ML20129A035
| ML20129A035 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05000000, Turkey Point |
| Issue date: | 05/31/1984 |
| From: | Varga S Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20127A737 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-84-794 NUDOCS 8506040445 | |
| Download: ML20129A035 (15) | |
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t 7590-01 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY DOCKET NOS. 50-250 AND 50-251 NOTICE OF CONSIDERATION OF ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSES AND PROPOSED NO SIGNIFICANT' HAZARDS' CONSIDERATION DETERMINATION.AND OPPORTUNITY FOR HEARING The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is considering issuance of amendments to Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-31 and DPR-41 issued to Florida Power Company (the licensee), for operation of the Turkey Point Plant, Units 3 and 4, located in Dade County, Florida.
The amendments would allow spent fuel pool storage capacity expansion from 621 to 1404 spaces for each spent fuel pool.
The proposed expansion is to be achieved by reracking each spent f el pool with two discrete regions, within each pool.
These amendments were requested in the licensee's application for amendments dated March 14, 1984.
Before issuance of the proposed license amendments, the Commission will have made findings required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended-(the Act) and the Commission's regulations.
l-The Commission has made a proposed determination that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
Under the Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendments would not (1) involve a I
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ADATD84-794 PDR
4 7590-01,
significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction ~ in a margin of safety.
The, technical evaTuation of whether or not an increased spent fuel pool storage capacity involves significant hazards considerations is centered on three standards: (1) does increasing the spent fuel pool capacity significantly increase the probability or consequences of accidents previously evaluated? Reracking to allow cloper spacing of fuel assemblies does not significantly. increase the probability or consequences of accidents previously analyzed; (2) does increasing the spent fuel storage capacity create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously analyzed? With respect to Turkey Point Plant Units 3 and 4, the staff has.not identified any new categories or types of accidents as a result of reracking to allow closer spacing for the fuel assemblies.
The proposed reracking does not create the possibilty of a new or different kind of accident previously evaluated for the spent fuel pool.
In all reracking reviews completed to date, all credible accidents postulated have been found to be conservatively bounded by the evaluations cited in the safety evaluation reports. supporting each amendment; and (3) does increasing the spent fuel pool storage capacity significantly reduce a margin of safety? The staff has not identified significant' reductions in safety margins due to increasing the storage capacity of spent fuel pools.
The expansion may result in a minor increase in pool temperature by a few degrees, but this heat load increase is generally well within the design limitations of the installed cooling systems.
In some cases it may be
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7590-01.
necessary to increase the hea't removal capacity by relative minor changes in the cooling system, f.e., by increasing a pump capacity.
But in all cases, the temperature of the pool will remain below design values.
The small increase in the total' amount of fission products in the pool is not a significant factor in accident considerations.
The increased storage capacity may result in an increase in the pool reactivity as measured by the neutron ~ multiplication factor (K,ff).
However, after, extensive study, the staff determined in 1976 that as long as the maximum neutron multiplication factor was less than or equal to 0.95, then any change in the pool reactivity would not significantly reduce a margin of safety regardless of the storage capacity of the pool.
The techniques utilized to calculate X,ff have been bench-marked against experimental data and are considered very reliable.
Reracking to~ allow a closer spacing between fuel assemblies can be done by proven technologies.
In summary, replacing existing racks with a design which allows closer spacing between stored spent fuel assemb.ies is considered not likely to involve significant hazards considerations if several conditions are met.
First, no new technology or unproven technology.is utilized in either the construction process or in the analytical techniques necessary to justify the expansion.
Second, the K f the pool is maintained less than or eff equal to 0.95.
Reracking to allow closer spacing satisfies these criteria.
The licensee's submittal of March 14, 1984 included a discussion of tne proposed action with respect to the issue of no significant hazards consideration.
This discussion. has been reviewed and the Commission finds it acceptable.
Pertinent portions of the licensee's discussion, addressing each of the three standards, is provided herein.
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~4-The licensee's evaluatio.n references specific sections of the Safety Analysis Report (SAR) included in their submittal dated. March 14, 1984.
