ML20129H403

Amends 85 & 72 to Licenses NPF-76 & NPF-80,revising Extension of Standby Diesel Generator AOT to 14 Days & Extension of Essential Cooling Water Loop & Essential Chilled Water Loop AOTs to 7 Days

ML20129H403
Person / Time
Site:	South Texas
Issue date:	10/31/1996
From:	Alexion T NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
To:
Shared Package
ML20129H407	List: ML20129H403 ML20129H414
References
NUDOCS 9611050218
Download: ML20129H403 (25)

Text

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k UNITED STATES l

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l

t WASHINGTON, D.C. 20666-0001

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HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER COMPANY CITY PUBLIC SERVICE BOARD OF SAN ANTONIO l

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{ENTRAL POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY CITY OF AUSTIN. TEXAS DOCKET NO. 50-498 l

SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT. UNIT 1 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE l

Amendment No. 85 License No. NPF-76 1.

The Nuclear Regulatory Comission (the Comission) has found that:

A.

The application for amendment by Houston Lighting & Power Company *

(HL&P) acting on behalf of itself and for the City Public Service Board of San Antonio (CPS), Central Power and Light Company (CPL),

l and City of Austin, Texas (C0A) (the licensees), dated May 1,1995, as supplemented by letters dated June 22, August 28, November 22, i

and December 19, 1995, and January 4, 8 (two letters), and 23, June 27, July 9, August 8, and September 23, 1996, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as l

amended (the Act), and the Comission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, as l

amended, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Comission; C.

There is reasonable assurance:

(i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Comission's regulations; l

D.

The issuance of this license amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

• Houston Lighting & Power Company is authorized to act for the City Public Service Board of San Antonio, Central Power and Light Company and City of Austin, Texas and has exclusive responsibility and control over the physical construction, operation and maintenance of the facility.

9611050218 961031 PDR ADOCK 05000498 P

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2.

Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and Paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-76 is hereby amended to read as follows:

2.

Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 85, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated in the license.

The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3.

The license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance to be implemented within 30 days of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l

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r Thomas W. Alexion, Project Manager Project Directorate IV-1 i

Division of Reactor Projects III/IV Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical Specifications l

l Date of Issuance: October 31, 1996 l

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UNITED STATES

- j j

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i

't WASHINGTON, D.C. 20666-0001

%,*****/

l HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER COMPANY l

l CITY PUBLIC SERVICE BOARD OF SAN ANTONIO CENTRAL POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY CITY OF AUSTIN. TEXAS l

DOCKET NO. 50-499 l

l SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT. UNIT 2 MiENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE l

l Amendment No. 72 l

License No. NPF-80 l

1.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

l A.

The application for amendment by Houston Lighting & Power Company *

(HL&P) acting on behalf of itself and for the City Public Service i

Board of San Antonio (CPS), Central Power and Light Company. (CPL),

and City of Austin, Texas (C0A) (the licensees), dated May 1, 1995, as supplemented by letters dated June 22, August 28, November 22, and December 19, 1995, and January 4, 8 (two letters), and 23, June 27, July 9, August 8, and September 23, 1996, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; 1

?

l B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, as i

amended, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.

There is reasonable assurance:

(i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health l

and safety of the publit., and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; l

D.

The issuance of this license amendment will not be inimical to the l

common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.

The issuance of tnis amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commissira's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

• Houston Lighting & Power Company is authorized to act for the City Public Service Board of San Antonio, Central Power and Light Company and City of Austin, Texas and has exclusive responsibility and control over the physical construction, operation and maintenance of the facility.

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. 2.

Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and Paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-80 is hereby amended to read as follows:

2.

Technical Soecifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 72, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated in the license.

The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the

{

Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3.

The license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance to be implemented within 30 days of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

,us L.

1a I

Thomas W. Alexion, Projec Manager Project Directorate IV-I Division of Reactor Projects III/IV Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

~

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance:

October 31, 1996 I

i

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NOS. 83 AND 72 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NOS. NPF-76 AND NPF-80 DOCKET NOS. 50-498 AND 50-499 Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the attached pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change. The corresponding overleaf pages are also provided to maintain document completeness.

REMOVE INSERT 3/4 7-13 3/4 7-13 3/4 7-33 3/4 7-33 3/4 8-1 3/4 8-1 3/4 8-2 3/4 8-2 3/4 8-3 3/4 8-3 3/4 8-4 3/4 8-4 3/4 8-8 3/4 8-8 B 3/4 7-3 B 3/4 7-3 B 3/4 7-3a B 3/4 7-7 8 3/4 7-7 8 3/4 8-2 B 3/4 8-2 B 3/4 8-5 B 3/4 8-5 i

B 3/4 8-8 B 3/4 8-8 6-18a 6-18a

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l PLANT SYSTEMS 1

3/4.7.4 ESSENTIAL COOLING WATER SYSTEM l

l LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION i

3.7.4 At least three independent essential cooling water loops shall be OPERABLE.

/PPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With only two essential cooling water loops OPERABLE, restore at least three loops to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within l

the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS 4.7.4 At least three essential cooling water loops shall be demonstrated i

OPERABLE:

a.

