ML20128P636
| ML20128P636 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | La Crosse File:Dairyland Power Cooperative icon.png |
| Issue date: | 07/17/1985 |
| From: | Taylor J DAIRYLAND POWER COOPERATIVE |
| To: | Zwolinski J Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737, RTR-REGGD-01.097, RTR-REGGD-1.097 GL-82-33, LAC-11027, NUDOCS 8507260467 | |
| Download: ML20128P636 (22) | |
Text
.
j a v'
D DA/RYLAND h [k COOPERAT/VE P.O BOX 817 2615 EAST AV SOUTH . LA CROSSE. WISCONSIN 64601 (608) 788-4000 July 17, 1985 In reply, please refer to LAC-11027 DOCKET NO. 50-409 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attn: Mr. John Zwolinski, Chief Operating Brannch #5 Division of Licensing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 -
SUBJECT:
DAIRYLAND POWER COOPERATIVE (DPC)
LA CROSSE BOILING WATER REACTOR (LACBWR)
PROVISIONAL OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-45 POST TMI REQUIREMENTS, SAFETY PARAMETER DISPLAY SYSTEM NUREG-0727 SUPPLEMENT, GENERIC LETTER NO. 82-33 REQUIREMENTS FOR EMERGENCY RESPONSE CAPABILITY
References:
(1) NRC Letter, Crutchfield to Linder, dated July 12, 1983.
(2) DPC Letter, Linder to Crutchfield, LAC-9252 dated August 11, 1983.
(3) DPC Letter, Linder to Paulson, LAC-10251 dated October 11, 1984.
(4) DPC Letter, Linder to Zwolinski, LAC-10639 dated March 15, 1985.
(5) NRC Letter, Paulson to Linder, dated August 17, 1984.
(6) NRC Letter, Crutchfield to Linder, dated May 14, 1984 Dear Mr. Zwolinski Reference 1 requested that DPC discuss how the plant deviates from the guidance in Regulatory Guide 1.97. Reference 2 stated that a report on Regulatory Guide 1.97, Revision 2 will be submitted by July 1985. In 1983, Revision 3 to Regulatory Guide 1.97 was issued. This letter will show in which areas LACBWR meets and deviates from Regulatory Guide 1.97, Revision 3, the current issue.
The enclosed table documents what instrumentation LACBWR has for the variables listed in Reg. Guide 1.97. The BWR listing in the regulatory guide is geared specifically to a General Electric BWR. Since LACBWR is an Allis-Chalmers BWR, systema differ as does the information necessary to determine whether -
safety functions are being maintained.
WP1.4.6 , 8507260467 850717 f[f N hDR ADOCM 05000409 PDR t 'l.o
s o
Jchn A. Zwolin:ki, Chisf July 17, 1985 Operating Reactor's Branch #5 LAC-11027 LACBWR is a smaller, simpler plant than the other BWR's. Therefore, not as much information is necessary to determine the safety status of the plant. In some cases where qualified instrumentation is not available for a variable, diverse parameters can be consulted to obtain an approximate status indication.
LACBWR's small size equates to less severe consequences for a major accident than at other plants. A consequence study was submitted to the NRC in Reference 3, with additional information provided in Reference 4. The results of that study were that the radiological consequences of a major accident were acceptable as long as adequate core cooling was maintained. Therefore, the most important information needed during an accident is whether adequate core cooling exists. Other indications are of lesser importance.
Adequate core cooling is provided by any one of the following: 1) water level above the top of the core, 2) 1 High Pressure Core Spray Pump operating, 3) 1 Alternate Core Spray Pump operating with reactor pressure < 50 psig, 4) Low Pressure Core Spray Valve open with differential pressure between the reactor and Containment Building less than 30 paid, or 5) Containment Building flooded to core midplane following a LOCA. If the control room instrumentation includes the above information, it is adequate to determine whether the radiological consequences of an accident are acceptable or not.
The control room actually contains considerably more instrumentation than is needed for just determination of adequacy of core cooling. Attachment 1 shows the instrumentation, its range, environmental qualification, redundancy and type of power supply for the variables listed in Regulatory Guide 1.97, Revision 3. All LACBWR control room instrumentation is governed by the approved Quality Assurance program to varying degrees, dependent on the function of the instrumentation.
