIATES ( 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1034 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
l 'l 304 I like this call for very careful evaluation by people ('_s\
\-s/ 2 familiar with the situat. ion at hand and with the specific 3
plant design and the engineering and operating skill and 4 knowledge to put the two together to come up with the 5 right steps. 6 I agree with that, but it would MR. OKRENT: 7 take some prethought and analysis. 8 MR. CAHILL: I agree there, too, and I think 9 this is something that all of us should address. I don't to think is necessarily particular about this plant. We will 11 work with that. 12 MR. EBERSOLE: Mr. Cahill, let me put you in a 13 delirama which nobody wants to get into, and I don't know
'x 11 what to do with it, but let's see what you would do with
('b
\
13 it. Let's say that we know that you have suffered a dried ' 16 up core and you have got some substantial damage. What are 17 you going to do, dump water on it enthusiastically when la you can get your hands on it and are you going to meter it 19 carefully? You have recovered a cooling capability and how 20 you going to utilize it? 21 MR. CAHILL: I will tell you now I don't know. 22 Again, it involves using as much knowledge of the actual 23 situation that you have got. Have you got a completely dry 25 core? 3 MR. EBERSOLE: Essentially. Don't let me pin rp1 TAYLOE ASSOCIATES kj 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SulTE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
305 , I you to the solution, but I just ask you to think about
.C\ \// 2 that. Maybe somebody else would care to comment. That is 3
one of the problems we have. I MR. ODELL: Those are the food for thought type 5 of questions that are covered under this potentially 6 damaging operations and the recognition of symptoms that
~
would tell you that you have suffered core damage. 8 We do talk about core cooling mechanics and 9 ways that you might cool the core. I don't pretend that H) this was necessarily the final answer on every conceivable 11 condition that you could get into. We try to give the 12 operatnrs and the supervisors the tools.by which they can 13 ' evaluate rather than specific steps in order to handle i ~T II that situation. I (d I3 MR. DEDDENS. I would just offer one comment in "I regard to the question you brought up, Dr. Ebersole, on K what do you do if you have a dried up core. I just like to , 18 cite the personal experience that I had on WASH 28 in 1979 19 when the word was of course received at Babcoch and Wilcox 20 in Lynchburg, Virginia that there was an accident at Three 21 Mile Island which came very close to the scenario that you 22 just described. ! M Although that core was not completely dried 21 out, it was significantly undercooled. The entire efforts 25 were to get water back into the reactor to get the core r l O
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I i
m. l l 306 I
,, sufficiently covered and sufficiently cooled to reverse
/ T x ,) 2 the damage postulated that was taking place at that time. 3 3
The outcome of that of course was the modern ' I day emergency response plans that have been developed by 3 all of the utilities who have operating plants or who have 6 plants under construction. 7 A great deal was learned from that experience, 8 and of course one of the major purposes of the emergency 9 response system and the emergency response plan is to , i 10 bring to bear all of the knowledge that exists, not only 11 within the utility, but within the designer of the plant 12 such as General Electric in our case to provide that quick 13 response and quick advice on how to get water back into '
,s 18 that reactor in the safest possible way.
r \
15 MR. EBERSOLE: You said the safest possible 16 way. That is the qualifier that I don't understand. To me 17 I think I would get it in there by any method I could find la as fast as I could.
19 MR. DEDDENS: Let me say that I agree with you 20 in that regard and that was the thrust of the effort at l 21 Three Mile Island, to get the water back into the reactor. 22 That was the whole driving effort exhibited by Babcock and 3 Wilcox in providing advice to the control room at Three 28 Mile Island was ways to get water back into the reactor. 23 MR. EBERSOLE: On the other side of the coin is (N TAYLOE ASSOCIATES ( 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 ; (202) 293 3950
307 1 the apprehension of steam explosion. ( 2 MR. DEDDENS: Was what? 3 MR. EBERSOLE: The apprehensions about steam I explosion. 5 MR. DEDDENS: Yes. 6 MR. CAHILL: That is why you have got to get I sure of what you have got. Is it a really dry core and how 8 long has it been dry because usually there is going to be 9 water. 10 MR. ODELL: To finish answering the question 11 about the use of the simulator in training is related to 12 procedure use and the clarification of those procedures. 13 One of the best uses we find for the simulator it is to ensure that our general system operating procedures, \ 13 emergency operator procedures really do work anc. we can go 16 through a validation process. This will be discussed by 17 Mr. Bogolin here shortly. 18 The simulator is a rapid transfer of operating 19 experience. You touched on equivalent operating experience 20 before. Let me clarify that in that those equivalency 21 judgments were made on a rigorous testing analysis in that 22 in the equivalent experience usually you have to pay a 23 penalty for being on either a PWR or Navy experience and 28 it doesn't allow him to take full credit. 25 So the makeup for that experience that he is p TAYLOE ASSOCIATES
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'l l-308 p,_ 1 missing is done in simulator exercises. The simulator was 2
~,
weighed very heavily in operator training because it is 3 plant specific transfer of knowledge on how the plant i operates under a number of different conditions. 5 (slide.) 6 One last question that was asked was on 7 maintenance training. Again, this training is performance 8 based training programs and it has both classroom and 9 laboratory and on-the-job training requirements. 10 On-the-job training requirements are matrixed for task, 11 and it if not provided in the training lab, it is done l 12 actually on the job site. 13 This is the one for mechanical maintenance --- , g 's 11 MR. OKRENT: Excuse me, before you take that
\,- g3 off.
16 MR. ODELL: Yes, sir. 17 MR. OKRENT: Maybe it is included in the l 18 course, but it seems to me that it would be useful for 19 people taking such a course to be exposed for two or three 20 hours to a considerable list of errors that have been made 21 by maintenance people and the potential consequences had 22 these things not been intercepted. M MR. ODF.LL : Yes, sir. The way that is done, and 21 that does not necessarily show up as a task in a training 25 requirement, but what we do to support that is when those
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309 1 _ identifiny errors come in, they get filed and incorporated /x / 2 in with the appropriate lesson plan as supplemental 3 material to training, not only on that task, but what I happens when you do it wrong. 5 MR. OKRENT: It seems to me that people maybe 6 need courses in history, very special history. 7 (Laughter.) 8 MR. ODELL: That is true, and that is what we 9 do, yes, sir. 10 MR. OKRENT: And there are a series of events, 11 for example, where operators disregarded instructions and 12 got plants into trouble, et cetera. I don't know that this 13 included in most training, but if it isn't and I were
/"N li responsible, I would certainly include it.
I
) ~
I5 MR. ODELL: It is. 16 (Slide.) 17 This shows the training program similar to 18 mechanical maintenance training. This is electrical 19 maintenance. 20 (Slide.) 21 And, finally, the I&C maintenance training. 22 That concludes this presentation. . 23 MR. OKRENT: If I could go back to the earlier 21 discussion of the total layout of your engineering 25 approach, I was wondering if "anywhere in the organization
/ 'T TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 'd 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
y I l 310 1 there is what I call a black hat group whose job it is to (p_ ) (m ,/ 2 find out whether the other groups are doing their work 3
-right?
-I MR. BOOKER: That would be the independent 5
Safety Engineering Group on site. That is one of their 6 functions, to review operations and maintenance and trends 7 of what is' happening to see if there is anything that is 8 noticeable that they should making management aware of. 9 Of course, you also have your operations QA 10 program that is also looking at both maintenance and 11 operations, too. 12 MR. OKRENT: Well, I agree in principle that' 13 the two groups you have mentioned might and perhaps will
~ ,r %1 li bring up items of this sort. What I have in mind is the \~,/
15 group who is sort of dedicated to finding difficulties in 16 the design or the operation or so forth and rooting them 17 out if they are there. In other words, a group who falls la into a poor reputation is something happens because they 19 didn't find it out before it happened and it was 20 findable and this sort of thing. 21 Well, let me leave it at that. 22 MR. REED: The next item on the agenda then is 23 the schedule for writing and implementing emergency 21 operating procedures. Chuck Bogolin, who is the Operations 25 Supervisor who you were introduced to previously, will ' (S
\
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311 I give that presentation. I,1 ,
\- / 2 MR. BOGOLIN: I am Chuck Bogolin, and my 3
objective here is to give you a status of where we stand ! I with our emergency operating procedures. ! i 5 (Slide.) 6 Back in the early 1980's, right after the 7 owners group was formed for addressing the symptom based 8 emergency operating procedures, GSU got involved and we 9 have been involved ever since. 10 Presently the committee is working from Rev. 3 l Il to Rev. 4 which will be in effect in December of this , 12 year. Our procedures are presently written to Rev. 3 of 13 the guidelines which were effective early January. II We have submitted our procedures generation g'~)}
%. 15 package to the NRC. That was in 1983, and they came back i 16 and they had some questions. So we had a supplemental 17 submittal in February of this year.
18 The validation and verification program ; 19 procedure that we developed came from a document that was 20 put out by INPO, plus some guidelines, and I don't ! 21 remember the number of the document that the NRC put out 22 for the very same thing, and that is where our program was 21 developed. . 28 We had General Electric, one of the engineers , 5 that works with the Emergency Procedure Guidelines (U ) TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
- - - - ., _- -_ m _. .- -- . - . - - . . . - - , _ _ , . -- ._ -. ,-- .___. . -
1: .I l - 312 I Committee did all of the calculations for us for our plant 7s t i
\/ 2 specific numers.
3 (Slide.) 4 So after we received these numbers we were 5 able to go ahead and complete and incorporate the numbers 6 within the procedures, the graphs and that type of thing, I and we issued a set of EOP's and approved them for the 8 validation and verification program which is now going on. 9 The verification against the generic EPG's is 10 where you take the EPG's step-by-step and compare them to 11 what you have written. Where we have varied or deviated 12 from the emergency procedures guidelines, we have written 13 a justification statement as to why we had to do that for
/~h 14 River Bend.
ks. / 13 Right now, we are, like I say, 50 percent 16 complete on our validation and verification program. 17 And in order to complete that we need input from our 18 engineering group, Nuclear Plant Engineering. What I 19 expect out of them on that is to look at the numbers that 20 we have in there, verify that these numbers are correct, 21 and if they see something in there that is from an 22 engineering point of view what we are saying we want to do 23 will just not work, they will make that comment and make 21 us aware of this so we can adjust the procedures to 25 reflect that.
,O TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
313 y 1 MR. OKRENT: This will be based on how the
-- 2 simulator behaves I assume.
3 MR. BOGOLIN: Yes, sir, we are depending on the I simulator quite a bit on the walkdowns and observing the 3 operator performance. That is all part of the validation ' 6 and verification program and we have completed that 7 portion. 8 What we haven't received yet are the comments 9 from the human factors folks. We have General Physics, t 10 plus three of my supervisors and one of the tech staff Il engineers all involved in this. It was just completed so 12 we haven't gotten the information yet. 13 We are working now to try to incorporate what
/ 11 we know has to be changed from our own observations N,.)T 15 because we want to try the rewrite of these EOP's on the 16 next class that goes into simulators in July. This group [
17 that is going in next have never been exposed to the 18 EOP's. So we feel that we will get a very good feedback 19 from them as to what they think about them. 20 MR. EBERSOLE: Let me ask a question. In the 21 research area the big deal is primarily code verification, 22 to do experiments and to fit the codes to the experimental 21 performance and extrapolate it to real plant performance. 23 It seems that your simulator program is almost entirely 25 dependent on code usage because your operations simulator '
} TAYLOE ASSOCIATES V 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
m-l- J\ 314 I is fed by paper codes.
.( s
(,/ 2 How do you satisfy yourself that the codes you 3 used truely reflect real plant performance? How do you 1 cross-check that and what'is your basis for believing the 5 plant performs the way the simulator says it does? 6 Well, sir, that is taken from MR. BOGOLIN: 7 Chapter 15-of the FSAR which is the accident analysis for 8 the River Bend plant. That is as much as I can speak on 9 it. I am not familiar with the codes or I am not that to oriented. 11 MR. BOOKER: I believe Bill Odell may be able 12 to expand on that. 13 MR. ODELL: We do of course use the design gg 11 codes as a basis for comparison. This shows just one where
13 we track the simulator performance against those codes 16 which have some operational experience behind them and 17 they have been shown against other BWR's, and I could show 18 that for a number of different parameters here.
19 We have done that extensively in our 20 acceptance testing program, what I call benchmarking of 21 the similator. The next step of course is during the power 22 ascension testing to make sure that this simulator matches 23 this plant. So it is on a generic basis and our plant 28 specific FSAR transient analysis and this simulator has 3 been verified against that. (Aj TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 1625 i sTitesf, N.w. - suite io04 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
315 1 MR. EBERSOLE: Sometimes these are called rule (_j 2, curves that you anticipate following as you evolve from a 3 transient or whatever. I MR. ODELL: Yes, sir. 5 MR. EBERSOLE: Do you have in place the 6 procedures which when you depart from the rule curve you 7 know what to do? 8 MR. ODELL: The simulator or the plant? 9 MR. EBERSOLE: The plant. 10 MR. ODELL: With respect to the simulator I 11 won't know until --- 12 MR. EBERSOLE: As you go into the plant you I3 have to anticipate that it may not follow these curves and s 18 at points of departure you have to take unusual and
\/' 13 different actions if the plant is not following the 16 anticipat2d curves.
17 MR. BOGOLIN: Yes, sir. Within the EPG's are 18 the EOP's themselves. As I told you yesterday, we have 19 five main EOP's, and I said we had a total of 11. The 20 other six are what we call contingencies.- Should you be in 21 the level control guideline and things aren't working, you 22 will be directed out of that one to a contingency which 3 would take you into every last possible method that you 21 could put water on that core. 23 MR. EBERSOLE: I see. (] TAYLOE ASSOCIATES ; () 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3953
'l. I ' l 316 l [ ,-
, - 1 MR. BOGOLIN: So that is when things. don't f\- -) 2 work, that is the route we take.
3 MR. EBERSOLE: Are these procedures in a I management package that we can see these? What are we 5 talking about, two feet, one foot or six inches? 6 MR. BOGOLIN: I could have them down before you 7 leave this afternoon. 8 MR. EBERSOLE: Fine. I would appreciate that. 9 MR. BOGOLIN: I will make arrangements to get 10 them here. 11 MR. BOGOLIN: If you don't have any other 12 questions, that is all I have. I3 MR. OKRENT: I am told we now should have a
,/s ) Il five-minute break while we are rearranging seating so we
\J 13 can go into Item G.
16 (Recess.) 17 MR. OKRENT: The meeting will reconvene. la We are on agenda Item G. Perhaps the operators 19 can introduce themselves briefly and tell us in 10 or 15 20 seconds about their prior experience each, starting on my 21 right. 22 MR. MELANCON: August Meloncon. I have been 23 with GSU about six and a half years. I came up through 25 their fossile program. I was in their fossile plant for 23 about two and a half years. Then I transferred over to the O' TAYLOE ASSCK:lATES 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
4 . 317 E I River Bend Station and have been through all their (,_)I. N- 2 training programs, thfough certification and observation 3 trainingandcertifiebROandSRO.
'I MR. HOWELL: My name is Randy Howell. I am (
5 shift supervisor. I originally came from the Hatch nuclear 6 plant in Georgia. I worked there for six years as a 7 reactor operator, a licensed RO. I have been working at 8 River Bend about three and a half years. Originally I 9 hrote procedures for the Quadrex Corporation and shortly i 10 after that, I was here about a year, I went to work with Il GSU in the Operations Department where I have been ever 12 since. I was foreman for two years and recently became 13 shift supervisor. Il (~N. MR. TRASK: My name is Ed Trask. My nuclear (m,) ! i 13 experience, I was six years in the Navy, I was qualified 16 as a reactor operator, reactor technician and watch II supervisor on the USS NIMITZ and was the reactor control 18 supervisor for one of the plants. I have worked for GSU 19 going on four years now. I have gone through their entire
- ' training program and certified SRO and RO.
21 MR. McGEE: My name is James McGee. I am a 22 foreman. My experience is primarily Navy Nuclear. I was a 23 qualiafied watch supervisor-service, and I have been with 28 GSU now three years. 25 MR. OKRENT: I am sorry, you have been with 4 (^) U TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 16251 STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950 ,
run
.l:
I 318 I GSU? 7-i )
'\ / 2 MR. McGEE: For three years, and I am certified 3
SRO. 4 MR. EBERSOLE: Let me dispell any notion you 3 might have that this is an inquisition of some sort, 6 because that is not what it is. It is an attempt for us to I learn something about what you do, s 8 It is always a pleasure to see a bunch of 9 ' bright young fellows who I guess I could say are on the 10 firing line or in the trenches, as one of our members 11 says. We rarely get to see the fellows who are really face l 12 to face with the problems in the trenches or on the 13 So this was an attempt to get some sort of boards. (~^) It interaction between us and you. V 15 I have churned together a few questions, and I 16 am sure you have copies of these, and I think I was a 17 little too ambitious on some of them. So I will pull back. 18 The object was just to attempt to get from you the degree l.. 19 of physical understanding about the nature of your 20 responsibilities and your problems on a big plant like 21 this. l l l 22 I, as a case in point, asked a question to 21 which I expected a response about degrees of severity. How 21 do you describe on your own personal basis the most 3 critical accident situation which you might be required to O TAYLOE ASSOCIATES d 1625 i STREET, N.W. - $UITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
319 s I mitigate by your actions in which you become the safety ' ( 2 system and the automatic systems are depending on you to 3 get out of trouble.
~8 I will give you a little help to start with, 5
but mainly I am just trying to catalyze the conversation , 6 and get you to talk. I never do learn anything when I am I talking. So I want to get you to talking. 8 I envisioned really quickly, I said well, at ! 9 the top of the list is this crazy thing called ATWS, which 10 it makes my hair stand up to think about it, and beyond i Il that is the large LOCA and the small LOCA, and coming down 12 the line, at least in response times, is.this choice of 13 more or less normal in respect to those other two things, (}
\ ,/
II but I had a progressive degradation of the cooling systems 15 until I get to the last line of defense. 16 Let me just offer whoever you care to 17 volunteer how you regard your charge to run the plant in > 18
- this context that I am talking about? What are the most 19 critical accident situations and how do you think you can l ,
20 cope with them? - 21 MR. HOWELL:I will answer that question. At the 22 top of my list I will say right off the bat will be a 23 control room fire in which we are assuming no automatic 21 ' actions to occur. So the operator would have to take all 25 . actions manually. l I O
\
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7 '
.1 I :
320 l The first thing we would do would be to
,~
w/ 2 manually shut down the reactor as we attempt to leave the 3 control room. I must say presently we have not been 4 trained in remote shutdown operations. We are trained to 5 finalize our procedures now and at the point when these 6 are finalized, and we plan to train all the operators, 7 ' foremen and supervisors, in remote shutdown. 8 MR. EBERSOLE: You are talking about coping 9 with the big fire. 10 MR. HOWELL:Well, it could be from the fact 11 that it may potentially prevent any automatic action from 12 occurring at all. It may lead to an ATWS and it may lead 13 to a LOCA, you know, you just don't know. 11 MR. EBERSOLE: So you are talking the fire that b(~T 13 degrades the control room functions. 16 MR. HOWELL: That is correct. , 17 MR. EBERSOLE: You have at this time yet to be 18 really reviewed two emergency shutdown centers. U 19 MR. HOWELL: Right. 20 MR. EBERSOLE: Do you have any comments on your 21 method of utilization of these and how you expect to work 22 these and what you believe the ambience might be and 23 whether these are dependent on the working of electrical 21 HVAC systems which may or may not work? Could you comment 25 on how you would utilize your aux shutdown centers in this t : l f) V TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 l WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950 l i
321 I 7_s . fire which you think is your major problem? Perhaps this ( \ \~ ,/ 2 has not been worked out and maybe I am premature. 3 MR. HOWELL: Presently it has not, but I think 4 this will be covered when we do have our procedures 5 finalized. 6 MR. EBERSOLE: Do I get any comments from you 7 other fellows about your perception of what is your most 8 challenging future function? - 9 MR. TRASK: Using the simulator training for a 10 I basis to answer that question, I would have to say that 11 the anticipated transient without scram event would i 12 probably be the most challenging oecause let's say your 13 main turbine has tripped and you don't have your first t (~ 18 line to relieve the energy within the reactor vessel and \ _,S) ' 15 you have a core that is still with the rods out and not 16 inserted. 17 In that case you have now a pressure problem 18 and an eventual level problem and also power with those 19 three aspects in which you deal with the emergency 20 operating procedures for a reactor pressure vessel 21 integrity. Those three functions there would have to be 22 coped with in a different manner and concurrently also 51 hc.vi,ng to be aware of the containment integrity because of 28 the pressure within the vessel and power will have to be 25 ralleved through the steam valves in the suppression pool. t-TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 16251 STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 > WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293-3950 e
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,_ You have to be very aware of the fact that now 6' l
's / 2 you would also have to deal also besides your reactor 3
pressure vessel integrity with your containment integrity 4 by cooling the suppression pool and looking after your 5 containment. 6 MR. EBERSOLE: Well, does it bother you any 7 that you are expected to do these overly complex things 8 which in your whole lifetime of duty you may never see and 9 yet you have to stand proped and ready to take these 10 actions? There are some schools of thought that say you 11 are wasting your time concentrating on things that don't 12 happen. How do you feel about that? 13 MR. TRASK: In relationship again to the
.(~]
18 training we have had, it would be a very uncommon
\v 13 occurrence to walk into our simulator and not have one of 16 these happen to us.
17 MR. EBERSOLE: You mean there is considerable 18 attention to this in the training program? 19 MR. TRASK: Yes. 20 MR. EBERSOLE: Yet you know the frequency of 21 this event is about on the level of that of a vessel 22 failure. 11 MR. TRASK: The importance placed upon an ATWS 21 or a LOCA or any abnormal procedure or event that would 25 either direct us to AOP or an EOP is stressed highly., i TAYLOE ASSOCIATES ! b 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950 l L
323
.s I
Speaking for myself, I am very confident about having to
\
w/ 2 enter an EOP having been a part of the three weeks 3 simulator and also the validation for the EOP's. To me I I don't myself any fear whatsoever as far as dealing with a 3 situation like that. 6 [ MR. EBERSOLE: The ATWS mitigation process t 7 l involves the injection of boron which is supposed to l L 8 slowly clam things down. Are you aware of the implications 9 of any kind of fluid system leak which is concurrent with 10 this problem, the implication being of course that you 11 have a limited amount of boron? 12 MR. TRASK: Yes. In our emergency operating 13 procedures in the event that we had to initiate standby
/N II liquid control and in the event that concentration of
\s] 13 boron was subject to a leak, we also have contingency 16 operations EOP for mixing and injecting a boron solution 17 through our condensate storage tank through our condensate la system.
19 MR. EBERSOLE: There has been discussed a 20 maneuver whereby you force the coolant level down to 21 decrease reactivity of the core and thus reduce power. 22 What are you currently being taught in this direction? Are 23 you taught to do that or not to do that or what? 21 MR. TRASK: Our emergency operating procedures 3 do have us in that event. When it is required in that I V) TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SulTE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
7 l l 324 I (, time to utilize steam cooling, we do bring the reagtor
)
-U 2 water level down to a certain point for a procedure to 3
limit thermalization and decrease power. 4 MR. EBERSOLE: How do you interpret this 5 process in view of its risk that you are going to get core 6 damage by overheating? How far do you bring it down, and I could you tell me where you bring it? Do you now have a 8 numerical value for the level that you bring it? 9 MR. TRASK: Yes, we do. 10 MR. EBERSOLE: And where is the level? Il MR. TRASK: It is in the area of top of active 12 fuels. 13 MR. EBERSOLE: Say that again? ("-} ll MR. TRASK: Top of active fuel. V 13 MR. EBERSOLE: Right to the top of the active 16 fuel. 17 MR. TRASK: In that vicinity, yes. I couldn't 18 give you'the exact number on it. 19 MR. EBERSOLE: So you would bring it to that 20 point. Are you aware of the implications that if you go in 21 the other direction and completely overflow that you are 22 going to lose the boron? Il MR. TRASK: That is correct. 21 MR. EBERSOLE: And then you will have had it. 23 MR. TRASK: Well, we do have various TAYLOE ASSOCIATES
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325 1 contingencies for injecting boron through other' systems V( ) 2 like the condensate storage and condensate transfer. 3 MR. EBERSOLE: Well, enough of that. How about 4 the large LOCA? 5 MR. OKRENT: Excuse me. I would just like to 6 understand. Are you saying that there are other supplies 7 of boron than the one that you would normally use for --- 8 MR. TRASK: I am saying that in our emergency 9 operating procedure that we would be in in the event that
- 10 we would be injecting with the standby liquid control 11 system, in the event that what Mr. Ebersole said that that 12 nornal standby liquid control is not available, we do have 13 a contingency ---
[~'N II MR. OKRENT: No, no. You misunderstood his U 15 point I'think and let me clarify. He was, if I understand 16 correctly, assuming that in fact the standby liquid 17 control system worked and pushed boron into the vessel, la but now there might be one or more mechanisms whereby you 19 lost fluid from the vessel, losing boron with this fluid, 20 at some point you might make it up with water not 21 containing boron, but this then raises reactivity and gets 22 you possibly back into a difficulty. s - 23 So this other route you were talking about is 21 only valuable for his postulation if you have some 23 additional supply of boron which I didn't think you did [V TAYLOE ASSOCIATES i.25 i 31 1. N.w. _ su,1o0c4 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
n. I I 326 7, I have. I think there was a misunderstanding on the , I's ') 2 postulate there. i 3 MR. EBERSOLE: I think that is right. My I understanding is that you do not now have any way to add 5 to your boron supply, certainly not in the short term. 6 MR. HOWELL: No, we do not. I MR. EBERSOLE: So you have t( guard carefully 8 what you have put in to see that it doesn't get away from 9 you. 10 MR. TRASK: That is correct. 11 MR. HOWELL: The standby liquid control system 12 is designed so that we would take into account some amount 13 of leakage anyway. r" j% 11 MR. EBERSOLE: Yes. I3 MR. HOWELL: When all of it is pumped in, then 16 we are assuming so much, you know, that will leak out, and 17 we still have the concentration required to shut down the 18 vessel. 19 Now in the event that we do have a leak out of 20 the vessel, the lower the water level, the higher the 21 concentration of baron will be in the area which would 22 help to shut the reactor down. 2'l MR. EBERSOLE: You would tend to go to low t 21 levels and keep the concentration up in this case. 25 MR. HOWELL: As much as possible without (~') V TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 1625 i STREET, N.W. - $UITE 1004 WASHINGToH, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
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327 f3 1 endangering the core. l t t ,
2 MR. EBERSOLE: Is there any replenishment 3
contemplated at this time in the supply to the liquid i 3 system after you have stopped your shot your charge? 5 MR. HOWELL: You mean coming back and adding 6 boron and water to the standby control? I MR. EBERSOLE: Yes. Do you recharge the system? ! 8 MR. HOWELL: It is presently not covere', but I 9 don'y see where that would not be feasible.I am sure that 10 would be fine. 11 MR. EBERSOLE: It would seem a natural thing to 12 do anticipating that you would have trouble getting the 13 rods in. (T 11 MR. TRASK: It would come down to a point of 'x / 15 accessibility into the containment because that is where 16 it is located, if anything would hinder you. II MR. EBERSOLE: To replenish the charge. 18 MR. TRASK: If the atmosphere parameters were 19 such that someone could enter, it would be no problem. 20 MR. EBERSOLE: Let me go on to a more palatable 21 topic. Let's say that you have shut down the reactor, but 22 maybe in a progressive and unfortunate way because there 23 was a tornado that ran around your station and you had 26 diesel troubles, you progressively began to lose your 25 shutdown cooling systems. I O ) TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 16251 STREET, N.W. - SulTE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
, , - , , . . , . , - - - , -. . ~ , ,. , , , . - , - - . . . - - - , _.--m,
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'l 328 I What I think I am looking for is your own
]z~s')
A/ 2 concept of the array or totality of ways of cooling you 3 have got, assuming mu have successfully tripped and you 4 have successful access to the SAR and it will work, and 5 you give me of how many ways you can get water in the 6 core. Share the problem. I MR. MELANCON: As far as getting water'into the 8 core because we have our normal condensate feedwater which 9 would be available and we have all our ECCS systems for 10 injecting water, if it got down to it we could use service 11 water. We have a connection for service water to be 12 injected into the RHR system which can be fed into the 13 vessel. We could use SLICK as a means of makeup using the i () 11 test tank. We could use CRD pumps for putting water into V 15 the reactor. 16 As far as heat removal, of course the ultimate 17 heat sink, the condenser for normal means if the condenser 18 is isolated. We have RCIC that we can use in the steam f 19 condensing mode in conjunction with RHR, and also the 20 shutdown cooling mode of RHR for normal shutdown. 21 MR. HOWELL: Also if you get to the point where 22 you don't have normal means avaiable such as shutdown Il cooling or whatever, then our procedures do teach us, and 28 which we have been taugnt in the simulator, that as an 25 alternative we can flood up the vessel and use flooding up TAYLOE ASSOCIATES (mV) 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WAfNINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
329 I to cool it, and at the same time we can open a relief I i ) '\/ 2 valve until we get to the point where we are actually 3 pumping water through the relief valve into the 4 suppression pool and then use RHR and suppression pooling 5 to give us the decay heat removal capability. 6 MR. EBERSOLE: All of these methods are 7 dependent on the presence of fairly large amounts of 8 alternating current power, say at least the output of one 9 diesel. If you lose that, then you lose these methods of 10 cooling the containment. 11 If you were to experience the loss of 12 containment cooling but you were still cooling the core 13 and you saw the beginning of pressure buildup in the I4 containment, do you have some expedient to cope with that? f("%I t
\_ ' :
15 MR. TRASK: In a situation of that scenario - 16 and we were to lose a diesel, our standby service water II system, which would be our cooling mechanism at that time, 18 would energized. Now in the design in the event of the 19 failure of one diesel, it contains two loops of 250 20 percent capacity pumps which are each supplied power by 21 either one of the diesels, but not both. So each loop, i 22 which is separate and has a separate cooling loop to each 23 component, a 50 percent capacity pump will start on the 21 surviving diesel in each loop to give you a hundred 3 percent capacity service water which would then supply all TAYLOE ASSOCIATES d 16251 STREU, N.W. - SUITE 1004 i WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
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., s your ventilation systems, your RHR and your fuel pool
! )
\/ 2 coolers.
3 MR. EBERSOLE: Where does the standby cooling , 4 system enter the fluid system to go into the reactor, at i 5 what point does it enter? t 6 MR. TRASK: In the event that you had to use p 7 the service water to make up for water inventory in the 4 8 vessel, its piping connections are two motor operate 9 valves which tap into the low-pressure coolant injection , 10 discharge piping and RHR system downstream of the heat 11 exchanger which would go directly into the vessel. 12 MR. EBERSOLE: Oh, it is driven in downstream 13 of the heat exchangers.
/"' Il MR. TRASK: The service water pumps, that is N.)g 15 correct.
16 MR. EBERSOLE: How big is that supply, how many ; i II gpm approximately? 18 MR. McGEE: That particular number is 19 available in the EOP. It actually gives you the quantity 20 of makeup that will be available from that source. Right 21 off the top of my head I couldn't give you that number. : 22 MR. EBERSOLE: Let me go on to my second 21 question. My second question was sort of a philosophical 21 question. I was asking you about your opinion of 3 qualifiers that made you believe or disbelieve you could O(. TAYLOE ASSOCIATE', 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 8004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950 r
331 I
. , _ . do these things that we are. talking about. I asked do you \m l -2 think you have the following assets to perform these '
3 functions and you can discuss each one. I Do you think you have got adequate 5 instrumentation and that the instrumentation is not too 6 complex? I saw your simulator function yesterday. I am not 7 an operator, and it blew my mind to hear all the 8 enunciator signals and the light coming on and the verbal 9 instructions. 10 I will run through these and then just open 11 the conversation. 12 Do you do you think you have got adequate and 13 not too complex instrumentation? ,\ (~' 11 Do you think you have an appropriate degree of 13 an automatic response, or is it your opinion that you 16 would rather have more or less automation? 17 Do you think you have got reasonably simple 18 recovery procedures or too complex, and I know immediately 19 that ATWS is too complex from my view. Do you think you 20 have got time enough to do the things you have got to do? , 21 I am just listing the elements of operator response. 22
'And having done something, do you think you II have instrumentation that will confirm or deny that you 28 did the right thing?
23 And, finally, in case you made a mistake, can l ;O TAYLOE ASSOCIATES (, 16251 STREET, N.W. - $UITE 1004
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you reverse fourself?
~- 2 I invite any of you to just discussion in your 3
opinion basis these matters. I am talking about the burden I of the operator I guess, and I equate him to the Roman 3 party,.Horatious at the bridge who, you know, who will 6 solve all problems when they haven't been solved in the 7 design process. 8 MR. HOWELL: Do you want to address each item 9 individually? 10 MR. EBERSOLE: Fine, yes. Go ahead..Do you 11 think you have got a practical operating problem or do you 12 have troubles? Maybe you should think that the bosses 13 aren't here. (} v ll ( Laughter . ) 13 MR. McGEE: You mentioned the simulator, and 16 being in that situation with the enunciators and the 17 available indicators sort of blew your mind. An initial 18 I guess exposure to that, that is the impression that 19 everybody gets. But by and large if you live basically as 20 we do, live and work in that environment, you spend a few 21 12-hours days in there, the familiarity there, you 22 recognize which enunciators require a response now and 23 which ones typically come in on a nuisance basis. 28 MR. EBERSOLE: Well, what we see wnen we visit 25 these things are moments of chaos rather than the long I []
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333 1 p, intervals of abolute boredom when you don't have to do (j)- ( 2 anything. , 3 MR. McGEE: Well, in the a construction phase I there is a lot of chaos, but preferably controlled chaos. 5 But now as far as the operators in the control room, one 6 of the things that we have to our advantage is the fact I I that we are nct in there by ourselves. There are at least 8 three of us in there at any given time. So that you do 9 ' have that advantage of a team type environment there. 10 But the indications and controls, although 11 there are places that we identified in the control room 12 design review type, or when we actually went through that, 13 there are places where we would prefer maybe a little bit rs 11 better indication, but by and l'arge what we have is 13 adequate. 16 MR. EBERSOLE: One of the more difficult 17 problems that has come up out of this business was it was la the realization that the operator can be both a hazard as 19 well as a safety device, and which of these he is the most 20 of, we think it is being a safety device. But out of the 21 TMI-2 case came the realization that we had to upgrade 22 operator input information, the indicators and the 11 recorders that feed his brain. 28 Do you have any comments on how you handle 25 contradictory redundant signals when you don't have an h, TAYLOE ASSOCIATES V 16251 STREET, N.W. - $UITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. '0006 (202) 293 3950 t
I
\~
334 1 auctioneering basis on a given parameter. (x (_) 2 MR. McGEE: We do have redundant indications, 3 but even in the cases where we have direct indication, we 4 also have indirect indiction as far as say, for example, 5 what is going on within that system. 6 MR. EBERSOLE: Do you hypothesize in the coursa
~
of your work that I am going to be confronted with 8 contradictory indications and then find a solution to 9 that? 10 MR. McGEE: Well, you can hypothesize, but even 11 as far as the simulator training we are given that type of
'12 information and required to deduce the problem and 13 actually the condition of the plant at any given time.
7s 11 MR. EBERSOLE: To go on quickly here, I put
~ \ -) 13 this question down in view of the TMI-2 case, and I said 16 describe the difference as you understand it between 17 direct and indirect instrument indications and include 18 here both the process indications as well as equipment 19 performance.
20 You recall that the TMI-2 case was the direct 21 result of reading an instrument and interpreting what was
~
22 going on when it was not. Do you understand the difference 23 between direct and indirect instrumentation and where you 21 have it in your plant and what it might mean to you? You 5 know, this can be valve position, it can be temperature, (7 TAYLOE ASSOCIATES i () 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
J i 335 l pressure or whatever. x, 2 MR. TRASK: For indirect indication, first let 3 me say that if we are talking about a particular system, I let's say a system which is designed to put water in the ! 5 reactor, we have many valves and a pump in that system, 6 besides flow, a valve indication of discharge pressure, I check valve position and ultimately water level. 8 If any of those indications were to fail, 9 there is enough indication of the various parameters that 10 you can judge that water is entering the core. 11 In relation to the fact that do we have any 12 indirect indication, the first thing that comes to mind is 13 our relief valves which we have an indication of the It solenoid's demand of that valva --- (e-U MR. EBERSOLE: Of the what? i 16 MR. TRASK: The solenoid whether it is II energized or not to tell you that there is a demand for 18 that valve to be opened. 19 MR. EBERSOLE: In other words, you know it is 20 energized or not energized, but you don't know whether it 21 works. 22 MR. TRASK: Well, for actual position we have 23 also ways to monitor that which would be the tailpipe 28 temperature on a recorder and also acoustic monitoring so 25 we could access whether or not that valve is open. O ( TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 16251 STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
Y l l 336 I MR. EBERSOLE: I believe you had two solenoids 7s i / - t A/ 2 per SAR. Now this has a blind spot and how do you know [ 3 which one is working? Are they both working? You know the i 8 problem at Salem, when something worked they didn't know 5 what was making it work. 6 MR. McGEE: We have indications on the 601 7 control panels of both solenoids, A and B. I 8 MR. EBERSOLE: That they are energized. 9 ' MR. McGEE: That they are energized or --- 10 MR. EBERSOLE: But you don't know whether they 11 work or not. + 12 MR. McGEE: No, sir. Like I said, we have no 13 direct indication of the safety relief valve position. It gN 11 is all indirect.
\ ,] '
I3 MR. EBERSOLE: How long is it before you 16 realize that an SAR is being worked by only one solenoid?
- 17 MR. McGES: You mean in a condition?