At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, l

power-operated, or automatic) servicing safety-related equipment l

that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position is in l

its correct position; l

b.

At least once per 18 months during shutdown, by verifying that:

1)

Each automatic valve servicing safety-related equipment i

actuates to its correct position on a Safety Injection, ECW pump start, screen wash booster pump start and essential chiller start test signals, as applicable, 2)

Each Essential Cooling Water pump starts automatically on a l

Safety Injection or a Loss of Offsite Power test signal, and 3)

Each screen wash booster pump and the traveling screen start automatically on a Safety Injection test signal.

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SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 7-13 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 85 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 72

PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.5 ULTIMATE HEAT SINK i

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.5 The ultimate heat sink shall be OPERABLE with:

a.

A minimum water level at or above elevation 25.5 feet Mean Sea Level, USGS datem, and j

b.

An Essential Cooling Water intake temperature of less than or equal to 99'F.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

i ACTION:

With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

This ACTION is applicable to both units simultaneously.

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4 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.5 The ultimate heat sink shall be determined OPERABLE at least once per 24 hou's by verifying the intake water temperature and water level to be r

within their limits.

d SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 7-14 Unit 1 - knendment No. 4

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PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.14 ESSENTIAL CHILLED WATER SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION l

3.7.14 At least three independent Essential Chilled Water System loops shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

i ACTION:

With only two Essential Chilled Water System loops OPERABLE, restore three loops to'0PERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within l

the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

l SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS l

4.7.14 The Essential Chilled Water System shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by:

a.

Performance of surveillances as required by Specification 4.0.5, and l

l b.

At least once per 18 months by demonstrating that the system starts I

automatically on a Safety Injection test signal.

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i SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 7-33 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 85 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 72

3/4.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3/4.8.1 A.C. SOURCES OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.8.1.1 As a minimum, the following A.C. electrical power sources shall be OPERABLE:

a.

Two physically independent circuits between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class 1E Distribution System *, and b.

Three separate and independent standby diesel generators, each with a separate fuel tank containing a minimum volume of 60,500 gallons I

of fuel.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

a.

With one offsite circuit of the above-required A.C. electrical power sources inoperable, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the remaining A.C. sources by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.S.I.1.1.a within I hour and at least once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> thereafter.

Restore the offsite circuit to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in xt least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN O thin the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

b.

With a standby diesel generator inoperable, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the above-required A.C. offsite sources by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.1.a within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and at least once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> thereafter.

If the standby diesel generator became inoperable due to any cause other than an inoperable support system, an independently testable component, or preplanned preventive maintenance or testing, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the remaining OPERABLE standby diesel generators by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2.a.2) for each such standby diesel generator separately within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />, unless it can be demonstrated there is no common mode failure for the remaining diesel generator (s).

Restore the inoperable standby diesel generator to OPERABLE status within 14 days or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and l in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

c.

With one offsite circuit of the above-required A.C. electrical power sources and one standby diesel generator inoperable, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the remaining A.C. sources by performing Specification 4.8.1.1.la. within I hour and at least once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> thereafter; and if the standby diesel generator became inoperable due to any cause other than an inoperable support system, an independently testable component, or preplanned preventive i

i SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 8-1 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 68,85 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 67,72

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION ACTION (Continued) maintenance or testing, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the remaining OPERABLE standby diesel generators by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2a.2) within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />, unless it can be demonstrated there is no common mode failure for the remaining diesel generator (s); restore at least one of the inoperable sources to OPERABLE status within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY l

within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following l

30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />. Restore at least two offsite circuits to OPERABLE status l

within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> and three standby diesel generators to OPERABLE l

status within 14 days from the time of initial loss or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

d.

With one standby diesel generator inoperable in addition to ACTION i

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b. or c. above, verify that:

1.

All required systems, subsystems, trains, components, and devices that depend on the remaining OPERABLE diesel generator as a sourcs of emergency power are also OPERABLE, and 2.

When in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the steam-driven auxiliary feedwater pump is OPERABLE.

Iftheseconditionsarenotsatisfiedwithin24hoursbeinatleastl HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

e.

With two of the above required offsite A.C. circuits inoperable, restore at least one of the inoperable offsite sources to OPERABLE status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. With only one offsite source restored, restore at least two offsite circuits to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> from time of initial loss or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> l

and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

f.

