ML20135E663
| ML20135E663 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 12/04/1996 |
| From: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | |
| References | |
| ACRS-T-2085, NUDOCS 9612110401 | |
| Download: ML20135E663 (327) | |
Text
._ __ _ - - . - _ _ - - - - - - - - - - - .
OfficicI Trcnscript sf Prsco dings l
- O NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION !
AcRsr-2085 ;
Title:
Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards ,
l Westinghouse Standard Plant Designs Subcommittee l
TRO4 (ACRS)
RETURN ORIGINAL !
TO BJWHITE l Docket Number: (not applicable) M(ST;2E2s THANKS! ,
i Location: Rockville, Maryland i i l
- O l
! Date: Wednesday, December 4,1996 j 9612110401 961204 08 PDR 1
i Work Order No.: NRC-923 Pages 1-182 I 1 g y1
!)
i Ui\lUl!
NEAL R. GROSS AND CO., INC.
Court Reporters and Transcribers 1323 Rhode Island Avenue, N.W.
110020
( b b I forbe leone Comttee
i /
l 0'%
DI8 CLAIMER PUBLIC NOTICE BY THE UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS DECEMBER 4, 1996 4
l The contents of this transcript of the !
proceedings of the United States Nuclear Regulatory i Commission's Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards on '
DECEMBER 4, 1996, as reported herein, is a record of the discussions recordsd at the meeting held on the above date.
This transcript has not been reviewed, corrected and edited and it may contain inaccuracies.
l
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NEAL R. GROSS COUR'REPORTERETRANSCRIBERS 132BHODESLAM&ENUHTpf (202)4-4433 WASHINGTotip20005 (20234-4 433 t
i 1
1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ;
l
! 2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3 + + + + +
4 ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS 5 (ACRS) i 6 WESTINGHOUSE STANDARD PLANT DESIGNS SUBCOMMITTEE i
i 7 + + + ++ l l
8 WEDNESDAY I l
9 DECEMBER 4, 1996 l 10 + + + + + l l
11 ROCKVILLE, MARYLAND
]
i 12 + + + ++
13 The Subcommittee met at the Nuclear Regulatory O
1 l
14 Commission, Two White Flint North, Room T2B3, 11545 15 Rockville Pike, at 8:30 a.m., Robert Seale, Chairman, 16 presiding.
17 COMMITTEE MEMBERS:
18 ROBERT L. SEALE Chairman 19 MARIO H. FONTANA Member 20 THOMAS S. KRESS Member 21 DON W. MILLER Member 22 WILLIAM J. SHACK Member 23 l
l 24 1
r C/ 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N W.
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l' i 2 l
l 1 ACRS CONSULTANT PRESENT:
i 2 James J. Carroll
'7_1
'~} 3 ACRS STAFF PRESENT:
4 Noel Dudley 5 ALSO PRESENT:
6 Tom Kenyon 7 William C. Huffman 8 Brian McIntyre 9 William R. Carlsou 10 Moshe Mahlab l
11 Michael Corletti 12 James W. Winters 13 Donald F. Hutchings l t <
(/ 14 Robert M. Blumstein 15 Jerry Wilson 16 Goutam Bagchi 17 Harley Wilson 18 Tony Attard 19 Yixing Sung 20 Don Lindgren 21 Gordon Israelson l
l 22 James L. Groves i
23 Jim Lyona 24 Jeff Holmes (O) 25 Chang Li NEAL R. GROSS l
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3 1 A-G-E-N-D-A l
- 2 Acenda Item Pace i
(
3 Introduction 4 4 NRC Opening Comments 6 5 AP600 Introduction and Design Philcsophy 6 Mr. McIntyre 15 l
7 SSAR Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 8 Fuel - Mr. Carlson 39 9 Components - Mr. Mahlab 51 10 Systems - Mr. Corletti 74 l 11 SSAR Chapter 9 - Auxiliary Systems 12 Water Systems, HVAC - Mr. Hutchings 100 13 Fire Protection - Mr. Winters 123 C\/
t
\/ 14 Fuel Storage and Handling - Mr. Blumenstein 144 1
15 SSAR Chapter 11 - Radioactive Waste l 16 Mr. Grover 154 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 C
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4 1 P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S
-s 2 (8:34 a.m.)
'J 3 CHAIRMAN SEALE: The meeting will now come to 4 order.
5 This is the meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee 6 on Westinghouse Standard Plants Design.
7 I am Robert Seale, Chairman of the 8 subcommittee.
9 ACRS members present are Mario Fontana, Thomas 10 Kress, Don W. Miller, and William Shack.
11 ACRS Consultant in attendance is James 12 Carroll.
p,.
13 The purpose of this meeting is to review I
)
14 chapters 4, 5, 9 and 11 of the AP600 Standard Safety 15 Analysis Report and the associated NRC Draft Safety 16 Evaluation Report.
17 The subcommittee will gather information, 18 analyze relevant issues and facts and formulate proposed 19 positions and actions as appropriate for deliberations by 20 the full committee.
21 Noel Dudley is the cognizant ACRS staff 22 engineer for this meeting. He's over in the corner here.
23 The rules for participation in today's meeting 24 have been announced as part of the notice of this meeting
/~
k_Nl 25 previously published in the Federal Register on November NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N W.
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5 1 19, 1996.
2 A transcript of the meeting is being kept and O-
\
J 3 will be made available as stated in the Federal Register 4 notice.
5 It is requested that the speakers first 6 identify themselves and speak with sufficient clarity and 7 volume so that they can readily be heard.
8 We have received no written comments or 9 requests for time to make oral statements from members of 10 the public.
11 Today, the subcommittee will begin its review 12 of the AP600 Standard Safety Analysis Report which was 13 initially submitted to staff for review on June 26, 1992.
)
(/
A- 14 The subcommittee plans on reviewing the staff l 15 final safety analysis report after it is issued. Staff 16 will make some opening comments today and Westinghouse 17 will introduce the AP600 design and design philosophy.
18 The subcommittee will then hear presentations 19 on the following: The reactor, reactor coolant system and l 20 connected systems, the auxiliary systems including fire 21 protection and radioactive waste management.
22 Any comments from any members of the committee 23 before we get started?
24 James?
l ~ '\
(( ,) 25 MR. CARROLL: Yes, I was curious as to what l
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6 l
1 version of the Westinghouse SSER we are looking? Version l
, 2 nine?
('-")
i l
3 CHAIRMAN SEALE: I believe that is correct, 4 yes.
5 MR. KENYON: The latest version is revision C nine.
7 CHAIRMAN SEALE: Yes, nine is the latest.
t 8 MR. CARROLL: Okay.
9 And I guess you will tell us what the status l
l 10 of the staff SSER is?
11 CHAIRMAN SEALE: Yes.
12 MR. KENYON: Mr. Huffman will present a
- 13 discussion of the status.
(~x l k- 14 MR. CARROLL: Because it would have been a lot l
15 easier, for me at least, to review this thing if I had --
16 CHAIRMAN SEALE: That is a shared comment, up 17 front.
18 Okay. We will proceed with the meeting then 19 and I will call on William Huffman of NRR to begin.
20 MR. HUFFMAN: Thank you.
21 My name is William Huffman and I am one of the l
l 22 AP600 project managers; there are four of us.
l l 23 What we are doing here this morning is we are 24 going to give you some introductory remarks on the status y)
(~ 25 of the schedule.
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l l
7 l
l 1 All the other detailed information as to where
,_ 2 I can be contacted is on the slide.
1(' ') 3 We are presently actively developing a 4 realistic and achievable schedule for finishing the AP600 5 review.
6 Within the last couple of weeks we have had 7 some intensive worker level and senior management meeting 8 level interactions with Westinghouse to try to develop 9 this schedule. We will have another senior management 10 meeting coming up on December 9 which will hopefully 11 provide some closure in this schedule-making process.
12 What we found is the principal driving factors 13 on the schedule right now are the remaining Westinghouse !
p
)
(_/ 14 deliverables and the staff resource availability to 15 support the review. l 16 I should probably add an addendum on the 17 resource availability and note that a lot of operating 18 reactor issues have been coming up in certain key areas 1
19 that have been impacting some of the AP600 effort. '
20 Other factors that are probably less 21 significant right now are a policy issue paper that we 22 have before the commission that we have briefed the ACRS 23 on previously, SECY-96-128 which we are awaiting a policy l 24 decision on.
) 25 Levels of detail of information in the SSAR:
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8 1 Seems like a lot of the areas that the staff is interacting with Westinghouse involves the extent of
>n 2 k.)r 3 documentation that should be included in the SSAR.
4 Programmatic reviews: These are reviews that 5 cut across all review areas and somewhat appropriate, they 6 come at the end of the review, being ITAAC, technical 7 specifications, initial test programs. It is possible 8 that these will have -- in fact, right now it appears that 9 at least one area of these will have some impact on the l 10 schedule.
11 And then there is a collection of --
l 12 MR. CARROLL: What is that area?
13 MR. CARROLL: ITAAC. We just received U 14 recently the ITAAC and we had some concerns about it which 15 we have expressed in writing to Westinghouse.
16 This is a very difficult aspect of the review 17 and it is not clear as to the extent of effort it would l
18 require for the staff to complete that review.
19 MR. CARROLL: Is Westinghouse taking a 20 significantly different approach to ITAAC than combustion 21 or GE did on their plans?
22 MR. HUFFMAN: I don't know if it is ;
23 significantly different; they are taking a different l 24 approach. I wouldn't like to characterize it as (tQ
) 25 significantly different, but there are differences.
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1 We have initially expressed our concern with ps 2 those differences to Westinghouse.
3 These differences may result in a different
- 4 type of --
5 We had previously characterized or thought we 6 had a well-characterized knowledge of the amount of effort 7 it takes to do an ITAAC. We are somewhat concerned that 8 because of the method that Westinghouse chose that there 9 might be some lengthening of time in this area.
10 MR. CARROLL: And what you would like 11 Westinghouse to do is to follow the pattern previously set ,
l 12 or what?
13 MR. HUFFMAN: I think it would make it easier i Ch
'--} 14 for the staff. There is a learning curve, as I said. The l 15 staff is used to other evolutionary design reviews in 16 ITAAC so it is always easier for the staff to review 17 something that they are familiar within terms of 18 methodology.
19 MR. CARROLL: Yeah, but ITAAC is something 20 that I think will evolve, should evolve into a better 21 product. I wouldn't discourage people from being 22 innovative.
23 MR. HUFFMAN: Right. We have one of the 1
24 individuals here from the staff who was intimately i /~'
(_)s 25 involved in previous ITAAC and perhaps he can provide some NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N W.
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l l 10 1 further comments.
,_ 2 MR. WILSON: This is Jerry Wilson, NRR.
i t 3 After the completion of the ITAAC reviews on 4 the two evolutionary designs, we did a lessons-learned 5 after it amongst the staff and with the industry and the 6 results of that we put in a standard review plan that was 7 recently issued for comment.
8 I think the point that Bill is making and I 9 would agree with is if Westinghouse followed the lessons-10 learned from the standard review plan, the staff's review 11 would be able to be completed in a shorter time period.
l '] I agree with you that while we are not 13 discouraging doing things differently, we are just f
rx 1
\J 14 pointing out that if you do do things differently, it is 15 going to take the staff longer to do the review.
i 16 MR. CARROLL: Okay, 17 MR. HUFFMAN: The last point is that there 18 seems to be a collection of some key technical issues that 19 both Westinghouse and the staff just have to get together 20 on and iron out. We were in the process of trying to work 21 out some method that identifies responsible people, both 22 at this end and at the Westinghouse end to just go ahead 23 and make decisions in these areas.
24 These have not been elevated to a policy issue
(
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11 1 they will be. It is just a matter of getting the right 2 people together and making a final decision.
- ~] 3 MEMBER KRESS: I thought RTNSS had already 1
l 4 been resolved.
5 MR. HUFFMAN: I would say that in 1
6 Westinghouse's mind they are essentially complete. But 7 there was an identified process that was in the SECY paper 8 and Westinghouse has followed that process and no 9 significant RTNSS systems have been identified.
10 MEMBER KRESS: Right.
11 MR. HUFFMAN: There are certain aspects of the 12 review, though, the process, that have not been completed 13 in its entirety by Westinghouse.
/'N
(_) 14 MEMBER KRESS: So, it is just the application 15 of the process?
16 MR. HUFFMAN: Well, right. And we are not 17 ready to state, unequivocally that there will be nothing 18 that will fall out of this.
19 In terms of these specific chapters of the 20 FSAR,.4, 5, 9 and 11, I guess I do have to emphasize that 21 all of these are still under active review by the staff.
22 I heard you make the comment that it would 23 have been nice if you had had an FSAR on these, but we are 24 still some distance away from these.
l
(~N j () 25 As far as the issues contained in these NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N W.
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12 i
l 1 particular chapters, we are very close to closure on most 1
- 2 issues. I say that on most because there is an issue in i
~# 3 chapter 9 that is being addressed in our policy paper and 4 the decision on that will affect what happens on spent l
5 fuel cooling and makeup.
l 6 MR. CARROLL: We will hear about that issue 7 when we get to chapter 9?
8 MR. HUFFMAN: No. I believe that we are not 9 going to address that issue today. I will let 10 Westinghouse confirm that, but they feel that because the 11 policy decision has not been made yet, it is probably not ,
l 12 appropriate to speak to that issue.
l 13 The ACRS has been briefed on what the issue is I
(~N )
14 there.
15 Most of the remaining issues in these chapters 16 are of a documentation nature, again, the level of detail.
17 So there is nothing there that we can see that will affect j i
l 18 the design. '
19 As I said, we are just getting into the 20 programmatic reviews. I don't believe anybody thinks 21 there will be anything from the programmatic reviews that 22 will come back and affect the design, but there is always 23 that possibility, the programmatic reviews being ITAAC, 24 initial test program and technical specifications.
l (~N l
() 25 In anticipation of a question, if you are NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N W.
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l 13 l l l 1 wondering when you can expect to see an FSAR, I would say l
! i
~\ 2 probably sometime in the fall of 1997.
\
f
'~') 3 That's all I have.
4 CHAIRMAN SEALE: Are there any questions?
5 MR. CARROLL: You mentioned when you began 6 that you were one of four project managers.
7 MR. HUFFMAN: That is correct.
8 MR. CARROLL: Who is in charge?
9 MR. HUFFMAN: We have a senior project 10 manager, Mr. Tom Kenyon over here. And then we work with 11 Tom; he's not our boss but we look to Tom for a lot of the i 12 experience that he carries, project management experience.
13 CHAIRMAN SEALE: Could you tell us who the
[~'N 1
\
\ ~-) 14 other project managers are?
15 MR. HUFFMAN: Diane Jackson who is sitting in 16 the back, in the audience there, another individual who is ,
1 1
17 not present here today, Joseph Rosky, myself and Mr. I i
18 Kenyon, 19 CHAIRMAN SEALE: Okay.
20 Any other questions?
l 21 MR. CARROLL: You sort of divided up the --
22 MR. HUFFMAN: Yes, we have various divisions 1 i
23 of responsibility. Mrs. Jackson has chapters 9 and 11 and l
! 24 I would have chapters 4 and 5.
l p)
(,, 25 MR. CARROLL: Oh.
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l l 14 l
1 MR. KENYON: Dr. Seale, my name is Tom Kenyon l gg 2 on the staff.
Ikj
3 One thing that I did want to point out is the 4 staff doesn't have any formal presentations that we 5 intended to make today because our review is continuing.
l
! 6 We brought staff here and we will have staff l
7 here to be ready to answer any questions that may come up.
i 1
8 CHAIRMAN SEALE: I understand and we l
9 appreciate your willingness to standby for potential 10 questions that might arise during the presentations.
11 In many respects, this is not the best way to 12 do it since it would be nice to have the other l 13 documentation. On the other hand, if we have inputs, you li '
14 probably want to get them as soon as you can, so we will 15 try to act accordingly.
l 16 I should say for the record, before we go any l
17 further, Mr. Carroll was intimately involved in the l
18 reviews of the two evolutionary designs, the ABWR and the 19 System 80+. In particular, he paid great attention to the 20 questions of ITAACs and other technical issues that were 21 to be transferred largely to the applicant, the license 22 holder, --
24 CHAIRMAN SEALE: Yes, the COL at that point in 25 the process.
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15
! 1 So, we expect his input to be very invaluable l
-, 2 as we go through this and you might expect many of his L'/ 3 comments to reflect that interest of ours.
4 With that comment, if there are no others, we l
l 5 will go on and Mr. McIntyre from Westinghouse get us 6 started here.
i 7 MR. McINTYRE: Okay. Thank you very much.
l 8 I have my own slides, really, but I am going l
9 to start with Bill's slides to explain, give you a little
( 10 different perspective. Actually, I think it is pretty l
l 11 much the same perspective.
12 He is right on the schedule. We are working l
13 on the schedule very diligently. We have sat down with
\- 14 the branches for two days, two weeks ago, and went ;
15 through, item by item what we need to get done, what we l 16 need to close things out, and we are trying to role that i l
l 17 into a schedule. l l
l 18 It depends, obviously, on the two things: We )
l 19 have got to get it to the staff and the staff has got to 20 review it.
21 We are competing with a lot of different items l l
22 right now. Nucleonics and a lot of operating plan issues l 23 which do get a higher priority with the staff than the 24 AP600 does.
(O ,) 25 On the policy issues, what we need to have is 1
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16 1 the vote from the commission on those. We have looked at l
! 2 what they are, we know if the staff wants sprays as one of I A l ( )
'" 3 the policy issues.
l 4 We know if that comes down one way what we 5 will do. If it comes down the other way, we know what we 6 are going to do in that direction.
7 I don't see this as being a big thing from us l
l 8 making a decision and taking a course of action, but it is 9 going to be something, depending on which way ther,e things l
10 go, that we are going to have to submit to the staff and 11 have to sit down and review.
i 12 On the level of detail of information in the 1
13 SSAR, when we turned the SSAR in in 1992 we were generous
, O
- b. 14 to a fault in the amount of information that we turned in.
l 15 There was the SRP and then we -- yes, you can l
16 turn in too much.
17 What we found is a lot of the stuff that we 18 are -- this lower, lower level of detail of stuff that is 19 still changing as you go on and do more detailed work on 20 the plant.
21 You may be aware that we have the first of a l
22 kind engi- 3 ring contract from the Department of Energy l
l 23 and the Advanced Reactor Corporation. So, we are doing a 24 lot more work on the plant. It is something that GE kind (O) 25 of got caught up in, the same thing, that they had to NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N W.
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17 i 1 actually come back and make changes to the design after 1
1
! 2 their FDA had been issued.
t [s\
\"J t
3 We found that some of that lower level of 4 detail is changing and will be changing as more work is l
5 done. So, it is stuff that we are trying not to put in 6 the SSAR at this point.
7 What we are finding out is that the staff is 8 saying that they relied on that specific information to 9 make their safety determination. So, we went back and 10 read, I guess, eight of the SSAR and we took a bunch of 11 the stuff out. And staff asked where the heck did the 12 stuff go, you guys? They are having to go back and re-13 review it.
fm
- 14 We recognize that that's going to take more 15 time, more money. But we think, talking to the utilities, 16 and the direction that we have been given and what we i
l 17 think is the best thing to do, we recognize that is part ;
1 18 of the exercise that we have to go through. It is painful 19 and expensive, but that is something that we just have to 20 accept.
21 The programmatic reviews, as Bill pointed out, 22 we did take a different approach on the ITAAC. We talked l 23 to the utilities, we talked to our sponsors, the 24 Department of Energy, we talked to NEI after the ITAAC
' C'\
(/ 25 exercise was over and said we really would like to do some i
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18 1 things differently. l i
l 1 l
2 So, what we got was a lot of input from the 3 utilities and that is what you see reflected in our 1
4 ITAACs. !
5 And they are different. They are different l 6 because we got the input from the utilities and different l
7 because of the design philosophy of the plant which I am 1
8 going to talk about in a very high level in a couple of ;
9 minutes.
1 10 There are things that are different in the )
i 11 AP600 that will give you a different type of ITAAC.
12 The key technical issues, RTNSS, back in 1993, 13 we did agree on a process. It is like everything; the i
- 14 devil is in the details. You turn it in, you have to be 15 sure that the PRA is good, there are I think six or seven 16 outstanding general issues post-72 hour actions which is 17 also a policy issue. i 18 There is adverse system interactions, There is 19 -- I am not doing very well.
20 But anyway, there are six things.
22 MR. McINTYRE: ATWS is not one.
23 MR. KENYON: ATWS was included in the 24 evaluation.
l l
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l 19 l 1 make any difference.
l fs 2 We have made submittal to the staff on all but I
(~') 3 I think the post-72 hours. But that should be moving 4 along because it is key.
l l 5 Probably one of the biggest things in there is t
6 the thermal hydraulic uncertainty of how robust is your 7 PRA. Do you have the right success criteria. We have a 8 path laid out with the staff and action is ours right now.
I 9 We have the benchmark, the MAAP 4 computer code for use 10 and it is something that is just proceeding along and it l l
11 is in this schedule. ,
1 l
12 I think this is a really important issue that
,_ 13 we are done making system changes. We will only make them
, i l k 14 because those are associated with a policy issue or we 15 have to for some reason to get through the regulations or 16 to get past the staff. Those are the only driving things. i l
17 We are not doing things for, I am going to 18 call them, design enhancements. We have had to call a 19 halt to that because they can't finish their review if we 20 keep changing the SAAR.
21 So, we realize one of the thins; is, stop 22 changing the plan, guys.
23 MR. CARROLL: Now, do you believe Brian that 24 the status of the thermal hydraulics testing is such that I
'~
ih
( ,/ 25 time won't change?
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20 1 MR. McINTYRE: Absolutely.
7s 2 MR. CARROLL: How about the staff? Do they
! 3 share that view?
l l
l 4 MR. McINTYRE: I'll answer that; I think 1
5 honestly.
6 LAUGHTER -
l 7 We are at the point now on the testing that 8 the other subcommittee, Ivan's subcommittee, we are ready 9 to meet with them on the PIRT and scaling report and that i
10 is schedule for December 18 and 19. At that point, it is 11 my understanding that Dr. Levin is willing to stand up and 12 say yea, verily, we are satisfied with the testing pending 13 the review of the codes.
,O
\- ' 14 But they don't see any need for more. They 15 are doing their confirmatory testing at OSU, ROSA, but l
l 16 they are not looking to us to do anymore testing at this 17 point.
l l
18 MR. HUFFMAN: This is Bill Huffman on the i 19 staff.
20 I concur with Brian's remarks. There is one 21 area that, I wouldn't say it would affect the design, but l
l 1 l 22 PRHR heat exchanger, the initial testing was done with l l 23 tubes and the current design is a C-tube design. !
24 Westinghouse has done a lot of work to O)
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l 21 l
1 in that design are valid and the codes can applicably l
l
,s 2 demonstrate the proper heat transfer.
- / \
' \
3 We recently got an update of the PRHR final 4 analysis report that quantifies and qualifies 5 Westinghouse's position. The reactor sys'. ems branch is 6 looking at that in detail at this point in time.
7 We haven't identified any further concerns in 8 that area, but we have not finished reviewing that 9 particular report.
10 MR. CARROLL: Thank you.
11 MR. McINTYRE: Another thing on the subject of 12 schedule. We have another SSAR revision that will be 13 coming in on December 20. That will be revision 10. ,
("N )
k_ 14 We have two or three more planned SSAR 15 revisions. They are primarily just cleaning up things 16 with the staff and closing out open items, that is 17 basically what we are doing at this point.
18 So, there will be more SSAR revisions; they 19 will be less significant than the previous submittal have 20 been.
21 Now for my own presentation.
22 I think one thing that has been important in 23 the AP600, if you look at our design process, it has been 24 an iteration that we have gone through. To some extent, we i
()
/'
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i i 22 I l
1 problems that engineers can always make something better.
l rs 2 We think that at this point we are beyond the point of 3 diminishing returns as far as getting design 4 certification.
l 5 But we had the input from the utility 6 requirements document and the AP600 is designed to be 7 compliant with the ALWR utility requirements document.
8 We took our own lessons-learned from designing 9 the 56 plants we have operating in this country, things we l 10 could truly do better. -
I 11 We started with a blank piece of paper. We 12 have a safety analysis. We find out what components need 13 to be improved or changed.
t o
k_- 14 We went through the same thing with the PRA, i 15 five so far. We go through and find the weakest component 16 or the weakest system of where the issues are and we would 17 fix it. As a result, I think we have a pretty robust .
l 18 design.
19 We have also done a lot of studies as far as 20 the plant arrangement, and I think Mr. Carroll will 21 appreciate this. We have even thought of things like when 22 you change reactor coolant pump, how big the little dolly 23 has to be and whether or not there are enough pathways to 24 get it through.
! r~N
( ,)
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1 l 23 1 designed into the plant. I i
I 2 One of the intentions is that, of course,
!-sV) 3 nuclear has to be cost competitive. If the O&M costs are I 4 high, then we realize that the AP600 isn't going to be 5 something that people will be interested in.
l 6 This has been much more of an innovative 7 design than you have seen in the past and it is the l
l 8 difference between the evolutionary plants where you were 1
9 evolving a little bit as opposed to this plant, the AP, l
10 the advanced, the AP600 design where we have really done 11 some significantly different things.
l l 12 There should be one more bullet, several l
13 iterations have been completed. There should be one that l i\ -)
! 14 says we are done. I think that that is an important one.
15 But the engineers made up this slide, not the management.
16 MR. CARROLL: You mentioned the EPRI utility 17 requirements document as one of those design inputs?
18 MR. McINTYRE: Yes.
19 MR. CARROLL: Is there a short list or perhaps 20 no list of departures from that document? I would like to 21 know how closely you have followed that.
22 MR. McINTYRE: In the end there will be none.
23 We have as part of the other program that we 24 don't talk about as part of design certification, the 25 first of a kind, we have a data base that has been built l NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N W.
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f l 24 1 for all 8,562, or whatever the number is, a huge number of l
2 requirements that they have gone through and for the ones 7-
~'
3 that we have achiesad as part of the plant design at this 4 point.
5 Some of those are ones that the utility has to 6 worry about. We can't address. But their data bases have 7 been built up and we get taken to task, that may be a 8 strong word, by the utilities on a bi-monthly basis and we 9 go through those deviations and we either work on changing 10 the plant or they recognize it was a nice requirement but 11 you guys really can't do it, can you.
12 So, they will look at changing the 13 requirements document.
l !
\/ 14 MR. CARROLL: Who is doing that? The EPRI 15 group?
16 MR. McINTYRE: No, Westinghouse along with the 17 utility sponsored group for the AP600. It is the 18 utilities and the people from EPRI. i 19 Actually, we have four people en site from the 20 utilities who watch us, make sure that we tse the line. j 1
21 So, it is a very well-established working 22 relationship, and they have been on site since 1992.
l l 23 MR. CARROLL: The cottom line is that there 24 will be no deviations from the URD as modified by
,s k ,) 25 discussion?
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25 1 MR. McINTYRE: Yes.
,_s 2 MR. CARROLL: Good.
/ \
\ ') 3 MR. WINTERS: My name is Jim Winters, I am 4 from Westinghouse.
5 The utilities requirements docupant covers 6 requirements across the board, from operating to detailed 7 design, safety-related requirements.
8 Last summer we completed a review that said 9 all requirements that had an impact on the safety were 10 addressed in the SSAR we complied with at that time with 11 no changes to that since.
12 The requirements that Brian is talking about 13 are requirements that are in the detailo or in the f"xI
\/ 14 operating review.
15 MR. CARROLL: Or non-safety related.
16 MR. WINTERS: Or non-safety related.
17 MR. KENYON: Mr. Carroll? Tom Kenyon from the 18 staff.
19 The staff reviewed the EPRI requirements 20 document up through revision five for the passive, 21 although it might have been six, for the passive 22 requirements document.
23 We are still under the commission direction to 24 determine where the Westinghouse AP600 deviates from the
) 25 requirements document and we would expect to see a list of NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE , N W.
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i 26 1 where they deviate from the requirements document that the i
,~ 2 staff approved. That would be through revision five.
! 2
~
3 So, we would hope to see from Westinghouse 4 what things were being changed.
5 MR. CARROLL: Okay.
6 MR. McINTYRE: And if you look at the NRC 7 strategic assessment re-baselining paper, lirection-8 setting issue number ten, on licensing advanced reactors, 9 one of the commission's preliminary views was that the 10 staff should find a way to stay in touch with the 11 requirements document as it changes and review those 12 changes.
13 They haven't gotten to that point because that O f
('/ But they realize 14 hasn't been implemented at this point.
15 that the URD is changing.
16 I will underline those things that are 17 probably most important to us.
18 The top one is obviously safety, but we are 19 trying to do that with a greatly simplified plant and 20 these are the things that have really driven a lot of 21 these changes you are going to hear today when we talk 22 about the SSAR sections.
23 We are also trying to give the utilities 24 greater operating flexibility in component sizing, in the O)
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27 1 in some areas. I will talk about some examples later on.
2 MR. CARROLL: This was also an emphasis in the (3
3 URD?
l 4 MR. McINTYRE: Yes. If you meet the URD you 5 can do all of these things. This has become even more ,
j l
6 driving as you have seen the plants get shut down for 1 l
7 various reasons.
l 8 But it has to be something that is !
l 9 competitive, not just from a financial standpoint, but I 10 from an O&M standpoint. So, you really need to look at 11 this from an integrated standpoint.
12 CHAIRMAN SEALE: Mario, do you have a 1
13 question?
V 14 MEMBER FONTANA: I think so. With respect to l l
15 competitive cost of power, you expect that on the first l 1
16 plant to be sold or is there a learning curve?
l l
17 MR. McINTYRE: The way the plant is, there are 18 certain things that are assumed in here and it is not on 19 the first plant. But it is designed to not only be 20 competitive with nuclear but with other means of i
1 21 generating power.
22 From a safety margin standpoint, one of the .
I 23 requirements that was in the utility requirements document I 24 was to have the 15 per cent thermal margin in the core and (D we have done that a lot of different ways.
g 25 )
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l 28 1 But we also have to meet, without operator l s 2 actions for core cooling, the core melt frequency of 104,
- I )
3 which is something that got rolled up into the RTNSS l
4 resolution that we actually committed that we would do 5 that with no non-safety systems taken into account in the 6 PRA.
7 Also, to have a large release of 10-6 So, 8 these are significantly better than current operating 9 plants are.
10 MEMBER FONTANA: Is that defined like EPRI 11 used to define it as greater than 25 R outside the i
12 boundary?
13 MR. McINTYRE: Who defined it like that?
<~s
!\ -)
14 MEMBER FONTANA: Well, a while back EPRI was 15 defining a large release as anything that causes site 16 boundary whole body dose greater than 25 R had to have a 17 probability of occurrence smaller than 10 .
18 I don't know if that number is still there.
19 MR. McINTYRE: The number is not there. If 1 l
20 you look at the design of the AP600, and because we don't 21 have the containment failures, the release is either very, 22 very tiny or it would be huge; there will be nothing in 23 between because of the way the plant has been designed.
24 It is either black or white; there is no shade
(%
( ,) 25 of gray in this case.
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'i
29 i
1 Things that we have tried to do from a l 7y 2 licensing standpoint --
,)
3 MR. CARROLL: What is left out of those 4 numbers, core melt frequency. You are not considering 5 sabotage.
6 MR. McINTYRE: It's not sabotage it's full 7 power operation, it is shutdown, it's external events. We 8 are doing seismic margins, we are not doing a seismic PRA.
9 It does include fire, it does include --
10 MR. CARROLL: Seismic is not included?
11 MR. McINTYRE: Seismic is not included in 12 that.
13 MR. CARROLL: I think your presentatio'n would i \
\') 14 be improved in the future if you would put a footnote as 15 to what isn't included. l l
16 MR. CARROLL: I would just like to remind l 17 people when they look at those numbers that they are not 18 everything.
19 MEMBER FONTANA: I missed something. Is l 20 shutdown included or not?
21 CHAIRMAN SEALE: Yes.
22 MEMBER FONTANA: Seismic isn't.
23 MR. McINTYRE: Seismic is not.
24 Okay. There have been a lot of advanced plant (D 25 licensing issues as things have evolved, that really
(_/
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30 l
l 1 weren't in place when we started. We have done a lot more
,_ 2 in the way of severe accident work. You are seeing some
. I s
\'-)
3 of this reflected in the balance of prevention and 4 mitigation.
l 5 We have done extensive testing which I will l
6 talk about from a high level here in a few minutes, but 7 not only to look at the thermal hydraulics code to help 8 keep Ivan happy, but also to look at the components that 9 are different.
10 An example are the reactor coolant pump where 11 we built the depleted uranium fly-wheel and the bearing l
12 to go along with it, and spun it up to be sure that we 13 knew how it would coast down.