18 MR. EBERSOLE: It is being energized, but it 19 never moved. 20 MR. McGEE: Well, one of the things that comes ; 21 to mind is unless this is discovered during maintenance or ! l 22 testing, then you might want to address that. ; 23 MR. EBERSOLE: Is it a-periodic assessment you 21 make for that? 23 MR. McGEE: I don't know that right off the top l 1 TAYLOE ASSOCIATES (OV) 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 , (202) 293 3950
337 I of my head.- i t V 2 MR. EBERSOLE: I am going to think that you l 3 don't know until the maintenance what it is and which of I them worked. 5 MR. McGEE: No, sir. I can't think of a way ; 6 right now that we would actually assess. The fact that it I did work would be more of concern to the operators at the 8 time. Can you selectively energize each solenoid without 9 energizing the other one and then watch the tailpipe? 10 MR. McGEE: Yes, sir, we have a key lock switch 11 for each solenoid on the 601 panel. l 12 MR. EBERSOLE: You work with solenoids one at a , I3 time and see if they work by via the tailpipe temperature. II ' f] Is that right? Is that right. V 15 (Panel members nodding affirmatively.) 16 MR. McGEE: In the acoustic monitor, yes, sir. 17 MR. EBERSOLE: Well, let me go on. No, Dave? 1 18 Well, five more minutes on MR. OKRENT: 19 whatever you want. If you want, I will take five minutes. 20 MR. EBERSOLE: Why don't you take five minutes. 21 MR. OKRENT: Can you think of any way in which i 22 you might lose much of the information that is normally j 21 given to you in the control room? 23 MR. HOWELL: Right now quite a few of our 25 instruments in the control room for different parameters TAYLOE ASSOCIATES , v 1625 l STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950 i
7 -- . I I 338 I are powered from RPS. If we get to a point for any reason
/
-- 2 were we lose both buses of RPS, presently we only have one 3
alternate power switch for altering the power supply. They I _are giving us a second switch which is to be installed at 3 a later date to give us where we can put both RPS buses on 6 alternate power supply. 7 If we are at the point where we have a loss of 8 offsite power, then that would be a concern, particularly 9 the' neutron instruments. 10 MR. OKRENT: Well, let me postulate you have 11 lost much, if not all, of your instrumentation in the 12 _ control room. What would you do? 13 MR. HOWELL: If you lose all your 11 instrumentation, the first thing to do is just assume the v' 15 worst and go with it in that condition. At least if you 16 assume being in the worst condition, you will take 17 appropriate action to safely shut down the reactor. 18 If you do not have any means of identifying l 19 power level or identifying water level, you can look 20 around and assure that you do have water going into the 21 vessel. We have in some of EOP's methods for if you have 22 so much flow going into the vessel we can open relief 21 valves 1, 2 and 3 and use it to determine what your 21 pressure is. 25 Combining the three, the flow, the pressure i O TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 f WA3HINGToN, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950 i k
i 339 1 and the vessel and fact of how many SRV's you have open, ID 2 (ss) we can use that to determine what the power level is to ' 3 give us an estimated power level which will give you some 4 idea and that is something to go from. 3 MR. OKRENT: Do you know whether your 6 instrumentation falls mid-scale or somewhere else if it I loses power? 8 MR. HOWELL: On a loss of power? I believe most 9 of it fails downscale. 10 MR. OKRENT: I am sorry, I couldn't hear. 11 MR. HOWELL: Most of it fails downscale. I 12 MR. OKRENT: Is that by design? I3 MR. HOWELL: I think that is built into the II
-~ instruments, yes..
\ 'l
~ I3 MR. EBERSOLE: Are you taught as a matter of 16 fact which way they go when you lose power to them?
II MR. HOWELL: On the various instruments? 9 18 MR. EBERSOLE: Yes. 19 MR. HOWELL: Some we are just through normal 20 every day course of action in the simulator. 21 MR. EBERSOLE: Some go up, some go down and , 22 some will float somewhere. 3 MR. HOWELL: Right. Right offhand I cannot say 28 which ones will fail upscale and which ones will fair ! 23 downscale and which will fair as is, no, sir. L Q ( f TAYLOE ASSCK:lATES 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 ' WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950 i
v- 'l l 340 1
,, MR. TRASK: But we are trained not to just look \m,/ 2 at.one indicator. We have more than one indicator for 3
virtually all the parameters. So we are trained heavily on 4 not.to rely on any indication. 5 MR. EBERSOLE: This brought up a little topic 6 of terminology. I heard reactor protection system I mentioned, and let me ask you about that". The reactor 8 protection system, at least in the parlance of the 9 industry at large is the system that controls reactivity 10 and if it goes dead we have dead circuit trips which got 11 us into trouble at Salem, as you know, and the reactor 12 trips and that leaves you in the function of getting heat 13 out of it.
-~ 11 .What do you call the reactor protection
(
13 system, and then I am going to ask you what you call a 16 safety system versus an engineered safeguard system and I 17 am trying to get your understanding of the hierarchy of 18 systems. What is the reactor protection system in an 19 integral sense to you?
20 MR. TRASK: The reactor protection system is a 21 nuclear safety system which is designed to prevent the 22 possibility of violating the integrity of the reactor fuel 23 boundary or the containment. 28 MR. EBERSOLE: So you interpret it in the broad 23 sense and not just in the context of controlling the TAYLOE ASSOCIATES C'S 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 f202) 293 3950
341 I reactivity. g
' 2 MR. TRASK: Correct.
3 MR. EBERSOLE: To you it is a safety grade I system, right? 5 MR. TRASK: That is right. 6 MR. EBERSOLE: A reactor protection system. I MR. TRASK: That is correct. 8 MR. EBERSOLE: What do you call an engineered 9 safeguard system? Where is it in the hierarchy? I am going to to ask you what is on the Q list later on, the critical 11 list, the tech specs. What are the engineered safeguards 12 systems? These are sets of systems which are in the SAR 13 and it wouldn't have discrete sets. ( II MR. TRASK: The engineered safety systems are
'U' 15 systems which you utilize to combat say an event which is 16 categorized by frequency. In this case most of these II systems are categorized for events which are infrequent 18 transients.
19 MR. EBERSOLE: Mitigation events normally on 20 standby by core spray as the case in point or low-pressure 21 injection and so forth. But there are other safety systems 22 which are not resting and waiting for something to happen. 23 They are running all the time. Do you know how many of 25 these are critical to the safe operation of your plant and 25 in the functional context how many functions there are, TAYLOE ASSOCIATES (/
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3-I 342 I and if one of these functions fails and you get in ! L[ } 2
\~./ trouble? These are running support safety systems which >
3 are curiously enough not identified in a discrete set like l 4 the engineered safeguard systems. ' 3 Nevertheless, they are probably more important i 6 because they are on line all the time. Do you know which
~
7 ones they are, that if the function fails you get in 8 trouble? ! 9 MR. McGEE: I don't think we have ever I 10 designated anything like this. 11 MR. EBERSOLE: I will pick one. If I lose 12 component cooling I am in trouble. - 13 MR. McGEE: Yes, with those types of systems. !
~
,r~'g Il MR. EBERSOLE: I think it might be important if
\ )
'~' 13 you haven't done it to sit down and make a discrete list 16 of these and anticipate the total functional failure and 17 describe what you are going to do when it happens.
18 MR. McGEE: You discussed in your first 19 question I think the list of events which require --- 20 MR. EBERSOLE: That was the culmination of 21 these systems working properly to get the water in and get 22 the heat out of the containment. But it is not unusual 21 that these things are not set apart as a discrete set, but 25 they should be, and the next question is do you know they 3 are on the text specs in the Q list? '(] \_/ TAYLOE ASSOCIATES taas i sine:T, N.W. ~ $Ulfe 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 2000e (202) 293 3980 I e
343 1
, For years the aux feedwater system was not on \J '
2 the Q list in PWR's, and oddly enough the string system 3 was not on the Q list at Salem. I Dave, I think this concludes my attempt to 3 talk to these fellows, unless you have something to add. 6 Let me ask you if you have any comments or 7 questions to ask? Did I miss something? 8 (Laughter.) 9 You know, to be really objective about these 10 things you should say you asked the wrong questions and 11 you should have asked this. 12 (Laughter.) 13 Do you have any such things to comment on? p)
'w 18 15 (No response.)
MR. EBERSOLE: No. If not, I thank you very 16 much and it has been a pleasure to talk to you. II MR. OKRENT: Are any of you familiar with one la or more of the probabilistic risk studies that have been 19 done on the boiling water reactors? 20 (Laughter.) 21 MR. TRASK Ranky, would you like to answer 22 that? 3 MR. HOWELL: No, thank you. 28 MR. EBERSOLE: I will comment on that. It has 25 been shown, and we worked on it last Thursday, that (L j) TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 16251 STRiff, N.W. = SUlff 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20004 (202) 293 3980
v i I 344 I approximately 80 percent of the risk of core melts resides
,_s / i w, 2 in the failure to get the heat out. It comes mostly in 3
getting-the heat out of the containment which suggests i that earlier question that I asked you of what are you 3 going to do when you can't get heat out of the containment 6 and the pressure is building. 7 There are presently no well defined exits from 8 that problem although Limerick is working on it and I 9 suggest that you examine the Limerick approach which is 10 very simple, 11 With that I am finished. 12 MR. OKRENT: Thank you very much. 13 I think it is a reasonable time to take a
,r's 11 break for lunch. It is almost 12:25. Let me assume we can
(\~') 15 get back in 50 minutes and we will begin after lunch with 16 the seimsic design matter. 17 I think we will then hear from the members of 18 the public and after that we will go back to yesterday for 19 both the items we didn't cover and maybe responses to 20 questions that arose yesterday that you may want to make 21 bricfly today. Then following that I guess we will take up 22 H, I and K. So that is the master plan as of now. 21 (Whereupon, at 12:25 p.m., the subcommittee 28 recessed, to reconvene at 1:15 p.m. the same day.) 25 TAYLOE ASSOCIATES (VO 1625 i $7REff, N.W. $Ulft 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20004 (202) 293 3950
345 1 AFTERNOON SESSION 2 (1:20 p.m.) 3 MR. OKRENT: The meeting will reconvene. I Before we begin with the item on seismic 5 design, I have a pragmatic question. If one were to leave 6 this site about 3:30 on a Friday afternoon, how long would I it take to get to the airport? ,Are there any experts? 8 MR. BOOKER: A half hour to the airport, but 9 then allow svme time to check your car in. 10 MR. OKRENT: Thank you. There is no traffic jam II sort of thing? 12 MR. WEIMKAM: Not that you are used to. 13 (Laughter.) Il MR. OKRENT: Thank you. 33 All right. Let's get on then with seismic . 16 design of plant equipment. 17 MR. REED: Regarding that particular subject, 18 Fred Lambert, Supervisor of Design Enginering, who you met 19 yesterday will address that topic. 20 MR. LAMBERT: Good afternoon. 21 The topic of my presentation this afternoon is 22 the seismic design basis for the River Bend Station. 21 (Slide.) . 28 The River Bend Station is located 25 approximately three miles south of St. Francisville and TAYLOE ASSOCIATES
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v: - -
- l; lI !
346 !
. .. I approximately 24 miles northwest of Baton Rouge. j
~ O x- 2 The site is located in the Southern Hills 3
section of the Gulf Coast Station tectonic province. The i 4 site-is underlaid with approximately 2,700 feet of [ l 5 unindurated sand, clay, maryl and gravel of Cenozoic and
- I 6 and Mesozoic age. l i 7 (Slide.)
I 8 The River Bend site is located in an area ; t 9 which~is typically an area of' infrequent and and low ' 10 seismicity typlified by shallow focus type activity. 11
- The maximum historical earthquake in the Gulf ;
j 12 Coast Basin is the Donaldsonville earthquake which is 13 located approximately 50 miles from the River Bend site. i i l 16 The New Madrid _ earthquake, the large New ! 2 x - 13 Madrid earthquake is located in the Mississippi embayment [ 16 area, and this is a distinct and separate area from the i I 17 River Bend site from both geologic history and structure. ! l i 18 The epicenter of the New Madrid earthquake is l i i 19 approximately 370 miles from the River Bend site with i 20 ! , significant faulting trending south toward Memphis, which 4 i 21 would place the trending in the area of 310 miles from the j i
~
22 River Bend site. * [ 21 In the recorded past within a 200 mile radius ! t 21 of the' River Bend site there have been 28 earthquakes with [ i ; jf 25 an epicentral intensity of three to four or greater. i ! h } O TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 1625 i STREET, N.W. - $UlTE 1004 i I WASHINGTON, D.C. 20004 [ l (202) 293 3950 ' 4 l n.- ---,-,,-,,,n , , . . . - . , . - , . - - - - , -,n,.,,.,.. , - .n.,-.. -,e,--,~ m ,-
347 1 Since 1811 there have been four earthquakes 2 within a 100 mile radius of the River Bend Station. 3 (Slide.)
'I MR. EBERSOLE: What were those white dots on 5 Were those the earthquakes?
that illustration? 6 MR. LAMBERT: That is correct. 7 MR. EBERSOLE: Thank you. 8 MR. LAMBERT: In the case of the Donaldsonville 9 earthquake, its epicentral intensity was in the range of to five to six and it was felt at the River Bend Station with 11 an intensity of approximately four. 12 The New Madrid earthquake located 13 significantly north of the station, which occurred in the 11 1811 to 1812 time frame, had intensities in the area of 11 O' \" 15 to 12, and it was felt-that the River Bend Station site 16 with an intensity of approximately four to five. 17 One other significant earthquake that we have 18 evaluated was the Greenville, Mississippi earthquake, and 19 that had an intensity of approximately six to seven, and 20 that was felt at the River Bend Station with an intensity 21 of approximately four. 22 .The Greenville earthquake is located in the 21 Quachita Basin, and it is located approximately here, 195 28 miles from the River Bend Station. 3 (Slide.) O TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20004 (202) 293 3950
E l l 348
,a- I Our seismic design basis for the River Bend s 2 Station is based on two significant events. That would be 3- the Donaldsonville earthquake and the New Madrid 8
earthquake. 5 In the case of the Donaldsonville earthquake, 6 which is in the same tectonic province as the River Bend 7 Station, we would move the Donaldsonville earthquake to 8 the River Bend site and postulate an intensity of six 9 seismic event. 10 In the case of the New Madrid earthquake, 11 using attenuation curves developed by Nutley's isothermals 12 of the.New Madrid earthquake, we would place the New 13 Madrid earthquake at its southern boundary which we feel 1
~ll V
"') is.310 miles, and that would give us again an intensity of 13 six seismic event at the River Bend Station.
16 In the case of Greenville, which has a 17 distinct and separate structure, we would move it within
;_ 18 145 miles, and its effect at the station would be an 19 intensity of four, 20 In the case of Donaldsonville using intensity
- 21 acceleration relationships for the Dcoaldsonville L
22 earthquake, we would expect to see based on the work done 23 by Neumann, Murphy and O'Brien a range of peak ground 21 accelerations from .07 to .055 to .06g's. 23 In accordance with 10 CFR 100 Appendix A, the O' TAYLOE ASSC<lATES 1625 i STREET, N.W. $UITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20004 (202) 293 3950 f L t
349 1 minimum earthquake peak ground accelration that we would (, (my 2 use for design purposes is an earthquake of .10g peak 3 ground acceleration. That is what we have in fact done for l our River Bend design and our response spectra has been 5 anchored in accordance with Reg. Guide 1.60 and .10g's. We 6 feel that is a conservative design basis considering the I worst case postulation of approximately .07g's. 8 (Slide.) 9 Our River Bend approach has been a 10 deterministic approach in accordance with the standard 11 review plan. It appears.that the general NRC concern with 12 that approach is how do you account for uncertainty, and 13 the uncertainty appears to stem from the Charleston s 11 earthquake where the U. S. Geologic Survey was not able to ' ~' I3 confirm the struture or tectonic features which were 16 responsible for the Charleston earthquake, and on that 17 basis an event of that sort could possibly be postulated 18 at other areas. 19 I understand that is one of the reasons that 20 the NRC .s now completing a seismic hazard probabilistic 21 assessment for the region east of the Rockies and this 22 should be addressed following my presentation by the M staff. 21 The initial study, which is being conducted by 3 Lawrence Livermore National Labs, one of the ten test
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in-
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350 I sites that is being evaluated is the River Bend site. 73 2 Along a parallel path EPRI is sponsoring a 3 seismic hazard assessment which GSU is a participant in. I Mr. Cahill is one of the members of the Executive 5 Committee which gives us certainly a hopeful say in the 6 work that is being done. I In fact, we just received a letter from the 8 Owners Group requesting that River Bend also be included 9 as one of the ten test sites for the EPRI study. 10 The results of this work will place the 11 industry in a strong position to participate in the NRC 12 policy decisions. It will also provide us a basis for 13 comparison and support in the NRC Lawrence Livermore work. 11 f~') V And, lastly, it will provide strong scientific 13 support in developing an integrated methodology for 16 evaluating site specific seismic design ground motion. 17 In conclusion, we feel seismic margin has been 18 accounted for in our design base. Our peak ground 19 acceleration was computed as .079's, and following the 20 requirements of Appendix A of 10 CFR 100 we have used .10g
- 21 as our licensed design basis.
22 That concludes my presentation. 23 MR. WEIMKAM: I would like to introduce Mr. 28 Jeff Kimball from the NRC staff who will make a 23 presentation on the seismic hazards characterization TAYLOE ASSOCIATES (V) 1625 i STREET, N.W. - $UlTE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950 i
l 351 I program. ( 2 MR. KIMBALL: As part of an ongoing joint 3
. Office of Research and office of Reactor Regulations 8
program through Lawrence Livermore National Lab a 5 probalistic seismic hazard methodology has been developed. 6 This is an expansion of the work that was undertaken as ' I part of the NRC's systematic evaluation program. I. 8 The program is basically set up to assist us 9 in addressing the USGS clarification on the Charleston 10 earthquake, but equally to help us assess increased use of 11 PRA's and increased use of seismic hazard analysis in the f 12 review process. 13 (Slide.) It I would just quickly like to go through some (# < I *. of the steps and then to show some of the preliminary 16 results for the River Bend site. We currently consider the 17 results preliminary in nature. We are still going through 18 a feedback process, which I will explain, with how 19 Livermore gets the input in these probabilistic harzard 20 analyses. There is a large volume of material and we are 1 21 still sorting through the material to see what parameters 22 impact the results and we also are going to go through a l i 23 peer review process. 21 In about October of this year we should have 25 rerun the calculations with the feedback results and j O (f TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 16251 STREET, N.W. - $UITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950 l l u
m 1
\
352 1 taking into account significant peer review comments, and i
\> 2 then we will have the opportunity to look at the 3
differences which exist for the ten sites and determine I the future action we want to take in calculating the 5 hazard for the rest of the plants east of the Rockies. 6 (glide,} 7 To quickly illustrate the steps which are 8 necessary for Livermore to calculate the hazard, there are 9 basically three steps. 10 One is the identification of seismic source 11 zones which are areas which have basically equal 12 earthquake potential in them. 13 The next is for each of the zones to develop
/~ II an earthquake recurrence curve. Basically it is the number
13 of earthquakes in the zone and the likelihood or the 16 distribution of different size earthquakes in that zone.
17 Then to combine these two with a method of la getting the ground motion at a station, at an individual 19 point. 20 Then these three inputs were given totally by 21 expert panels and Livermore developed a methodology l 22 basically to integrate these three together for individual Il sites to come up with a probability of exceedence for a 28 given ground motion. 15 (Slide.) O (, TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 16251 STRitT, N.W. - $Ulff 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
353 l The first steps were accomplished through a
/ \
(.,/ 2 seismicity panel made up of 11 experts throughout the 3 United States and step three was accomplished by a I seismicity panel which was made up of five experts. 3 (Slide.) 6 Just to quickly go over the type of 7 information. Livermore developed questionnaires that were 8 sent to the panels. In term of the seismicity panel shown 9 in the previous slide, they gave us information on seismic to source zonation. This included all different zones the 11 experts wanted to use such as the chance that a zone might 12 not exist, he believes it may exist or may not exist and 13 the shapes of the zones. Il 73 Then for each of the zones given there were ('~) 13 recurrence statistics for all the zones and what is shown 16 here is an upper magnitude cutoff, or basically the 17 largest earthquake that could occur in the given zone la either in terms of magnitude or intensity, uncertainty in 19 all the above parameters and, as I stated previously, we 20 are now going through a feedback process basically 21 explaining to the experts, Livermore explains to the 22 eperts how they used the experts input. 11 The expert then has a chance to see if it 21 makes sense with what he was saying, and a feedback 25 questionnaire has been developed and sent back to the (] V TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
I 3 354 I expert panel which they will answer and those changes will f~s J % s-) 2 be incorporated. 3 (Slide.) 4 In terms of the ground motion panel, there was 3 an initial meeting held with seven ground motion experts. 6 The panel was initially seven. It was apparent after that 7 _ meeting that Livermore needed to go back and do some work 8 and basically that work was developing what we call an 9 attenuation booklet just to synthesize as much information to as they could on ground motion attenuation in the Eastern Il United States. 12 Then the booklet and the questionnaire were 13 sent to the experts for their weighing, and again a very fN ll important consideration was taking into account the 13 uncertainty in the models themselves and then the basic 16 random uncertainty given a certain earthquake and a 17 certain distance and the variability in ground motion. 18 If you would like, I have mar.y viewgraphs that 19 I could show. I will show one example of the zonation and 20 I will make some comment relative to the Gulf Coast and 21 River Bend. 22 (Slide.) 23 This is an example of the type of source zones 21 for one of the experts. In particular I picked this one 3 out, but the others show pretty similar things with some O V TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 16251 STREET, N.W. - $UITE 1004
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b r ,' 355 l
!- I ~ variations. But in particular in terms of the New Madrid
<Qf 2 region typically the experts confined the highest seismic l
'3 !
, zone in New Madrid to a heigh zone, not necessarily the !
I size of events that could occur in a zone around New t L
- Madrid, but in terms of the level of seismicity for large !
t 6 events it was typically confined to a narrow zone. ! 7 (Slide.) ' l 8 Also typical in terms of the Gulf Coast from I 9 [ ] pretty much most of the experts was a large zone of !
- 10
- general diffuse seismicity, and this is just one example.
II (Silde.') 12 In terms of all the sites and River Bend in j 13 particular, and I will explain what is on this curve, this ! It is a plot of the annual probability of exceedence versus 1.' peak acceleration from .lg to 1 g for each of the ! 16 different seismicity panel experts. This is a best 4 estimate plot and it is a simple plot basically. The words II la "best estimate" is actually not a very good way to [ 19 describe it, but basically it just takes the highest 20 probability zone for that expert, his most probable "B" : 21 value and his most probable activity rate upper magnitude ; - 22 cutoff combined with the most probably attenuation model [ 23 from each of the attenuation experts. ! 2 In terms ^of River Bend,'the distribution given f 25 this range of experts is approximately one order of ; i 1 TAYLOE ASSOCIATES ! I taas a sineef, N.W. = sulft 1004 h wAswenerow,o.c. ~20004 l j (202) 293 39so L !. h c
N I 356 I magnitude. I believe it is a little less than one order of xj 2 magnitude at the low accelerations. As typical in these 3 types of curves, the spread gets greater as it gets to 3 lower probabilities or larger accelerations, being well 5 over an order of magnitude here. 6 In the ten test sites this is pretty much I typical of the spread in results for the seismicity 8 experts. 9 MR. OKRENT: Before you take that transparency 10 off, if I am reading it correctly then, if I take the il value of .2g --- 12 MR. KIMBALL: I have a plot about two now that 13 will be able to talk about that I think. CN, il MR. OKRENT: All right, I will wait. IS MR. KIMBALL: In addition to doing it for a 16 given peak acceleration, the attenuation experts provided 17 input in terms of response spectra also, and this is just la a sample for River Bend of the best estimate plot for many 19 geoseismicity seismicity experts. This is 10 to the minus 20 three annual probability of exceedence and this is just 21 the response spectra. 22 Again, this is just to illustrate the , 23 variation in the responses to the panel. Typically the 28 variation rose as the frequency decreases. And for River 25 Bend, the reason this does this is because the hazard (9 v' TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 16251 STAltf, N.W. = Sulft 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20004 (202) 293 3990
357 1 _ curves tend in this area, around one hertz frequency, to e s (s,) 2 be controlled by a far source and typically the New Madrid l 3 source. ' 4 (Slide.) 5 Livermore has also in terms of the methodology 6 and taking into account the uncertainty of all the
~
parameters has run approximately 2200 hazard calculations : 8 for each site. It is 220 runs for each expert tnking into 9 account the variation in zonation and upper magnitude 10 cutoff, and then approximately 40 runs with each of the 11 attentuation panel. I 12 So it totals up to 2200 runs at each site, i 13 and from the 2200 runs they were able to draw what we call M constant percentile hazard curves, a harzard curve that ; (}.
' I3 has a 50th percentile, f example, and I would like to 16 show that and discuss a few of the things in terms of 17 River Bend.
38 (Slide.)
> Again, this is the annual frequency 20 exceedence, 10 to the minus 3 and ten to the minus 4, and 21 This is .lg and along this axis is the peak acceleration.
22 .2g, .3 and .4, and these are the constant percentile 23 harzard curves. r 21 In term of the River Bend safety shutdown 25 earthquake peak acceleration, the 50 percentile has a 4.5, i TAYLOE ASSOCIATES [] (,, 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
T : I 358 . t I that is ten to the minus four annual posulated exceedence.
,_s
< l w/ 2 Flipping that around, it has approximately a 2,200 year 3 return grid.
4 One can also get the variation in that number : 5 using the 15 to 85th, and just to show the variation, it 6 runs from 555 to approximately one in ten thousand. I The distribution at River Bend tends to be on 8 the low side in terms of spread. There are sites which 9 will show a higher spread than this, and that is about a 10 factor of 17 or 18. There are some sites which tend to P 11 show factors of 40, for example, even at these low peak 12 accelerations. 13 Another way to look at this is to look around 18 the safety shutdown earthquake in this area of the hazard ' ~ 15 curve and basically to look at the slope of the ha: rd f 16 curve to get a feel for how the hazard changes with a 17 given change in peak acceleration. 18 In this area you can see that the peak ; 19 acceleration changes by 50 percent and the hazard curve 20 would slide up or down by about a factor of three. One ; 21 could also go to a given peak acceleration, for example, l 22 .2 here on this curve and simply read off seven times ten 23 to the minus five at 50 percentile, for example, i 28 We are currently using this information to - 25 help us assess existing PRA's. However, we are not using l
/~N, TAYLOE ASSOCIATES (j 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WJ SPfac, TON, D.C. 20006 l
'M2) 293-3950 i i !
m l 359 1 this.information in a direct sense to decide, for example, l Q) 2 a given safe shutdown earthquake or decide the 3 acceptability of a given result in a PRA. I Do you have a question on this one? i 3 MR. OKRENT: What is the principal cause or 6 ca use.3 in the minds of these experts for concluding that, 7 for example, at 50 percentile a .2g is seven times ten to 8 the minus f!ve, or whatever it is, is not a vanishingly 9 In other words, it is assumed that the small number? r 10 maximum cutoff is larger than the equivalent of model five : 11 Mercale 6 or do you recall? l 12 MR. KIMBALL: Well, I can attempt to answer the 13 question. Tha low probability comes from the attenuation O Il relationship combined witn the recurrence relationship in U 13 terms of where the upper magnitude cutoff is. Also, the 16 experts have upper magnitude cutoffs at least equal to the II largest earthquake. 18 MR. OKRENT: And these people have the --- 19 MR. KIMBALL: The largest historic earthquake. 20 MR. OKRENT: Which is for? 21 MR. KIMBALL: For the host zone, and it changes 22 for each expert, it would be approximately a magnitude of 23 five for this area, 4.8 or a 5. It will vary slightly. It 21 depends on the site, but maybe 30 percent of the experts, ! 25 one-third of them will have an upper magnitude cutoff O TAYLOE ASSOCIATES bl 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 1 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
.I 360 1
equal to that maximum historic earthquake. The rest of
/N
\m,) 2 them basically have that as a larger earthquake, and some 3
of them, if you get down to the recurrence relationhip for i the host zone, you will be talking about, in terms of the 3 earthquake itself, of probabilities of something around 6 the 1 in 10,000 range, and you combine that with an
~
attenuation relationship, which has an uncertainty 8 attached to it, and if you go up into a one sigma or two 9 sigma area or the tail of that distribution and you look 10 at those types of combinations, you can end up with be 11 able to get for any site basically in the way the 12 methodology is developed ground motion valves at very low 13 probabilities, rT 11 In the way this is developed there is no N)
~ 13 truncation on acceleration, for example. So there is 16 always some part of the tail of the attenuation l~ relationship that will add something.
18 MR. OKRENT: Well, I am still trying to , 19 understand what you are saying. Let me for the moment ' 20 assume that all of the experts said that the equivalent of l 21 what could produce an MN6 was the largest magnitude. Now I 22 don't know if you equate that to a magnitude of 5 or not. 21 MR. KIMBALL: Is it about that. 21 MR. OKRENT: Then if you put it under the 3 plant, that is as close as it can get. If you put it under TAYLOE ASSOCIATES d 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950 11 r
< _ - - _ , ,. , - _ _ _ _,ie-1 ----t-
361 ! I the plant can you get .5g? [k.)') 2 MR. KIMBALL: With the given attenuation 3 relationships if you put it close to the plant, there 4 would be a finite probability of getting .5g. 5 MR. OKRENT: And is this a single peak you are 6 talking about or some kind of --- I MR. KIMBALL: It is an instrumental peak 8 acceleration. So, yes, it could be a single peak. 9 MR. OKRENT: Well, I am trying to understand 10 the degree to which you feel you are able to use the i 11 information at the ten to the minus four or ten to the i 12 minus five annual frequency of exceedence and it is not . 13 clear to me. ('V il 15 MR. KIMBALL: I guess it depends on what
. context you are trying to use it in. I will try to answer 16 it ---
II MR. OKRENT: Let's say with a PRA in mind. 18 Okay, with a PRA in mind. MR. KIMBALL: 19 MR. OKRENT: And you were the man who had to 20 tell the people who were next in the calculational step 21 what they should put in for a probabilistic distribution 22 of seismic hazard. l~ 13 MR. KIMBALL: In terms of the PRA process, the 21 most important thing in terms of utilizing this type of 25 information is to have a good interaction I think between i
/T (j TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004
{ WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 l (202) 293 3950 i
m
'l I
362 1 the seismologist, the structural engineer and the systems V 2 analyst in total. In terms of what you are giving them, 3 what the engineer needs and wants is extremely important. 1 You can go out in the community and fight all 5 you want, for example, about what is the proper thing to 6 give in terms of peak acceleration, damage effective 7 acceleration and sustained acceleration. 8 In terms of the information provided in the 9 report, there have been a few of those types of arguments, 10 and I hesitate to say none, but a few of those types of 11 arguments involved in this process in terms of giving i 12 hazard results. 13 In terms of its use in their PRA, the topics 11 which may become involved, for example, between a b 15 seismologist and a structural engineer, many of them are 16 also controversial. But I think the proper thing ~to do is 17 ! just correctly characterize the type of information you 18 are giving and making sure tha't the structural engineer, 19 for example, that that is the type of information they 20 need when they are combining a hazard curve with a 21 fragility calculation, j 22 I don't thi'nk there is a simple answer to your 23 question. { 28 MR. OKRENT: I don't think you have given me an 25 answer. For example, would you tell the --- A TAYLOE ASSOCIATES I 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 ' (202) 293 3950
. .- - , .- . - - - . - . ~ -
363 i 1
,_ MR. KIMBALL: I guess I would say they l
\~ 2 are extremely low probabilities, and obviously these 3 calculations if you show extremely large uncertainty in 4 low probabilities, you get a different person doing a 5 seismic hazard curve and they may come up with absolute 6 large and absolute differences in these low probabilities 7 compared to this and they will probably also show large i 8 variation in their results at those low probabilities. 9 Basically it says that in a process with large 10 subjective judgment involved in it that the point 11 estimates are very uncertain, for example, and that a 12 de-emphasis on coming up with a single number of estimates 13 based on these low probabilities is probably prudent. 11 MR. JKRENT: I must confess I still don't know {')S \_ 15 what you told me. 16 Do you have any questions, Dr. Trifunac. 17 MR. TRIFUNAC: No. I can maybe help you a 18 little bit. I think if I were standing there I would you 19 don't need to give them low probability because what he is 20 giving in that diagram is a complete distribution 21 function, and if you know what you are doing with it, you 22 will combine it with the distributions afterwards, and 23 somebody down the.line that understands the fragility of 25 this piece and tha fragility of that piece will decide i 5 what is the acceptable risk for that particular piece. ; I l O \ TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 l WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 ; (202) 293 3950 i
a 364 I But this is all the information you need to
/s1 V 2 gather a spectra of course to combine this with 3
distributions of response. So in the end you end up with 4 distribution functions. It is not necessary to choose a 5 probability level here or the acceleration level. 6 MR. OKRENT: Well, let me pose a question. I 7 can envisage for purposes of discussion a site being the 8 recipient of two different earthquakes, each of which 9 produce a .5g peak at the site, but in one case there is a 10 single peak and the rest is less than, let's say, a third 11
, of this. In the other case, these are sustained peaks for 12 a minute. Let me just postulate that this is a 13 possibility.
l l [] 14 It seems to me that set of earthquakes is not 15 described on that one graph. 16 IIR . KIMBALL: That is correct. 17 MR. OKRENT: What is why I am asking what is it la you are --- 19 MR. KIMBALL: The existing PRA's, in addition 20 to that, they have not been done in a sophisticated manner 21 in the whole picture to take that type of situation into l 22 account. Using a sustained basis peak acceleration, for 21 example, is only one part of that picture. Different 28 earthquakes have different spectral shapes, response 25 spectral shapes, or average response spectral shapes. ( i TAYLOE ASSOCIATES l L 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SulTE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
365 j l There is an attempt to not quite envelope kj/ 2 that, but to conservatively take that into account by i 3 taking a broad band spectral shape, you know, in a PRA. 1 But, again, that still may not be the right to do it for a i 3 nearby earthquake. They may have a different spectral 6 shape. ! I You are exactly right in terms of the thing 8 you can identify as an issue, but it is a difficult issue 9 to factor into a PRA, for example. 10 MR. OKRENT: Now the Livermore study isn't --- i II MR. KIMBALL: Some of the issues we will have 12 to address as time and money allow us to I guess, but in 13 terms of the total picture, it will be many years before ; 11 many of those issues are addressed.
~~} j
%_) I3 l '
MR. OKRENT: All right. Now let me ask what 16 does this graph tell us about River Bend and the 17 likelihood of seismic events being a trivial or a 18 significant contributor to risk? l ! 19 MR. KIMBALL: Let me put this viewgraph up. ! 20 (slide.) ; 21 MR. OKRENT: Maybe it doesn't tell us anything 22 about it. 23 MR. KIMBALL: It may not tell us anything new. [ 21 This is again the response spectra. This is . 3 the frequency and the response velocity. Now this plot is , ' -\d() i TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WAf tflNGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950 l l
d [ l 366
^
1 the safe shutdown earthquake spectra, and the 50th , f %, , (_,/ 2 percentile, the 1,000 year uniform hazard spectra and the , 3 5,000 year uniform hazard spectra. In this comparison, ; i
-8 River Bend appears at approximately the 2,000 year area l 5
and tracks to the 5,000, 6 In terms of the ten sites, this falls in the 7 better half of the comparisons in terms of return period. 8 In terms of our experience, this is I guess consistent 9 with our experience in the fact that recently licensed to plants that we have hazard estimates at, the probability 11 of a safe shutdown earthquake is on the order of ten to 12 the minus three to ten to the minus four annual 13 probability.