The analysis of the proposed reracking was accomplished using currently acceptable codes and. standards as specified in Section 4.2 of the SAR.
The results of the licensee's analysis in relation to the three standards is as follows:
First Standard - Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
In the course of the analysis Florida Power and _ Light Company (FPL) has identified the following potential accident scenarios:
1.
A spent fuel' assembly drop in the spent fuel pool.
2.
Loss of spent fuel pool cooling system flow.
3.
A seismic event.
4.
A spent fuel cask drop.
5.
A construction accident.
The probability of any of the first four accidents is not affected by the racks themselves; thus reracking cannot increase the probability of these accidents.
As for the construction accident, FPL does not intend to carry any rack directly over the stored spent fuel assemblies.
All work in the spent fuel pool area will be control?ed and performed in strict accordance with specific written procedures.
The spent fuel cask crane which will be used to access the spent fuel pool area has been addressed in FPL's response to the NUREG-0612, " Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power
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j Plants".
This response demonstrated Turkey Point Plant's compliance with
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Phase 1 of the NUREG-0612 criteria.
In addition, the temporary construction crane which will be used to move racks within the spent fuel pool will meet
7590-01 the design and operation requirements of Section 5.1.1 of NUREG-0612.
By letter dated November 1,1983, the NRC concluded that the control of heavy loads program (Phase 1) at the Turkey Point Plant was in compliance with the requirements of NUREG-0612.
This program provides for the safe handling of heavy loads in the vicinity of the Spent Fuel Pool.
Accordingly, the proposed rerack will not involve a significant increase in the probability of an accident previously evaluated..
The consequences of (1) A spent fuel assembly dr'op in the spent fuel pool are discussed in the licensee's Safety Analysis Report.
For this accident condition, the criticality acceptance criterion is not violated.
The radiological consequences of a fuel assembly drop are not changed from that described in Chapter 14 of the Turkey ' Point Updated FSAR.
The NRC also conducted an evaluation (as described in the Turkey Point SER dated 3/15/72) of the potential consequences of a fuel handling accident and found the calculated doses to be less than Part 100 guidelines.
Thus, the consequences of this type accident will not be significantly increased from previously evaluated spent fuel assembly drops, and have been found acceptable by the NRC.
The consequences of (2) Loss of spent fuel pool cooling system flow, have been evaluated and are described in Section 3.0 of the Safety Analysis Report.
The structural integrity of the spent fuel pool will be maintained and no new means of losing cooling water or flow have been identified.
As indicated in Section 3.0, there is sufficient time to provide an alternate means for cooling (i.e., the 100% capacity spare pump) in the event of a failure in the cooling system.
Thus, the consequences of this type accident will not be significantly increased from previously evaluated loss of
7590-01
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l cooling system flow accidents.
Additionally, the NRC has previously accepted this system design in the SER for the last rerack (dated 3/17/77).
The consequences of (3) A seismic event, have been evaluated and are described in Section 4,0 of the Safety Analysis Report.
The new racks will be designed and fabricated to meet the requirements of applicable portions of the stC Regulatory Guides and published standards listed in Section 4.2 of the Safety Analysis Report.
The method of support of the new racks remains the same as for the existing rack.s which are ' freestanding on embedments in the pool floor and able fo transfer normal and shear loads to
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the Spent Fuel Building.
The new racks are designed so that the floor loading from the racks filled with spent fuel issemblies does not exceed the itructural capacity of the Spent Fuel Building.
Therefore the integrity of the pool will be maintained and no new means of losing. cooling water or flow have been identified.
The Spent Fuel Building and pool structure have been designed in accordance with the criteria outlinea in Section 5.2.2 and Appendix SA of the. Turkey Poi Updated FSAR and previously accepted by the NRC.
Thus, the consequences of a seismic event will not significantly increase from previously evaluated events.
The consequences of (4) A spent fuel cask drop have been evaluated as described in Sections 3.0 and 5.0 of the Safety Analysis Report.