(~h
\- 14 We got a surprise whsn we ran that test the 15 first time and found out you needed to make some changes i
16 in the flywheel design so that it did have a longer coast l
1 l
17 down. It was actually in the way the welds were done in 4
l 18 the stainless steel.
19 MR. CARROLL: Eventually, you are going to l
20 explain to me why you don't need to NDE the thing ,
l 21 periodically?
l i 22 MR. McINTYRE: Yes. l 23 MR. CARROLL: Good.
24 MR. McINTYRE: The answer is you don't care if
("'y 1
( ,) 25 it fails; it stays in the casing. l i NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS l 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N W (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON. D C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 l
I 31 1 But we will talk about that in that chapter.
,, 2 MR. CARROLL: Okay.
\~ ' 3 CHAIRMAN SEALE: And how that impacts the cost l
4 effectiveness.
5 MR. McINTYRE: We've done extensive testing on 6 the components. We have done significant accident analyses 7 and PRA studies and those have been the iterative 8 processes. This is the first plant that has really used 9 the PRA and the accident analysis as part of the design 10 process. It wasn't done after the fact.
l 11 This doesn't give you a small emergency 12 planning zone because that goes well beyond anything that 13 we are going to do in design certification.
l
(~)/
N- 14 The intent of this bullet is that you get the 15 doses down following a design-basis accident. This is 16 more of a political issue than it will ever be a technical l
17 issue.
18 We will do our part. We will design the plant l
19 right and then we will turn it over the attorneys to worry 20 about that part of it.
21 The things that we have done to make the plant 22 different, we have significantly increased some components l 23 that are important like the size of the pressurizer.
24 A good way to look at this is a two loop plant f
25 with a four loop pressurizer; it's huge. It gives you a
(
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l
32 1 lot of ride out, if you look in our chapter 15 analyses
- 2 that there are a lot of different results than you would i
\ ') 3 expect to see in a current two loop plant. In fact, we 4 don't even have PORVs on this plant.
5 It is one of the ways you get the cost of the 6 plant down but put the larger pressurizer on and you get 7 much better transient analysis results. You don't have to 8 worry about them sticking open.
9 The volt reactor power density is a three loop 10 vessel with significantly more fuel assemblies. If you 11 look at what it does from a numerical standpoint, these 12 are some of the parameters.
13 You are getting the same power. We have
\w- 14 reduced the hot leg temperature even though we have 15 Inconel 690 tubes in this plant we have also reduced the 16 hot leg temperature to try to address the stress corrosion 17 cracking of the tubes. Same operating pressure, more fuel 18 assemblies.
19 MR. CARROLL: What is the reference plant you 20 are comparing it to?
21 MR. McINTYRE: It is a typical two loop that 22 would be found in this country.
23 MR. CARROLL: If you were designing Point 24 Beach today?
(~~h
(_) 25 MR. McINTYRE: That would be an example.
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33 1 Westinghouse doesn't mention other plant names, but yes,
( - 2 that is an example.
%-] 3 So, buy having more fuel assemblies and the 4 newer fuel designs you have a significant reduction in the l
5 linear heating rate which gives you much better accident 6 performance from a non-LOCA standpoint.
7 It is also a much larger vessel. And because 1
8 it has a radial reflector it also has significantly lower 9 fluence given that it is operating for 20 more years than 10 the current.
11 MEMBER FONTANA: Is it a thicker wall, too?
12 MR. McINTYRE: The vessel?
13 MEMBER FONTANA: Yes.
N- 14 MR. McINTYRE: I don't believe so 15 MEMBER FONTANA: The ID is bigger.
16 Feed and bleed is not an option?
17 MR. McINTYRE: It is done differently.
18 MR. BAGCHI: This is Boutam Bagchi from the 19 staff.
20 Just to give you a direct answer to your 21 question, so much margin in the thickness of the vessel, 22 just a small increase in diameter isn't going to make that l
l 23 much of a difference.
24 MR. McINTYRE: I think the biggest difference (q
_ ,/ 25 in the AP600 is that we have the passive safety systems as NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N W.
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34 1 opposed to the powered safety systems which is why this l <~s 2 plant does not necessarily fit in to the standard review t 1 3 plan where you can say you have done this and this, 4 because this is just done differently.
5 We do the same functions, but we tend to do 6 them differently.
7 We also tried to simplify the non-safety I
8 systems significantly in this plant. That has been done 9 just by building them better, taking valves out, using 10 better valves.
11 It is a digital I&C system with all the 12 multiplexed fiber optics. It doesn't have a cable
_ 13 spreading room.
5 1 <
14 Also, the use of modular construction which we 15 are not going to talk about in this particular meeting.
16 It is intended to be a factory-built plant with the 17 modules constructed off-site and then you bring them to 18 the site. Not only from the systems standpoint, the 19 normal RHR system and things like that, but structural 20 components.
21 In the interest of time, I mentioned that we 22 used the PRA as a design tool. The PRA is now basically 23 done; I think we still have a couple of questions to l
( 24 answer for the staff. We have been through it five times
(~
k -)/
m 25 and each one has been in a little more detail as the valve NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N W.
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i 35 l
l l 1 types and routings and things like that have been pumped
, 2 up.
l ,
l i )
3 CHAIRMAN SEALE: In this insights cocument l
l 4 from the PRA, would that include a lessons-learned 1
5 assessment of the impact of the PRA on the design process?
6 MR. McINTYRE: It has a chapter that talks 7 about design changes that were made as a result of the l
8 PRA.
9 This is the part that finds its way into the 10 SSAR so that when the owner is making some changes to the 11 plant, he will look at these insights and realize he i
12 shouldn't change that.
13 What we found in the end is that we do meet 14 the NRC and EPRI PRA goals. Our bottom-line core belt 15 f requency excluding seismic is 2.2 x 10-7, that is using l 16 the non-safety systems.
17 For the RTNSS evaluation, I think it was about 18 2x10-6 which says we did that without any of the non-safety 19 systems. with safety systems only.
20 What we are saying is you get a big difference, an f 21 order of magnitude or two, by not using the non-safety 22 systems. We never said they weren't important, but we did 23 say we could meet the commission's safety goals without 24 them.
()
A 25 The thing that we have also achieved is a lot NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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l 36 1 of diversity in the systems. We have shown, as with l
2 Ivan's group, there are more different ways to deal with
() 3 an ATWS event, to deal with a tube rupture event in this 4 plant than you do in current plants.
5 So, while it is simpler, it is surprisingly 6 much more redundant and diverse in dealing with accident 7 situations.
8 We never said they weren't.
9 From the simplification standpoint to show 10 what we have achieved, and this gets back to the cost of 11 the plant, ease of operating the plant, we have -- and it 12 also shows what you get from having the passage systems --
13 there are no safety related pumps in the plant. That's t
O i 1
V 14 what you get from having passage systems. Because you 15 have fewer systems and going down to the very bottom line, 16 you've been able to almost halve the amount of seismic ,
l 17 building volume that's required. !
i i
18 So there's a lot of benefits to this and this 19 is just sort of a simplification from going from that 20 reference plant to going to the AP600. The amount of 21 reduction in either plant size or in safety-related stuff 22 that the utility has to take care of which is how we're 23 going to make this thing cost competitive.
l 24 I think at this point, due to the hour, I'll l
j Q
Q 25 say we are going to talk about -- if you look at the whole NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N W,
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l 37 l 1 SSAR, the 18 chapters of the SSAR, one of the things if i
2 you followed the evolutionary plants in any significant 73
(~ 3 detail, they had a Chapter 19 which was their PRA. Our 4 PRA was submitted separately from the SSAR. What we have i
5 to do, a little challenge in life before we get to design 6 certification, is figure out what we need to take from the i
l 7 PRA, this is the insights chapter that I mentioned that l
, 8 we're writing and put that in Chapter 19 of the SSAR, but 1
9 that's not something that staff needs to write their FSAR, 10 we don't think. 1 l
11 The four chapters we've picked, 4, 5, 9 and 11 12 are the ones where we think that we are furthest along 13 with the staff in the review, but there's no significant
/~'S j 14 outstanding issues. We want to, because the plant is 15 different, we want to get this in front of the Committee 16 because it is different and you really need to stop and 17 think about how all this is going to work together. It 18 also really formed the basis for understanding a lot of 19 the other systems, as here is how the major systems work.
20 We will be scheduling meetings hopefully with 21 you guys in the next couple of months for the rest of 22 these chapters, as once we get the schedule, when we know 23 where we are with the staff where we expect to be at this 24 point. We'd like the staff to be able to stand up and say b)
(_j 25 yeah, verily, we like it. We've signed off, but we know i
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38 1 that it's really not done until it's done. And it won't s 2 be done for -- until certainly later next year.
/ )
Q'/
3 So we've picked the four systems where we are 4 -- we think most comfortable where the staff is. As Bill 5 pointed out, we're not going to talk about the spent fuel 6 pool. The staff has two issues on that. One of those is 7 before the Commission in SECY 96-128. We know what the 8 Commission thinks. We'll tell you what we think and how 9 we're going to go forth.
10 MR. CARROLL: Can you briefly tell me what 11 that is?
12 MR. McINTYRE: What the issues are?
13 MR. CARROLL: Yes.
O 14 MR. McINTYRE: One of them is the seismic 15 nature of the cooling system and we boil the pool because 16 it does not have an active safety-related system and the ;
17 staff isn't real keen on that concept.
18 MR. CARROLL: They've accepted it for 30 19 years.
20 MR. McINTYRE: Well, they're thinking that 21 over. That was some of our logic. This goes back to the 22 advance plan issues and the operating plan issues, that 23 because of the things that have happened in the operating 24 plants are going back and taking a look at it. There's a
\
t, <
( ,/ 25 rule in the works. There's something going on in the --
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39 1 MR. HUFFMAN: The shutdown rule will probably f~x 2 address this. I think there's a lot of effort and I am
( l w'
3 really speaking now - 'come in around 9:30, but the 4 shutdown rule has looked at the whole regime of spent fuel 5 pool capability while the operating plants out there are 6 considering -- I think the consideration is that they want 7 to have a system that does not rely on boiling. So there 8 is a potential that it could impact this design.
I 9 MR. McINTYRE: Until that happens and SECY 10 comes out, we can't really tell you what we're going to ;
l l
11 do. Or if we tell you what we're doing it wouldn't be '
l I
12 something that the staff at this point would say they're 13 buying into.
\'
14 So the rest of the agenda, we will now be 15 starting to talk about the SSAR, Chapter 4 and 5. We're 16 going to start by talking about the design of the fuel and 17 go into the components and the systems and if we have time 18 for the break, I guess that's at the Chairman's 19 prerogative. Then we're going to talk about the auxiliary l
20 system, the Chapter 11, the radioactive waste. With that, 21 our next speaker.
l 22 CHAIRMAN SEALE: Very good. We'll save our 23 questions.
24 (Pause.)
i
[~
(,/) 25 MR. CARLSON: Good morning. My name is Bill l
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40 l
1 Carlson. I'll be presenting the AP600 reactor core and 7,3 2 fuel design section of the SSAR Chapter 4.
i !
'~#
3 My background is primarily in nuclear design, l 4 however, with me today I have with us Dr Harley Wilson i
l 5 who will be available to answer any questions related to 6 fuel performance and also Mr. Yi Sing Sung, who will be 7 able to answer any questions related to thermal hydraulic 8 design and/or DNB testing.
l 9 Starting with the core design, the core is 10 comprised of 145 fuel assemblies, utilizing a 17 by 17 11 fuel assembly lattice array and a 12 foot active fuel 12 length which is the standard fuel length.
13 A comparison of the AP600 core layout is shown
(
'N / 14 here, relative to a typical 600 megawatt electric 2 loop 15 design. Typical 600 megawatt electric 2 loop designs are 16 comprised of 121 fuel assemblies of a smaller 16 by 16 1
17 fuel assembly lattice design.
18 You'll see that the AP600 core is contained 19 within a 157 inch ID reactor vessel which is the same 20 dimension as that employed in our larger 157 assembly 900 21 megawatt 3 loop designs.
22 A typical 2 loop design employs a 132 inch 23 reactor vessel.
24 MR. CARROLL: You've got a scale problem there 1
l t'
( 25 in terms of vessel wall thickness, I think.
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41 1 MR. CARLSON: This was supposed to have'been 2 drawn to scale.
'"'/
3 MR. CARROLL: I can't believe the vessel wall 4 is twice as thick.
5 MR. CARLSON: Also a stainless radio reflector 6 is employed in this design, replacing the baffle and 7 former neutron pad designs employed in the standard 2 loop 8 design.
9 MEMBER FONTANA: The 60 year life that you 10 project, is the limiting consideration the vessel 11 irradiation?
12 MR. MAHLAB: My name is Moshe Mahlab and I'll 13 be talking about the reactor component after this session.
/ T
(_/ 14 MR. CARROLL: Where is the -- point to the 15 reflector that you're talking about.
16 MR. CARLSON: The reflector is here. And the 17 reflector design will be covered in the next presentation.
18 MR. CARROLL: Okay, and what are those guys 19 inside of it?
20 MR. CARLSON: Oh, that is just a cross hatch 21 representation. This will be a block plate design with 22 cooling holes and we'll cover that in the next i 23 presentation.
24 MR. CARROLL: That does keep the vessel wall -
25 -
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42 i
1 MR. CARLSON: Yes, yes.
2 MR. CARROLL: Okay.
~
3 MR. CARLSON: But from here we're able to see 4 that this design is capable of a significant reduction 5 vessel fluence.
6 CHAIRMAN SEALE: This industry still gets the 7 Captain Bizarro award for the year on units.
8 (Laughter.)
9 MR. CARLSON: Well, I have them in both units 10 on this one. Okay, the increase in the core loading from 11 a typical 2 loop from approximately 50 metric tons of 12 uranium to approximately 67 metric tons of uranium results 13 in approximately a 25 percent reduction in the core r~N,
-) 14 average power density.
15 You get a comparable 25 percent reduction in 16 the fuel specific power, the fuel rod average heat flux 17 and also the fuel rod average linear power in kilowatts 18 per foot, so as you can see, we're increasing the thermal 19 margins in the core.
20 The low power density core design also results 21 in improved fuel utilization requiring low feed 22 enrichments for a given discharge burn up, while 23 maintaining the capability to achieve a 24 month cycle 24 with fewer fuel assemblies and that eases the burden, of l (~'%
(_) 25 course, on the spent fuel.
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l l 43 l
! 1 MEMBER FONTANA: How did you decide in that I
~~ 2 power density, work backwards from some criteria?
- /
3 MR. CARLSON: The main criteria was the EPRI 4 criteria that we had achieved at least a 15 percent 5 increase in thermal margins in the core design and we felt 6 that a 25 percent increase, this power density is 7 comparable to that, I believe, in a boiling water reactor.
8 It felt that the design, the loading and approximately 9 where we were in discharge burn ups would allow us to 10 accommodate at this point a 3 zone core with about a 11 50,000 megawatt per day per metric ton discharge burn up.
12 Going to the fuel assembly design, the AP600 13 fuel assembly design is similar to the standard k/ 14 Westinghouse 17 by 17 V-5H design but with the following 15 features. The fuel assembly itself is approximately 10 16 inches longer. This fuel assembly is approximately 170 l
17 inches long, a typical 17 by 17, 12 foot fuel assembly is '
18 approximately 160 inches long.
19 An advanced fuel rod design is employed in 20 this core design which I'll cover on a later slide which 21 essentially doubles the gas plenum volume to accommodate 22 for the increase in fission gas release associated with 23 the higher discharge burn ups and the higher fuel rod burn 24 ups.
l'^'\
l
(_) 25 One additional structural grid is used in the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N W.
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44
! 1 design. Structural grids are identified here for a total l
7-~g 2 of 9 structural grids versus 8 in the standard design. We U 3 also add one more intermediate flow mixture grid for a 4 total of 4 IFMs in the design.
5 MEMBER FONTANA: Is that debris filter, is 6 that kind of drawn to scale or does it kind of really look 7 like that or does it look more like they had in Clinch 8 River where debris could not --
9 MR. CARLSON: I believe this is drawn to 10 scale. The main part is the hole is drilled in the bottom 11 of the fuel assembly nozzle are much, much smaller.
12 MR. McINTYRE: What you see there is fuel 13 assembly bottom nozzle. i 14 What you see there is the debris or the bottom l
15 nozzle and what really the point is that we've taken the )
16 bottom nozzle and made some modifications, so it's not --
17 if you were to look at a current fuel assembly,it would 18 look the same, bottom nozzle, at leae from this I 19 perspective. It is that thick.
20 MEMBER FONTANA: You remember the Clinch River 21 design, well, anyway, it was designed in such a way that l 22 it was almost impossible to block it with chunks of debris j 23 or anything like that.
24 CHAIRMAN SEALE: I think that's the intent
/^T (l 25 here too.
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45 1 MEMBER FONTANA: It is, okay.
,, , - 2 MR. CARLSON: Moving on to the fuel rod L)
3 design, the fuel rod design again is similar to the 4 Westinghouse standard V-5H fuel design,but incorporates 5 the following advanced features. One is ZIRLO cladding 6 which is an advanced corrosion resistant zircalloy 7 material which is alloyed with tinted niobium.
8 Upper and low plenums are used in the design 9 as mentioned previously and also --
10 MEMBER SHACK: How many are currently using 11 ZIRLO cladding?
12 MR. CARLSON: Pardon me?
13 MEMBER SHACK: How many plants are currently
,em l
- 14 using ZIRLO cladding?
I 15 MR. CARLSON: I'll ask Dr. Wilson.
16 MR. WILSON: I'm Harley Wilson. I don't know 17 the exact number, but it's on the order of say 15 to 20.
18 About 75 to 80 percent of production this year will be 19 ZIRLO so there's a very strong move to ZIRLO.
20 MEMBER SHACK: And how high are the burn ups 21 that you're reaching?
22 MR. WILSON: I believe at this point the lead 23 region is hit in the 50s.
24 MR. CARLSON: We also utilize a long
(_,/ 25 approximately 3-inch long solid bottom end plug to prevent I i
NEAL R. GROSS l COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS l 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N W.
l (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON. D C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 l
l l
46 l
1 clad fretting due to debris trapped in the bottom grid.
2 This is the area where most debris induced fretting 3 occurs. This is an illustration of the fuel rod and you 4 will notice the upper and lower plenums separating the 5 fuel stack, but also you'll notice a 2.7 inch long solid 6 bottom end plug.
7 Reactivity could control features utilized in 8 design are comparable to standard designs. The design l
9 employs soluble boron, rod cluster cc: ul assemblies, j 10 RCCAs, and also burnable absorbers, both discrete and ,
11 integral fuel burnable absorber designs. One thing which 12 is new in the design is MSHIM which is an advanced load I l
13 follow operational strategy which is employed in the l 14 design to meet a URD requirement for no boron change 15 during load follow operation.
16 MSHIM essentially uses two independently 17 operated groups of control rods, simultaneously controlled 18 both the reactivity and the core power distribution.
19 The design utilizes both black and gray RCCA 20 designs, 61 total control rods and design, 45 black RCCAs 21 and 16 gray RCCAs are employed. The gray rod positions are 22 highlighted here. The normal operation in the MSHIM is 23 that the MSHIM banks operate with a fixed overlap and 24 provide reactivity control while 9 rod fairly heavy worth,
/
25 A.O. Bank provides the actual power distribution control.
l ()
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47 l 1 With regard to the nuclear design, the l
i
,s
, 2 reactivity coefficients are, for the most part, comparable i )
l \ /
l 3 with standard designs. In some conventional designs, the 4 moderator temperature coefficient is allowed to be l 5 positive at reduced power conditions. The AP600 design, 6 however, maintains the negative moderator temperature 7 coefficient over the full range of operating conditions 8 all the way from full power down to zero power. This l
9 again is an ALWR requirement.
10 The reactivity control systems are adequate to 11 insure power distribution control and shutdown capability 12 are maintained. The design meets the ALWR cycle energy 13 requirement which requires the ability to obtain a 24
)
s/ 14 month cycle with an 87 percent capacity factor.
l 15 All applicable general design criteria are met ,
I 16 in the nuclear design. ;
l 17 CHAIRMAN SEALE: And again that's with a burn l l
18 up of about 60,000 did you say is the peak?
19 MR. CARLSON: We attain a 24-month cycle with 20 a3 zone core with a region average discharge burn up of 21 approximately 54,000 megawatt days per metric ton. Part 22 of the low power density of feature benefits.
l 23 MR. CARROLL: What's the peak?
24 MR. CARLSON: The peak rod in this particular l (h
( ,) 25 design is around 64,000 megawatt days per metric ton.
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48 1 CHAIRMAN SEALE: Okay, now there have been 2 comment or there have been concerns recently expressed i Q,)
3 over some difficulties that have been encountered in l 4 operating plants at around 45,000 megawatt days per metric l
5 ton on od sticking and things like that.
6 The design features that you incorporated into 7 this, you believe will avoid that difficulty?
8 MR. CARLSON: Yes, I believe so. Dr. Wilson l
9 can comment on this, but one of the features we intend to 10 use is with the use of ZIRLO there is less growth and 11 that, I believe, has been identified as one of the 1
l 12 contributing factors. Dr. Wilson can talk about these 1
13 sticking rods. l
(
l '> 14 MR. WILSON: The final corrective actions for i
15 the incomplete insertion are still being generated, but we ,
l 16 found basically three factors that are playing a role.
17 One is we found that the incomplete insertion at plants l
18 with an exit temperature, high temperature plants which is 19 in excess of 615. We've also found that the IFMs --
20 MR. CARROLL: Why is that?
21 MR. WILSON: It's due to accelerated growth 22 mechanism.
23 MR. CARROLL: So the 15 degree difference is -
24 -
C\
'N_) 25 MR. WILSON: That's reflective of the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N W.
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l l 49 I
1 operating conditions of the plant. Yes.
f3 2 The other observation was we do not see the
. (%/
l
)
3 binding in the upper, sticking in the upper portion of the 4 assembly with plants that have intermediate flow mixers 5 and also the high growth would be reduced by zero, so 6 basically this design has -- addresses all three of those 7 mechanisms -- what, 600 as opposed to 615. We're using l l 8 zero 0 and reusing IFMs which gives you -- in addition we 9 have a shorter span length which could be in a positive 10 direction. i i
l 11 CHAIRMAN SEALE: We've also recently heard ;
12 about some reported difficulties with enhanced 13 fragmentation of high burn up oxides due to -- in cases (h l 14 where you've had reactivity insertions perhaps of the 15 aqueous variety or something like that, at relatively 16 lower energy deposition levels than previously 17 anticipated, I guess is the way to say it.
18 Are you following that work and do you believe i l
19 you would be able to have that problem in hand?
20 MR. WILSON: You're talking about the RIA?
21 CHAIRMAN SEALE: Yes.
22 MR. WILSON: We're following that work and as 23 we're involved with a utility group which is addressing 24 it. And I guess I'm not sure exactly where that is right C\
(m / 25 now, but I believe yes, we would have that addressed here.
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1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N W.
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1 50 1 CHAIRMAN SEALE: I assume the staff will l
s 2 comment on that at the appropriate time in your review?
3 MR. ATTARD: My name is Tony Attard of the 4 staff. We will be, we are following that and we'll 5 comment on that at the time.
6 CHAIRMAN SEALE: Okay, so it's hanging up 7 there on the hook and we'll want to hear from it.
8 MR. CARLSON: With regards to the fuel 9 assembly thermal hydraulic design, since the fuel rod, the 10 grid and fuel assembly lattice are the same as the 11 standard 17 by 17 design, the thermal hydraulic 12 characteristics are, for the most part, comparable to 13 standard designs. Both DNB and vibration evaluation
/~N.
-- 14 testing has been performed, including testing on a 15 modified V-5H grid design which has eliminated vibration 16 and DNB concerns.
17 Also, because of the use of the canned motor 18 pumps, it modified low flow DNB correlation has been 19 developed for analysis of two particular low flow DNB 20 transients, specifically loss of flow and locked rotor.
21 This has been submitted to the NRC.
22 All performance and safety requirements 23 related to the thermal hydraulic design of the fuel l
24 assembly have been met.
25 MR. CARROLL: Amplify on this modified low NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N W.
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51 1 flow DNB correlation. Why is that necessary?
2 MR. CARLSON: Because the minimize DNB are --
/ ._T f
)
3 now occurs beyond the boundary of our current WRB-2 4 correlation, the bottom boundary of the flow. And 5 therefore we had to make an extension to cover the low 6 flow transients, especially where the minimum DMB was now 7 occurring in an area, okay, which was beyond the limits of 8 the correlation.
9 MR. CARROLL: And this is because the canned 10 pumps down has as --
11 MR. CARLSON: As much inertia and the flow 12 coast down characteristics are much, much far.ter than with 13 a shaft seal.
,n.,
! )
(/ 14 MR. CARROLL: Oh.
15 CHAIRMAN SEALE: Other questions? All right.
16 liR . CARLSON: Thank you.
17 CHAIRMAN SEALE: Thank you.
18 MR. MAHLAB: My name is Moshe Mahlab and I'm 19 involved with the reactor component design and I'll be 20 giving you a brief overview of the reactor component in 21 the AP600.
22 Talking about the primary components, we focus 23 here on the reactor vessel, the integrated head package, l
t l 24 steam generators, the reactor cooling pumps and the p
i t 25 pressurizer.
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l 52 l
1 I'll say a few words about the connecting
,~ 2 pipe, the cold leg pipe, te hot leg pipe. Again, as the t :
'"' 3 objective of this whole program was to learn from 4 experience, there is a very limited number of welds in 5 these piping. Those are forged pipe rather than made of 6 pieces of fast piping to eliminate welding problems. As 7 you see, the main objective of the program is to enhance 8 safety and improve the integrity of the systems, based on j l
9 experience and what we have learned from past operation of j i
10 nuclear power.
I 11 The area that the design is focusing on where l
12 its attempt to modify and improve on the past design of 13 the reactor component system is mostly coming from n
I )
\_/ 14 operating plant issues that being addressed in this design 15 is dealing with stress corrosion cracking problem and by 16 dealing with materials selection and dealing with 17 improvement of the chemistry as well as dealing with 18 issues that occur in the reactor vessel embrittlement and 19 trying to address the life of the reactor in the presence 20 of neutrons and fluences and deal with ALARA which mostly 21 is meant to reduce to exposure of workers and employees 22 during maintenance and during operation of the plant.
23 The objective is being defined by the URD 24 requirement document for this project is to achieve a O
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! 53 1 when we deal with fatigue analysis, with corrosion and l
l 2 material issue, those are the objectives that we have to
/m i
\
3 design for. And again, we are utilizing the best proven 4 technology, mostly we are not deviating from past designs 5 and past component design in the areas that we know that 6 it's doing the job and it's working well.
7 Let's deal with the --
8 MR. CARROLL: All of the hot and cold leg 9 piping, if I understood you, is a single forging?
10 MR. MAHLAB: A single forging.
11 MR. CARROLL: The only welds are at the steam 12 generator of the vessel.
13 MR. MAHLAB: In some of the sensors that are rs V)
/
14 on the piping.
15 MR. CARROLL: Oh , okay.
16 MR. MAHLAB: The major changes or the major l l
17 modification has been done and compared to a standard 2 18 loop plant in the size of the vessel which employ a 3 loop 19 size vessel with 145 fuel assemblies and that was driven l 20 in addition to the issues that Mr. Carlson indicated to 21 try to achieve two year refueling cycle and was derived 22 from optimization of the cost of the fuel cycle and the 23 enrichment requirement in the equilibrium core. The use 24 of 145 fuel element in the equilibrium, we will need about 3.6 percent enrichment and that was a governing economical V("\ 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N W.
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i 54 l
1 decision on the fuel cycle.
l gS 2 We are using a large vessel and internal which U 3 is again based on 3 loop to run a 600 megawatt output from 4 this power plant and the other major change occurs in the 5 radial reflector and the reactor internals that I'll be 6 talking about in the next few slides.
7 All of this is to achieve again mostly to 8 focus on the less embrittlement that will occur in this 9 plant as a result of those design modifications.
10 Let's look at the vessel design. Some of the 11 -- in the past research that took place on the issue with 12 embrittlement, the selection and the control of copper, 13 sulphur and phosphorous in the selection of the material
\' 14 for the vessel was attributed to be the major contributor 15 to the presence of embrittlement in an environment of 16 neutron.
17 And in the design, we selected as a SA 508 18 carbon steel with control on the presence of copper, 19 sulphur and phosphorous. The class 2 and 3 selection is 20 dependent on what overlay process will be used to provide 21 the stainless steel overlay in the vessel.
22 Another issue that appeared in the past --
23 MR. CARROLL: Are either of those a weld 24 overlay?
,R
(,')
\ ,
25 MR. MAHLAB: Yes.
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55 i
1 MR. CARROLL: Okay.
3 2 MR. MAHLAB: In the past few years we have 3 heard about head penetration cracking that is being l
4 studied in one of the responses in the design to this 5 issue is to use Alloy 690 as part of the top head 6 penetration. ,
l 7 Another URD requirement is no penetration 8 below the core. As you can see, there is no penetration !
9 in the bottom part of the vessel and another improvement i l
10 compared to the past design of the reactor vessel and as 11 you can see, the selection of -- this is going to be a 12 forged cylinder in one single piece to avoid any welding 13 being in the belt line or in the core region of the O
k- 14 reactor.
15 As normally in the past we used to make those 16 vessels out of bent plate and therefore we will have a 17 longitudinal weld. This time the design is based on a 18 single forged cylinder at the size larger than the size of 19 the core in order to avoid any weld to be in the presence 20 of the -- in the line of the core, the active --
21 MR. CARROLL: What is the relative neutron 22 fluence at those welds compared to the peak fluence in the 23 lower shell course?
24 MR. MAHLAB: What we are expecting, I can -- I
) 25 am supposed to have a -- it is coming, but there will be a NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N W.
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l 56 l 1 number --
2 MEMBER SHACK: Chapter 5 table has it.
(~~\
3 CHAIRMAN SEALE: I think Mr. McIntyre had it.
4 MR. MAHLAB: Yes, the value is that we are 5 expecting for the relative fluence at 60 years of 6 operation will be about one half of that expected in 40 7 years in the standard 2 loop plant.
8 Now as you will see, in addition to the 9 reduction in the neutron fluence, we also have made 10 additional provisions to try to protect the vessel wall 11 from embrittlement.
12 MR. CARROLL: That wasn't my question. My 13 question was what is the fluence at the weld relative to?
I rn
)
(_/ 14 MR. MAHLAB: I don't have that answer. I have 15 --
16 MR. CARROLL: A very small percent of --
17 MR. MAHLAB: I think at the end it will be in 18 the order of one half of what existed in the standard 2 19 loop plants that we had.
20 MR. McINTYRE: I think we don't have that.
21 MR. CARROLL: Okay.
22 MR. McINTYRE: You're asking and we've looked l 23 at the welds that Moshe is talking about, longitudinal l
24 welds, but they're really not there any more. You're l
i (n,) 25 asking the question the weld between the lower head and --
l NEAL R. GROSS l COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N W (202) 234 4 433 WASHINGTON, D C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
i 57 I
1 MR. CARROLL: Yes, okay.
1 \
2 CHAIRMAN SEALE: Like 2 percent.
i i i
~~
3 MR. MAHLAB: Looking at the upper internals --
4 CHAIRMAN SEALE: Just a minute, just a moment.
5 The 690 you're talking about is the same material, I 6 guess, that the French are using in some of their advanced 7 vessels, isn't it?
8 MR. MAHLAB: I cannot answer that for sure, 9 but my guess is yes, because that's what appears in the 10 literature.
11 CHAIRMAN SEALE: Okay, so there's inferential l l
1 12 data there anyway. l 1
13 MR. CARROLL: And it replaces what? I A j i
i l
'w/ 14 MR. MAHLAB: The 600, the Inconel 600.
15 CHAIRMAN SEALE: Yes, okay.
16 MR. MAHLAB: The upper internal is made of the 17 conventional inverted hat which support the control rod 18 guide tubes as well as the support column which is in the 19 design contained the fix core instrument. We can see here 20 the blackened dots are showing the fixed core instruments
~
21 that will be inserted into the core and stay there 22 throughout the operation for the cycle of the fuel and 23 they will be inserted into the core through the support l 24 columns here. I A l
() 25 Again, from past operating experience, the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N W (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
58 1 concern was on control rod wear that was observed in the f-ss 2 industry as being an issue with operating nuclear power i () 3 plant. Few measures have been taken to improve on that by 4 providing a thicker guide card. Those are the pins or the 5 horizontal supports for the rod let that become thicker in 6 this design to provide for better contact between the 7 control rod let and the control guide and the guide card.
8 We also, there is a better flow distribution 9 that had been tested and designed here to allow a less 10 resistance flow of the fluid when inserting during 11 downward motion of the control rod.