- s'
-),/
14 In terms of the slope of the hazard curve for 13 events larger than the .lg peak acceleration, for example, 16 the hazard curves are fairly consistent in that a doubling 17 of tne peak acceleration, for example, would be 18 approximately an event somewhere in the six to eight 19 change in hazard, for example. That is the best way I can , 20 give that type of answer, and pretty much they are all l 21 fairly consistent. Of the ten test sites at least, there s 22 is not one that sticks out in terms of the hazard growing l i l ) 21 at a faster rate at least. 21 MR. OKRENT: I am a little curious. Did you 23 always take the 50th percentile when you were showing r'N, TAYLOE ASSOCIATES
'\ ) 1625 i STREET. N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
367 l comparisons? (_ \
\_.) 2 MR. KIMBALL: You are blessed with the first 3
basic comparison shown for a given site in terms of, let's 4 say, a safe shutdown earthquake. The reports includes all 5 the spectra and hazard information, but it includes no 6 comparisons with design basis information. We are making I that ourselves. t 8 Because the process is in such a preliminary 9 stage, you know, we have made comparisons of it to see 10 where things fall and to make sure the results look 4 11 consistent and to make sure the program is going where we 12 want it to go, but we are not explicitly using this 13 information right now, other than when asked to make (~3 Il comparisons, for example, comparing to existing PRA which t Q! 15 we are reviewing. This falls in the better half of the > 16 plants. 17 MR. OKRENT: Well, I must say if I were to take 18 the results that you presented as in some way 19 representative of current expert opinion, I wouldn't see 20 any reason why the kinds of caveats that the ACRS has 21 posed concerning seismic contribution to risk for other [ 22
- plants it has recently reviewed for operation wouldn't 13 apply about the same way here, even though this is looked ,
28 upon as a relatively aseismic region. 25 MR. KIMBALL: I won't try to change your mind, FN TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950 l l
'I I
l~ 368 I but you have to remember that having a favorable
- 7. s
\ l N/ 2 comparison or, as I say, in the better half of of the 3
comparisons, and you do have a low seismic design, gives I you an indication that it is a low hazard plant.. In fact, 5 in just the 10 sites alone, it is the second lowest in the 6 relative sense of those 10 sites. The only one lower than 7 it is Lacrosse which is also in what the staff has stated 8 is essentially a very quiet seismic region. 9 So in that sense these results are consistent 10 with that. It is coming out lower than other sites, 11 significantly lower than northeastern sites. 12 MR. OKRENT: But the design basis is less. 13 MR. KIMBALL: That is true, but having it still () LJ li come out for most of the spectrum that is a 5,000 year 13 return period and having a low design basis means the i 16 hazard must be low if this comes out on the better half of 17 the comparison. 18 MR. OKRENT: Well, see that is a 50 percentile , i 19 thing. So there is a 50 percentile chance that you are 20 wrong, too, if I look at it at face value. I 21 MR. KIMBALL: The way those are calculated, it 22 is not quite like that. But, yes, that is why we have l
$1 plots showing the variability and, for example, and you l 28 can do this the same for respc.se spectra for a given i
23 variability. The large part of the variability comes from l (-s T TAYLOE ASSCK:lATES 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950 l I
t 369 1 the attenuation experts compared to the seismicity ( 2 experts. In other words, if we used one attenuation model 3 and all the input from the seismicity experts, we would I get a much tighter spread with different attenuation , 5 models, which means there is more modeling uncertainty in 6 attenuation probably than with source zonation or - 7 recurrence relationships. 8 MR. OKRENT: Are there any comments or 9 question? 10 MR. TRIFUNAC: I have a question about this 11 concrete fill, but I don't know whether I should bring it 12 up now. 13 MR. OKRENT: Well, let's bring it up now. It is (s 11 to the applicant I believe. d 15 MR. TRIFUNAC: Well, let me bring that question 16 up then. I understood yesterday that there were some 17 reasons to put a concrete fill between the outside 18 containment concrete structure and the steel containment 19 ( vessel to a certain elevation and I would like to 20 understand why it was done in the first place, and then I 21 have some questions about the consequences. 22 MR. LAMBERT: All right. The concrete annulus 23 fill was not placed for seismic considerations. It was 21 placed to reduce the dynamic responses resulting from SRB 23 actuation events, the steam relief. (s TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293-3950
'I l
.I 370 I The reactor building containment internal
.(~s3 .
\, / 2 structures were originally designed and found acceptable 3
based on our seismic design basis. It was only from those i loads originating from SRV events. 5 MR. TRIFUNAC: Now that this has been accepted 6 in the design, I would like to understand whether 7 realizing that this filling has changed the whole 8 frequency of the containment inside and outside, whether 9 this frequency change is significant to the degree that it 10 might influence some of the forces of instrumentation for 11 anchors or piping or whatever, because the frequency may 12 be changing up and down the response spectra curve. 13 MR. LAMBERT: That has been analyzed with the f'N. Il addition of that additional mass from the concrete. I 15 would like to have Stone and Webster who has done that 16 analysis address it in detail if I could. 17 MR. SHA: What was the question? 18 MR. TRIFUNAC: The question is this. I suppose 19 that the force and functions of the floor response spectra 20 and so on for the design of anchors and the analysis of 21 stresses and various components of equipment and piping, I 22 suppose were carried out on the basis of the original 23 design, but now you have added this concrete between the 28 two shelves which generally speaking should increase the 5 frequency and whether this was included in your (' '
\
TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950 k
-- . _. =_ ,
371 1 consideration. 2 MR. SHA: Yes. The frquencies have increased, L 3 the exact number I will have to get later for you, but 4 they were increased so that the magnitude, the responses 5 due to the SRV's come down very significantly. 6 MR. TRIFUNAC: They have come down. I MR. SHA: Yes. The peak frequencies have ! 8 remained, about the same, about 22 hertz on most of the 9 points, but the magnitude has come down like from about 10 lig's and now it is in the range of 3 to 4g's, 11 MR. TRIFUNAC: I don't understand how the [ 12 magnitude has come down and the frequencies have remained 13 the same. ' 18 (N MR. SHA: The frequencies have increased so (_-) 15
]
that they are beyond the forcing function frequencies. , 16 Earlier they were closely matched and resonance was 17 created because of the forcing functions and the 18 frequencies which vary from 5 to about 25 to 30 hertz SRV 19 loads. 20 MR. TRIFUNAC: Well, for example, what was the 21 frequency of the steel and of the concrete containment? 22 MR. SHA: It was about 23 or 24 hertz, 23 somewhere very close to what the forcing function 28 frequencies were, j U MR. TRIFUNAC: Which forcing function ! f (~') v TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 16251 STREET, N.W. - $JITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 i (202) 293 3950 i l
f(T l l 372 1 frequency? x ,) 2 MR. SHA: This is the SRV loading. 3 MR. TRIFUNAC: No, I mean in terms of an I earthquake. 5 MR. SHA: Earthquake, we really did not have a 6 problem due to earthquake, t I MR. TRIFUNAC: Maybe you don't understand my 8 question. You have a piece of equipment --- 9 MR. SHA: The response due to earthquake has 10 not significantly changed because most of the response is 11 due to soil responses. The peaks are at only about three 12 or four hertz. 13 MR. TRIFUNAC: Well, let me try to explain the 11 question again. You have an original SSE, you have the ' (~~]J
%. 35 '
spectra and you have accepted certain mappings. All right? 16 MR. SHA: Right. ; 17 MR. TRIFUNAC: Now you use that as an input to f 18 get floor response spectra, and at the particular point, 19 say any particular trace that you like there is a floor 20 response spectra based on that calculation which is also 21 assuming that you know the fundamental frequency of the 22 whole system, right? 23 MR. SHA: Right. 21 MR. TRIFUNAC: Okay. Now you put that 23 additional concrete in and that obviously changes the l (] C TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 203 3950
373 1 frequency.
/3 t \ \~/ 2 MR. SHA: Right.
3 MR. TRIFUNAC: So that the floor response 4 spectra with a high peak around the first load shifts to a 5 higher frequency, and maybe your 15 percent assurance, or ' 6 whatever percent you use ---
~
MR. SHA: We have reanalyzed the whole ! 8 containment with the same seismic input. The peaks are , 9 mainly in the three to five hertz range because it is~on 10 soil, very soft soil. Therefore, the seismic responses are 11 not affected by it. I 12 MR. TRIFUNAC: Are you analyzing response using 13 soil structure interaction? r~N II MR. SHA: We are using a lump mass method. ! 15 MR. TRIFUNAC: So what you are saying is that 16 the bulk of the rocking frequency comes from the 17 compliance of the soil and not from the frequency of the 18 containment. { 19 MR. SHA: Not from the frequency of the 20 containment. ; 21 MR. TRIFUNAC: I see. So that this additional 22 concrete stiffening effect is very small. ; 23 MR. SHA: Right. 21 MR. TRIFUNAC: Okay. Now from the other point
- 25 of view, from strictly an engineering point of view, the A
( TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 16251 $TREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 f (202) 293 3950
. _,--,m, , r-. - - - -.--.m -,.--.7 _-. -_p------__ _ - -
v .- I 374
,~ s I
fact that you could have temperature gradients from inside ( 1
\-) 2 and out and from outside in, and that you have this 3
anchoring elements that are connected to the shell, do you 4 get any prcblems there with large moments in the steel 5 containment?
)
6 MR. SHA: We did not, because the temperature
~
gradient, the high temperatures when there is an accident 8 are limited to a very small area inside. So there is no ( 9 real gradient, except the operating condition gradient. We 30 have a seven-foot thick section which resists that moment 11 also. - l 12 MR. TRIFUNAC: Okay. I have just one more 13 question then. You say that the soil is very soft. f- ~ 11 MR. SHA: Yes.
-k' 15 MR. TRIFUNAC: Now in the original design you 16 had, primitively speaking, a large concrete slab on top of l~ which on the outside you have a concrete shell and inside t la of.which you have a steel shell. Now by adding this 19 annulus additional concrete fill in between the two you 20 have created an additional and possibly significant l 21 stiffness in shear and bending like in this way.
22 MR. SHA: It is quite steep. 23 MR. TRIFUNAC: Yes, I know, but you have 21 stiffened it up further. 25 MR. SHA: Yes. I TAYLOE ASSOCIATES ( 1625 l STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
375 1 MR. TRIFUNAC: If the soil is very flexible and r^ I ( kj 2 the foundation is very large, if you assume that the soil 3 is very soft, there should be some deformation of that in 4 the direction penpendicular to the surface of the path. Do 5 you get somewhat large stresses in this additional 6 concrete ring? Did you analyze that? I MR. SHA: Yes, we did, and I don't think there 8 are any problems. 9 fir . TRIFUNAC: How did you analyze that? 10 MR. SHA: You mean the mat? The mat was . Il analyzed --- . 12 MR. TRIFUNAC: No, I mean the additional 13 stiffness in the ring. L
-,3 Il MR. SHA: When we analyzed the mat we put the 's ~ 15 stiffeners of the element which restrains it. So we 16 increased the stiffness of that support at the junction 17 where this concrete meets the mat.
18 MR. TRIFUNAC: I am talking about one portion 19 of the mat going down and the other portion of the mat 20 going up because the whole structure is rocking and i 21 because there is a seismic wave underneath it. 22 MR. SHA: It is analyzed as a shell structure. 23 With the seismic loads applying, naturally it will lift 26 vertically with soil springs underneath. 3 MR. TRIFUNAC: I am asking you about the D. i TAYLOE ASSOCIATES , 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950 ~
v
.l-l 376 l structure and not the spring underneath.
p_ i f
\/ 2 MR. SHA: Okay. From this analysis we got the 3
forces and moments at various sections. Maybe I am not 4 understanding your question. 5 MR. TRIFUNAC: This is the fundation mat, and 6 on it is the shell. 7 Right. MR. SHA: 8 MR. TRIFUNAC: And the seismic wave, together 9 with rocking, wants to deform it like this, but the shell 10 upstairs is preventing that deformation. Now the mat 11 originally was flexible in this direction because it was 12 just a slab. Now you have added a very stiff ring around 13 it and that stiff ring is going to attract a lot of forces r~M ll to itself because it is stiff. So that you may get a very 15 large sheer into that stiffening additional concrete 16 because of this type of deformation. l 17 MR. SHA: Okay. That was reanalyzed with the l 18 lump mass model. The reg. guide spectra time history 19 analysis was done. 20 MR. TRIFUNAC: If 1 can suggest that perhaps : i 21 you could look at it. It may not be important, but I don't 22 believe you can analyze with the lump mass model. It might 23 be a good idea to check this. 21 MR. SHA: I believe we have checked, but we 25 will give you more information if you want. TAYLOE ASSOCIATES l 's 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SulTE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
377 1 MR. TRIFUNAC: Thank you.
/
(m,\/ 2 MR. OKRENT: While you are there could I ask a 3 different question but in the seismic area. My 5
. recollection is that the containment building has a 5 neighbor. I don't recall whether it is the auxiliary ,
6 building. I MR. LAMBERT: Auxiliary and fuel building. 8 MR. OKRENT: And fuel building. 9 MR. LAMBERT: Yes. , 10 MR. OKRENT: This is on a separate foundation, II is it? 12 MR. LAMBERT: Yes. I3 MR. OKRENT: How close are they?
'N II MR. SHA: I think they are very close.
l
\_/ i3 :
MR. LAMBERT: We have a space that varies from , P 16 three inches at the base of the buildings up to four 17 ' inches at the higher elevations between the aux and the 18 reactor building and the reactor building and the fuel 19 building.
- 20 MR. OKRENT: And how much of that space is used 21 up by relative motion at your design basis earthquake? 6 22 l MR. LAMBERT: Part of the shake space has been 13 used up, but not all of the shake space.
28 MR. OKRENT: Do you recall what fraction? 25 MR. LAMBERT: I would say at worst we have used TAYLOE ASSOCIATES Os 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHlHGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950 i _ _ _ - . _ . _ _ _ _ . _. ~ _ _ _ _ _ .
y-1 I 378
,-~ 'l up I will say possibly 75 percent. I don't have figures
*e 2 available, but we can get those.
3 MR. OKRENT: Now suppose we had a large : 4 earthquake. Would you get building interaction somewhere? 5 MR. SHA: These values which Craig just 6 mentioned, that about 75 percent is used up from four 7 inches, are'very conservative values. 8 MR. OKRENT: But suppose you did get building 9 interaction, where would it occur? Let me just postulate. 10 Double the earthquake. We saw a moment ago that there are ! 11 experts who estimate that is not a one in a billion year [ 12 event. Where would you get contact and how severe would 13 the contact have to be before you were concerned?
/~'N II MR. LAMBERT: Well, I believe we had used a
(
\J
)
I3 more conservative input to come up with the relative 16 movement in our shake space. The contact obviuously would ; 17 be at the top of the buildings, and we haven't analyzed, 18 to the best of my knowledge, for a probably event of more
~
19 than we had originally designed our shake space for. 20 MR. OKRENT: The top would mean the top of the 21 shield around the --- ; 22 MR. LAMBERT: As we amplify the responses 23 through the building, obviously we have more deflection in 25 the upper elevations of the building. Down at the bottom 25 we may have a three-inch shake space and the combined t i TAYLOE ASSOCIATES j 'V 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293-3950
- 1. . . - -
i 379 p_s I deflection between the adjacent buildings may be only one > I ; \-) 2 inch, whereas up at the top where we have four inches, we 3 may move as much as two and a half inc..es, t 4 MR. OKRENT: And those are reinforced concrete 3 structures that we are talking about? 6 MR. LAMBERT: All three structures are i 7 reinforced concrete, the exterior walls. 8 MR. EBERSOLE: In the same vein, but on a much 9 cheaper topic, what are the margins of strength against to these large earthquakes in respect to the battery 11 restraints? 12 MR. LAMBERT: I would have to defer that I? question to someone else relative to specific questions as 18 (~'N to the battery supports. , \ ,l i I". MR. EBERSOLE: The reason I picked the battery 16 supports is that they are critical to everything and they II are also easy to make extremely rugged. So it would be i la unfortunate if they were marginal in their performance 19 against these spectacular earthquakes that Dave has 20 referred to. 21 MR. LAMBERT: I would rather expect that we 22 have significant margin built into the way we have 13 enveloped our response spectra. Inherent in the structural 25 materials we have used we have got significant margins. 25 Specific numbers I couldn't quote today, but we certainly /^N TAYLOE ASSOCIATES ( 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WA$HINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
- 1 I
I 380
,- s I could get that information.
Ik ') 2 MR. TRIFUNAC: How did you calculate that? 3 MR. SHA: Each building is analyzed separately. I MR. TRIFUNAC: Yes. 3 MR. SHA: And we determine the maximum 6 displacement at all the elevations for each building, and 7 then we added this as if they will be out of phase. 8 MR. TRIFUNAC: They go like this. 9 MR. SHA: Out of phase. 10 MR. TRIFUNAC: Like this and not like that. In 11 the separate analysis then you don't consider the fact 12 s that the rocking of one building may be seriously damaged 13 by the rocking of the other since they are so close. Take [~] 18 the containment thing. It is very heavy and a very stiff
\~J .
13 structure, and if it tilts this way by its sheer weight i 16 and inertia it is going deflect the ground just the 17 opposite way so that the other side will want to bend over i la even if there is no earthquake vibration. I guess this is 19 not included in the analysis, is it? 20 MR. SHA: Due to a seismic event? 21 MR. TRIFUNAC: Any event. If you analyze the 22 buildings separately you are I presume ignoring the 23 interaction between two buildings through the deformation 28 of the soil. 25 MR. SHA: That is true.
; TAYLOE ASSOCIATES \- 16251 STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
p 381 1 MR. LAMBERT: For the record, the batteries are r"
'(N)_
2 in our control building which is significantly separated 3 from the aux building, the reactor building and the fuel i P 1
-building.
t 3 MR. OKRENT: That helps, but the question that t 6 Mr. Ebersole was raising was one concerning the support of 7 the batteries themselves, and I could add on various motor 8 centers and so forth and important instruments racks, et ; 9 cetera, et cetera, which sometimes have a habit in other i 10 reactors of just about meeting design. 11 Well, I think we had better go on to the next 12 top because the time is fleeting. 13 We will next call on members of the public who f-It have asked for a chance to make oral statements. l (\~,) 15 David Madden. 16 MR. MADDEN: My name is David Madden. I make my 17 living writing books. 18 I have listened to much calm, unemotional talk 19 here about facts and figures, and to skeptical questions 20 ( that request clarification and interpretations, and I have 21 heard all too many I don't know answers. 22 ( I look at the 25 or so emormous volumes of 23 data in.t.he back of this room, and having heard these 50 28 or so specialists report to you, I get the nervous feeling 25b that no.one person has a comprehension of the whole. l p i TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 16251 STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293-3950 l l
p -. _ l. l-382 1 _ Now I can well imagine GSU's sense of comfort ( )
\s / 2 in noting that only one private citizen has asked to speak 3
to you, and maybe that is because their information I facilities broke down, I heard about this two days before 5 the event, so that they can maintain their fantasies facts 6 and figures without interruptions and nervous shock from 7 the public. , 8 Human nature being, unfortunately, what it is, 9 I can imagine GSU taking that silence as consent. Go ahead 10 and risk our lives. We trust you. You can do that, but I 11 am here today to tell you without euphemism that you 12 absolutely do not have my consent, not even to convene to 13 consider risking the health and lives of thousands of
N li defenseless human beings, and to tell you that there is l
i (G 13 one person at least who considers this hearing therefore . ! t 16 to be morally rotten, one person at least to tell you, 17 GSU, in this public place that I do not trust you, one 18 person at least to tell the NRC, not these gentlemen here, i 19 but the NRC, that I do not trust the NRC to protect me or ; 20 my fellow citizens from GSU. ; 21 You may get the impression that I fear GSU. I ' 22 do.- I fear the NRC. But there is one man that I fear far 23 more than GSU or NRC, and that is the man that will be i 21 responsible for the crucial valve or button or whatever 25 you want to call it, the man who will control the monster p x TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950 l i
m
, 383
! once you scientists have walked away leaving the health
/, ,
Q) 2 and the live's,of thousands at risk. That man who has not 3 been discussed here at all, as far as I know, prone to 4 human error, and that is the dreaded explanation we will 3 want to hear. Yes, thousands were poisoned, but it was 6 human error. So, you know, let's don't worry about that, a 7 man as likely as some of you to say, oh, I don't know to a 8 life or death question. I do not trust that man with my 9 life. 10 Well, are you are stupid enough you may ask to Il live within the radius of this plant, if you don't trust 12 this man? No, I'am not. I am not going to be one of the 13 victims of this calculated risk that you have taken on 11 behalf of other people because the day before River Bend
/ms C# e 15 becomes a monstrous reality I, like any other sane and
' ' 16 intelligent person, which probably includes every one of 17 you in this room who has kept himself informed, will move
[_ 18 far beyond the reach of it. l 19 Now I dopht that it will unsettle the 20 atmosphere of scientific detachment that dominates this 21
; hearing if I raise with some emotion this simple moral 22 issue. If the GSU scientists and the NRC scientists 23 conclude that they are willing to risk the lives of 25 thousands of people and the health, and you notice they 25 without consent, so that a few, and this has not been
'O \,,./ TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 1625 i sinEET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293-3950 l
V \ l l 384 , I brought up either, why all this is being gone into, GSU 7s \
'- # 2 shareholders may add to their bank account, and don't tell 3
me we need this plant, because that has been demonstrated 8 that we don't. 3 And if we they prove to be right for the next 6 50 years that accidents are extremely unlikely, then the
'I only damage that will be done will be that millions of 8 people-will be forced to pay for GSU's colossal mistakes 9
in the realm of high finance aided and abetted by to scientists, 11 And if those consumers are willing to submit 12 to that kind of tyrany, as they are obviously are, perhaps 13 they deserve the severe financial burden that will be li forced upon them. , (N'v) I3 But if GSU and the NRC are wrong, if the I , 16 don't knows heard here echo with deadly irony, and there 17 is no more painful death than an ironic death one day in la the future, then thousands of people may die as a direct 19 result of your authority to risk the lives on behalf of 20 profiteers whose financial incompetence and technological 21 ineptitude are a matter of public record. 22 To risk the lives of citizens without their 3 consent may be legal, let us all bow down, but it is 23 clearly immoral. Forgive my lack of scientific detachment. 3 I am not dealing in facts and figures. (m'v) TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 1625 l STREET, N.W. - SulTE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
s 385 l If those people pay for your mistakes with
/ t \-) - 2 their lives, the question of immorality will be such 3
magnitude that no one of you will be able to comprehend I it, and we have in this century another good example of 3 t, hat kind of incomprehensible immorality, much less accept 6 the responsibility for it. I Where you see comfortable facts and figures up 8 here and floating in the air and a risk that you are 9 willing to take, I see being an emotional creature, in 10 case you don't know it by now, contaminated or dead 11 bodies, and I exaggerate deliberately, if yo' want to call 12 it exaggeration. 13 I challenge every one of you, and I am looking I r'~j ll you in the eye, I challenge every one of you to put the E) 15 facts and the figures aside for just one moment and 16
.imasine, and I know from reading about certain scientists II that scientists have imaginations. That is how they make 18 the breakthroughs, That is how Einstein made a 19 breakthrough. So use the imagination and then meditate on 20 what you conjure up.
21 And I want you to see the spectacle of rotting 22 bodies, living or dead, walking around as they are on the Il border of Mexico this very day be'.a :ee of human error. The 21 scientists who created that c df, an excellent job,
$1 walked away and some ill-paid person distributed it along
,s.
TAYLOE ASSOCIATES j 'xs 1625 i STREET, N.W. - $UITE 1004 ! WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
I l l 386 1 the border of Mexico and El Paso. I want you to look at f% (_,) 2 those bodies as evidence of human error. It won't be your 3 error. It will be the human error of the man who pushes 4 the switch. ; 5 And I ask you to consider something that we , 6 don't consider very much, guilt. I ask you consider, and l. I this will never come up, punishment. And if the time ever 8 comes, because I am not going to be around that plant or 9 any other plant, I promise you I will remind you 10 personally of these basic moral considerations. 11 I am a writer, but I don't just believe in 12 c.rds, I believe in actions. So I ask every one of you to , 13 get up from here, walk out and resign. ; 7-Il MR. OKRENT: Unless there is a wish to make ! ~( /
\/ I5 comments and response to what we have just heard, I will 16 ask Mr. J. David McNeill to make his comments. Mr. McNeill 17 is Assistant Attorney General.
18 MR. WILCOX: I am Clifford Wilcox, President of 19 West Feliciana Parish Police, which is the governing body 20 of our parish. River Bend has had a great economy on our 21 parish. It has given our people better than 400 jobs. You 22 might say that doesn't sound very large, but we only have 23 a parish of about 9,000. 28 In the Town of St. Francisville, which is our 25 parish seat, the population has increased about 25 or 30 TAYLOE ASSOCIATES (o) 1625 i STREET, N.W. - $UITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
387 i I percent. Six to seven hundred apartments have been built. I\/,) 2 Right now a condominium is being put up and really has had
'3 a great effect on our economy and we are real glad to have I it.
l
+ 5 MR. OKRENT: I am sorry. I didn't realize that !
6 we had the second speaker.
, i I
Mr. McNeill. 8 MR. HALL: My name is Wendel Hall and I am
- 9 Superintendent of Schools in West Feliciana Parish. I f
10 certainly have no expertise in the field of atomic power. II However, I was asked to make some comments 12 about the social and economic impact upon the parish. 13 There certainly have been a great many positive effects as
11 far as our local economy, the stimulation of business, as
13 l Mr. Wilcox has pointed out.
16 We did not have hear the problems that we 17 anticipated with the large construction project that moved 18 into a very, very small community. Due to the increased
- 19 taxation and the increased business we have been able to 20 cope with those fairly well in the past and we expect to 21 be able to copy with them in the future. But it certainly i
22 has been a positive economic force, not only in our M parish, but for this entire region. 23 I cannot address myself to the technical 25 aspects that you gentlemen have been listening to, but we p TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 1625 l STREET, N.W. - SulTE 1004 l WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950 t
- l.
I I 388 7 I certainly have had a very good working relationship so far
'-- 2 with the construction people and with Gulf states 3
Utilities. 4 Thank you very much. 5 MR. OKRENT: Thank you. 6 I will try again. Mr. McNeill. I MR. McNEILL: May it please the committee, I am 8 David McNeill and I am an Assistant Attorney General for 9 the State of Louisiana. 10 I would like to make three observations about 11 the proceedings yesterday and today, and I hope that it 12 would serve some purpose in the future. 13 The first is, it is my understanding that on i (}
%./
14 May 25th the final SER, the safety evaluation report, was 15 released. I have not yet gotten a copy and, as far as I 16 know, only the applicant, the staff and the committee bare 17 present have copies of this document. Therefore, it puts 18 me at a disadvantage in trying to evaluate the proceedings 19 here. 20 The second point is that yesterday a tour was 21 made of he River Bend facility by the staff, applicant and 22 the committee to which the members of the general public j 51 and myself as representative of the public were not 28 invited and neither were the intervenors in the licensing 23 proceeding. o
/ i TAYLOE ASSOCIATES
! E/ ions a STREET, N.W. - $UITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 ! (202) 293 3950 l l
389 1 I don't think Gulf States would have had any N- 2 objection had we been invited, but I don't know that 3
-anyone asked that question. I think that we should have 4
been invited because I know myself I would have gotten a 5 lot more out of hearing your questions to the applicant 6 and the staff's questions to the applicant and the I responses and comments. I think this would have been very 8 useful. 9 Another thing is at this public meeting 10 yesterday I was very disappointed in the physical 11 arrangements. These were corrected this morning by raising 12 that speaker and by fixing the amplifier over here, but in 13 the back of the room yesterday you could not hear a word
/ II of the proceedings. It was kind of frustrating because I N.)) 13 gathered that a lot of very useful information was passing 16 back and forth, but I couldn't participate in it.
17 I look forward to getting a copy of the report 18 of these proceedings, and I would ask that this committee 19 hold another such proceeding in the Baton Rouge area 20 either at St. Francisville or at Baton Rouge in the future I 21 at some appropriate time after the public has had a chance 22 to evaluate the final safety evaluation report and come up 23 with the proper questions to ask. 21 And I also ask that I and the other 3 participants in the licensing proceeding be allowed to r fT TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 1625 l STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
.r- , . - . . _ _ . . . .- _ , _ . . _ - .-.y y. _, - __
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{ i 390 1 make a tour with the committee of the River Bend facility 2 so that we can look it over and ask whatever questions 3 might be appropriate. 1 As far as a meeting place for such a future 3 meeting, I would be happy to try to assist you in finding 6 a place. We have plenty of public facilities both here and
~
7 I would imagine in the St. Francisville area where 8 something like this could be held that would accommodate 9 such a large meeting and have the appropriate public 10 address facilities and what-not. 11 Thank you very much. 12 MR. OKRENT: Before you leave, let me ask the 13 staff are there some guidelines on availabilities of 11 SER's that either you or the applicant are supposed to
']
x.) 13 follow? I thought the State would receive something like 16 this automatically. 17 MR. McN3ILL: Sir, I will probably have a copy 18 of it when I get back to my office. I understand that one 19 of the other people who are on the service list of the 20 River Bend proceedings received her copy yesterday evening 21 after she left here. But that doesn't do you much good in 22 trying to prepare to come here and participate. 23 MR. NOVAK: A copy of the safety evaluation is 28 available in the local Public Document Room which is 23 located in the Louisiana State University Library h A TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 1625 I $TREET, N.W. - $UITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293-3950
391 1 Government Documents Department. [ v} 2 MR. McNEILL: Well, I am sure that I will get a 3 copy within the next few days, but even if you had one on 4 May the 27th, that only gives you a few days to prepare 5 and it is a document about this think with a lot of 6 technical information to be digested. 7 So I would suggest that we be given a little 8 time to digest that document and that another such meeting
- be conducted as I previously requested.
10 MR. OKRENT: I think Mr. McNeill has raised a 11 question that the staff should think about and how this 12 relates to your making available some unbound copies as 13 you might possibly do to alleviate this kind of a it situation. The binding takes a few days. For example, I3 typically I might receive first an unbound copy and then a 16 bound copy. I carry the bound copy because it is printed 17 on both sides and it is much lighter. Certainly I myself 18 wouldn't like to have to run to the document room to 19 review material. 20 With regard to the ACRS tour, a tour is for 21 the purpose of the members and the consultants of the 22 subcommittee seeing the plant, and the questions that are 23 asked are questions of fact, but not the kind of questions 28 that we have here today. For example, you might be walking 25 around and saying well, is this a pump for the RHR system f] As TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
y l-I- 392 I or what is that pipe do, or so forth. It gives you an
't :
'w_/ 2 orientation that you might not get from looking at a 3
drawing, and also it gives you a subjective opinion of the 8 state of construction of the plant and so forth. 3 But it is not a meeting while we are walking, 6 and that is in fact because of the provisions of the
~
Federal Advisory Committee Act that the actual meeting be 8 held with a transcript or an equivalent and in public. 9 MR. OKRENT: I agree with you, sir, about those 10 subjective feelings you acquire, and that is exactly why I 11 would like to tour the plant with you. I got quite the 12 same feelings when I toured the Waterford III plant down 13 in Taft, Louisiana. You get a lot out of going to the 18 plant, particularly when you have knowledgeable people (~S)
\' 15 such as the contractors, the applicant's staff and the NRC 16 staff, and in the case of the Waterford tour I made, one II of the NRC Commissioners.
la This was very useful and it was helpful in 19 trying to orient your thinking. These are mammoth 20 projects and a large amount of public money is being 21 spent. We the ratepayers aro going to have to pay for i 22 this. Mr. Madden pointed out some of the problems that we 21 may envision in the future. I think the public has a right 25 to know and to see these things. ! 25 Now I agree that a lot of this is very
.O
, TAYLOE ASSOCIATES C/ 1625 i STREET, H.W. - $UITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
393 1
,_ technical. If the representatives of the public can't l i k/ 2 comprehend it, that is another matter entirely. That is
{ 3 something if I go I will have to take my chances on that.
'I 4
.But I do feel that the public has a right to access to S r that information and we have a right to the opportunity to l 6
find out these facts because you always hear that 7 arguments are based on fear and not facts. I would like to 8 get the facts. I don't like to argue from conjecture. I 9 like to argue from facts, but I would like to have those 10 facts available. 11 MR. OKRENT: All right. Well, I should note i 12 again that the ACRS members and their consultants and the 13 staff request that th'ey be able to take a tour. On one 11 previous occasion I can recall at a different site a ' 13 member of the public who was intervening in that 16 particular action asked if she and a expert who consulted 17 with her could attend with us. la What we said then was that it didn't seem that 19 it would modify the size of the group so much that it 20 would change the nature of what we could see. We had no 21 opinion on the subject and it was up to the plant owner 22 because we were touring their facility. t 23 Well, I am sure that Gulf States MR. McNEILL: 21 would not have any objection. There are only four 25 intervenors in this proceeding. (O j TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 I WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
v i I 394 I MR. OKRENT: The one thing I am not promising,
.")
( (_,/ 2 however, is another tour because we have seen the plant 3 now. And at the moment I am not promising that we will 4 hold another meeting in this area, we will have to see, or 5 necessarily if we hold another subcommittee meeting, that 6 it will be in the near future. There might be another one I at some later time. 8 Let me just make one other comment. I am 9 equally disappointed with the way things were yesterday, 10 and in particular at this end the temperature and we 11 couldn't get up and escape. We are very sorry that it was 12 difficult to hear at the back and we are pleased that it 13 is working better today. f's 14 If someone has passed the word very early in 15 the morning that you just couldn't hear, you know, we 16 would have recessed for 10 or 15 minutes while Mr. 17 Quittschriber tried to work something out at least on the c l la hearing. I think the temperature was beyond control 19 yesterday and he had to do something overnight for that. 20 Anyway, thank you for your comments. 21 MR. McNEILL: Thank you. 22 MR. OKRENT: Any other comments? I 23 (No response.) 26 MR. OKRENT: Then I guess we will go back to 25 some items that we missed yesterday, the applicant's i l C) (< TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950 I
k 395 I consideration of PRA's and system interaction studies. [ T
' 2 \~/ MR. REED: If you will give us a moment for our 3
eyes to refocus now that the bright lights are off, we 4 will then proceed. i 5 You have asked that we pick up with the 6 probabilistic risk assessment. Jim Glazer, Director of 7 Nuclear Plant Engineering will now give that presentation. 8 MR. GLAZER: Good afternoon. 9 (Slide.) 10 I would like to begin the discussion this 11 afternoon by saying that our philosophy within GSU within 12 the management of the River Bend project is that we have a 13 positive attitude towards probabilistic risk assessment II f-'s and systems interaction analysis and we feel that PRA and
,)
15 systems interaction analysis have potential benefits and 16 usefulness as an engineering tool. 17 We feel that it can be utilized to evaluate 18 future design modifications to determine the effect of 19 those proposed modifications on the vulnerability of River 20 Bend to severe accidents. 21 The probabilistic risk assessment and systems 22 interaction analysis also have potential benefits to us to 21 aid in our decision-making process in the future in the 28 areas of increasing reliability and availability and 3 assessing additional maintenance and training needs for . (] (/ TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 1625 i STREET, N.W. - $UITE 1004 WA$HINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
I I 1, 396 I 7x systems and components which have the most impact on plant
)
\ '/ 2 safety.
3 During the design process on River Bend the 8 engineers had utilized systems interaction techniques. As 5 one example, the River Bend failure modes and effects ! 6 analysis performed on safety related instrument and
~
controls and electrical power and distribution systems 8 utilized system interaction techniques. 9 I would like to qualify that by saying that 10 although the failure modes and effects analysis analyzes i 11 components within a system, in other words, an intrasystem 12 versus an intersystem, the techniques basically are the 13 same. ( l
/
)
'8_J Il System fault trees are constructed for each '
15 system and the fault trees and the system functional 16 success criteria were analyzed for compliance with single 17 failure criteria. la When single failures were identified which ' 19 caused loss of a system safety function, the design was 20 evaluated to determine the availability of a compensating 21 safety feature. If no compensating safety feature was 22 available, a review of the design was accomplished and the M necessary modifications were initiated to the system as 28 necessary to provide an alternate success path. I 5 In performing the design therefore in i f% t
*t TAYLOE ASSOCIATES V 1625 i stater, N.w. - suite 10o4 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
397 1 conformance with the applicable codes and regulations, we II
.U 2 have utilized other system interaction techniques and I 3
think we have demonstrated yesterday in some of the
'4 discussions, particularly the discussion for the 5
instrumentation used to follow a severe accident, that we 6 have used the techniques of event trees, et cetera, and 7 the fact that we have done other evaluations of common 8 mode failure, these actions give us confidence that we 9 have minimized River Bend's vulnerability to severe 10 accidents. 11 As part of GUS's licensing application, work 12 has been performed on a mini-probabilistic risk assessment 13 for the River Bend plant. This mini-PRA was built on the p, l' RSSMAP study, that is the reactor safety study methodology t) ,3 program, for a BWR-6 and in particular Grand Gulf. I 16
, The study was prepared by Sandia National Labs 17 for the NRC. The accident sequences used in the River Bend 18 mini-PRA were taken from the RSSMAP Grand Gulf study. The 19 River Bend mini-PRA also utilized RSSMAP fault trees and 20 component failure probability data.
21 The probabilities of core melt and containment 22 failure are combined to determine the probability of 23
. release, and these probabilities were adjusted to take 25 into account the design differences between River Bend and 23 Grand Gulf and were the major differences that you heard TAYLOE ASSOCIATES Q(/ 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTO.0 D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950 L
1TT
'l 398 I yesterday. This was done by performing a qualitative
's,/
2 evaluation to assess the impact of those design 3 differences on the RSSMAP Grand Gulf data. 8 A review of the failure cutsets for the 5 systems involving the design differences was made and it 6 was determined that the impact on the final probability
~
was negligible. As a result it was concluded that it was 8 acceptable to utilize the source term and failure 9 probability data from the Grand Gulf RSSMAP. 10 In performing the risk analysis as part of the 11 mini-PRA, we utilized site specific data to perform the 12 consequence analysis. This data includes site specific 13 meteorology, topography, population data, site economy and (~s. Il emergency planning data, et cetera. 13 This analysis was utilized completing the CRAC 16 II code which was developed by Sandia Labs. Using CRAC II 17 risk curves were developed and using the RSSMAP source 18 terms, the risk curves for River Bend compared favorably 19 to that of the BWR for the reactor safety study, WASH 20 1400. 21 The River Bend mini-probabilistic risk 22 assessment also used the recent source term work being al done by Battelle Memorial Institute under contract to the 28 NRC and we did this in order to demonstrate the potential 25 for risk reduction if these more recent realistic source
T (d
TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 162s i STREET, N.W. - $UITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
399
,-s I term studies are adopted. \- / 2 GSU is currently involved in a Phase II 3
program for the mini-PRA program. The work is intended to 8 further develop the PRA and make it more River Bend 5 specific. We will look at the event trees and the 6 functional success criteria and Carefully review them to 7 assure that we have used the most realistic data for the 8 plant. 9 The event trees will be expanded to include 10 such things as ATWS sequences, manual and automatic 11 initiation of alternate shutdown systems will be 12 considered, River Bend fault trees will be made plant 13 specific, terms will be included to represent power Il ("Ni conversion and diesel generator recovery, and loss of
\/ l 15 off-site power recovery frequencies will be upgraded to 16 take into account the operating history of a River Bend 17 grid which was talked about yesterday.