By limiting the decay time for all fuel by an area defined by a potential impact arc in the pool to~ 1525 hours0.0177 days <br />0.424 hours <br />0.00252 weeks <br />5.802625e-4 months <br />, the radiological consequences of the cask drop will be well within the guidelines of 10 CFR 100 and will be less than the consequences of the previous Accident Analysis.
The Analysis also demonstrates that K will always be less than the NRC acceptance criteria.
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o 7590-01 Thus, the consequences of a cask drop accident will not be significantly increased from previously evaluated ~ accident analysis.
The consequences of (5) A construction accident are enveloped by the spent fuel cask drop. analysis described in Sections 3.0 and 5.0 of the Safety Analysis Report In addition, all movements of heavy loads handled during Ehe rerack operation will comply with the NRC guidelines presented in NUREG-0612, " Control of Heavy Loads at the Nuclear Power Plants", as described in FPL's previous responses to the NRC, and'as supplemented in Sections 3.0 and 4.0 of the Safety Analysis Report.
Thus, the consequences of a construction accident will not be significantly increased from previously evaluat'ed accident analysis.
Therefore, it is concluded that the p'roposed amendments to rerack the spent fuel pools will not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
Second Standard - Create the possibility of a new or different kind of' accident.from any accident previously evaluated.
The proposed reracking has been evaluated in accordance with the guidance of the NRC position paper entitled, "0T Position for Review and Acceptance of Spent Fuel Storage and Handling Applications", appropriate NRC Regulatory Guides, appropriate NRC Standard Review Plans, and appropriate Industry Codes and Standards as listed in Section 4.2 of the Safety Analysis Report.
In addition, several previous NRC safety evaluation reports for rerack applications similar to this proposal have been reviewed.
Neither the licensee nor the NRC staff could idantify a credible mechanism for breaching the structural integrity of the spent fuel pool which could result
. in loss of cooling water such that cooling flow could not be maintained.
As
7590-01
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a result of this evaluation and these reviews, the proposed reracking does not, in any way, create the possibility of a ' ew or different kind of n
accident from any accident previously evaluated for the Turkey Point Spent Fuel Storage Facilitiet.
Third Standard
-Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
The NRC staff safety evaluation review process has established that the issue of margin of safety, when applied to a,reracking modification, will e
need to address the following areas:
1.
Nuclear criticality considerations.
2.
Thermal-Hydraulic considerations.
3.
Mecha'nical, material and structural considerations.
The established acceptance criteria for criticality is that the neutron multiplication factor in spent fuel pools shall be less than or equal to 0.95, including all uncertainties, under all conditions.
This margin of safety has been adhered to in the criticality analysis methods for the new
- rack design as disi:ussed in Section 3.0 of the Safety Analysis Report.
The methods to be used in the criticality analysis conform with the applicable portions of the codes, standards, and specifications listed in Section 4.2 of the Safety Analysis Report.
In meeting the acceptance i ~
criteria for criticality in the spent fuel pool, such that Keff is-always less than 0.95, including uncertainties of a 95/95 probability confidence level, the proposed amendment to rerack the spent fuel pools will not involve a significant reduction _in the margin of safety for nuclear 1
criticality.
i Conservative methods are used to calculate the maximum fuel temperature
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and the increase in temperature of the water is the spent fuel pool.
The l
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thermal-hydraulic evaluation uses the methods described in Section 3.0 of the Safety Analysis Report in demonstrating the temperature margins of safety are maintaiiled.
The proposed reracking will allow an increase to the heat load in the spen't fuel pool.
The evaluation in Section 3.0 of the Safety Analysis Report 'shows that the existing spent fuel cooling system will maintain the pool temperature margins of. safety for the calculated increase in po'ol heat load.
Thus, there is no signif,icant reduction in the margin of safety for thermal-hydraulic or spent fuel cooling concern.
The main safety function of the spent fuel pool and the racks is to maintain the spent fuel assemblies in a safe configuration through all normal and abnormal loadings, such as an earthquake, impact due to a spent fuel cask drop, drop of a spent fuel assembly, or drop of any other heavy object.