With two or three of the above required standby diesel generators inoperable, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of two offsite A.C. circuits by performing the requirements of Specification 4.8.1.1.la. within I hour and at least once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> thereafter; restore at least l

one standby diesel generator to OPERABLE status within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> and j

at least two standby diesel generators to OPERABLE status within l

24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and l

in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />. Restore at least three standby diesel generators to OPERABLE status within 14 days l

from time of initial loss or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 8-2 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 68,85 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 57,72 l

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS 4.8.1.1.1 Each of the above required independent circuits between the offsite transmission network and the Onsite Class 1E Distribution System shall be:

a.

Determined OPERABLE at least once per 7 days by verifying correct breaker alignments, indicated power availability, and b.

Demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months during shutdown by transferring the unit power supply from the normal circuit to each of the alternate circuits.

4.8.1.1.2 Each standby diesel generator shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:caxn) l a.

In accordance with the frequency specified in Table 4.8-1 on a l

STAGGERED TEST BASIS by:

l 1)

Verifying the fuel level in its associated fuel tank, 2)

Verifying the diesel starts from standby condition and accelerates to 600 rpm (nominal) in less than or equal to 10 seconds.'3' The generator voltage and frequency shgil be 1.2 Hz within 10 seconds' ) after the 4160 1 416 volts and 60 start signal.

The diesel generator shall be started for this test by using one of the following signals:

a)

Manual, or l

b)

Simulated loss-of-offsite power by itself, or l

l c)

Simulated loss-of-offsite power in conjunction with a l

Safety Injection test signal, or d)

A Safety Injection test signal by itself.

3)

Verifying the generator is synchronized, loaded to 5000 to 5500 minutes, g,ates with a load of 5000 to 5500 kW for at least 60 kW, and and 4)

Verifying the standby diesel generator is aligned to provide standby power to the associated emergency busses.

b.

At least once per 31 days and after each operation of the diesel where the period of operation was greater than or equal to I hour by checking for and removing accumulated water from its associated fuel tank; c.

Maintain properties of new and stored fuel oil in accordance with the Fuel Oil Monitoring Program.

SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 8-3 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 68,85 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 57,72 l

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i ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS i

SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS (Continued) i d.

Deleted.

l e.

At least once per 18 months, during shutdown, by:

1) *) Subjecting the diesel to an inspection in accordance with l

procedures prepared in conjunction with its manufacturer's recommendations for this class of standby service; 2)

Verifying the generator capability to reject a load of greater than or equal to~ 785.3 kW while maintaining volta 4160i416voltsandfrequencyat60i4.5Hz;")'geat l

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3)

Verifying the generator capability to reject a load of 5500 kW without tripping. The generator voltage shall exceed 5262 volts during and following the load rejection;',ng) 4)

Simulating a loss-of-offsite power by itself, and:

a)

Verifying deenergization of the ESF busses and load shedding from the ESF busses, and b)

Verifying the diesel starts on the auto-start signal within 10 seconds, energizes the auto-connected shutdown loads through the load sequencer and operates for greater than or equal to 5 minutes while its generator is loaded with the shutdown loads. After energization, the steady-state voltage and frequency of the ESF busses shall be maintained at 4160 i 416 volts and 60 i 1.2 Hz during this test.

5)

Verifying that on a Safety Injection test signal, without loss-of-offsite power, the diesel generator starts on the auto-start signal and operates on standby for greater than or equal to 5 minutes. The generator voltage' and frequency shall be 4160 i 416 volts and 60 i 1.2 Hz within 10 seconds after the auto-start signal; the steady-state generator voltage and i

frequency shall be maintained within these limits during this test; 6)

Simulating a loss-of-offsite power in conjunction with a Safety Injection test signal, and:

a)

Verifying deenergization of the ESF busses and load shedding from the ESF busses; b)

Verifying the diesel starts en the auto-start signal within 10 seconds, energizes the auto-connected ESF (accident) loads through the load sequencer and operates for greater than or equal to 5 minutes while its generator SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 8-4 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 68,85 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 67,72 l

Table 4.8-1 DIESEL GENERATOR TEST SCHEDULE NUMBEROFFAILURESy)

NUMBER OF FAILURES IN LAST 20 VALID TESTS LAST 100 VALID TESTS)

TEST FREQUENCY

$1 54 Once per 31 days I

22*

25 Once per 7 days SPECIFICATION NOTATIONS m

Loss of one 13.8 kV Standby Bus to 4.16 kV ESF bus line constitutes loss of one offsite source.

Loss of two 13.8 kV Standby busses to 4.16 kV ESF 1

bus lines constitutes loss of two offsite sources.

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l m

All diesel generator starts for the purpose of these surveillances may be l

preceded by,a prelube period.