12 The other change that has been done was on the 13 in-core thimble that -- I'm sorry, on the stainless steel
14 split pin that is the mechanism by which the guide tubes 15 are connected to the upper support plates. Those thimbles l 16 were originally made of X-750 alloy which were converted 17 now to a stainless alloy to try to eliminate the cracking 18 that has been observed in these split pins.
19 MR. CARROLL: What alloy? ;
i 20 MR. MAHLAB: I believe it's 316, stainless l
l 21 steel.
22 MEMBER SHACK: Is that component actually 23 replaceable if you had to do it?
24 MR. MAHLAB: I believe so. And we have done l , 25 it because we got some cracking in the split pin.
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59 1 MR. GRROLL : What about the whole upper i
,o) 2 support?
'J 3 MR. MAHLAB: Oh yes. This could be removed.
4 In the lower internals -- maybe we can spend a few minutes 5 on this, core barrel which is the volume by which the core 6 is residing, the lower support plates and what Mr. Carlson 7 showed before was the radial reflector which is made of 8 octagon shape and I'll show a better picture of it in the 9 next slide. It replaces the baffle former that existed in 10 the previous design and it's really a significant 11 improvement as we see it compared to the former baffle 12 that existed before with a large number of pieces and a !
l 13 lot of fasteners that were involved with it.
14 The other modification that occurred was that 15 the use of a single lower support plate. The standard 2 16 loop design has a tie plate and a lower support plate. l 1
17 This design was modified mostly to eliminate potential 18 starvation to cooling to certain fuel elements because of 19 the vortices, so there is a flow distrioution plate that 20 has been added here that has this shape with the column 21 supports that are indicated by the star here and it l 22 provides a much better flow distribution and eliminates 1
l 23 vortices.
24 This has been extensively tested on the Teruga p
() 25 plant with MHI, in combination with MHI.
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l 60 l l
1 We also have done smoke tests at the !
l l
! 2 University of Tennessee to provide indication on the flow I
O
\'
3 distribution.
l l
4 MR. CARROLL: Has there been a vortexing l
5 problem on existing 2 loop plants? ,
l 6 MR. MAHLAB: There are suspicion that they l
7 existed and this attempted to try to modify that 8 situation.
i 9 MR. CARROLL: But that was based on product 10 information? ,
11 MR. MAHLAB: I don't know exactly. Do you 1
1 12 now?
l l 13 CHAIRMAN SEALE: Identify yourself.
!jO !
l C/ 14 MR. CARLSON: Bill Carlson from Westinghouse. l 15 Yeah, I don't believe that has anything to do with any )
16 neutronic feature of the core.
17 MR. CARRCLL: I said how was it detected.
I I
l 18 MR. MAHLAB: How it was detected.
19 MR. CARLSON: That --
20 MR. SUNG: Ishi Sung from Westinghouse. From l
i 21 what I understand is it was detected by *he thermal couple 22 indication.
! 23 MR. CARPOLL: By thermocouple, sure. Thank 24 you.
O ij 25 MR. MAHLAB: the other element of the lower
! NEAL R. GROSS l COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N W.
l WASHINGTON D C. 20005 3701 (202) 234-4433 (202) 234-4433
i 61 1 design is this radial reflector that we talked about. Let s 2 me show you what it looked like and I wish I would have
/ T i s !
l 3 had a picture of the former baffle.
l 4 As you can see it's made of eight horizontal 5 pieces that are mounted one on top of the other, and they 6 are all tied together by a tie-rod that fits into the 7 groove that you can see. At the four sides of the radial 8 reflector is a stainless steel piece.
9 There are holes on top through the length of 10 the radial reflector to provide for cooling, and both 11 flows of the flow inside the core is upward as well as in 12 -- the cooling holes of the radial reflector are also 13 upward. Those were designed with a minimum delta P ,
r N. !
k- 14 between them in order to eliminate any potential baffle l l
15 jetting that we had observed in the current design.
16 It is a very heavy piece; it's a single piece.
17 It was tested again in combination with MHI for its Aruga l
18 plant; tested mostly for temperature distribution and flow 19 distribution; not tested at the very high temperature.
20 MR. CARROLL: Now, this is fabricated out of 21 plate?
22 MR. MAHLAB: Fabricated out of plate, yes.
- 23 MR. CARROLL
- How are the horizontal pieces l
l 24 sealed?
~s i
( ) 25 MR. MAHLAB: There is a groove between the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE N W.
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62 1 pieces and they are all tied together with a longitudinal l
j 2 tie-rod that sits in the groove along the side there.
7_sI (G 3 MR. CARROLL: And what keeps you from having l 4 flow jet into the core -- a baffle jetting kind of
(
5 phenomena?
6 MR. MAHLAB: Because there is no delta P 7 between the flow in the cooling hole and the flow in the 8 core. So therefore there is no driving force to create 9 that jetting that existed before in our tool of design.
10 MR. CARROLL: Oh, okay. Got you.
11 MEMBER SHACK: Now, does the tie-rod see a 12 lower DPA than the baffle bolts would in the current 13 design?
(3 5-- 14 MR. MAHLAB: I don't know the answer -- I l 1
15 don't know the relative answer. But I can get you the 16 answer.
17 Moving to the driveline, we get two sets of 18 instruments: the CRDMs and the in-core instrumentation are 19 all housed in the -- what we call the integrated head 20 package -- which is a configuration that sits on top of 21 the head and houses the CRDMs and the in-core 22 instrumentation.
23 As we said, those are -- the CRDM are all top-24 mounted configurations, very similar to design used in the l
l A) i s_ 25 current operating plan. The difference is the top-mounted NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N W.
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63 1 configuration of the instrumentation draft line, which is 2 mounted from the top.
7s
\) 3 I believe there are a lot of plants, the CE 4 plants mostly, that employ that technique of top-mounted i
5 instrumentation. This was a URD requirement and that's 6 why it was implemented in the Westinghouse design for the 7 AP600.
8 Those top-mounted instruments, during 9 refueling operation, will be pulled out from the core and 10 be brought to the head level, and when the head is moved, 11 will be moved to a stand where those instrumentation could 12 be dropped back to a pool or a body of water to protect 13 from the radiation.
O
\/ 14 Again, in the. control rod drive line we 15 focused on ALARA and reduction in cobalt presence in the 16 latches and the pivot pin, and mostly by modifying the 17 material of the hardfacing, to provide for the reduction 18 in cobalt presence. And we are using one of two: it's 19 Salite 6, or a material called Norem.
20 MR. CARROLL: Called what?
21 MR. MAHLAB: Norem. Which is ,t. ly used in 22 the Naval program. And it has a very low content of 23 cobalt and provides a hard surfacing appropriate for this 24 design.
) 25 MR. CARROLL: It's had lots of experience.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N W (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON. D C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
I i
1 64 1 MR. MAHLAB: Yes, but we are testing it i ,m, 2 ourselves. I mean, we are providing -- because I believe i ( )
3 some of the information is not open for the public.
4 MR. CARROLL: Yes. And how about Stalite 6?
5 That again is a low cobalt material?
6 MR. MAHLAB: Right, it's a low cobalt 7 material.
8 MR. CARROLL: Does it have a lot of experience 9 in this application?
10 MR. MAHLAB: Exactly.
11 MR. CARROLL: Okay. What's the low canopy 12 seal weld item there? l 13 MR. MAHLAB: Oh, there. There was some leak 14 which was detected at the weld here that was done in the 15 current plant on a basis of canopy seal. This has been 16 replaced in this design with full penetration weld to )
I 17 eliminate that leakage.
18 This was originally done because of the need 19 to access or remove that weld in case of a need for 20 maintenance on the CRDM. I think we -- two things 21 happened.
22 The number of events that was observed in 23 failure of the CRDM was very small over the last 30 years.
24 And second, the ability to develop tooling and have access t
O \
() 25 and perform the repair in a short time improved NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N W.
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65 1 significantly. So we don't see that as a hindering 73 2 effect.
l V)
/
3 Dealing with the steam generator, this Delta 4 75 is the model that will be used for the application of 5 the AP600. The Delta 75 is the steam generator that is in 6 operation at VC Summer for the last year-and-a-half or so.
7 It's really based on the Model F steam generator, however 8 the number of tubes was increased because it meant to 9 replace a preheater Model D steam generator at VC Summer.
10 We have quite a success after so many years of 11 operation, with the tube material that was selected for l
12 the AP600 steam generators. It's less than .1 of the l
- 13 total tubes plugged so far in the operation.
(D)
\- 14 MR. CARROLL: In that mix of units, what's the 15 longest running unit?
16 MR. MAHLAB: What's the longest running? I 17 think it's Korea 2, if I'm not mistaken, which is running 18 from 1972.
19 MR. CARROLL: What was the name of the plant?
20 MR. b'AHLAB : Korea 2; Korea number 2.
1
! 21 MR. CARROLL: Okay.
22 MEMBER SHACK: A lot of those would be l . 23 thermally treated alloy 600, rather than 690, right?
24 MR. MAHLAB: The answer is yes.
) 25 MEMBER SHACK: How many of those are 690 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS l
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! 66 l
! 1 units?
i
. 2 MR. MAHLAB: As far as I know, at least the s"/ 3 l one that is operating at VC Summer is, and it's running 4 for at least a year-and-a-half now. And the design for 5 Shearon Harris for steam generator replacement will use l
6 the same alloy 619.
7 As I said, this is the same design as for 8 Delta 75 that's operated at VC Summer, which the exception 9 of the interface that the bottom channel had, that has the 10 reactor coolant pump attached to it, and it's supported 11 from it.
12 It makes the support of the pump relatively 13 very simple, because the only interface is with the weld
/^s)
?
() 14 between the suction nozzle and the bottom of the channel l
15 head. l 16 MR. CARROLL: Now, this steam generator has a 17 lot more maneuvering room in terms of transients, before 18 you get a low level or a high level trip? I 1
19 MR. MAHLAB: I believe that there is a lot cf 20 maneuvering with them. They are much more flexible. The 21 heat transfer area is about 15 percent higher than would 22 be for an equivalent 51 or 44. They are much more 23 flexible in operation.
24 Talking about the reactor coolant pump, the l
l l D)
( 25 statement here is, field-proven operation. As you all NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N W.
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l l 67 l
1 know, there are hundreds of them in operation, mostly in
- ,s 2 the Navy program. It provides with a direct cooling --
i
(' ') 3 with the reactor cooling, liquid cooling. It does not l 4 require separate seal cooling system and therefore l
5 eliminates one of the concerns for loss of coolant f 6 accident.
7 I stated here, 12 years of mean time between 8 maintenance. This is a record that was obtained mostly 9 from circulating pumping boilers of the same design, and 10 the record was greater than 12 years. We also have about 11 31 years experience in Yankee Rowe of this design type of l 12 pump. And we also had 25 years of experience of those 13 pumps at Shipping Port.
(~
k- 14 There were also two, I believe two Italian l l
15 plants that employed the canned motor pump, and I think 16 they are now shut down because of the moratorium in Italy, i 17 but we did not have any maintenance problem with those 18 pumps for the years they operated.
1 i
19 MR. CARROLL: What would you expect to do at I
20 12 years?
21 MR. MAHLAB: Just to open for inspection.
22 MR. CARROLL: So there is no real --
23 MR. MAHLAB: There is no real failing parts, 24 or anticipated parts that fail.
/
( ,1 25 And the last item here is the high inertia NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
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t i
1 68 i l
l 1 rotor. We have done flywheel testing to verify the l \
l,S 2 material to be selected as well as the configuration that
( 1 1
% .)
3 can fit into this pump, and we have quite a successful l 4 test that can give us the coastdown that we need to --
5 required to bring this pump to a stop.
6 As far as, I believe Mr. Carroll, you had a l
7 question before relative to the flywheel and the weld. I l l
8 believe the design basis for this plant is that we will be 9 able to sustain a locked rotor, and therefore, in case l 1
10 that we will have any problem with the flywheel for 11 failure of the weld, the safety system needs to address i l
12 that. And the system is designed to sustain one locked 13 rotor. !
/^N s 1 I
\/ 14 I did not have a slide of the --
l 15 MR. CARROLL: My question really was about l l
16 5.4.1.3.6.3, flywheel integrity. And the statement that i
17 jumped out at me was that in-service inspection of the !
I 18 flywheel assembly -- the paragraph that says, it's hard to 19 get it out, and it ends with, "for these reasons, routine 20 periodic inspection of the flywheel assembly is not -" .
Don, maybe you want to answer I 21 MR. MhHLAB:
22 that?
23 MR. CARROLL: I have to say, I am looking at i
l 24 Revision 5.
l r-k_)N 25 MR. LINDGREN: My name is Don Lindgren. Five NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N W.
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l
! 69 l
1 is current. The flywheel is a pleated uranium alloy.
r~ 2 It's encased in a motion-resistant (indiscernible). The V
i 3 fundamental reason we don't do an inspection, or require 4 an inspection of this, the steel flywheel (indiscernible) l 5 is that if we were to get a failure of that flywheel it 6 would be contained within the pump.
7 As you can see, most of it is at the same l
8 elevation as the flange. You have about six or seven 9 inches of steel there. Even the lower portion you have up l
10 to three inches of steel. We have done the studies to I 11 look at how much energy it would take the flywheel pieces l
12 to break out of that pump casing.
I
,_ 13 The flywheel in fact, has about only ten
, t <
l k 'i 14 percent of the energy or less, that would be required to I 15 break out of that. The guidance on the flywheel's reactor l
l 16 coolant pump has a number of recommendations regarding j 17 stress levels of flywheel, stress levels of the flywheel, 18 inspections of the flywheel material at manufacturing; 19 that sort of thing, and we are in conformance with that.
l 20 One change is that we do not require periodic l
21 adjustments (indiscernible). In existing shaft steel 22 pumps the flywheel sits on top of the pump inside an 23 enclosure that's really little more than cheap metal. So 24 that would, if the pump flywheel were to break, it would
(
(D _) 25 not (indiscernible) the pump (indiscernible) the flywheel.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS I 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N W.
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70 1 MR. CARROLL: Well, I'm worried about such 7~ 2 things as our corrosion-resistant can allowing water to 3 get to the depleted uranium. What happens then?
4 MR. LINDGREN: Our expectation is that if that 5 were to happen and we don't think it would, that as you 6 corroded uranium, it would tend to throw the rotor off 7 balance and that at some point you would need to shut down 8 because of the vibration (indiscernible).
9 MR. CARROLL: You'd also be putting uranium in 10 solution reactor coolant system --
l 11 MR. LINDGREN: If in fact, the water got into i l
12 the enclosure and then came out again, (indiscernible) ]
13 crack (indiscernible) wouldn't have much (indiscernible).
A)
(
x_/
1 14 If you had such a large crack that got some kind of boat i 15 there, you would tend to make -- have such an unbalanced 16 condition that you wouldn't be able to run the pipes 17 (indiscernible) pump (indiscernible) vibration 18 (indiscernible).
19 MR. CARROLL: And you do have good vibration 20 monitoring on this pump?
21 MR. LINDGREN: Oh, yes.
22 MEMBER FONTANA: Is the pump seal LOCA the 23 main reason that you went away from the other design of l
- 24 the pump?
/~
(N) 25 MR. MAHLAB: The issue was to try to eliminate NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N W.
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i l 71 l 1 those forced out to that statistically existing, or 7, 2 existing in the current operating plant, to deal with the
~
3 seal and to deal with the potential LOCA.
4 And the other thing, it also drove us -- the 5 plant meant to have no safety diesels, so there is no l 6 safety diesel to support the charging pump that's normally 7 existing in the seal pump.
8 MR. CARROLL: But you do need component 9 cooling water for the thermal barrier, don't you?
10 MR. MAHLAB: Of the pump itself or for the 11 motor?
12 MR. CARROLL: For the motor.
l 13 MR. MAHLAB: For the motor, there is one.
l
\_/ 14 MR. CARROLL: So where does the power come 15 from to --
16 MR. MAHLAB: Oh, it has a -- Don, maybe you 17 can answer that?
18 MR. CORLETTI: This is Mike Corletti, 19 Westinghouse. Yes, the pump has the component cooling 20 water to the pump, but in an accident situation, the 21 direct coolant pumps are not required to operate; in fact, 22 we tripped the reactor coolant, so we don't need safety-l l 23 related component coolant water.
24 MR. CARROLL: Would they -- under those
' 3 25 conditions, would the motor be damaged?
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72 1 MR. MAHLAB: It's not believed that it will be s 2 in the 30 seconds or 40 seconds that that will be U 3 required.
4 MR. CORLETTI: Is your question, would long 5 term -- would the heat up of the motor then cause 6 equipment damage? We are designing for -- right now, a 7 design basis would be two hours under those conditions; 8 that the design basis for equipment protection be able to 9 at least withstand that. We believe it would be longer; 10 it would actually be able to withstand longe .
11 MR. CARROLL: But here we're t- .cing about a 12 station blackout kind of event, okay.
13 MR. CORLETTI: Yes. That is an equipment kI 14 protection evaluation that is ongoing.
15 MR. CARROLL: But you do have the diesels?
16 MR. CORLETTI: Yes.
17 MR. MAHLAB: Yes.
18 MR. CARROLL: Okay. One oddball one that 19 jumped out at me was a section called, " Threaded Fastener 20 Lubricants", and you tell me that they're prohibiting the 21 use of lubricants containing molybdenum. How about i
22 silver? Silver irradiates pretty good.
23 MR. MAHLAB: I don't have the answer for that. I 24 You want to try to answer that?
r
'(_)h 25 MR. LINDGREN: That specific portion of the i
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N W.
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73 1 (indiscernible) was in response to a staff request.
i g3 2 MR. MAHLAB: How about moly --
3 MR. LINDGREN: Silver I -- must be used, that 4 is, the contact of the reactor coolant is barely --
5 CHAIRMAN SEALE: Could you get a little closer i
j 6 to the mike? And identify yourself.
7 MR. LINDGREN: This is Don Lindgren again.
8 The kinds of lubricants that we can use that are in 9 contact with reactor coolants are very limited. The 10 specific case of molybdenum sulfide is the one that has 11 had a historic problem of causing cracking, and that's why 12 that was addressed, not so much from a radiation 13 standpoint.
/~N
. f l
\ ') 14 But that was more from a component integrity !
l 15 issue was why we specified that.
I 16 MR. CARROLL: Bill's making the point, it's l 17 probably the sulfur in the moly coat that's doing your l
18 damage. Okay.
19 MR. MAHLAB: Thank you.
20 CHAIRMAN SEALE: Thank you. And you're 21 finished?
22 MR. MAHLAB: Yes, I'm done.
23 CHAIRMAN SEALE: Okay. Well, it is 10:30 and 24 I was just wondering if we shouldn't go ahead and take our D.
(_) 25 break at this point? So we'll recess until a quarter of ;
! NEAL R. GROSS l COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N W.
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74 l
1 11, and be back and Mr. Corletti will then, I guess, l
2 start. Okay?
\
x 3 (Whereupon, the foregoing matter went off the
! 4 record at 10:32 a.m. and went back on the 5 record at 10:48 a.m.)
6 CHAIRMAN SEALE: I believe we're ready to 7 resume, and it is a quarter-of. I should like to note, 8 Mr. McIntyre, that Dr. Kress and I have an obligation at 9 12, so we're going to want to quit a couple of minutes 10 before, and then pick it up gain at 1:30 as is indicated 11 on the schedule.
12 Okay, Mr. Corletti, you may --
13 MR. CORLETTI: Good morning. My name is Mike
[_s\,
N' 14 Corletti and I'm going to be speaking about Chapter 5, 15 SSAR Chapter 5 which is titled, " Reactor Coolant System 16 and Connected System".
17 You've seen this figure a couple of times this 18 morning. I'll just -- one last time here.
19 MR. CARROLL: Yours isn't in color.
20 MR. CORLETTI: The component guys get all the 21 good stuff.
22 (Laughter.)
23 A couple of things I just wanted to point out 24 on this diagram that wasn't mentioned. Elimination of the l
(j~)
( 25 croscover leg and our loop piping. Now, the reactor NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE , N W-(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
l 75 i
l 1 coolant pumps are integral to the steam generator channel l
l fs 2 head, and that improves performance in a cold leg break l ( )
l %J l 3 scenario with the crossover leg blowdown phase that 1
4 results in -- by elimination of the crossover leg it 5 improves our LOCA performance.
l 6 I think the other parts of the major 1
7 components have been covered in this figure.
8 I'm going to jump to this figure here in the 9 reactor coolant system, and just point out some key, 10 maybe, differences than a conventional tube plant. Again, 11 as we said, the two hot legs and four cold legs. And that 12 was dictated by the size of the canned motor pump. We 13 wanted to stick with a proven size and basically, the
/~s e 4 k.s' 14 kinds of flow rates we needed, we required four reactor 15 coolant pumps.
l 16 You see that we have spray valves connected --
17 a spray line connected to each cold leg similar to a l 18 current Westinghouse PWR. The CVCS purification loop is 19 different and we'll be talking about that in Chapter 9, i 20 but here we just show the connections to the CVCS. And 21 basically we do not run -- and Don will be talking about 22 that later -- but we do not run continuous charging and 23 letdown, but we run a purification flow driven by the head 24 of the reactor coolant pumps.
l ()
(_) 25 The other important things, differences, we l
1 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N W.
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l 76 1 utilized direct vessel injection -- and you see the DVI l - 2 nozzles there for our safety injection system -- and we
/s i l
\
3 also have the ADS valves that act in conjunction with the 4 passive core cooling system to mitigate loss of coolant
- 5 accidents. They do not serve any overpressure function, 1
l 6 and they're only for - oolely for LOCA mitigation.
7 This next slide is touching on the RCS l 8 pressure control components. We'll start with the 9 pressurizer. A significantly larger pressurizer -- 1600 10 cubic feet, which is basically 60 percent larger than the 11 2-loop plant which has a thousand cubic foot pressurizer.
1 12 This greatly enhances the operation of the 13 plant for storing transients, reduces heater uncovery
' [~)h
\- 14 problems and minimizes the pressure excursions experience l
15 during the various transients.
16 Another design basis for the plant was no 17 safety-valve lift for normal and upset events. This is 18 based on the URD requirements document. And this is l
19 accomplished on a best-estimate basis. We're assuming the 20 normal pressure control system operating.
l 21 This has also allowed us to eliminate the need 22 for power operator relief valves, and therefore we find 23 that as a significant improvement -- minimize the 24 possibility of the problems with PORV.
()
f~s 25 Here are some of the major plant control NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N W.
, (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 1
77 1 requirements. An important one, this plant is designed 2 for a step-load reduction from 100 percent full power to
/r,T
( /
l 3 house loads utilizing a 40 percent steam dump and a 4 partial rod insertion, for a partial trip system.
5 MR. CARROLL: Now, does that say that if the 6 generator breaker opens you will ride through it? Full 1
7 load rejection?
8 MR. CORLETTI: Yes. We will -- we are able to l
9 go back to house loads.
10 MR. CARROLL: Without a reactor trip?
11 MR. CORLETTI: Without a reactor trip, right.
12 MEMBER KRESS: How does the volume of your 13 primary reactor coolant system compare with the standard
(~
k-) 14 3-loop or 2-loop --
15 MR. CORLETTI: With a 2-loop it's going to be 16 larger, mainly because of the larger vessel -- which is i 17 like a 3-loop vessel -- and also the larger pressurizer 18 which is larger. The total system volume is 8400 cubic 19 feet. Total system volume including the pressurizer. I 20 don't know how that compares offhand, with a 2-loop, but I 21 know it's larger.
22 MEMBER MILLER: Your 40 percent steam dump, 1
l 23 that's basically wired current?
24 MR. CORLETTI: Right. Forty per --
n
( ,) 25 MEMBER MILLER: How do you get 100 percent NEA; R. GROSS COURT REPORTE.',S AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N W-l (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON. D C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 l
l
! 78 l 1 load -- almost 100 percent? Steam generator?
l l 7-s 2 MR. CORLETTI: The partial trip system, which l N)~
3 is covered in Chapter 7 -- it's not really part of Chapter l
4 5 -- but is a partial trip system where -- maybe Bill, can 5 you speak to it?
6 MR. CARLSON: This is Bill Carlson. What will l
7 happen is, a system similar to what I believe is used in 8 the combustion engineering plants will be used to allow 9 the step load reduction. A pretty selective number of 10 control rods, 4 or 8 shutdown banks, will drop in the core 11 which will drop the nuclear power at a rate that you'll be 12 able to accommodate the load reduction.
13 MEMBER MILLER: So you have a modified core
(-
' / 14 protection calculator? Maybe we should wait until Chapter 15 7?
16 MR. CARLSON: Yes.
I 17 MR. CARROLL: I would report that on Diablo 18 Canyon which has this feature, unique among Westinghouse 19 plants, it didn't work on August whatever-it-was when we 20 had the big west coast blackout. We lost both units due l 21 to steam generator level problems. We don't have partial l
22 rod insertion; we have --
23 MR. CORLETTI: Well, what did you get your 24 reactor trip on? High pressure or --
I
/~T l k ,)
s 25 MR. CARROLL: No, no -- level.
1 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISMND AW., N W (202) 234 4433 WASHINGTON, D C 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
79 l
l 1 MR. CORLETTI: High pressure raactor level?
\
l
, -s 2 MR. CARROLL: No, no, steam generator --
l %J l 3 MR. CORLETTI: Oh, high steam generator level, i
4 okay.
5 MEMBER MILLER: But this has larger steam ,
l 6 generators, right?
7 MR. CARROLL: Oh, yes. And we don't have rod l
l 8 insertion either.
9 MEMBER MILLER: Right. So --
j 10 MR. CARROLL: We have atmospheric dumps.
11 They, not we.
12 MEMBER MILLER: It used to be we.
13 MR. CARROLL: I sold all my stock.
! (7_ \
14 (Laughter.)
15 MR. CARROLL: But it has a very desirable 16 feature. The other thing, and I should have asked it of l
17 the core guy that -- is a desirable feature is that on l 18 system upsets of the sort we had on the west coast a 19 couple of times, frequency drops. Westinghouse is 20 traditionally at a low frequency trip of 58 hertz, and we !
I 21 want our units to go down to 55 before they trip. This 22 gets you into DNBR space. Are you capable of going down l
23 that low?
24 MR. CORLETTI: I don't know the answer to that p l (s 25 question.
l NEAL R. GROSS !
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80 1 MR. CARROLL: I don't think the utility
,g 2 requirements document it. But in our brave new world of U 3 utility deregulation, I think we're going to see --
4 MEMBER KRESS: Well, what does that do? Does 5 that change your pump recirculation flow rate? ,
1 1
6 MR. CARROLL: Yes. Because the frequency -- 1 7 MEMBER KRESS: So your cooling is --
l 8 MR. CARROLL: -- pumps -- ,
l 9 MEMBER KRESS: Drops pretty bad, I guess at l 1
10 that level.
I 11 MR. CARROLL: Well, it's directly 12 proportional.
13 MR. CORLETTI: Don, you're asking really, what i
/~'s 1
-- 14 is our upset point for under frequency trip then?
l I
15 MR. CARROLL: What could it be.
16 MR. CORLETTI: Don, we -- you don't know? ;
1 17 MR. LINDGREN: I don't know what it is 18 offhand, no.
19 MR. CORLETTI: Okay.
20 MR. CARROLL: It's traditionally been 58 21 hertz.
22 MR. CORLETTI: I don't think we've changed 23 that.
I 24 MR. CARROLL: Okay.
25 MR. CORLETTI: These next two slides speak to l NEAL R. GROSS i l
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81 1 the overpressure protection features for the AP600.
7s 2 Basically we're using two spring-loaded safety valves and
('~ I 3 we've eliminated the water-filled loop seal going with 4 their design -- safety valve designs there that have been 5 implemented in some current plants where they have no 6 safety valve leakage without a loop seal. It's a modified 7 disk design.
8 And this we feel is an improvement because it 9 reduces the problems associated with set point drifts that 10 the plants that have water-filled loop seals have.
11 We've also -- another design difference is, 12 eliminated the pressurizer relief tank. Various reasons 13 that we've been able to do that. Number one, the PORVs l3
(_) 14 have eliminated due to the larger pressurizer. We do 15 capture valve leakage. Basically what we have is a 16 discharge chamber for the safety valves, and leakages 17 collected here and drained to the reactant cooler drain 18 tank.
19 And with the larger pressurizer we've 20 essentially eliminated safety valve lift for the most 21 probably events. So with those design features we've 22 basically had the safety valves discharge routed to a 23 rupture disk that has a very low set pressure. That 24 discharge chamber just serves the collect leakage. And
^N d 25 opening a safety valve, that rupture disk would open and NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N W.
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82 1 would be discharged to the containment.
g-. 2 One of the --
t~') 3 MR. CARROLL: So it s relieving pressure and 4 the retrodisk is --
5 MR. CORLETTI: Like 50 pounds. One of the 1
6 concerns that staff had, one of the questions that staff 7 had was, where is this discharge routed? Is it routed 8 away from safety-related equipment? And we've had to show 9 that yes, it is. Show where that discharge would be in an 10 improbable event.
11 MR. CARROLL: It would be a good idea to route 12 it away from where people might be, too.
13 MR. CORLETTI: Right, right.
\
N- 14 MEMBER KRESS: I came in a little late. What 15 do you mean by reference plant, on that figure?
16 MR. CORLETTI: This is showing -- basically 17 what this shows is a typical 2-loop Westinghouse plant, 18 and this is just showing functionally -- I understand 19 there's more than -- basically it's just showing the PORVs 20 and the safety valves that would discharge to a PRT.
21 MEMBER KRESS: By reference plant you mean 22 just something to compare the new features of the AP600 --
23 MR. CORLETTI: Right, right. Just showing the 24 differences, right. And what happens in the current plant g)
( 25 is, the PRVs or the safety valves is, they would discharge NEAL R. GROSS GOURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N W.
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1 83 !
l 1 to the PRT for any length of time. They have a rupture l fs 2 disk that bursts and ruptures in the containment, also.
I 3 MR. CARROLL: Yes, it does.
? :
4 MR. CORLETTI: The next feature that I wanted l 5 to speak to is the larger -- there's a pressurizer surge i
6 line -- with a significantly larger surge line in this 7 plant. It's an 18-inch surge line. A 2-loop plant would 8 have anywhere from a 10- or 12-inch surge line.
9 The reason it's bigger, the main reason is its l 10 size for ADS operation, long-term ADS operation, to 11 minimize the delta P that we would have in the system.
1 12 But this also affords us benefits in RCS overpressure 13 protection; it minimizes the peak pressure that you would
's ' 14 get for your design basis overpressure events.
15 As you see here, the surge line is routed, and 16 it looks kind of like a corkscrew design. One of the 17 reasons for that odd design, odd-looking design is, it's 18 been designed for leak before break to reduce the stresses 19 that we would experience on the surge line that come up i 20 with this arrangement.
21 It's also designed to minimize stratification, 22 basically how we connect into the hot leg piping on the 23 top there, to minimize the amount of stratification you l
24 may get into the surge line. Current plants, some of them l
('~'\ 25 are routed on the side which tends to exacerbate a
\
\ ,/
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84 1 stratification problem if you have one.
fr s, 2 In addition, we're including temperature V instruments on the surge line to monitor for the presence 3
4 of stratification, and also have employed continuous 5 outsurge during shutdowns to minimize the amount of 6 stratification that can build ~up.
7 MR. CARROLL: Now, if the first plant shows 8 that temperature instrumentation isn't really needed, then 9 how do you get rid of it in a certified design?
10 MR. CORLETTI: Well, I think -- we've 11 identified a minimum amount for every plant, right now --
12 we've defined in the SSAR. But we also have a commitment 13 due to our leak before break -- and I think this is talked I
( \
14 about in Chapter 3 -- due to our commitments on leak 15 before break to have really extensive monitoring on the 16 first plant. To then at least operate for one cycle to 17 get a good profile to assess stratification.
18 But the minimum amount -- we require at least 19 the minimum amount of strap on RTDs that we've identified I 20 in the SSAR.
l 21 MR. CARROLL: Okay.
1 22 MR. CORLETTI: I'm not going to speak a lot 23 about the ADS valves. Just basically, they're talked ,
24 about in Chapter 5, but their operation is talked about in f r^N l
(_) 25 Chapter 5 because their operation is so integral with that NEAL R. GROSS l COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N W.
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85 1 of the passive core cooling system.