18 In conclusion, I would like to say that our 19 ' philosophy again at GSU is that PRA and systems 20 interaction analysis can be a viable engineering tool and 21 some of the techniques have been utilized in the design of 22 the plant. Il We have performed a mini-PRA based on the 21 Grand Gulf RSSMAP data, and we are currently refining that
%i PRA to make it more River Bend specific. We have exposed (l TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 1625 i STREET, N.W. - $UITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
y_ _. .I l. 400 l GSU personel to PRA training and some personnel have been
.( )
(m/ 2 acquired within the organization that have previous 3 experience in other employment. I Therefore, we plan to continue to try to 5 develop the tool and our capabilities in evaluating both 6 of those to determine the best way to utilize them to 7 minimize the vulnerability of River Bend to severe 8 accidents. 9 MR. EBERSOLE: Mr. Glazer, I noticed that most to of your presentation pertained to evaluating in a relative II way River Bend versus Grand Gulf. I would like to comment 12 on the more nearly absolute scale on which to work. 13 Last week I was at a meeting of the group that () 18 is doing the work on KV-45, which is the problem of decay
'^
13 heat removal and whether or not we would use dedicated 16 systems or use the somewhat scattered and randomly 17 organized systems which we use today. And against that 18 background I can a few things. 19 I believe you can group the damaging accident 20 potential in the plant into about three groups. We have 21 the failure to control reactivity, the ATWS problem, as a 22 set if you wish to look at it this way, there is the LOCA 23 problem mostly in the large LOCA context as the second 21 subset, and then there is the large set which is failure 23 of the shutdown heat removal process granting that you p)
\._./
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401 1 don't have the other two accidents. 2 At this meeting there was a discussion of the 3 relative risks of PWR's and BWR's, and on sort of an I absolute scale it was stated that approximately I think 5 something like 75 to 80 percent of the risk of having a 6 molten core rested in the thesis that you would lose the 7 shutdown heat removal function from the core or from the 8 containment or both. 9 The focus of that was largely on the thesis 10 that the BWR, unlike the PWR, that you would fail to get 11 the heat out of the containment and the effect of that 12 would be regressive and cause a core melt because of loss 13 of the containment function.
- O II So this accentuates the notion, and it was b 13 stated in the meeting that if you could find some 16 simplified way to get the heat out of the suppression pool 17 once having got it there by appropriately cooling the 18 core, you would vastly enhance the reliability of the 19 overall process and greatly reduce this 80 risk factor 20 probably down to a mere negligible level.
21 I move up now to having you consider one means 22 to do that which has been looked at at Limerick, and it is 23 my favorite ax to grind and I will admit it, and that is a 25 careful evaluation of the pre-damage use of containment 25 venting with low-pressure water being used to simply keep f) (/ TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 1625 l STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950 m
v l '\ 402 1 the core cool. 2 If you do that, we can reduce to a great 3 extent our concern about power, about fire, about the 4 remote shutdown centers and about hundreds of things which 5 you now must incorporate in your PRA. In short, you reduce 6 the target area for consideration. I I just offer that as a suggestion. 8 In the ATWS area, however, I am not done. I 9 would have you look at in a perspective way what you have 10 been given by GE, and in particular I would have you look 11 at the point at which the independence of the control rods 12 has been somewhat watered down by the presence of a 13 dump volume and a number of devices which attempt then to Il compensate for it being a common point of vulnerability.
" 13 These are of course the level switches which monitor 16 whether or not that dump volume has been filled and 17 therefore precludes your getting rods into this reactor.
18 That is the AI.iS that of course results from that. 19 I ti. ink I would like to have a competent group 20 such as yourselve:. survey in perspective what you have 21 gotten from the industry and satisfy yoarselves far and 22 above just taking it off the shelf that that is the way 23 you would have done it. 28 As you know, the logic of this is to close 25 this volume before you guarantee that the rods will shut. O TAYLOE ASSOCIATES V 1625 i SMEET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
r 403 1 7 ~) I would like to have you question that general thesis and
+ 1 '/ '- 2 ask why it is done and ask why you believe really that 3
those level switches can't be hammered into a state of 8 inaction by hydraulic shock or whatever and so blind your 3 system to the knowledge that that volume is filled. 6 That is the main essence of my response to our 7 PRA studies is to look back further in perspective than 8 making a comparative against another plant. 9 MR. OKRENT: Can I understand what your plans 10 are with regard to systems interaction analysis. Do you 11 have something definite in mind over the next few years or 12 just what? 13 MR. GLAZER: At this point I don't think I can (]
%J 18 tell you that we have a definite plan for systems 13 interaction analysis other than some of the things that we 16 have done, although we haven't done a major systems 17 interaction analysis type evaluation.
la We have more geared it towards trying to use 19 the PRA that we did for the environmental report and 29 upgrade that PRA and trying to basically use that in the 21 future, like I said, as a tool within the engineering 22 organization to review future modifications or needs to U modify the plant and assessing modifications, one against 28 the other, which has a more significant impact on plant 23 safety and trying to fix those things relatively speaking.
} TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 162$ I STRitT, N.W. - SUlft 1004 WA$NINGTON, D.C. 20004 (202) 293 3930
l i 404 l MR. OKRENT:
,_ Let's see, in the PRA area were
_,/ 2 you planning to bring in what some people call external 3 events? I MR. GLAZER: We have not considered external 3 events. We felt that River Bend basically designed like 6 all other plants taking into account Appendix R and I missile protection, et cetera, et cetera, that that is a 8 very low probability in that looking at where we are in 9 the region as far as low seismicity, et cetera, that that 10 was not considered in the PRA that we have done. 11 MR. OKRENT: Well, it might be worth reflecting 12 on it further when one thinks of the curves we saw 13 presented by the staff with regard to the seismicity part,
~s- Il as well as the margins you may or may not have, for \ 13 example, between buildings, et cetera.
16 And since your design of the cabling again is 17 different, it might be worth a look. At the moment the 18 only thing I can think of that might be a common source of 19 cabling fires is the earthquake itself, which a large 20 earthquake is not too probable. So I would probably look 21 for other sources or other combinations I guess for doing 22 that part. 21 Well, let's see, I think we have some kind of 28 a presentation by the staff in the same general area. E' MR. NOVAK: Dr. Okrent had an ACRS meeting on p/ q, TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 1625 i STRitT, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
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405 1 Harris several months ago and the question of PRA and its
/
( )1 2 utilization in the licensing process came up. Specifically 3 you asked that that same question be considered by the 8 staff and that we be prepared to answer it as part of the 5 subcommittee deliberations on River Bend. 6 Following that meeting I distributed the I transcript of the Harris ACRS meeting and specifially the 8 questions that came up related to this subject. I met on 9 several occasions with a number of managers in the Office 10 of Nuclear Reactor Regulation at the Assistant Director 11 level, and I would say that that is probably the 12 appropriate level to get feedback on how insights from the 13 PRA studies, previous PRA studies continue to be used and p 18 focus attention on certain issues on ongoing reviews. IU From this meeting I was able to conclude that 16 the insights occur as a learning process. Most II specifically as we look at PRA's, that information 18 certainly within the technical staff and the specific 19 technical review organizations is known to them and it 20 does influence their review of an ongoing case. 21 Specifically on River Bend, the case of the 22 concern over lagging in the control room, and from what 23 we learned from earlier PRA reviews, it influenced the 28 questions and the positions developed as part of the 25 River Bend application.
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Y I l 406 1
, On a more formal method, the standard review t ' 'v' 2 plans are updated periodically, and I think most of the 3
insights and the things that we learned are included in 8 the standard review plan updates. 3 I think if we were to look at the 1975 vintage 6 standard review plan and compare it to the 1980, there I would be clear examples of where positions in the review 8 process would show that the PRA did have an influence on 9 how we do business today. 10 Basically that is the situation as I 11 understand it based on the discussions that I have had. We 12 certainly make use of similar PRA's, the Limerick PRA that 13 was performed. Going back to the Rasmusen Study, that was 11 discussed earlier this morning, has given us a different V' 15 view of features of boiling water reactors and pressurized 16 water reactors that influence our review process. 17 I don't have anything more specific than that 18 to add to the presentation at this time. 19 One other thing that very recently happened is 20 the Executive Director for Operations as directed that the 21 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, along with the 22 Office of Research develop and implement a program where 21 the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation will quickly, and 21 I will say in terms of two months, review any submitted 23 PRA by an applicant and from that review identify the O TAYLOE ASSOCIATES d 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
ll ' 407 I salient features of that those points that were brought 2 out by that PRA and distribute it to all applicants and to 3 all parties, for example, through Board notification, if 4 r.ecessary,'so that the features and information gained 3 from the PRA would be disseminated. We would not a 6 judgment at that time as to the validity of that piece of 7 work, but rather make a point of distributing it. 8 I think the recent Browns Ferry experience 9 back in February where it culminated with the Executive 10 Director for operations identifying that that activity was 11 previously identified and perhaps had a better exposition 12 of that information been provided it could have been 13 prevented, p ll We had Congressional inquiries and as a direct 15 consequence of that we have taken direct action now to 16 make sure that important features developed on the PRA are 17 quickly disseminated to the public, to the applicants and 18 to the interested parties. 19 I will try to answer any questions you have. 20 MR. OKRENT: Well, I am interested to hear that 21 your attention on lighting questions in the control room 22 is at least in part a result of the learning process. 23 It seems to me that there are a very 28 considerable number of specific scenarios that have arisen 25 out of the now many PRA's, and many of them since 1980, a C)
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408 1 very considerable number of scenarios, some of which may ('" ) , be completely plant specific but some of which may offer 3 generic kinds of questions. It perhaps may not be the same I component at all, but nevertheless the phenomenon carries 5 over or whatever. 6 I do find the staff using the PRA technique I very heavily in its decision-making process on unresolved 8 safety issues. I for one have trouble understanding why ' 9 the staff doesn't have some kind of a systematic effort of to its own complementing what you just described in the I 11 action of Mr. Dircks whereby things that one has learned 12 or he may have known it before but his attention was 13 focused by a PRA, that these things are not in some way Il I
; rather systematically identified and information J 13 concerning them obtained as part of the next review :
16 whether or not it is part of the standard review plan. II One example we have been talking about here 18 was are buildings close together. We know very well at 19 Indian Point 2, which Mr. Cahill happens to have had a 20 connection with, that that issues was quite important, and 21 there may be other things of this sort. 22 l At least it would be worth knowing about at 23
- this time whether or not one took any specific actions 28 during this stage of the review. I think to not to try to ,
25 get this information is just losing an opportunity, in my l t f) L/ TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 16251 STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 i WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
r0 l l 409 gs I opinion. It might be in some cases that when one is aware i ) k/ 2 of the thing there may be rather simple changes that could 3 handle it. In fact,it might increase the reliability and I _ prospective licensee might be only to happy in fact to do 5 it. In other cases it may pose difficult questions that at 6 least have been raised and are resolve in some more I general context. 8 But not to do this seems to me is to go back 9 to repeating in effect what happened after WASH 1400 where 10 it took five years or so before the licensing staff 11 seriously addressed a vendee on all reactors. 12 MR. NOVAK: Well, I have one example that I 13 learned since yesterday and I will share it. {}
-v l' I think in listening to the variations in the 15 containment design, the difference in the weir wall and 16 the method of cooling, suggested to me that the use of the II PRA tool to compare kind of the conventional MARK III 18 system to this proposed system would be worthwhile to see 19 if there were any additional requirements on AC outside 20 power versus something else. I did discuss it with Mr.
r 21 Cahill and said that we would be asking him to review 22 . that. 21 I think here, in my view, is an excellent
'21 example of where one could sort of get a feeling for the 23 differences in one design versus another, whether there l
l l b / TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 1625 i STREET, N.W. - $UlTE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
410 I were any specific benefits or whether there was something 2 specifically to look for in terms of necessary things that j 3 have to happen to make the system work properly. 4 So we will be pursuing that in the next month 5 I would expect and would be able to speak to it in the 6 full committee. 7 MR. OKRENT: I for one am interested in knowing 8 whether the differences in containment design 9 configurations among the various MARK III's is significant to in any way or not, leaving aside for the moment the 11 difference between spray and fan cooler, which is an issue 12 that was identified. la well, let me encourage the staff to do in 11 effect what it seems they are now going to be asking the V-15 licensees to do. You are going to tell the licensees this 16 seems to have been learned from PRAs that reflect on it. 17 It seems to me we have been sitting here for 18 about two hours, and I get a little confused because I 19 haven't changed my watch, but maybe it is as good a time 20 as any to take a 10-minute break. 21-When we reconvene we will probably start off 22 with any answers that you may want to give to some of the 23 questions of yesterday, and then we will go on with the 25 agenda and Mr. Ebersole will begin chairing the meeting. 25 (Recess.) l' O
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{
!~
l 411
,, s 1 MR. EBERSOLE: I want to at this time tell you i ) \' 2 our plan for continuing and finishing the meeting here.
- 1 3 We have just the following topics. We first
^
4 want to take up the response to yesterday's questions 3 - which we believe you now have. Following that se will take 6 up the item under B sub (f) which is the ATWE mitigation
~
features, and then beyond that to finish the agenda we 8 will pick up H, I and K in that order. 9 " So to get the meeting started now I would 10 like to have the applicant come forth with the responses 11 to sev' era'l questions we had yesterday. 12 MR. REED: Fine. At this time I would like to
~
13 introduce Joe Quirk with General Electric Company who will resp'ond to several questions that you had yesterday.
/)
A/ Il 15 Not to recap all of them, but one had to do with the internal 16 pressure of the fuel and the other had to do with the 1 r 17 bypass on the L9CI mode, and,I believe possibly one other, la but we will let him su'mmarize that. J. '
.,"y 19 MR .' ' QUIRK : My name is Joe Quirk from General 20 Electric Company. $
21 Yes, I would like to respond to the three 22 areas, being the first area, internal pressure of the fuel
'r M Icods and the second being the RHR. Now there were two r> 21 fquestions related to RHR, one being the normal alignment, i
25 was it through the RHR heat exchanger or the bypass. We ( )
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412 I are going to clarify that. The second question related to l ) V 2 RHR regarded how long in a post-LOCA mode it would 3 operate, and that part of the question will be handled by I Gulf States Utilities by Larry Schell. Then the third area 5 that we are going to clarify for you is the HPCS diesel 6 generator reliability. 7 The first area is the internal pressure of the 8 fuel rods. What that is is there are some conditions where 9 the internal fuel rod pressure exceeds the nominal system to operating pressure. II The staff question is are the fuel thermal 12 performance characteristics acceptable for that condition? 13 The concern related to this issue is that the p Il tensile stresses in the clad could cause clad creep which V' I5 could increase the gap which could increase the thermal 16 resonse and increase the calculated temperature. That is II the concern. 18' The GE resolution is based on test data and 19 based on analysis. We conclude that the clad creep rate 20 will not exceed the fuel swell rate 'and thus the degraded 2I thermal performance will not occur. 22 We have made a submitted to the NRC and they 23 are currently reviewing that submittal, and we expect the 28 staff will complete their review of this submittal later 25 this month and we also expect that this issue will be O) b' TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 18251 $fREf7 N.W, . $UlTI 1004 WASHING NN, D.C. 20004 (202) 293 3950
v i I 413 I resolved. N-) 2 The second area of clarification is the RHR 3 and, as I said, the concern that we are going to address , 8 now is what is the normal alignment mode of the RHR. 3 The answer is it is aligned so that it will 6 pump both through the heat exchanger and through the 7 bypass. The heat' exchanger is not valved out. The valve to 8 the heat exchanger is open. The bypass valve around the 9 heat exchanger is also open. 10 So there will be a flow split and some will go 11 treough the heat exchanger and some will go through the 12 bypass and go to the core. I' MR. EBERSOLE: Joe, was that because it was e Il less expensive to put a bypass in the valve and the g '3 V 13 necessary pipe around the heat exchanger than to make a . 16 bigger exchange? 17 No, Mr. Ebersole, it wasn't. It is MR. QUIRK: 18 to give the proper priority to injection into the vessel. 19 In this way you may have the RHR heat exchanger valve for [ 20 maintenance or for some inspection or whatever, and you ! 21 still have an LPCI injection directly into the vessel. I 22 MR. EBERSOLE: It is to bypass the heat l 23 exchanger for repairs. 21 MR. QUIRK: That is one option, but under no 25 condition do you fail to give alignment diretly to the
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414 I vessel, under no condition. s- 2 MR. EBERSOLE: Is there a tech spec on that 3 condition that you can continue operation? I I believe there is, but I don't MR. QUIRK: 0 recall what that is. Let me say if you are talking about 6 requiring to cool that there is ample time given a 7 postulated LOCA and LPCI injection, there is ample time to 8 get the RHR heat exchanger lined up if it is out for 9 maintenance and valved back in. 10 MR. EBERSOLE: If I recall that little 11 schematic, that little lined diagram, it didn't show a 12 valve that isolated the exchanger , but you say there are 13 such valves. (~T II MR. QUIRK: There is a valve there, yes. 13 MR. EBERSOLE: Thank you. 16 MR. QUIRK: The other part of this question on 17 post-LOCA environment will be handled by Gulf States 18 Utilities. 19 Then the last area that I will hope to clarify 20 if HPCS diesel generator reliability and the operating 21 history data. 22 If you go back to the mid-70's, the NRC 23 required a prototype qualification test be conducted on 2I the HPCS diesel generators. This testing has been 25 performed on LaSalle, which is a BRW-5, and on Grand Gulf, O Aj + TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950 I
.n , _._ . . - - _ . - . - - , , - -- . . . - _,, , . _ _ . . , , , , . . . . _,,-_---.r-,-
T I 415 i I which is a BWR-6. Each test requires 69 starts, and in '
/ \
s' 2 both series of tests there were no failures. ! 3 So there were 138 demands under test mode and 8 zero failures for these two different diesel generators of 5 the same manufactured type. 6 MR. EBERSOLE: Let me ask you another thing on 7 the independence of that diesel generator. My current 8 understanding is in fact that diesel generator is 9 dependent on one of the other diesel generators. Am I 10 correct? 11 MR. QUIRK: No, sir. The HPCS diesel generator ,. 12 is independent from the other two diesel generators. 13 MR. EBERSOLE: Where does it get its cooling ll water? O)
\.
15 MR. QUIRK: It is powered from a cooling water 16 source, from the division three diesel generator. 17 MR. EBERSOLE: That is one of the other la diesels. i 19 MR. QUIRK: No, that is the same diesel. 20 MR. EBERSOLE: So it has its own auxiliary 21 cooling water supply powered by its own output? 22 MR. QUIRK: Powered by the division three 23 diesel, yes, sir. 21 MR. EBERSOLE: And it has the environmental 25 controls powered by its own output? n
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416 I
, MR. QUIRK: Yes. It is safety grade and 2 qualified as such.
3 MR. EBERSOLE: So you are telling me that the i 3 division three generator and its cooling pump and in all 3 aspects that it needs no support from any other electrical 6 power supply. 7 MR. BOOKER: Let me interrupt here. That design 8 is a stone and Webster design rather than a GE design, and 9 let's let Bill Culp respond to that. 10 MR. CULP: The cooling water for the diesel ! 11 generator, the division three diesel generator is derived 12 from either division one or division two service water 13 pumps, and those are powered from division one and two and Il ' not division three. b 15 MR. EBERSOLE: Well, here I have a disconnect. 16 Mr. Quirk say that that is not so. 17 MR. CULP: The scope of the cooling water la supply is within our scope and the cooling water supply 19 does come from either the division one or two. 20 MR. EBERSOLE: Well, why wasn't it that the 21 division three diesel generator simply equipped with a - 22 radiator or a fan or its own auxiliary inputs rather than 23 be allowed to be dependent upon the other two generators? I 21 MR. CULP: When individual failures are 25 considered, we will meet all criteria. (] (j . TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 1675 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006
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- l l
417 I s MR. EBERSOLE: I understand, 2 m, Well, Joe, they tell me that it gets it water 3 from --- I MR. QUIRK: I stand corrected, Mr. Ebersole. 5 MR. EBERSOLE: Carry on. 6 MR. QUIRK: That covers the three areas. I MR. REED: There were additional questions 8 asked yesterday that we would like to respond to at this 9 time also. 10 The first question was the uncertainty in the II ultimate containment analysis, and Mr. Mahindra Sha from 12 Stone and Webster will provide that response. 13 MR. SHA: There was a question regarding the (} 18 ultimate capacity, the predicted ultimate capacity for C/ 15 internal pressure and external pressure. The question was 16 what is the uncertainty and whether it will be lower than l 17 we had predicted. la We have reviewed that question again, and the 19 factors which would influence this capacity would be, one, 20 the approximations in modeling, secondly, the reaction 21 tolerances, third, the strength of properties or if there 22 is any flaw in the material and, fourth will be the 21 welding processes and how that will affect the strength of 2I the material. 25 The modeling approximations, the effect of [) V TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 1625 t STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 l l WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293-3950 l l r
418 I that will be very insignificant because it is a very
,_s 2
simple shell model. Therefore, we don't consider that will 3 decrease and reduce the capacity or that there is any I uncertainty in estimated predictions we have. 5 MR. EBERSOLE: Pardon me. I understand the 6 simplicity of that model is considerably obscured by the 7 presence of lots of penetrations which act as stress 8 loads --- 9 MR. SHA: Okay. The area where the problem is 10 governing the failure that is occurring is in the torus Il area which is not influenced by these penetrations. So 12 penetrations are separately evaluated and the capacities 13 are at least equal to what the containment has or very ( II close to it.
\~]/ '5i Reaction tolerances are considered in our ,
16 prediction of the buckling capacities which are included 17
' in the ASME code case and also the paper which we use as 18 basis. The reaction tolerance will be the out of roundness 19 tolerance which you might find in the actual construction.
20 That is considered. 21 As far as material properties, what we use is i 22 the minimum strength of material which is specified by U ASME. The actual strength usually is higher than what we 21 use. So we don't expect that that will reduce the capacity , 25 of 'he t containment. l p/ ( TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 16251 STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 i (202) 293-3950
m i I 419 l As far as material flaws, that is the only I (. 2 area we haven't taken a look at, but which we will take a 3 detailed at it and see if that will affect it. 8 The welding processes are all well controlled, 5 and also the containment full penetrations welds are all 6 radiographed a hundred percent. So we expect welds to be 7 even stronger than the containment itself. 8 I think these are the basic factors. These ara 9 the reasons we feel that what we have is the lower bound to values of the capacities. In fact, if we analyze for 11 post-buckling capacity and also considering the 12 redistribution of stress, we will get even higher 13 capacities than what we have. 18 ('~') So if we find in the future that the pressures
%.) 13 are close to that or even 60 or 70 percent, then we can go 16 back and review that whole thing and determine the II capacities more accurately, but we think this is the lower 18 bound.
19 MR. EBERSOLE: What was the numerical value for 20 this one? 21 MR. SHA: It is 56 psi for the internal 22 pressure and for external pressure it is 4.8 psi. M MR. EBERSOLE: That is the extrenal pressure on 25 the containment wall? 23 MR. SHA: Right. O V TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
420 I
,, y MR. EBERSOLE: I see. Thank you.
t : 2 MR. REED: The next item we would like to 3 address at this time is there was a discussion on the 8 design with regard to water and steam hammer, and Mr. 5 Robert McMoreland with Stone and Webster will respond to 6 that. I MR. EBERSOLE: While he is coming up, I will 8 just say that we had heard I know on several occasions of 9 the problems in the transition mode fron the condensing to 10 the full solid water flow and vice versa. 11 MR. McMORELAND: Relative to RHR and steam 12 condensing? . 13 MR. EBERSOLE: Yes. Il MR. McMORELAND: The general question was 15 relative to what we had analyzed for water hammer. Both of 16 those types of fluid transient events and systems analyzed 17 are listed in Section 3-9 of the FSAR, and that listing of 18 systems and events is based on NUREG 0582 requirements. 19 The results of the water hamner analysis are 20 then evaluated i.n accordance with the ASME 3 Code for the 21 appropriate service level limits. 22 With respect to RHR steam condensing water 21 hammer loads, those are evaluated to service level B 28 requirements. The stuck open control valve, the steam 25 inlet stuck open control. valve was evaluated to service TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 16251 STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3930
l 421 I level C limits. I k-,D / 2 MR. EBERSOLE: So these individual sources of 3 water hammer have been looked at? I MR. McMORELAND: Yes. 5 MR. EBERSOLE: I recall there was some question 6 for a long time about the impact of water suddenly going 7 into the core spray sprager ring when in the survey it 8 must have been initially discharged, and yet it was hit 9 with full flow from this big pump you have got. What is to the current status of that? Is there any concern about 11 knocking it down? 12 MR. McMORELAND: I would have to defer the 13 analysis on the sparger itself to GE. This is not done by , fx il Stone and Webster. IS MR. EBERSOLE: Does GE have any comment about 16 the viability of the sparger ring in respect to water 17 hammer? ! 18 MR. REED: -We will see if we can't pick it up i 19 shortly. 20 MR. EBERSOLE: All right. We will pick it up 21 later. 22 MR. McMORELAND: The other question I would 23 like to address is there was a concern about feedwater 28 bypass with respect to a post-turbine trip in the load 3 flow control environment. C' ( TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 16251 STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
i i 422 , I s The feedwater system has three 33.3 percent
? \ ~ 2 capacity pump. Each of those pumps has its own dedicated ,
3 flow bypass line which actuates automatically when you get I down to 30 percent of that individual pump's flow , 3 capability. 6 The design also has 20-inch feedwater bypass I from the feedwater header back to the condenser. That line ' 8 is in there primarily as a startup line to allow us to 9 flush out the feedwater system upstream feedwater heaters 10 prior to initiating flow into the reactor vessel. II Also in the River Bend design there is a 12 startup flow control mode. It is an automatic mode. It is 13 a low flow mode that could be utilized in that event. It
/~h II is designed primarily for the initial stages of startup
(_), l 13 when you have low feedwater flow, but it could be used in ! 16 a post-turbine trip. 17 The operator can select that mode manually 18 l from the control room and he will get an automatic control 19 feedwater flow in the range of about 9500 gpm. As a final i 20 step he would have to go into then a manual control mode 21 from the control room. 22 MR. EBERSOLE: Well, excluding your turbine 23 trip then in respect to the main feedwater loss, there is 28 no automatic shutdown to a proporational flow condition to 5 low level eightt the shutdown power lev'el; is this r\ (j N TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
w
'l .I 423 l correct? It is a manual function?
I \ x,/ 2 MR. McMORELAND: The shutdown feedwater flow? 3 MR. EBERSOLE: Yes. I I MR. McMORELAND: There is a feed pump trip at l 3 level eight which would stop all feed flow on high reactor l 6 Water level. , I MR. EBERSOLE: And then what happens? Does that f I 8 invariable fall on the RCIC? ! 9 MR. McMORELAND: It would depend I think on the I 10 circumstances. Il MR. EBERSOLE: What I am trying to find out, 12 you know, is whether it challenges the RCIC pumps. : 13 MR. McMORELAND: You would challenge it. That ; l l l .N ll is in the high water level. It is a high water level trip ! > l 1 t: Q t 15 of the feed pump. It is the same water level that had the 16 RCIC been running, it would have also stopped injection. 17 MR. EBERSOLE: Yes, I undertand that, but let la me rephrase the question. If I have a turbine trip, do I 19 expect to maintain water in the boiler without calling on 20 the RCIC? ; 21 MR. McMORELAND: Yes, if at all possible. 22 MR. EBERSOLE: And is that done by automatic or
- 3'l manual means?
21 MR. McMORELAND: It is done essence by a i l l 25 combination of both, by the operator selecting --- I ! (N TAYLOE ASSOCIATES , l () 16251 STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950 1
i 424 l
,s 1
MR. EBERSOLE: What is the automatic portion of i
! I \~s/ 2 it?
3 MR. McMORELAND: Well, the operator would have : 4 to select that low feed flow control mode from the control 5 room. That is the manual action. He has to select that 6 mode. Once he selects that mode, that mode will control 7 automatically that low feed flow. 8 MR. EBERSOLE: Okay. So he then enters that 9 mode manually. P 10 MR. FREEHILL: Excuse me. There is an automatic 11 level setdown in the event of a scram. It automatically 12 sets th'e level controller down to a low value to 13 automatically run back the feed reg. valves after the , r~ 11 scram. Then the operator takes the action and shuts down l N )3 15 i the main flow valve switches to the start valve. So the 16 automatic setdown gives him some added time to shift from II the large valve to the small valve. I 18 MR. EBERSOLE: It is a semi-automatic function 19 ' I guess or a mixed automatic and manual function. 20 MR. FREEHILL: That is correct? 21 MR. EBERSOLE: Does it have to be done in a 22 hurried manner or not? 23 MR. FREEHILL: Within a minute or two. Now in 25 the event he is not fast enough, you go to level eight and 5 the feed pump does trip. We have two motor driven pumps (3 g\/) TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
T I
.l.
425 s I that are relatively easy to restart. Of course, if you are 7 t 6
-/ 2 at level eight, then you aren't too concerned at that 3 moment, and then you still have your bypass valves on the i turbine and then you blow down there and restart the pump 5
on the startup valve. 6 MR. EBERSOLE: I think I can report back what 7 happens now. Thank you very much. 8 MR. REED: Another question that was asked 9 yesterday, or excuse me, I think this one was today, was 10 the number of cables involved in the fire test. 11 MR. EBERSOLE: Yes. 12 MR. REED: We will have Mr. Bill Raughley from 13 Stone and Webster, he was the one responding at that time,
/N ll address that.
i 15 MR. RAUGHLEY: With regard to the testing of 16 the sealant, that is required to pass a three-hour test 17 without the cables on the other side of the sealant la ignited. 19 With regard to the quantity of cables, we have 20 selected the worst case configurations for the plant, 21 considering tray filled material, and all those 22 configurations will be assembled on one slab and it is a 23 single test. 28 MR. EBERSOLE: You are making a discrete test 25 of the worst model you have got there? [' TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 16251 STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 i (202) 293 3950
l 426 ; l
,_ MR. RAUGHLEY: Yes, and we will also be using i >
\s / 2 the River Bend specific cables.
3 MR. EBERSOLE: Well, we couldn't ask for more I than that. That is fine. Thank you. 5 MR. REED: The next item I have was the 6 question about the RCIC reliability and Tom Szabo from I Stone and Webster will respond to that. 8 MR. SZABO: The question, as I understood it, 9 was on the two isolation valves on the steamline to the 10 turbine. The valves are specified to close at a 11 differential pressure of 1337 psi. They are shop tested at 12 one cycle to ensure that they open against that maximum 13 ' differential pressure. II _(~N MR. EBERSOLE: They close against a pressure i !
\_/ ' I3 l differential you say? ,
16 MR. SZABO: They are specified to close and II open at a maximum differntial pressure of 1337 psi. , 18 MR. EBERSOLE: I guess I have difficulty 19 understanding the requirement that it close against a 20 pressure unless it is ceded closed. When it begins to 21 close and it is normally open , what it closes against is a 22 dynamic load --- r 23 MR. SZABO: That is right.
-28 MR. EBERSOLE: ---
which has to be expressed in 25 some numerical way other than differential. Do you follow A TAYLOE ASSOCIATES i -(j 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 l WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
, - , .- --m, - -ee-- --, , ~ - - , , - , . , - - , , ~ - , . -- .-~,----.----.,n. . - - - - . . -
V
'l I
427 1 me?
'- 2 Yes, I follow you.
MR. SZABO:
- 3 MR. EBERSOLE: Have they been shown to be I capable of closing against a full flow broken pipe 5
-condition?
6 MR. SZABO: No, they have not been currently ' 7 shown to close against that full flow condition. ' 8 MR. EBERSOLE: So they haven't been shown to do 9 that? 10 MR. SZABO: No, they have currently not. , 11 MR. EBERSOLE: Then also as they are installed 12 and tested, isn't it a fact that they are never open and 13 closed against other than normal turbine flow, if that? l /'T 14 MR. SZABO: The valves are normally opened and
- ( }
- s/ 13 l they are normally opened against very little differential 16 pressure since there is a bypass around the inside valve 17 to heat up the line.
18 MR. EBERSOLE: I am going to cut this short and 19 just say I think you have illustratred by point that you 20 really don't know the reliability of those valves as is 21 not know the HPCI valves on other plants and this leads to ! 22 a substantial concern about what happens if that steamline 21 fails if it is standing fully open and you are unable to 21 close it. I would suggest that you analyze that and be 25 able to talk about at sometime when we meet later. It is b
\
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428 1 sort of a mini-PRA. t V 2 (Laughter.) 3 MR. SZABO: I just want to correct something in I the record that came up yesterday on the differential 5 pressure, and this is in the RHR system between the RHR 6 heat exchanger and the service water. I In all modes of operation the RHR system is at 8 a higher pressure than the service water system. So in the 9 event of a leak you are going to leak into the service 10 water system and not the other way. 11 MR. EBERSOLE: Can you give me a nominal number 12 for those pressures? 13 MR. SZABO: Yes. Service water is at nominally II 95 psig and RHR is at around 135 or 140 psig. G- 15 MR. EBERSOLE: I might point out that this is a
~
16 tecnical difference between the typical plants I have seen 17 l to the staff. I think these have nominally been about 400 18 psi. I don't know what that means, but I suggest that you 19 look into it. It may be that if the pipes have been run 20 down in radius to this low pressure level that you have a 21 more fragile system. 22 MR. SZABO: There are various modes of RHR and 23 I am just giving you the minimum prassure that that RHR is 24 going to experience. 23 MR. EBERSOLE: What is the maximum as in a ( ) TAYLOE ASSOCIATES NJ 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
V~- i I 429 l hydro context? p~ ;
\~ 2 MR. SZABO: In a hydro context the design is 3
probably in the neighborhood of 12 or 13 hundred pounds. 4 MR. EBERSOLE: The RHR low pressure side? 5 MR. SZABO: No, excuse me, 500 pounds, five or 6 six hundred pounds. I MR. EBERSOLE: Why don't you tell us sometime 8 what you hydro that system to. 9 MR. SZABO: Okay. 10 MR. REED: General Electric representative Joe 11 Quirk would like to respond to a question about the 12 sparger. 13 MR. EBERSOLE: Yes, sir. These spargers will be r~N li empty when they see the onset of flow from these big
\ l !
x_/ 15 pumps. So one could deduce that they are going to have a 16 hangup. 17 MR. QUIRK: Mr. Ebersole, regarding the HPCS 18 system, you know that the discharge side of the HPCS pump i < 19 has a jockey pump that keeps the line filled with water up 20 to the injection valve. So when the valve opens then it 21 flows into the vessel. 22 . Water hammer is a problem only when the 21 sparger is uncovered with water. When it is covered with 21 water it is a solid system and there is really no 3 potential for water hammer damage. The HPCS is initiated () () TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293-3950 i
430 I at a level two, and at level two the sparger is well I \ > 2 covered. 3 MR. EBERSOLE: What about the large LOCA case? l
~I MR. QUIRK: The large LOCA case I do not have 5
the answer for that, but the rate would drop and I believe 6 the sparger would be uncovered. I don't have the answser I on the water hammer loads on the sparger for that 8 condition right now. I am tracking it and we will get you 9 an answer. 10 MR. EBERSOLE: All right. As you know, it is a 11 long-standing question. Thank you. ! 12 MR. REED: I think that is my list at this 13 time. We would like to proceed then on into the agenda. . A II MR. OKRENT: Next is Item E sub (f) ATWS b I5 mitigation features and you have Mr. England scheduled to 16 talk about that. , II MR. ENGLAND: I am going to speak briefly about : 18 the ATWS mitigation features and GSU's plans in that 19 area from a licensing perspective. - 20 (Slide.) i 21 GSU has been involved in the ATWS owners group 22 since its inception some time ago and we did support the f 23 utility proposed rulemaking for ATWS modifications. 21 At this time we are awaiting the issuance of 25 the final rule and have looked at the drafts and some of (')
%d TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
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.I l
431 1 the proposed changes to the drafts and I anticipate that (_) 2 it will be issued any day now, and that has been true for 3 about the last six months. 4 The two particular areas that I will touch on 5 briefly are the plant modifications or more specifically 6 the features that have been included in the plant at this
~
time and our plans for future modifications. i 8 (Slide.) 9 The features listed on this slide are the 10 features that are currently incorporated in the River Bend 11 design. 12 First is the recirc pump trip on an ATWS 13 signal.
-~ 14 second is the scram discharge volume ;
I l (-) 15 modifications. [ 16 Third, which is a normal feature for this 17 series of reactors is the mainsteam isolation at reactor la aater level one, and also, which has been covered in 19 earlier presentations, are the operator training and 20 simulator experience for reactive control in the ATWS 21 procedures. 22 (Slide.) 23 The potential design changes are basically 25 those changes which are covered in the final rule, dual 3 operation of the standby liquid control system which for O V TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 16251 STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
432 1 our plant will be 86 gallons per minute. fx , ( ) s, 2 In that area we have begun to look at from an 3 engineering perspective the feasibility of operation and I the kinds of modifications that would be necessary to 5 incorporate that mode of operation. 6 Also, another feature of the proposed rule is I an independent, redundant scrain air header exhaust valve, 8 or an alternate rod insertion mode. 9 ' Finally, an item which is specified a little 10 less clearly is increased reliability of the reactor trip 11 system. 12 MR. EBERSOLE: Does that mean in the mechanical 13 or electrical context? II gx \ MR. ENGLAND: I believe that would mean in both i
13 contexts.
