ML20129A512
| ML20129A512 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 04/16/1984 |
| From: | Trubatch S NRC OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL (OGC) |
| To: | Hayes B, Messenger G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTOR & AUDITOR (OIA), NRC OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS (OI) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20129A429 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-84-745 NUDOCS 8506040636 | |
| Download: ML20129A512 (1) | |
Text
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{ b..c NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION E WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 't, % I April 16, 1984 W w MEMORANDUM FOR: George Messenger, Acting Director Office of Inspector and Auditor Ben B. Hayes, Director 1 Office of Investigations FROM: Sheldon L. Trubatch Office of the General Counsel
SUBJECT:
DIABLO CANYON - GAP 2.206 PETITION Attached for your consideration is GAP's most recent 2.206 i petition. Please handle it in accordance with the Commission's Memorandum and Order of April 13, 1984. A copy of that Memorandum is also attached. t Attachments as stated \\ 8506040636 841211 PDR FOIA DEVINEB4-745 PDR g' gq -1
7CD ETE' ' UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION COMMISSIONERS: 84 APR 13 P8:02 Nunzio J. Palladino, Chairman Victor Gilinsky LTir$dYEOi Thomas M. Roberts BRANCH James K. Asselstine Frederick M. Bernthal SERVED APR12 E84 In the Matter of PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY, ) Docket Nos. 50-275 OL 50-323 OL (Diablo Canycn Nuclear Power Plant, } Units 1 and 2) ) ) C Lf-h - 7 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 7his decision completes the Nuclear Regulatory Comission's ("NRC" or "Comission") reinstatement of Pacific Gas and Electric Company's ("PG&E" or " licensee") Facility Operating license No. DPR-76 (" low-power license") to conduct low-power tests (at up to 5% of rated pcwer) at the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 ("Diablo Canyon"). The events leading up to the Comission's suspension of this license and subsequent steps to reinstate the license in part nave been described in several prior orders of the Comission.I Accordingly, this order focuses on events which have IThe low-power license was issued on September 22, 1081. See CLI-81-22, 14 NRC 598 (1981). It was suspended on November 19, 1981. See, CLI-81-30, 14 NRC 950 (1981). Following substantial review and reanalysis of the design and construction of Diablo Canyon, and public meetings at which all interested parties participated, the Commission reinstated the low-power license in part to authorize PG&E to load fuel l and conduct pre-criticality' tests (operational modes 6 and 5). [ Footnote Continued] hL.a++"a"~ a
o 2 occurred since the Comission's last order and refers Sck to previous events only as necessary. Safety Review A Comission condition for reinstatement of Diablo Canyon's low-power license was the successful completion of an Independent Design Verification Program (IDVP). CLI-81-30, 14 NRC 950 (1981).2 The IDVP was conducted by organizations and individuals not associated with PG&E and was managed by Teledyne Engineering Services (TES). PG&E conducted a separate design verification effort called the internal technical program (ITP) which was performed by PG&E's Diablo Canyon Proiect ("DCP"), a joint organization of PG&E and Bechtel. Then, the NRC staff, with the help of its consultant, Brookhaven National Laboratory, conducted its own analysis. [FootnoteContinued] CLI-83-27, 18 NRC (1983). Subsequently, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit denied a motion to stay the. Comission's authorization to PG&E. On January 16, 1984, the Comission denied Joint Intervencrs' motion for a stay of-fuel loading and pre-criticality testing at Diablo Canyon finding that these activities did not present significant health and safety risks and would not prejudice subsequent Commission decisions or foreclose modifications, if necessary, of the plant. CLI-84-1, 19 NRC (1984). On January 25, 1984, the Comission reinstated another part of PG&E's low-power 'icense by authorizing precritical hot system testing (operaticnal modes 4 and 3). As a separate matter, the Comission declined to review the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board's decision in ALAB-728, 17 NRC 777 (1983) which affinned a decision by the Atomic. Safety and Licensing Board on all issues other than quality assurance related to PG&E's application for a license to load fuel and c6nduct low-power testing. 2The Commission's Order required an IDVP of seismic, service-related contract activities prior to 1978. Ir. addition, the NRC staff required an IDVP of non-seismic, service-relateo contract activities, PG&E internal design activities and post-1978 seismic service-related contract activities. In addition to design verification, the IDVP also' reviewed some construction activities.