, ,7 s 2 So basically, the fact that we do -- I just 3
(~~,/
3 wanted to point out that we did have the RCS pressure 4 bound -- or, these ADS valves are RCS pressure boundary 5 valves. The first three stages you'll see, are connected <
l 6 to the pressurizer, and they discharge to a sparger 7 located in the IRWST.
l 8 They're motor-operated valves. We've employed 9 a gate and a globe valve in series, with the gate valve i
10 used as an isolation valve, and the globe valve is used to 1
4 11 control the blowdown. So they're staggered -- their 12 opening is staggered, where we first open the gate valve 13 and then open the globe valve, so we take the delta P g
t 14 across the globe valve.
l 15 And the fourth stage we have -- the fourth 1
I 16 stage depressurization valves are connected to the hot '
17 legs. And we employ a squib valve. Squib valves are --
l 18 and there we also -- upstream to that we have a motor-19 operated isolation valve -- a normally opened motor-20 operated isolation valve. That could be used to close if 21 that valve was leaking, or to recover a plant.
l l 22 The next two slides speak --
l l 23 MR. CARROLL: The motor-operated valves.
24 MR. CORLETTI: On the ADS valves?
() 25 MR. CARROLL: Yes.
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86 1 MR. CORLETTI: Yes.
I
,_ s 2 MR. CARROLL: Are they fully testable in i _
3 accordance with whatever it is, generic letter --
l 4 MR. CORLETTI: Yes, in ASME we are able -- we 5 design to do in-service testing, and we're committing --
l 6 we've committed and have started to do that at a 6-month 7 interval. We've taken exception to the ASME code of 8 quarterly testing, and there was a real trade-off there.
9 We would have preferred to do no testing at l
10 power of the ADS valves, just because, maybe reduce the l 11 likelihood of an inadvertent ADS. But in PRA, by doing j 12 that we showed -- the PRA drove us to have to do some 13 testing because the reliability of the valves are improved
[')h s_ 14 based on how often you do testing.
15 So we weighed this trade-off and we committed 16 to testing the ADS valves every six months. And basically 17 what's not shown here, but there are test connections to 18 allow you to equalize the pressure across the gate valve 19 to do testing of the gate valve with no DP power.
20 And the globe valve is done -- we individually 21 stroked the globe valve, basically with no DP -- or with a 22 limited DP across it.
23 There was also an interlock that we designed 24 to prevent opening two valves in series that would cause a r~N
()
25 blowdown of the plant at power.
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87 1 MR. CARROLL: Okay, but that is stroking the 7s 2 valves without --
3 MR. CORLETTI: Right, that's stroking the 4 valves at -- that's right.
5 MR. CARROLL: -- power, inferential pressure.
6 MR. CORLETTI: Right. It's a power. At 7 shutdown we would also do -- we can do a limited DP test.
8 However, what we are seeing, or what we're committing to 9 is that if we select -- if you select the correct kind of 10 globe valve such that you can show that its opening 11 characteristics are such that it will open with a pressure 12 drop, with a positive pressure here, then that obviates 13 the need to really to do extensive DP, flow DP testing.
A/ 14 MR. CARROLL: On the globe valve?
15 MR. CORLETTI: On the globe valves. And the 16 gate valves, which is the concerns that are -- the 17 industry issues on gate valves of pressure locking and 18 thermal binding, we have addressed that in design 19 modifications to the valves. For pressure locking we're I i
20 drilling a hole on the one side to equalize the pressure.
21 Also, remember when I said that we've 22 staggered the opening of these valves? This valve opens 23 essentially first when there was no blowdown. So we open 24 the gate valve first, once it's fully opened we then open (q) 25 the globe valve. This eliminates the need to have the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N W.
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l l
l 88 l 1 gate valve perform under blowdown conditions.
l -,. 2 MR. McINTYRE: These valves would have been
~
3 type tested as part of the ITIAC process?
4 MR. CORLETTI: That's right.
l 5 MR. McINTYRE: So you will have shown that the l
6 valves that are in there are capable of operating.
7 MR. CARROLL: Okay. So how about the fourth 8 stage? What situation is there?
9 MR. CORLETTI: The fourth stage of valves are 10 squib valves and they are explosive-type valves, similar 11 to --
12 MR. CARROLL: So the MOVs ahead of them are 13 open?
f
\'-)/'
14 MR. CORLETTI: Normally open MOV with position 15 indication to verify that the valve is normally open, and 16 we also -- the valve does receive a confirmatory open 17 signal when we get a Stage 4 actuation.
18 MR. CARROLL: How often do you replace the 19 squib charges?
20 MR. CORLETTI: Our IST requirements I believe, 21 are 20 percent - we're doing it in accordance with ASME 22 code, but it's like 20 percent every two years, I believe 23 is what it is. And I think IST is in Chapter 3. But 24 basically, we're in accordance with ASME.
l A j
(j 25 MR. CARROLL: I didn't realize ASME had l
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89 1 affection on that. Okay.
l n 2 CHAIRMAN SEALE: Go ahead.
( )
v 3 MR. CORLETTI: The next two slides speak to 4 the reactor vessel head vent. Just point out that yes, we 5 have a head vent. Head vent valves were designed in 6 accordance with NUREG-0737 which is requirements for TMI.
7 They are safety-related. They receive no automatic 8 signals; they would be only operated by the operator from 9 the control room. And it discharges to one of our ADS 10 headers which is submerged in the IRWST.
11 MR. CARROLL: When do we talk about the design 12 and testing of the sparger? Is that in another chapter?
13 MR. CORLETTI: The design of the sparger is
( \
\- 14 covered in Chapter 6; the testing of the sparger -- we 15 have done ADS tests that cover, you know, design of the 16 sparger, design of the ADS piping in the valves. The 17 tests aren't covered, I don't think, in the SSAR, per se.
18 MR. McINTYRE: What particular aspect?
19 MR. CARROLL: What makes me feel good that the 20 sparger is really going to work?
21 MR. McINTYRE: That was one that was actually 22 tested on a full-scale, full-flow basis.
23 MR. CARROLL: That's what I remember. Okay.
24 How do you keep sucking water back up?
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i i 90 )
l 1 water back up there? We have -- it was not shown on this l f3 2 simplified sketch, but we have a vacuum breaker on each
-] 3 ADS discharge header, that would operate in case you would 4 have a manual operation of a single valve and then quickly j 5 close it and the steam would condense. So yes, we do have 6 vacuum breakers in those lines.
1 7 MR. CARROLL: What testing have you done of j l
8 the vacuum breakers?
1 9 MR. CORLETTI: Me haven't -- our ADS testing 10 facility had vacuum breakers in them that we use. We have 11 not done prototypic testing of the vacuum breakers. We've 12 sized the vacuum breakers based on what our requirements l
13 would be, and we've been able to use the testing to see rw ss 14 that -- their capabilities.
15 MR. CARROLL: They're important.
16 MR. CORLETTI: Yes, yes. And they're safety-17 related. They're like a relief valve, so we don't see any 18 proof of principle design testing that's necessary for the 19 vacuum breaker.
l 20 MR. CARROLL: Okay.
1 21 MR. CORLETTI: The next set of slides is going 22 to cover the normal residual heat removal system. And l
23 just say a few things.
24 Basically, the normal -- one of the big (G,) 25 benefits of the AP600 passive safety systems is how we've NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N W.
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l
91 1 been able to simplify the designs of our auxiliary
- 2 systems, and the first case-in-point that we're going to Is\
~~
3 talk about is the normal RHR.
4 It's designed for shutdown decay heat removal, 5 and it's allowed us to -- since it has no other safety 6 functions like design for low head SI like the current 7 plants would have -- we've been able to downsize it and 8 optimize it for a shutdown decay heat removal function.
9 As I was saying, the system has no active 10 safety functions, however it is safety Class 1 up to the 11 isolation valve outside containment, and it's Class 3, 12 safety Class 3 for the remaining portions. And that -- we 13 did that basically, for RCS pressure boundary integrity A
s- 14 function so that in a shutdown -- during shutdown we have 15 a very high integrity, low leakage system that we could I
16 count on, outside containment.
17 The system also has some defense-in-depth 15 functions that we talk about in the SSAR. Low pressure 19 RCS makeup. That is -- and I'll speak to that system 20 alignment. And also performs a low temperature, 21 overpressure protection function for the AP600.
1 1
22 The shutdown decay heat removal, basically we l 1
l 23 have a single connection to the hot leg and two pumps and 24 return to each DVI line. And this is the alignment that
/~h
( ,j 25 the system would be in during shutdown for decay heat I
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92 l 1 removal function.
l 2 LTOPS is performed by relief valve -- single
/- T t
('-) 3 relief valves in the hot leg section that discharges to l
4 the sump in containment.
5 MR. CARROLL: I don't understand the piping on 6 the right-hand side.
7 MR. CORLETTI: Right here? Basically this is 8 showing the connection from the hot leg -- we have 9 parallel sets of isolation valves. That's in response to 10 EPRI URD requirements showing that you can have a single l 11 failure for some of its imported defense-in-depth ,
i 12 functions. But basically, these lines are inside l
13 containment, into design, to make sure we could get the
(~ l k_)) 14 RHR system on line we have redundancy.
15 MR. CARROLL: Okay. Gotcha.
16 MR. CORLETTI: Another mode of operation that 17 it employs is -- we call low pressure RCS makeup. In an 18 accident scenario following maybe first stage ADS 19 actuation, our emergency procedures instruct the operator 20 to align the system, take suction from the IRWST, and to 21 inject into the DVI nozzles.
22 This serves a couple of functions: provides 23 safety injection capability, non-safety related safety l
l 24 injected capability to provide additional margin, and it t
) 25 also can enhance recovery from a LOCA.
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93 1 MR. CARROLL: Now, this is done after 7s 2 blowdown?
1
(
V) 3 MR. CORLETTI: This would be done -- they 4 would align the system as you would see your level in your
- 5 core makeup tank start to come down to approach the first 1
6 stage ADS -- if you start to approach it you would want to 7 get this on-line.
8 MR. CARROLL: But you don't want to pump an 9 IRWST down --
10 MR. CORLETTI: Yes, this is a low head pump, 11 so until the pressure in the RCS comes down, really you 12 would just be running on miniflow and you would not be l 1
'13 injecting.
A l t i i
\/-
14 Another mode that the system can operate in 15 would be IRWST cooling. And for instances of extended --
16 for long-term passive RHR operation, if we could choose to 17 -- the operator has the option to align the system to cool 18 the IRWST to prevent steam being released into 19 containment.
20 This line up -- oh, this is not correct -- I 21 just realized. Sorry about that. Basically, this mode 22 also allows for full-flow testing --
23 MR. CARROLL: Don't apologize too much because 24 we don't have the figure anyway.
! I)
(_) 25 MR. CORLETTI: This allows full-flow testing NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N W.
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1 94 r
1 of the pumps at power, and also we provide that IRWST fx 2 cooling function that I spoke of.
l 3 Some other design features of the RHR.
4 Intersystem LOCA enhancements. The system has been 1
5 designed in accordance with the guidance provided in SECY-6 90-016 regarding its alternate rupture strength being 7 greater than or equal to the RCS operating pressure. i 1
l 8 In addition to that, we have -- compared with '
9 a standard plant we have additional isolation valves.
10 Basically, up to this valve is full RCS design pressure, 1
11 and those additional isolation valves also help to reduce 12 the probability of an intersystem LOCA.
, 13 Another feature is these relief valves. In I\/ i I 14 the event that the system would be aligned at pressures l 15 above the relief valves set point, the relief valve limits 16 the peak pressure that you would experience in the system.
17 And also, we have interlocks to prevent the l 18 opening of these valves. These valves are -- normally 19 have power to the valves removed in power operation. We 20 also have interlocks that prevent these valves from 21 opening if the RCS pressure is above the desired pressure 22 of the system.
j 23 MR. CARROLL: Anything innovative on the seals 24 on the pumps?
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95 l
1 a disaster bushing to limit the peak -- any leakage that i f ., 2 you would get if the system wa exposed to full RCS r s l
3 pressure. And it's designed to limit the leakage to l
l 4 within the capabilities of the makeup system -- of our 5 normal makeup system.
l 6 MR. CARROLL: Where are the tubes that my heat 7 exchangers -- what's their pressure capability?
8 MR. CORLETTI: The tubes are 900 pound design 9 pressure. This portion of the system is a 900 pound 10 design pressure.
11 MR. CARROLL: And what does that realistically 12 take?
13 MR. CORLETTI: That will take over 2250/2300
[~h 14 psi. Over that.
15 MR. CARROLL: And that's true of all the 16 components?
17 MR. CORLETTI: It's true of all of the 18 components, as I said, with the exception -- the seal will 19 have leakage at that pressure. We submitted a detailed 20 evaluation of the whole AP600 in regards to intersystem 21 LOCA and we presented that in a WCAP -- we did a l 22 systematic evaluation of every system connected to the RCS l
l l 23 to assess our compliance with the guidance of SECY-90-016.
24 The next subject I wanted to speak to is that p) x_ 25 entitled mid-loop enhancements -- enhancements that we
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! 96 l
t 1 make to the design to increase our safety at shutdown and l
73 2 specifically during mid-loop operations. Mid-loop I )
s 3 operation is the term they use -- they reduce the level to 4 that in hot leg to allow insertion of the nozzle dam in l 5 the steam generators to do steam generator maintenance.
l 6 But the biggest thing, the most important 7 difference is that we have the passive safety systems --
8 are available and are designed to operate at shutdown 9 through mid-loop. So they're there in case we have a loss 10 of the normal RHR system, they're designed, between IRWST 11 actuation and the ADS valves, to provide safety injection 12 during shutdown in case you would have a loss of your i
13 normal RHR system. l i
fs
) l t (
(_) 14 Another significant change that we did was to I
15 the, what we term a step nozzle connection to the hot leg. )
l 16 Essentially the RHR system -- we have a large nozzle that 17 connects to the hot leg piping. It's a 2-foot -- I can >
l 18 show you.
19 Basically, we have a step nozzle connection, 20 and what this step nozzle does, it serves to reduce the 21 velocity in the hot leg piping and effectively suppresses 22 any vortex that would occur as a result of lowering the l
i 23 level in the hot leg piping.
24 And it reduces it to less than total of five
(~)N i
25 percent air entrainment at its peak, at the lowest level l NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
l 1
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97 l 1
l 1 that you can get in the hot leg and still support your 2 full RHR flow.
.O V 3 So it's a significant improvement there as 1
4 regards to problems that pumps have had, RHR pumps have .
I 1
l 5 had with air entrainment into the pump suction.
l 6 Another change is offset loop piping. What l :
7 that means basically, the cold legs are above the hot 8 legs, that we can totally drain the cold legs and still )
i i
i 9 have a significant level in the hot leg. Basically, our l
10 minimum level that we have to drain down to is like 80 l 11 percent in the hot leg -- 80 percent level in the hot leg, l 12 which is significantly higher than what current plans have l
i 13 to do.
(~N, l
~s 14 The next bullet, self-venting pump suction 15 line. Basically that means is the pump suction line --
l t
l 16 RHR pump suction line is continuously sloping downward to l
l 17 the pump, so that you have no local high points, no areas i l
l 18 for air to collect and prevent RHR pump operation. I 19 And another important feature is effected --
20 since we've been able to optimize the design of system, we 21 don't require throttling of RHR flow when you're in mid-l l 22 loop operation. The current plans, in order to suppress 23 air ingestion into the RHR pump suction, they have to cut 24 way back on their RHR flow.
~
k,s) 25 A lot of times they're relying on air-NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N W.
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98 1 operated valves to achieve that throttling. And problems l ,x 2 with air-operated valves, if the valve would fail open,
() 3 all of a sudden you'd get a large flow in this line, l
4 you'll get a big entrainment and cause a loss of RHR. The 5 pumps will cavitate and trip and cause a loss of RHR. So 1
6 that throttling of RHR flow at shutdown, we see as a 7 significant improvement.
8 And the last slide is RCS instrumentation 9 enhanced for shutdown. Basically we have provided hot leg 10 level instrumentation with redundant safety-related 11 instruments that measure the level in hot leg. This level 12 instrumentation automatically isolates our letdown, or 13 normal draining path on a low level, so that as the
('~%
- 14 operators are draining the water inventory down to the l
15 mid-loop, when you get to a certain setpoint it would 16 automatically close the drain valves.
l 17 It also, on detection of the empty level it l
18 would automatically actuate the IRWST injection with a 30-19 minute time delay. That 30 minutes allows them to 20 recover, level, and to alert people that we've had a ;
i 21 problem and get out, you know, to evacuate containment if 22 people happen to be there. It also gives them an 23 opportunity to recover the level.
24 The other change, pressurizer wide range g
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l 99 1 range level on a pressurizer for shutdown, and then they
,f S 2 have a blind spot between when they're transitioning from I,m]
3 the bottom of the pressurizer down to the elevation in the l
l 4 hot leg. We've extended our pressurizer wide range level l
l
[
5 instrument down to the bottom of the hot leg, so they have l
6 a continuous wide-range monitoring of that level.
1 7 In addition, the hot leg temperature and core 8 exit thermocouples are provided during shutdown. I think 9 in most of our current plans, the hot leg wide range 10 temperature monitors are inserted at the top of the loop 11 piping, and in mid-loop operations they're really not 12 available to provide temperature indication.
,_ 13 Well, we've provided them in the bottom of the l
[\ ~ #) 14 hot leg so we can have continuous hot leg temperature and 15 monitoring throughout shutdown.
16 MR. CARROLL: Your level instrumentation is 17 permanently installed --
1 18 MR. CORLETTI: Permanently installed, yes.
19 MR. CARROLL: What am I going to do with all 20 that tigon tubing I've got --
21 (Laughter.)
22 MR. CORLETTI: Well, that's all I have on 23 Chapter 5. I think that wraps up Chapter 4 and 5 of our 24 presentation.
(*M
(_ 25 CHAIRMAN SEALE: Very good.
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100 1 MR. McINTYRE: And the next subject is going
,3 2 to be Don Hutchings talking about Chapter 9.
V)
(
3 MR. CARROLL: While we're getting ready, I'd 4 like to ask the staff, on the two chapters we just 5 finished, at the moment at least, there's no show-stoppers 6 in your SER? Just sort of confirmation of what we learned 7 today?
8 MR. HUFFMAN: Yes, this is Bill Huffman. In 9 Chapter 4 I can pretty much say unequivocally that there 10 are none. Chapter 5, I don't believe there are.
11 Fortunately, the staff just walked out --
12 (Laughter.)
13 But we have a tracking system that monitors
\2 14 the open issues that are left and of the identified 15 issues, there are none.
16 CHAIRMAN SEALE: Okay. Thank you for asking l
17 that question. l 18 MR. HUTCHINGS: My name is Don Hutchings and 19 I'm here to basically give an overview of portions of 20 Chapter 9, which are auxiliary systems, and I'll be 21 talking about various water systems, a lot of BOP systems, 22 process auxiliaries, and some HVAC systems.
23 First we'll talk about SSAR section 9.2, and l
- 24 this includes our water system. Since there's a fm
(,,) 25 significant number of these systems, what we've done here l l NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS l 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N W.
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i 101 1 as this overhead lead-in slide, is to basically point out
~~s 2 all the systems that are in this section. In the slides
'"h 3 that follow up we'll talk about certain ones -- certain 4 aspects of these systems that we feel is important to note 5 what some differences may be between our plant and more 6 conventional designs.
7 As you can see from the list of service water 8 system and component cooling water, various demineralized 9 water system, sanitary drains, chilled water, turbine 10 building cooling water, and waste waster systems, and our ,
i 11 hot water heating system.
l 12 In AP600 our service water system really 13 serves no safety-related function. And as it points out
[ j
\--)' 14 here, our service water system is a little bit different 15 than most plants in that essentially, the only thing that 16 it supplies is cooling water for the component cooling 17 water system heat exchanger. That's the only actual load 18 that is on the system. And in the event of a loss of AC 19 power we have it automatically onto our diesels to act as 20 a defense-in-depth type system.
21 MR. CARROLL: Cooling for the diesels is 22 component cooling water?
23 MR. HUTCHINGS: Cooling for the diesels is --
l l 24 they're air-cooled diesels.
/~N
() 25 MR. CARROLL: Ah, very good.
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102' 1 MR. HUTCHINGS: They're their own closed-loop.
7- 2 MR. CARROLL: Well that's --
(
3 CHAIRMAN SEALE: That's a step.
4 MR. CARROLL: That's a step. I like that.
5 However, we learned at Diablo Canyon that if you put it on 6 the sea coast, radiators will corrode away --
7 (Laughter.)
8 MR. HUTCHINGS: Okay.
9 MR. CARROLL: You've got to get special 10 radiators or special corrode --
11 MR. HUTCHINGS: So they don't corrode from the 12 atmosphere, yes.
13 The next system -- and then again, since
\- 14 there's so many systems I'm just trying to give some 15 highlights on these. The next system is the component 16 cooling water system. And again, this serves no safety-17 related function.
18 There is however -- on most of these systems 19 there's no safety-related functions with the exception of 20 some -- occasionally we have a containment isolation 21 function which this system does have such a valve.
22 MR. CARROLL: By that you mean, just simply 23 where the piping for this system penetrates the
( 24 containment --
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l 103 1 shut off, correct.
-~ 2 Here again, our component cooling water system l%J transfers heat from our various systems in the plant to
- 3 4 our service water during normal operation. And it just 5 removes heat, again, consistent with how most plants do in 6 order to keep the plant operating and keep the core during 7 shutdown so we can keep it cool.
8 MR. CARROLL: Now we learned that from an 9 investment protection point of view, we can't have this 10 out of service much more than two hours without damaging 11 the reactor coolant pumps. What else is in that category?
12 What else can you get into trouble with if you don't have 13 component cooling water?
'\--) 14 MR. HUTCHINGS: Gordon, would you -- what are 15 the other loads that we might have?
16 MR. ISRAELSON: I'm Gordon Israelson. I work 17 for Westinghouse. That component cooling water system 18 main load is the chillers, and this chilled water is used 19 throughout the plant for heating and ventilation systems 20 and the, perhaps some of the electronics systems.
21 The computers might be degraded under the 22 design high temperature if we lose chilled water to them, 23 you know, to the coolers for those areas. And I can't say 24 how long it would take for that to be degraded.
i rN
( ,) 25 MR. HUTCHINGS: And on AP600 the chillers --
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104 1 we'll get to that a little further. We have really two f-~ 2 sets of chillers: there's water-cooled and air-cooled N)s The air-cooled chillers are more for the plant 3 chillers.
4 defense-in-depth safety functions; the water-cooled 5 chillers are not needed for any safety shutdown, but 6 again, they're redundant -- we have some redundancies in 7 them.
8 MR. CARROLL: No, I guess I'm thinking about a 9 station blackout that lasts more than a couple of hours.
10 What can happen?
11 MR. HUTCHINGS: Right.
12 MR. CARROLL: Okay.
13 MR. HUTCHINGS: Our next slide actually is the 7~
( )
\ Again, we have a containment 14 chilled water system.
15 isolation function that exists here, and it supplies 16 chilled water to the HVAC systems, both during full power 17 and shutdown operation.
18 As I pointed out a moment ago, we have an air-19 cooled subsystem that is basically dedicated to our VBS.
20 Our VBS, that's the system -- that's our HVAC system that 21 is used to cool the air to the main control room.
22 This system also supplies some water to the 23 makeup pump and the normal RHR pump compartment unit 24 coolers, which are other items that again, from a defense-i p)
\_ 25 in-depth standpoint, that if available, we would like to l
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105
( 1 have in operation.
i 2 These air-cooled chillers are on the diesels'
[ s)
\_J The water-3 automatically in the event of a power outage.
l l 4 cooled chillers, depending on the load, they are available 5 to be put on the diesel, but that's something that the 6 operators in the plant would make on a decision basis.
7 MR. CARROLL: A former member, Carlyle l
8 Michaelson, always worried about chillers. He contended 9 that most of us in the nuclear business haven't had a lot 10 of experience with them, and there are some rather subtle 11 features.
12 One of the things he was worried about is, if 13 they trip how do you get them where you started again?
fh
\- 14 You've got a problem of what, purging the refrigerant out 15 of the oil?
16 CHAIRMAN SEALE: Right.
17 MR. HUTCHINGS: Yes, I don't know if I have 18 the backup information right here. On AP600, some of our 19 chillers use a refrigerant and some don't, and I don't 20 remember which subsystem is which off the top of my head.
21 That was one of our issues in general.
22 Working with the utilities there was a lot of discussions 23 between Westinghouse and the utilities regarding just l
24 refrigerant in general. It's a hazardous material, its l
gs I
(_,) 25 leak potential and that type of stuff.
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106 t
1 So what we've done is gone through a lot of 1
7-_.
2 effort to minimize the amount of refrigerants even needed
()'
3 in our chiller systems. And again --
4 MR. CARROLL: How do you chill without a 5 refrigerator?
6 MR. HUTCHINGS: Just water. And then the 7 concern of course, would be freezing, and we've tried to 8 place equipment in areas that that's not an issue. So I 9 don't know what your specific concern is. l 10 MR. CARROLL: Well, let me try this. Have you 11 had some real expert on chilled water systems look at your l
12 design?
13 MR. HUTCHINGS: Yes. We've been talking --
IQ k)m 14 our chilled water design is basically being done through j 15 Bechtel, and we're using their expertise on that design.
16 MR. CARROLL: You feel comfortable with the 17 Bechtel engineers that are working on this, when there's 18 really no chilled water system?
19 MR. HUTCHINGS: Yes, and the other thing is, 20 is I do feel that as a direct statement, and additionally, i 1
i 21 we work with other AEs on -- this kind of indirectly falls l l
22 because it's related to our HVAC systems, so we work with 23 Burns & Rowe also. So we're constantly checking not just l
l 24 from one source. So I feel that our design is acceptably I 25 -- you know, appropriately designed.
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107 1 MR. CARROLL: Okay.
,- 2 CHAIRMAN SEALE: Have you had a specific 3 follow-up item on the question of air entrainment in 4 refrigerant, and the de-entrainment time requirements?
5 MR. HUTCHINGS: I don't believe so. I don't 6 believe that's been one of the specific staff questions 7 that we've been at.
8 MR. CARROLL: I think another Carl Michaelson 9 horror story was, somebody had a skid mounted on one and 10 it was all appropriately powered from 1E power sources 11 except for a 110 volt cord dangling off of it, which was 12 to keep the oil warm when the unit was on standby.
I 13 CHAIRMAN SEALE: Oh, yes, oh yes.
(~s 14 MR. CARROLL: And that was plugged into it.
15 Ordinary socket in the wall.
16 MR. HUTCHINGS: And didn't come on.
17 MR. CARROLL: Which didn't inspire a lot of 18 confidence in Carl to whoever designed that one --
19 probably Bechtel -- who knew what they were doing.
20 MR. HUTCHINGS: Yes. Well, the AP600 -- I l l
4 21 think the one point that we need to make is, we have a lot i
22 of -- because the plant is passive and we have a lot of 23 defense-in-depth functions, that we take probably -- I 24 don't want to use the word " excessive" because it's not Q 25 right, but I'll say extremely important close looks at our NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N W.
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108 1 defense-in-depth systems to make sure that they'll work.
7- 2 Because we have every desire that they will work.
U 3 So we're probably looking at them even a step 4 more than what I would say a traditional plant would in 5 some aspects. And we look at them as if they're safety-6 related. We maybe even don't necessarily have all the 7 documentation in many cases that would be required, but we 8 look at them almost in the same way.
9 MR. CARROLL: Probably makes them safer not 10 having it.
11 MR. HUTCHINGS: Right. The next system we 12 have is our -- we have a hot water heating system. Now, 13 this is a system that essentially pumps hot water to
/~'N
-- 14 various areas in the plant.
15 As it says here, it goes to selected, non-16 safety related air handling units and unit heaters in the 17 plant during cold weather operation, and the containment l
18 recirculation fan cooling units during plant outages.
19 One of the points that we'll see on the next 20 slide -- there's a couple of times on this -- is that this 21 piping is generally -- it is a high energy system because 22 of its design temperature and pressures. And that was 23 done essentially, in order to make the piping as small as 24 we could make it, to route it through the plant easier.
im
'\s,) 25 However, as we point out here, it's generally NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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109 1 excluded from safety-related areas outside of containment, I
g~) 2 and that we've basically used one-inch and smaller piping l
(-) 3 to minimize having to worry about ruptures and having to
)
4 analyze the ruptures.
5 MR. CARROLL: That's the staff position? That 6 you don't need to do it --
7 MR. HUTCHINGS: Yes, that's consistent. And 8 the one aspect that we see here highlighted below, is that 9 the hot water system actually shares the piping of the I 1
10 chilled water system inside containment.
l 11 We have essentially a system that is --
)
12 normally you don't have hot water in the containment, 13 there's no reason to have hot water in the containment --
p_s 14 however, during an outage there may be times where it
)
15 would make sense to want to put some heat into the i
16 containment, so the piping would essentially just go 17 through and use the chilled water piping and run through 18 the fan coolers so they could add heat to the area.
19 MEMBER FONTANA: What does VYS stand for?
20 MR. HUTCHINGS: VYS -- I'm sorry, that's the ;
1 21 hot water heating system. If you go on the first slide --
22 MEMBER FONTANA: I know, I know, but I just 23 wondered why it's VYS. It's strange.
24 MR. HUTCHINGS: Oh. We've got to have an
\_/ 25 acronym for everything.
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l 110 1 1 MEMBER FONTANA: All right.
,g 2 MR. HUTCHINGS: So that essentially, is the !
t \
(/
3 highlights from Section 9.2 of the SSAR. The next section l
4 is 9.3, and here we talk about the compressed air system, '
l 5 plant gas sampling systems, and floor drain systems, and l
6 CVCS. I l
7 MR. CARROLL: Now, we're not going to talk 8 about fuel handling systems?
9 MR. HUTCHINGS: Correct. I 10 CHAIRMAN SEALE: Not until later.
11 MR. CARROLL: Thank you.
l 12 MR. HUTCHINGS: Okay. AP600, again, we have 13 no safety-related function on our compressed air systems
\- I 14 except for a containment isolation function. And we have 15 three basis subsystems: we have an instrument air 16 subsystem, service air, and a high pressure air.
17 And these components are all located in the 18 turbine building -- the major compressors. And I've 19 identified here -- this slide basically tells us the 20 function of these systems. The instrument air supplies 21 compressed air for normal operations of valves. Service 22 air is for some local -- it's really for maintenance and 23 some air-powered pumps.
1 24 It also supplies breathing air in the event l
'/~'s 25 that there's contamination in the air. You can use that i \_)
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111 1 system along with some portable air purification 2 equinment.
3 And then we have the high pressure air 4 subsystem. And this syrtem essentially -- it's main 5 function is to charge up our safety-related VES -- which 6 is the emergency habitability system, which I'm not really 7 going to talk about here. That's actually in Chapter 6.4, 8 I believe.
9 MR. CARROLL: That's the control room 10 habitability?
11 MR. HUTCHINGS: Yes. Which is the safety 12 system. But this high pressure system is used to recharge 13 the cylinders for that system. It also supplies air to
/'N k- 14 the generator breaker package and allows you to charge 15 some fi::efighting equipment, which are all rated at the 16 same prescure. i 17 The next system is CVS, Chemical and Volume 18 Control System. Again, this system is -- it has some non-19 safety related functions, which would be RCS makeup for 20 leaks in cooldown, for boration dilution control, and for l 21 -- to limit the buildup of RCS radiation.
l 22 It has some defense-in-depth functions, which 23 is makeup and boration and pressurizer auxiliary spray.
24 And it has some safety-related functions. It has a
()
I 25 pressure boundary isolation, containment isolation, l
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112 1 dilution accident isolation, and excessive RCS makeup
,_,s 2 isolation.
3 Some of the simplifications of this AP600 l
4 design compared to a more standard or the reference-type i 1
5 plant -- there's no RCP seal injection required of course, 6 because they have different pumps. Volume control tank 7 and continuous degassing is eliminated; we don't have it 8 in the design. Boron thermal regeneration system isn't 9 required. We don't have evaporators, and reactor makeup 10 water system is eliminated.
11 We have -- key features of improved 12 purification is located inside containment and there are 13 greater flow rates in all of our modes, including our A
kl s 14 shutdown mode. And we've reduced the boric acid 15 concentrations to 2.5 percent by weight, and we don't need 16 any heat tracing for room heating at that concentration.
17 MR. CARROLL: That assumes that -- what 18 temperature? What minimum temperature?
19 MR. HUTCHINGS: Anything down to probably like :
20 50 degrees or so. What is it, do you know? Thirty-two?
21 MR. CARROLL: Okay. That's an improvement.
22 MEMBER SHACK: Is there any sort of commitment l 23 to follow, like the EPRI guidelines for primary and j 24 secondary water chemistry control?
()
o 25 MR. HUTCHINGS: Yes. It probably even exceeds NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS ,
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l 113 1 -- we have internal Westinghouse guidelines for water n 2 chemistry requirements, which I would say, we meet or N. 3 probably in some cases, exceed what those requirements l
4 are.