16 MR. EBERSOLE: You have no conceptual II descriptions that you are talking about at this time? i I8 MR. ENGLAND: That is correct. l 19 Upon issuance of the final rule we would meet 20 with the staff within the six months allotted to discuss 21 our specific plans and proposed schedule. At this time we 22 would anticipate making any required modifications not 11 prior to the first refueling outage. 28 MR. EBERSOLE: My i'pression, and I think there 25 are some events that substantiate it, is that the main O TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
Wl-1 433 l unreliability of the system is focused on the dump volume
/
(_,)i 2 logic and the design. However, at this time you can't make . 3 any statements to that effect. , 4 This left item here has not been refined any 5 further than that? 6 MR. ENGLAND: That is correct, other than the ! 7 modifications that have already been made in the scram 8 discharge voldme system providing independent vent and 9 exhaust valves and increased reliabiilty of some of the 10 components in that existing design. 11 MR. EBERSOLE: All right. Thank you. 12 I am going to move to Item H which pertains to 13 the control room. je-). II MR. REED: At this time Mr. Don Chase, a system a.>
' I5 engineer with our tecnical staff on our plant staff will 16 respond to that. He has been with Gulf States for 17 approximately three and a half years and prior to thst he la spent two and a half years with nuclear experience with 19 the Tennessee Valley Authority. He has a bachelor of ,
20 science in civil engineering from Clarkson College. 21 MR. CHASE: What I am going to do this 22 afternoon is talk briefly about the different control room . 3 design review activities that have taken place in the past 28 and then give you a status on the ones that are currently 25 underway. ( O V TAYLOE ASSOCIATES M251 STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
434 I (Slide.) (-s \'
\/ 2 This is a flow chart of the detailed control 3
room design review activities, or DCRDR. Back in August of l I
'81 the BWR owners group performed a preliminary control 3
room design review on our control room. It was at the GE 6 San Jose facility at the time. I Because of the manufacturing status of the 8 panels, several of the significant instrumentation and 9 inserts were not available. So the survey was not 10 complete. II A summary report was submitted in December of 12
'81 and in that summary report was indicated the areas 13 that need to be completed at a later time, and the overall l Il l 7S conclusions of that report was that River Bend and PGCC i J
~# 13 used good human factors principles in our design.
16 In January of '84 we submitted to the NRC a ; 17 program plan that tells the methodology that we will be 18 using to perform the other activities that are on this 19 slide'here. 20 (Slide.) 21 Let me just show you the review team 22 componsition that is involved in this design review. This L M is the core team, the people that are involved in all the 21 day-to-day activities. You can see the emphasis on
- 25 operations experience and human factors. I i ,
l ' f' TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950 D
y-l~ l 435 i (Slide.) 2 s, During March of this year a task analysis 3 based on EOPs was performed. What you are trying to do is
-l to identify the control room operator task and
" l corresponding information and controls that are required '
6 during emergency operations. ' 7 The verification of I&C requirements and the 8 validation of the control room functions activities are ; 9 currently underway. 10 (Slide.) 11 The next activity is the assessment of HED's, 12 and this shows how we intend to prioritize them. It based 13 on a combine criteria of the likelihood of operator error f e x. Il and resulting safety consequences. The HED will be
.s !'
'~/ 15 further examined for their cumulative or interactive !
I 16 effects. 17 One each of the HED's is prioritized corective 18 action will be decided for each of these and this action 19 might be enhancement, design modification, training, , 20 advising procedures or any of a combination of those. 21 A schedule for implementation will be 22 developed for each of these human engineering Il discrepancies and that will be based on the category 21 assigned and any additional engineering study requirements 25 that there might be, the complexity of the implementation O TAYLOE ASSOCIATES ' ' k,, 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 i WA$hlNGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950 L
436 1 and any plant scheduling constraints. 2 The results of this design review will be 3 published in a summary report that will be submitted to I the NRC in October of this year. 5 Just in conclusion I would like to say that 6 GSU is confident that the design review activities that I have taken place in the past and that are currently 8 underway will verify that good human factors principles 9 were used in our design. 10 MR. EBERSOLE: Let me ask this. Earlier on we 11 were talking with the operators and I mentioned what I 12 called three categories of systems pertinent to the safety 13 problem. One was the reactivity control system, the , - - Il anti-ATWS set, the one that gets the reactor shut down. % 15 The second was the LOCA mitigation set and then I 16 identified within that the so-called engineered safeguards 17 systems as a subset. Then the third, and by far the most la important and more complex, is the long-term shutdown heat 19 removal Cet. 20 When I see these analyses about operator 21 response and designs of the control boards, what I fail to 22 is more less unification of these sets in any organized 23 path. Color the sets red, blue and green if you wish. 21 I wonder why this is not done? I would think 25 it valuable that the operator know in fact what set of O TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
v i I 437 l interdependences he had to face in long-term heat removal. (~q\ (,,) 2 How many systems have to work and what will be the 3 consequence, including the time, the consequence of the 4 failure of one of them even though it may be an 5 environmental control. 6 Is there any consideration given in the 7 analysis of control room design and operator response to 8 treating these groups or systems as sets of critical 9 systems? 10 MR. CHASE: The grouping of systems as you have 11 dscribed them have not been contemplated as such. 12 Enhancements such as could be coloring a control, if that 13 was the appropriate thing to do, or using lines of l f~ 18 demarcation or a color _ coded backing.
\~- 15 MR. EBERSOLE: Well, I will give you an 16 example. It was just mentioned a while ago that the No. 3 17 diesel depends on one of their other two, and that would 18 be shown if you had such a discrete identification, this 19 interdependence, as well as many others, as you know, that 20 are in any integrated function to performance.
21 I just wondered if you in the course of 22 studying the operator response do give consideration to l
!! integration of the overall operational function in the set 21 context?
$5 MR. CHASE: Well, like I said before, the exact
,O TAYLOE ASSOCIATES
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P 438 I way that you had mentioned groupings has not been brought
- s-(_) 2 up in that sense. The way that we have discussed grouping 3
controls like that would be through a mimick type of ! 4 pattern. '
- t 3
MR. EBERSOLE: Are there any substantial ' 6 changes contemplated at this time to the control room? I MR. CHASE: Well, our present status is we are 7 8 starting the prioritization. So at this stage we don't 9 have all the findings and they aren't all prioritized. 10 One area that is somewhat obvious that needs 11 more looking at would be the lighting in the control room. 12 MR. EBERSOLE: The emergency lighting or just f 13 the normal lighting? I i l f-Il MR. CHASE: The normal lighting is adequate in l L') 35 most cases. Emergency lighting is going to require more 16 review. II MR. EBERSOLE: Thank you.
~
18 I believe we have a description of the safety 19 parameter system. 20 MR. REED: And the following presentation, 21 which would be the description of the remote shutdown t 22 capability, both will be provided by Mr. Phil Porter, l l El Senior Electrical Engineer in our Electrical Engineering 21 Department in our Nuclear Plant Enginering Group. 25 MR. PORTER: Good afternoon. P rm TAYLOE ASSOCIATES i 16251 STREET N.W. - SUITE 1004
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i 6 _ _ _ . - . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _
v- _ l I
<. 439 1
,, I will be describing our safety parameter t
( . , 2 display system. , 3 (Slide.) 4 iThe system that we purchased was from General 5 Electric. We presently monitor approximately 1400 6 in ividual signals that are obtained primarily from the 7 control room. We monitor things like valve positions, flow 8 rates,pressurelevelb,systeminitiationsignals, fluid 9 levels, process temperatures, power availability,
/ ' (
10 vibration and thermal displacement. Those are roughly the 11 e'ight categories of variables that we monitor. r 12 One of the primary reasons for choosing the 13 system that we did was the ability to be able to generate ye3 18 user unique displays. If we find during the course of
\j 15 using the system that the displays are not optimum from 16 a human factors standpoint, we do have a control sta' tion 6 17 in the technical support center where the displays can be la upgraded rather rapidly.
19 Typical displays that the machine will 20 provide, it will provide color displays. Colors will f 21 change in correspondence with the conditions being r r e 22 displayed. e.,, ,. X- 23 I believe Mr. Bogolin talked about our 21 ' emergency operating procedures. The displays can be 25 geared and are presently geared towards implementing the r - (7 TAYLOE ASSOCIATES (),b, ;* i625 i sinsir, s.w. - suits iOO4 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950 E / _M
440 I emergency operating procedures as we see here. 2
~, We can also display two-dimensional plots so 3
the operator can actually follow it. He can see where the 4 event started and he can see where he is going in a 5 two-dimensional space. It gives him a much, much better 6 idea of what is happening as far as the transient is 7 concerned. 8 (slide.) 9 We do monitor a sufficient number of bus 10 voltages and breaker positions to be able to construct the Il station safety related bus of one-line diagrams. So the 12 operator can tell at a glance precisely what the status of 13 his bus is. 11 Another advantage of the system is that it is e rs.i V 15 user friendly.- The operator does not have to sit down and 16 key in demands. He has a one-button repertoire that he can 17 actually go to higher level display and he can page down 18 through it for detail. 19 MR. EBERSOLE: Does that system display an r 20 operational status of each circuit breaker? 21 MR. PORTER: Yes, that is monitored. Yes, it 22 will display that breaker position open or closed using 23 our standard plant conventions for color code. 24 (slide.) 25 This is purely diagramatic. It is-not meant to A TAYLOE ASSOCIATES b) ions i sinser, N.w. - suite iOO4 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950 k_
I-l s 441 1 be an' exact detail of the system. When you made your tour ( (_/ 2 of the control room I believe you saw some cabinets 3 mounted up on top of the termination cabinets. 4 We had already purchased our control room and 5 it was about that time frame that we obtained direction 6 from the staff that we were going to have to install a
~
safety parameter display system. We wanted to make the + 8 leadt impact on the control room. So we opted to sample a 9 lot of our signals from the termination cabinets. ; 10 In some cases where we had to obtain signals u from inside the control room we ran cables out to the 12 termination cabinets. 13 Now those little enclosures which you saw up x\ 18 on top of the termination cabinets is right here. That is i
\- 15 our intelligent data acquisition system. We bring out our 16 analogue and digital signals out to that and they
,, y
U terminate on some analogic modules.
18 The modules are separated by power supplies in 9 19 ( that if'we are monitoring a Class lA signal, and'it is a l'
, 2 division one signal, then we put it on an analogic module m
2l> or sensor to pick up that signal which is pcwered from a 22 division one. So we maintain separation there. Il We also transfer our signals over to optical 28 isolation. We change it here to an optical isolated signal Zi and trans'mit it to two what are called formatters. , O TAYLOE ASSOCIATES
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442 1 Now the data path is paralle,1 to the cervice (_,-) 2 building, and I believe yc- walked through the techncial 3 support center on the third floor and probably had a l chance to view that computer system. Basically it is a 5 parallel data path, i 6 One set of data which goes to the transient I recording and analysis computer and the other set of data, t 8 which is the same data, goes to the real time analysis and 9 display computer. This computer is our SPDS computer here, 10 and it drives these particular displays. We have one at ' 11 the technical support center, one in the control roem and 12 one in the emergency operations facility. , 13 This computer again is used as a safety 11 parameter display system computer and the operator within l 7-
~' 15 l the control room has a one-button operation. The two 1
16 displays will be on lazy susans. We tried to human factor II engineer it as best we could, and he can turn it so that 18 he can be standing at the long response bench boards and 19 turn around and actually see what is happening. 20 Thus, we have another display that is also 21 driven singly. So we have to two keyboards. This should 22 actually be split here. These are actually two separte l 23 displays. So conceivably a shift supervisor could be using 28 one while the operator was actually using another one if i 25 he wanted to. i
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i l 443 1 As a result of the Salem ATWS event, and 2 another reason which we decided to purchase this system, 3 and that was the ability to be able to reconstruct plant I transients. Now we didn't know about the Salem ATWS at the 5 time because it had not occurred, but what we did was we 6 realized our good fortune in purchasing this system. 7 We basically bought it for plant startup, but 8 now we see that we can also use it to reconstruct plant 9 transients. The data tends to be very, very quick and to because of the number of signals which we are monitoring, II we can construct the plant transients in conjunction with 12 our plant process computer. So it certainly aids us in 13 that regard. 7-Il MR. EBERSOLE: May I comment on the Salem event
\- 13 in one aspect. What it disclosed was, among other things, i
16 was that there had been successful scram functions 17 occurring, but with only the one driver to exexcute the la functions they had lost redundancy for some time. You will 19 remember the dead circuit function had been lost in some 20 cases and the kicker, the shunt trip was doing it for 21 them, but they didn't know it. ( 22 MR. PORTER: Right. l 13 MR. EBERSOLE: I saw vestages of that in your 21 design here with respect to those important SAR valves, 3 and I suggest you look at that because you can get the
~S TAYLOE ASSOGATES (Q 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 l (202) 293 3950
444 1 SAR function using the temperature on the tailpipe and Q 2 never know which or whether both of the solenoids had done 3 the job. I It only points out the fact that when you have 3 duality in triggering functions without monitoring to 6 determine that they are both working, you won't know until 7 the second one fails that the first one failed. 8 MR. PORTER: I see. All right. 9 MR. EBERSOLE: Now whether you can put that on 10 here or not, I don't know. 11 MR. PORTER: Another advantage which I have 12 already discussed here, and that is obviously the SPDS 13 function. Because we do implement the emergency operating Il procedures, the operator is quickly able to get a general u 15 assessment of what the plant is doing. l_ 16 Our operators are trained to use the 17 benchboards. They do not rely upon the safety parameter la display system. It certainly gives them a general idea, 19 but they are required to use their Class 1 instruments in 20 the control room. 21 MR. EBERSOLE: Do you see any problems and 22 conflicts between the presence of this handy-dandy thing l 23 in the corner and the board over on the other side? 28 MR. PORTER: And the what now? 25 MR. E"3RSOLE: You have now two systems in TAYLOE ASSOCIATES l g 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 } WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950 l L
v I I 445 l competition. p_ 2 s,f MR. PORTER: What are those two systems? You 3 mean the plant process computer? 4 MR. EBERSOLE: This display you have here, the 3 safety parameter display, which is not safety grade --- 6 MR. PORTER: That is correct. I MR. EBERSOLE: --- but very handy. It is an 8 integrated display, better integrated than that on the 9 board, but on the board is where the good stuff is. 10 MR. PORTER: That is correct. 11 MR. EBERSOLE: Do you see any phychological or 12 other conflicts in having the presence of these two 13 gradient systems? (~s 11 MR. PORTER: No. Our operators are trained when 15 they walk through all these transients to use the 16 benchboard instruments. They have it there, but they are 17 trained to use those instruments. 18 MR. EBERSOLE: And then what do they do, look 19 over afterwards to see if their other display corresponds? 20 MR. PORTER: We do not have an SPDS presently 21 installed in our simulators, but we will, and I could not 22 address that problem. I would have to turn that over to 23 Mr. Bogolin or'Mr. Odell to answer that. 25 MR. EBERSOLE: I am merely suggesting that it 23 might be an attractive nuisance as well as an asset and l. (~j') ( TAYLCE ASSOCIATES 16251 STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 i WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950 l l L
r~ 446 1 want you to evaluate that in a psychological context. (h (_,) 2 MR. PORTER: All right. 3 That concludes my discussion of the SPDS. I MR. EBERSOLE: Thank you. 5 MR. PORTER: I will now be discussing our 6 remote shutdown capabilities.
~
(Slide.)
.8 We originally had one remote shutdown panel, 9
and in discussions with the staff because of the single, 10 single failure criteria, we were asked to install two [ 11 remote shutdown panels. I believe you saw them the other 12 day. As a consequence, we do have redundant control 13 panels. 14
-s We felt at the time that we met GDC 19 for ,
t I
\~/ I3 i remote shutdown, the capability for meeting the single 16 failure criterion, but we found out later on that the 17 staff analysis in Appendix R in conjunction with a main la control room fire had set us back.
19 We have had discussions with the staff, as Mr. 20 Weinkam had discussed, and we have established a design 21 basis for the main control room fire and are now reviewing 22 the capabilities of these panels to be able to shut the Il plant down given that design basis and we probably will 28 have to make operational procedure changes as well as 5 perhaps some minor equipment changes to be able to take p TAYLOE ASSCK:lATES ( 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SulTE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950 k
~l l 447 1 care of that particular event. f%. (s,) 2 The remote shutdown panels are located in 3 security controlled areas. We do have independent tranes l 4 of HVAC supplying those panels and we will, and I stress i 5 this, we will meet the Appendix R requirements. ! 6 MR. EBERSOLE: I have come to be suspicious of 7 the word " independent" without a considerable amount of 8 study and examination as to what it really means. You know 9 it can mean almost anything. 10 I guess what I am interested in is the HVAC 11 system. Is it truly independent of a common fire? 12 MR. PORTER: I will let Mr. Dave Sharp, of GSU 13 Engineering, he is our HVAC engineer, address that r- Il question.
'/ 15 MR. EBERSOLE: While he is coming up, I went to 16 the plant yesterday and you get the wrong impression 17 sometimes because all you see is the local view. I guess I 18 was a little bit concerned, and I probably shouldn't say 19 this but I will, that you put these centers in available 20 space within what I could not discern as independent 21 volumetric spaces in the context of fire and hot gases, ,
22 which may or may not be dependent on isolation for dampers 23 and other things that don't very often work well. j 21' So my reaction was that although you do have 25 " remote" shutdown centers, they are not that remote, and l I f[] V TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 I WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 ; (202) 293 3950
448 1 maybe you can convince me they are that remote. im k_-) 2 MR. PORTER: I will let Mr. Sharp address the 3 HVAC remoteness, and he might be able to address the fire 4 protection remoteness also, the panels from the main 5 control room as well as each other. 6 MR. SHARP: Good afternoon. I am David Sharp
~
with Gulf States in Nuclear Plant Engineering. 8 The remoteness shutdown panel area is served 9 by two independent air handling units. They are powered 10 from division one and division two buses, are located in 11 separate rooms and are not affected by fire, by any area 12 fire which could affect one area but it will not affect
-13 the other. , -]
Il MR. EBERSOLE: Are these possibly served by 1 ( /
/ 15 common HVAC ductwork?
16 MR. EHARP: Yes, sir, they are, l~ MR. EBERSOLE: Then I want to know does that 18 mean you are dependent on these rather delicate damper 19 functions.to save the day?I am getting down to what is 20 independence, and I find so many interpretations in the 21 context of real independence that I don't know what I have 22 got until I put the remote center out in the yard 23 somewhere. 28 MR. SHARP: We have never postulated a failure 25 of the passive equipment in the ductwork system.
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.I 449 1
MR. EBERSOLE: What about the dampers? b 2
\s / MR. SHARP: The isolation damper for the unit, 3
the fire damper, is a tested CAT 1 surveilled damper. 4 MR. EBERSOLE: Is the isolation dependent on 5 damper functions? 6
.MR. SHARP: Yes, sir, I am afraid it is. !
I MR. EBERSOLE: What is the physical phenomenon 8 that actuates the dampers? 9 MR. SHARP: The heat from the fire will operate 10 the fusable link and drop the curtain type fire damper. 11 MR. EBERSOLE: And at what temperature does the 12 link melt? 13 MR. SHARP: 165 degrees.
,g Il MR. EBERSOLE: And can your equipment in the
15 protected regions withstand 165 degrees?
16 MR. SHARP: Yes, sir. 17 MR. EBERSOLE: So you are sure that the alloy , la will at least melt? 19 MR. SHARP: Yes, sir. 20 MR. EBERSOLE: And then you have the remaining 21 problem of did the damper work. 22 MR. SHARP: The fire dampers have been proven 21 somewhat reliable in many applications, not only in the 21 nuclear industry, i 3 MR. EBERSOLE: Is this subsystem per se given O TAYLOE ASSOCIATES , \ 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950 e._-- ,. . , . - . , , , -. . . ~ . _ _ . , . - -
450 r I the privilege of sort of a mini-PRA and you come up with a [\ (,,. 2 satisfactory conclusion that you will have a plant if you L 3 have a big fire? f
~I MR. SHARP: We have not performed a mini-PRA on 5
this particular system. 6 MR. EBERSOLE: Let me suggest to the specialist 7 who mentioned PRA earlier include it in his sphere of 8 studies you can come up with some sort of a judgment on 9 that. 10 MR. SHARP: Yes, sir. Il MR. EBERSOLE: Thank you. 12 MR. PORTER: The system, both panels are fully 13 designed to qualify for Class lA service. The panels are [ 7s it obviously located in the control building which is a i (
15 seismic category one structure, and we also have emergency 16 lighting and communications are located at each remote 17 shutdown panel to be able to use those panels.
18 That concludes my presentation. 19 MR. EBERSOLE: Let me, before you go away, just 20 again remind you that I suggest that you interface with 21 the goings on in Limerick about the ultimate remote 22 shutdown system which would obviate real concern about 21 these complex relationships that we are discussing here. 21 MR. PORTER: All right. 3 MR. EBERSOLE: Thank you. p TAYLOE ASSOCIATES g 16251 STREET, N.W. - $UITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
i r il 451 1 MR. REED: The next item on the agenda is the gx : (s / 2 environmental qualifications program for River Bend. Larry 3 Schell will provide that presentation. Larry is an l electrical engineer in our Nucl(ar Plant Engineering Group 7 5 who has been with Gulf States for approximately a year. 6 Prior to that he had seven years nuclear related I experience. He has a diplom in physics which is comparable 8 to a master's degree in the United States from the ) 9 Tecnical University of Hanover in West Germany. i 10 MR. SCHELL: Mr. Chairman, ladies and 11 gentlemen. The subject of my presentation is equipment 12 qualification. 13 I would like to familiarize the subcommittee l
-~ ll with the programs that we at River Bend have implemented V- 13 to meet our equipment qualification requirements and 16 commitments.
17 (Slide.) la I would like to give you an overview about all 19 of our activities and try to identify to you how they fit 20 together and make up a program. 21 I will briefly talk about environmental 22 qualifications, seismic qualifications and about what we 21 are doing to maintain qualification once equipment has 24 been turned over to GSU. 25 I would also like to identify to you the :
-(] TAYLOE ASSOCIATES (j 1625 i STREET, N.W. - $UITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
452 I schedule we are working to in support of fuel load in
'O V 2 April of next year.
3 (Slide.) I The River Bend commitments with respect to 5 environmental and seismic qualificsation of electric 6 equipment are outlined on my next slide. 7 with respect to environmental qualification, 8 we are committed to the methodology of IEEE 323-1974 and 9 also to NUREG 0588. 10 In the interpretation of NUREG 0588 we have 11 also taken guidance from the the draft Revision 1 of Reg. 12 Guide 1.89. 13 For seismic qualification we are committed to ) 18 IEEE Standard 344-1975. V 13 (Slide.) 16 The environmental qualification requirements [ 17 depend on the location of equipment. 18 Areas that would see the environmental 19 consequences of an accident are classified as harsh i 20 environments. For example, all areas inside the reactor 21 building would see the environmental consequences of a 22 LOCA and are therefore classified as harsh environments. 23 Also most areas within the auxiliary building and fuel l 28 building are harsh envionment areas. 23 On the other hand, areas inside the control i I l l
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453 I building and inside the diesel generator building do not ( 2 contain high energy piping, nor do they contain sources of 3 radioactivity and are therefore classified as mild 8 environments. 5 MR. EBERSOLE: In that characterization of mild 6 enviroment, as we just talked about earlier, which is in I connection with the RCIC steamline, that building tends to 8 have in it lines containing high-pressure vapor or 9 moderate pressure vapor with some potential for getting 10 away. Well, there may be even impulse lines in there. 11 Putting the building into I guess I will call 12 it a Turkish bath state, if not a very high temperature 13 state, I suspect a lot of equipment in those areas may be g 18 open general purpose equipment and, thus, these would be 15 subject to condensation phenomena on the terminal boards 16 and the stubs of the electrical apparatus, including II moderately high voltage equipment like 4160. 18 I would like to have you comment on how you 19 either prevent or handle thesis that this condensation 20 shorting will not' occur in the places called mild 21 environments. - 22 MR. SCHELL: The control building is --- 21 MR. REED: May I interject something here just 28 basically. I think the RCIC system that you are referring 25 to is not located in either the control building or the FT TAYLOE ASSOCIATES l Cl 1625 i smin, N.W. - $UlH 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
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'I 454 I
-, diesel generator building which he shows on his slide as
\-,) 2 mild environments.
3 MR. EBERSOLE: Okay. Are there any of these 8 other lines that are vapor producing in these areas? 5 MR. SCHELL: Any area that would be subjected 6 to higher humidity than we would expect under normal 7 conditions as a result of an accident would not be 8 classified as a mild environment. 9 MR. EBERSOLE: Would you look at such matters 10 as inadvertent initiation of the fire sprays from seismic 11 events? 12 MR. SCHELL: I don't think that is considered 13 in the environmental qualification program. r-wg Il MR. EBERSOLE: What if you have open electrical 15 apparatus that is under potential deluge from a spurious 16 response to seismic events. II MR. SCHELL: I think we have protected it from 18 flooding and from exposure to the fire protection 19 equipment. 20 MR. EBERSOLE: Oh, you have protected it from 21 the sprays of the fire equipment? 22 MR. SCHELL: Yes, sir. 23 MR. EBERSOLE: Thank you. 28 MR. SCHELL: Under the environmental 25 qualification program for harsh environment we are TAYLOE ASSOCIATES ( 16251 STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950 i - L
r 455 I required by the final rule on equipment qualification, 10 (' _)) 2 CFR 50.49 to qualify three categories of equipment. 3 First, there is safety related equipment, 4 equipment on which we rely to maintain the reactor coolant 5 pressure boundary, equipment to shut down the reactor and 6 maintain it in a safety shutdown condition and equipment I that we use to mitigate and prevent the consequences of 8 accidents that could result in potential offsite 9 exposures comparable to the 10 CFR 100 guidelines. IU We are also qualifying equipment that is not 11 safety related, but whose failure could have an impact on 12 the performance of safety related equipment. And we are 13 qualifying certain post-accident monitoring equipment in , gs 18 accordance with our commitment to Reg. Guide 1.97. i \
I5 MR. EBERSOLE: May I ask in aspect of 16 interpreting what is qualification. Does it mean to you 17 that when you are in a harsh environment that you
- la hermetically seal electrical apparatus against the
{ 19 intrusion of pressure and vapor and fluid? 20 MR. SCHELL: We do if we rely on the seal in 21 the qualification, if we test the seal, for example, in 22 the qualification program. If we don't rely on the seal, ; M then we will test the equipment in its installed 28 condition. 3 MR. EBERSOLE: You would test it in its TAYLOE ASSOCIATES q, 16251 STRffT, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGToti, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950 i l _ - . _ . - _ _ . _ - _ _ . . . -. _ , , - - _ =
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installed condition. f'/ (_, g 2 MR. SCHELL: Which would mean in this case no 3 seal. We would make sure that the equipment can operate. I MR. EBERSOLE: And, of course, it will then be 5 subject to surface condensation? 6 MR. SCHELL: For example. I MR. EBERSOLE: So what you are going to do is 8 have hermetically sealed equipment, but you will test when 9 it is unsealed? 10 MR. SCHELL: No. We either have hermetically 11 sealed equipment and we test it in that configuration, or 12 we have unsealed equipment and we also test it in that 13 config'tration. I -~ 11 MR. EBERSOLE: You contemplate having
'~ 13 electr ical apparatt:s in hostile environments which in fact 16 will be subject to condensation way down on the terminal 17 boards and stubs of the apparatus which lead to 18 substantial leakage curves. You expect to use open 19 equipment in hostile environments?
20 MR. SCHELL: No. We use terminal blocks in the 21 aunt.liary building and we have qualified them for the 22 environment that we would expect in the auxiliary 21 building. 21 MR. EBERSOLE: But the hostile environment. 25 MR. SCHELL: Both inside the containment and (j 7 TAYLOE ASSOCIATES s 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
457 1 the auxiliary buidling are hostile environments. Inside (3 2 i ,) the containment we do not use terminal blocks. We use 3 qualified spices. I MR. EBERSOLE: And how are they qualified? 5 MR. SCHELL: By type test, sir. 6 MR. EBERSOLE: These are sealed and they are 7 not subject to condensation? 8 MR. SCHELL: We took a prototype splice and 9 exposed it to the environment. 10 MR. EBERSOLE: The reason I mention this is 11 because I have found that in a sort of a half way state 12 that the industry is attempting to qualify open equipment 13 in hostile environments admitting that there will be l il 7-s substantial leakage curves in say 25 milliamp circuits
~ sl 15 which compromises the validity of the signals that you get l
16 from transducers. 17 The reason they did this is that they had 18 trouble obtaining the pressure, the anti-collapse pressure 19 requirement against something like 50 pounds pressure. So 20 we find presently there are in fact many installations 21 that have vented Nema Type 4 enclosures which are still 22 called Nema 4 which have been rendered no longer in that Il class. I just wondered if you are trying to avoid doing 25 that modification. 13 MR. SCHELL: We have avoided to the largest rT TAYLOE ASSOCLATES Q 16251 STREET, N.W. - $UITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293-3950 k
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'l 458 I
extent the use of terminal blocks inside the containment. (_,) 2 In fact, we don't have any terminal blocks in the 3 containment at this time. I MR. EBERSOLE: So you go into your hermetically 5 sealed component protection seal --- 6 MR. SCHELL: --- seal for qualified splices. 7 MR. EBERSOLE: Thank you. 8 (Slide.) 9 MR. SCHELL: I will be referring from now on to 10 BOP equipment and NSSS equipment. What I mean is BOP 11 equipment is all the equipment supplied by our 12 architect / engineer, Stone and Webster, and NSSS equipment 13 is all equipment that is supplied by General Electric g- s 11 .under the NSSS contract.
%~ l'- Our balance of plant equipment contains in the 16 ~
specification the requirement for qualification to 323-74, 17 and we have calculated the environments in accordance with 18 NUREG 0588. supplemented by the draft Reg. Guide 1.89. 19 Qualification is done by the vendor. However, 20 to assure consistency in the approach to qualification and 21 in the methodology, we have a hundred percent review of 22 all documents pertaining to qualification by Stone and 11 Webster, our architect / engineer. 28 (Slide.) 25 For the NSSS equipment we have contracted with TAYLOE ASSOCIATES O). (, 1625 i STitEET, N.W. - SulTE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
459 1 General Electric to upgrade the existing qualification to 2 IEEE 232-74 and to the environments calculated in 3 accordance with our commitment.
-8 The methodology of this qualification program 5 is described in the GE topical report. The qualification 6 is being done by General Electric, and I would like to I
mention to you that the NRC's Region IV office has 8 frequently audited this program and we had a lot of 9 positive feedback from the NRC and their consultants. 10 (Slide.) 11 The staff has asked us a question with respect 12 to the mechanical equipment qualification for equipment 13 located in a Sarsh environment, and I would like to g) t
' ~'
18 I3 address at this time a question that you have asked yesterday. 16 You asked for the radiation exposure of the 17 pump seals in the RHR pump. The design radiation dose for la the RHR pump is in the order of magnitude of four times 19 ten to the seventh rad and a 180-day calculated 20 post-accident would result in an exposure of 1.25 times 21 ten to the seventh rad, which means that we have a 22 significant, margin. 3 But in addition to the design enveloping the 28 requirements, we are going through a specific analysis for 23 safety related active equilpment for both NSSS and BOP. We TAYLOE ASSOCIATES ( ,/ 16251 STREET, N.W. ~ $UITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
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\
460 1 review the meterial capabilities of non-metallic materials
'3 . (j 2 in this equipment and we determine to what extent they l l
3 ' support the safety function, evaluate its capabilities and I compare them to the environmental challenges. 5 (Slide.) 6 We also seismically and dynamically qualify l 7 our equipment. Dynamic qualification is the qualification 8 to the effects of earthquakes and to the effects of steam 9 condensation in the suppression pool as a result of safety , 10 relief valve discharge and as a result of a LOCA. 11 MR. EBERSOLE: Earlier on you will recall we 12 were talking about the valves associatied with the RCIC. 13 MR. SCHELL: Yes, sir, 18 MR. EBERSOLE: And we obtained a statement to l 15 the effect that at this point in time you are not quite 16 sure whether these can intercept full mass flow associated 17 with an RCIC. But you say here you do have the dynamic 18 qualifications. ' 19 MR. SCHELL: Yes, sir, designed and qualified 20 I to withstand the effects of hydrodynamic loads. It is the 21 inboard isolation valve that I am talking about which is , 22 subjected to hydrodynamic loads. There are several valves 23 in the RCIC system that are not subjected to hydrodynamic 28 loads. 23 MR. EBERSOLE: All I wanted to hear you say is p V TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
461 1 that you know these would close if the pipe was broken. A
. q-) 2 MR. SCHELL: Yes, sir.
3
., MR. EBERSOLE: And you do contemplate prove
'I tests that validate these points?
3 MR. SCHELL: We have received several questions 6 and ideas from the staff in a presentation we recently 7 made with respect to the pump and valve operability review 8 and we are presently evaluating that and we will report on 9 that later. 10 MR. EBERSOLE: Thank you, 11 (Slide.) 12 Both our balance of plant and the NSSS 13 equipment meets the qualification requirements of IEEE 73 Il 344-75, and we have included the qualification to
13 hydrodynamic loads which is different because of the 16 duration of the loads associated with them.
17 What I have presented to thus far is the la programs that we have implemented to procure and provide 19 safety related equipment at the site. However, we are 20 realizing that once equipment has been turned over to us, 21 it our responsibility to maintain the qualification of 22 this equipment, to follow the installation instructions Il and to make sure that equipment is removed from service at 25 the expiration of its qualified life. 25 (Slide.J O/ TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 1625 l STREET, N.W. - $UITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950 r
5
]'
462 1 Therefore, GSU has established a task force at (D
\s ,) 2 the end of 1983 which is supported by a member from 3 '
engineering, maintenance, quality assurance and 4 operations. 5 (slide.) 6 This task force will accomplish its work in I three phases. 8 Under Phase I we have identified all those 9 areas that are potentially affected by equipment 10 qualification requirements. 11 Currentli we are working on Phase II, the 12 development of a master plan that will lead to the
.13 implementation of all of the equipment qualifica' tion
- It requirements into a detailed maintenance and surveillance 13 procedures, and that third phase will be done by the 16 groups responsible for maintenance and surveillance under I 17 the oversight of the task force. ;
la we anticipate that some of the existing 19 procedures may have to be revived, especially to reflect 20 the fact that equipment may have a limited qualified life. 21 MR. EBERSOLE: In particular, when equipment is 22 type qualified, when never gets to suspect the uniformity ; i 21 of the production process and the maintenance process to , 28 ensure replication of the original characteristics of the 5 type. b (~)
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463 l I wondered if you could comment how you are
; i
(_) 2 going to assure yourself that you are getting truly a 3 replication of the type which was tested in the lab? And I the model that I have the most interest in is of course 5 those solenoid valves that execute che SAR opening 6 function which are absolutely critical to the safety of 7 your plant. Could you comment of how you are going to make 8 sure they are going to work. 9 MR. SCHELL: These are Asco solenoid valves and 10 they are in the process of being qualified by General 11 Electric as part of the qualification to the whole SRV. 12 These valves are manufactured under a strict controlled ' 13 program by Asco, and we will assure that we give them the maintenance that is required by the manufacturer and by 11 f-sg ( ) 13 our own judgment from reading the qualification report. 16 MR. EBERSOLE: Has there been any fai' lure 17 record of those solenoid valves that you can comment on? 18 j MR. SCHELL: I am not aware that there was a 19 failure on the particular model that we are using. 20 MR. EBERSOLE: Well, of course, I guess you 21 have subjected them to environmental challenges either. 22 MR. SCHELL: We may not. 23 (Slide.) 28 My last slide deals with the schedule that we li are working to. At the end of May we have submitted to the (O (_) TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 16251 STitEET, N.W. SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20004 (202) 293 3950
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I 464 I staff an update of our equipment qualifiation document
~ n.
k ,) s 2 mainly in response to 10 CFR 50.49 and also we have 3 expanded on our presentation in the earlier submittal. 8 On July 1st we will submit to the staff a 5 complete listing of all equipment that may require some 6 kind of quaJification. We will identify at that time to 7 the staff where we are with respect to the qualification 8 and also where we are with respect to installion of this 9 equipment. II We are scheduled to have about 85 percent 11 complete by September of 1984 such that we are ready for 12 the NRC audits by the Equipment Qualification Branch, the 13 Seismic Qualification Review Team and the Pump and Valve
-s II Operability Review Team in October.
15 We are scheduled to complete all of our 16 qualifications by March of 1985 in time for fuel loading 17 in April.
18 Thank you very much. 19 MR. EBERSOLE: Thank you, Mr. Schell. 20 MR. REED: Mr. Ebersole, before we go into the 21 next item, there was the question about the sparger in the 22 reactor vessel, and we do have some late information from
%I General Electric.
28 MR. EBERSOLE: Yes, I would like to hear about 25 that. TAYLOE ASSOCIATES Q(_j 16251 $TREET, N.W. - $UITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
465 1 MR. QUIRK: I have talked to our San Jose
,eq (mjl 2 Engineering Department on your question and it turns out 3 that we have evaluated that phenomena, that load I condition, and that the resultant loads are negligible, 5 less than 15 psi, and that we have done an extensive 6 analysis using the TRAK 2 Code and have documentation in 7 our Engineering Group that have been verified on the 8 resulting analysis.
9 MR. EBERSOLE: Do you happen to know why you 10 don't get a severe hydraulic knock? II I asked that question, and the MR. QUIRK: 12 explanation is beyond my comprehension. 13 (Laughter.) e- II Let me try though. As you recall, the design
I3 is that the HPCS line comes out and then takes a verical 16 drop before it begins its horizontal run. The water in II this line is heated during normal operation due to I8 convection back through the line.
I9 Now when you postulate a LOCA and you 20 depressurize through the break and you depressurize the 21 vessel, some of this water begins to flash back into the 22 vessel and at the same time the HPCS has stated and starts 21 generating water up through the line. 28 This frothy mixture, together with water goes 25 down the line and into the spargers where the energy is (')
\ ,/
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v l-l- 466 1 dissipated through the many nozzles, and the resulting O (_) 2 loads are very small. 3 MR. EBERSOLE: I see. I take some comfort in 4 the fact that I think this model core could get along 5 without the distribution function anyway. 6 MR. QUIRK: We have shown that, by the way.