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A diesel generator start in less than or equal to 10 seconds (fast start) l shall be performed every 184 days. All other diesel generator starts for l

the purpose of this surveillance may be modified starts involving reduced fuel (load limit) and/or idling and gradual acceleration to synchronous' speed.

l m

Generator loading may be accomplished in accordance with vendor l

recommendations, including a warmup period prior to loading.

cs>

The diesel generator start for this surveillance may be a modified start (see SR 4.8.1.1.2a.2)).

m Momentary transients outside this load range due to changing conditions on the grid shall not invalidate the test.

m If Specification 4.8.1.1.2a.2) is not satisfactorily completed, it is not necessary to repeat the preceding 24-hour test.

Instead, the standby diesel generator may be operated at 5000-5500 kW for a minimum of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> l

or until operating temperature has stabilized.

m Criteria for determining number of failures and number of valid tests shall be in accordance with Regulatory Position C.2.e of Regulatory Guide I

I 1.108, but determined on a per diesel generator basis, for the purpose of determining the required test frequency, the previous test failure count may be reduced to zero if a complete diesel overhaul to like-new condition is completed, provided that the overhaul, including appropriate post-maintenance operation and testing, is specifically approved by the manufacturer and if acceptable reliability has been i

demonstrated. The reliability criterion shall be the successful completion of 14 consecutive tests in a single series. Ten of these tests shall be in accordance with the routine Surveillance Requirements SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 8-7 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 68 I

Unit 2 - Amendment No. 57 l

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SPECIFICATION NOTATIONS (Continued) 4.8.1.1.2a.2 and 4.8.1.1.2a.3 and four tests in accordance with the 184-day testing requirement of Surveillance Requirements 4.8.1.1.2a.2 and 4.8.1.1.2a.3.

If this criterion is not satisfied during the first series of tests, any alternate criterion to be used to transvalue the failure count to zero requires NRC approval.

(9)

The associated test frequency shall be maintained until seven consecutive failure free demands have been performed And the number of failures in 4

the last 20 valid demands has been reduced to one.

0o) This test may be performed during power operation provided that the other 4

two diesel generators are operable.

ou Credit may be taken for events that satisfy any of these Surveillance Requirements.

SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 8-8 Uit 1 - Amendment No. 6&rg1,85 Uit 2 - Amendment No. Eh74, 72

PLANT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.7.1.6 ATMOSPHERIC STEAM RELIEF VALVEL The atmospheric steam relief valves are required for decay heat removal and safe cooldown in accordance with Branch Technical Position RSB 5-1.

In the safety analyses, operation of the atmospheric steam relief valves is assumed in accident analyses for mitigation of small break LOCA, feedwater line break, loss of normal feedwater and loss-of-offsite power.

3/4.7.1.7 FEEDWATER ISOLATION VALVES The OPERABILITY of the feedwater isolation valves ensures that no more than one steam generator will blow down in the event of a steam line or feedwater line rupture. The operability of the Feedwater Isolation valves will minimize the positive reactivity effects of the Reactor Coolant System cooldown associated with the blowdown, and limit the pressure rise within containment. The OPERABILITY of the feedwater isc'.ation valves within the closure times of the Surveillance Requirements are consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analysis.

3/4.7.2 STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITATION The limitation on steam generator pressure and temperature ensures that the pressure-induced stresses in the steam generators do not exceed the maximum allowable fracture toughness stress limits. Tne limitations of 70*F and 200 psig are based on a steam generator RT, of 10'F and are sufficient to prevent brittle fracture.

3/4.7.3 COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the Component Cooling Water System ensures that sufficient cooling capacity is available for continued operation of safety-related equipment during normal and accident conditions.

The redundant cooling capacity of this system, assuming a single failure, is consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.

3/4.7.4 ESSENTIAL COOLING WATER SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the Essential Cooling Water System ensures that sufficient cooling capacity is available for continued operation of safety-related equipment during normal and accident conditions. The redundant cooling capacity of this system, assuming a single failure, is consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.

When a risk-important system or component (for example Essential Cooling i

Water) is taken out of service, it'is important to assure that the impact on plant risk of this and other equipment simultaneously taken out of service can be assessed. The Configuration Risk Management Program evaluates the impact i

f SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3/4 7-3 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 49,85 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 9,72

PLANT SYSTEMS BASES ESSENTIAL COOLING WATER SYSTEM (Continued) on plant risk of equipment out of service. A brief description of the Configuration Risk Management Program is in Section 6.8.3 (administration section) of the Technical Specification.

3/4.7.5 ULTIMATE HEAT SINK The limitations on the ultimate heat sink level and temperature ensure that sufficient cooling capacity is available either:

(1) provide normal cooldown of the facility or (2) mitigate the effects of accident conditions within acceptable limits.