The consequence study (Reference 3 and 4) discussed earlier detailed the possible effects of the design basis earthquake, safe shutdown methodologies, i and plant modifications necessary to implement safe shutdown. The instrumentation which is installed due to resolution of the seismic topic will be qualified to perform following the design basis earthquake (DBE). Since control room instrumentation is not expected to be used following the DBE, seismic qualifications are not needed or discussed in the table.
Attachment 2 discusses the deviations from the guidance provided in Regulatory Guide 1.97. From the review of Attachments 1 and 2, DPC has concluded that sufficient instrumentation is available to determine the magnitude and severity of an accident or transient despite the deviations between LACBWR instrumentation and the Regulatory Guide 1.97 guidance. Where instrumentation is not environmentally qualified, it is not needed during a major loss of coolant and/or diverse parameters are available which provide sufficient information. Therefore, no modifications or additions are necessary due to the Regulatory Guide 1.97 review.
WPl.4.6 s
O-Jr.hn A. Zwolin:ki,-Chicf July 17, 1985 Operating Reactor's Branch #5 LAC-11027 If there are any questions, please contact us.
Yours truly, DAIRYLAND POWER COOPERATIVE
$f$h /
V Jaines W. Taylor General Manager FL:LSG:RMB:sks cc: J. G. Keppler, Region III NRC Resident Inspector Walter Paulson, LACBWR Project Manager WPl.4.6
. m. mA O'
I i
- ~
l Type a ttt last rument Catemory <** Ramae Canalificatten todundance power source Display Beactivity Control meclear lastrumentattee 1 latermediate Bamse 104 to 10E Full Feuer Mild 34 1A Inverter Control Beem m3t 10-11 to 104 Ampe met 104 to log ye11 yeuer Mild N3 18 inverter Control Boom 10-II to I d Ampo Peuer Rease 1 sSt 104 to 1501 Full Power Mild 56 1B Inverter Centrol Rose ut 104 to 1501 Full Feuer Mild 55 IB Inverter Control Race s7I 1 to 1501 Fell Feuer M11d N5,6,8 18 laverter control Roon 587 1 to 1503 Full Power Mild N5,6,7 18 Inverter Control Room Centrol Rod Poetties 3 Frimary 0-45 inches Mild uot Required Rs Building MCCLA Control Room Secondary, Rode Full In Secondary 15 lampe (steps) Mild not Required la leverter Control Room p Frimary, Rode Full la Ra Plant 125 VDC l
l Red Full la Oa/Off Mild Not Required 18 Inverter Control Room l Frimary, Secondary Rs Bldg. MCCIA l
t RCS Solable aeros Concentra- 3 0.1-10 pre - sample cas Mild MA Statica Fouer Radio-l ties Grah sample be diluted for extended Chemistry Lab range i Lore coettaa 1
Reacter heter Level 1 safety t h ===1 1 -30 to +30 toch Marsh Chamael 2,3 18 laverter Control Room Safety na-12 -30 to +30 f ach marsh Chamael 1,3 1A laverter Control Room safety n--I 3 -30 to +30 inch marsh Chaamel 1,2 1C laverter Control Room l Core Temperatore
- RA NA NA NA MA NA
- met Flaat spect14e
! I Recorded Contimmensly l
IT Stered In Computer Memory
??? As befteed in Regulatory Guide 1.97
.g-kF1.4.e
(
l
- s. __Y 4