The mechanical, material, and structural considerations of the proposed rerack are described in Section 4.0 of the Safety Analysis Report.
The proposed racks are to be designed in accordance with applicable portions of the "NRC Position for Review and Acceptance of Spent Fuel Storage and Handling Applications", dated April 14, 1978, as modified January 18, 1979; Standard Review Plan 3.8.4; and the Turkey Point Updated FSAR Appendix SA.
The rack materials used are compatible with the spent fuel pool and the spent fuel assemblies.
The structural considerations of the new racks address margins of safety against tilting and deflection or movement, such l
that the racks do not impact each other or the pool walls, damage spent fuel i
j assemblies, or cause criticality concerns.
As previously stated, neither the licensee nor the NRC staff could identify a credible mechanism for
- breaching the structural integrity of the spent fuel pool which could result in loss of cooling water such that cooling flow could not be maintained.
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t 7590-01
- 10 Thus, the margins of safety are not significantly reduced by the proposed
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rerack.
The licensee's request to expand the Turkey Point Plant's spent fuel storage pool capacitiet satisfies the following conditions: (1) the storage expansion method consists of replacing existing racks with a design which allows closer spacing between stored spent fuel assemblies; (2) the storage expansion method does not involve rod censolidation or double tiering; (3) the K,ff of the pool is maintained less than or equal to 0.95; and (4) no new technology or unproven technology is utilized in either the construction process or the analytical techniques necessary to justify the expansion.
Consequently, the request does not involve significant hazards consideration in that it: (1) does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, (2) does not create the possibility of a new or different. kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated, and (3) does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
Accordingly, the Comission proposes to detennine that these changes do not involve a significant hazards consideration.
1 The Commission is seeking public coments on this proposed determination. Any comments received within 30 days after the date of publication of this notice will be considered in making any final detennination.
The Comission will not nonnally make a final determination unless it receives a request for a hearing.
l Coments should be addressed to the Secretary of the Comission, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Comission, Washington, D. C.
20555, ATTN:
Docketing and Service Branch.
7590-01.
By July 9,1984
, the licensee may file a request for a hearing l
with respect to issuance of the amendments to the subject facility operating licenses and any person whose interest may be affected by this proceeding and who wishes to part'icipate as a party in the proceeding must file a written petition for liave to intervene.
Requests for a hearing and petitions for leave to intervene shall be fil,ed in accordance with the Commission's " Rules of Practice for Domestic. Licensing Proceedings" in 10 CFR Part 2.
If a request for a hearing or petition for leave to intervene is filed by the above date, the Connission or.an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, designateo by the Connission or by the Chairman of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel, will rule on the request and/or petition and the Secretary or the designated Atomic Safety and Licensing Board will issue a notice of hearing or an appropriate order.
As required by 10 CFR 12.714, a petition for leave to intervene shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in the proceeding and how that interest may be affected by the results of the proceeding.
The petition should specifically explain the reasons why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the following factors:
(1) the nature of the petitioner's right under the Act to be made a party to the proceeding; (2) the nature and extent of the petitioner's property, financial, or other interest in the proceeding; and (3) the possible effect of any order which may be entered in the proceeding on the petitioner's interest.
The petition should also identify the specific aspect (s) of the subject matter of the proceeding as to which petitioner wishes to intervene. Any person who has filed a petition for leave to intervene or who has been admitted as a party may amend the petition without 1
7590-01,
I requesting leave of the Board up to fifteen (15) days prior to the first prehearing conference scheduled in the proceeding, but such an amended petition must satisfy the specificity requirements described above.
Not later than fifteen (15) days prior to the first prehearing conference scheduled its the proceeding, a petitioner is required.to file a supplement to the petition to intervene which must include a list of the contentions which are sought to be litigated,in the matter, and the bases for each contention set forth wit'h reasonable specificity, pursuant to 10 CFR 52.714(b).
Contentions shall be limited,to matters within the scope of the amendment under consideration.
A petitioner who fails to file such a supplement which satisfies these requirements with respect to at least one contention will. not be permitted to participato as a party.