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l SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3/4 7-3a Unit 1 - Amendment No. 85 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 72 i

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PLANT SYSTEMS BASES The limitations on minimum water level and maximum temperature are based on providing a 30-day cooling water supply to safety-related equipment without exceeding its design basis temperature and is consistent with the recommend-ations of. Regulatory Guide 1.27, " Ultimate Heat Sink for Nuclear Plants,"

March 1974.

3/4.7.6 (Not used) 3/4.7.7 CONTROL ROOM MAKEUP AND CLEANUP FILTRATION SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the Control Room Makeup and Cleanup Filtration System ensures that: (1) the ambient air temperature does not exceed the allowable temperature for continuous-duty rating for the equipment and instrumentation cooled by this system, and (2) the control room will remain habitable for operations personnel during and following all credible accident conditions.

Operation of the system with the heaters operating for at least 10 continuous hours in a 31-day period is sufficient to reduce the buildup of moisture on the adsorbers and HEPA filters.

The OPERAUi3TY of this system in conjunction with control room design provisions is based on limiting the radiation exposure to personnel occupying the control room to 5 rems or less whole body, or its equivalent.

This limitation is consistent with the raquirements of General Design Criterion 19 of Appendix A, 10 CFR Part 50.

ANSI N510-1980 will be used as a procedural guide for surveillance testing.

3/4.7.8 FUEL HANDLING BUILDING EXHAUST AIR SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the Fuel Handling Building Exhaust Air System ensures that radioactive materials leaking from the ECCS equipment within the FHB fol-lowing a LOCA are filtered prior to reaching the environment.

Operation of the system with the heaters operating for at least 10 continuous hours in a 31-day period is sufficient to reduce the buildup of moisture on the adsorbers and HEPA filters.

The operation of this system and the resultant effect on offsite dosage calculations was assumed in the safety analyses.

ANSI N510-1980 will be used as a procedural guide for surveillance testing.

3/4.7.9 SNUBBERS All snubbers are required OPERABLE to ensure that the structural integrity of the Reactor Coolant System and all other safety-related systems is main-tained during and following a seismic or other event initiating dynamic loads.

Snubbers are classified and grouped by design and manufacturer but not by size.

For example, mechanical snubbers utilizing the same design features of the 2-kip,10-kip and 100-kip capacity manufactured by Company "A" are of the same type.

The same design mechanical snubbers manufactured by Company "B" for the purposes of this Technical Specification would be of a different type, as would hydraulic snubbers from either manufacturer.

A list of individual snubbers with detailed information of snubber location and size and of system affected shall be available at the plant in accordance SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3/4 7-4 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 19 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 9 m-,

4 PLANT SYSTEMS 7

BASES 3/4.7.13 AREA TEMPERATURE MONITORING The area temperature limitations ensure that safety-related equipment will not be subjected to temperatures in excess of their environmental qualification temperatures.

Exposure to excessive temperatures may degrade equipment and can cause a loss of its OPERABILITY. The temperature limits include an allowance for Instrument error of i 3*F maximum.

3/4.7.14 ESSENTIAL CHILLED WATER SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the Essential Chilled Water System ensures that sufficient cooling capacity is available for continued operation of safety-related equipment during normal and accident conditions. The redundant cooling capacity of this system, assuming a single failure, is consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.

When a risk-important system or component (for example Essential Chilled Water) is taken out of service, it is important to assure that the impact on plant risk of this and other equipment simultaneously taken out of service can be assessed. The Configuration Risk Management Program evaluates the impact on plant risk of equipment out of service. A brief description of the Configuration Risk Management Program is in Section 6.8.3 (adininistration section) of the Technical Specification.

I e

SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3/4 7-7 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 44,85 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 33,72

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3/4.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS l

i BASES 3/4.8.1. 3/4.8.2. and 3/4.8.3 A.C. SOURCES. D.C. SOURCES. AND ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION l

l The OPERABILITY of the A.C. and D.C. power sources and associated distribution systems during operation ensures that sufficient power will be l

available to supply the safety-related equipment required for:

(1) the safe i

shutdown of the facility, and (2) the mitigation and control of accident conditions within the facility. The minimum specified independent and redundant A.C. and D.C. power sources and distribution systems satisfy the requirements of General Design Criterion 17 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50.

l The ACTION requirements specified for the levels of degradation of the power sources provide restriction upon continued facility operation commensurate with the level of degradation. The OPERABILITY of the power sources are consistent with the initial condition ~ assumptions of the safety analyses and are based upon maintaining at least two redundant sets of onsite i

A.C. and D.C. power sources and associated distribution systems OPERABLE during accident conditions coincident with an assumed loss-of-offsite power and single failure of the other onsite A.C. source. The A.C. and D.C. source i

allowable out-of-service times are based on Regulatory Guide 1.93,

" Availability of Electrical Power Sources," December 1974. The term, verify, l

as used in this context means to administrative 1y check by examining logs or l

other information to determine if certain components are out-of-service for i

maintenance or other reasons.