3 The scope of the IDVP and ITP, and the relation between them, is explained in detail in ALAB-763. 19 NRC (1984). Essentially all of Diablo Canyon's safety-related seismic design was reviewed: the ITP reanalyzed all of the seismic design for safety-related structures, systems and components, while the IDVP oversaw and verified selected pcrtions of the work in accordance with the program approved by the Commission..The review of non-seismic safety-related design was not as comprehensive. The IDVP reviewed three safety-related systems and two areas cf safety-related analysis applicable to many other systems. Items of concern identified by .the IDVP as potentially generic were addressed by the ITP for all systems designed by PG&E. In turn, the ITP verification work was sampled by the IDVP and the results reported in an Interim Technical Report (ITR). The ITP independently reviewed other non-seismic systems. As a result of this interacti_on between the ITP and IDVP, the IDVP obtained a broad and compre-hensive understanding of the non-seismic design of Diablo Canyon. The IDVP was completed in October 1983; PG&E's ITP is still ongoing. The NRC staff's review of the IDVP Final Report is contained in Supplements 18, 19 and 20 to the Safety Evaluation Report (SER) for Diablo Canyon, Unit 1. Supplements 18 and 19, PG&E's ITP, and physical modifications to the plant were the basis of the staff's recommendation of the partial rein-statement of PG&E's low-power license to load fuel and perform pre-criticality testing at Diablo Canyon. 27, 18 NRC (1983). At that time there were still several open icems and follow up items which the staff believed required resolution prior to reinstatement of the rest of the low-power license. The staff has updated its progress on open items in Supplement 20 to the Safety Evaluation Report (SSER 20). The staff considered infbrmation
s 4 4 in the seismic monthly reports from the IDVP and PG&E, the IDVP Final Report, the PG&E final reports, and the Interim Technical Reports.3 SSER 20 presents the staff's safety evaluation of open items and follow up items that in the staff's view, must be satisfactorily resolved prior to the Commission's reinstatement of PG&E's. authority to achieve criticality and perform low-power testing, i.e. reinstatement of the low-power license for Diablo Canyon, Unit 1. SSER 20 reports that many of the open items and follow up items previously identified in SSERs 18 and 19 have been re-solved. On March 27, 1984, the NRC's Director of Licensing reported that in his view, all open and follow up items identified in SSER 20 had been resolved satisfactorily for reinstatement of the low-power license for Diablo Canyon, Unit 1. He also stated that: (1) he knew of no new informa-tion since the completion of SSER 20 which would affect the staff's con-clusions or judgments in SSER 20; and (2) that any other issue not addressed in SSER's 18, 19, and 20 had been satisfactorily addressed for the purposes of low power operation. The Commission also heard from Mr. Isa Yin, an NRC inspector at Diablo Canyon. Mr. Yin reported that he had found inadequate compliance with the L' quality assurance program for designing supports for small bore and large bore piping. He also stated that reinspection following modification of the pipe suspensions would be rendered more difficult by the environmental conditions in the plant after operation at low-power. Accordingly, he requested that the Commission defer granting a low power license until PG&E ) 3The Interim Technical Reports (ITR) are called interim because they were issued before completion of the IDVP. The-ITRs document the completion of technical issues. i
5 had remedied the deficiencies in pipe supporting systems and those changes had been reinspected by the NRC. - The Commission voted to defer reinstatement of the low power license .for Diablo Canyon until the disparity between Mr. Yin's views and those of the rest of the technical staff had been considered by the Advisory Commit-tee on Reactor Safeguards ("ACRS") - a statutorily created advisory commit-tee comprised of experts in various disciplines including nuclear engineer-ing, nucler.r physics. and radiation health physics. The ACRS met in public session on April 6,1984 and heard from Mr. Yin,other members of the NRC staff, and Mr. Stokes, a previous employee at Diablo Canyon who had made allegations regarding'the adequacy of the quality assurance program for the design of supports for small bore oipes. Mr. Yin had found that some of Mr. Stokes' allegations were correct. The NRC staff informed the ACRS that, on March 29, 1984 the NRC had convened a peer review panel of technical experts to review Mr. Yin's concerns. The panel met with Mr. Yin, and later with representatives of PG&E and some of the contractors involved in the IDVP. The peer review panel also visited Diablo Canyon to examine in detail some of the specific items identified as deficient by Mr. Yin. After the visit, the peer review panel met with Mr. Stokes, and somewhat later met again with Mr. Yin to discuss the panel's proposed findings. The panel concluded that Mr. Yin's concerns did not warrant delaying low-power operation of Diablo Canyon, but did require resolution prior to going to full-power. Mr. Yin also addressed the ACRS. He stated that "while several reverification and corrective action programs should be completed by PG&E prior to NRC issuance of a full power operation license, the ' will be no apparent risk to the public health and safety to allow the reactor testing
up to five percent power at the present." On questioninC by members of the ACRS, Mr. Yin reiterated his position in spite of his acknowledgement of -some residual differences with the rest of the NRC staff. On April 9, 1984 the ACRS reported on its consideration of Mr. Yin's - concerns. Based on the presentations by Mr. Yin and other members of the NRC staff and supporting documentary material, the ACRS found: We agree that it is acceptable to permit low pcwer operation at this time. We believe that such operation will not compromise-corrective actions that may be required. In view of the statetents by the ACRS and Mr. Yin, the Comission concludes that the concerns previously expressed by Mr. Yin have been resolved satisfactorily and do not warrant deferring the reinstatement of the low-power' operating license for Diablo Canyon. Quality Assurance The Joint Intervenors and the Governor of California raised issues related to design quality assurance and to construction qual _ity assurance ~ at Diablo Canyon. Their motion to reopen the record on the design quality assurance (DQA) program at Diablo Canyon was granted, and resulted in an 4 adjudicatory proceeding before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board at which the adequacy of the IDVP was a central issue. On March 20, 1984, the Appeal Board issued a 122-page decision in which it found: [T]he scope and execution of the applicant's verification program have been sufficient to establish that Diablo Canyon Unit 1 design adequately meets its licensing criteria. The applicant's verification efforts provide adequate confidence that the Unit 1 l safety-related structures, systems and components are designed to perfonn satisfactorily in service and that any significant design deficiencies in that facility resulting from defects in the applicant's ' design quality assurance program have been remedied. Accordingly, we conclude that there is reasonable assurance that .the facility can be operated without endangering the health and safety of the public.