The Commission hereby provides notice that this proceeding is on an application for a license amendment falling within the scope of Section 134 of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of.1982 (NWPA), 42 U.S.C. 510154.
Under Section 134 of the'NWPA, the Cormnission, at the request of any petitioner or party to the preceeding, is required to employ hybrid hearing procedures with respect to "any matter which the Consnission determines to be in controversy among the parties." Section 134 procedures provide for oral agrument on those issues "deterinined to be in controversy," preceded by discovery under the Rules of Practice, and the designation, following argument, of only those factual issues that involve a genuine and substantial dispute, together with any remaining questions of law to be resolved at an adjudicatory hearing. Actual adjudicatory hearings are to be held only on those issues found to meet the criteria of Section 134 and set for hearing after oral argument on the proposed issues.
However, if no 1
l 7590-01.
petitioner or party requests the use of the hybrid hearing procedures, then the usual 10 CFR Part 2 procedures apply.
(At this time, the Comission does not have effective regulations implementing Section 134 of the NWPA although it has published proposed rules.
See Hybrid Hearing Procedures for Expansion of Onsite Spent Fuel Storage Capacity at Civilian Nuclear Power Re. actors, 48 Fed. Reg. 54,499 (December 5, 1983).)
Subject to the above requirements, and any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene those pennitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding, have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the hearing, including the opportunity to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses.
If a hearing is requested, the Commission will make a final detemination on the. issue of no significant hazards consideration.
The final determination will serve to decide when the hearing is held.
4 If the final detennination is that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration, the Comission may issue the amendment and make it effective, notwithstanding the request for a hearing.
Any hearing held would take place after issuance of the amendment.
If the final determination is that the amendment involves a significant hazards consideration, any hearing held would take place before the issuance of any amendment.
Nomally, the Commission will not issue the amendment until the expiration of the 30-day notice period.
However, should circumstances change during the notice period such that failure to act in a timely way would result, for example, in derating or shutdown of the facility, the
7590-01 ~
i Comission may issue the license amenciment before the expiration of the 30-day notice period, provided that its final determination is that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration.
The final detennination will can'ider all public and State comments received.
Should s
the Comission take this action, it will publish a notice of issuance and provide for opportunity for a hearing after i,ssuance.
The Comission expects that the need to take this action will occur very infrequently.
A request for a hearing or a petition for leave to intervene must be.
filed with the Secretary of the Comission, U,S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission, Washington, D. C.
20555, Attention: Docketing and Service Branch, or may be delivered to the Comission's Public Document Room,1717 H Street, N.W., Washington, D. C., by the above date.
Where petitions are filed during the last ten (10) days of the notice period, it is requested that the petitioner promptly so inform the Commission by a toll-free telephone call to Western Union at (800) 325-6000 (in Missouri (800) 342-6700).
The Western Union operator should be given Datagram Identification Number 3737 and the following message addressed to Steven A.
Varga: petitioner's name and telephone number; date petition was mailed; plant name; and publication date and page number of this FEDERAL REGISTER notice.
A copy of the petition should also be sent to the Executive Legal Director, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission, Washington, D.C.
20555, and to Mr. Harold F. Reis, Esquire, Lowenstein, Newman, Reis and Axelrod, l
1025 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Suite 1224, Washington, D.C.
20036, attorney for the licensee.
Montimely filings of petitions for leave to intervene, amended petitions, supplemental petitions and/or requests for hearing will not be t
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7590-01 s
' entertained absent a determination by the Commission, the presiding officer or the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board designated to rule on the petition
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and/or request, that the petitioner has made a substantial showing of good cause for the granting'of a late petition and/or request.
That determination will be tiased upon a balancing of the factors specified in 10 CFR 2.714(a)(1)(i)-(v) and 2.714(d).
For further details with respect to this action, see the application for amendments which is available for public inspection at. the Comission's Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, N.W., Washington, D.C., and at the Environmental and Urban Affiars Library, Florida ' International University, Miami, Florida 33199.