It does not mean to perform the Surveillance

}

Requirements needed to demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the component.

BACKGROUND The unit Class IE AC Electrical Power Distribution System AC sources consist i

of the offsite power sources (preferred power sources, normal and j

alternate (s)], and the onsite standby power sources (Train A, Train B and 4

Train C diesel generators (DGs)). As required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC j

17, the design of the AC electrical power system provides independence and redundancy to ensure an available source of power to the Engineered Safety l

Feature (ESF) systems.

The onsite Class IE AC Distribution System is divided into redundant load l

groups (trains) so that the loss of any one group does not prevent the minimum safety functions from being performed. Each train has connections to two preferred offsite power sources and a single DG.

Offsite power is transmitted to the plant switchyard at 345 kV by multiple j

circuits on four separate rights-of-way. The two unit standby transformers are energized from separate busses in the switchyard via independent feeders.

Each standby transformer has the capacity to supply the Class IE loads of both 1

units.

In normal operation, the Class IE loads of each unit can be supplied s

j by the standby transformers and/or its auxiliary unit transfomer.

In the j

event of a loss of power from its normal source that unit's Class IE loads are SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3/4 8-1 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 68 i

Unit 2 - Amendment No. 57 l

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- _ m.. _ _ _

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS BASES A.C. SOURCES. D.C. SOURCES. and ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION (Continued) manually transferred to the unit's auxiliary transformer or to the standby transformers.

In the event of a loss of preferred power, the ESF electrical loads are automatically connected to the DGs in sufficient time to provide for safe reactor shutdown and to mitigate the consequences of a Design Basis Accident (DBA) such as a loss of coolant accident (LOCA).

Ratings for Train A Train B and Train C DGs satisfy the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.I08. The continuous service rating of each DG is 5500 kW with 10% overload permissible for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> in any 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period.

Refer to UFSAR Chapter 8 for a more complete description.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES The initial conditions of DBA and transient analyses in the FSAR, Chapter 6 assume ESF systems are OPERABLE. The AC electrical power and Chapter 15,igned to provide sufficient capacity, capability, redundancy, sources are des and reliability to ensure the availability of necessary power to ESF systems so that the fuel, Reactor Coolant System (RCS), and containment design limits are not exceeded.

The OPERABILITY of the AC electrical power sources is consistent with the initial assumptions of the Accident analyses and is based upon meeting the design basis of the unit. This results in maintaining at least two trains of the onsite or one train of the offsite AC sources OPERABLE during Accident conditions in the event of:

a.

An assumed loss of all offsite power or all onsite AC power; and b.

A worst case single failure.

The AC sources satisfy Criterion 3 of NRC Policy Statement.

A single train onsite AC source can effectively mitigate all but the most severe events with operator action in some cases. The events that cannot be mitigated by a single train onsite AC source are highly unlikely. When a risk-important system or component (for example a Standby Diesel Generator) is taken out of service, it is important to assure that the impact on plant risk of this and other equipment simultaneously taken out of service can be assessed. The Configuration Risk Management Program evaluates the impact on plant risk of equipment out of service. A brief description of the Configuration Risk Management Program is in Section 6.8.3 (administration section) of the Technical Specification.

LC.Q Two qualified circuits between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class IE Electrical Power System and separate and independent DGs for each train ensure availability of the required power to shut down the reactor and maintain in a safe shutdown condition after an anticipated operational occurrence (A00) or a postulated DBA.

i Qualified offsite circuits are those that are described in the FSAR and are part of the licensing basis for the unit.

SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3/4 8-2 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 68,85 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 67,72

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ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS BASES A.C. SOURCES. D.C. SOURCES. and ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION (Continued)

TS 3.8.1.1 Action e.

Operation may continue for a period that should not exceed 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. This level of degradation means that the offsite electrical power system does not have the capability to effect a safe shutdown and to mitigate the effects of an accident; however, the onsite AC sources have not been degraded. This level of degradation generally corresponds to a total loss of the immediately accessible offsite power sources. With both of the required offsite circuits inoperable, sufficient onsite AC sources are available to maintain the unit in a safe shutdown condition in the event of a DBA or transient.

l TS 3.8.1.1 Action f.

With two or three of the standby diesel generators inoperable, there is insufficient or no remaining standby AC sources.

Thus, with an assumed loss of offsite electrical power, insufficient standby AC sources are available to power the minimum required ESF functions. A single train onsite At nurce can effectively mitigate all but the most severe events with operator action in j

some cases. The events that cannot be mitigated by a single train onsite AC j

source are highly unlikely.