Type B taetrumeet Catefory Range Qualification Redundance Power Soerce Display teacter Coolant System Imregrity Beacter Pressere I Safety rs ,g gi 0 3600 peig Mild S.S. Channel 2 la Inverter Control Room Safety Chamael 2 0-1600 psig Mild S.S. Channel i IB Inverter Control Room EPCS U 0-1400 psig Earsh S.S. Channel I and 2 IS Inverter Control Room Barrow Range I 1200-1400 pstg Mild S.S. Channel I and 2 It !averter Control Room RPCS Drywell Pressere
- NA NA NA NA NA NA Drywell Semp 14 ,el - 1 0-12' Mild la Inverter control Room Cantatement Reteattaa 0-12' Mtid IB Inverter Control Room Tank Level (2 chm ==els) Mild level Switch High Alare 120V Reg. TBMCCIA Control Room 125V Rs Plant DC Caetatament integrity Containment Pressere I ch,a=+1 2 0-70 psig Mild Channel I ** I A Inverter Control Room Chammet i I." -5 to 200 pets Mild Channel 2 ** 18 Inverter Cont rol Room
! Primary containeret Isolation i Valve Position Cantalement Weattlation Opes-Closed Mild Two Inlet 18 Inverter Control Room Two outlet l
4' Vest Meader open-Closed Mild External Valve 18 Inverter Control Room Decay Meat Blondown Slide-Wire 0-1002 Mild None IB Inverter '
Control Room Beteettee Tash Discharge Opes-Closed Mild IB Inverter Control Room Liquid Waste IB Inverter Control Room Flow Indication (0-99.9 CP4)
- het Flaat Specatic
- Redwadant For Analyzed Accide,nt Range I
Recorded Canti - *1y
" Stored la rv ter Memory hP1.4.6
7T, ._
'E' ^q
'w
_ _ . . . - eum enum eum -EED eth 4Emuk -
3 III -
-21 ; 5 I to o t bb b E gb J E : E-I y!
z 5
i 3
- hE - =-----------
I.
st 5
t g "
- EC I "- h 4
P "! g U
- A "E ;f E- 4 -
saanIa:g
- 4. e
. I 8
3
= s I E e
i s*
t I % A3 y<
\
.j l
~
M.
u 8
3 '
, : : 1 I
, l *
'1 'I "g '
]age l gj's- ! ,
n i
- z: si a.
A la 1 I
l l
- ., -n.eq e
~ Cr Type C 1morrummer Category Ramme Quellficattee
'~e Power Searce Dioelay Feel Claddian Radioactivity Concentrattee er 1 Radiatise level ta Circulattag Primary Coolant - Offgae 0-10' cpm (-0-10' eC1/cc Mild is leverter Centrol toen l heetter i er 103 C1/ day)
Tietoreen Peel Inte?tity is laverter Castrel Rose Offees 7
Monitor (0-10 ma/br) analyste of Primary Coelant 3 10-I to 10-2 me1/mi Mild 3 detectore TSC Inverter Plant Lab l (Y opectrum) sample can be diluted to 2 separate spectrum 18 Diesel Generator cover entended range eettets l
l l M NA hm Core Temperature
- MA NA EA Beacter Coelaat Pressure boundary Beacter Freemere 1 Safety Chammet I t 0-1600 peig Mild S.S. Chaemel 2 la taverter Control Room
- Safety th - 1 2 0-1600 pois Mild S.S. Chamael 1 13 Inverter Control Room RFCS tt o.1400 pois Marsh S.S. Chamael 1 and 2 15 Inverter Control Room marrow Range i 1200-1400 psis Mild S.S. Chamael 1,2, hPCS 1B Inverter Control Room Contatement Radiattee T 3 0.1-10 R/ur (5 detectore Mild 18 laverter local and 0.1-100 R/Br (2 detector M11d 18 inverter Control Room Barsh Cont. 314 3. High Range is Inverter Control Room Area Radiation Monster 15 Diesel Generator 108-108 R/ur (2 Chaa.)
Drywell Sump 1.ewel (Retenties 1 0-12' Mild 15 taverter control Room Tank Level) 2 ^ = - Is 0-12' Mild 15 Inverter Control Room 14 vel Switch High Alare 120V Reg. TBMCCIA Control Room 125 V Rs Plant DC Suppreestem reet level
- EA NA NA NA NA NA Drywell Pressure
- 3A NA NA NA NA NA
- het Flaat spectiac I Recorded Coatinuously TT Stored la Computer Memory
.A.