Dated at Bethesda, Maryland, this 31st day of May 1984.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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tek A ga,
lef ven Operating Reacto ranch #1 Division of Licensing l-i
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISS 7 13 VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY j g. g,fg.g3
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DOCKET NOS. 50-280 AND 50-281
'h g,f,y NOTICE OF CONSIDERATION OF ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSES AND PROPOSED NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION DETERMINATION AND OPPORTUNITY FOR HEARING The U. S. Nuclece Regulatory Comission (the Comission) is considering issuance of amendments to Facility Operating License Nos. OPR-32 and DPR-37, issued to Virginia Electric and Power Company (the licensee), for operation of the Surry Power Station Unit Nos. 1 and 2 located in Surry County, Virginia.
The amendment would revise the Technical Specifications 2.1, 2.3 and 3.12 N
to change the existing FaH = 1.55 (1 + 0.3(1-P)) where a 0.3 multiplier is used instead of a 0.2 multiplier and to revise the rod insertion limits.
The changes are proposed by the licensee's application dated May 2, 1983.
'N The Surry FaH fractional power limit is proposed to be modified to incor-N parate a 0.3 fractional power multiplier.
The full power FaH limit will remain N
i unchanged. The increased fractional power FaH will be compensated for by more restrictive fractional power core thermal limits.
The more restrictive core l
l thermal limit lines will maintain the current design bases DNB criteria.
These l
analyses were performed using analytical techniques consistent with the Surry design bases and previous NRC-approved 0.3 fractional multiplier analyses, i
The Surry Uni.t i rod insertion limits were raised prior to Cycle 7 operation N
to ensure the predicted FaH radial peaking factor would remain within the Technical Specification limits.
Implementation of the 0.3 part power multiplier i
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on FaH will provide substantial additional peaking factor margin at low powers, and will allow restoration of the rod insertion limits to pre-Cycle 7 values after approximately one month of Cycle 7 operation.
Before issuance of the proposed amendments, the Comission will have made findings required by the Atomic Energy. Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Comission's regulations.
The Comission has made a proposed determination that the amendments requests involve no significant hazards consideration.
Under the Comi;sion's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation of the facilities in accordance with the proposed amendments would not (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
The Comission has provided guidance concerning the application of these standards by providing certain examples (48 FR-14870).
The change related to the fractional multiplier falls within the category of example (vi) of a no significant hazards consideration which may in some way reduce a safety margin but where the results of the change are clearly within all acceptable criteria.
The fractional multiplier was derived using previously approved techniques.
In addition, the change in margin is compensated by more restrictive fractional power core thermal limits.
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7590-01 o
I The change related to the rod insertion limits similarly falls into the category of example (vi) of a no significant hazards consideration in that previously approved techniques were used in detemining the limits.
In addit on, the rod insertion limits change is compensated by the additional peaking factor margin at low powers.
The Comission is seeking public coments on this proposed detennination.
Any comments received within' 30 days after the date of publication of this notice will be considered in making any final determination.
The Comission will not normally make a final determination unless it receives a request for a hearing.
Coments should be addressed'to the Secretary of the Comission, U. S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D. C.
20555, Attention:
Docketing
.and Service Branch.
By August 15,1983, the licensee may file a request for a hearing with respect to issuance of the amendments to the subject facilities operating licenses and any person whose interest may be affected by this proceeding and who wishes to participate as a party in the proceeding must file a written petition for leave to intervene.
Request for a hearing and petitions for I
leave to intervene shall be filed in accordance with the Commiss. ion's " Rules of Practice for Domestic Licensing Proceedings" in 10 CFR Part 2.
If a request for a hearing or petition for leave to intervene is filed by the above date, the Comission or an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, des 2cnated by the Comission or by the Chairman of the Atomic Safecy and Licensing Board Panel, will rule on the request and/or petition and the Secretary or the designated
'(
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board will issue a notice of hearing or an appro -
priate order.
=4 As required by 10 CFR 52.714, a petition for leave to intervene shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of the proceeding.