O, ALAB-763, slip op. at 101.- ~ Additional motions filed by the Joint Intervenors and Governor of California to reopen the record on DQA are still pending before the Appeal LBeard. The Joint Intervenors and the Gcvernor of California also sought reopening of the record on construction quality assurance (CQA). That motion was denied by the Appeal Board in ALAB-756, 19 NRC (Dec.19, 1983). Petitions for review of that decision are now pending before the . Comission, and petitions' to reopen the record are also pending before the - Appeal Board. In view of the pendency of the petitions for review of ALAB-756.(on construction QA), and of the fact that the time for filing petitions for review of ALAB-763 (on design QA) has not elapsed, we express no opinion as to the correctness of the two Appeal Board decisions. Nevertheless, we consider it worthy of note that there is nothing in the Appeal Board's decisions on construction quality assurance or. design quality assurance to suggest that PG&E's low-power license should not be reinstated. Allegations Since 1982, the NRC staff has received numerous allegations and concerns about the design, construction, and operation of the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant (Diablo Canyon) and the management of these activities by Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E).4 As the IDVP neared completion "In early 1982, the staff received allegations regarding the design and operation of the component cooling water system (CCWS) for Diablo [FootnoteContinued]
8 and the' target.date for a Comission decision en reinstatement of the license approached, the flow of allegations became a deluge and the NRC staff, with Commission concurrence, established a special Diablo Canyon Allegation Management Program ("DCAMP") to pursue the allegations and concerns to resolution ~. The DCAMP is' described in Supplement 21 to the Safety Evaluation Report for Diablo Canyon (SSER 21). The procedures for handling allegations under DCAMP included confirmation.of the allegation by contacting the alleger whenever possible, site inspections of constructicn or documentation, independent measurements and evaluations where appropri-ate, technical reviews, interviews with site personnel, public meetings on significant technical issues, discussions between the alleger and staff on staff's findings and reports to the Comission. So far, allegation manage-ment has involved more than 40 members of the NRC technical staff and con-tractor personnel and required 18,000 person hours. The st#'s review of an allegation was not limited to the allegation itself, but included all necessary related issues. [FootnoteContinued] Canyon, Unit 1. The staff's evaluation of the allegations is described in Supplement No.16 to the Safety Evaluation Report (SSER 16). On the basis of that evaluation, the staff concluded that the CCWS satisfied . most design requirements, that the only deviation was acceptable on the basis of PG&E's satisfactory demonstration of design capability in this area, and that the allegations regarding the CCWS had no generic implications. In ALAB-763, the Appeal Board instructed the Director, Nuclear Reactor Regulation, to ensure that PG&E's proposed technical specification on CCWS is incorporated into the plant technical ' specifications before pennitting operation. The order of reinstatement of PG8E's low-power license is contingent on the Director's completion ' of that action.
9 On January 4,1984, the staff reported to the Comission on the investigation into 103 allegations using the procedure described above. SECY-84-3, SSER 21. However, additional allegations continued to be received and the DCAMP has attempted to keep up with them. Staff provided an updated written review of the allegations on February 6,1984 (SECY-84-61) and reported on them to the Connission in public meetings helc on January 23, February 10, and March 19, 1984. By mid-March, the total number of allegations was approximately 400. On March 20, 1984, staff issued SSER 22, which addressed 219 of the allegations, including the ones addressed previously. Staff reported that it had examined 188 allegations in detail and determined that 31 other allegations did not warrant detailed review because they raised issues similar to those already considered or were not related to significant safety issues. In mid-March, the.Comission gave public notice that it hoped to be able to make a decision on reinstatement of the license for criticcTity and low power operation on March 26, 1984. In the weeks before March 26, scores of new allegations were filed. One group, the Government Account-ability Project, filed allegations that were received by the Comission only hours before' the scheduled meeting.. Approximately 500 allegations have now been filed. Needless to say, this flood of last-minute alleged new information, years after the adjudicatory proceedings began, has strained the Commission's resources. As noted above, the first two hundred of the recent allegations have been reviewed in detail under.DCAW. No license, not even a low power license, can be issued without adequate protection to the public health and safety. However, special considerations apply to low power operation. Most importantly, the possible consequences of an accident during low-power g .n.
10 ope' ration are limited to a very small fraction of those possible at full power. Low-power operation would generate between one-hundredth-and-one tenth of the radioactive fission products which would be generated by full power operation. Thus, any consequences.of accident would be significantly less than those detennined by the safety evaluation for Diablo Canyon. Accident consequences would be further reduced by the lower quantity and rate of production of decay heat produced at low-power as compared to that produced at full power. However, the energy required to damage a reactor, the capacity.of the heat removal systems, and safety features are not reduced by low power operation. Therefore, accidents involving failures of these systems at low-power operation would evolve over longer periods than at full power operation and could be contained by equipment operating at only a few percent of capacity. With the above in mind, all of the allegations have been reviewed under one basic safety criterion: is there significant new information which suggests that some safety-related structure, system or component necessary for safe low power operation will not perfora its safety func-tion, or that there are such weaknesses in licensee's management or quality assurance that plant safety is called into serious question. For the first two hundred allegations, the results of the review are documented in SSER 21 and the transcripts of the public Ccamission meetings in January, February, and March. For t'ie approximately 300 more recent allegations, the Commission was faced with a choice of decision delay, while the review could be carefully documented, or reliance on a preliminary review and staff expert judgment without the more detailed documentation. The Comis-sion has deliberately chosen the latter course. There is every reason to
11 ~ believe that more allegations will be filed and delay to provide written documentation will lead to paralysis in Commissio, decisionmaking. All of the allegations received on or before April 13, 1984, have been reviewed under the criterion specified above and those necessary to be resolved prior to license reinstatement have been resolved. As a result, none of these allegations warrant a delay in the reinstatement of the low-power license. Work under DCAMP will continue, both to document the reviews completed to date and to address those matters that need to be resolved prior to licensing at higher power levels. Operator Experience The Comission has also considered the circumstance that the regular operating staff for Diablo Canyon has a limited amount of experience with operating similar facilities. The Comission was briefed on the issue by PG&E as part of its comments at the public meeting of February 10, 1984. PG&E has 43 holders of senior operator licenses and 16 holders of reactor operator licenses at Diablo canyon. A typical licensee has successfully completed: (1) a 30-month program on power plant fundamentals, equipment, systems, radiation protection and administrative controls including time on-shift at the facility; and (2) an approximately year-long licensing program. Several license holders have participated in pre-operational testing programs, hot functional testing programs, on-going testing, maintenance, surveillance and modification programs. Licensed operators have also each had from 200 hours to 300 hours of hands-on simulator training. However, because the operators have not had actual plant operational experience, additional experienced personnel will be on hand to assist with startup operations. This extensive training of PG&E's