5 MR. CARROLL: Now, before you move off into 6 HVAC --
7 MR. HUTCHINGS: Sure.
8 MR. CARROLL: On the air systems, what 9 commitments have you made in terms of testing the 10 instrument air system? My understanding is, Reg Guide --
11 what is it, 1.82? -- for future plants requires much more 12 elaborate testing than we've historically done. Does that 13 ring any bells?
(V I 14 MR. HUTCHINGS: Let's see here.
15 MR. CARROLL: The kind of thing that 16 committees worried about in the past has been the 17 situation where you have a size leak in the system where 18 the pressure has slowly decayed and all kinds of strange 19 and wonderful things --
20 MR. HUTCHINGS: Oh yes. Now, that does ring a 21 bell. We have -- as a matter of fact, we've had some 22 discussions with the staff on that specific subject. We 23 were asked to put some words to test in accordance with --
1 l
l 24 I don't have the actual Reg Guide in front of me -- but to l
[N l
[ () 25 test and to do -- there's two sets of tests: one is a NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE , N W.
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114 ll
?
1' quick f ailure and the other is a slow degrading f ailure.
rwg 2 And we have agreed to do that testing.
U 3 And our present wording in the SSAR we believe 4 says it; however, we've been asked to clarify it -- you 5 know, to make it very clear -- and we said fine, we'll do 6 that because we have every intention of testing to those 7 requirements.
8 MR. CARROLL: With the plant in operation?
9 MR. HUTCHINGS: Well, it's to whatever the 10 requirements are in that section. I don't know if that 11 means the plant --
12 MR. LYONS: This is Jim Lyons, plant systems 13 branch. It's Reg Guide 1.68 --
[)
'/ You're right --
14 MR. CARROLL: Six-eight. l 15 MR. LYONS: --
.3, and it's a pre-operational 16 test. It's part of the pre-operational tests that it will 17 be done.
18 MR. CARROLL: Do it very carefully.
19 MR. HUTCHINGS: We want to pass, too. The 20 next section I want to talk a little bit about is 9.4 21 which is the HVAC systems. Here we have a bunch of 22 systems, and I think in AP600 -- let me just make a 23 general remark on HVAC systems -- is we're different.
24 We're different from the standpoint of -- the
(~
\_ ' 25 fact that we don't have a lot of safety-type systems, and i
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l
115 1 as we go through this we'll be able to see on the next
- 2 slide, once I go through some of these overviews, that you i /
'~'
3 can see what I'm talking about.
4 Basically, the points are that except for 5 containment isolation and main control room isolation, all 6 of the systems that are described in this 9.4 are non-7 safety related. Again, the safety-related HVAC which is 8 the VES, is described in 6.4. That's the control room 9 habitability section; that's separate.
10 Some of our HVAC systems perform defense-in-11 depth functions and all of the concentrations at the site 12 boundary is within the 10 CFR 20 allowable concentration 13 limits, and all of our internal room airborne r3
- 14 concentrations are within the 10 CFR 20 occupational 15 derived air concentration limits.
16 And we also have a design for smoke control, 17 which we essentially handle by bottling up the area in 18 which the smoke is contained, and maintaining higher 19 pressures in surrounding areas to keep the smoke from 20 escaping into other rooms.
l 21 MR. CARROLL: You would have made me a lot 22 happier in looking at this if the statement about safety-23 related HVAC as described in Section 6.4 appeared as a
- 24 footnote in 9.4. I kept looking for habitability, and
/
25 that was a big issue. You might want to think about
(_)i l
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116 1 adding that for some future reviewer.
l
~s 2 MR. HUTCHINGS: Okay.
~# 3 CHAIRMAN SEALE: Reducing the level of 4 tension. I 5 MR. HUTCHINGS: Even on my part because --
6 okay. This first system I want to talk somewhat about is !
7 our nuclear island non-radioactive ventilation system, or 8 VBS. This is the system that is really our main defense-9 in-depth system for the main control room, the 1E 10 electrical rooms, and the passive containment cooling 11 system valve room, and heating and ventilation systems.
12 This is a system that we would employ as long 13 as we have power. If we have the diesels or some sort of
~
(/)
k- 14 power, this would be used before we would gr io that 15 control room, the VES system.
16 It performs the following functions. It 17 monitors the control room, supply air for radioactive 18 particulate and iodine concentration, and it also isolates 19 the duct work that penetrates the main control room if we 20 get a high radiation signal.
21 MR. CARROLL: Now, I never did get straight 22 from my cursory reading of this, whether you're doing the 23 same things for the tech support center as you're doing 24 for the control room? For example, are you --
(f^h) 25 MR. HUTCHINGS:
I No.
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)
t 117 1
1 MR. CARROLL: Are you monitoring the quality
- 2 of the air going into it?
' \'~' l
\
3 MR. HUTCHINGS: The tech support center would 4 be on -- it's on this basic system but not in that defense 5 mode. In other words, the VES -- I don't believe that 6 supplies our tech support center either. So this system, 7 when it's used in this mode, it is not real -- the tech 8 support center is really not considered part of that.
9 MR. CARROLL: I guess my basic question is, is l
10 the tech support center habitable under severe accident 11 conditions where you don't have on-site power?
12 MR. HUTCHINGS: I don't believe that it is.
13 MR. McINTYRE: The tech support center -- all
.C' N- 14 those people are moved into the control room.
15 MR. CARROLL: Well, that'll get cozy.
16 MR. HUTCHINGS: Yes, I believe the answer is 17 no.
18 MR. CARROLL: So you'd end up in the control -
19 - the essential people in the control room?:
20 MR. HUTCHINGS: Yes. Right.
21 MR. CARROLL: And you're designing the control 22 room habitability system to accommodate those additional 23 people?
l
( 24 MR. McINTYRE: To accommodate 11 people. Up
( (
()) 25 from five in the original design.
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116 1 MR. CARROLL: So five are the operating crew e 2 and then you've got six people from tech support? Is that 3 the notion?
4 MR. McINTYRE: Yes.
5 MR. CARROLL: Okay.
6 MR. HUTCHINGS: Now, it's going to show that 7 I'm wrong.
8 CHAIRMAN SEALE: Yes.
1 9 MR. HUTCHINGS: And I know that this slide is 10 right because I looked on the -- can I -- I want to get a l 11 book, if I might.
l 12 CHAIRMAN SEALE: Maybe we could just break 13 right here.
f %.
MR. HUTCHINGS:
14 That would be fine.
15 CHAIRMAN SEALE: Because Tom and I are going l 16 to have to leave. You can clear this up over the lunch l
i l 17 hour1.967593e-4 days <br />0.00472 hours <br />2.810847e-5 weeks <br />6.4685e-6 months <br /> and then take a few minutes at the beginning at 1:30, i
18 to resolve this issue, and then we'll go ahead. Okay?
l 19 MR. HUTCHINGS: Okay.
l
(
i 20 CHAIRMAN SEALE: We'11 recess for an hour-and-21 a-half, to 1:30.
22 (Whereupon, at 11:58 a.m., a luncheon recess 23 was taken.)
24
\
) 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N W (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
119 l
1 A-F-T-E-R-N-O-O-N S-E-S-S-I-O-N 2 (1:36 p.m.)
r3
%/ )
i 3 CHAIRMAN SEALE: I think we have a couple of 4 issues yet.
5 MR. WINTERS: Don wasn't done.
6 CHAIRMAN SEALE: No , he wasn't quite done.
7 MR. WINTERS: I'm here to answer morning 8 questions so Don can restart. There were three questions 9 that were asked this morning.
10 CHAIRMAN SEALE: Oh, okay; I'm sorry.
11 MR. WINTERS: And I was going to clear those 12 up so that we have a clean morning, and then Don will 13 complete his HVAC. I I
/ s i <
14 CHAIRMAN SEALE: Oh, okay; either way.
15 MR. WINTERS: I'm Jim Winters, "or the record.
16 No slides right now. This will only take a second.
17 You asked a question about fluents at the I
18 welds on the reactor vessel in comparison to the midline.
19 The reference plant -- we don't use plant names -- has a l
20 mid -- a peak fluence of 4.2 x 10". The calculated peak, 21 which is slightly above the mid plane for this plant, j
22 AP600, is 1.4 x 10".
23 So that's the comparison of peak to peak.
24 CHAIRMAN SEALE: But that's not at a weld.
rm k 25 MR. WINTERS: The peak -- no, at the lower NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N W.
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( 120 1 weld, which is the higher of the two fluenced welds on l
2
! 2 AP600 at the peak azimuthal location is 2.1 x 10 "
l e gT
~
3 calculated, which is 15% of the mid plane peak. We do not 4 have a number for the reference plant, so I can't tell you 5 what it was on that plant.
6 But the guy thought it would be about the 7 same. So ours is -- the weld is 15% of -- the peak 8 azimuthal place on the weld is 15% of the peak at the 9 midpoint.
10 CHAIRMAN SEALE: On the AP600?
11 MR. WINTERS: On the AP600.
12 CHAIRMAN SEALE: And then there's another 13 factor of --
(')
-- 14 MR. WINTERS: Almost 3M to the --
15 CHAIRMAN SEALE: Between the AP600 and the 16 reference plant.
17 MR. WINTERS: Right.
18 CHAIRMAN SEALE: So you're about 2%.
19 And it's 60 years versus 40 years.
20 MR. WINTERS: And that's 60 versus 40 as well.
2' MEMBER SHACK: And then the material is also 22 rich more resistent embrittlement anyway.
23 MR. WINTERS: That's right, you're right.
24 CHAIRMAN SEALE: Very good.
t
) 25 MR. WINTERS: Okay, now the second question
( /
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121 1 that we went after was the under frequency question on l
,, 2 pump trip.
- r >
3 AP600 does not use an under frequency trip or 4 under voltage trip on its main pumps. They use an under 5 speed trip which is just real speed. It doesn't -- it's i 6 not off the electrics because that's a -- we use just a l
7 regular tach. It's an electronic tach on the pumps.
1 8 MEMBER KRESS: But that would be equivalent to l
9 __
10 MR. WINTERS: It would be equivalent.
11 The loss of flow accident, the DBA, was based l
12 upon a 10% reduction or a 90% normal pump speed, and l 13 that's the trip. That trips before low flow, although it l O
- 14 is a low flow indication.
15 MR. CARROLL: Fifty-four.
i 16 MR. WINTERS: So that's 54 hertz for the 17 safety analysis.
18 Now, based upon instrument accuracies, a13 19 this type of instrument's very accurate, we would expect 20 that you could ride through a 55 hertz without a trip. If l 21 it was required, there is margin in other places like our 22 DNBR correlation and some other places that we could 23 probably squeak out another hertz or two, but our design 24 right now on the surface is for 54 hertz.
f i
) 25 The last discussion we had about clean up for NEAL R. GROSS l COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N W.
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l 122 1 this morning was how the VBS works on high radiation and fs 2 how it takes care of the technical support center and what
/ \
\
' ') 3 happens when we go onto the main control room habitability 4 center.
5 CHAIRMAN SEALE: Yes.
6 MR. WINTERS: DBS is working on main station 7 power. When you get a high radiation alarm in the ducts 8 -- in the air supply ducts to the main control room, it 9 switches to -- J 10 MR. CARROLL: Are those ducts also supplying ,
l 11 --
l 12 MR. WINTERS: The TSC, yes. <
13 When you get a high alarm -- not high, high, f'
k ))
~ 14 but a first high alarm -- the system turns on the extra l 15 filtration units -- they're called supplemental filtration 16 units -- and closes the intake -- the normal intake. So 17 then it switches to a supplemental air intake system still 18 feeding main control room and technical support center so 19 that -- and that in intended to maintain adequate levels 20 for personnel under high radiation conditions.
21 If that system isn't keeping the radiation out 22 or the radiation load is too high, there is a high, high l 23 radiation detection in the same ducts, and that turns off 24 DBS and isolates it. And main control room is now fed by O)
( ,
25 the main control room habitability system. The technical NEAL R. GROSS l COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., tv W.
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123 1 support center is fed by nothing, as is the rest of the 2 VBS and loads.
7-3 At that point, you're going to have to abandon 4 a TSC and go into main control room. But that's on the 5 high, high or loss of electric. Now, DBS is powered by 6 the diesels. If the diesels come on, DBS comes on; and 7 then you're back into the scenario of the graded approach 8 to radiation.
9 MR. CARROLL: Is it also supplied by the gas 10 turbine? Oh, you don't have a gas turbine.
)
11 MR. WINTERS: No, we have a pair of diesels, i
12 non-safety diesels. J l
13 MR. CARROLL: That's right. j
( ')
'~ 14 MR. WINTERS: Okay, those were the three i
i 15 questions we ended with, and --
l 16 CHAIRMAN SEALE: Very good. Thank you. I 17 MR. WINTERS: -- now we'll get back to the 18 regular agenda.
19 MR. CARROLL: Is the NRC happy with the fact 20 that there are only six people from tech support to be 21 accommodated in the control room?
22 MR. WINTERS: Our approach for the control 23 room is 11 people. We only need one person to actually 24 operate this plant, and three that are on shift. So my I
("
s 25 count would be three plus eight, not five plus six.
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l 124 i
r 1 Gkay, now five is the three that were actually 7~ 2 operating the plant and the two that came in to help them
(\v t
3 because there was an accident, and then six. The number 4 11 has been agreed to, and we -- as far as we know, is l 5 acceptable to the staff.
i 6 MR. CARROLL: How many of the six are NRC?
7 MR. WINTERS: That's their question on the COL 8 to answer.
9 MR. HUFFMAN: This is Bill Huffman of the NRC l
10 staff.
11 That number still is being evaluated, and I j 12 don't know if we have reached a consensus that that's
,, 13 adequate, but it is being looked at.
/ \
\
\' ') 14 CHAIRMAN SEALE: Fine. All right, Mr.
15 Hutchings, you may resume your --
16 MR. HUTCHINGS: Okay. And that's why --
17 CHAIRMAN SEALE: -- time in the barrel.
18 MR. HUTCHINGS: When I put up my second slide, 19 it seemed to be -- I think we cleared up the confusion i
20 that normally we are indeed supplying the main control 21 room -- the TSC and the 1E rooms.
22 CHAIRMAN SEALE: Okay.
, 23 MR. HUTCHINGS: The next system I have here is 24 our VXS which is our AnnexAux building nonradioactive HVAC i O t
(_/
4 25 system. And that has a number of subsystems in it. And NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS l
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1 125 1 if we go to the defense in depth portion of these 2 subsystems, that's basically -- it provides cooling to the 7-(,) electrical switch gear and the battery charger and is in a 3
4 couple of equipment rooms when the diesel generators 5 operate and when chilled water is available.
1 6 And then it also provides ventilation cooling, !
l 7 essentially just air flow, to electrical switch gear in 8 the battery charger rooms and equipment rooms when the 9 diesel generators operate when we have a loss of chilled 10 water.
11 The next system I wanted to discuss was the 12 diesel generator building system. And essentially here 13 what we've done is, even though we don't have safety grade
/s
( )
'/
- 14 diesels, we've added a defense in depth function to the 15 ventilation system for the diesel generator rooms in order 16 to make sure that they are available to -- and kept within i 17 their normal operating ranges as best we can during any 18 event.
19 There's some service modules -- electric 20 service modules associated with the diesels that are also 21 on this system. And essentially, it provides ventilation 22 cooling to the diesel generator rooms when the diesel 23 generators are operating.
24 It provides cooling to electrical equipment A
() 25 modules I was just talking about, and provides normal NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N W.
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126 1 heating and ventilation to the diesel oil transfer module
. 2 enclosure so that the fuel system to the diesel is (D
s"/ 3 maintained within an adequate temperature range.
4 And one thing we've done relative to this is 5 the utilities have requested -- which we've been trying to 6 comply with as much as possible -- to eliminate heat 7 tracing. So, in this case, we've actually -- you heat the 8 whole enclosure as opposed to having just, you know, heat 9 tracing tape all over the place on the piping systems. ]
i 10 That pretty much concludes my HVAC.
11 CHAIRMAN SEALE: Are there any comments or 12 questions rather from the committee, or you, Jay?
13 MR. CARROLL: I guess I asked earlier on a t
A l 1
s k/ 14 previous section are there any showstoppers as far as the I 15 staff is concerned on this particular issue.
1 16 MR. HUFFMAN: The responsible manager hasn't i l
17 made it back yet. The answer is no.
18 CHAIRMAN SEALE: You have some loose ends, you 19 say?
20 MR. HUTCHINGS: Well, what I'm saying is we 21 have open items and --
22 MR. CARROLL: Any showstoppers on the water 23 systems or --
24 CHAIRMAN SEALE: Ventilation.
A l
(). 25 MR. CARROLL: -- ventilation that are --
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l 127 1 MR. LYONS: None right now. l I
7 2 No, this is Jim Lyons, Plant Systems Branch.
3 No. We still have a lot of little loose ends 4 to clean up, but no major --
5 CHAIRMAN SEALE: Okay. Unless there's further 6 comment, we'll go on then to the next section which -- and i
' I guess it is now 1:30.
8 MR. CARROLL: Pretty close.
9 CHAIRMAN SEALE: Okay, Mr. Winters; is that 10 right?
l 11 MR. WINTERS: Mr. Winters.
12 CHAIRMAN SEALE: Okay, fire protection. .
13 MR. CARROLL: Is he lucky that Carl isn't here A 1 (v) 14 or Ivan.
i 15 MR. WINTERS: My name is Jim Winters, and I'm l 16 the manager of Project Engineering and Integration.
17 Fire protection is more than just providing 18 some water through a hose when you have a fire. It covers 19 many facets of a program and fire brigades and water and 20 everything else. It's controlled in this arena by the 21 Branch Technical Position CMEB 9.5-1 which is contained in l 2
l 22 the standard review plan and which is equivalent to l 23 Appendix R. ;
l 24 Appendix R was put in 10 CFR 50 for existing fh
'%,) 25 plants. This covers new plants.
1 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N W.
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128 1 Talk about the fire protection system in three
~s 2 parts, or fire protection program. There's the system,
()r i
3 which is actually water delivery. It is described in SSAR 4 Section 9.5 and meets the Branch Technical Position. Then 5 there is the plant design which says you put things in the 6 right place. You kept combustibles out of the wrong 7 place.
8 It includes separation and all of the rest of 9 the things. It also covers HVAC so the smoke goes away.
10 It coves ingress and egress and the accessibility for your 11 fire fighting personnel to make sure that you have the 12 right kind of air supplies to cover your fire fighters and 13 the rest of it.
/,_,\
\
'J 14 And that's covered -- oh, and you have to take 15 away the water that you've pumped in. That's flood 16 control. And we address that in Appendix 9A. And in our 17 opinion, it also complies with 9.5-1.
18 And fire protection, in accordance with the j 19 Branch Technical Position, also includes the site specific l 20 things: the organization, the training, the personnel, 21 and alarms, and the rest of that stuff that will be l
22 handled by the COL applicant. We have accommodated the I
i 23 provisions in the design to support that; but that is not 24 part of certification, and we won't talk about that any
(
(3_) 25 more.
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l
129 l 1 CHAIRMAN SEALE: You say that this Branch l
-s 2 Technical Position is the moral equivalent of Appendix R.
1 \_)
l 3 MR. WINTERS: Right.
4 CHAIRMAN SEALE: And it sounds to me like that 5 it isn't because you're not asking for any kind of 6 exemptions or waivers or anything, which seems to be the 7 rule with Appendix R.
8 MR. WINTERS: In the SSAR, we do have our 9 compliance matrix with Appendix R because it's covered by 10 this.
11 CHAIRMAN SEALE: Yes, yes.
12 MR. WINTERS: And we comply except for two 13 places, and those are definition places on --
14 CHAIRMNN SEALE: To the Branch Technical 15 Position or Appendix R?
16 MR. WINTERS: It doesn't matter. They're the i l
17 same. Appendix R.
18 CHAIRMAN SEALE: Okay, okay.
19 MR. WINTERS: Okay, so I'm going to switch
)
20 back now to the fire protection system, which is the 21 hardware associated with fighting fires. There are a l
22 number of main requirements from Appendix R, and we meet l 23 them. We detect and locate fires and provide operator l
24 indication of those locations.
l r~
I l
k_)N 25 That is by fire area. And where the fire NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N W.
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130 1 area, like in containment, is a large area, it's by fire l
2 zone within that area. We provide the capability to (g!
V extinguish the fires in any plant area, limit fire damage 3
4 by having fire area restrictions, and enhance safe shut 5 down capabilities by making sure that if a fire is in an 6 area, we can get it put out and it doesn't degrade your 7 ability to do a safe shut down.
8 The system also supplies fire suppression 9 water at the right flow rates and is designed in the 10 standard manner of a loop design with two pumps, two 11 tanks; and you can get water to anywhere from either ,
1 12 source, either way.
13 MR. CARROLL: Now you are not in any way r%
i )
V 14 compromising the fire protection system by using it for )
1 15 other purposes? I'm thinking of the fact that a lot of ;
16 present day plant people are using it for seal coolina and l
17 things like that. l l
1 18 MR. WINTERS: No, there's no -- in the next 19 slide, we'll talk about the only other purpose we can use 20 fire water.
21 The first bullet here is a continuation of the 22 capabilities of the system, that it can maintain 100% of
! 23 its design capacity assuming loss of a single fire pump or i
l 24 loss of outside power. However, that does put us on the n
) 25 diesel -- the non-safety diesel to do that.
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131 1 MR. CARROLL: So your fire pumps are electric?
2 MR. WINTERS: One each.
i7,)
3 MR. CARROLL: One electric, one diesel?
4 MR. WINTERS: Right. So if the diesel one 5 dies, you need to have the plant station diesel off.
6 Okay, but if the electric one dies, then you can -- it's 7 its own diesel.
8 MR. CARROLL: Okay.
9 MR. WINTERS: Okay, we also have a Seismic 10 Category 1 source of fire water that's unrelated to the 11 fire protection system. It's connected to, but unrelated.
12 And that's the top portion of the PCS tank that we use for 13 containment cooling. Can be piped to safety related --
r3
- 14 safe shut down areas of the plant as a passive fire water 15 source for those safe shut down related areas in the aux 16 building and in containment.
17 And that's a Seismic Category 1 piping, and it 18 requires no pumps if we need to use that following a safe 19 shut down earthquake. The assumption is safe shut down 20 earthquake takes out the complete fire water system and 21 you have this seismic standpipe system to service safe 22 shut down areas.
23 MR. CARROLL: So then we need only a coolant 24 containment?
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I l 132 1 down, right. But by the time you've added up all the l
2 accidents that got you to where you were -- to where you
(-s)
V 3 needed this, adding that one more is outside the bounds of l
4 the rules.
5 However, in order to do that, this is the 6 connection I was going to talk to you about. The fire l
7 water system, main fire pumps, can supply water if they're i
8 available to this PCS tank and system. So that when the 1
t 9 PCS tank drains down, the fire water system can fill the 10 PCS tank as well. It goes both ways.
l
! 11 And we can actually pump directly to the top l
l 12 of containment with the fire pumps if -- now, they're non-13 safety and they're defense in depth, and it's piped up and
'w- 14 all the rest of that, but we can pump water to the top of 15 containment with the fire pumps.
1 16 It's piped up to do that. That's the only 17 other service besides fire fighting.
18 MR. CARROLL: Now the passive containment 1 1
19 cooling system is good for the length of the -- the entire )
20 length of the accident or for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />? In other words, 1
21 after some time.
22 MR. WINTERS: Oh, for fire fighting, the t
l 23 amount of water that is available for fire fighting, 24 assuming it was full, is two streams of 75 gpm for two A
(_) 25 hours. That's how much water's available for fire NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N W.
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133 l
1 fighting. That is not included in the volume of water s 2 that's assumed for passive containment cooling in that l
, ( ')
'~
3 same tank.
4 Did that answer your question?
l 5 MR. CARROLL: I guess my question is, do I 6 have to replenish the passive containment cooling system 7 tank with fire water after some period of time?
8 MR. WINTERS: Yes; if you're using it for 9 passive containment cooling, you have to replenish the 10 tank after 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> some way. One way is with the fire 11 water system. Another way is to bring up a pumper and 12 hook it to a connection that we have outside containment l
13 in the yard. l I'h
- 14 MR. CARROLL: Okay.
15 MR. WINTERS: Okay, and that's the alternate 16 path of water to wet containment -- one of the alternate 17 paths.
18 MR. McINTYRE: (Inaudible.)
19 MR. WINTERS: Yes, absolutely.
20 MR. McINTYRE: (Inaudible.)
21 MR. WINTERS: Okay, now -- that's all I wanted 22 to say about the fire fighting portion of this. The other 23 parts of fire fighting, we talked about before. There are 24 two air systems that each supply different kinds of air 13
( ,) 25 for the -- either the bottles or the direct hook up for NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N W.
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l 134 l l
1 the fire fighters. ;
gx 2 There's portable fire extinguishers scattered i
(
V) 3 around -- not scattered around -- placed judiciously 4 around the plant. And so, that was it for the fire ;
5 fighting system. I'd like to talk about fire protection 6 design now. 1 7 Another question?
8 We were blessed with having a non-evolutionary 9 plant. We started with a plant layout that looked like 10 this. And if we were clever, we could fill that up to do ,
11 not only the designs that people normally think of, but to
)
12 do enhanced designs to help with fire protection, flooding 13 control, and all the rest of the things that we wanted to !
\
('."# )
14 do.
l 15 And there was a lot of work done to -- as we 16 populated this plant with its equipment, that we did it in 17 such a way to enhance the capabilities of fire protection 18 in an overall program sense.
19 The packaging of equipment makes it easy to do 20 separation, makes it easy to isolate fires, makes it easy j 21 to -- easier -- makes it easier to control combustibles.
22 Because you put combustibles in a place that's separate l 23 from where you don't want fires.
24 Some of the highlights of ours are that all of
,m (s) 25 our safe shut down features are on the nuclear island.
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135 l
1 That's the containment and the aux -- parts of the i
l 7- 2 auxiliary building around containment. There's no cable t
(~)'/ 3 spreading room in this plant because our advanced digital 1
4 control system.
5 MR. CARROLL: You do have a raised floor in l 6 the control room to --
7 MR. WINTERS: Yes.
8 MR. CARROLL: -- accommodate that. Have you -
9 - what have you done about fire fighting in that area?
10 MR. WINTERS: The main fire fighting approach 11 to the control room is hand-held fire extinguishers. The 12 loading -- the combustible loading under that floor is not 13 of the level to put in the automatic halon systems and
\
e r~x
\ ') 14 that kind of --
15 MR. CARROLL: Floor plates up in a hurry?
16 MR. WINTERS: I believe so, yes.
17 MR. CARROLL: Okay.
18 MR. WINTERS: From the other part of 19 electrical or division approach to life, we have stacked 20 electrical divisions in separate fire areas. This picture 21 is an example of one of our fire area drawings. The dark l 22 lines indicate three hour fire barriers which separate l
l 23 fire areas from other fire areas.
24 And it's probably hard to see -- if I can get
(
x ,/ 25 this right because I can't see. All -- we have four NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N W.
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136 l 1 divisions of electrical equipment. Division A, equipment 2 is stacked in the building like that. Division C -- the O
~
3 stack goes over here -- is here.
4 Division B includes the spare battery room, 5 but it does down through here. And Division D is the rest 6 of that. All the safe shut down and electrical equipment 7 that is necessary for these areas -- or for the plant are 8 then stacked that way.
9 Now what does that do for us? That makes it 10 much easier to route the cable, route the HVAC, and route 1
11 all support systems so that you can keep all your 12 divisions separate. They come into containment through a 13 penetration area here from separate fire penetration (s
k_ 14 areas.
15 And once they're inside containment, which is 16 a single fire area and separation is -- we don't do that 17 by physical barriers in the same sense as we do outside of 18 containment -- we route the B and D divisions separate 19 from the A and C divisions, clearly separated by feet, 20 many feet, and on different levels.
1 21 Once we're inside containment, generally A and 22 C equipment is on the south side. B and D equipment's on 23 the north side. And we keep that separation going 24 throughout the placement of equipment and follow that (O),
25 criteria throughout the nuclear island.
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l
137 1 MR. CARROLL: So I have a fire in division --
p- 2 green Division C over here.
i i
\
'.)
3 MR. WINTERS: Green Division C. We can lose 4 the entire division and the plant will still shut down 5 safely.
6 MR. CARROLL: How about the smoke generated 7 from that fire?
8 MR. WINTERS: On detection of smoke, there are 9 fire dampers in the air supply -- in the HVAC system, both 10 air and exhaust, from each area. So in C -- C is here, 11 this blue area -- the fire dampers would close. That 12 would effectively isolate that area. The other area 13 supplied by that HVAC system will be at a higher pressure.
O
\
N2 14 Now, HVAC in this building is separated into
\
l l
15 two subsystems. There's an A/C system and a B/D l 16 subsystem. The B/D's are in a completely different 17 system. The only way smoke can get over here is either go 18 outside and come back in, which it really doesn't want to; 19 or you know, sneak down the hall. l 20 There may be some overflow smoke going into A j 21 Division, but not to B and D because they are in separate 22 HVAC subsystems with separate supplies and separate 23 filters.
24 MR. CARROLL: This assumes that among your p
(,) 25 three hour fire barriers are doors that are going to keep NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE , N W.
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138 1 smoke from getting out.
,s
- 2 MR. WINTERS: Right.
I \
~
3 MR. CARROLL: Three hour fire barrier doors 4 don't do that.
5 MR. WINTERS: Well, the assumption is that the 6 air is going in -- moving in through the door instead of 7 coming out. So there will be some -- because we're 8 keeping the rest of the area at a higher pressure. Now, 9 does that always work or does some tend to seep out from -
10 - well, there may be some.
11 But the design is to keep the air going into 12 the room, not coming out of the room.
13 MR. CARROLL: Okay, are there any piping and -
(\' )
14 - or electrical penetrations through the three hour wall 15 between A and C?
16 MR. WINTERS: There are a few connections --
17 electrical connections between A and C and between A/C and 18 B/D. Those generally go up, over, and back down; and we 19 have eliminated, to the best of my knowledge -- there may 20 be one or two -- that go through the wall this way.
21 Most of them go up, collect in the main 22 control room, and come back down; or up and, in the case 23 of B and D, go across then come back down so that the 24 intent is having none.
l i
rx k ,) 25 MR. CARROLL: Up through the control room. So NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N W (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
139 1 my smokey fire in blue Division C would communicate to the 1
ry 2 --
.d 3 MR. WINTERS: Could. There is a penetration 4 -- smoke barrier penetration of the wire through this 5 floor. The floor is a fire area barrier, and all 6 penetrations are the three hour penetrations. The main 7 control room is its own fire area separate from all 8 others. And, by the way, on that, it's got its own HVAC 9 system, VBS.
10 MR. CARROLL: Help me out. What could Carl 11 have asked?
12 MR. WINTERS: What else? Do we ask any more e- 13 questions?
14 It has been easier on this plant because we 15 did start with a clean sheet of paper than backfitting 16 Appendix R. And we --
17 MR. CARROLL: With blue Division C isolated, 18 --
19 MR. WINTERS: Yes.
20 MR. CARROLL: -- ventilation wise, other 21 divisions at a higher pressure, --
, 22 MR. WINTERS: Right.
l 1
1 23 MR. CARROLL: -- there is a flow of air into 24 Division --
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140 1 is, yes.
i l 73 2 MR. CARROLL: How does it get out?
l l )
v 3 MR. WINTERS: Well, the assumption here again 4 is that because the exhaust duct that's downstream of the 1
5 fire barrier that closed off this room, there probably is 6 going to be leakage into that exhaust duct and so that i
7 there will be some migration out the exhaust duct from i
8 that area.
9 MR. CARROLL: Okay.
10 CHAIRMAN SEALE: Yeah, I think the point is 11 really interesting that Appendix R isn't that hard if you 12 have it to begin with.
13 MR. WINTERS: Right.
A I i V 14 Now, the real secret -- and we've also 15 calculated all our combustible loadings and everything in 16 these rooms. The secret to ensuring that you have a fire 17 safe plant of this type is making sure the operators don't 18 bring in all of their scaffolding shavings and the rest of 19 it and leave it in a pile -- or their oil cans or 20 whatever.
21 CHAIRMAN SEALE: And you ration paper, I 22 imagine.
23 MR. WINTERS .: Yes.
l i
l 24 CHAIRMAN SEALE: Okay.
A l
h 25 MR. WINTERS: Okay, the other points we've NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N W (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON. D C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
141 1 already discussed about are packaging. We have the PCS l 2 tank that provides the passive seismic Category 1 source i
I '# 3 of water for fire in safe shut down areas. And we have i
4 built in, as opposed to built around, the access 5 ventilation, flood control -- that's fire fighting. l l
6 But we've also included separation. We've 7 built in separation in the -- in containment, for example, 8 from the beginning rather than trying to come in with I l
9 band-aid barriers.
l 10 MR. CARROLL: Now as far as taking care of 11 flooding from fire water or other sources, --
i 12 MR. WINTERS: Right.