Since the offsite electrical power system is the only source of AC power for this level of degradation, the risk associated with continued operation for a very short time could be less than that associated with an immediate controlled shutdown (the immediate shutdown could cause grid instability, which could result in a total loss of AC power).

Since any inadvertent generator trip could also result in a total loss of offsite AC power, however, the time allowed for continued operation is i

severely restricted. The intent here is to avoid the risk associated with an immediate controlled shutdown and to minimize the risk associated with this level of degradation.

Surveillance Reauirements The AC sources are designed to permit inspection and testing of all important

)

areas and features, especially those that have a standby function, in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 18.

Periodic component tests are i

supplemented by extensive functional tests during refueling outages (under simulated accident conditions). The Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements (SRs) for demonstrating the OPERABILITY of the standby diesel generators are in accordance with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.108, Regulatory Guide 1.137, as addressed in the FSAR and NUREG-1431.

Where the SRs discussed herein specify voltage and frequency tolerances, the following is applicable. The minimum steady state output voltage of 3744 is 90% of the nominal 4160 V output voltage.

This value, which is specified in ANSI C84.1, allows for voltage drop to the terminals of 4000 V motors with minimum operating voltage specified as 90% or 3600 V.

It also allows for voltage drops to motors and other equipment down throgh the 120 V level where

(

minimum operating voltage is also usually specified as 90% of name plate j

rating. The specified maximum steady state output voltage of 4576 V is less SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3/4 8-5 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 68, $5 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 67,72

T ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS q

7 BASES A.C. SOURCES. D.C. SOURCES. and ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION (Continued) than the maximum operating voltage of 4756 specified for 4000 V motors.

It ensures that for a lightly loaded distribution system, the voltage at the terminals of 4000 V motors is less than the maximum rated operating voltages.

The specified minimum and maximum frequencies of the standby diesel generators are 58.8 Hz and 61.2 Hz, respectively. These values are equal to plus or minus 25 of the 60 Hz nominal frequency and are derived from the recommendations given in Regulatory Guide 1.108 and NUREG-1431.

SR 4.8.1.1.1.a This SR ensures proper circuit continuity for the offsite AC electrical power supply to the onsite distribution network and availability of offsite AC electrical power. The breaker alignment verifies that each breaker is in its correct position to ensure that distribution busses and loads are connected to their preferred power source, and that appropriate independence of offsite circuits is maintained. The 7 day Frequency is adequate since breaker position is not likely to change without the operator being aware of it and because its status is displayed in the control room.

SR 4.8.1.1.1.b Transfer of each 4.16 kV ESF bus power supply from the normal offsite circuit to the alternate offsite circuit demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the alternate circuit distribution network to power the shutdown loads.. The 18 month Frequency of the Surveillance is based on engineering judgment, taking into consideration the unit conditions required to perform the Surveillance, and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths. Operating experience has shown that the components usually pass the SR when performed at the 18 month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

SR 4.8.1.1.2.a.1 This SR provides verification that the level of fuel oil in the fuel tank is at or above the required level.

SR 4.8.1.1.2.a.2 This SR helps to ensure the availability of the standby electrical power supply to mitigate DBAs and transients and to maintain the unit in a safe shutdown condition.

1 To minimize the wear on moving parts that do not get lubricated when the engine is not running, these SRs are modified by a Note (Note 2) to indicate i

that all DG starts for these Surveillances may be preceded by an engine prelube period and followed by a warsup period prior to loading.

SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3/4 8-6 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 68 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 57

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS aASES A.C. SOURCES. D.C. SOURCES. and DNSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION (Continued)

For purposes of this testing, the DGs are started from standby conditions.

Standby condition for a DG sean that the diesel engine coolant and oil are being continuously circulated and temperature is being maintained consistent with manufacturer recommendations.

In order to reduce stress and wear on diesel engines, some manufacturers recommend a modified start in which the starting speed of DGs is limited, warsup is limited to this lower speed, and the DGs are gradually accelerated to synchronous speed prior to loading.

In addition, the modified start may involve reduced fuel (load limit). These start procedures are the intent of Note 3, which is only applicable when such modified start procedures are recommended by the manufacturer.

Once per 184 days the DG starts from standby conditions and achieves required voltage and frequency within 10 seconds. The 10 second start requirement supports the assumptions of the design basis LOCA analysis in the FSAR.

The 10 second start requirement is not applicable (see Note 3) when a modified start procedure as described above is used.

The normal 31 day Frequency for SR 3.8.1.2 (see Table 4.8-1, " Diesel Generator Test Schedule," in the accompanying LCO) is consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.108. The 184 day Frequency in Note 3 is a reduction in cold testing consistent with Generic Letter 84-15. These Frequencies provide adequate assurance of DG OPERABILITY, while minimizing degradation resulting from testing.