~
MR. EBERSOLE: Well, thank you. 8 MR. QUIRK: You bet. 9 MR. REED: Thank you. 10 MR. EBERSOLE: The next item is the emergency 11 planning presentation. 12 MR. REED: That is correct. Mr. John I3 Cadwallader, Supervisor of Emergency Planning, will give 18 that presentation. Mr. Cadwallader has been with GSU for
'- 15 approximately three years. He brings with him five years 16 prior experience which includes work with the state agency l~ that is responsible for emergency planning within the la state.
19 MR. EBERSOLE: I am going to be very much 20 interested in how you get the words out to the folks in 21 all those swamps out there. 22 (Laughter.) 21 MR. CADWALLADER: Good afternoon, Mr. Ebersole. 28 I am going to give you an overview of the 25 emergency planning for the River Bend Station. 4 (T TAYLO'E ASSOCIATES
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- } q, x -
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. 467 1
As Supervisor of Emergency Planning, I am
,x,
() 2 responsible for the development and the impleme.tation of 3 thV onsite em6rgency plan and for the interface witu the i I State of Lousiana, the five local governments within ten 5 miles of River Bend Stati'on and also the State of 6 Mississippi to ensure that there are operational offsite I plans to support.,the licensing effort. 8 < (Slide.) 9 i This first slide depicts the 10-mile emergency
' 8 10 '
planning zone. It takes in.psrt of five local parishes
! 11 within Louisiana. Those are' East and West Feliciana, East J
J v 12 and West Baton-Rouge and Point Coupee. The total 13 population, 4,, , both permanent and transient, is 36,000 with t il 22,500[,>ermanentand14,000 transients.
'd 1 *.
' 'l '
There are three municipalities within the
> f 16 10-mile emergency planning zone, Jackson, Lousiana with a 17
' population of 2,200, St. Francisville in West Feliciana la Pari'Jh with 1,100 and New Roads at Pointe Coupee with 19 3,900.
20
?j 6 5 (Slide.)
21 1; p s Also I have the map of the 50-mile ingestion 22 padhway emergency planning zone, and that takes in 18
.,. k Louisiana parishes and four Mississippi counties.
a' ~,,/ i -
') e 28 (Slide.)
,, r
,,'J s 25 Gulf States has worked with the State of r
,o TAYLOE ASSOCIATES
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v i l 468 1 Louisiana through the Lousiana Nuclear Energy Division and
.(_,)
(3 2 the Lousiana Office.of Emergency Preparedness since 1978 3 in the development of the Louisiana peacetime radiological 4 response plan and the three site specific attachments from 0 the nuclear power plants that impact the State of 6 Louisiana, those being Louisiana Power and Light, the
~
Waterford 3 plant in Taft, Louisiana which impacts St. 8 Charles and St. John the Baptist parishes, Mississippi 9 Power and Light' Grand Gulf plant in Port Gibson, 10 Mississippi which impacts Tensile Parish and then Gulf 11 States Utilities' River Bend Station which impacts the 12 five parishes which I showed you previously. 13 In June of 1983 the State of Louisiana, the 7- g Il five River Bend parishes and Gulf States began a
15 conservative effort in revising the Louisiana peacetime 16 radiological response plan in the River Bend attachment, l' which includes the five parish plans. They were submitted 18 to the NRC and to the Federal Emergency Management Agency 19 in December of 1983. And the State of Louisiana is 20 anticipated comments from the Federal Emergency Management 21 Agency any time now.
22 (slide.) 23 Both the onsite and offsite emergency plans 21 have been developed in accordance with NUREG 0654, Rev. 1 li entitled "The Criteria for the Preparation and Evaluation TAYLOE ASSOCIATES
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~
< ;> n .
-b
, 469 I
,s of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness I )
\/ 2 in Support of Nuclear Power Plants."
3 This document has 16 planning standards and I 4 evaluation criteria which can be summarized in these five i 3 different areas. 6 The first being organization which includes 7 the designation of certain persons with detailed 8 responsibilities and the appropriate authorization to 9 carry out their emergency functions. They must also ' nave 10 the appropriate facilities and equipment and emergency 11
, organization underneath them to carry out these functions.
12 The second is the backbone of the whole thing. s *M It is the communications and notification scheme, That is fN 18 both within the nuclear power plant from the emergency
]
13 response facilities and then to the state and local 16 governments and to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. II The third one is the accident assessment and 18 protective response aspect. This entails the training of ' 19 persons in decision-making roles to identify when an , 20 emergency situation exists and then to make the approprite 21 classification of the emergency based on information 22 obtained from the various sources such as the plant' 23 instrumentation, the emergency response information system 28 and a digital radiation wonitoring system. 23 Then these individuals must direct members of t
/N TAYLOE ASSOCIATES (j, 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950 e
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I '
'I 470 I the emergency organization to take whatever necessary
_,[ 2 actions which would mitigate the situation. This might 3 also include coordinating back with the state and local 4 governments concerning recommended protective actions to 3 provile for the public health and safety. t 6 The next one is training, and this includes
~
development of emergency implementing procedures with a 8 specific training matrix which is laid out according to 9 the emergency organization such that certain individuals 10 have detailed training on these procedures through 11 training modules and classroom environment with drills
;2 exercises and tabletop drills and exercises a full-scale 13 exercise on an annual basis, i
-, il During the annual exercise a scenario is
13 developed which postulates some of these accidents which 16 we were discussing earlier this morning which puts the 17 decision-makes such as Mr. Cahill, Mr. Deddens and persons 18 with the State of Louisiana and the local parish :
19 authorities in the situation where they must make 20 decisions so that they do use their imaginations to try to 21 determine how they would solve situations such as you 22 brought up this morning. Il MR. EBERSOLE: On the one hand it is nice to 28 have people dispersed, widely separated and out in the 3 boondocks in general, but on the other hand how do you get (~] Q TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950 ,
t 471 , I the word to them? I can't imagine anything other than the ( ,. . (_, 2 light aircraft patrols or something. How do you propose to 3 J get the word to these dispersed people? I MR. CADWALLADER: At the present time we are 5 developing the prompt notification system with 10 miles of
- C' the River Bend Station and this will be composed of I electronic sirens, high-power electronic sirens and we 8 will be using the emergency broadcast system which is 9
already in existence here in the State of Louisiana. 10 I would also state that the State of Louisiana 11 has a history of being able to evacuate due to hurricanes, 12 and also we had an incident of a train derailment where 13 people were evacuated for three a half weeks, and then It 7- also down by Waterford 3 they evacuated 17,000 people in a b 13 very short period and they were using the plans that were 16 developed for Waterford 3 because the accident happened at : II Union Carbide in close proximity. 18 MR. EBERSOLE: I see. t 19 MR. CADWALLADER: Then the last thing is after 20 you have these drills and exercises you determine whatever 21 deficiencies there are and you go back and look at your 22 emergency plan and your procedures and your training 3 program and make whatevar modifications are necessary. 28 MR. EBERSOLE: What sort of actual physical j M drill do you contemplate to determine how well your system
/^\ TAYLOE ASSOCIATES k 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 l WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 !
! (202) 293 3950 i a b
I 472 I works? g-(_, 2 MR. CADWALLADER: They will be done on a small 3 scale initially where we have the different departments of 4 the different agencies offsite. They are working together 5 with the people that would be involved in their 6 organization and then you take different departments and 7 you post a scenario which would cause them to work 8 together, 9 Then after you do that a number of times, you 10 bring in both the onsite and the offsite and you do dress 11 rehersals. So you develop a number of different scenarios. 12 MR. EBERSOLE: Are your audio systems, do they 13 contemplate just being general alarms or are they going to 18 be coded or what?
-3 \ 15 MR. CADWALLADER: For the prompt notification 16 system that we were talking about earlier?
II MR. EBERSOLE: Yes. 18 MR. CADWALLADER: Yes, sir, there will be a ! 19 specific one which means that there will be a situation at 20 River Bend. This would mean to turn on their radios 21 because there would be some kind of message through the 22 emergency broadcast system. ,
?! MR. EBERSOLE: So this is just a general audio 21 alert.
Zi MR. CADWALLADER: Yes, sir. (3 TAYLOE ASSOCIATES I () 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950 l
473 1 MR. EBERSOLE: You are not going to attempt to
! 2 s,/ code the audio signals. i 1
3 MR. CADWALLADER: No, sir. 1 (Slide.) 3 The next slide is a projected schedule of 6 completion of off-site activities. As I stated earlier, I the State of Louisiana plan and the River Bend attachment 8 were submitted to the NRC and to the Federal Emergency 9 Managment Agency in December of last year. 10 Since the first of the year the State of i 11 Louisiana, the local governments and Gulf States has been ! 12 working on developing specific implementing procedures for 13 the parish and this will be completed in July and training Il f- progarms will commence in August with a high intensity Y" I3 leading up to the joint NRC/ FEMA review exercise for both 16 offsite and onsite in January, and then the prompt 17 notification system which we discussed will be in l 18 operation also at that time. 19 (Slide.) 20 This slide depicts the emergency response 21 facilities at the River Bend Station, those being the main 22 control room, the technical support center, the 3 operational support center, the emergency operations 28 facility and the emergency communications center. 23 The n.ain control room is the location of the n TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 1625 I STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
v
'l l
474 1 initial activity during the unusual events stage, and at ( 2 the alert stage the technical support center and the 3 operational support center are activated. 4 These two facilities are on the third floor of 3 the services building which you toured. Then the emergency 6
' operations facility and the emergency communciations I
center, the media center will be activated at the site 8 area emergency. 9 The shift supervisors will have activities 10 here. The Plant Manager or his desigee is in charge of the 11 Technical Suport Center and his title is Emergency 12 Director. Then a person of Mr. Cahill's status is in 13 charge of the Emergency Operations Facility. Sc you have r~N 'll either Mr. Cahill, Mr. Deddens or Mr. Wygand in charge of 15 this operation. Then Dr. Draper would be in charge of the 16
, Emergency Communications Center.
II MR. EBERSOLE: I was wondering if you could la clarify sometning for me. In the event of a normal, and I 19 hesitate to say normal accident, but an accident which 20 is well controlled, there would be no big need to start a 21 great emergency evacuation program. 22 But if you had a degraded core, a " severe i 21 accident," my understanding was that the local technical 21 support center might in fact become non-occupied and you 25 wouuld have to go offsite to some place to an auxiliary D [d
' TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950 l
475 I site for control of the accident. Is that true? g Q 2 MR. CADWALLADER: On the emergency operations 3 facility.or the technical support center? l 4 MR. EBFRSOLE: You did have it shielded to the i I) standards of the control room? 6 MR. CADWALLADER: Yes, sir. I MR. EBERSOLE: But the standards of the control 8 room don't accommodate severe accident releases, not to my I 9 knowledge. I 10 MR. CADWALLADER: Yes, sir. 11 MR. EBERSOLE: So I suspect that you must leave f 12
-that both from a direct as well as a ingested dose 13 standpoint, and where do you go if you have to do that? I t
l m 11 understood there was one uptown. l IT) MR. CADWALLADER: The backup to the 16 emergency operations facility is in Baton Rouge. It is at- l 17 a Gulf States facility which has the communications there- ;
~18 also.
19 MR. EBERSOLE: So that in essence duplicates 20 that function in Baton Rouge? - 21 MR. CADWALLADER: It duplicates the emergency 22 operations facility, but it would be the place that Gulf 23 States would use as its operating center, yes, sir. , 2I MR. EBERSOLE: Okay. Thank you. 2') (Slide.)
,A TAYLOE ASSOCIATES I
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_ _ ,~.
y-I l 476 1 As I said earlier, the communications network i \
\~ ,/ 2 is the backbone of the whole emergency response system.
3 This block designated as the River Bend I Station stands for the three different emergency response 5 facilities being the main control room, the technical 6 support center and the emergency operations facility. I There are redundant communications systems 8 from these places to the parish sheriff's office and the 9 designated emergency operations centers and also back to 10 the State of Louisiana, to the Nuclear Energy Division, 11 the Louisiana Office of Emergcncy Preparedness and also 12 communications back to the Mississippi Highway Patrol and 13 the Mississippi Emergency Management Agency.
-s 16 Also there are communications back to the 7
V 15 NRC Region IV and NRC headquarters, the emergency 16 notification system and the health physics network. 17 MR. EBERSOLE: Do these communications systems 18 take into account the human factors of severe nippy 19 weather and winds and all that that are also associated 20 with loss of power? 21 MR. CADWALLADER: We have a backup with radios 22 so that we can maintain communications with these Il different parties that way. 26 MR. EBERSOLE: What about the transmission of Ti the paramedic information out of the reactors? OV TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 16251 STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
477 I MR. CADWALLADER: Through communication we can 2 have a way to transmit that information, and we have 3 status boards so that we can keep up with that information 8 in the different facilities. 5 MR. BOOKER: The backup facility in Baton Rouge 6 is the backup for the emergency operating facility which I was located in our training center. That is the facility 8 you are speaking of, right? 9 MR. UBERSOLE: Right. But the post-accident 10 monitoring systems, the most remote of these is where, you 11 know, the consoles. Where ih the most remote of these? I 12 am really asking where is that and are you assured it will 13 be there after a heavy weather accident?
-~ II MR. BOOKER: It is in the auxiliary building.
\ f ms 15 MR. EBERSOLE: That is the most remote of the 16 post-accident monitoring systems.
17 MR. BOOKER: Just a moment. We have a problem 18 with the terminology, post-accident sampling system and 19 post-accident monitoring, et cetera. i 20 MR. EBERSOLE: I am talking about the plant 21 parameters. 22 MR. BOOKER: Oh, you are talking about the ERA 21 system. The most remote location of the ERA system is in 25 the emergency operating facility which is in the training t 23 center. fo TAYLOE ASSOCIATES j ( 16251 STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293-3950 l \
,l ..
I 478 1 MR. EBERSOLE: I see. b(_,/ 2 MR. CADWALLADER: And then if something would i 3 happen where we would lose that, we have communications I such that-we can transmit that information out to the 5 emergency operations facility and keep track of it. I 6 MR. EBERSOLE: I see. Thank you. ! 7 (Slide.) 8 My last slide is an example of sequence of t j 9 events during an emergency using the example of the [
-10 emergency core cooling system being initiated and injected 11 into the reactor vessel where the shift supervisor 12 recognizes an off-normal condition and takes the following 13 actions.
<~ ll His first step is to implement the emergency I # -
14 operating procedure for the reactor vessel level control i i 16 because his primary responsibility is to take care of the 17 reactor. , 18 The second step through training is that EOP 19 implementation leads to a review of the emergency 20 implementing procedure classification of emergencies where 21 specific initiating conditions and emergency action levels . l~ 22 are spelled out. M i [ And this would designate which clarsification 28 of emergency, notification of an unusual event, alert, 23 site area emergency or general emergency, i l r
/~N TAYLOE ASSOCIATES
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1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950 1
479 I
,_. Under each one of these emergency implementing / \
( ,/ 2 procedures there is a list of other procedures that would 3 be implmented. You would take care of the notifications 4 through a specific emergency implementing procedure and 3 augment the emergency organization to step up the 6 different emergency response facilities. 7 That concludes my presentation. 8 MR. EBERSOLE: Do I have any questions from the 9 staff on either this topic or in a general context? 10 I am about to close this meeting. I No, sir. That is all I have. MR. WEINKAM: 12 MR. EBERSOLE: Are there any questions from the 13 audience or anybody prior to closure of this meeting? II g-'3 (No response.) (m-) I3 MR. EBERSOLE: Well, I want to thank all of you 16 for a fine presentation and your cooperation in answering II all these questions. 18 With that I hereby adjourn this meeting. 19 (Whereupon, at 5:05 p.m., the meeting 20 adjourned.) 21 ___ i 22 i w3 21 25 O
'\,
TAYLOE ASSOCIATES 1625 i STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 293 3950
g CERTIFICATE OF PROCEEDI::GS m ,
*(G -
This is to certify that the attached proceedinc;s before the 3 4 NRC COMMISSION 5 In the matter of: ACRS on River Bend Station 6 Date'of Proceeding: 8 June 1984 7 Place of Proceeding: Baton Rouge, Louisiana a were held as herein appears, and that this is the original
, transcript for the file of the Commission.
10 Mary C. Simons Official Reporter - Typed 12 .
) 13
( W A977 % Q) ,, Officia6 Reporter - Signature I is 16 . j 17 16 l 19 l . l 20 l 21 22 23 l' 24
\J 25 TAYLOE ASSOCI ATES REGISTERED PROFESSION AL REPOP.TERS
- NORFOLK, VIRGINIA l
l l l l I O l l l RIVER BEND ACRS l l SEISMIC HAZARD CHARACTERIZATION r PROGRAM - INTERIM RESULTS i i e I l I I i I , - i i k I i b l I
~
Q I l i I
o INTERIM RESULTS PRELIMINARY
. FEEDBACK NOT COMPLETED
. PEER REVIEW NOT COMPLETED
. KEY INPUT ASSUMPTIONS STILL BEING ASSESSED
. . OTHER HAZARD ESTIMATES ARE LIKELY TO BE
} VERY DIFFERENT DUE TO HIGHLY JUDGEMENTAL CHOICE i 0F_ INPUT PARAMETERS O i e e L .
~
o O v v N-,- - - ----. . , - - - - --
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. TABLE 2-1.
/
. EUS SEISMICITY PAPEL WJBERS .
Dr. Peter W. Basham(2}
. . 1. ,
,.g.<... .
J. - Professor Gilbert A. BollingerIlb4.'c?'/<'*.' *- ~ ~ II) Mr. Richaro J. Holt - Professor Arch C. Johnston
. Dr. Alan L. Kafka Professor James E. Lawson Professor L. Tim Long Professor Otto W. Nuttli( } (- }
~
Dr. Paul W. Pomercy II) ( Dr. J. Carl Stepp [D l Dr. Anne E. Stevens(3) Professor Ronald L. Street (1) Professor M. Nafi Toks5z(1)E(4) Dr. Carl M. Wentworth (3) c - w ,. c .;;;f. xfjotes,: .
, , . , (1)g, Also , participated in the ,SEP, Panels ,. ,.,g3.g.<,gif,,,,y.. .yy (2) Only provided zones and seismicity parameters for Canaoa C33 Cnly proviced zonation--no seismicity parameters AIse member of the Ground Motion Panel (Table 2-2)
('44 f ei e 8 e 5 . r g I d . . 8
% a'g '.* **"*59
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. ZONATION
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. RECURRENCE FOR ALL ZONES UFFER MAGNITUDE CUT 0FF l
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<V EXPERT UNCERTAINTIES , , ,
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. I EUS GROI.ND MOTION MODEL PANEL PFcFS - -
.-s :
- I i
David M. Boore l 6
. . .Kenneth. Campbell . . ~u v ..
. vi _,-
Professor Otto W. Nuttli(1)&(2) ' Professor Nafi Toks5z(2) Professor Mihailo Trifunac III . -
. P:cfessor Daniele Veneziano ,
i L
~.
S .I f i Notes: (1) Participated as a member of the SEP EUS Ground Motion Panel. { (2) Also member of the Seismicity Panel (See Table 2-1) l t t I f i l 1 t l
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I 4 LLNL ATTENUATION BOOKLET AFTER FIRST PANEL MEETING f
; .- . EXPERT WEIGHT VARIOUS GROUND MOTION MODELS '-7 ??C2st*1 '
- UNCERTAINTY ATTACHED TO EACH MODEL
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o 0 0 ' IMPORTANT DATES
- PROJECT AUTHORIZED 8/71 e LIMITED WORK AUTHORIZATION ISSUED 9/75 l e CONSTRUCTION PERMIT ISSUED 3/77 I
e CONSTRUCTION SLOW DOWN 9/77 l e FIRST CONCRET ')OUR 8/79
@ FUEL LOAD l . 4/85 l @ COMMERCIAL OPEL iTION 12/85 e CONST. 87% COMPLETE AS OF 5/1/84 j
l l 1 i
r. O' x . GULF STATES UTILITIES COMPANY OWNS AND OPERATES SIX INTERCONNECTED r ELECTRIC POWER STATIONS
'? '
t KILOWATTS e NECHES STATION l L' BEAUMONT 427,000 ! e SABINE STATION ~ l BRIDGE CITY 1,946,000 l e LEWIS CREEK STATION
- WILLIS 530,000 t O' "
.e ROY S. NELSON STATION l y
1
- WESTLAKE 1,314,000 l e LOUISIANA STATION l BATON ROUGE 277,000 -
I e WILLOW GLEN STATION ! BATON ROUGE 1,894,000 '
- e TOTAL GENERATING
CAPABILITY 6,388,000 l e 42% CO-OWNERSHIP : BIG CAJUN 2 UNIT 3 227,000 6,615,000 s,
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l rottoo stxo nestavore t CALVERT TRINITY u > MADISONVILLE R/VER BEND STATION i LEW/S 09EEg
" ST. FRANCISVI LLE i
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e C BATON LEVELAND NEdMS NAVASOTA 8
} STAT /0N LAFAYETTE g,,,, g gia L - c,,,LE, W/LLOW GLEN STATMN m
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s C? o GALVESTON G GULF OF MEX' /CO l
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RIVER BEND STATION GENERAL ELECTRIC - BOILING WATER REACTOR (BWR) STONE & WEBSTER ENGR. CORP. - A/E -- DESIGN & CONSTRUCTION GENERAL Ef.ECTRIC TURBINE / GENERATOR 3300 ACRE SITE - 25 MILES NORTH BATON ROUGE 2 MILES SOUTH ST. FRANCISVILLE 1 2 MILES EAST MISSISSIPPI RIVER - THERMAL RATING REACTOR - 2894 MWT ELECTRICAL OUTPUT NET. - 934 MWE l TURBINE / GENERATOR - 1040 PSIA l 550 F l CO-OWNER CEPCO - 30% GSU RESPONSIBLE FOR DESIGN, CONSTRUCTION & OPERATION i
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Z o m< O Z<L Lu F Z i CO Z G LU o$ U u L l O _ Q ! E l l
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SUPPRESSION WEIR WALL) POOL HORIZONTAL VENTS * "-"' I E
,-- ,, -.--..-m-,-,------,----w -,- - - - - - , - - , . , - - ,
9 i ; i l DESIGN REQUIREMENT ! I DRYWELL MUST BE DESIGNED FOR EXTERNAL PRESSURE (OR NEGATIVE DRYWELL PRESSURE EVENT) l 1 91VER BEND DESIGN l O o DRYWELL STRUCTURE AND SYSTEMS ARE DESIGNED FOR 1 l EFFECTS OF NEGATIVE DRYWELL PRESSURE WITHOUT ! VACUUM BREAKERS l l OTHER MARK lil'S DESIGN INCLUDES DRYWELL VACUUM BREAKERS __ i O
l O ! i i DESIGN REQUIREMENT . o SUPPRESSION POOL VENT COVERAGE MUST BE l
- MAINTAINED DURING BLOWDOWN EVENT !
O ECCS PUMP NPSH MUST BE MAINTAINED l RIVER BEND DESIGN o O, POOL INVENTORY IS ADEQUATE TO MAINTAINj ENT COVERAGE o CONCRETE FILL IN DW AND LOW WEIR WALL o ACTIVE SUPPRESSION POOL MAKE-UP IS NOT REQUIRED ! OTHER MARK lil'S ! o REQUIRE AUTOMATIC SUPPRESSION POOL MAKE-UP (UPPER POOL DUMP) _ ; l
O DESIGN FEATURE
! CONTAINMENT HEAT REMOVAL (SUPPRESSION POOL BYPASS MITIGATION)
RIVER BEND DESIGN 09 4R - SUPPRESSIONAND POOL COOLING MODE l 2 - SAFETY RELATED UNIT COOLERS l
- OTHER MARK lil'S RHR IN SUPPRESSION POOL COOLING MODE
, AND ! CONTAINMENT SPRAY MODE ._. 1 1 ,O ! l i l l
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1
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) DESIGN REQUIREMENT 1 CONTAINMENT MUST BE DESIGNED FOR I EXTERNAL PRESSURE i (NEGATIVE CONTAINMENT PRESSURE) l l
RIVER BEND DESIGN l o CONTAINMENT EXTERNAL PRESSURE DESIGN ! GREATER THAN NEGATIVE PRESSURE FROM i Q") IN ADVERTANT COOLDOWN l o INADVERTANT COOLDOWN TRANSIENT IS TERMINATED ! BY AUTOMATIC ISOLATION OF UNIT COOLERS l f i OTHER MARK lil'S !
' GRAND GULF, CLINTON - VACUUM BREAKERS l NOT REQUIRED !
PERRY, GESSAR - VACUUM BREAKERS REQUIRED - l l I
6 N g g t e O H C I T A U
~
L A S - V D S E A -- o BT OL RO RN F E W - M E N I N - A - T N _ O - 0 C _ l.l la l i ! E
i o O O I i i l RBS CONTAINMENT EVALUATION I FOR NEW LOADS l ! NEW LOADS l l l REACTOR BUILDING CONFIGURATION i l RBS EVALUATION TO DATE l CONCLUSIONS _ . . . l
! o o o l NEW LOADS l l SRV AND CO 1 VALVE,2 VALVES,7 VALVES (ADS) AND 16 VALVES DISCHARGE CASES LOCA ANNULUS P.RESSURIZATION (A-P) POOL SWELL CONDENSATION OSCILLATION (CO) CHUGGING .....
O O) O
- RBS CONTAINMENT PARAMETERS STANDARD 218 PLANT 1%" THICK VESSEL WITH STIFFENERS l AND ANNULUS CONCRETE FILL i 16 SRV'S l
, HIGHER HCU FLOOR i VENT STRUCTURE i 7.5' SUBMERGENCE j LOWER MAXIMUM DRYWELL PRESSURE QUENCHER SUPPORTS FROM DRYWELL ' t.- . . _ _ _..__ _ _ .- _ _ _ _ _ _ ___.__ _ __ _ - _- - - - _ - - _ - - - . - - -
/-
( RIVER BEND STATION MARK lli CONTAINMENT fPOLAR
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WEIR WALL O L
RBS EVALUATION TO DATE NSSS EQUIPMENT l RPV, RECIRCULATION, MAINSTEAM PIPING, HCU'S AND OTHER EQUIPMENT BALANCE OF PLANT STRUCTURES, PIPING AND EQUIPMENT C Hee 10
RBS EVALUATION TO DATE ! BALANCE OF PLANT l j e DYNAMIC ANALYSIS OF ALL REACTOR ! BUILDING STRUCTURES FOR SRV AND l LOCA LOADS l e SRV LOADS l STIFFENERS AND CONCRETE ANNULUS FILL ADDED TO THE CONTAINMENT VESSEL TO REDUCE DYNAMIC RESPONSES FOR PIPING AND EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATION e LOCA LOADS i CO AND CHUGGING - NOT SIGNIFICANT POOL SWELL AND A-P - SIGNIFICANT ~ . . .
- O Q O l POOL SWELL LOADS e BULK POOL SWELL AND FROTH j IMPACT AND DRAG LOADS
- ORIGINAL DESIGN BASED ON GESSAR
! APPENDIX 3B j VELOCITY = 40 fps FROTH IMPACT = 15 psi (HCU FLOOR) l FROTH DRAG (AP) = 11 psi ON EXPOSED AREA ONLY (HCU FLOOR)
- DRAFT NUREG 0978 CRITERIA l VELOCITY GRADIENT (V MAX = 50 fps) i FROTH IMPACT - VARIES WITH HEIGHT FROTH DRAG (AP) = 11 psi ON FULL AREA (HCU FLOOR) _ , , ,
i
I O O> O 4 i RBS POOL SWELL - OTHER EFFECTS l e INSTRUMENTATION LINES ' SHIELDING a MOVE TO OTHER AREAS e INCREASED PIPING RESPONSE AND SUPPORT REACTIONS
O O O ADDITIONAL CONTAINMENT ISSUES e MR. HUMPHREYS IDENTIFIED 22 AREAS OF CONCERN 66 TOTAL ISSUES ADDRESSED IN 50 ACTION PLANS ' e JUNE 23,1982 AND JULY 23,1982 NRC LETTERS REQUEST GSU RESPONSES e GSU RESPONSES AUGUST 13,1982 - OWNERS GROUP DECEMBER 9,1982 - ACTION PLANS APRIL 29,1982 - UPDATED RESPONSES AUGUST 15,1983 - STATUS JULY 1984 - GSU FINAL REPORT e NRC FEEDBACK TO DATE eGSU 14/66 GENERIC /52 PLANT SPECIFIC 57/66 COMPLETE RESPONSES PROVIDED 9/66 REQUIRE ADDITIONAL INFO e 1/10 SCALE TEST TO RESOLVE LOCAL ENCROACHMENT ANALYSIS CONCERNS _ .
.Os e ADDITIONAL CONTAINMENT ISSUES -
SUMMARY
e ACCEPTABLE ANALYSIS RESULTS FOR ALL ISSUES e ONE MINOR DESIGN CHANGE BEING PURSUED TO PREVENT A CONTAINMENT LOW AIR MASS SCENARIO e GSU IS CONTINUING TO WORK WITH CONTAINMENT ISSUES OWNERS GROUP TO RESOLVE ENCROACHED POOL SWELL ISSUES e GSU IS PROVIDING A REVISED ANALYSIS TO - ADDRESS NRC CONCERNS ABOUT THE RESPONSE OF RHR SYSTEM . i
RBS j HYDROGEN CONTROL PROGRAM ' PRESENTATION OVERVIEW 1 . r i e RBS HYDROGEN CONTROL SYSTEMS e RESOLUTION OF HYDROGEN CONTROL ISSUE e
SUMMARY
i
O O., O l RBS HYDROGEN CONTROL SYSTEMS FUNCTIONS
- o MONITOR HYDROGEN CONCENTRATION I o CONTROLS HYDROGEN CONCENTRATION IN DRYWELL AND l CONTAINMENT THROUGH
1
- 1. MIXING DRYWELL AND CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERES
- 2. REDUCING THE AMOUNT OF HYDROGEN WITH
, RECOMBINERS
- 3. REDUCING THE AMOUNT OF HYDROGEN BY CONTROLLED IGNITION (IGNITERS)
- 4. AS A BACKUP, PURGING THE CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE -~
l i o o. o l l RBS HYDROGEN CONTROL SYSTEMS l - (CONTD) l i f CONTROL SYSTEMS e CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE MONITORING SYSTEM e HYDROGEN MIXING SYSTEM e HYDROGEN RECOMBINER SYSTEM e HYDROGEN IGNITER SYSTEM e CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN PURGE SYSTEM _ , , , _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ , ~ . _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ . _ _ . . _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ .__.__.___ ,.._ _ .___,_ _ ____ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _
- g g, gm l RBS HYDROGEN CONTROL SYSTEMS l
4 HYDROGEN IGNITER SYSTEM l o 104 DISTRIBUTED IGNITERS o AX MUM 30 FEET S ARAT O BETWEEN OPERABLE IGNITERS; (BOTH DIVISIONAL POWER SUPPLIES OPERABLE) o MAXIMUM 60 FEET SEPARATION BETWEEN OPERABLE IGNITERS (ONE DIVISIONAL POWER SUPPLY OPERABLE) o MINIMUM OF TWO IGNITERS, ONE FROM EACH POWER SUPPLY, IN EACH SUBCOMPARTMENT
O O,, O RESOLUTION OF HYDROGEN CONTROL ISSUE l PROGRAM TO ADDRESS HYDROGEN PRODUCED IN l DEGRADED CORE ACCIDENTS o HYDROGEN CONTROL OWNERS' GROUP PROGRAMS o RBS CONTAINMENT ULTIMATE CAPACITY ANALYSIS I I o ADDITION OF HYDROGEN IGNITER SYSTEM TO RBS COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL SYSTEM o RBS ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT SURVIVABILITY EVALUATION PROGRAM 8 l __ , _ _ _ . , _ _ . . _ _ _ . . _ . _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ __ . _ . . . _ . _
RESOLUTION OF HYDROGEN CONTROL ISSUE HYDROGEN CONTROL OWNERS' GROUP PROGRAMS o GSU JOINED IN FORMATION OF HYDROGEN CONTROL OWNERS' l GROUP AND SUPPORTED HCOG PROGRAM ACTIVITIES GE STUDY OF ACCIDENT SCENARIOS AND SOURCE TERMS MARK 111 CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN-BURN RESPONSE ANALYSIS AND TOPICAL REPORT FOR CODE (CLASIX-3) 1/20 SCALE MODEL MARK 111 CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN i BURN TESTS IGNITION LIMITS TESTING (AECL/WHITESHELL LAB) _ E___.._--__--____-______-______----______-
O O, O';9s
~ ,
4 9 ,
~
R8 SOLUTION OF HVDROGEN
~
~
CONTROL'ISSUEQsONTD)~ _ v .
~
E_
- ~ ~ '
~
x .l
~ _m
~ . ..
3-oGSU CONTINUING SUPPORT OF O.NGOING HC6Gb o ~
~
~
~
PROGFlAMS
~
~ ~
s- _
.c : .,
HYDROGEN SOURCE TERM ANALYSIS ..
~
1/4 SCALE MODEL MARK lli CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN ' i COMBUSTIBLE ENVIRONMENT TsSTS HYDROGEN CONTROL EMERGENCY PROCEDURE GUIDELINE DEVELOPMENT ,,,
---,n- - - - , - ____
l o Q. o RESOLUTION OF HYDROGEN CONTROL ISSUE l l ! RBS CONTAINMENT ULTIMATE PRESSURE CAPACITY ANALYSIS
~
A. INTERNAL PRESSURE CONDITIONS e RBS DESIGN PRESSURE (INTERNAL) STEEL CONTAINMENT 15 PSID DRYWELL 25 PSID )j i
O O O RESOLUTION dF HYDROGEN CONTROL ISSUE (CONTD) e RBS ULTIMATE PRESSURE (INTERNAL) CAPACITY ' ANALYSIS ' STEEL CONTAINMENT 56 PSIG DRYWELL 80 PSIG l PERSONNEL ~AIRLOOK 72 PSIG EQUIPMENT HATCH 56 PSIG ) l OTHER PENETRATIONS 100 PSIG i e RBS - SPECIFIC CLASIX-3 ANALYSIS l HYDROGEN COMBUSTION (RESULTS DUE t PRESSURE (INTERNAL) JUNE 29,1984) ' j 1
o o o RESOLUTION OF HYDROGEN CONTROL ISSUE I RBS CONTAINMENT ULTIMATE PRESSURE CAPACITY ! ! ANALYSIS j B. EXTERNAL (NEGATIVE) PRESSURE CONDITIONS l e RBS DESIGN PRESSURE (EXTERNAL) . I STEEL CONTAINMENT 0.6 PSID ! DRYWELL 20 PSID i
RESOLUTION OF HYDROGEN CONTROL ISSUE (CONTD) e RBS ULTIMATE PRESSURE (EXTERNAL)' CAPACITY ANALYSIS STEEL CONTAINMENT (JUNE 29,1984) j DRYWELL (JUNE 29,1984) , r 4 e MAXIMUM EXTERNAL PRESSURE FOR HYDROGEN COMBUSTION / COOL-DOWN EVENT j STEEL CONTAINMENT (JUNE 29,1984)
- DRYWELL (JUNE 29,1984)
)
i o Q o
- RESOLUTION OF HYDROGEN I
CONTROL ISSUE i i ! RBS ESSENTIAL EQUIPMEhlT SURVIVABILITY EVALUATION PROGRAM o DEFINE CRITERIA FOR ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT ; o DEVELOP ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT LISTING o EVALUATE ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT SURVIVABILITY BASED ON CLASIX-3 THERMAL ENVIRONMENT l o EVALUATE ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT SURVIVABILITY BASED ON 1/4 SCALE TEST THERMAL ENVIRONMENT o PROVIDE ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT PROTECTION MEASURES AS REQUIRED i
O O, b - RBS HYDROGEN CONTROL PROGRAM i l
SUMMARY
o INTEGRATED PROGRAM TO ADDRESS H 2 CONTROL ISSUE o MULTIPLE SYSTEMS PROVIDED FOR HYDROGEN CONTROL
- o CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY WILL BE ASSURED FOR BOTH l
POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE PRESSURE. CONDITIONS 0 ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT SURVIVABILITY WILL BE ASSURED FOR DEFLAGRATION AND DIFFUSION H 2 COMBUSTION l o ADDITIONAL CONFIRMATORY ANALYSIS AND TESTING l UNDERWAY TO RESOLVE H2 CONTROL ISSUES
O 03 O I UNINTERRUPTIBLE POWER SUPPLY- 120V AC PANEL i
- SAFETY RELATED INSTRUMENTATION LOADS l o CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERIC MONITORING l o LEVEL AND PRESSURE ACCIDENT MONITORING RECORDERS
! O LPCS INSTRUMENTATION i o ROD CONTROL AND INFORMATION SYSTEM l o STANDBY SERVICE WATER SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION I o ANALOG INSTRUMENTATION PANEL
- o ANALOG ISOLATORS I o DRYWELL INSTRUMENTATION j o EMERGENCY RESPONSE AND INFORMATION SYSTEM j o ESF INSTRUMENTATION - . .