13 MR. CARROLL: -- you have drains in the room.
/^\
s- 14 MR. WINTERS: Yes.
15 MR. CARROLL: Presumably they all go to some 16 common drain tank. Are there traps in those lines?
l 17 MR. WINTERS: Okay, the --
18 MR. CARROLL: How do you deal with that? l I
19 MR. WINTERS: The drains on the -- the aux 20 building has been designed to have two separate types of 21 drains because of the way the equipment's been placed in 22 it. From here over is the clean aux building. There's no 23 radiation sources allowed or designed into this side of 24 the whole building all the way up and down.
l /~%
() 25 And their drains just drain to a waste water l
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l 142
[ 1 system.
- 2 MR. CARROLL: Not a way smoke could i ( }
3 communicate from one division to another?
4 MR. WINTERS: Not the way it's designed, no.
5 We've --
6 MR. CARROLL: Well, because you'd be --
7 MR. WINTERS: Right, you'd have to blow it 8 down, and then it would have to blow back up. And in 9 effect, it's -- all the air and everything's trying to go 10 to the drain tank. Now on the other side --
11 MR. CARROLL: How is the drain tank vented, 12 the outside of the building someplace?
13 MR. WINTERS: Yes; on the clean side. Okay,
(
t 14 on the dirty side, it goes to the radiological waste drain 15 system. And I'm not sure how -- are you going to talk l 16 about that, Gordon, when you get up?
17 Well, Gordon's going to talk about waste 18 drains. Maybe he can answer that question when he comes 19 up. I'm not exactly sure how that works. But we did have i 20 that as a requirement is not to have drains being the 21 communication path for smoke.
22 CHAIRMAN SEALE: Anything else?
23 MR. WINTERS: So with the two exceptions that 1
i l 24 are in the SSAR that are both definition exceptions, we i FN l ( ,)
t 25 believe we meet the requirements of Appendix R. And right NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N W (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
I 143 1
1 now, we have no significant outstanding technical issues I
7s 2 with the staff that we know of.
\
(_/
3 But we are working details. There are not 4 only wording in the SSAR, but some placement of equipment.
5 MR. CARROLL: And does Mr. Lyons agree with l
6 all that?
7 MR. LYONS: Yes, for the most part. The only 8 thing that we probably should point out is that when they 9 talk about maintaining -- that they're protecting the safe 10 shut down, that they've defined safe shut down as the 420 11 in the higher pressure. It's not a cold shut down.
12 That's one issue we're still kind of struggling with.
13 MR. CARROLL: You haven't resolved that yet?
G s- 14 MR. LYONS: Not totally, no.
15 MR. CARROLL: Ah, okay.
16 MR. WINTERS: That's my definition -- is the i
17 difference between safe shut down and cold shut down. l l
18 MR. HOLMS: My name is Jeff Holms, the fire i 19 protection reviewer for AP600. And these were general 20 statements and we're -- I'm sorry. We're still dealing 21 with a lot of the details. Okay, so I'm not going to say 22 everything is fine. And they could turn into something l
l 23 bigger, okay.
24 One of the things that we -- we sat down with 25 last week and discussed was the -- you know, the PCS tank.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N W.
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144 1 And I haven't gotten back with Westinghouse on some of the l
f3 2 issues, so there's still some things pending on that.
/ i
, L /'
3 For example, using the PCS system, you know,
! 4 after the earthquake for fire water -- we still need to l
5 discuss some issues on that. There's a lot of issues 6 still going on. So I just don't want you guys to leave 7 here thinking everything is perfect, but we're still 8 working on it.
9 That's all I have to say.
10 CHAIRMAN SEALE: Any other questions?
11 Well, I think you've taken care of -- for now, 12 anyway, until we perhaps hear more from the staff.
13 What's next, the fuel storage and handling?
t \
14 Mr. Blumstein?
15 MR. McINTYRE: We're going to do fuel storage 16 and -- not the spent fuel system.
17 CHAIRMAN SEALE: Fuel storage.
18 MR. McINTYRE: How you get it from there in.
19 MR. CARROLL: Okay, gotcha.
20 MR. BLUMSTEIN: I'm Robert Blumstein, Bob 21 Blumstein, AP600 Fuel Storage and Handling in Chapter 9.1 22 Basically, we've used simple, proven 23 technology that has been in plants for years. There's 24 been problems with fuel handling in the past, mostly A
k ,)
s 25 economic and just keeping them running. But we've taken NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N W.
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145 1 the best -- plagiarized the best designs from what's out 73 2 there and tried to get the best features in this and the
\i
/
3 most reliable especially in terms of reliability 4 components.
5 We're using proven industrial components 6 throughout all the systems wherever possible, not as they 7 did in the past quite often for a fuel moving train --
8 reinvented the wheel for this.
9 Fuel protection -- wt've got a very 10 conservative design in fuel protection, not moving any 11 loads over the fuel. The spacing's 10.8 between grids in 12 the racks. In existing plants, we go as low as nine 13 inches and do pretty well with it. l
(~)/
k- 14 There's no drain path below the top of the i 1
15 core or the racks so that the -- they're always full.
16 There's no way for the water to get below that other than 17 to boil off.
18 MR. CARROLL: Hopefully you can pump it out.
19 MR. BLUMSTEIN: Well, yes. Built in the l
20 control systems for the fuel movement with new PLC 21 technology and we build in mistake avoidance so that the 22 machine knows when the operator's doing something he 23 shouldn't do and diagnostics of it, it will move on. And 24 this has paid out in the existing plants when we've been t'h
() 25 able to upgrade.
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l 146 1 For the receipt and spent fuel storage and l
,- 2 shipping first, seemed like the best way to go through i
N'- ,)
3 this was geographic. We bring the fuel in downstairs with 4 an overhead crane. We bring it up through the hatch and 5 rack the boxes here.
l 6 Then they bring the boxes forward. And 7 they're now talking about and I think putting in a 8 monorail crane along this wall just to transport boxes up.
9 For a while they were talking about putting in a cart, 10 which was kind of --
11 MR. CARROLL: Why would you initially put them 12 where you do? Why don't you put them where you need them?
13 You don't produce things when you're moving things.
(~- j
\~ 14 MR. BLUMSTEIN: Yeah, well they have some 15 other equipment, and one of the problems, I think, these l 16 things are stacked in large crates. And they didn't want 17 the crates around and in this area because they do 18 inspections and - fuel inspections and so on.
19 So they wanted this room pretty clear. And of 20 course, this is all done off line or away from -- so they 21 bring them over and do the inspection in this area, up end 22 them using this one ton jib crane. By the way, the l 23 monorail will be two ton or less, and it will be out of 24 the way.
25 Also, the overhead crane can't go beyond this NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N W.
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i 147 l
1 line roughly, so that you can't get over -- you can't get l
s 2 any heavy lifts over the fuel storage. They up end them, i / \
E) 3 carry them over to the new fuel storage which is dry and 4 has a capacity for 56 fuel assemblies.
5 From there, the jib crane takes them to the 1
6 new fuel elevator. They're dropped down and picked up by 7 the refueling machine and moved to wherever they want 8 them. There's also room for storage -- for tool storage 9 in this area.
10 MR. CARROLL: Now when you say a big crane 11 can't go over the pool, --
12 MR. BLUMSTEIN: There's no rail for it.
13 MR. CARROLL: So how are you going to remove O
k-) 14 spent fuel in a cask?
15 MR. BLUMSTEIN: Oh , it does get over the cask 16 area.
17 MR. CARROLL: Oh, that's the cask area.
18 MR. BLUMSTEIN: Getting the fuel back out --
19 when they want to remove fuel from the area, there are 20 weir gates --
21 MR. CARROLL: Yeah, yeah; okay.
22 MR. BLUMSTEIN: -- here and here; one for the 23 transfer system, one for the spent fuel cask area. And 24 they flood this up, bring the fuel through, and -- using
((',i/ 25 the refueling machine then put it into a wash area.
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l i 148 l
1 MR. CARROLL: That's the removable hatch to
,m
, 2 the right?
, r )
3 MR. BLUMSTEIN: Yes. This one is the loading 4 -- cask loading area. And I'm not sure what this one is, l
5 to tell you the truth. But they then can bring i* into a 6 wash area and on out. I wasn't sure of that, and I didn't 7 bring anything with me. I was looking for it.
8 MR. CARROLL: What's the other one, out of l
9 curiosity? i 10 MR. BLUMSTEIN: Other equipment; I'm not sure, 11 to be truthful. Non-refueling. There's a lot of other 12 stuff in the building.
13 MR. CARROLL: The other removable hatches to V) 14 the left there are the ones you remove --
! l 1
15 MR. BLUMSTEIN: To get downstairs because the !
)
1 16 railroad car or truck comes in below this.
17 CHAIRMAN SEALE: Okay.
18 MR. BLUMSTEIN: And they've got room for ten 19 refuelings plus one full core. And there's room for five 20 damaged assemblies and space to work on them -- inspect l l 21 them and so on.
l l l
22 MR. CARROLL: And what does ten refuelings l
l l 23 assume with respect to when DOE is going to be ready to 24 inspect spent fuel?
D (j
N 25 MR. BLUMSTEIN: Yeah; well, that's -- how long NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N W.
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149 l 1 is a refueling good for? Two years. That's 20 years. l l l e 2 MR. CARROLL: Twenty years. ,
I \~ ' ;
3 MR. BLUMSTEIN: Roughly. l l
4 MR. CARROLL: I think you need more storage 5 given the progress that's been made to date.
l 1 6 MR. BLUMSTEIN: I won't argue that. l l
I 7 CHAIRMAN SEALE: We can't resolve that issue )
l 8 here. Let's get along with the technical ones.
I 9 MR. BLUMSTEIN: One more thing. The refueling 1 l
l l 10 machine is the same as in the containment so the training 11 and the protection it of'fers and the better control are 12 all built in. We'll get into some of the features of that 13 when we get to the containment machine. They're l [~)-
14 identical.
15 Transfer system -- identical to what we l
16 already have again with some of the features -- PLC l l
l 17 controls and more reliable switches. Throughout all of l 18 this stuff, there are going to be redundant sensors and i
l 19 things.
20 MR. CARROLL: PLC controls? ;
1
! 21 MR. BLUMSTEIN: That's program logic control.
l 22 Essentially it's a computer, but it's a very l
i 23 industrialized -- built for control, not for computing.
24 The only real features that change on this are b)
's_f 25 quick opening transfer tube -- I'm sorry, the ball and l NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
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150 l 1 flange -- I'm sorry -- which is the containment -- is a l
- 2 dog connection type so that it comes out a lot quicker and i G l 3 less likely to strip bolts and things of that sort.
4 And the valve at the other end is identical to 5 the other ones.
6 MR. CARROLL: Is it double O ring with the 7 testing provision the same?
8 MR. BLUMSTEIN: These are all vendor items and 9 we're writing the specs now. So to be truthful, I'm not 10 sure. But it's --
11 MR. CARROLL: Should be.
12 MR. BLUMSTEIN: Yeah, I'm pretty sure it is.
13 More modern, but not pushing the edge. Motor controls and O
\~ / 14 drives, so the system should work more reliably. The 15 upgraded systems we've got do. And again, the system will 16 diagnose itself and also tell the guy you shouldn't be 17 doing that -- hopefully.
18 But most of these features are design features I I
19 that are mostly vendor.
20 If you wanted to go back on any of these, just 21 holler. I'm kind of trying to move along. I'm sure you 22 will.
23 Okay, in a reactor cavity, again, the 24 refueling system is pretty much what it is in existing 25 plants. We've got the integrated head package so that NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N W.
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151 1 it's much easier to remove a head. You just pull things
,- 2 out of the way and quick disconnect connectors and so on, 3 and away it goes.
4 The sequence is basically they disconnect --
5 well, they shut down and get the rems down and so on. And 6 they disconnect everything off the head. They make a 7 single lift with everything, put it over on a head stand.
8 As they lift it, they lower the water level -- or they 9 raise the water level. I'm so sorry.
10 So that as the head comes up, the water comes 11 up with it for protection. When they get it over here and 12 they get the water up, they pull the internals and upper 13 internals here. And if necessary, later, after they I b k/ 14 defuel, lower internals. They've got room in containment 15 for temporary storage area and inspection, and also for 16 RCC inspection and possible work on it.
17 The refueling machine traverses these rails 18 but can sweep this general area. And it picks up the fuel 19 and will automatically, with directed moves, go to the --
20 through the fuel location and to the storage -- or, I'm 21 sorry -- the up ender.
22 And they put it in the up ender. They tote it 23 down. The cart goes back to the other side.
24 MR. CARROLL: Now this head storage stand, l
k,N) 25 that has a pool underneath it to shield the --
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i l
152 1 MR. BLUMSTEIN: I don't think so, no. They s 2 don't have any pool under the head storage. That's --
)
3 they have shielding there on the head package, and there's 1
4 a -- this is all off shielded.
5 MR. CARROLL: Okay.
l 6 MR. BLUMSTEIN: Cement pilings and so on.
7 It's pretty much the way the plants are now.
8 MR. CARROLL: Suppose I want to get under the 9 head to look at the condition of the cladding or whatever.
10 How would I --
11 MR. BLUMSTEIN: You can get there. The head's 12 sitting up on here, and there's ways of getting in there.
13 MR. CARROLL: Yeah, but you've got the in-core
,.C\,
\_/ 14 detectors hanging down. ]
l 15 MR. BLUMSTEIN: What we're doing now when j 16 we're doing inspections, they run robotic equipment in 17 there very much the way they do a steam generator.
18 MR. CARROLL: Okay.
19 MR. BLUMSTEIN: It's not simple, but you could 20 run somebody under there for a few seconds. In fact, 21 they're using some of the same tooling right now to do 22 sleeve inspections and so on.
23 In elevation, upper and lower internal sit 24 under the water level -- up ender. So, having the newer
(~T
(_) 25 fuel handling machine and spent fuel machine, you get much NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N W.
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l
153 1 better protection because you're bringing the fuel up into l -
,\ 2 a plate and moving it protected. You've got much better i 3 load control.
l 4 You're not swinging a chain or c ble hoist.
5 More precise operator directed, automatic moves, so the I
l l
l 6 operator says make the next move and the thing goes to )
i l
7 where it's supposed to be. We'll have redundant sensors 1 8 and very reliable equipment we've found in the plants l l 9 we've put these in.
10 Reliable industrial controls and motor drives, 11 and also available for yedrs to come. Fail safe design 12 throughout as much as we possibly can. Built in mistake 13 avoidance self-diagnostics. And one of the big things O
kl 14 commonality, you don't have to train people twice. You 1
l 15 don't have double parts and everything else so that the 16 people that are used to one thing, when they're cycled 17 over to the other machine, they're at home.
18 In fact, it turns out that everything sits the 19 same way so they don't have to start going left and right 20 hand. You have the in-containment storage location.
21 I tried to zip.
22 CHAIRMAN SEALE: Any other questions?
i 23 MR. BLUMSTEIN: We're not covering the water 24 cooling.
A
() ,
25 CHAIRMAN SEALE: Okay, I guess now we'll go on l NEAL R. GROSS l COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIDERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N W.
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154 1 to Chapter 11.
gs 2 MR. McINTYRE: And our speaker is going to be
'a)
I 3 Jim -- actually, it's -- Jim Grover and Gordon Israelson 4 will both be speaking, but Jim Grover will be the first 5 speaker.
6 CHAIRMAN SEALE: All right, sir.
7 MR. GROVER: Okay, this is going to be going 8 through Chapter 11. This will be shared by myself, Jim 9 Grover, and by Gordon Israelson.
10 The first part which I will be covering is the 11 part on the source term being used for the waste process 12 system and rad waste handling. Essentially, as in the 13 current plans, we have two source terms that we're s
14 considering: a design basis source term and a realistic 15 source term. l l
16 The design basis source term in most current 17 plants is based on a 1% fuel defect level. For the AP600, 18 we're using a quarter percent fuel defect level. This is 19 consistent with the NRC's guidance within the shielding i 20 discussion of this -- of the SRP. It's also consistent 21 with at least one other -- one operating plant I'm aware 22 of.
23 MR. CARROLL: What does that mean, that one 24 operating plant has quarter of a percent fuel defect?
. 25 MR. GROVER: No, know of one operating plant NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N W.
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155 1 in which they have used quarter percent fuel defects as
,. 2 the design basis. Because the experience of the plants is t
3 far, far below this level.
4 In the realistic source term, this is source 5 term based on many years of reactor operation. This 6 information was consolidated into the ANSI 18.1 document.
7 This is also the source term that's reflected in NRC's 8 GALE code.
9 MR. CARROLL: That's 1984. Haven't things 10 gotten a lot better since then -- somewhat better?
11 MR. GROVER: Maybe somewhat better. I mean, 12 the '84 is much better than the 1976 which was the older 13 stuff. I know the plants are much more rigorous about i
A a C' 14 addressing leakers in their fuel assemblies during 15 reconstitution. So it should be -- so this should be a 16 conservative -- I mean, we call it realistic.
17 It's the historical material that we have 18 readily available.
19 MR. CARROLL: Are you aware whether there's 20 any effort to update that standard? ,
1 21 MR. GROVER: I'm not aware of any effort.
22 MR. CARROLL: Okay. Not too many new plants 23 coming along.
24 CHAIRMAN SEALE: No. Does the staff have any
( ()
/
25 problem with these two assumptions?
i NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N W.
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156 1 MR. GROVER: I'm going to be addressing a
,_ 2 little bit later -- there is a modification to one of the 3 source terms in one application.
i 4 CHAIRMAN SEALE: Okay.
5 MR. GROVER: So, I don't know if you want to 6 talk about that now or not, because that's coming up on 7 the further slides.
1 8 MR. CARROLL: Why don't we wait. '
9 CHAIRMAN SEALE: We'll just wait then and then 10 let you comment --
11 MR. CARROLL: On the very end.
12 CHAIRMAN SEALE: Yes.
13 MR. GROVER: Okay, the design basis source g
~- 14 term -- this provides the basis for the primary coolant 15 tech specs because we have the activity spec for iodine 16 and for noble gases. It's used for design basis accident 17 and dose analysis for those accidents in which the release 18 is primarily that of reactor coolant such as steam 19 generator tube rupture or a main steam line break because 20 of leakage over to the secondary side.
21 This provides a basis for rad waste systems 22 design used to provide a maximum estimate for solid waste 23 generation, and is the basis for the radiation shielding 24 design. Although, we all know the main nuclides of A
( ,) 25 concern for shielding are the corrosion products. But NEAL R. GROSS i COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS l 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N W l (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON. D C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 l
157 1 still, the fission products do play a part.
l
,_ 2 The tech specs -- as a result of using the 3 quarter percent fuel defect level, we're using a .4 l
4 microcurie per gram dose equivalent to iodine-131. This 5 replaces the standard tech spec value of one microcurie l
6 per gram. In concert with that, the iodine spike 1
7 transient limit for the AP600 is 24 microcuries per gram 8 of dose equivalent iodine-131 instead of the 60 9 microcuries per gram in the standard tech specs.
10 That's the same ratio, 60 to 1 or 24 to .4.
l 11 MR. CARROLL: Now refresh my memory. The l
12 transient is the result of pressure going down in the l
l 13 steam generator? 4 l I
())
\- 14 MR. GROVER: Well, it's a result of either !
15 power -- reactor trip will do it.
16 MR. CARROLL: Okay, that's right. :
1 1
17 MP. GROVER: Or from a depressurization of the 18 primary side will trigger an iodine spike.
19 MR. CARROLL: And this is thought to envelope 20 the worst possible spike for purposes of looking at off ,
l 21 site doses from the steam generator to the --
22 MR. GROVER: That's right.
i
! 23 The realistic source term essentially has two 24 primary functions, and one is to calculate an anticipated
/"
( ,N) 25 annual releases from the plant. And from that, determine NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N W, (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 l
~
l 158 1 where we would stand relative to 10 CFR Part 20 2 concentration limits. It's also used in the evaluation of 7-3 operating costs of the rad waste systems since this is an 4 approximation of expected operation.
5 Now in evaluating outside release l
6 concentrations, what we find is, for the AP600, the 7 realistic source term -- you have a liquid pathway release 8 concentrations that is 13% of Part 20 limits. The gaseous 9 pathway is 2%. These are annual averages. On the -- call 10 it the conservative source term, this is a source term 11 that was -- it's not the design basis source term.
12 It's something in addition to that. We took l 13 the design basis source term of a quarter percent defects,
(,_'i k#-
14 adjusted it up to 1% defects for all fission products 15 except the noble gases and iodines which are controlled by 16 tech specs.
17 MR. CARROLL: Why did you do that?
1 18 MR. GROVER: Stubbornness on my part and on 19 the part of staff. This was a -- the standard review plan 20 in the discussions of evaluating maximum waste process
! 21 system releases addresses design basis fuel defects, and l
l 22 then identifies those as being 1% fuel defects.
l l
l 23 We objected to calling 1% design basis, and 24 this sort of went back and forth. And we finally said O(_j 25 we'll just use 1%, and we'll do the -- accept the fact NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N W.
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159 1 that the tech specs restrict you on the iodines and noble gx 2 gases.
I \
'~
3 What we actually find, if you look at the 4 contribution of different nuclides from the source term --
5 when we say 36% is going -- of that 36% of the limit on 6 concentrations, 1/3 cf that is taken up by tritium; 7 roughly 2/3 by -- well, it's about 60% by cesium. And 8 cesium is one of the nuclide groups that -- I mean that 9 has been increased from a quarter percent to the 1% fuel 10 defect level basis; and then it was 5% for all others.
11 So what we find is that even with the very 12 conservative source terms that are -- that go beyond the I
,, 13 design basis, we have a -- release fractions that are well ,
- s ,
> i '
14 below 10 CFR 20 concentrations limits.
15 CHAIRMAN SEALE: Very good.
16 Now do you have any comments from source 17 terms?
18 MR. LI: This is Chan Li of Plant Systems.
19 Actually, the last slide that he presented 20 which has that conservative source term with stars there, 21 that's the result of discussion with staff according to 22 standard review plan that staff has the criteria for the 23 source term -- assume 1% fuel defects.
24 MR. CARROLL. I think that's what he said.
l (~N I
k_) 25 CHAIRMAN SEALE: Yes.
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i l 160 1 MR. GROVER: Excuse me, Chan. We're you
, ~s 2 saying that in your analysis, you are using -- your A.
3 analysis, you are using 1% for the iodines and noble gases 4 as well?
5 MR. LI: With the exception of iodine and 6 noble gas.
l
- 7 MR. GROVER
- Oh, okay.
l
! 8 MR. LI: Because you have it in the tech spec.
l l
9 CHAIRMAN SEALE: Okay.
l 10 MR. GROVER: Okay.
l 11 CHAIRMAN SEALE: All right.
( 12 Mr. Israelson, I guess you're the anchor man l
, 13 in this relay, huh? Except I'm sure we'll get a comment l
14 or two from Mr. McIntyre at the end of the day maybe.
l 15 MR. McINTYRE: Absolutely.
l 16 MR. ISRAELSON: The AP600 radioactive waste l
r 17 management systems are broadly characterized into three 18 different systems as liquid rad waste, gaseous rad waste, l 19 and solid rad waste. The first system I'd like to talk l
20 about is the liquid rad waste system.
21 The liquid rad waste system receives influence 22 from a number of different sources. I have a simplified 23 sketch of the liquid rad waste system. Hopefully you can 24 all see this. The influence to the liquid rad waste 25 system in terms of radioactive reactor coolant -- the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N W (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D C 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
161 1
1 primary source is from our chemical volume and control l
i
- 2 system, which is the reactor let down.
/s't U 3 This let down comes out of containment into a l
l 4 vacuum degasifier which removes hydrogen and trace radio 5 gases. And then it's put into what we call effluent hold l 6 up tanks. The only waste that goes into these tanks is l
7 reactor coolant. Okay, it's never mixed with any 8 equipment drains or floor drains.
9 In addition to the let down, various drains 10 within containment that are reactor coolant will drain to 11 the reactor coolant drain tank. This tank is normally 12 expected to just sit there fairly idle not doing anything.
13 on occasion, it may automatically turn on, and it will A)
(' 14 pump water to the degasifier, and then it goes into the 15 effluent hold up tanks.
16 Now inside of containme:t, we have a i
1 17 containment sump down at the very bottom of the l 18 containment. This catches all the compartment and floor 19 drains and some drains such as the fan cooler condensate.
20 Basically ~anything that is junky will end up in the ;
i l
21 containment sump. l 22 This runs automatically on level control. One 23 pump turns on on high, and it turns off on low. The duty 1
24 between the pumps is cycled. And it pumps out of j 1
() 25 centainment into what are called waste hold up tanks.
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162 l 1 These waste hold up tanks also receive floor drains and 1
i 2 equipment drains from the radioactively contaminated areas l l7h I
i
'~/
3 of the auxiliary building and the annex building, and also l
4 the rad waste building.
5 MR. CARROLL: Now in the case of these tanks 6 and the ones up above, the valving doesn't show. And only l
7 one is lined up at a time.
8 MR. ISRAELSON: In terms of receiving inputs, 9 yes. And there's an automatic diversion from one tank to 10 the other on high level. And there's an alarm in the 11 control room which notifies the operators that the tank is 12 full and ready to be processed.
13 The other source of liquid influence to the O
\ s# 14 liquid rad waste system ends up in what we call a chemical 15 waste tank, and that's the hot sinks and showers and 16 chemical waste from the rad chem lab.
17 MR. CARROLL: Now there is no on site laundry 18 to be concerned with?
19 MR. ISRAELSON: That's correct. In the AP600, 20 we're going by the current industry practice of shipping 21 laundry off site for cleaning. So we do not have an on l
22 site laundry.
l 23 One thing I might mention is that in terms of 24 effluent processing, the AP600 does not use boron recycle.
(D
( ,/ 25 So everything that's let down from the reactor coolant NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N W (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 l
i
163 1 system eventually gets discharged. Okay, we don't reuse s 2 the water, and we don't recycle the boron.
1 ( T i V l 3 MR. CARROLL: Don't put your plant in the 1
4 vicinity of an orange grove.
5 MR. ISRAELSON: Orange grove?
6 MR. CARROLL: Citrus fruit doesn't like boron.
l l
l 7 MR. ISRAELSON: Okay.
8 MR. CARROLL: How do I know that? Because we l 9 had lots of boron in our geothermal steam at PG&E dumping 10 it into the rushing river. Water was taken out of it for l 11 citrus groves, and it made the citrus growers unhappy, so 12 we had to find other ways of getting rid of it.
l 13 MR. ISRAELSON: Okay.
l f^^
i -- 14 All right, now we'll talk about what the in 15 fluents are to the liquid rad waste system. Let's talk l
16 about how they're processed. In all cases, --
17 MR. CARROLL: Well, let me ask you about that 18 system. How often do you think you're going to have to 19 bring mobile equipment in, or is it going to be just 20 permanently sitting there?
21 MR. ISRAELSON: For processing liquid rad 22 waste?
23 MR. CARROLL: Well, I'm thinking particularly
- 24 of the chem lab and detergent drain.
1
(_j 25 MR. ISRAELSON: I'm trying to remember now. I l
l NEAL R. GROSS l COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N W.
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164 i
t 1 did that calculation.
7- 2 MR. CARROLL: Is that a huge tank or --
c
\ s
! x_/
l 3 MR. ISRAELSON: This is a 10,000 gallon tank.
t 4 I think it's -- for design case, it's good for about a l 5 month's worth of inputs before it has to be processed.
6 MR. CARROLL: I'm curious as to given that, 7 why you would want to -- why you wouldn't have some 8 permanently installed equipment in a 60 year plant.
9 MR. ISRAELSON: There was a decision made that 10 the --
11 MR. McINTYRE: It's expensive and it's a pain.
12 The industry is going in a lot of ways to doing things off 13 site and hiring it done.
[,_h
\- 14 MR. CARROLL: A trend I tried to fight 15 against.
16 CHAIRMAN SEALE: It probably is in the wrong I
17 pay grade to try to pay people to do that kind of thing.
18 MR. ISRAELSON: You know, right now, we really 19 expect that most of the water that goes in the chemical l 20 waste tank which is the hot sinks, that's going to be 21 sufficiently benign so that we can sample it and then dusp 22 it overboard without any kind of processing at all.
23 MR. CARROLL: Okay, so you're drawing really 24 ought to show a bypass around mobile equipment.
(^T
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165 1 drawing. In our system, we do have the capability of
,- 2 bypassing everything.
t') 3 MR. CARROLL: That's right. That's the 4 answer.
5 MR. ISRAELSON: Okay, well we did get into the 6 processing aspects of this tank. So, we do have 7 provisions for bringing mobile equipment on site and
- 8 processing the contents of this tank. As I said, if we --
9 if it's acceptable, you can put it into -- and it's now 10 shown on this diagram -- but you can actually put it into 11 the waste hold up tanks and process it with in-plant 12 equipment if it's chemically suitable for that.
13 If it's clean encugh that it doesn't need to
(~N,
\ /' 14 be processed at all, we can pump it into the monitor tanks !
15 and then dump it overboard.
16 MR. CARROLL: What's the off site disposal l 17 line that's on the drawing? That sounds like it bypasses 18 the monitor tank.
19 MEMBER SHACK: The bottom line.
20 MR. ISRAELSON: Oh, we also have the 21 capabilities of putting the water into tanker trucks and 22 they can take it off site and process it and dispose of 23 it.
24 MR. CARROLL: Ah, that's what off --
e~N
( ,
) 25 MR. ISRAELSON: That's what that means.
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166 i
1 Okay, so we talked about the chemical waste
,_s 2 tank. Now the waste hold up tanks and the effluent hold 1
! \g) 3 up tanks are all processed using common equipment. This 4 is a -- the first step is filtration, followed by ion ;
I 5 exchange where the water then goes into one of three 6 monitor tanks.
i 7 After processing, the monitor tanks are 8 recirculated and sampled. If they're shown suitable for ,
l 9 discharge, then they're pumped into a circulating water 10 system blow down which further dilutes them, and they're ;
i 11 discharged.
l l 12 I don't know how much detail you want of this I 13 system, but the liquid rad waste system automatically r'N 1 t
\ -) 14 shuts itself down if there's high discharge radiation l 15 detected. And there's an alarm made into the main cont'rol 16 room. We have diverse methods of stopping discharge.
17 There's a control valve on the discharge which 18 automatically closes on high radiation, plus the pumps on 19 the monitor tanks are all disabled on high radiation.
20 They have two independent methods of shutting 21 down discharge when that occurs.
22 MR. CARROLL: Now how about the potential for 23 radioactive waste in the turbine building? How do you 24 deal with that?
O)
( 25 MR. ISRAELSON: Okay. All right, in the event NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N W.
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i l 167 1 that the steam generator blow down system detects
-s 2 radiation, there's an automatic diversion of the blow down
'^'
3 from that system into the wast ^ hold up tanks here. And l
l 4 there's an alarm in the main control room that tells them 5 that there's been radiation detected and that this is now 6 going on.
7 Then the steam generator blow down will be 8 treated in the same fashion as other wastes.
1 9 MR. CARROLL: Okay, now if I have steam 10 generator -- a steam generator tube rupture, I'm also 11 going to get my condensate polishers collecting some 12 radioactivity.
13 MR. HUTCHINGS: I'm Don Hutchings from 14 Westinghouse. If that situation were to occur, there's a 15 -- during the high radiation sensor -- it bypasses the --
16 basically the demineralizers and clean up equipment and 17 goes directly to this rad waste system without being --
18 you know, without separating the water and cleaning it up.
19 MR. CARROLL: Oh, okay.
20 CHAIRMAN SEALE: That's a lot of -- that's a 21 lot of flow.
22 MR. ISRAELSON: It can be.
l 23 CHAIRMAN SEALE: How do you -- what do you do i
24 with the -- to vent it?
() 25 MR. ISRAELSON: To what?
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I 1
l 168 l
1 CHAIRMAN SEALE: Vent it.
2 MR. ISRAELSCN: Oh, vent the tanks?
l \ '~j 3 CHAIRMAN SEALE: Yes.
4 MR. ISRAELSON: We have vents sized that are 5 bigger than any -- that allow air out faster than we can 6 put water in.
7 CHAIRMAN SEALE: And appropriate filters?
8 MR. ISRAELSON: On the vents?
l 9 CHAIRMAN SEALE: Yes.
10 MR. ISRAELSON: There is no filtering on the 11 vents of the tanks. These -- the rooms where these tanks 12 are located are serviced by the radioactive -- what are 13 they called, radiation area or ventilation system. And i 73 1
> 14 there are radiation monitors up in that ductwork which l 15 alarm and isolate, I believe, if the high radiation alarm 16 is sounded.
i 17 Now, these tanks are fairly good size. And I
18 we've considered the issues of, you know, splashing and 19 whether the particulates can be carried out the vents.