~ 12 operators and PG&E's comitment to provide additional trained personnel during start-up have led the Commission to find that FG&E has an adequate operating staff for Diablo Canyon.5 Seismic License Condition The Comission has also considered recent developments regarding the characterization of the Hosgri Fault. At the public meeting of March 26, 1984, the staff reported that it had received a preprint of an article by certain petroleum geologists who have used previously unavailable informa-tion developed during petroleum exploraticn to determine that Hosgri Fault is a thrust fault and not a strike / slip fault as previously believed. In view of this development, the staff proposed that PG&E should conduct further seismic and geologic studies of the Hosgri Fault. Mr. Devine, a geologist with the United States Geological Survey also discussed the new SThe Connission notes that a literal reading of 10 CFR 55.25(b), which was adopted in 1963, would have required candidates for operator license examinations, at facilities that have yet to go critical, to have had " extensive actual.operaticnal experience" before taking the operator license examination. Since 1967, the NRC has taken the position, in publicly available documents, that completion of NRC-approved training that utilizes simulators can, togetehr with other nuclear reactor activities, constitute adequate experience. Operators at.Diablo Canyon and four other plants were licensed on this basis. Because this long-standing interpretation of the rule does not match the literal language of the rule, although it satisfies the rule's purpose and does not diminish safety, the Comission will shortly initiate a rulemaking proceeding to conform the ~1anguage of the rule to this long-standing practice. In the interim, the Commission sees no reason to revoke or suspend existing operator licenses, including those held by the operators at Diablo Canyon. The sophistication of current simulator training provides a suitable basis for operator licensing, and similar training in lieu of operational experience consittutes no diminution of safety. Under these circumstances, the Comission finds no reason to grant Joint Intervenors' April 10, 1984 motion for a stay based on the operator license issue.
13 findings with the Ccemission. In Mr. Devine's view, this new infomation was not startling but more in the nature of a refinement in the understand-ing of the overall faulting pattern in the region around Diablo Canyon. Mr. Devine. supported the NRC staff's proposals for further study. He also stated that, in his view, the new report did not warrant any change in the magnitude of the Safe Shutdown Earthquake for Diablo Canycn. The Comission has determined that this new information dces not affect its low-power decision. There is no indication that the new infor-mation undercuts the seismic design basis for Diablo Canyon. However, the Comission has asked the ACRS to review the new infomation prior to any full power decision and to coiment on a draft license condition which would require PG&E to reassess by 1988 the seismic design basis for Diablo Canyon. Additional Matters The staff has denied Joint Intervenors' petition for enforcement action under 10 C.F.R. 2.206. DD 84-8, 19 NRC (March 26, 1984). Joint Intervenors contended that PG&E's failure to provide to the Comission a 1977 audit' perfomed by Nuclear Services Corporation on the quality assurance program by. Pullman Power Products, a PGSE contractor, required continued suspension of the low-power license. The Director, Inspection and Enforcement found that PG&E made a material false statement by failing in 1978 to provide the audit to the Licensing Board considering quality assurance. However, the Director also found that under the circumstances, the material false statement was a violation of the lowest severity level and, as such, warranted only a Notice of Violation. That Director's decision is still pending before the Commission for its detemination of
14 whether to review it. 10CFR2.206(c)(1). Under these circumstances, the Commission expresses no opinion on the correctness of tiie Director's decision. However, the Commission finds noteworthy that nothing in the decision suggests that PG&E's low-power license should not be reinstated. On April 12, 1984, the Government Accountability Project (GAP) petitioned the Commission pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206 to direct the Office of Inspector and Auditor (0IA) to initiate an investigation into alleged false statements by PG&E and the NRC staff regarding the resolution of allegations of deficiencies in design and construction quality assurance at Diablo Canyon. GAP also requested an opportunity to address the Commission on April 13, 1984 on the alleged false statements and suggested that the Commission defer any decision on reinstituting PG&E's low-power license for Diablo Canyon until this matter is resolved. In addition, GAP requested the Commission to direct the Office of Investigations (01) to release transcripts of interviews with allegers to the Board considering design and
- censtruction quality assurance.
GAP's request was supported by affidavits from Mr. Steven Lockert and Mr. Charles Stokes. Both have provided allegations to the Commission on several previous occasions; most recently, Mr. Stokes addressed the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS). Mr. Lockert's affidavit refers to some welds, made in 1974 and corrected in 1977 for which, in some instances, documentation was not provided until 1982. Deficiencies in welds and the quality assurance program for documenting repairs to welds have been the subject of many other allegations investigated by the staff. Similarly, Mr. Stokes' affidavit contains allegations of the type already extensively considered by the staff. Mr. Stokes' affidavit also draws
15 legal conclusions based on his opinions of various actions taken at Diablo Canyon. For the most part, GAP's allegations of false statements by the NRC staff and PG&E are based on its own interpretation of the implications of various allegations regarding conditions at Diablo Canyon. Others of GAP's - allegations are based on GAP's differences of opinion with various statements by members of the NRC staff. To the extent that GAP relies on statements by Mr. Yin, GAP's conclusions are not supported by Mr. Yin's statements to the ACRS and a Member of Congress. As for staff's implementation of its policy of reinterviewing allegers, the Commission notes that staff's policy was announced before GAP imposed additional procedural burdens on access to allegers. Finally, regarding statements addressing compliance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, that issue is pending before the Commission in the centext of its review of ALAB-756 and ALAB-763. Because those reviews are still pending, the Commission expresses no opinion on this issue. However, the Commission notes that the Appeal Board found that PG&E had complied with Appendix B. Under these circumstances, the Commission finds that nothing in GAP's s-recent submittal requires the Commission to delay consideration of reinstatement of PG&E's low-power license. However, the Commission has asked its Office of Investigations to consider GAP's request for the protected release of transcripts of interviews to the Board and has requested its Office of Inspector and Auditor to review the petition and to ,'i take whatever actions it deems necessary.