4
- . _ . . . . - , . . . - . . ~ - -
O
~
O O STATION ONE LINE DIAGRAM g 230KV SWITCHYARD g s s s s ss
- MAIN l MAIN l
TRANS W W TRANS 2145 f
-230KV T 21-45 -230KV NORM PFD NORM PFD NORM PFD SVCE j j SVCE j j SVCE SVCE j j SVCE yj SVCE 22 ep p n 220 ( q rn 22 230 e n rn r n 22-4.16 r n 230-13.8KV -13.8KV 13.8KV 4.16KVj > -4.16KV 4 4.16KV se s e s e sr NORM NORM
\ /
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480V S/B BUS 1 480V S/B 480V S/B BUS 3 3500KW 4.16KV S/B DG A Cases ese
.__._____ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ __ ___ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ - . _ _ _ __,.___.,em,__ . , . _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ . . . . . _ _ _ . . _ , _ _ _ _ , _ _ , _ _ , , _ _ _ , , . . . _ , , , _ , _ , _ _
CLASS 1E AC DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (ONE DIVISION SHOWN, TYPICAL FOR OTHER DIVISION) gl l i ALTERNATE SUPPLY STANDBY DIESEL GENERATOR PFD STA SVCE XFMR. 4.18KV NORM. BUS 4.16KV 3500KW IRTX-XSRIC l P877 P877 P877 UNDER VOLTAGE (UV) 0000 uy 0000 0000 . d g_. .h--TRIP g- -
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~ O l' Ol
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PGCC PGCC yy 0000 0000 480V LOAD CENTER TRIP ---?' I 2b TYPICAL l MOTOR LOADS MISC. LOAD BATTERY CHARGER l 50HP 250HP UP TO 250KW l 480 VOLT pygg MOTOR CONHOL CENM ( J C l
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O t MOTOR LOADS MISC. LO AD 1/2HP 50HP UP TO 50KW UPS 480 - 120/240 VOLTS DISTRIBUTION XFMR. 120/240 VOLT MOTOR LOADS < 1/2HP DISTRIBUTION PNL c ..u
O O O CLASS 1E DC DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (ONE DIVISION SHOWN, TYPICAL FOR OTHER DIVISION) TO 8ACK-UP BATTERY 440V AC CHARGER LOAD CENTER
~
_ 125 VOLT
/ BATTERY q 8ATTERY CHARGER J\ , j\
125 VOLT DC SWITCHGEAR ! A) l W 125 VOLT DC
- 480V AC 480V AC DISTRIBUTION PANEL
- MCC MCC 6 6 I UNINTERRUPTISLE i
POWER SUPPLY 1 120V AC DISTRIBUTION PANEL (SAFETY RELATED INSTRUMENTATION) c,....
O On O *' 125V DC SYSTEM SAFETY RELATED LOADS ' o UNINTERRUPTIBLE POWER SUPPLY (UPS) o 125V DC MCC - (RCIC) e DIESEL GENERATOR EXITATION CABINET 1 o DIESEL GENERATOR RELAY CABINET ! O SAFETY RELATED SWITCHGEAR CONTROL l POWER I o CONTROL ROOM RELAY PANELS - .- [ 1
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.,: 6 TO CAJUN NO. 2 SOUTHERN COMPANY g CAJUN NO. 1 0 O l
r-l s U O* C 2 C COLY Zi L 3 l : O A C WEBRE WILLOW f , GLEN ! N - -- L . P . &L . i L.P.&L. ' l kN L.P.&L. , l . l BATON ROUGE 500 & 230KV O' SYSTEM
- SCCKV 230KV 1985 i
_-----n , - . _ _ . _ _ . . _ . , _ -_ , . - - - _ ,,,
-___e - , , , - , - -
- sacz :
i O . - -- l BATON ROUGE AREA SYSTEft:
._FOUR INCOMING 500KV LINES 500KV LOOP I 230KV NETWORK I l
P THREE 500-230KV SUBSTATIONS: FANCY POINT >
- WILLOW GLEN i i
O COLY ! i FOUR EXISTING PLANTS WILLOW GLEN 18914f3l LOUISIANA STATION 277iB1 . Bro CAJUN 1 (CEPCO) 230f1W ! BIG CAJUN 2 (CEPC0/GSU) 1620MW i i l : l I 1 ( O i
I ,- , RIVER BEND SYSTEM - FAitCY POI!!T SUBSTATIOi! 2 - 500 KV LI?lES
,. 500KV RHlG BUS SUBSTATION -
500/230KV TRANSFORMER, 4 POLES 230KV BREAKER AND ONE-HALF SUBSTATION 4 - 230KV LI!!ES 2 - STATION SERVICE LEADS REDUNDAtlT LINE RELAYING REDUt1 DANT TRAtiSFORMER AND BUS RELAYING o I LO
N ,I [' . RSS RSS UNIT UNIT UNIT 1 1 1 NORTH
- _ _ _ . _ _.230KV
'I 4 J J J 4 4 4 yeus
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N N .1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1,s00TH 230KV e , . Bus V% - CEPC0 Ic3 I3 I3 i EORP DUAY PORP l L IlUDSCN llUDSON i 500KV 500KV L-746 L-752 CEPC0 McKNIGili I
'c. ...
FANCY POINT SUBSTATION , ONE-LINE DIAGRAM R
. _ _ _ - . . _ . _ ~ ___ - _ . . _ . _ _ . . - - - _ _ _ _ . . __ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . - _ . _ _ _ _ . - . _ - _ _
; O O O "'? .
l i l l SYSTEM RELIABILITY ! e ANNUAL LOAD FLOW STUDIES l l e STABILITY STUDIES , e 500KV SYSTEM RELIABILITY BETTER THAN 1 OUTAGE /100 MILES / YEAR ' l e AVERAGE GRID OUTAGE TO EXISTING PLANTS i 1 EVENT PER 21.5 PLANT YEARS -- l L - __ _ ________ __-_______ _ _____ _____ __ _ _____ _ _ ___-_ _ _
s r c. , O O . RELIABILITY OF OFFSITE POWER TO GSU - AND CEPCO PLANTS C.O. PLANT L.O.P. OR PLANT DATE YEARS ISOLATION l CAJUN 1 1970 14 2 l CAJUN 2 1981 3 2 i i LEWIS CREEK 1970 14 2
- LOUISIANA STATION 1930 54 2 NECHES 1938 46 1 l NELSON 138KV 1959 25 NELSON 230KV 1970 14 ; SABINE 138KV 1962 22 1
! SABINE 230KV 1974 10 WILLOW GLEN 138KV 1960 24 1 ! WILLOW GLEN 230KV 1973 11 ! 237 11 4 11 L.O.P./237 PLANT YEARS = 1 EVENT /21.5 PLANT YEARS _,,,
. . - , _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ ~ . . _ _ . _ _ _ - - _ -
O O O "* . l RELIABILITY OF OFFSITE POWER TO GSU PLANTS C.O. PLANT L.O.P. OR PLAh'T DATE YEARS ISOLATION l LEWIS CREEK 1970 14 2
- LOUISIANA STATION 1930 54 2 l NECHES 1938 46 1
! NELSON 138KV 1959 25 NELSON 230KV 1970 14 , SABINE 138KV 1962 22 1 SABINE 230KV 1974 10 ) WILLOW GLEN 138KV 1960 24 1 l WILLOW GLEN 230KV 1973 11 . 220 7 7 L.O.P./220 PLANT YEARS = 1 EVENT /31.4 PLANT YEARS -
----,-r-------- ,____-----------------------v-=-w---- - , -- - _ - _u - . --- e- - ------_----,-x,,--or--e --eme~~--,w-m ,,w n-- - +- -
l O 03 Ou i l I STATION BLACKOUT ANALYSIS CONCLUSIONS e DRYWELL PRESSURE LESS THAN DESIGN PRESSURE ' e CONTAINMENT PRESSURE LESS THAN DESIGN PRESSURE e DRYWELL TEMPERATURE LESS THAN DESIGN TEMPERATURE e CONTAINMENT TEMPERATURE ONLY 8 F ABOVE DESIGN VALUE e POOL TEMPERATURE 32 F BELOW SATURATION TEMPERATURE e ADEQUATE QUENCHING AND NPSH _ . _ _ _ . . _ . . . . . . _ . - . _ . _ , . . , - . _ . . _ . _ _ _ _ , . _ , . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . . - . , _ . , . . . -_ . _ _ _ _ , , - . _ _ _ , _ _ . _ . _ _ , _ _ - , . . _ _ , , . _ _ . - , . _ _ . _ . . . , . _ - - . . _.___.___.m.__ , , , . . . . . - , -
O O3 O '"" RBS DC POWER SYSTEM ANALYSIS AND DESIGN INCLUDE A FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA) PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS IN FMEA WERE: o DONE DOWN TO COMPONENT LEVEL CHAFi3ERS BUS PANELS FUSES RELAYS o FMEA PERFORMED FOR INDIVIDUAL SYSTEMS REQUIRED FOR SAFETY AND INCLUDES THE EFFECT OF LOSS OF POWER o ALL FMEA SUBMITTED AS PART OF FSAR _,
O O O , RBS DC POWER SYSTEM CONFORMS TO IMPROVEMENTS RECOMMENDED IN NUREG 0666 1.a. 3 INDEPENDENT DC TRAINS, ONE PER SAFETY RELATED DIVISION.
- b. ADDITIONALLY SWITCHYARD IN SEPARATE BATTERY
- 2. USE OF AC UNINTERRUPTABLE POWER (CONVERTED FOR DC POWER) FOR ACTUATION AND CONTROL OF EACH SAFETY RELATED INSTRUMENTATION AND CRITICAL LOAD TRAIN l 3. NO BUS TIE DIRECT BREAKERS BETWEEN SYSTEMS l4. RBS HAS PROVISIONS TO CONNECT A BACKUP BATTERY
- CHARGER l5. SURVEILLANCE PROCEDURES J6. MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES -.....
l
O 03 O' l STATION BLACKOUT ANALYSIS ASSUMPTIONS l l e LOSS OF ALL AC POWER e SCRAM AT TIME ZERO e NO ECCS EXCEPT RCIC ) e SRVs AUTOMATICALLY MAINTAIN REACTOR ! PRESSURE
- e NO ACTIVE HEAT REMOVAL - . . .
l
O O O ACRS - STATION BLACKOUT 671 (671) 1EN8* BAT 01 A 600 -
- DUTY CYCLE - EXISTING (FROM CALC. E-143)
DUTY CYCLE - ASSUMING STATION AC BLACKOUT sm- (NOTE: INCLUDES 100A CONTINUOUS i (456) (451) FOR UPS) S O. E '
$. 4n_ '
p (336)
- 3 ~-i !
g 300-(270) {
-) -
o (270) 200-(102) l (146) (146) 100 - j - - 1 MIN j O ' ' 1 MlN 11 MIN 239 240 10 MIN MIN MIN 8 H JURS TIME
-_ - _ . , _ _ , _ _ . , _ . _ . . . _ _ _ , ,.__.,%,,.m_ , . . , ,_.._m .
--_.---._,-3-,,,_._._-%-....,.,.,w ..,..,m,,,,,%.---n- -,m .w - , _ , ..--,,-_,,,,,,..-c -
w,, --,en+--------- , - - w--- --w
O O O STATION BLACKOUT ANALYSIS l RESULTS AT 12 HOURS l l DRYWELL PRESSURE 18.4 PSIG CONTAINMENT PRESSURE 14.2 PSIG ! DRYWELL TEMPERATURE 306 F l I ~ CONTAINMENT TEMPERATURE 193 F l ! POOL TEMPERATURE 229 F (TSAT = 261 F) ' 4 i
O 06 O" l RIVER BEND l DIESEL QUALIFICATION PLOGRAM INITIATED BY GSU IN NOVEMBER 1983 i I OBJECTIVES: e EVALUATE THE TDI DIESELS AT RIVER BEND e DETERMINE WHAT IS NECESSARY TO ASSURE RELIABLE STANDBY POWER RESOURCES INCLUDE: e RIVER BEND PROGRAM e TDI OWNERS' GROUP PARTICIPATION - . . . .
O OUA ^ DELAVAL~ um sume men mum - OWN S' PR R JOHN HAMILTON OA MNNING AND SCHEDUUNG MIME SEARCY JIM SHIPP I I I I I I DIESEL ENGINEERING UCENSING F.A.A. TDI S&W (CHOC) SRI TESTING REVIEW CUFF WELLS TASK FORCE (PALQ ALTO) GARY RODGERS JIM BAKER VINCE KLCO JOHN PRICE LEE DUCK R. NESSITT (SITE) G. DRISCOLL e TEST PROGRAM e SUPPORT OWNERS e INTERFACE TO e ANALYSIS e ANALYSl$ e TECHNICAL SUPPORT eINDEPENDENT PLANNING AND GROUP DESIGN NRC e TEST PROGRAM e DESIGN INPUT e LOAD EVALUATSON REVIEW PROCEDURES REVIEW $NPUT e PRODUCT UPGRADES e INSTRUMENTATION e TEST PROGRAM e CONSTRUCTION e AlvER SEND e INSTRUMENTATION e TEST PROGRAM SYSTEMS INPUT
!NTERFACE DESIGN REVIEW INPUT INPUT e INSTRUMENTATION e DATt. ACQUISITION e REVIEW DELAVAL e OPERATING HISTORY PROGRAMINPUT FOR DYNAMIC e DATA REDUCTION UPGRADES INPUT e ENGINE DESIGN TEST e DESIGN FEATURES e DEFINEINSPECTION e WARRANTY REPAIRS EXPERTISE REVIEW e ENGINE TESTING AND MONITORING PROGRAM e PRODUCT UPGRADE REVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS
- TRANSFER OF SMPS TECHNOLOGY TO RIVER SEND = = =
O O O l RIVER BEND DIESEL ACTIVITIES l I i DESIGN INDUSTRY PRESERVICE REVIEW EXPERIENCE INSPECTION 4 1 i' SUCCESSFUL 3 r 3 7 3 r TEST QUALIFICATION 3 REWORK 4 AND -- 7 l INSPECT SURVEILLANCE 4 AND MONITORING em l l l l
O O,, ' O"
SUMMARY
OF ACTIVITIES DESIGN REVIEW OWNERS' GROUP e 16 GENERIC PROBLEMS (PHASE 1)
- RIVER BEND SPECIFIC (PHASE II)
RIVER BEND ' e REVIEW OF OWNERS' GROUP REPORTS
- e SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS BY GSU, SWEC, CONSULTANTS INDUSTRY EXPERIENCE
! OWNERS' GROUP DATA j OBSERVATION OF INSPECTIONS AT OTHER PLANTS -.- E__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - -__
O Os O
SUMMARY
OF ACTIVITIES (CONTD) PRESERVICE INSPECTION i VENDOR AND SUBVENDOR INSPECTIONS: l TDI, ELECTRIC PRODUCTS, WOODWARD, RTE DELTA PRELIMINARY TEST OF COMPONENTS AND SUBSYSTEMS l . ! VISUAL INSPECTION OF OVER 60 ITEMS SELECTED, l BASED ON INDUSTRY EXPERIENCE I j PRESERVICE DISASSEMBLY AND INSPECTION, ) USING OWNERS' GROUP CRITERIA -- i ) l'
O Os O""' l l l
SUMMARY
OF ACTIVITIES (CO~NTD) l l REWORK e PISTONS AND RINGS 4 o VALVE PUSHRODS l e CYLINDER HEAD STUDS I e CYLINDER LINERS I l e TURBOCHARGER LUBRICATION ) e JACKET WATER PUMP
- e TURBOCHARGER BRACKET i e FUEL INJECTION TUBING j e FUEL INJECTION PUMP RETURN LINE l e FUEL INJECTOR NOZZLE TIPS j e IDLER GEAR LOCKNUT i e OTHER DESIGN REVIEWS IN PROGRESS L __. -. .. - _. .. ..
O Op O " '" l
SUMMARY
OF ACTIVITIES (CONTD) : l TESTING l
- e CRANKSHAFT TORSIONAL VIBRATION i e CRANKSHAFT BENDING STRESS ,
o ENGINE VIBRATION e ENGINE PERFORMANCE e TURBOCHARGER BEARING LUBRICATION AND COOLING e TURBOCHARGER BRACKET VIBRATION POST TEST INSPECTION INSERVICE SURVEILLANCE AND MONITORING -- e._.-_- - - . - - - .. _ - _ . . ~ . . _ . . _ - . _ _ . , - . . . _ _ _ . _ . - _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - . , _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - - - _ . - _ _ . _ . . - - . - - . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - - , _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - - . _ _ _ - , _ _ _ _ _ _ _
l i 0 03 0"' i I - 1 l QUALIFICATION OF TDI ENGINES IS CONSIDERED FEASIBLE I l
- 1. RESOLUTIONS OF MAJOR FAILURES WILL BE PROVIDED l BY OWNER'S GROUP i
l 2. ADDITIONAL KNOWN AND LATENT PROBLEMS CAN BE RESOLVED BY DESIGN REVIEW, INSPECTION, REWORK, AND TESTING
- 3. SURVEILLANCE AND MONITOR!NG PROGRAM WILL BE DEVELOPED _ , , ,
I i
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- 5. SYSTEM PUMP 10. REACTOR CAVITY SPARGERS .
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- 4. MANUAL REMOTE CONTROL VALVE 9. SERVICE WATER l
- 5. FULL FLOW BYPASS _
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O Op O REACTOR VESSEL MAKE-UP WATER
- CONDENSATE /FEEDWATER SYSTEMS l e REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING
! (RCIC)
- HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY (HPCS) e RESIDUAL HEAT R.EMOVAL (RHR) i e LOW PRESSURE CORE SPRAY (LPCS) -.
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- 3. MAIN STEAM 9. TURBINE EXHAUST i'
- 4. FEEDWATER 10. CONDENSATE FROM CONDENSATE STORAGE 5.RPV TANK OR RHR HEAT EXCHANGER
- 6. SUPPRESSION POOL 11. STEAM TO RHR HEAT EXCHANGERS ;
- 12. SUPPRESSION POOL STRAINER i t
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- 1. CONTAINMENT 6. CONDENGATE STORAGE I
- 2. DRYWELL INITIAL SOURCE
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- 4.RPV 8. INJECTION VALVE
- 5. SUPPRESSION POOL 9. SUPPRESSION POOL STRAINER l
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- 4. SYSTEM PUMP 8. SUPPRESSION POOL STRAINER l I
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O Q 0 36 RIVER BEND STATION AMI STUDY RESULTS
' ~~
COLOR LEGEND.
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= .A.;.A J,6.s 15 l _,2._.[ EVENT TREE ANALYSIS
=
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m - e* A d -- - M . 2.1 ^ 1 _, . t . 1,t_ . 7.'.w _ L_....- m .
..- __ . m 68 [. ._> ,a TOTAL NO. OF VARIABLES IDENTIFIED c ...
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FIGURE 1 3Be i ACCIDENT MONITORING ' O INSTRUMENTATION STUDY l IMPLEMENTATION METHODOLOGY ! l EVENT TREE OPERATING REG. GUIDE 1.97 ANALYSIS REVISION 3 PROCEDURES VAR VAR VAR , LIST LIST LIST ! I f
= INPUT DATA COMPOSITE . RANGE O CATEGORIZATION STUDY m
- VARIABLE LIST O e LOCATION
- INSTRUMENT ID l
- SEOUENCE NO. i
- SPDS SIG lD
\
LICENSING AND REVIE1Y I L TECHNICAL 7 DISCREPAh.CIES ! REQUIREMENTS DCRDR , l l RESOLUTION OF Q DISCREPANCIES l f ..... I l
O ( O i 4 TABLE 1 COMPOSITE LIST OF ACCIDENT MONITORING VARIABLES d SOURCE ! z U U U 5 ~ m o O 2
$m VARIABLE INSTRUMENT ID BENCHBO D S G ID RANGE l
1 REACTOR VESSEL WATER LEVEL I' X X X 1821*LTN044C D 1 1H13*P601 821EA001 209 - 409 IN (FUEL ZONE) 1
*PTN062A,8 1H13*P680 007 521 - 581 IN (NARROW)
*LTN041C C33EA024
*LTN027 361 - 581 IN (WIDE RANGE) i 027 521 921 IN (SHUTDOWN) 1C33*LTN017 i
*LTN004A,8,C 521 - 701 IN (UPSET)
I i 2 REACTOR VESSEL PRESSURE X X X 1C33*PTN005 1 1H13*P680 821EA004 01200 PSIG
*PTN004A 850-1050 PSIG 1821*PTN062A,8 ,1H13 *r*601 013 0-1500 PSIG C33EA028
) 033 4 { 0 3 DRYWELL PRESSURE X X X 1 CMS *PT2A,8 1 1H13*P808 CMSPY024 0-50 PSIA 025 l. I 4 CONTAINMENT /DRYWELL HYDROGEN CONCENTRATION X X X 1 CMS *AT25A,8 1 1H13*P808 CMSYY001 l 0 10% HYDROGEN (NARROW) 2 1 002 0 30% HYDROGEN (WIDE) 5 SUPPRESSION POOL LEVEL X X X 1 CMS
- LIT 23A,8 1 1H13*P808 CMSLYO28 MINUS 18 - 4 FT MEASURED 3 029 FROM NORMAL POOL LEVEL c ...
. . , . . _ - - . . _ , . . . - - _ . . . - . - . - - - - - - - - ~ + ' - -- -
! O O) O' !~ ) ATWS . } DESIGN FEATURES INCLUDED !
- TRIP RECIRCULATION PUMP ON ATWS
- MODIFIED SCRAM DISCHARGE VOLUME e MSIV TRIP AT LEVEL 1
\ - e OPERATOR TRAINING AND SIMULATOR EXPERIENCE FOR REACTIVITY CONTROL _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ . . . . . _ _ . . _ . _ . . _ _ _ . . . _ . . _ , . _ _ _ _ _ _ . . . . . . . _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . - _ _ _ . _ . . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . . _ . _ _ _ _ . ~ _ . . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . . .
o o o ATWS (CONTD) l POTENTIAL DESIGN CHANGES
- DUAL SLC PUMP OPERATION e INDEPENDENT / REDUNDANT SCRAM AIR HEADER EXHAUST VALVES (ARI) e INCREASED RELIABILITY OF REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM ._....
i i l L-----_--._-.-_---_.___.-_--___-. _ _ - _ -___ _ _ _ ____ _ - _ _ _ __ _ --- -
ANTICIPATED TRANSIENT WITHOUT SCRAM - ATWS . O GSU INVOLVEMENT IN ATWS OWNERS GROUP , o SUPPORT FOR UTILITY PROPOSED RULEMAKING o NRC FINAL RULE REQUIREMENTS ! o FUTURE MODIFICATIONS o PLANT MODIFICATIONS COMPLETED _ _ _ _ - . . _ , - _ - - _ . . _ , _ _ - _ _ . , . - . . _ _ - _ - _ . _ . . - , . -- _ , - _ _ . _ _ _ , ~ . - .
O On O PROBABILISTIC RISK ASSESSMENT (PRA) SYSTEMS INTERACTION ANALYSIS ' l (SIA) l e GSU'S PHILOSOPHY TO' WARDS PRA/SIA
- e SIA TECHNIQUES USED IN DESIGN
! OF RIVER BEND l i ePRA MINI PRA e FUTURE USES OF PRA/SIA TECHNIQUES EXPANDED PRA l
I 1 PLANS FOR INDEPENDENT AUDIT i OF PLANT WITH DESIGN e GSU ASSESSMENT OF NEED PREVIOUS AUDIT EXPERIENCE GSU QA, NRC, INPO, CNRC MINIMlZED INTERFACE S&W (CONSTR./ASE), GE(NSS) i I i L_ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ - . . _ - - . . _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - . _ _ _ _ . - _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _
; O NUCLEARO iVIEW BOARD O
{ MEMBERSHIP ' ! CHAIRMAN: SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT - EXTERNAL AFFAIRS ALTERNATE CHAIRMAN: l VICE PRESIDENT - RIVER BEND NUCLEAR GROUP , MEMBERS: ! VICE PRESIDENT- ADMINISTRATION MANAGER - POWER PLANT ENGINEERING & DESIGN MANAGER - ENGINEERING, NUCLEAR FUELS & LICENSING : ' RIVER BEND STATION PLANT MANAGER DIP 9CTOR - QUALITY ASSURANCE j DihdCTOR - NUCLEAR PLANT ENGINEERING DIRECTOR - NUCLEAR LICENSING MINIMUM OUORUM:
~
CHAIRMdN (OR HIS ALTERNATE) AND 4 MEMBERS (NO MORE THAN 2 ALTERNATES)
- /
SOARD COMMITTEE GULF STATES manuse ON m UTILITIES NUCLEAR SAFETY SOARD OF DIRECTORS g j NUCLEAR SAFETY CHAIRMAN OF THE 80ARD ADVISORY AND j COMMITTEE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER 1 P.W. MUA8MLL i I f SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT RIVER BEND NUCLEAP l GROUP CORPORATE NUCLEAR W.J. CAHaLL j REVIEW COMMITTEE / NUCLEAR REVIEW BOARD """"* l ovatggy g ASSURANCE E.8. MAM CHA4RMA38 VICE PRESIDENT
- C" RIVER BEND NUCLEAR GROUP J.C. DEDODes EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT
! I I I VICE PRESIDENT I ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES PROJECT MANAGER MGR.-ENGINETRING, PLANT MANAGER NUCLEAR FUELS
& LICENSING J.G. WlEGAleO J.H. CUALEss J E. 800KEA 1
l l
- , , - - --w .vr v -,v- v_- , , , , - , - . . , - - , - , , _ - - - ,
,- - . .v,_-.vw,-., - - - - , - - - - - -
< O SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT RBNG W.J. CAHILL, JR.
MANAGER
- QUALITY ASSURANCE l T.C. CROUSE i
j VICE PRESIDENT j RBNG J.C. DEDDENS I I I I I I i VICE FRESIDENT PLANT PROJECT ENGINEERING, NUCLEAR ADMINISTRATION MANAGER MANAGER FUELS, & LICENSING i i j J.G. WElGAND J.H. CURLESS J.E. BOOKER i I
! I I I ASST. PLANT ASST. PLANT
] MANAGER MANAGER i SERVICES OPERATIONS i P.D. GRAHAM P.E. FREEHILL f ] o OFFICE SERVICES
- TECHNICAL SUPPORT e OPERATIONS e START-UP e NUCLEAR PLANT ENGINEERING j eRECORDS
- ADMINISTRATION e MAINTENANCE e CONTRACT MANAGEMENT e NUCLE AR LICENSING l 0 TRAINING e MATERIALS MANAGEMENT
- RADIATION PROTECTION / e PROJECT ENGINEERING e NUCLE AR FUELS o SECURITY CHEMISTRY e CONSTRUCTION e EMERCENCY PLANNING l1 O ENWRONMENTAL
- COST l MONITORING e SCHEDULING
; ePROCUREMENT o ACCOUNTING c i
s u -- . - . _ _ - - . . . . _ . - - - . . - - - - _._ - . - ....- - - - . - - . . - _ ._ _ . __ ______-__ _ _.__ ____ _ -
~
! o o o l FACILITY REVIEW COMMITTEE
- MEMBERS RESPONSIBILITIES l ASSISTANT PLANT MGR POTENTIAL UNREVIEWED SAFETY OPERATIONS QUESTIONS i
), OPERATIONS SUPERVISOR PROGRAM REVIEW j RADIATION PROTECTION j TECHNICAL SUPERVISOR POST ACCIDENT SAMPLING SECURITY PLAN i GENERAL MAINTENANCE EMERGENCY PLAN SUPERVISOR SAFETY RELATED MODIFICATIONS RAD. CHEM SUPERVISOR TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION l REACTOR ENGINEERING CHANGES SUPERVISOR TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SITE ENGINEERING NON-COMPLIANCE SUPERVISOR l TESTS AND EXPERIMENTS l OPERATIONS QA j SUPERVISOR ABNORMAL EVENT REVIEW SPECIAL REVIEWS I
O Os O RIVER BEND STATION RADIATION /CHEMI'JTRY SECTION ORGANIZATION CHART ASSISTANT PLANT MANAGER OPERATIONS P.E. FREEHILL I RADIATION / CHEMISTRY SUPERVISOR M.CASSADA
- I I l
RAD PROTECTlqN CHEMISTRY RAD HEALTH SUPERVISOR SUPERVISOR SUPEhVISOR C. FANTACCI C.NASH ! I I I i i i s i ! s I RAD PROT. HEALTH CHEMICAL LEAD CHEMISTRY RADIATION HEALTH FOREMAN-2 PHYSICIST ENGINEER CHEMIST FOREMAN SPECIALIST PHYSICIST l I I - I I I RADIATION RADIATION NUCLEAR RADIATION RADIATION PROTECTION PROTECTION CHEMISTRY PROTECTION PROTECTION j TECHS.15 TECHS-2 TECHS-4 TECHS 2 TECHS.2 1 , SHIFT COMPLEMENT t CHEM. TECH. 1 RAD PROT. TECH. I l
O O O ! RIVER BEND STATION l OPERATION SECTION ORGANIZATION CHART l 1 ASSISTANT PLANT MANAGER . OPERATIONS P.E. FREEHILL I l OPERATIONS SUPERVISOR C. BOGOLIN i I ASSISTANT OPERATIONS SUPERVISOR T. FREDIEU l I i SHIFT SUPERVISORS - 6 R. JACKSON R. HOMLL D.HARTZ M. BISHOP l l i I I l l RADWASTE FOREMAN l l CONTROL OPERATING FOREMAN ~ 6 l I I l NUCLEAR EQUIPMENT OPERATORS - 6 l l NUCLEAR CONTROL OPERATORS - 18 l I j SHIFT COMPLEMENT l NUCLEAR EQUIPMENT OPERATORS - l24 l 1 SHIFT SUPERVISORS - SRO 1-COF CONTROL OPERATING FOREMEN - SRO 3-NCO NUCLEAR CONTROL OPGATOR - RO l 4-NEO NUCLEAR EQUIPMENT OPERATOR l 1-NEO. RW NUCLEAR EQUIPMENT OPERATOR-RADWASTE _ 1 .
1 O O, O RIVER BEND STATION l ! OPERATIONS GROUP ORGANIZATION CHART ) PLANT MANAGER (' ._ _ l l ASSISTANT PLANT l MANAGER i OPERATIONS P.E. FREEHILL 1 l I I RADIATION MAINTENANCE OPERATIONS PROTECTION-CHEMISTRY J. BURTON C. BOGOLIN M.CASSADA
O Oy 0 ' ' l i RIVER BEND STATION MAINTENANCE SECTION ORGANIZATION CHART 1 ASSISTANT PLANT MANAGER OPERATIONS 9.E. FRE EH8LL I ! GENERAL MAINTENANCE l SUPERVISOR J. DURTON l I l I I I MECHANICAL MAINTENANCE l&C ELECTRICAL MAINTENANCE SUPERVISOR SUPERVISOR SUPERVISOR J. WENASLE L. THOMPSON H.ROARK ME_. i M_ i
..O I.
I j FOREMAN-4 FOREMAss.3 FOREMAN 4 h i M =E FORE MAN.2 i i I I I I nEPainMEu uTsury wonuEns Tscusesciases stECinsc Ams l .. .. .. .. SHIFT COMPLEMENT I 14C TECH. 1 i l l l
O O i ! F ! 1 1 O LL LZ4 l OWH 0) gE i gmMZ l o <Envo mamme 1 Lu >4 ! l WEE I LL F LLI !
- 0) (1. i 30 -
l Q ! o 2
i F PLANT MANAGER I ASSISTANT
\
i PLANT MANAGER-SERVICES P. GAAHAM I l I I TECHNICAL MATERIALS I I COMPUTER SYSTEMS CONTROL SYSTEMS
& PLANT SERVICES SUPERVISOR PROCESS SYSTEMS SUPERVISOR REACTOR ENGINEERING SUPERVISOR SUPERVISOR SUPERVISOR G. K1000 A.GAYLOR S. TNISODEAUX T. OVEAUD D. WILUAMSON i
i i e STATION MATEAIAL i e MAINTAIN COMPUTER e ECCS SYSTEMS ! MANAGEMENT / WAREHOUSE SYSTEMS e SOP & NSSS MECHA8elCAL
- PROCEDURE DEVELOPMENT e ELECTIUCAL SYSTEMS SYSTEMS
- SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM j e MAINTA404 8/O UST
- REGULATORY COMPLIANCE e SNPO INTERFACE e ISC ENGINEEAlteG i e GENERAL SUPPORT TO PLANT eNPROS e TURSINE & SUPPORT SYSTE003 e REACTOR MA8eEUVERS e STP SCHEDuuteo e WASTE PROCESSaNG I STAFF ON COMPUTER SYSTEMS e a OF PEOPLE e ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT e e OF PEOPLE e s OF PEOPLE e FIRE PROTECT 40eg PRESENT DeRECTS-S e s OF PEOPLE PAESENT D4RECTSS PAESENT OtRECTS-S e 458 PRESENT DeAECTS.g PRESENT CONTRACTS-1 PAESENT CONTRACTS-S PAESENT CONTRACTS-S e s OF PEOPLE PLANNED (OL)-S PRESENT CONTRACTS-2g ptApostED (OL)-11*
j PLAleteED (OL)-S PAESENT DIMCTS-S PLANNED (OL)-26 PAESENT CONTRACTS-4 i PLANNED (OL)-1A* i l
*FIVE ENG400EERING POSITIOttS IN SOTN THE PAOCESS SYSTEMS AleD CONTAOL SYST TEST ENG4NEERS CURAENTLY IN THE STAATUP A800 TEST GROUP.
l I l
S O E I e. T R A P S E D R T G 3 L N A M U S O R R S E R E % 8 S R D F 3 R 0 E O SS Q TT I N S TE Y I K L S AU RR
~ T S R O NA OO I
E W E C PP L C P EE A I P L W RR D O I O U N T S V I CS H PE L L Q I Y : AB ~ T C SA R L R I D O A N O V UO O A
. QN GF O e e e o j! !) l,j: l1 l
l 0 03 o i GSU IS RESPONSIBLE i FOR QUALITY e AS LICENSEE WE ARE ULTIMATELY RESPONSIBLE FOR QUALITY e EARLY DECISIONS TO PROMOTE QUALITY: 1
- 1. MINIMlZE COMMUNICATION INTERFACES
- 2. HAVE GSU SENIOR MANAGEMENT AND QA ON SITE _ . . .
i I _ -_ ____ _ _ _ ._ _ - - ___- _ - _ _ -__ _ _ __ - _ _ _ _ _
O O O GSU QA ORGANIZATION SENIOR VP - RBNG I MANAGER - QUALITY ASSURANCE i
- DIRECTOR - DIRECTOR -
l OPERATIONS QA , , QUALITY SERVICES ! I I I I l SUPERVISOR SUPERVISOR SUPERVISOR SUPERVISOR ' OPS QA QC QE QS I I I I e SURVEILLANCE OF e INSPECTIONS e SURVEILLANCE OF e AUDITS TESTING AND eNDE CONSTRUCTION e QUALIFICATIONS OPERATIONS e NCR AND 55(e) OF SUPPLIERS e PROCEDURE REVIEW REVIEWS j e QUALITY CONCERN { e MEMBER FRC AND JTG e INSPECTION PLANNING PROGRAM ! e DATA PACKAGE REVIEW e PROCUREMENT REVIEW e RECORD PACKAGE REVIEWS e MODIFICATIONS REVIEWS e SHOP SURVEILLANCE --
GSU QA PERSONNEL DATA e 43 QA OR QC PLUS 4 CLERICAL e 27 PERMANENT EMPLOYEES WITH PLANNED INCREASE TO 37 e 16 CONTRACT EMPLOYEES
~
e 11 DEGREED ENGINEERS,6 OTHER DEGREED INDIVIDUALS l e 37 HAVE PRIOR COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR CONSTRUCTION OR NUC-LEAR OPERATIONS EXPERIENCE _ e y _ _...we-g,wp.n w =- wn . w e -m m-me w wwh-**-"C ~ ' ' ' - *"~~" ***""' ""*^ ^- -
O OD O GSU QA PERSONNEL DATA (CONTD) e 7 NAVY NUCLEAR TRAINED e 17 YEARS AVERAGE WORKING EXPERIENCE o 7 YEARS AVERAGE QA OR QC EXPERIENCE f e TOP 7 HAVE AVERAGE OF 12 YEARS NUCLEAR EXPERIENCE o KEY RBNG PERSONNEL HAVE PRIOR QA EXPERIENCE (CAHILL, BOOKER, GRAHAM, KING)
- TWO IN SRO TRAINING PROGRAM
O O O S&W QA PROGRAM ELEMENTS e ENGINEERING ASSURANCE . 1 o PROCUREMENT QUALITY ASSURANCE ' ! e CONSTRUCTION CONTROL AND COMPLETION PROGRAM e FIELD QUALITY CONTROL ' o QUALITY ASSURANCE AUDITING _ . . _ _ _ j
i O Ob O ACTIVE GSU INVOLVEMENT e ENGINEERING REVIEWS / PARTICIPATION
- CONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT l AND OVERVIEW
~
e QA REVIEWS AND APPROVALS e STOP WORK USEAGE - .- l l
l o o, en i o ENGINEERING ORGANIZATION o INTERFACE WITH GE, SWEC AND INDUSTRY SUPPORT GROUP l o PARTICIPATION IN INDUSTRY GROUPS __ S
- _ - - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - -___---_---__-___-_~_m--- - - '
_ --__ _ - ~- ___ _ __-_-- ----_--_ --m-+-,,.
O $h w .. R VICE PRESIDENT - R8NG W.J. CAHILL. JR. MANAGER QUALITY ASSURANCE T.C. CROUSE VICE PRESIDENT R8NG J.C. DEDOENS I k I s i VICE PRESIDENT PLANT PROJECT ENGINEERING, NUCLEAR ADMINISTRATION MANAGER MANAGER FUELS, & LICENSING J.G. WENIANO J.H. CURLESS J.E. SOOKER I I I ASST. PLANT ASST. PLANT MANAGER MANAGER OPERATIONS SERVICES P.D. GRAHAM P.E. FREEHILL e OFFICE SERVICES e TECHNICAL SUPPORT e OPERATIONS e START.UP e NUCLEAR PLANT ENGINEE.%M4 eRECORDS e ADMINISTRATION e MAINTENANCE e CONTRACT MANAGEMENT e NUCLEAR LICENSING e TRAINING e MATERIALS MANAGEMENT e RADIATION PROTECTION / e PROJECT ENGINEERlNG e SIUCLEAR FUELS e SECURITY CHEMISTRY e CONSTRICTION e EMERGENCY PLANNING e ENVIRONMENTAL eCOST MONITORING e SCHEDULING ePldOCUREMENT l
- ACCOUNTING s I
O
-- - ,-, - - - - . - , ,-, , , _ , , . _ , , , - - - - - ,-a.-- ,,,...-,,.--..---------nn. . - , - - , - - - - - , - , - - , - - , - - - , . - - - - - - - - , - - - - - _ - , - - - , . . - - - , - - , - - - - - - , . - - - - , . , - -
-,n-n.. , + - , .