The petition should specif,1cally explain the reasons why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the following factors:
(1) the nature of the petitioner's right under the Act to be made a party to the proceeding; (2) the nature and extent of the petitioner's property, financial, or other interest in the proceeding; and (3) the possible effect of any orde'r which may be entered in the proceeding on the petitioner's interest.
The petition i
should also identify the specific aspect (s) of the subject matter of the proceeding as to which petitioner wishes to intervene.
Any person who, has filed a petition for leave to intervene or who has been admitted as a party may amend.the petition without requesting leave of the Board up to fifteen (15) days prior to the first prehearing conference scheduled in the proceeding, but such an amended petition must satisfy the specificity requirements described above.
Not later than fifteen (15) days prior to the first prehearing conference scheduled in the proceeding, a petitioner shall file a supplement to the petition to intervene which must include a list of the contentions which are sought to be litigated in the matter, and the bases for each contention set forth with reasonable specificity.
Contentions shall be limited to matters within the scope of the amendments under consideration.
A petitioner who fails to file such a supplement which satisfies these requirements with respect to at least one contention will not be permitted to participate as a party.
4
/d90-01 0-
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Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding, subject to any limitations in the order grariting leave to intervene, and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the hearing, including the opportunity to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses.
If a hearing is requested, the Commission will make a final determination i
on the issue of no significant hazards consideration.
The final determination will serve to decide when the hearing is held.
If the final determination is that the amendments request involves no significant hazards consideration, the Consission may issue the amendnents and make them effective, notwithstanding the request for a hearing.
Any hearing held would take place after-issuance of the amendments.
If tim final determination.is that the amendnents involve a significant hazards consideration, any hearing held would take place before the issuance of any amendments.
Normally, the Commission will not issue the amendments until the expir-ation of the 30-day notice period. However, should circumstances change during the notice period such that failure to act in a timely way would result, for example, in derating or shutdown of the facility, the Consission may issue the license amendments before the expiration of the 30-day notice period, provided that its final determination is that the amendnents involve no significant hazards consideration. The final determination will consider all public and State connents received.
Should the Connission take this
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s 7590=01 g
- action, it will' publish a notice of issuance and provide for opportunity for a hearing after issuance. The~ Consission expects that' the need to take this action will occur very infrequently.
A request. for a hearing. or a petition for leave to intervene must be filed with the Secretary of the Connission U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Consission, Washington, D.C.
20555, Attention: Docketing and Service Branch, or may be delivered to the Commission.'s Public Doctanent Room,1717 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C., by the above date. Where petitions are filed during the last ten (10) days of the notice period.. it is requested that the petitioner promptly so infons the Commission by a toll-free telephone call to Western Union at (800) 325-6000 (in Missouri (800)~342-6700). The Western Union operator should' be given Datagram Identification Number 3737 and the following message addressed to Steven A. Varga, Chief, Operating Reactors Branch No. 1, Division of Licensing:
petitioner's name and telephone number; date petition was mailed; plant name; and publication date and page number of this FEDERAL REGISTER notice. A copy of the petition should also be sent to the Executive Legal Director, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Connission, Washington, D.C.
- 20555, and to Mr. Michael U. Maupin Hunton and Williams, Post Office Box 1535, Richmond, Virginia 23213, attorney for the Ticensee.
l Montimely filings of petitions for leave to intervene, amended petitions, supplemental petitions and/or requests for hearing will not be entertained absent a determination by the Connission, the presiding officer or the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board designated to rule on the petition and/or request.
that the petitioner has made a substantial showing of good cause for the
(,
/S90-01 7-granting of a late petition and/or request.
That determination wlll be based upon a balancing of the factors specified in 10 CFR 2.714(a)(1)(1)-(v) and 2.714(d).
For further details with respect to this sction, see the application for amendments which is available for public inspection at the Consisison's Public Document Room,1717 H Street, N.W., Washington, D.C., and at the Swem Library, College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, Virginia 23185.-
Dated at Bethesda, Maryland, this lith day of July 1983.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMISSION i
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tevenA.Varka,C Operating Reactors ch No. 1 Division of Licensing s
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