16 Motion For Stay Joint Intervenors have requested the Commission to stay the effec-tiveness of any reinstatement of PG&E's authority to operate Diablo Canyon Unit 1 at low-power until the ccepletion of all pending administrative matters and the conclusion of any judicial review of the Commissicn's decisions underlying such reinstatement of authority. In the alternative, Joint Intervenors have requested the Commissicn to stay for several days any reinstatement of PG&E's low-power license to permit them to apply to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for an emers ncy stay pending appeal. Joint Intervenors base their request on three rs: (1) the issues raised in their stay request of October 31, 1983;(2)pendingallegations'ofdesignandconstructiondeficienciesat Diablo Canyon and motions based on those allegations; and (3) an affidavit by Dr. Michio Kaku. The Conunission belietes there is no warrant to stay the effectiveness of the reinstatement of PG&E's low-pcwer license until all administrative and legal appeals are exhausted. However, the Commis-sion will delay the effectiveness of this decision until noon, April 19, 1984 (Eastern Time) to give Joint Intervenors an opportunity to read the decision and determine whether to pursue judicial review. Nothing has happened since October 31, 1983, which would cause the Commission to change its mind about Joint Intervenor's previous motion for a stay. As for recent developments based on allegations, the progress on resolving these allegations indicates that they do not support a motion for stay. Finally, the generic nature of Dr. Kaku's affidavit reveals a lack of specific knowledge of the Diablo Canyon plant and, in particular, the activities to be undertaken during start-up and low-power testing. The affidavit does not describe any specific aspect of low-power operation of
P 17' Diablo Canyon which would create an undue risk to public health and' safety or to'the plant personnel. Rather, the affidavit is based on general and well-known considerations, some of which are irrelevant to Diablo Canyon, and hypothetical accident scenarios without any indication of their likeli-hood of occurrence during low-power operation at Diablo Canyon. It is well-established that speculation about a nuclear accident does not, as a matter of law, constitute the imminent, irreparable injury required for staying a licensing decision. State of New York v. NRC, 550 F.2d 745, 756-57 (2d Cir. 1977); Virginia Sunshine Alliance v. Hendrie, 477 F. Supp. 68, 70 (D.D.C. 1979). Under these circumstances, the Commission sees nothing in Dr. Kaku's affidavit which contradicts the extensive technical reviews of Diablo Canyon. For these reasons, the Commission denies Joint Intervenor request for a stay. l i \\
18 Conclusion The Comission has determined that the concerns which led it to suspend PG&E's low-power license have been resolved to the point where that license can now be reinstated in its entirety.6 Comissioner Gilinsky dissents from this order. The separate views of Chairman Pa'.ladino and Comissioners Gilinsky and Bernthal are attached. It is so ORDERED. For the Conaission 5.gRREcp h .a /du N t. C ~! c / SAMUEL J. U+1LC D Iji.-@-{./~'t E Secretary of the Comission Os fg. 2-. ',- E Y,g,
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- Dated at Washington,.DC,
\\ N day of A{E l , 1984. this 65till pending before the Comission is PG&E's request for an extension of the expiration date of the original low-power license. As the Comission has previously stated, PG&E's extension request is subsumed within the proceeding on PG&E's application for a full-power operating license. The staff safety evaluations, testimony and views of the parties, and adjudicatory proceedings that have been held in this proceeding are all applicable, to the extent relevant, to PG&E's i extension request. The Comission finds that the previous adjudicatory hearings that have been held satisfy the hearing requests that have been filed with regard to PG&E's extension request and that, because PG&E's extension request does not raise any health, safety or environmental issues that have not been resolved previously, that extension request should be granted.