4 As~. AGE 3 ENGR, NUC. FUELS & lac. iL eoonEn 1 3/4 14/14 l 3F/78 l 13/15 l SUPERVISOR DIRECTOR TOR 06AECTOR EMERGENCY PLANNING NUCLEAR LICENSING NUCLEAR PLANT ENGsNEEReteG g'3, j J G. CADWALLADER W.A REED J.M. GLAZA4 gg, ggg M r. sAssuomicu i I I _J l ' SUPERVISOR SUPERVISOR
- = SUPERVISOR NUCLEAR LICENSING ENGaNEERING A004. -
L.A. ENGLAacD ENGINEER 4NG ANALYSIS DJ. EAUEGER A.As EMA48 l SUPERVISOR SUPERVISOR
- SUPERVISOR NUCLEAR LICENSING -
GAECHANICAL ENGINEERING - NUCLEAR FUELDS EA.GAANT J A.WAACHT AE SAARY l I I ENVIRONMENTAL SUPERVISOR
- SUPERVISOR LICENSING - NUCLEAR ENGINEER 4NG - IN-CORE FUELS
, ACoon E.A ZoCH L.A. EEATHERWooo l ? I SUPERVISOR I ELECTRICAL ENG8NEERING j J G. PROP $oM l I i
~ SUPERVISOR CIVIL ENGINEERING STAFFING _ LEVEL PRESENT/ AUTHORIZED
_ SUPERVISOR SITE ENG6NEER8NG e 0
. - , _ _ - - ,---..--.,--...,,.-m._ , , - _ . , . . . - - . , - . . , - . - . _ - - . . - . , _ , - - , - _ . . _ - , -. . . . _ - _ , . _ . -,_,,_,,_wn- ,. ,...r, . . - _ _. _ , . . . , -___m - - - _ .
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O On O NUCLEAR PLANT ENGINEERING ORGANIZATION DIRECTOR NUPE GLAZAR i SITE BEAUMONT SR
, STENO
- 1 I I I I I S'UPERVISOR SUPERVISOR SUPERVISOR SUPERVISOR SUPERVISOR SUPERVISOR 1 ELEC ENG
! SITE ENG CIVIUSTRUCT MECH ENG NUC ENG NUPE ADMIN PROPSON WRIGHT ZOCH KRUEGER g CLERICAL I l 4 (2) 1 I LEAD ENG LEAD ENG ENGINEER ENGINEER ENGINEER ENGINEER SUPPORT ISEG SITE ENG (4) (14) (14) (s) (5) )' I I j ENGINEER ENGINEER
- i (4) (8) {
i . i ! l
1 i l
- MECHANICAL. MAINTENANCE TRAINING !
l l PHASE I i BASIC MATHEMATICS & SAFETY IWEEK e BASIC MATH e FIRST AID { e BASIC ALGEBRA e PERSONEL SAFETY PHASE II , FUNDAMENTALS OF TOOLS a EQUIPMENT 7-10 WEEKS l l e BASIC HAND & POWER TOOLS e HEAT EXCHANGERS ( e VALVE REPAIR e BEARINGS I e PIPING e PUMPS OFF SITE VENDOR TRAINING l-2 WEEKS l l e BS W VALVE REPAIR i e GENERAL ELECTRIC
- e EMD DIESEL REPAIR A// offsite courses are on plant spec /fic equipment.
OTHER TRAINING I i e GEN. SYSTEMS TRAINING l e GEN. EMPLOYEE TRAINING e EMERGENCY RESPONSE TRAINING ! i O , l l
i l O ELECTRICAL MAINTENANCE TRAI\ LNG PHASE I BASIC MATHEMATICS l WEEK e ALGEBRA ! e SCIENTIFIC NOTATION e TRIGONOMETRY ; PHASE II t BASIC ELECTRICAL 8 ELECTRONIC 5' 4-6 WEEKS e DC THEORY e SOLID STATE THEORY e AC THEORY e ELECTRICAL SAFETY l PHASEIH l EQUIPMENT MAINTENANCE 4-6 WEEKS O e TRANSFORMERS e PROTECTIVE RELAYS i e SWITCH GEAR e VOLTAGE ! OFF SITE VENDOR TRAINING l-2 WEEKS l
- GENERAL ELECTRIC Course Legnth e LIMETORQUE VALVE ;
Ali off site courses are on plant specific equipment. i
.OTHER TRAINING e GENERAL EMPLOYEE TRAINING e GENERAL SYSTEMS TRAINING e EMERGENCY RESPONSE TRAINING i i
l l
O I a C MAINTENANCE TRAlMlhG PHASE I BASIC ELECTRONICS EQUIPMENTa REPAIR 8-12 WEEKS e BASIC ELECTRICITY e TRANSISTOR PRINCIPLES
- BASIC ELECTRONICS e CIRCUlT BOARD REPAIR e POWER SUPPLIES e SPECIALIZED ELECTRONIC DEVICES PHASEE FUNDAMENTALS OF INST. 8 CONTROL 8-12 WEEKS e ACTUATORS S POSITIONERS e ANALYZERS e CONVERTERS eSPECI AL INST.
PHASEIII O SYSTEMS 4-6 WEEKS
- ROD CONTROL & INFO.
- CONDENSATE e FEEDWATER CONTROL e RADIATION MONITORING OFF SITE VENDOR TRAINING 3- 5 WEEKS e HONEYWELL CO'MPUTER Course Length i
e GENERAL ELECTRIC e GENERAL ATOMICS A// off site courses are on p/mi specific equipment. OTHER TRAINING e GEN. SYSTEMS TRAINING e FIRE BRIGADE TRAINING e GEN. EMPLOYEE TRAINING e EMERGENCY RESPONSE TRAINING B
L I O ~ RIVER BEND STATION TRAINING e TRAINING PROGRAM FEATURES i
- TRAINING FACILITIES l e TRAINING ORGANIZATION e OPERATOR SELECTION e OPERATOR PROGRESSION i
- INITI AL OPERATOR TRAINING C e e
SIMULATOR TRAINING ABNORM AL OPERATIONS TRAINING l l e REQUALIFICATION TRAINING FOR OPERATORS ; e MAINTENANCE TRAINING , l l t I I
~
i f t l 1 i l I
i i O - GENERAL TRAINING PROGRAM l SYSTEMS APPROACH TOTRAINING l e DETERMINE OBJECTIVELY WHAT AN EMPLOYEE MUST j KNOW OR BE ABLE TO DOTO PERFORM A' TASK 4
- JOB ANALYSIS / TASK ANALYSIS i e DEVELOPMENT OF LESSON PLANS !
USE OF LARGE CONTRACTORS FORINITIALTRAINING O l e STAFFING PROBLEMS AVOIDED l
- e EXPERIENCED ORGANIZATIONS e RESOURCES OF LARGE CONTRACTOR l GSU COMMITMENT TO TRAINING e TRAINING A SEPARATE, HIGHLY VISIBLE DEPARTMENT l l
* - HIGH STANDARDS FOR STAFF l l
- HIGH STANDARDS FOR TRAINING COURSES i i
O l
i I i O l l i i 1 i TRAINING FACILITIES l PLANT SPECIFIC SIMULATOR l l
- BUILT BY SINGER / LINK INC.
- OPERATIONAL AUGUST 1983 l
150 PROGRAMMABLE FAULTS l O TRAINING CENTER l
- SIMULATOR l j
- CLASSROOMS AND TRAINING LABS l
l
- OFFICE SPACE 'AND AUDITORIUM MAINTENANCE TRAINING FACILITY
- CLASSROOMS l l
- TRAINING LABS :
O l l l {
O . O - - O i 1 l l VICE PRESIDENT 4 ADM I NISTRATION
- I 1 DIRECTOR j NUCLEAR TRAINING
) ) COORDINATOR i I COORDINATOR COORDINATOR I I COORDIN ATOR LICENSE TRAINING I MAINTENANCE TRAINING TECHNICAL TRAINING I GENERAL I I EMPLOYEE TRAINING I I
- LICENSED OPERATOR g
- ELECTRICAL e CHEMISTRY I e GENERAL EMPLOYEE ,
- REQUALIFICATION I eI&C e RADIATION PROTECTION e FIRST l AID /CPR e SRO TRAINING ! e MECHANICAL e QA/OC TRAINING l e TECHNICAL STAFF f
e NUCLEAR EQUIP.
- WHAREHouSE e EMERGENCY RESPONSEI e FIRE PROTECTION OPERATOR TRAINING I l e HELPERS g e RESPIRATOR TRAINING l l e RAD WORKER TRAINING !
I I I I PROKCT MANAGER PROJECT MANAGER GENERAL PHYSICS CORR NUS CORP
, OPERMOR TRAINING TECHNICAL TRAINING
! l l
. _ - . _ _ _ . . . . - _ - - - - .. - - - . . - - - - . - ._ .-_-_.---_..- - - ~.-.-.-- - - ._-.. _ -.
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i OPERATOR SELECTION ! l
- EDUCATION
~
! e HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE ; i i ! 1 I O SCREENING i e GEOGRAPHICAL PREFERENCE l e APTITUDE ]i GSU BASIC BATTERY l BASIC MATH AND SCIENCE i e PSYCHOLOGICAL j MINNESOTA MULTIPHASE INVENTORY l 4
- CALIFORNIA PSYCHOLOGICAL INVENTORY l
i
- PHYSICAL l I
COMPLETE MEDICAL EXAMINATION l O l t i
i . O COLD LICENSE. OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM FUNDAMENTAL / TECHNICAL 17 WEEKS e MATH / SCIENCE ePOWER PLANT PRINCIPLES OFLUID MECHANICS
- REACTOR THEORY e HEAT TRANSFER eCONTROL SYSTEMS SYSTEMS TRAINING 12 WEEKS eLECTURES e DESIGN / OPERATION e WALK THROUGHS e 00ALIFICATION CARD SIMULATOR TRAINING 12 WEEKS e ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS
- EMERGENCY OPEMATIONS -
e NORMAL OPERATIONS e SYSTEM INTEGRATION e ABNORMAL OPERATIONS e APPLIED THEORY OBSERVATION TRAINING. 4 WEEKS' e OPERATING SWR PLANT e oN THE JOS EXPERIENCE REVIEW AND AUDIT 6 WEEKS e TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS e DESIGN e ADMINISTRATIVE e MODIFICATIONS ePROCEDURES e FUEL HANDLING j OTHER TRAINING GEN. EMPLOYEE TRAINING e FIRE PROTECTION TRAINING SUPV. EMILLS TRAINING e EMER4ENCY RESPONSE TRAINING MITIGATING CORE DAMAGE 1 1
J i O OPERATOR PROGRESSION l l i NUCLEAR EQUIPMENT OPERATOR ! eOPERATES TURBO-GENERATOR- NUCLEAR
- BOILER SYSTEMS, RELATED AUXILI ARY l EQUIPMENTS, RELATED PIPING SYSTEMS AND ,
! THE STATION ELECTRICAL SERVICE EQUIPMENT. 2 YEARS ! i o = r ! NUCLEAR CONTROL OPERATOR l eOPERATES AND CONTROLS THE TURBO- ! ! GENERATOR-NUCLEAR BOILER SYSTEM, ITS i l l Q RELATED AUXILARY EQUIPMENTS, RELATED PIPING SYSTEMS AND THE STATION ELECTRICAL l SERVICE EQUIPMENT. , l eOSTAIN AND MAINTAIN THE NRC REACTOR l OPERATOR LICENSE. l l ! 2 YEARS o l SHIFT FOREMAN / SHIFT SUPERVISOR , l e SUPERVISE THE OPERATION OF THE PL ANT. f i e OSTAIN AND M AINTAIN THE NRC SENIOR i I REACTOR OPERATOR LICENSE. ! I l l l l
O l HOT LICENSE OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM I FUNDAMENTAL / TECHNICAL TRAIN ING - 6 WEEKS e REACTOR THEORY e THERMODYNAMICS OFLUID MECHANICS
- CHEMISTRY e HEAT TRANSFER e METALLURGY SYSTEMS TRAINING 6 WEEKS I eLECTURES l
e DESIGN / OPERATION SIMULATOR TRAINING 5 WEEKS _ e ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS O e NORMAL OPERATIONS e EM ERGENCY OPERATIONS e SYSTEM INTEGRATION e ABNORMAL OPERATIONS e APPLIED THEORY [ CONTROL ROOM TRAINING 13 WEEKS ! e TRAINING SHIFTS ! e QUALIFICATION CARDS REVIEW AND AUDIT 4 WEEKS e ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS e RADI ATION PROTECTION e TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS e FUEL HANDLING ePROCEDURES t l OTHER TRAINING i e GEN. EMPLOYEE TRAINING e FIRE PROTECTION TRAINING e SUPV. SKILLS' TRAINING e FIRE BRIGADE TRAINING : e MITICATING CORE DAMAGE i lO : 5
,- - , - - , , , ,-,,.,---.,----,,-----,------,,--<-,---,,,------,----,..-r-.w - --
I l O NUCLEAR EQUIPME NT l OPERATOR TRAINING ! l FUNDAMENTAL / TECHNICAL 6 WEEKS l e POWER PLANT THEORY e COMPON ENTS l e BASIC PRINCIPLES l { SYSTEMS 11 WEEKS i i e OUTSIDE SYSTEMS ! e INSIDE SYSTEMS ! Q e e OPERATING PRINCIPLES WALK THROUGHS { l QUALIFICATION CARDS e HANDS ON ! i
- PERFORMANCE BASED i O l l l
i O ABNORMAL OPERATIONS TRAINING i PREVENTATIVE j i I e SYSTEM DESIGN e BASIS OF PROCEDURES e PROCEDURE TRAINING l e ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS . e SIMULATOR SCENARIOS i i MITIGATING CORE DAMAGE j e EMERGENCY RESPONSE e CORE COOLING MECHANICS j e POTENTIALLY DAMAGING OPERATIONS ! O e RECOGNIZING CORE DAMAGE e RADIATION HAZARDS l l l l I O ,
REQUALIFICATION ! TRAINING : l e CONTINUOUS PROGRAM
- SIX SHIFT ROTATION - ONE WEEK TRAINING !
- TWO YEAR CYCLE !
- ELEMENTS l l - LECT.URES, DRILLS, SIMULATOR TRAINING i
- MAINTAIN / INCREASE PROFICIENCY !
O
- TRAIN ON MODIFICATIONS
- OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE '
- REQUIRED TOPICS / EVOLUTIONS
- TEAM TRAINING l
- EVALUATIONS .
- QUIZZES l l - ANNUAL EX AMINATION l
- PERFORMANCE EVALUATION I i
l l i O il
O SIMULATOR TRAINING OBJECTIVES ! i REINFORCES SYSTEM KNOWLEDGE ! e PANEL ORIENTATION l e SOP's t INTEGRATES SYSTEM OPERATION j e SOP's l e GOP's l STRESSES ADMIN CONTROLS l e ADMIN PROCEDURES l e TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS i e OTHER PROCEDURES l i SYSTEMATIC TRANSIENT RESPONSE l 0 - e AOP's se"^aios j e EOP 's l DEVELOP TEAM CONCEPT ! e CONTROL ROOM ENVIRONMENT f a SENARIOS l l l
. l O l l t I
i
i TYPICAL SIMULATOR TRAINING DAY l 0 - CLASSROOM [ LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENTS l
\
e SMALL LOCA IN DRYWELL eSMALL LOCA OUTSIDE DRYWELL ( e DBA LOCA THERMAL LIMITS e AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (APLHGR) , e LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION AND BASIS e MAPLHGR AND MAPRAT : EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES ! e EOP -lO RPV FLOODING ABNORMAL OPERATING PROCEDURES e AOP-36 SINGLE MSIV CLOSURE e AOP -37 MAIN CONDENSER TUBE LEAK e AOP -38 UNEXPLAINED INCREASE IN REACTOR POWER S AOP -45 FAILURE OF SRM OR 1RM DETECTOR TO RETRACT : CONTROL ROOM EACH TEAM OF CAND/ DATES SHALL RESPOND TO LOCA 'S OF VARIOUS SIZES AND IN VARIOUS LOCATIONS. ) I O . i; ,
l O Os Om l RIVER BEND STATION l EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES j j IMPLEMENTATION PLAN / SCHEDULE (CONTD)
- 5. WRITE PLANT SPECIFIC, HUMAN FACTORED, EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES, REV. O ISSUED FOR USE IN V&V WRITTEN TO REV. 3 OF EPG'S l 6. COMPLETE VERIFICATION AGAINST GENERIC EPG'S, IN HOUSE REVIEW COMPLETE, INDEPENDENT REVIEW TO BE COMPLETED BY
! 12/31/84
- 7. COMPLETE VALIDATION PROGRAM SIMULATOR VALIDATION IN PROGRESS, APPROXIMATELY 50% COMPLETE, l ~ REMAINING VALIDATION TO BE COMPLETED BY 12/31/84
- 8. COMPLETE ENGINEERING REVIEW OF EOP'S AGAINST DESIGN BASIS, TASK IDENTIFIED FOR NUPE ACTION, TO BE COMPLETED BY 12/31/84
! 9. USE TASK ANALYSIS, EOP V&V AND DCRDR TO DEVELOP REMAINING l OPERATOR TRAINING IN PROGRESS, TO BE COMPLETED BY 12/31/84
O O> O" l i RIVER BEND STATION l EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES IMPLEMENTATION PLAN / SCHEDULE l 1. ASSIST IN DEVELOPING GENERIC EMERGENCY PROCEDURE GUIDELINES, l j RBS PERSONNEL CONTINUE TO PARTICIPATE IN BWR OG EPC - REV. 3
- COMPLETE WORKING ON REV. 4 l
- 2. SUBMIT PROCEDURE GENERATION PACKAGE TO NRC, INITIAL SUBMITTAL 8/31/83, SUPPLEMENT SUBMITTED 2/27/84
- 3. GENERATE VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION PROGRAM / PROCEDURE REV. O OF OSP-0009 ISSUED
- 4. COMPLETE PLANT SPECIFIC CALCULATIONS COMPLETED BY THE GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY o..
e 4
O - M O O R - LW OE I _ RV T E _ NR - ON O CG FI _ OS E _ SD U T A _ T _ S _ O . l :I!}:l : ll ! :
O O O REVIEW TEAM COMPOSITION . D. CHASE: l GSU SYSTEMS ENG.
~
D. BURGY: G.P. HUMAN FACTORS SPECIALIST R. LIDDLE: i G.P. HUMAN FACTORS SPECIALIST A. FREDIEU: ! GSU ASSISTANT OP. SUPERVISOR M. BISHOP: l GSU SHIFT SUPERVISOR nww.-=--____ _ -__ - ____-,-__-______--ee__ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ - - - - - - . - - - - . . - - . - _ - _ - - - - _ _ _ . - _ --w_-- - _ - _ _ . - - - -
1 1 0 l SAFETY STATUS l z .- .. . i m l D NOT SAFETY SAFETY RELATED j g RELATED o i y TO i _ -- - Og O ga
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ING FLOWCHART OF DCRDR ACTIVITIES ! O ! I f PHASEI DCRDR PLANNING ;
#"" ""E" IIA" PLANNING PREPARATION I
l 1se18wmOG CR SURVEY PROGRAM CHECKUST S RESULTS I
+ 4 CONTROL ROOM OPERATING SURVEY EXPERIENCE i Review l l l ;
+ + !
j PHASEil RSS FSAR REVIEW SYSTuS i DESCRIPTIONS i A I O TASK ANALYSIS SASED ON EOPs
+
VERIFICATION OF ISC REQUIREMENTS
+ !
VAUDATION OF CONTROL ROOM q PUNCT10NS aL ASSESSMENT OF ( HEDs PHASE Ill ASSESSMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION h -- HED CORRECTION / l' IMPLEMENTATION q SCHEDUUNG
+ l PHASE IV PREPARATION OF DOCUMENTATION DCROR SUMM ARY l
REPORT O " - l l
. - - - - , - , - , - - - - . - - - - - , , , - - -n -- ,- , - - , _ _ _ _ _
i l O O ~ O 3 '3e' l RBS EMERGENCY RESPONSE INFORMATION
- AND TRANSIENT RECORDING SYSTEM l
e SYSTEM MONITORS APPROXiMATELY 1,400 SIGNALS OF THE FOLLOWING GENERAL TYPES: VALVE POSITIONS FLUID LEVELS l FLOW RATES PROCESS TEMPERATURES j PRESSURE LEVELS ELECTRIC POWER AVAILABILITY l SYSTEM INITIATION VIBRATION / THERMAL DISPLACEMENT e END-USER IS ABLE TO GENERATE UNIQUE DISPLAYS FOR PRESENTING ; PLANT PARAMETER INFORMATION TO THE OPERATOR IN WHATEVER IS BEST-SUITED FOR HUMAN FACTOR CONSIDERATIONS e SYSTEM CAPABLE OF RECONSTRUCTING PLANT TRANSIENT EVENTS TO AlD IN DIAGNOSIS OF VARIOUS EVENTS - i e SYSTEM IS USEFUL IN PROVIDING AN OVERVIEW OF THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF VARIOUS SAFETY FUNCTIONS DURING THE COURSE OF A PLANT TRANSIENT --
O O3 Os ELECTRICAL ONE-LINE DIAGRAM i i b C b O O uJLv wo
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' TECHedICAL SUPPORT CENTER SITE FACILITV l i
i i L__.__________._.___._____________.-__._____....~__.__..-.________.___________________________________-____ _ -
3% h 00 CONTAINMENT i RPV
-( DESIGN l 15 }e-
, -( SRV tift liosog PRESS l .0.1 l PSIG SRV C PSIG OPEN b i ( OPER HI l 2.0 )e PRESS l 1000 lC
- ! MSiv PRESS l 0.1 l PSIG i 100% BPV l 1030 SHUT b i
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) -( OPER HI l 90 i LCO HI l + Se I ISOL b TEMP 85 *F LVLl 30 llN. C -{ OFTR Hi l 135 }8- C ] TEMP 125 *F .-( LCO LOW l +12 SPMS PWR 100 % l R C 5 ( APRM DNSCL l 3
- SUPPRESSION POOL p SUPPRESdiuN POOL
-( OPER H1 l 12 6 i OPER Hi l 95 LVL 12 FT 4 IN. b TEMP 90 *F
-( OPER LOW l 12 2 g )
k I l i 1 CRITICAL PLANT VARIABLES 0 0 0 00/00/00 00/00/00 i TYPICAL ERIS CRITICAL PLANT VARIABLES DISPLAY
- . _ . . - - - . . _ . - - - _ . , . - . . , . , -. _ _ ___._. . _ _ . . . . _ . ~ . . . _ . . _ _ . . . _ - . . _ _ . . . _ . . . _ _ _ . _ _ _ . . _ . - . . _ _ . _ . . _ . _ _ . . . _ . _ _ _ _ _ , _ - _ _ . _ , , . _ _ . . _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ , . _ . . _ , ~
E. TYPICAL CONTAINMENT CONTROL DISPLAY I POOL COOLJNG POWER PUMP COOLING POOL LEVEL 12 FT IN. AVAILABLE AVAIL RUN HHb 25 DRYWELL 0 POOL LD ] 12-4 ]3 COOLING POWER FAN = {' COOLING AVAIL ABL E AVAll RUN ggg 15 - lSPMSlg
; CNTMT COOLMG POWER FAN 10 .
LCO m l 12 4 ]3 i COOLING AVAILABLE AVA8L RUN 5 - ggg gay A) LCO LOW l 12-2 l9 g naaaaaaaa OPEN b - 10 0 C HEAT CAP l 0-2 ]g CNTMT l WATER l CNTMT POWER SPRAY g AVAIL l PRESS AVAll PUMP RUN l ]HbHb gg ISOL Ib DW PRESS -81 PS80 PRESS VALVE POWER FAN j CONTROL LINE UP AVAll RUN ges SCRAM b 4 - VALVE POWER SBGT FAN ] LINE UP AVAll RUN lbHb 2 g m .... OPER m l 2.s ] g
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CNTMTTEMP 05 *F DW TEMP 'F 00
, POOL TEMP 'F 120 400 300 110 -
-{ RPV SAT l 310lb d DES 8GN l 300lg HEAT CAP l 122l0 325 -
200 -
-{ DESIGN l 195]b 250 . RPV SAT l Stejg 220 -
SORON 8MJl 110l g 90 %_ _ _ - ,
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to - q,, OPER He l 90 l g 'g4 / OPER Hil 135l9140 70 namanaman 100 annanmens e
-{ OPER HI l 95lb 00 (MIN) (M4N)
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I O O O REMOTE SHUTDOWN SYSTEM ) e REDUNDANT CONTROL PANELS I e SHUTDOWN PANELS LOCATED IN ! SECURITY-CONTROLLED AREAS e EACH SHUTDOWN PANEL AREA FURNISHED WITH INDEPENDENT TRAINS OF HVAC e REMOTE SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DESIGN WILL MEET THE APPLICABLE REQUIREMENTS OF TITLE 10 CFR PART 50 APPENDIX R e SYSTEM IS FULLY DESIGNED AND QUALIFIED FOR ! CLASS 1E SERVICE e PANELS ARE LOCATED IN THE CONTROL BUILDING (SEISMIC CATEGORY I STRUCTURE) TO FACILITATE j ACCESS DURING EMERGENCY CONDITIONS I e EMERGENCY LIGHTING AND COMMUNICATION l PROVIDED FOR EACH REMOTE SHUTDOWN PANEL _ i
O & O* REMOTE SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS ! DIVISION I REMOTE SHUTDOWN PANEL e RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM (TRAIN A)
- e REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM j e AUTOMATIC DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTEM l e STANDBY SERVICE WATER SYSTEM
! e CONTAINMENT MONITORING SYSTEM [ , j DIVISION ll REMOTE i SHUTDOWN PANEL e RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM (TRAINS B & C) ) e AUTOMATIC DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTEM !
- STANDBY SERVICE WATER SYSTEM i e CONTAINMENT MONITORING SYSTEM _.
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l j 120 VAC )1 .l MOTOR CONTROL CENTER l ! 8 . suu . .um . .u. . me . .n. . em . mm . - . . - . . . s. . - . . . m. . . am. . . au. . - . sum . - i um .a s . . su. . um. . su. . am . .ms . .u. . .mm . aus . mm . es. . . j l VALVE LOCATION l MO
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=
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O On O i ) HISTORICAL SEISMICITY ) e AREA OF LOW SEISMICIT j e GULF COASTAL PLAIN TECTONIC PROVINCE
- DONALDSONVILLE EARTHQUAKE (50 MI) l MM Y - E = MM IF AT RBS jl e MISSISSIPPI EMBAYMENT TECTONIC PROVINCE
-NEW MADRID EARTHQUAKES (370 MI)
MM XI- H = MM H -Y AT RBS '
-GREENVILLE, MISS. EARTHQUAKE (195 MI)
MM E - VII = MM N AT RBS
o c3 o SEISMIC HAZARD ANALYSIS e RBS - DETERMINISTIC APPROACH e NRC - LLNL SEISMIC HAZARD EVALUATION PROBABILISTIC APPROACH e RBS - ONE OF TEN TEST SITES e EPRI- SEISMIC HAZARD ASSESSMENT INDUSTRY SPONSORED GSU PARTICIPATING e RBS - SEISMIC MARGINS PEAK GROUND ACCELERATION COMPUTED AS 0.07g LICENSED AS 0.10g
I o on O i ! EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATION MAINTENANCE PHASE 1: IDENTIFY AREAS AFFECTED BY EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATION PHASE II: DEVELOP PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS AND ACTION PLAN FOR INCORPORATION PHASE lil: IMPLEMENT ACTION PLAN REVISE EXISTING PROCEDURES DEVELOP NEW PROCEDURES _ , , , t-_ - - - - - __ __ _____ __ _ _ _ _ _
l 'o MILESTONES ! l ) JUNE 1,1984
- FSAR UPDATE l
(REVISED EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATION DOCUMENT (EQD))
- JULY 1,1984 '
MASTER LIST SUBMITTAL *l O SEPTEMBER 30,1984 ; i
> 85% QUALIFICATION COMPLETION I OCTOBER 1984 NRC AUDITS (EQB, SQRT) l MARCH 1985 100% COMPLETE QUALIFICATION APRIL 1985 O FUEL LOAD .....
I {
! o 03 o l l PRESENTATION OUTLINE l
- PROGRAM OVERVIEW f
e ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION
- SEISMIC / DYNAMIC QUALIFICATION l
1 e EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATION MAINTENANCE j e SCHEDULE MILESTONES i - i
, . . , .i , , ,' '
O .
~0 3 O'
RIVER BEND COMMITMENTS (FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT) IEEE STANDARD 323-1974 "OUALIFYING CLASS 1E EQUIPMENT FOR NUCLEAR POWER GENERATING STATIONS" l NUREG-0588 "lNTERIM STAFF POSITION ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION ! OF SAFETY RELATED ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT" l ! IEEE STANDARD 344-1975
" SEISMIC QUALIFICATION OF CLASS 1E EQUIPMENT FOR NUCLEAR POWER GENERATING STATIONS" L
1 ~ i O OY O ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION . e HARSH ENVIRONMENT REACTOR BUILDING AUXILIARY BUILDING FUELS BUILDING l e MILD ENVIRONMENT CONTROL BUILDING l DIESEL GENERATOR BUILDING RIVER BEND STATION ENVIRONMENTAL ZONES HAVE BEEN j DEFINED AND ARE CLASSIFIED AS EITHER HARSH OR MILD. 1
! o o o l~ ! ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION i HARSH ENVIRONMENT l INCLUDES ALL THREE (3) CATEGORIES OF l 10CFR50.49: o SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT e NONSAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT WITH IMPACT ON SAFETY-RELATED e CERTAIN POST-ACCIDENT MONITORING EQUIPMENT ._...
~
! o o. , o l ! BALANCE OF PLANT (BOP) i ! e MEETS IEEE-323-74 AND NUREG-0588 . e QUALIFICATION BY VENDOR
- STONE & WEBSTER REVIEW AND APPROVAL l OF VENDOR REPORTS ~ . .
.---,.----..,---.____--.--,_,n_-.-~,,.- . , . , _ _ _ . , , . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ - - . - _ _ _ , , . ..
- o 03 o l
NUCLEAR STEAM SUPPLY SYSTEM (NSSS) l e MEETS IEEE-323-74 AND NUREG-0588 PER NEDE-24326 e QUALIFICATION BY GENERAL ELECTRIC l 1
O On O MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT (HARSH ENVIRONMENT) l l e SAFETY-RELATED ACTIVE o NSSS AND BOP e REVIEW OF MATERIAL CAPABILITIES OF' NON-METALLICS _ ,,, I
DYNAMIC QUALIFICATION l DYNAMIC LOADS SEISMIC EARTHQUAKE l HYDRODYNAMIC l l l SAFETY RELIEF VALVE (SRV) I ACTUATIONS l
- LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT -
o' i--- o> O 1 l l BALANCE OF PLANT (BOP) e EQUIPMENT MEETS lEEE-344-75 l e HYDRODYNAMIC LOADS ADDRESSED NUCLEAR STEAM SUPPLY SYSTEM (NSSS) ) e EQUIPMENT MEETS lEEE-344-75
- o HYDRODYNAMIC LOADS ADDRESSED _ . . .
I i i
l 0 o. o EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATION l MAINTENANCE
~
TASK FORCE ESTABLISHED DECEMBER 1983 REPRESENTS ENGINEERING MAINTENANCE , QUALITY ASSURANCE OPERATIONS _ , , ,
l l l SEQUENCE OF EVENTS DURING AN EMERGENCY l O EXAMPLE: i ECCS INITIATED AND INJECTED INTO REACTOR VESSEL i i SHIFT SUPERVISOR RECOGNIZES OFF-NORMAL CONDITIONS AND TAKES ' THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS: , i 4 STEP 1: IMPLEMENT EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURE (EOP) FOR ! REACTOR VESSEL LEVEL CONTROL STEP 2: THROUGH TRAINING
- E0P IMPLEMENTATION LEADS To t
REVIEW OF EMERGENCY IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE EIP 2-001, t
" CLASSIFICATION OF. EMERGENCIES" l l STEP 3: EIP-2-001 r
c NOTIFICATION OF ALERT SITE AREA GENERAL { UNUSUAL EVENT EIP-2-003 EMERGENCY EMERGENCY s EIP-2-002 ' f EIP-2-004 EIP-2-005 j i
, I
- STEP 4: IMPLEMENTATION OF SUPPORTING EIPS i
e NOTIFICATIONS ' , e SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS e AUGUMENTATION OF EMERGENCY ORGAfl!ZATION l
- , 'THE SHIFT SUPERVISOR AND EMERGENCY DIRECTOR ARE PROv!DED CLASSR00n TRAINING, DRILLS, AND An ANNUAL EXERCISE TO ASSURE
' THE ABOVE PROCESS IS UNDERSTOOD. i o l 1
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l 2,5,810 MILE POPULATIONS l 1980 POPULATION BY Town t ST. FRANCISVILLE - 1,111 WEST BATON 0- 2 MILE - 733/427
\CKSON - 2,186 ROUGE PARISH 2- 5 MILE - 3,872 /3,838 l
! b EW ROADS - 3,875 90/0 5-10 MILE - 17,932/9,663 f j 22,537/13,928 i i J t l
O GULF STATES UTILITIES C0f1PANY RIVER BEND STATION Ef1ERGENCY PLANNING A ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS JUNE 7 a 8, 1984
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i i i t CRITERIA FOR PREPARATION AND EVALUATION OF i RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANS AND Eg EBREDNESS IN SilPPORT OF NUClFAR POWER PLANTS ! i 9 ORGANIZATION . A i O e COMMUNICATIONS AND NOTIFICATION i e ACCIDENT ASSESSMENT AND PROTECTIVE RESPONSE j , e TRAINING e MAINTENANCE OF EMERGENCY PLANNING PROGRAM l [ I i i l l i l 1 . l I l I ( O l \
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i . l f I PROJECTED SCHEDULE OF COMPLETION - 0FFSITE ! COMPLETfON DATE
- 1. SusMrTTAL OF LOUISIANA PEACETIME DECEMBER 1983 RADIOLOGICAL RESPONSE PLAN AND l
RIVER 8END ATTACHMENT l
- 2. DEVELOPMENT OF LOCAL PARISH !
JULY 1984 IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES .
- 3. INITIATION OF IRAINING PROGRAM AUGUST 1984 O 4.
~
i PROMPT NOTIFICATION SYSTEM JANUARY 1985 : OPERATIONAL
- 5. NRC/ FEMA REVIEWED EMERGENCY JANUARY 1985 '
PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE ' L 6 l O - l I i
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9'5 - EAST GSU o - BATON ROUGE EOC/ -m CORPORATE MC E SHER 4FF'S OFFE OFFICE REG M IV _s e
-. 1 la :
- t. " "( ~HPN) ".,
i f I I { 1 3 EAST '- - 1 I
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FELICI ANA EOC/ S4ERIFF'S OFFICE -- - -a l
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- -j --
LOUISI ANA NUCLE AR ENERGY FEMA NRC j G SHE RIFF'S OFFICE , STAT M g E PA
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I -f* L l-- 8 LA.0FFICE OF EMERGENCY ASSIGNED STATE OF LA. E SHERIFF *S OFFICE ---j l j p___ PREPAREDNESS AGENCIES l r , i l i 3 I . i WEST ' j eI l GSU ! FELICIANA EOC/ --! SACKUP EOF -
' i' l MISS. HIGHWAY SHERIFF'S OFTICE -. _ I SATON ROUGE t_ _ _ SAFE TY PATROL
! ! e FEMA
) I :* s EPA 1 i j 8 NRC
. : 8 MISS. EERGENCY -
- LEGEND 1
{ l MANAGEMNT 1 2 s -- - AGENCY 4 CO40ERCIAL(PUBLIC) TELEPHONE
- ASSIGNED
! -- i STATE OF MISS. MOSIL E / BASE RADIO
- l ----
DEDICATED (PRIVATE TELEPHONE I *" "(HPN) AGENCIES l THE NRC EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION (ENS) 8
* * * " *
- NRC j HEALTH PHYSICS NETWORK (HPN) L,_,___,_, HEADOUARTERS i MOTE: _
(ENS) , i
- i. BOTH THE DEDidATED TELEPHONE ANO RADIO CONTROL CIRCUITS WILL RELY ON A MIXTURE OF PRIVATE i MICROWAVE AND DEDICATED LEASED CIRCUITS.
] 2. SEPARATE DEDICATED TELEPHONE CIRCUlT DESIGNATED THE HE ALTH PHYSICS NETWORM (HPN SERVES THE NRC EMERGENCY OFFSITE }I HE ADOUARTERS AND REGION 4 ) COMMUNICATIONS l 1 RIVER BEND STATION j FINAL S AFETY AN ALYSIS REPORT AMENDMENTe MAY 1983 j
-- . . _ - - - - _ _ _ _ . _ . . . . - - _ - - . - . ..__ _ . - - - - - - ____ -. _ - . - _ _ _ . . . _ _ . - -}}