20 And after taking a look at it, we decided that we didn't ;
l l l
l 21 need any special filtration on the vent exhaust 1
22 themselves.
23 Okay, next I'll go on to the gaseous rad waste 24 system. The gaseous rad waste system in the AP600 is very
/~'N
( ,) 25 much a passive system. It has no moving parts. The in NEAL R. GROSS l
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169 1 fluents to the gaseous rad waste system are either the 2 degasifier which is degasified reactor coolant which has I b,f- s i
l 3 come from the -- either the let down or the reactor
\
l 4 coolant drain tank.
5 The other source of waste gas would be from l
l l 6 the vent space in the reactor coolant drain tank. It's a I
l 7 very simple system.
l 8 MR. CARROLL: Now, another source is the air 9 ejector discharge that you're running with tube leaks in 10 your steam generators. Where is that?
l l 11 MR. ISRAELSON: That's ducted -- there is a 12 radiation monitor in that line, and it's vented out to the i
i 13 turbine building roof.
1
- i
/3 1
14 MR. CARROLL: And you're going to try to l l
j 15 capture that in this system?
i 16 MR. ISRAELSON: No. The waste gas which is, 17 of course, fully saturated with water vapor as it comes l l
I 18 out of the degasifier goes into a gas cooler where it's i
19 chilled to about 45 Fahrenheit by chilled water. It goes l
20 into a moisture separator, and it goes through the first 21 activated carbon bed which we call the guard bed.
1 l
l 22 We don't take any credit for off site releases 1
23 to the effect of this activated carbon. From there, it 24 can go into one or both of what we call our delay beds.
O
(_,) 25 These are -- either one provides 100% of the needed NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS i 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N W.
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170 1 radioisotope delay. And the discharge from the system is
,_s 2 monitored for radiation.
/ \
( )
3 And should there be a high radiation alarm, 4 the system automatically isolates itself and the operator 5 is notified by an alarm.
6 MR. CARROLL: What's pushing the gas through 7 this system?
8 MR. ISRAELSON: The degasifier discharge is 9 about two psi gauge and it vents to atmosphere out into 10 the plant vents. So we have a two psi difference to move 11 the gas through the system. And the reactor coolant drain 12 tank inside containment is also pressurized at two psi 13 with an inert blanket of nitrogen, rN 14 And so when some of that gas is vented off 15 into the gaseous rad waste system, it has the same 16 pressure pushing the gas through the system.
17 MEMBER FONTANA: What are the decay beds 18 packed with?
19 MR. ISRAELSON: Activated carbon.
20 MEMBER FONTANA: They're not cryogenically l
21 cooled, are they?
22 MR. ISRAELSON: No, sir.
23 MEMBER FONTANA: Okay.
24 MR. CARROLL: Is there the potential for s
( ,)
.? 5 enough radioactivity in there to cause high temperatures i
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171 1 and perhaps fire in the activated charcoal?
- 2 MR. ISRAELSON: We do have many -- let's see
(._ / 3 now. I think I brought a slide with me. We have a lot of 4 features designed into the gaseous rad. waste system to 5 prevent ignition of hydrogen or to extinguish a fire 6 should it occur somehow. The system normally operates -- 1 7 it's basically all hydrogen with some trade radio gases 8 unless you're doing a purging from the reactor coolant i
9 drain tank or purging for a start up.
10 Then it would be mostly nitrogen, but possibly i
11 some traces of hydrogen and these radio gases. And we 1 12 have in line hydrogen and oxygen monitors, and also a 13 moisture monitor in this system. These monitors -- high l O
k-- 14 moisture provides an alarm that doesn't do anything. It 15 lets the operators know that there may be some degradation 16 of the activated carbon performance with time because of 17 moisture wetting the beds.
18 MR. CARROLL: do this is moisture sensed after 19 the bed?
l 20 MR. ISRAELSON: Well, no; this is moisture 1
21 measured downstream of the gas cooler up before the beds.
j 22 We also measure --
23 MR. CARROLL: It might be indicative of 24 degradation of the beds. You mean --
C\
( ,) 25 MR. ISRAELSON: I'm saying it could cause it NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE , N W.
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172 l
1 in the future, t 2 MR. CARROLL: Okay.
(-s) 3 MR. ISRAELSON: The oxygen sensor is set to 1
4 alarm at about it, which is about a quarter of the minimum 5 concentration of oxygen and hydrogen for combustibility.
l l 6 And we have a hydrogen monitor which will give the 7 operator a continuous measurement of the hydrogen
- 8 concentration, and he's got an adjustable alarm on that.
l 9 He can set it anywhere he wants depending on 10 whether he's just done maintenance on the system and he's 11 got an oxygen rich environment and he's going to start a l
! (~N Y-- 14 MR. CARROLL: This goes to the plant vent, -- l l
15 MR. ISRAELSON: Right. j i
16 MR. CARROLL: -- which in turn goes to 17 atmosphere, what, above the containment someplace? l l
18 MR. ISRAELSON: Yes. I i
19 MR. CARROLL: Not just ahead of the air intake 20 to the control room, for example?
21 MR. ISRAELSON: No. The plant vent receives 22 all of the effluents from the various radioactive area 23 ventilation systems, and it's continuously sampled and 24 monitored for radiation.
25 MR. CARROLL: I actually said that for the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N W.
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173 1 benefit of our former colleague, Bill Lindblad, who the 2 Portland Trojan plant was smart enough to put hydrogen f-s 6 i V 3 storage tanks up on the roof that, if they had failed, 4 would have put hydrogen into the control room.
5 CHAIRMAN SEALE: Well, live and learn.
6 MR. CARROLL: Yes.
7 CHAIRMAN SEALE: What else can I say. l 8 MR. ISRAELSON: The solid rad waste system --
l 9 you see there's a number of categories of radioactive 10 waste. These are generally split into three types. We 11 call them dry solids, wet solids, and mixed wastes. The I
l 12 dry solid wastes are further split up into the compatible ;
i l
13 type, and this is your plastic ground cloths and your f's
!' ') 14 booties and hair nets and whatever else you have to --
15 that you can volume reduce by compaction.
16 We have non-compatible wastes, and I have the 17 quantities indicated on this slide of the total percentage 18 of these wastes. The wet solid wastes include the various 19 filter elements from the liquid '..ad waste system and the 1 20 chemical and volume control system and the spent fuel pool i 21 purification equipment. l 22 And then we have the spent resins also from :
1 l
l 23 those three systems that I just mentioned.
24 Mixed liquid and chemical wastes are something
) 25 that may have gotten contaminated. Maybe it was turbine NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N W (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
174 1 oil. But we've made an estimate that it would be 7M% of 7- g 2 all the solid waste as it's generated.
N, 3 CHAIRMAN SEALE: And essentially, when you say 4 processed by mobile systems or -- and that sort of thing, l
5 you assume that they're just sort of magically taken care 6 of by somebody outside the perimeter?
7 MR. CARROLL: Well, there's nuclear garbage l
8 men that will --
l 9 CHAIRMAN SEALE: I understand, I understand.
10 MR. ISRAELSON: We expect that the contractor 11 will come in and he'll --
12 CHAIRMAN SEALE: Okay.
13 MR. ISRAELSON: -- take them and process them
(~%
\ ') 14 appropriately. l l
15 CHAIRMAN SEALE: Yes.
16 MR. CARROLL: They are providing a big truck 17 bay for this kind of equipment and actual connections to 18 hook up to.
19 CHAIRMAN SEALE: Yeah, yeah. Well, you 20 wouldn't want him competing with staff for parking places 21 in the parking lot.
22 MR. ISRAELSON: So the following slide shows l
l 23 the inspected quantities to be shipped each year for 24 disposal, and this adds up to 1,630 cubic feet. And to O)
(_ 25 put this in perspective, you could put 1,630 cubic feet in NEAL R. GROSS JOURT REPORTERS AND TRANSC5tlBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N W (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
175 l
l 1 a one car garage. This would put the AP600 within the j i
2 top 10% of the operating plants in this country.
7_.
kJ 3 MR. CARROLL: Yeah, but they're big plants, l
4 not little dinky things like this 600 megawatt job.
5 CHAIRMAN SEALE: Yes.
l l
6 MR. ISRAELSON: All right, now after having 7 talked about the radioactive waste processing systems, the
! 8 last section of Chapter 11 of the SSAR is -- deals with l
9 radiation monitoring. And generally we've divided the 10 radiation monitors into those process type radiation 11 monitors, and then area radiation monitors.
12 There are 31 total process monitors, of which l
13 six are safety related. And of the radiation monitors, 1 1
('~) l k/ 14 there's 15 of those throughout the plant, and four of them 15 are safety related.
l 16 MEMBER MILLER: On the radiation monitors that 17 are safety related, I assume these are digital based 1
i 18 systems, right?
l 19 MR. ISRAELSON: Our whole plant is digital, j 20 We're going to have a distributed data highway, and all i
1 21 instruments put information onto this data bus. The 22 information is retrievable anywhere in the plant where you 23 can plug your portable work station into the appropriate 24 jack.
(m
(_) 25 And it's also available in the main control l l
l NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS l I
1323 RHoDE ISLAND AVE., N W (202) 2344433 WASHINGTON. D.C 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
1 l 176 l
l 1 room.
1 2 MEMBER MILLER: I guess the question -- will
, i \
3 we see the safety related radiation monitors back in 4 Chapter 7 when we get to that part as far as requirements 5 for software development and so forth?
6 MR. ISRAELSON: I don't know the answer to 7 that.
8 MEMBER MILLER: In other words, what we have 9 here is fairly sketchy, to say the least.
10 CHAIRMAN SEALE: That's an area which very 11 well could be in part covered by ITAAC. Certainly the --
12 MR. CARROLL: It will be.
13 CHAIRMAN SEALE: Yeah, processing and
(%
\ i V 14 presentation of that data, because those are pretty fast 15 moving technologies. I 1
16 MR. CARROLL: Well, it was a DAC on the 17 evolutionary plants.
18 MEMBER MILLER: I guess since I wasn't here 19 for the evolutionary, I'm just asking where I'll see more 20 information on this particular system.
1 21 MR. CARROLL: I would have expected to see j 22 some of this in Chapter 7.
l 23 MEMBER MILLER: That's my question.
24 MR. CORLETTI: Yes, I think Chapter 7 has
- A 25 safety related instrumentation addressed in protection t
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177 1 system, but I'm not sure how in depth they go into just l
s 2 the fact that we have these instruments and that they're 1( \
3 on PAMS and that -- and so forth.
l 4 But they're not part of -- they don't have 5 automatic protection features associated with them, I l
6 don't believe. Or no, we do.
7 MR. ISRAELSON: There are a few.
8 MR. CORLETTI: So they will be discussed 1
9 there. The automatic actuation features are discussed i
10 there also.
l 1
l 11 MEMBER MILLER: So the safety related channels I 12 that are in the rad monitoring system would be in Chapter 13 7?
l f) i 14 MR. CORLETTI: Yes.
i 15 MEMBER MILLER: Okay.
16 CHAIRMAN SEALE: And there they are.
17 MR. ISRAELSON: The safety related features 18 that the radiation monitors perform are listed here:
19 isolate containment air purge, isolate RHR if the plant is 20 in shut down and heat removal is in process. Otherwise, 21 the RHR piping is already isolated. Control room 22 supplemental filtration can be initiated.
23 And then, as we talked about earlier in this 24 graded approach, that if it's radiation containment to go
(--
(s i 25 up, then the emergency habitability system will turn on NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N W.
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1 l l l 178 l 1 and completely isolate the normal ventilation for the main j 2 control room.
73 t
3 And then there's long term post-accident 4 monitoring available which uses -- and we're counting on 5 non-safety as well as safety related radiation monitors.
6 MEMBER MILLER: Which would all meet Reg.
7 Guide 197. Those would all meet the Reg. Guide 197 for --
8 CHAIRMAN SEALE: Yes, yes.
i 9 MR. ISRAELSON: And that concludes my 10 presentation.
l 11 CHAIRMAN SEALE: Any further questions here?
12 Any comments on this specific part from the staff?
13 MR. LYONS: No comments from the staff.
,O
~ 14 MR. CARROLL: I wanted to go back with Mr.
15 Lyons on chilled water systems. That falls under you, 16 doesn't it?
17 MR. LYONS: Yes, it does.
18 MR. CARROLL: Have you taken Carl Michaelson's 19 advice and run out and got smarter about some of the 20 subtleties of these systems?
21 MR. LYONS: To some extent, yes. We've tried 22 to be as smart as we can about them, but we don't -- we l
! 23 haven't gone out to hire a specific chilled water expert. l 24 I think that's one of the thing you would have liked us to l
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179 1 it.
l ,g 2 MR. CARROLL: How have you been going about
( !
3 that?
4 MR. LYONS: Just being involved with the 5 nuclear HVAC utilities group is one way we try to tie in 6 with them both in the filtration systems and at the 7 chiller systems, that sort of thing; trying to get extra 8 training for my people. But sometimes that's few and far 9 between. And we don't -- internally, we don't have any 10 training programs for that.
11 MR. CARROLL: Okay.
12 CHAIRMAN SEALE: Okay, any other questions?
13 Well, that's all for you, Mr. Israelson.
)
\ ) l 14 McIntyre, you want to make any more further l 15 comments about these chapters? ,
I 16 MR. McINTYRE: Not specifically about these 17 chapters. I think --
18 CHAIRMAN SEALE: Okay, where do we go from 19 here?
20 MR. McINTYRE: Well, that's the next question.
21 We appreciate the time, as always, that we got from the 22 subcommittee today. I think we answered -- Noel needs to 23 check his notes. We got the three questions that came up.
l 24 We scurried off and called back. We got the answers to d 'N
'x_) 25 those.
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180 1 And I think you now have a little better 2 appreciation of what the AP600 is and what we're able to (n) 3 do by starting from a blank piece of paper, and also what 4 the URD really means once you implement it in a plant.
5 And I heard Mr. Carroll say a couple of times well, gee, i
6 that's certainly an improvement, or we didn't build them 1
7 like that in the '70s, and that's for sure.
l
( 8 And we think that the AP600 does represent a l
9 marked improvement. I didn't hear any showstoppers in 10 these four chapters either from the staff or from the 11 subcommittee. We'll work with Noel to figure out where we 1
12 are. We can't get to -- we don't want to bring you things t
13 that the staff is not in agreement with.
/- m 14 CHAIRMAN SEALE: That are not cooked yet.
1 15 MR. McINTYRE: Right.
l l
l 16 MR. CARROLL: Although we kind of like that I
17 sometimes. i i
18 MR. McINTYRE: That's why we're not talking 19 about Chapter 2 today.
20 CHAIRMAN SEALE: I see, okay.
t 21 MR. McINTYRE: We'll find the next three or l 22 four chapters that we can bring forth. Probably, from 23 what I understand of the schedule, it will be in the early 24 March time frame.
25 CHAIRMAN SEALE: Okay.
l NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N W.
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i
181 1 MR. CARROLL: Speaking of Chapter 2, Brian, I 2 did have one that really jumped out at me: the section on
(-~Y 3 airplane crashes.
4 MR. McINTYRE: Yes.
5 MR. CARROLL: Say that the plant design is 6 protected against airplane crashes in the vicinity of the 7 plant, and I had a little trouble visualizing what --
8 MR. McINTYRE: You don't worry about the other 9 ones.
10 MR. CARROLL: -- what the vicinity of the 11 plant was and what kind of an airplane I was talking 12 about. Vicinity could mean 30 miles away.
13 MR. McINTYRE: Okay.
O k-) 14 MR. CARROLL: I was just wondering if there 15 was -- it's part of the story, i 16 MR. McINTYRE: Thank you. I'll look into 17 that.
18 MEMBER MILLER: 747 at zero hit.
19 MR. CARROLL: CSA with a tank in it.
4 20 CHAIRMAN SEALE: I think your comment about 21 the impact of starting with a clean piece of paper is very 22 appropriate. And perhaps the fire issue is as good a 23 place as any to reflect that. Certainly in some ways, 24 it's very gratifying to appreciate that Appendix R
/*/
(,
\
25 compliance is a victim of timing and not of fundamental NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N W (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D C. 20005-5701 (202) 234-4433
l l
182 1 flaws in the way in which the regulation was written in 2 the first place.
NJ 3 MR. CARROLL: No, there's some fundamental 4 flaws in it.
5 CHAIRMAN SEALE: All right. But we will be 6 interested to hear as things go along. I don't believe 7 we'll be trying to send you -- send the staff a letter any 8 time -- well, the staff in this case, a letter any time at 9 this -- or any point in the near future. But we'll keep 10 this under advisement. And when the time comes, why it 11 will be a part of the overall --
12 MR. McINTYRE: Some kind words to the 13 Commission on Friday would be certainly appreciated.
V 14 CHAIRMAN SEALE: Are there no secrets?
15 MR. McINTYRE: I don't know what -- I just see i
1 16 you're on the agenda.
17 CHAIRMAN SEALE: Oh, that's right. I'm 18 teasing.
19 Anyway, we want to thank everyone from 20 Westinghouse. We thank the staff for being here to 21 support the committee in this effort.
22 And if there are no further comments or l
l l 23 questions, I'll declare that the meeting is adjourned.
24 (Whereupon, the proceedings were adjourned at
'O s / 25 3:15 p.m.)
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l
i l
l O CERTIFICATE This is to certify that the attached Proceedings before the United States Nuclear l
e Regulatory Commission in the matter of:
i l
Name of Proceeding: ACRS SUBCOMMITTEE ON WESTINGHOUSE STANDARD PLANT DESIGNS 1
Docket Number: N/A Place of Proceeding: ROCKVILLE, MARYLAND were held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript thereof for the file of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission taken by me and, thereafter reduced to I typewriting by me or under the direction of the court reporting company, and that the transcript is a true and accurate record of the foregoing proceedings.
Y AAA k.QORBETT RI8ER Official Reporter Neal R. Gross and Co., Inc.
O
/
4 INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE 4
WESTINGHOUSE STANDARD PLANTS DESIGN SUBCOMMITTEE 11545 ROCKVILLE PIKE, ROOM T-2B3 O* ROCKVILLE, MARYLAND DECEMBER 4, 1996 The meeting will now come to order. This is a meeting of the ACRS subcommittee on Westinghouse Standard Plants Design.
I am Robert Seale, Chairman of the Subcommittee.
The ACRS Members in attendance are:
Mario Fontana, Thomas Kress, Don Miller, and William Shack.
l ACRS Consultant in attendance is James Carroll.
The purpose of this meeting is to review Chapters 4, 5, 9, and 11 of the AP600 Standard Safety Analysis Report and the associated NRC staf f Draf t Safety Evaluation Report. The Subcommittee will gather
- information, analyze relevant issues and facts, and formulate 3
proposed positions and actions as appropriate, for deliberation by the full Committee.
Noel Dudley is the Cognizant ACRS Staff Engineer for this meeting.
, Od The rules for participation in today's meeting have been announced l
as part of the notice of this meeting previously published in the
< Federal Register on November 19, 1996.
A transcript of the meeting is being kept and will be made available as stated in the Federal Register Notice. It is requested that the speakers first identify themselves and speak with sufficient clarity and volume so that they can be readily heard.
We have received no written comments or requests for time to make
' oral statements from members of the public.
[ Chairman's Comments follow:]
Today the Subcommittee will begins its review of the AP600 Standard Safety Analysis Report (SSAR), which was initially submitted to the staff for review on June 26, 1992. The Subcommittee plans o'1 reviewing the staff Final Safety Analysis Report after it is issued. The staff will make some opening comments and Westinghouse will introduce the AP600 design and design philosophy.
The Subcommittee will then hear presentations on the following: the reactor, the reactor coolant system and connected systems, the auxiliary systems including fire s pro tec ti on , and radioactive waste management.
\'
We will proceed with the meeting and I call upon William Huf fman of NRR, to begin.
P NRR STAFF REMARKS TO !
THE ACRS SUBCOMMITTEE l FOR THE WESTINGHOUSE STANDARD PLANT DESIGN i
SUBJECT:
Status of the AP600 Design Certification Review DATE: December 4,1996 PRESENTER: William C. Huffman i PRESENTER'S TITLE:
Project Manager i Standardization Project Directorate Division of Reactor Program Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation t
PRESENTER'S TEL. NO.: (301) 415-1141
ll O O O AP600 REVIEW SCHEDULE e The staff and Westinghouse are actively developing a realistic and 1
- achievable schedule for completing the AP600 review e Primary factors driving schedule Westinghouse submittal of remaining deliverables Availability of staff resources to support the review e Other factors affecting schedule
- Policy issues (SECY-96-128)
- Level of detail of information in SSAR
- Programmatic reviews (ITAAC, Technical Specifications, initial Test Program) l - Resolution of key technical issues (e.g. RTNSS) i
O O O .
t t
REVIEW OF AP600 SSAR CHAPTERS 4, 5, 9,11
- All SSAR Chapters are still under staff review
- No anticipated system design changes other than those associated with Policy issues on the spent fuel pool makeup and coohng e Most remaining issues associated with SSAR documentation and level of detail e Programmatic reviews not far enough a2ong to preclude additional design concerns
o o oy yng AP600 i
AP600 Introduction and Design Philosophy t
Brian McIntyre Manager, Advanced Plant Safety and Licensing (412)374-4334 Westinghouse
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AP600 DFSIGN PROCFSS _
- Iterative Design Development Plant Design Criteria / Goals Inputs from utilities, industry, NRC, Westinghouse Systems Design Lessons leamed from previous designs Safety Analysis Single failure, conservative assumptions Risk and Severe Accident Analysis Common mode failures, best estimate assumptions Plant Arrangement and Modularization Studies Plant Evaluations (cost, reliability, availability, maintainability)
- Several iterations Have Been Completed First iteration started in 1987 Several iterations completed before SSAR submitted Each iteration is more detailed
APS00 PLANT DFSIGN CRITFRIA ;
= Greatly Simplify Plant i Cost, Construction, Maintenance, Operation, & Safety
- Greater Operation and Safety Margins
- Reduced Financial Risk to Utility
- Licensing Certainty i
Certification, Reduced Public Risk, Passive Safety-Related Systems
!
- Reduced Lead Time / Construction Schedule
- Competitive Cost of Power
- Reduced Operation and Maintenance Costs
- 90% Plant Availability,100 Man-Rem ORE
- No Plant Prototype Proven Components & Systems
- Standard Design for Wide Range of Sites
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O O O .
AP600 PLANT DFSIGN CRITFRIA -
- Safety Margins Simple, dedicated, independent, passive safety systems Substantial margins for Design Basis Accidents No operator actions required for core / containment cooling '
Low core melt frequency, < 10 4 /yr Low severe accident frequency, < 10-8 /yr
- Licensing Certainty Address current / advanced plant licensing issues Perform testing Perform accident analysis Perform PRA Reduce risks Low dependance on operator or nonsafety systems Reduce / simplify evacuation planning zone NRC design certification SSAR, PRA, ITAAC
AP600 PLANT DFSIGN CRITFRIA i
- Lead Time / Construction Schedule 5 year lead time / 3 year construction schedule Pre-engineered standard plant Pre-planned construction Modularization Plant simplification
- Competitive Cost of Power Pre-engineered / pre-licensed standard design 3 year construction schedule No prototype required ;
- Reduced Operation and Maintenance Costs Simplified design (system / equipment) 90% availability .
Increased design margins Proven, experience based equipment designs i O O O .
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AP600 PL ANT FFATURFS --
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- Increased Margms Lower reactor power density Larger Pressurizer Simplified Loop Configuration With Canned Pumps
- Passive Safety Systems
- Simplified Nonsafety Systems
- Digital Instrumentation and Control Systems Advanced control room
- Enhanced Plant Arrangement and Construction Integration of cost / construction / operation / maintenance Extensive use of modular construction J
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O O O
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AP600 PRA FVALUATIONS =
!
- PRA Used As Design Tool 5 major PRA quantifications / design iterations Significant interaction between design and risk analysis Initial PRA study done in 1987 PRA submitted to NRC June 1992, update underway Successive PRA studies became more detailed
- PRA Shows That AP600 Meets NRC and EPRI PRA goals for core melt and severe accident Not significantly dependent on Any one passive system Operator actions Nonsafety systems
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AP600 SAFFTY ANALYSIS - !
1
- Safety Analysis Used As Design Tool 5 major analysis / design iterations Significant interaction between design and safety analysis Initial analysis done in 1987 Analysis submitted to NRC June 1992, update in 1995 ;
Multiple codes used i LOCA => COBRA TRAC, NOTRUMP, TREAT, MAAP, RELAP NonLOCA => LOFTRAN, TREAT, NOTRUMP, MAAP, RELAP
- Safety Analysis Shows That AP600 Meets NRC and EPRI PRA requirements for accident performance Significant margins exist i Not dependent on .
Operator actions Nonsafety systems O 9 9 .
O O O .
AP600 SYSTFMS DFSIGN APPROACH -
1
- Greatly Simplify Systems Cost, Construction, Maintenance, Operation, & Safety
- Provide Simple Passive Safety Systems Use " natural" driving forces only One-time alignment of active valves No support systems after actuation No safety AC power, pumps, fans, diesels No operator actions required to cool core / containment l
i
- Provide Simple Active Non-Safety Systems I -
Redundant active equipment powered by non-safety diesels Minimize unnecessary use of passive safety systems Reduce risk to utility & public l
- Simplify Other Non-Safety Systems
AP600 SAFFTY SYSTFMS Provide Passive Safety Systems Greatly simplify construction, maintenance, operation, ISI / IST Mitigate design basis accidents without use of NNS systems including at power and shutdown events NRC PRA goals w/o NNS system; EPRI PRA goals w NNS system
- Safety Systems Design Features Only passive processes; no " active" equipment Conservative design for DBA; margins, single failure criteria Best estimate design for PRA; common mode failures No operator actions to cool core / containment
- Safety Equipment Design Features Reliable / experience based equipment Full NRC regulatory oversight Reg Guide 1.26 Quality Group A, B, or C; Seismic I design Startup Testing / Inspection (Tier i description and ITAAC) ;
Improved inservice testing / inspection Availability controls (Tech Spec with shutdown requirements)
Reliability controls (Reliability Assurance Program) i 9 9 9 !
O O O APS00 NON-SAFFTY DID SYSTFMS N
- Provide Non-Safety Defense-in-Depth Systems Reliably support normal operation Minimize challenges to passive safety systems Not required to mitigate design basis accidents Not required for NRC PRA goals; used for EPRI PRA goals t
- Non-Safety DID Systems Design Features Redundancy for more probable failures, automatic control Power from offsite / onsite sources (non-safety diesels)
Separation from safety systems
- Non-Safety DID Equipment Design Features Reliable / experience based equipment Minimum NRC regulatory oversight Reg Guide 1.26 Quality Group D; limited hazard protection Availability by procedures w/o shutdown requirements (RTNSS)
Reliability controls (less detailed Reliability Assurance Program)
Startup tests (Less detailed ITAAC)
meme AP600 SIMPLIFICATIONS -
Components 2-Loop Plant AP600 Reduction Pumps - Safety 25 0 eliminated
- Nonsafety 188 131 30 %
HVAC Fans - Safety 73 none eliminated
- Nonsafety 69 51 26 %
l-leat Exchangers 99 71 28 %
2553 Valves (>2") 1528 40 %
Safety Pipe (>2") 44,300 ft 7210 ft 78 %
Piping welds - Nuclear Systems ~10,000 ~5000 50 %
- RCS loop piping 32 15 53%
Containment Penetrations 93 40 57%
Evaporators 2 0 eliminated Diesel Generators 2 (safety) 2 (nonsaf) --
Bldg Volume (seismic) 9.4 mil ft3 5.1 mil ft3 45 %
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O O O .
i AP600 SHUTDOWN PASSIVF CAPABILITY --
i a Passive Safety Functions Provided During All Shutdown Modes
- Hot Shutdown / Hot Standby / Cold Shutdown Tech Spec require PRHR HX, CMT, IRWST, and ADS to be available
CMT / accumulator unnecessary .
Tech Spec require:
Containment integrity ADS stages 1,2,3 open IRWST MOV available
- Refueling Shutdown Refueling cavity provides >72 hours with equipment hatch open Refueling cavity takes >6 hours to boil
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CORF COOLING DFFFNSF-IN-DFPTH -
FUNCTION CURRENT PWR AP600 REACTOR SHUTDOWN - CONTROL RODS (BREAKERS) - CONTROL RODS (BREAKERS)
- RIDEOUT (NEG MTC, AMSAC, - CONTROL RODS (MG SETS) ,
AFWS, CVCS) - RIDEOUT (MORE NEG MTC, DAS, PRHRS/SFWS, CMT/CVCS)
RCS OVERPRESSURE - PZR PORV - LARGER PZR PROTECTION - HIGH PRES TRIP - HIGH PRES TRIP
- PZR SAFETY VALVES - PZR SAFETY VALVES RCS HEAT REMOVAL - MAIN FEEDWATER SYS - MAIN FEEDWATER SYS
- AUX FEEDWATER SYS - STARTUP FEEDWATER SYS
- MANUAL FEED / BLEED - PRHR HX (PZR PORV, HHSI) - AUTO FEED / BLEED (CMT / IRWST, ADS) ;
- MANUAL FEED / BLEED (ACCUM / RNS, ADS) '
HIGH PRESSURE - CVCS PUMPS - CVCS PUMPS INJECTION - HHSI PUMPS -CMT l - ACCUM / IRWST (ADS)
- ACCUM / RNS (ADS)
LOW PRESSURE -ACCUM -ACCUM INJECTION - LHSI PUMPS - IRWST (ADS)
- RNS PUMPS
! LONG TERM RECIRC - LHSI PUMPS FEEDING - CONTAINMENT SUMP (ADS)
HHSI PUMPS - RNS PUMPS l CONTAINMENT HEAT - FAN COOLERS - FAN COOLERS i REMOVAL - CONT SPRAY PUMPS / HX - EXTERNAL AIR + WATER DRAIN !
l - EXTERNAL AIR ONLY COOLING l
O O O ,
i O O O AP600 SSAR TFSTING 1
- Determine need for system / equipment testing
- System Testing to support SSAR Examined key phenomena in accidents Assessed new AP600 features Determined if data exists for code validation Developed AP600 test if data was unavailable or insufficient
- Equipment Testing to support SSAR Assessed new AP600 equipment Determined if data exists for equipment characteristics used in SSAR analysis Developed AP600 test if data was unavailable or insufficient !
- Equipment Qualification Testing ;
To be performed after design certification when design details & equipment suppliers are known l
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l AP600 SSAR ANALYSIS =-
Analysis Determines if Plant / System Performance is Acceptable i
- Testing Provides Code Validation Obtain high fidelity data beyond range of anticipated plant conditions Test facility modeled with same code used to analyze AP600 in SSAR If necessary, code models optimized to improve their accuracy If necessary, the AP600 design is optimized based on the results of code analysis O O O
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O O O
_q AP600 PASSIVF SYSTFM RFLIABILITY -
i
- Conservative Design Requirements ASME code, seismic design, equipment qualification Design out failure mechanisms i
- Accident Analysis Extensive analysis; accident size / location, limiting single failure Multiple, detailed, verified codes
- PRA insights More extensive analysis; system interaction, multiple failures !
Systematic calc / ranking failure probabilities
- Equipment Design Specifications Experience based equipment Lessons learned from operating plants
AP600 PASSIVF SYSTFM RFLIABILITY =-
i i
- Out-Plant Testing i Design Certification tests; sub-system / integral, different scales Equipment Qualification tests; prototype, verify limitng accident performance ,
Production tests; every valve, mild conditions
- In-Plant Testing Plant startup / ITAAC testing; verify instalation Inservice testing; verify no degration
- AP600 Passive Systems Will be Reliable Performance failure mechanisms eliminated by design / analysis / test Component failure mechanisms minimized; experienced based components
o o o pr, AP600 SSAR Outline .geoo t"""*
- CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF PLANT !
= CHAPTER 2 SITE CHARACTERISTICS l e CHAPTER 3 DESIGN OF STRUCTURES, COMPONENTS, EQUIPMENT AND SYSTEMS
. CHAPTER 4 REACTOR [
i e CHAPTER 5 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM AND CONNECTED SYSTEMS e CHAPTER 6 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES e
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CHAPTER 7 INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS e CHAPTER 8 ELECTRIC POWER e CHAPTER 9 AUXIUARY SYSTEMS i
e CHAPTER 10 STEAM AND POWER CONVERSION SYSTEM e CHAPTER 11 RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT
. CHAPTER 12 RADIATION PROTECTION l e CHAPTER 13 CONDUCT OF OPERATION e CHAPTER 14 INITIAL TEST PROGRAM l e CHAPTER 15 ACCIDENT ANALYSES e CHAPTER 16 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS !
. CHAPTER 17 OUALITY ASSURANCE l e CHAPTER 18 HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING !
I Westinghouse i
i gru{jj AP600 Chapter 4 Outline .geoo
- - - - - - - - - - - - '= -
e CHAPTER 4 REACTOR 4.1 Summary Description 4.2 Fuel System Design 4.3 Nuclear Design 4.4 Thermal and Hydraulic Design 4.5 Reactor Materials l 4.6 Functional Design of Reactivity Control Systems I
yrag AP600 Chanter 5 Outline r AP600 ,
e CHAPTER 5 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM AND CONNECTED SYSTEMS i
5.1 Summary Description 5.2 Integrity of Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary .
5.3 Reactor Vessel 5.4 Component and Subsystem Design i
pr u; AP600 Chanter r 9 Outline AP600
. CHAPTER 9 AUXILIARY SYSTEMS 9.1 Fuel Storage and Handling 9.2 Water Systems 9.3 Process Auxiliaries 9.4 Air-Conditioning, Heating, Cooling, and Ventilation System 9.5 Other Auxiliary Systems
- 9.5.1 Fire Protection System
- 9.5.2 Communication System
- 9.5.3 Plant Lighting System
- 9.5.4 Standby Diesel and Auxiliary Boiler Fuel Oil System Westinghouse O O O
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e CHAPTER 11 RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT 11.1 Source Terms 11.2 Liquid Waste Management Systems 11.3 Gaseous Waste Management System 11.4 Solid Waste Management 11.5 Radiation Monitoring Westinghouse i l
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Comparison of Selected Parameters og oo j Parameter Reference Plant AP600 i
Plant Design Otjective 40 yrs. 60 yrs.
Net Electric Output, MWe 620 600 Reactor Power, MWt 1876 1933 Hot Leg Temperature, F 616 600 Operating Pressure, psia 2250 2250 Numberof Fuel Assemblies 121 145 Type of Fuel Assembly 16x16 17x17 Linear Heat Rating, kw/ft 5.35 4.10 RN l.D., inches 132 157 RN Fluence (N/cm ) 5.0E+19 2.0E+19 Westinghouse
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AP600 Reactor Core and Fuel Design (SSAR Chapter 4)
William R. Carlson Fellow Engineer (412) 374-2145 Westinghouse
i Core Design ,yeoo
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" 12 ft. active fuel length j
- e Low Power Density Core (LPDC) Design Results in
~25% Reduction in: !
Core average power density (Kw/ liter) i Fuel specific power (Kw/KgU)
Fuel rod average heat flux (BTU /hr-ft2) ,
t Fuel rod average linear power (Kw/ft) e LPDC Design Results in improved Fuel Utilization Lower feed enrichments for a given discharge burnup
" 24 month cycle capability with fewer number of feed assemblies i
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O O O -
Comparison of Core Parameters pr u AP600 versus Typcial 2-Loop nyeoo
- am,,,w-AP600 Typical 2-Loop Core Thermal Power, Mwt 1933 1876 Numberof Fuel Assemblies 145 121 Fuel AssemblyType 17x17 16x16 Number of Fuel Rods 38,280 28,435 Active Core Height, cm (inches) 365.8 (144) 365.8 (144) '
Equivalent Core Diameter, cm (inches) 292.1 (115.0) 246.1 (96.9)
Core Loading (MTU) 66.9 49.7 Average Linear Power, kw/m (kw/ft) 13.45(4.10) 17.55 (5.35)
- Average Power Density (kw/ liter) 78.82 107.91 Average Specific Power (kw/kgU) 28.89 37.75 Fuel Rod Heat Transfer Area, m (ft2) 4170 (44,884) 3104 (33,410) 2 2 Average Heat Flux, kw/m (BTU /hr-ft ) 451 (143,000) 589 (186,700)
Number of Control Rods 45 33 Number of Gray Rods 16 --
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The fuel assembly is approximately 10 inches longer i
Advanced fuel rod design with gas plenums at top and bottom i
- Modified V-5H grid design utilized l 1 additional structural grid 1 additional intermediate flow mixer (IFM) grid t
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. The Fuel Rod Design is Similar to the Westinghouse V-5H Design but with the Following Advanced Features:
ZlRLO cladding for enhanced corrosion resistance Upper and lower plenums for increased fission gas release Long solid bottom end plug prevents clad fretting due to debris trapped in bottom grid Low linear power in conjunction with advanced features above can accommodate assembly average burnups of >60,000 MWD /MTU (ALWR URD requirement)
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O O O gruI Reactivity Control ageoo e Reactivity Control Features Comparable to Standard Designs
" Soluble boron Rod Cluster Control Assemblies (RCCAs)
Burnable absorbers ,
. Advanced Load Follow Operational Strategy Employed (MSHIM)
Enables no boron change load follow operation (ALWR URD Requirement) e " Black" RCCA Design ;
Standard 24 rodlet Ag-In-Cd RCCA ;
" 45 " Black" RCCAs utilized e " Gray" RCCA Design 4 standard Ag-In-Cd rodlets / 20 SS-304 rodlets 16 " Gray" RCCAs utilized ,
yni j AP600 RCCA Locations upsoo
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i Nuclear Design e Reactivity Coefficients are Comparable to Standard Designs e Moderator Temperature Coefficient Negative over Full Range of Expected Operating Conditions (ALWR URD Requirement) e Reactivity Control Systems Adequate to Ensure Power Distribution Control as well as to Ensure Shutdown Capability ,
e ALWR URD Cycle Energy Requirement Met 24 month cycle,87% capacity factor e All Applicable GDC's Met Westinghouse
Thermal Hydraulic Design
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e T/H Characteristics Comparable to Standard Designs e DNB and Vibration Evaluation Testing Performed Including Modified V-5H Grid Design e Modified Low Flow DNB Correlation Developed for Analysis of Low Flow DNB Transients (Loss of Flow and
, Locked Rotor), Submitted to NRC (WCAP-14371) e All Performance and Safety Requirements Met Westinghouse
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- l 11""l1 AP600 h
i AP600 Components (SSAR Chapters 4 & 5)
Moshe Mahlab ,
Manager, Equipment Engineering (412) 374-4870 Westinghouse
yn AP600 Primary Components geos l
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O O O gini AP600 Primary Components ageoo e Main Design Goals Enhanced Safety Address Operating Plant issues
- Embrittlement i
- ALARA High Reliability Over 60 Year Life Utilize Best " Proven" Technology i
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p-a Reactor System ,geoo i e Low Power Density I More Fuel Assemblies ,
e Larger Vessel & Internals l
Based on 3-Loop Design l
e Radial Reflector Replaces Baffle /Former e Results: ,
Reduced Neutron Fluence
" Less Embrittlement !
Less Chance of IASCC (Irradiation Assisted Stress Corrosion Cracking)
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Reactor Vessel ageoo e SA 508 CL 2 or 3, or SA 533 GR B e Limits on .Cu, S, P ;
e Alloy 690 Top Head Penetrations for PWSCC Resistance (Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking) e No Penetrations Below Core e Ring Forging Construction Fewer Welds Overall No Logitudinal Welds No Welds in Beltline Westinghouse
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Reactor Vessel AP600
.u' t' ' TJ %a , ,. u. u n INSTRUMENTATION ___
PENETRATIONS UPPER ' ' '
HEAD CRDM A .g PENE TRATIONS tr a Y
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yra Upper Internals ,yeoo
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e Conventional Configuration Inverted Top Hat e improvements to Guide Tube Reduce Control Rod Wear Thicker guide cards Better flow distribution e incore Thimbles Routed through Support Columns e Stainless Steel Split Pins Westinghouse
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,geoo e Modified 3-Loop Design Single Lower Support Plate No Lower Tie Plate Permits Longer Fuel Assembly Without Longer Reactor Vessel e Flow Redistribution Plate Proven Effective by Testing
- e Radial Reflector Replaces Baffle Former I
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e Instrumentation Driveline Top-mounted Configuration Similar to Design Used on Many Domestic Plants e Control Rod Driveline i Target Zero-Cobalt CRDM Latch Hardfacing and
- Pivot Pins
- Control Rods Plated to Reduce Wear l No Canopy Seal Weld
- Full Penetration Structural Weld Westinghouse ,
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! iru AP600 Driveline ageoo
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l ELECTRICAL CONNECTION IHP' SUPPORT STRUCTURE PLATE CRDM REACTOR O PRESSURE VESSEL .
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Westinghouse FUEL I ,
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p-a Delta 75 Steam Generator ageoo
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- e 12 Year Mean Time between Maintenance !:
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I AP600 Reactor Coolant System and ^
Connected Systems (SSAR Chapter 5)
Michael Corletti Senior Engineer ,
(412) 374-5355 Westinghouse ;
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p-a Comparison of Selected Parameters ageoo
- ___ - ==_
Reference Plant Parameter AP600 Plant Design Objective 40 yrs. 60 yrs.
Net Electric Output, MWe 620 600 ,
Reactor Power, MWt 1876 1933 Hot Leg Temperature, F 616 600 .
Operating Pressure, psia 2250 2250 Numberof Fuel Assemblies 121 145 Type of Fuel Assembly 16x16 17x17 t Linear Heat Rating, kw/ft 5.35 4.10 l RN l.D., inches 132 157 2
RN Fluence (N/cm ) 5.0E+19 2.0E+19 Westinghouse t
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AP600 Reactor Coolant System ageoo ws:* .. . 1 vm..
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- O O O -
gny RCS Pressure Control Components ageoo
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e Pressurizer Volume increased 60%
1600 Cubic Feet e No Safety Valve Lift for Normal & Upset Events Best Estimate Basis No Power Operated Relief Valves e Plant Control Requirements Loading and Unloadings at 5% Full Power / Min instantaneous Load Transients 10% Full Power Step-Load Reduction From 100% Full Power to House Loads
- 40% Steam Dump
- Rod Insertion Westinghouse
grqi RCS Overpressure Protection xpeoo e Two Spring-Loaded Safety Valves No Water-Filled Loop Seal Reduces Set-Point Drift e Pressurizer Relief Tank Eliminated PORVs Eliminated Valve Leakage Routed to RCDT Larger Pressurizer Eliminates Safety Valve Lift for Most Probable Events Westinghouse e e O .
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F....'lll AP600 Overpressure Protection ageoo a wa: - .. .
REFERENCE AP600 ;
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$18""'llll AP600 Pressurizer Surge Line ageoo m~ '
e Large (18-inch) Surge Line l Reduces Peak Pressure for Design Basis Overpressure Events Designed for Leak-Before-Break Designed to Minimize Stratification
-Temperature Instruments Provided to Monitor Stratification
-Continuous Outsurge Used to Limit Stratification During Shutdown Westinghouse ,
9 9 9
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ipnyy Automatic Depressurization Valves ageoo
_ _ _ = -
e Automatic Depressurization Subsystem Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Valves Operates with Passive Core Cooling System ADS Stages 1-3 Connected to Pressurizer e
j Motor-Operated Valves - Gate and Globe in Series i
l e ADS Stage 4 Connected to Hot Legs Squib Valves In Series with Normally-Open MOVs e ADS Operation Discussed in Chapter 6 Westinghouse ,
9 O O
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Reactor Vessel Head Vent yy '
ageoo l
f e Safety-Related Head Vent Valves ;
Designed in Accordance with NUREG-0737 Manually Operated From the MCR Discharges to IRWST (via ADS Discharge Header)
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4 I i lllf"'lll Reactor Vessel Head Vent ageoo CON TAINMEN T TTTT FROM 16" ADS :
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3 CORE REACTOR VESSEL Westinghouse 9 9 9 -
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pr a Normal Residual Heat Removal System ageo,
= _ .
3 Shutdown Decay Heat Removal No Active Safety Functions Safety Class 1/ 3; Seismic Category l
- RCS Pressure Boundary Function e Defense-in-Depth Functions Low-Pressure RCS Makeup Low-Temperature Overpressure Protection Westinghouse
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. t grill ISLOCA Enhancements ageoo
- - - - - - - - - ~ - - - - - - - - - - -
e Increased Design Pressure URS > RCS Operating Pressure ,
-Meets Guidance Provided in SECY-90-016 Additional isolation Valves Relief Valve inside Containment Interlock Prevents Connecting System to RCS at High .
Pressure i
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ug Mid-Loop Enhancements ~,gsoo
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e Passive Safety-Related Systems Available During l Mid-Loop l ;
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e Step-Nozzle Connection to Hot Leg Prevents Unacceptable Air Entrainment ,
e Offset Loop Piping Increases Minimum Mid-loop Level (80%)
e Self-Venting Pump Suction Line No Local High Points e No Throttling of RHR Flow Required for Mid-Loop Operation Westinghouse 9 9 9 .
RCS Instrumentation Enhanced for pu Shutdown AP600 e Hot Leg Level Instrumentation Redundant - Safety-Related Automatically isolates Letdown on Low Level Auto Actuation of IRWST on ~ Empty Level
- 30 Minute Time Delay t
e Pressurizer Wide Range Level Extends to Bottom of Hot Leg e Hot Leg Temperature and Core Exit T/Cs Provided During Shutdown Westinghouse
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O O O s AP600 HOT LEG LEVEL INSTRUMENTATION ,
3 CURREN~~ _ A \ ~~S A3600 S-E3 \OZZ_E STEP NOZZLE 20" PIPE RHR SUCTION LINE EXITS HOT LEG AT A 45 DEG ANGLE N
N RHR SUCTION LINE Reactor Systems Branch Discussion items April 25-26,1995 i Pagei2
O O O .
7; AP600 m w.u. -+ --
AP600 Auxiliary Systems Water Systems Process Auxiliaries I HVAC ,
(SSAR Chapter 9, Sections 9.2,9.3, & 9.4)
Donald F. Hutchings (412)374-5109 Westinghouse
i AP600 Auxiliary Systems pi!Qg (SSAR Chapter 9, Section 9.2) AP600 e Water Systems Service Water System (9.2.1)
Component Cooling Water System (9.2.2)
' " Demineralized Water Treatment System (9.2.3)
Demineralized Water Transfer and Storage System (9.2.4)
Potable Water System (9.2.5)
Sanitary Drainage System (9.2.6)
Central Chilled Water System (9.2.7)
Turbine Building Closed Cooling Water System (9.2.8) .
Waste Water System (9.2.9)
Hot Water Heating System (9.2.10)
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O O O AP600 Auxiliary Systems F""IIgl (SSAR Chapter 9, Section 9.2.1) AP600
~ --
e Service Water System (SWS)
The AP600 SWS serves no safety-related function.
The AP600 SWS supplies cooling water only to the nonsafety-related component cooling water system (CCS) heat exchangers in the turbine building.
In the event of loss of normal ac power, the SWS is l
automatically loaded onto the diesel generators.
l l
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AP600 Auxiliary Systems $11 11ll (SSAR Chapter 9, Section 9.2.2) A P 6~00
{
e Component Cooling Water System (CCS) .
The AP600 CCS serves no safety-related function except for containment isolation.
The AP600 CCS transfers heat from various plant components to the service water system (SWS) during normal phases of operation. It removes heat from various components needed for plant operation and removes core decay heat and sensible heat for normal reactor shutdown and cooldown.
-a
O O O AP600 Auxiliary Systems gil""Illj (SSAR Chapter 9, Section 9.2.7) AP600
~ -
e Central Chilled Water System (VWS)
The AP600 VWS serves no safety-related function except for containment isolation.
The VWS supplies chilled water to the HVAC systems and is functional during reactor full-power and shutdown operation.
The air-cooled VWS subsystem is dedicated to the nuclear island nonradioactive ventilation system (VBS) and the makeup pump and normal residual heat removal pump compartment unit coolers.
in the event of loss of normal ac power, the air-cooled VWS subsystem is automatically loaded onto the diesel generators.
i AP600 Auxiliary Systems girii (SSAR Chapter 9, Section 9.2.10) AP600
~. . . , - - !
e Hot Water Heating System (VYS)
The AP600 VYS serves no safety-related function. ,
To keep piping and components from freezing, the VYS supplies heated water to:
- selected nonsafety-related air handling units and unit heaters in the plant during cold weather operation
- - tne montainment recirculating fan coil units during cold l weaaer plant outages Westinghouse .
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O O O .
AP600 Auxiliary Systems pi"~illl (SSAR Chapter 9, Section 9.2.10) con't AP600 The VYS is a high energy system.
- Piping is generally excluded from safety-related plant areas outside the containment. t
- Piping routed in safety-related areas is 1 inch and smaller and is not evaluated for pipe ruptures.
- Design bases for routing high energy pipe in safety-related l areas and protection against the dynamic effects associated l with the postulated rupture of piping are given in Section 3.6.
l Piping is shared inside the containment between VYS and the central chilled water system i'VWS). ,
l
- The interface exists outside the containment and in l nonsafety-related piping of the chilled water system (VWS).
AP600 Auxiliary Systems ginigg (SSAR Chapter 9, Section 9.3) AP600
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l e Process Auxiliaries
- Compressed-and Instrument Air System i'9.3.1)
Plant Gas System (9.3.2)
Primary Sampling System (9.3.3)
Secondary Sampling System (9.3.4)
Equipment and Floor Drainage Systems (9.3.5) i Chemical and Volume Control System (9.3.6)
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AP600 Auxiliary Systems l" (SSAR Chapter 9, Section 9.3.1) g ..
e Compressed and Instrument Air System (CAS)
The AP600 CAS serves no safety-related function
. except for containment isolation.
The CAS consists of three subsystems: '
- Instrument air
- Service air
- High-pressure air Major components of the compressed and instrument air system are located in the turbine building.
I l AP600 Auxiliary Systems pi"~illll (SSAR Chapter 9, Section 9.3.1) CAS con't AP600 Instrument Air Subsystem
- supplies compressed air for air-operated valves and dampers.
Service Air Subsystem
- powers air-operated tools and air-powered pumps and
- supplies breathing air. (Individually packaged air purification equipment is used to produce breathing quality air for protection against airborne contamination.)
High-Pressure Air Subsystem
- supplies air to the main control room emergency habitability system (VES), the generator breaker package, and to the fire fighting apparatus recharge station.
O O O
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O O O -
AP600 Auxiliary Systems l11""11ll (SSAR Chapter 9, Section 9.3.6) AP600
._m e Chemical and Volume Control System (CVS)
Nonsafety-Related Functions
- RCS makeup for leaks and cooldown contraction
- RCS boration/ dilution control
- Limit buildup of RCS radiation Defense-in-Depth
- RCS makeup and boration
- Pressurizer auxiliary spray Safety-Related Functions
- RCS pressure boundary isolation
- Containment isolation
- Dilution accident isolation
- Excessive RCS make-up isolation
l AP600 Auxiliary Systems lIr iig (SSAR Chapter 9, Section 9.3.6) CVS con't AP600
- , - - =
Simplifications
- No RCP seal injection required
- Volume control tank, continuous degasing eliminated
- Boron Thermal Regeneration System eliminated
- Boron Recycle System (evaporators) eliminated
- Reactor Makeup Water System eliminated Purification improved
- Located inside containment
- Greater flow rates during all modes, including shutdown l
Boric Acid Concentration Reduced I
- 2.5 wt %
- No heat tracing or room heating Westinghouse .
O O O -
AP600 Auxiliary Systems $11""llll (SSAR Chapter 9, Section 9.4) AP600 t
[
o Air-Conditioning, Heating, Cooling, and Ventilation Systems Nuclear Island Nonradioactive Ventilation System (9.4.1)
Annex / Auxiliary Buildings Nonradioactive HVAC System (9.4.2)
" Radiologically Controlled Area Ventilation System (9.4.3)
Containment Recirculation Cooling System (9.4.6)
Containment Air Filtration System (9.4.7)
Radwaste Building HVAC System (9.4.8) ,
Turbine Building Ventilation System (9.4.9)
Diesel Generator Building Heating and Ventilation System (9.4.10)
Health Physics and Hot Machine Shop HVAC System (9.4.11)
+
AP600 Auxiliary Systems llIrii (SSAR Chapter 9, Section 9.4) HVAC con't AP60b
. Overview i Except for containment isolation and MCR isolation, all HVAC ,
systems described in section 9.4 are nonsafety-related Safety-related HVAC is described in section 6.4 Some HVAC nonsafety-related systems perform defense-in-depth functions
" Concentration at the site boundary is within 10 CFR 20 allowable effluent concentration limits internal room airborne cocentrations are within 10 CFR 20 occupational derived air concentration (DAC) limits during normal plant operation Smoke is controlled by isolating area and maintaining higher pressure in surrounding areas Westinghouse -
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O O O AP600 Auxiliary Systems $11""I1ll (SSAR Chapter 9, Section 9.4.1) AP600
=
e Nuclear Island Nonradioactive Ventilation System (VBS)
The VBS consists of the following independent subsystems:
i -Main control room / technical support center HVAC l subsystem
-Class 1E electrical room HVAC subsystem
- Passive containment cooling system valve room heating and ventilation subsystem t
AP600 Auxiliary Systems $11""i1ll (SSAR Chapter 9, Section 9.4.1) VBS con't AP600
. -v -,nn.
The VBS provides the following nuclear safety-related design basis functions:
-Monitors the main control room supply air for radioactive particulate and iodine concentrations
-Isolates the HVAC ductwork that penetrates the main control room boundary on high particulate or iodine concentrations in the main control room supply air or on extended loss of ac power to support operation of the main control room emergency habitability system (VES)
AP600 Auxiliary Systems llIrii (SSAR Chapter 9, Section 9.4.1) VBS con't AP600 i
' ' ~' ,16 Au.:-
The VBS provides the following defense-in-depth functions:
-Provides cooling to the MCR, TSC and Class 1E electrical rooms
- Provides ventilation cooling to the Class 1 E battery fooms
-Maintains MCR habitability when radioactivity is detected and ac power is available Westinghouse
h AP600 Auxiliary Systems $11""i1 l (SSAR Chapter 9, Section 9.4.2) AP600 e Annex / Auxiliary Buildings Nonradioactive HVAC System (VXS)
The VXS consists of the following independent subsystems:
- General area HVAC subsystem
- Switchgear room HVAC subsystem
- Equipment room HVAC subsystem
- MSIV compartment HVAC subsystem
- Mechanical equipment areas HVAC subsystem
- Valve / Piping penetration room HVAC subsystem Westinghouse e e -
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AP600 Auxiliary Systems gr il (SSAR Chapter 9, Section 9.4.2) VXS con't AP600
== ..
~~
The VXS provides the following defense-in-depth functions: '
- Provides cooling to the electrical switchgear, the battery charger and north air handling equipment rooms when the diesel generators operate and chilled water is available
- Provides ventilation cooling to the electrical switchgear, the battery charger and north air handling equipment rooms when the diesel generators operate coincident with a loss of chilled water Westinghouse
AP600 Auxiliary Systems l11""Il (SSAR Chapter 9, Section 9.4.10) Apsoo m
. Diesel Generator Building Heating and Ventilation System (VZS)
The VZS serves the standby diesel generator rooms, electrical equipment service modules, and diesel fuel :
oil day tank vaults in the diesel generator building and the two diesel oil transfer modules located in the yard near the fuel oil storage tanks.
The system serves no safety-related function and therefore has no nuclear safety design basis.
9 9 9 .
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AP600 Auxiliary Systems $11~11ll (SSAR Chapter 9, Section 9.4.10) VZS con't AP600
=
The VZS provides the following defense-in-depth functions:
- Provides ventilation cooling to the diesel generator rooms when the diesel generators are operating
-Provides ventilation cooling to the electrical equipment service modules when the diesel generators are operating
- Provides normal heating and ventilation to the diesel oil transfer module enclosure Westinghouse
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AP600 Fire Protection ;
i James W. Winters Manager, Project Engineering l (412)374-5290 l
l 2 i Westinghouse ,
gi""It Fire Protection ageoo
_ _ _ _ me- -
e Fire Protection Program Branch Technical Position (BTP) CMEB 9.5-1 is equivalent to 10CFR50, Appendix R for new plants Fire protection system design is described SSAR Section 9.5 It complies with BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Plant design (arrangements, HVAC, flood control) is
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evaluated in SSAR Appendix 9A It complies with BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Site specific aspects (organization, procedures, compliance) are the responsibility of the combined license applicant.
3 j Westinghouse ,
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O O O ll gi""Il Fire Protection System apeoo
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! e The fire protection system is designed to:
Detect and locate fires and provide operator indication of the location Provide capability to extinguish fires in any plant area, to protect site personnel, limit fire damage, and enhance safe shutdown capabilities
" Supply fire suppression water at a flow rate and pressure sufficient to satisfy the demand of any automatic sprinkler system plus 500 gpm for fire hoses, for a minimum of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> 4
l Ir"lig Fire Protection System
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_ _ _ , _ g .-_
e The fire protection system is designed to: (continued)
Maintain 100 percent of fire pump design capacity, assuming failure of the largest fire pump or the loss of offsite power Following a safe shutdown earthquake, provide water to hose stations for manual firefighting in areas containing safe shutdown equipment I
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i gi""Il l Fire Protection System ageoo .
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e The fire protection system is also designed to:
I Provide an alternate path of water to wet the containment dome or to refill the passive containment cooling water storage tank. ;
6 Westinghouse !
i Features of AP600 which ;
r ug i Enhance Fire Protection Program ageoo e " Packaging" of safe shutdown features All on Nuclear Island No cable spreading room '
Stacked electrical divisions in separate fire areas e Safe shutdown achieved with passive systems PCS tank provides passive Seismic Category 1 source e
of water for fighting fires in safe shutdown areas e Fire fighting design features (access, ventilation, flood '
control) built in.
7 Westinghouse .
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r tig Fire Protection Program ageoo e Conclusions AP600 design meets requirements of CMEB 9.5-1 No significant outstanding technical issues with NRC staff 8
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,s _ ,e.o ;., s AP600 Fuel Storage and Handling (SSAR Chapter 9.1) i Robert M. Blumstein Senior Engineer (412) 374-4870 Westinghouse
i l 11""11
^
AP600 Fuel Storage and Handling ageoo e Simple Proven Technology Best features from existing designs
! Most reliable components from existing equipment Proven industrial components where practical i e Conservative Design Fuel protection & spacing No drain paths below top of core / racks No heavy lifts over fuel storage e Built in mistake avoidance and diagnostics Westinghouse -
O O O AP600 Fuel Receipt, Spent Fuel Storage gr irg
& Shipping ,peoo
~ ~^ : ~ - ~
e AP600 Fuel Receipt, Spent Fuel Storage & Shipping e All Designs and Equipment Proven From Existing Plants e No Heavy Lifts Over New Fuel Receiving or Spent Fuel Pool e New Fuel Rack Spacing Conservative 10.9" (Existing Plants 9")
e All Spent Fuel Pool Penetrations, Drains & Gates to Transfer -
System & Shipping Cask Areas Above Fuel Racks
. Space for 10 Refuelings + 1 Core e Space for 5 Damaged Assemblies with Work Space & Tool Storage e Fuel Handling Machine Same as in Containment Westinghouse
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AP600 Spent Fuel Building Operating gir u Deck Plan View AP600
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AP600 Fuel Transfer System ageoo l -
e Quick Opening Transfer Tube - Lowers REM Time and Mistakes e Reliable Industrial Controls & Motor Drives Fail safe design throughout Built in mistake avoidance & self diagnostic features Westinghouse
gr"ugl AP600 Fuel Transfer System ,geoo
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O O O AP600 Reactor Disassembly, Fuel ggug Handling & Reassembly AP600 e Integrated Reactor Head Package Quick disconnects of all connections Single lift
" Saves REM, time & avoids mistakes e Same Fuel Handling Machine as in Spent Fuel Building Better protection of fuel & load control More precise operator directed automatic moves
" Reliable industrial controls & motor drives Fail safe design throughout Built in mistake avoidance & self diagnostic features Commonality of equipment & operator training
. In-containment Temp. Fuel inspection and Storage Locations Westinghouse
AP600 Reactor Building Refueling Floor lpu Plan View AP600
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AP600 Design Overview .
SSAR Chapter 11 i
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Presentation to Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards AP600 Subcommittee i
December 4,1996 Westinghouse l t
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ynyy AP600 ;
AP600 Radioactive Waste :
Management (SSAR Chapter 11)
James L. Grover l Senior Engineer (412) 374-5585 Gordon A. Israelson, P.E.
l Senior Engineer l
l (412) 374-4828 Westinghouse ,
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i AP600 Radioactivity Source Term J. L. Grover Senior Engineer (412) 374-5585 i
l i
AP600 Radioactivity Source Terms pru (SSAR Section 11.1) -
.geo e The AP600 Design Uses Two Source Term Bases i
Design Basis - 0.25% Fuel Defects Realistic - Based Upon Experience of Operating Plants (ANSI /ANS-18.1-1984) i Westinghouse .j e e e .:
-l ir u Design Basis Source Term .geoo e Defines Primary Coolant Activity Technical Specifications e Used for Design Basis Accident Dose Analysis e Provides Basis for Radwaste Systems Design e Used for Estimating Maximum Solid Radwaste Generation e Basis for Radiation Shielding Design Westinghouse
Primary Coolant Activity Technical Specifications 'F ..il
,geoo e lodine steady state limit of 0.4 microcurie / gram '
Dose Equivalent 1-131 e lodine spike transient limit of 24 microcurie / gram l Dose Equivalent I-131 e Noble gas limit of 150 microcurie / gram Dose Equivalent Xe-133 (' replaces the gross specific activity Technical Specification) l Westinghouse -l l
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l Realistic Source Term II AP600 -
e Used to Calculate Anticipated Annual Releases and Fractions of 10 CFR 20 Concentration Limits e Used in the Evaluation of Operating Costs of Radwaste Systems l
AP600 Offsite Release Concentrations FH AP600 i
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u o Realistic Source Term Liquid: 13% of 10 CFR 20 limits Gaseous: 2%
e Conservative Source Term
- Liquid: 36% of 10 CFR 20 limits Gaseous: 17%
- Design basis source term adjusted up from 0.25% fuel defects to 1%
fuel defects for fission products other than iodine and noble gases.
e Even with the Conservative Source Term, Release Concentrations are Well Below 10 CFR 20 Limits Westinghouse ,j O O O .
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AP600 Radioactive Waste .
Management G. A. Israelson Senior Engineer (412) 374-4828 t
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AP600 Liquid Radwaste System (WLS) g,-..aI-l j (SSAR Section 11.23 > AP600
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e Radioactively Contaminated Liquid influents Radioactive Waste Drain System Processed by filtration & ion exchange Reactor Coolant t
Processed by filtration & ion exchange Chemical and Detergent Wastes Processed by mobile systems e Non-Contaminated waste water is segregated and processed separately. Connections are provided for processing should contamination occur.
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O O O AP600 Gaseous Radwaste System (WGS) gr ug (SSAR Section 11.3) A 00
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e Radioactively Contaminated Gaseous Influents .
, Degasification of Reactor Coolant System Letdown i
Venting of Reactor Coolant Drain Tank Inside .
Containment Westinghouse
i Radioactive Gaseous Influents Cl :
e Primarily Hydrogen with Traces of Radioactive Kr and Xe e Radiogas Holdup is in Low Pressure Activated Carbon Delay Beds e Design Features Prevent Ignition and Automatically Dilute Combustible Mixtures with Nitrogen Westinghouse O O O
O O O ll AP600 Solid Radwaste System (WSS) gir ii (SSAR Section 11.4) .geoo e Radioactively Contaminated Solid influents Dry Solid Wastes (processed by mobile systems)
Compactible ~ 82.8% of All Solid Waste Non-Compactible ~ 4.7%
Wet Solid Wastes (dewatered & handled in plant)
Filter Elements Less Than 0.1%
Spent Resins ~5%
Mixed Liquid & Chemical Waste (processed by mobile systems)
~ 7.5% of All Solid Waste Westinghouse
AP600 Expected Shipped Solid Radwaste lginigg (Includes Shipping Containers) AP600
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S hipped solid radwaste m eets the goal of 1750 ft /yr which puts AP600 within the top 10% of operating p la n ts .
ft /Yr % of Total Dry Com pactible 873 54 l
D ry N on-C om pactible 373 23 W et Filters 25 2 W et Resin 315 19 ,
Mixed Liquid & Chemical 14 3 Total 1630 Westinghouse .
O O O .l
O O O :
AP600 Radiation Monitoring (RMS) pr ug (SSAR Section 11.5) ageoo m __ -
e Radiation Monitors are Provided for Two Functions:
Process Airborne and Effluent Radiological Monitoring and Sampling
, Area Radiation Monitoring l e Safety-Related and Non-Safety Radiation i Monitors are Provided l
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- Safety-Related Radiation Monitors 7ii
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e Initiate Containment Air Purge Isolation e Initiate Containment RHR lsolation i
e Initiate Control Room Supplemental Filtration e Initiate Control Room Ventilation Isolation and Actuate Emergency Habitability System e Provide Long Term Post-Accident Monitoring Westin n
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