Chairman palladino's Separate Views I believe that it is important to put in context Commissioner Gilinsky's statements t'30ut reactor operator experience. The Commission did not " disregard a vital safeguard"; it has simply applied the same standards to Diablo Canyon that have been applied to other commercial power plants over the last 17 years. I see no reason to impose different standards on this plant than on the-others which have preceded it. Each-applicant-for a reactor license is required to develop and implement an NRC-approved training program for its reactor operator candidates. It has been NRC practice to accept satis-factory completion of an NRC-approved training program as ful-filling the prerequisite for an operator candidate to take an NRC. reactor operator examination. As pointed out by the staff in SECY 84-152: "There are three phases of an NRC approved cold license ~ training program. Phase I includes basic fundamentals and operation of a research reactor during which the trainee performs at least 10 reactor startups. The time normally required to cover Phase I is 12' weeks. Phase II includes participatory observation of the day-to-day operation of a
~. nuclear power plant. This observation includes normal operation, surveillance testing and radiation' procedures. Also.:ccluded in this phase is the operation of a nuclear power plant simulator similar in design to the facility-for which the trainee will be seeking a. license. The duration of. Phase II-training varies from four to six months. Phase ~III is the. plant specific design lecture series which covers the features of trainee's facility and normally take six weeks to. complete." Reactor simulators have'become sophisticated devices which provide the opportunity to expose a reactor operator candidate tIo.a variety of plant operating conditions which is not generally possible on an actual plant. 4 It is also important to note that actual operating experience has a number of components in which reactor operators are involved. .These include such activities as learning about systems during construction -- a particularly good time to learn about the plant. I also want to comment on Commissioner Gilinsky's statement that '" advisors with questionable qualifications may be positively ' dangerous." I categorically reject the implication that advisors at.Diablo Canyon, or at any plant for that matter, are " positively ' dangerous." Each advisor has previously had an operator license
at'another commerical nuclear-power plant and has undergone training ~and examination on-specifics of the plant at which they -are to: advise. The debate that took1 place relative to Diablo Canyon was not about questionable qualifications. Rather, it was about whether the NRC itself administers the examinations for these advisors or whether the NRC audits the examinations administered by the utility. The-Commission has decided on the latter course of action, but neither. course of action results in advisors who are positively dangerous. l \\
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4/13/84 ADDITIONAL SEPARATE VIEW OF COMMISSIONER GILINSKY ON REINSTATEMENT OF LOW-POWER OP? RATING LICENSE AT DILBLO~ CANYON Attached are the separate views which I distributed two weeks ago when the Commission last discussed'the reinstatement of the Diablo Canyon low power license. At l that time I withheld approval because of the lack of actual operating experience on the plant's operating crews and the . absence of adequate compensating measures. The situation has not changed since then. None of the licensed operators at the plant has actual operating experience at a comparable commercial reactor. f The Commission has decided to require that the operators be backed up 'by experienced adviso::s. The critical difference f between myself and the other Commissioners is over how to l -certify the advisors' knowledge of the plant. Advisors with [ questionable qualifications may be positively dangerous. I l I l 'want the NRC to administer the examinations they will be l' given. The Commission is satisfied with company ) i administered examinations. The view has been expressed that { it makes.no difference who does the examining. I regard i [ this as naive. l Y
[ ee I ~ Since the Commission's la'st meeting on this subject a legal bar to' low power operations at Diablo Canyon has surfaced. .I have~ discovered that-the NRC's regulations: require operators whose license' examination is~ conducted on a. j -simulator, rather than on.an. operating plant, to have had " extensive actual operating experience at a comparable 1 reactor". None of-the Diablo Canyon operators meet this standard. Their licenses are therefore invalid until such i time.as they either meet this test or the Commission decides l l
- to exempt them_from this requirement on the basis of the factors enumerated in the regulations.
After receiving a memorandum from the General Counsel - stating that the course followed in this case is -inconsistent with the plain meaning of the regulations, the Commission decided this morning to ignore its regulations and simply assert that the licenses are valid. The effect ..is to disregard a vital safeguard which ensures that some degree of experience is available on a plant's staff. Had the regulations been followed, Diablo_ Canyon would not now find itself without any experienced operators. The Loperators are the most important safety feature in the plant since they have the discretion to undo all the other safety features in the plant. It is hard to think of a more 'important safety issue _than the competence and experience of L: .the operators. l t
+ '3/27/84-SEPARATE VIEW OF COMMISSIONER GILINSKY REINSTATEMENT.OF LOW-POWER OPERATING LICENSE AT DIABLO CANYON I am withholding my approval of the reinstatement of the .Diablo Canyon low-power license because I am not satisfied-with the readiness of the plant for operation.- I am especially concerned by the absence of commercial experience on'the operating crews and'the failure to compensate adequatelv for this. There'are two other aspects of this' case -- seismic design and. construction quality assurance -- which, while not disabling from the point of view-of low-power operation, do not cast the NRC's own review in a particularly favorable light. Operating Staff Experience I regard the operator experience question as the most important one in-this case. Seismic issues have received a great deal-of attention, as they should, but it is well to remember that' seismic protection is designed against unlikely contingencies. We rely on the operators for ensuring safety 24 hours a day, every day.
q i 4 Diablo Canyon does not have a single operator who has had actual-operating experience on a commercial nuclear power plant of comparable size. Four operators previously operated the Company's Humbolt Bay plant, a very small ' boiling _ water reactor -- one-twentieth the size of each Diablo Canyon unit -- which'has been shut down for 8 years, -hardly relevant experience. Much has been made of the fact of simulator training. This is valuable, but it does not compensate for the complete lack of relevant commercial experience. It is worth noting also that Diablo Canyon does not have a site-specific simulator. This problem should have been resolved a long time ago. At this point, there seems to be no alternative to supplementing the shift crews with experienced advisors for the initial period of operation. The di'fficulty with the D way this has been done is that there is no assurance that they have the site-specific training and knowledge needed -for safe operation. I would approve plant operation at low power if the advisor on each shift previously held a senior operator license on a large commercial plant, and if he has passed the site specific portion of the senior operator license examination for Diablo Canyon. The Commission has' instead chosen to allow the Company itself to decide whether the advisors are qualified and to require such advisors only above'five percent power. l:
Seismic Desian Standard '*1 I continue toLbe concerned by the issue c' seismic design standard's. -The. root of the difficulty is-that although PG&E and.the NRC staff accepted a standar'd based on a. Richter scale-magnitude 7.5 earthquake for the purposes of'the licensing hearing, after the Hosgri fault was discovered,: they'did notiaccept that-standard-in practice. Apparently in order to avoid.having to make significant modifications- .to the design, PG&E'and the NRC staff decided'on a' number of changes in the way the post-Hosgri standard-was applied. These'had the effect of. shaving safety margins'to the maximum extent. In at'least one respect, uhich involved _a substantial reduction in. safety margin, they resorted to a-highly dubious technique. This reduction, referred to as the tau effect, was accepted by two licensing Boards which thought that they,' and the expert witnesses, understood the ' technical basis. As it turns out, there is hardly any technical basis for the reductions. ~ I asked the Commission to take review of this question long ago. There was plenty of time to do a review before the. plant was ready for operation but at each point the concern -that plant operations might be held up persuaded the Commission.to ignore the problem. What I find particularly disturbing is that it was clear to me thct the Commission declined to take review not because it understood the l
-seismic design and thought it to be acceptable, but because it' looked like a can of worms, and the Commission feared the consequences of' reopening the issue. The ACRS recently told the Commission that "we do not believe that scientific or engineering analyses exist today that could be used to calculate the specific quantitative reductions in free-field seismic spectra (the tau effect) that he [Dr. Newmark] recommended for the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant." Had the Committee stated this view years ago when it originally reviewed the seismic design standard, I doubt that the Boards would have accepted the standard. The most favorable statement that the ACRS could ultimately make about the seismic standard was that the Committee-continued to feel that overall "the use of the staff approach leads to an acceptable level of safety in this instance." _This does not address the tau reductions or whether the safety regulations have been satisfied. What I take the Committee to mean is that the earthquake chosen to determine the seismic standard is too large and that the plant's design is adequate for a smaller earthquake. No doubt the Committee also took into consideration the fact that Diablo Canyon is a relatively isolated site. The ACRS did remind the Commission that it had earlier recommended
n:: that a : thorough review of the entire seismic design be undertaken,.to be completed about 1988. At yesterday's meeting, the Commission learned that a paper which is to be delivered at the Scripps Institute in April ' raise's-new questions about the interpretation of the. nature of the faults near Diablo Canyon. This new information reinforces the need for a thorough review of the-entire seismic design, as proposed by the ACRS. The Commission has now agreed in principle to such a. study. I wish this had been done earlier but I am prepared to accept this approach as.a way of dealing with the seismic issue. Construction Quality Assurance The NRC has received hundreds of allegations concerning the Diablo Canyon plant. Because one of the allegations was sent to me directly, I felt that I should look into how they were resolved. I chose the audit of the Pullman Power Products, the prime piping contractor from 1971 to 1977, done by the Nuclear Services Corporation (now Quadrex). An. important conclusion of that audit report was that-the Pullman quality assurance system had been inadequate -- among other things, that "there is no confidence that welding done prior to early 1974 was performed in accordance with welding specification requirements." Most of the piping had been installed by 1974. The NRC staff initially dismissed this' concern on the basis of its discussions with PG&E:and a review of the staff's own audit records'for the period between 1971 and 1977. The NRC staff subsequently decided to look into the allegation more closely, apparently because of the Regional Administrator's feeling that more needed to be done. In December 1983,-the staff issued a supplementary Safety Evaluation Report stating that it.had found "...no evidence to-conclude that there was a programmatic breakdown in Pullman Power Products-QA program..." and that "The details of the staff review are documents in Inspection Report 50/275/83-37." When I asked to see the inspection report three months later, the inspector initially refused to supply it to me. As it turns out, only notes existed at the time that the staff wrote the SSER. So far as I can-tell, the inspection report only began to be written at about the time I asked to see it. An explanation and correction of the reference to the inspection report was subsequently submitted by the staff to the Commission. 1 It now appears that the NRC staff called the leader of the NSC audit only in February and, when that person said that he could not remember much about the audit, did not pursue l
c this further. More could readily have been done, and'should - have been done earlier. I would have more confidence'in this review if the NRC had first contacted the people who worked on NSC's audit, had. then. completed the inspection report, subsequently written the-SSER,'and had only then informed the Board and the Commission of its conclusions.
~ VIEWS OF COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL'ON REINSTATEMENT OF LOW-POWER OPERATING LICENSE AT DIABLO CANYON Having gone through 21 years and literally hundreds of allegations, thousands of hours of inspections, reinspections, analysis, and investigation, we can often lose sight of the 98% that is done, since it-is frecuently the job of the Commission and especially the NRC staff to focus on the 2% that remains undone. I would therefore like to state for the record the effort that has gone into the long, painstaking, and sometimes just plain painful pet iod of reevaluation and modification of the Diablo Canyon power plant. During this period the licensee, through its primary contractor, ^has spent some 2,000,000 hours of professional effort to address the problems raised in the fall of 1981 and thereafter; other firms have carried out independent evaluations to the tune of 250,000 hours; the staff of the NRC has devoted 70,000 hours to the technical issues, and another 18,000 hours to evaluating allegations. Diablo Canyon is almost certainly the -most inspected plant ever built. All this is not to imply, of course, that legitimate questions cannot or should not still be asked. I would like to focus on one or two such broad, and I believe legitimate, considerations that remain with respect to the Diablo Canyon powerplant beginning operations. But first let me note what is not reasonable or legitimate to expect in any such massive endeavor. What is not~ reasonable to expect is perfection. It is not reasonable to expect all things to be perfect at any multibillion dollar construction project, a project involving thousands of workers and millions of independent steps leading to completion, over a period of some 15 years. And, as might have been expected, Diablo Canyon was not perfect. What was not expected, was that it wasn't even just good enough, 21 years ago, when this second construction, as it were, began. In my judgment, two important and legitimate issues deserve special mention here today. One question, and perhaps the most fundamentally 4