SR 4. 8.1.1. 2. a. 3 This Surveillance verifies that the DGs are capable of synchronizing with the offsite electrical system and accepting loads greater than or equal to the equivalent of the maximum expected accident loads. A minimum run time of 60 minutes is required to stabilize engine temperature, while minimizing the time that the DG is connected to the offsite source.

The load band is provided to avoid routine overloading of the DG. Routine overloading may result in more frequent teardown inspections in accordance with vendor recommendations in order to maintain DG OPERABILITY.

This SR is modified by two Notes. Note 4 indicates that diesel engine runs for this Surveillance may include gradual loading, as recommended by the manufacturer, so that mechanical stress and wear on the diesel engine are minimized. Note 6 states that momentary transients, because of changing bus loads, do not invalidate this test.

A successful DG start under SR 4.8.1.1.2.a.2 must precede this test to credit satisfactory performance.

SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3/4 8-7 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 68 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 57 i

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l ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS BASES A.C. SOURCES. D.C. SOURCES. and ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION (Continued) i SR 4.8.1.1.2.b Microbiological fouling is a major cause of fuel oil degradation. There are numerous bacteria that can grow in fuel oil and cause fouling, but all must i

have a water environment in order to survive.

Removal of water from the fuel oil tanks once every 31 days eliminates the necessary environment for bacterial survival. This is the most effective means of controlling microbiological fouling.

In addition, it eliminates the potential for water entrainment in the fuel oil during DG operation. Water may come from any of several sources, including condensation, ground water, rain water, contaminated fuel oil, and breakdown of the fuel oil by bacteria.

Frequent checking for and removal of accumulated water minimizes fouling and provides data regarding the watertight integrity of the fuel oil system. The l

Surveillance Frequencies are established by Regulatory Guide 1.137. This SR is for preventative maintenance. The presence of water does not necessarily

{

represent failure of the SR, provided the accumulated water is removed during the performance of this Surveillance.

j SR 4.8.1.1.2.c The requirements will be controlled and administered by the Diesel Fuel Oil Testing Program located in section 6.8.3 of Administrative Controls.

SR 4.8.1.1.2.e.1 This inspection is conducted once per cycle to ensure unexpected degradation l

is discovered.

l i

SR 4.8.1.1.2.e.2 Each DG is provided with an engine overspeed trip to prevent damage to the engine. Recovery from the transient caused by the loss of a large load could cause diesel engine overspeed, which, if excessive, might result in a trip of the engine. This Surveillance demonstrates the DG load response characteristics and capability to reject the largest single load (785.3 kW) without exceeding predetermined voltage and frequency. The 18 month Frequency is consistent with the recommendation of Regulatory Guide 1.108.

This SR is modified by two Notes. Note 4 indicates that diesel engine runs for this Surveillance may include gradual loading, as recommended by the manufacturer, so that mechanical stress and wear on the diesel engine are minimized. Note 5 allows the diesel start for this surveillance to be a modified start as stated in SR 4.8.1.1.2.a.2.

SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 8 3/4 8-8 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 68,85 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 57,72

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l ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS PROCEDURES AND PROGRAMS (Continued) j)

Containment Leakaae Rate Testina Proaram A program shall be established to implement the leakage rate testing of the primary containment as required by 10 CFR 50.54(o) and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, Option B, as modified by approved exemptions.

l This program shall be in accordance with the guidelines contained in Regulatory Guide 1.163, " Performance-Based Containment Leak-Testing Program", dated September 1995.

~

l Peak calculated primary containment internal pressure for the design basis loss of coolant accident (LOCA), P, is 41.2 psig.

The maximum allowable primary containment leakage rate, L,, is 0.3%

of primary containment air weight per day.

Leakage rate acceptance criteria are:

a.

Primary containment overall leakage rate acceptance criterion is 5 1.0 L,.

During the first unit start-up following testing l

in accordance with this program, the leakage rate acceptance criteria are s 0.60 L, for the combined Type B and Type C tests, and 5 0.75 L, as-left and s 1.0 L, as-found for Type A tests.

t b.

Air lock testing acceptance c'riteria for the overall air lock leakage rate is s 0.05 L, when tested at ;t P,.

The provisions of Surveillance Requirement 4.0.2 do not apply to the test intervals specified in the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

The provisions of Surveillance Requirement 4.0.3 apply to the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

k)

Confiauration Risk Manaaement Proaram (CRMP) l A program to assess changes in core damage frequency and cumulative core damage probability resulting from applicable plant configurations. The program should include the following:

l 1) training of personnel, 2) procedures for identifying plant configurations, the generation i

of risk profiles and the evaluation of risk against established I

thresholds; and 3) provisions for evaluating changes in risk resulting from l

unplanned maintenance activities.

SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 6-18a Unit 1 - Amendment No. 84,85 Unit 2 - Amendment No. M,72