2 important because it is unique to Diablo Canyon, is that of the seismic design adequacy of the Diablo Canyon facility. It should be understood that the science of geology, and especially the study and forecasting of seismic events is an_ inexact science, as is the engineering of t structures.to withstand seismic events of a given magnitude. But the . best experts available in the field today have offered reasonable and sufficient assurance that the design basis and construction of this plant is adequate to withstand the maximum probable earthquake in the geologic region of the Diablo Canyon plant. I have supported, and the ACRS has recommended, a continuing review and evaluation of the state of the seismic art and science as it develops and relates to Diablo Canyon over the next several years. In particular, I would note that the recent scientific paper, discussed in some detail at the last meeting of the Commission, apparently indicates that, although the Hosgri fault may be screwhat closer than i l h h h . prev ous y t oug t to t e Diablo Canyon site, the prcbability is that a large, 7.5 Richter-magnitude quake would, under this latest hypothesis, be less frequent than previously thought. I therefore find no reason, based on this latest of what I am sure will be many more papers on California geology and seismology, to change my position on the seismic adequacy of the Diablo Canyon plant. I have reached that conclusion on the basis of my personal inspection of the plant, the recommendation of the ACRS, and the-consensus of expert opinion. Another important issue is that Commissioner Gilinsky raises in respect to operator qualifications. No one questions the legitimacy of that issue, and indeed, the Comission is currently considering the question of how best to achieve not just adequacy, but excellence at all levels in nuclear powerplant operating staff qualifications. But the question here is not how PG&E and other utilities will achieve uniforn excellence in the months and years ahead, but whether PG&E in its Diablo Canyon operations today has achieved a standard that is, beycnd a reasonable doubt, adequate to protect the public health and safety. I believe it has achieved that standard. What they have achieved is good, if not perfect. I would add that, consistent with the strong expressed desires
3 ~ f Comissioner.Gilinsky,.I believe the.Comission does owe this o ~ 1icensee,ias it does all our licensees, a clear statement, and soon, of L hose'further-steps to be-taken along the road to excellence in the t ~ " operator corps as this licensee prepares for full power operation.- It' must'be emphasized'in this context that the Commission meeting this morning was not intended to address, nor is there any specific or ' implied need to ~ address for low-power operations at Diablo Canyon, the . question of the' Comission's longstanding regulation,10 CFR 955.25, and 'the-definition and practical application of that regulation in . satisfying the literal. requirement for " extensive actual operating experience at a comparable reactor." 'The fact-is, the Comission has either implicitly or explicitly concurred in -the evolving application of $55.25 since its promulgation more than 20 years ago. The fact is, 555.25 was promulgated at a time !when reactor. simulators were not generally available. The fact is, in a 1967 :nemorandum, the General Counsel's office explicitly concurred in the criteria which the staff were then applying in determining whether 555.'25 was satisfied or.not. The fact is, the Comission participated in the. development of the ANSI standard which provided that simulator training was an acceptable means of acquiring necessary experience. The regulatory guides which endorsed that ANSI standard as a method of complying with the requirements of $55.25 were published in their final form only after solicitation and consideration of public comments. Further, the Comission was explicitly informed by the staff of the planned issuance of NUREG-009.4 in June, 1976. I It-is both' understandable and eminently reasonable that the (prerequisites for operator licensing should change as the state of the
- art in operator training techniques changes.
Indeed, there are good L reasons to rely heavily on simulator training as a prerequisite for operator licensing, not the.least of which reasons is that in many l respects the use of a simulator is superior to experience gained actually sitting at the controls of a power plant. Given the background l. -of operator licensing criteria applied by this agency for the past 20 t -.,,. -. _ -,... - _ - _ - -.,,.. - ~ - -. _ . _ - ~.,,. _ _ _. _ -... - -.. -.. _ _. - - _.,, _ _ _, - - -.,
4 years _and the implicit, if not explicit, concurrence of the Commission in the application of those criteria, the suggestion that any near term operating license applicant should have a license denied or delayed because the Comission has suddenly changed its mind about what constitutes adequate operator q'ualification would be irresponsible, and would violate fundamental principles of fairness. The Comission has known exactly what it has been doing for 20 years, what it is doing .today, and what it intends to do with regard to operatcr training. The operators at Diablo Canyon meet Comission standards today, and will be required to meet what may well be upgraded standards yet to be adopted by the Comission in future regulations or regulatory guidance. Finally, I would address the concerns raised by Mr. Yin at the last meeting of the Commission, and seemingly resolved during the intervening two weeks. I do not interpret Mr. Yin's carefully considered position to reflect total agreement with his colleagues on all technical issues. I would be surprised, and frankly a little concerned, if there were ever total agreement within our staff on such issues. But I do understand that there is now essential agreement on an action plan and timetable for resolution of the remaining questions, and more importantly, agreement that those remaining questions and differences should not preclude criticality and 5% operation. I would caution that we are never entirely out of the woods in such matters, but I believe we have made significant progress, sufficient to act affirmatively to reinstate the suspended license of Diablo Canyon. There has been a worthwhile and necessary process undemay during the two weeks spent resolving Mr. Yin's questions, with the help of the expert third party oversight of the ACRS. I doubt, incidentally, that Mr. Yin considers himself, as some have characterized him, a "whistleblower". Rather, he is a professional member of the NRC's own technical staff who has openly expressed several times over the last four months, his professional disagreement with other staff on a number of technical issues. That is as it should be. But although the issues had been on the table for months, and had been discussed extensively, they apparently had not been discussed sufficiently prior to the
c LComnissiont s ~ March 27 meeting. : ;50 if.I may proffer ~one plea, ' to put it i' . kindly, to'our staff and especially to the senior stef.f, it would be (that-in-future, ' sten such professionai disagreererts exist acorg staff, ~
- if the Commissior,is. expected to resolve them in a meeting, then the Commission nust bave'the-benefit of an active debate.
Such a debate cannot occur when intrastaff communications nave been poor, ar.d when there 's not everf agreement _cn what the. disagreements are. ~ 1 4/13/84 1 Q-. . _... _ _ _}}