b?!.A.6
Type C B !=etrueest 6 Category Range (b.al if ic a t ion Redundance Power Source Display l
l Come.1. ment l
l Reacter Pressere I I
l Safety n ====1 It 0-1600 psig Mild S.S. Channel 2 1A !averter Control Room l
l Safety n - 1 2 0-1600 peig Mild S.S.n ===e1 1 It Inverter Control Room 1
l RFCS tt 0-1400 psig Marsh S.S. n ===e1 1 and 2 la Inverter Control Room 0
marrow Range I 1200-1400 pe13 Mild S.S. Channel I 2 and IIFCS IS laverter Control Rees l Costalaneet Pressure I n-1 1 I ." -5 to 200 pois Mild Channel 2 ** 15 Inverter Control Room 1 .
l Chamael 2 0-70 psig Mild Channel I ** 1A laverter Control Roon l
l Caetalaneet Rydrogen I l
l n====1 1 " 0-251 Mild Chaneet 2 TB MCC1A Reg. Bus local and l Control Room 6
l Ch neel 2 0-251 Mild Chanael i Ts McCIA Reg. Sus local and l Control Rooom l
l Contatament and Drywell l MA NA NA NA NA NA l oaygea= (s.r 1.erted l contataments) g l ii l Caetateneet Rifluent l 3 l Identitled Release rotats l 6 Gaseous heitor 'I l 104 to 10-2 pC1/cc Mild FIE 3 or SPINC 4 Ra Bldg. MCCI A (pump) 14 cal and l ,i i Ex B1dg. MCC18 Controf Room l assiliary Su11 dings
- 2 i (Monitor) l i
l FIM 3 " 10-7 to 103 pC1/cc Mild SPIE 4 TBMCCIA - Reg. Bus local and l l ,1 Control Room l l l (CT-2) i i l SFl% 4 " l 104 to 105 pC1/cc Mild FIE 3 ** TBMCCIA Local and l l Control Room l l (CT-2)
I l
- hot Flaat specat ac
- Redundant For Analyzed ACC1 dest Reese I
Recorded Coetteuously ,
' Stored la Computer Memory mF1.4.0 l
1 .
type D last rueest Category Range Qualiftestion Redundance Power Source Displev Condensate and Feedwater Systee Male reedwater Flow I 3 0-800,000 lbe/br Mild Not Regatred IB Inverter control Room Camdessate Storage Tsak 3 0-30 ft. Mild Not Regelred BS Inverter Control Room Frienry Centainment Ratated Systems Suppresstem char Spray
- EA NA NA NA NA NA Flow Drywell Pressere
- EA NA NA NA NA NA Suppressten Pool Level
- RA NA NA NA NA NA Drywell Atmosphere
- RA NA NA NA NA NA Temperature Drywell Spray Flow
- MA NA NA NA NA NA Mate seema Mate Steauline isolator Valve EA NA NA NA NA NA l 1eakage Centrol Systes*
l Primary Systee Saf ety Relief 2 Opee-Closed Marsh Thermoccuples Rm Plant I25 VDC Control Room Valve Peettles Indicattom (3 Valves)
MDS Valve Poettlee NA Open-Closed Marsh Not Required Rx Plant 125 VDC Control Room IAC and IDC Valve IB Taverter MSIW Indicatten Opee<!osed Mild Rx Plant I25 VDC Control Roon External valve (turbine TBMCC IA butIdtng MSIV)
Safet , Systee Slidewtre on Rs blog. 15 Inverter MSIV (0-I002)
I Sm. eda e condenser 5,stee l
l Valve Posities Steam Inlet 2 Opes-Closed Marsh 2 Channels Cen. Plant 125 VDC Control Room l 2 channels Rx Plant 125 VDC Control Room Valve Positioner 18 inverter Control Roon
$11dewire
-
- het Plant Specific I
Rec.orded Conttamously 6-hiPl.4.6 l
t t
.f.{
h +
Type 8 teerresset Cet , Reese Omettiteetten Redondence poner Source Steeler Sheedene Ceed. System (Caec'd)
Ceedeemste cettet Talve 2 Opes-Clemed moreh Not Regetred Ra Pieme 125 VDC Centret base feetties Cee. Plant 125 vec Offges West Walee Peettien 2 Opes-Cleoed Bersh not Regelred Ra Fleet 125 TBC Centrol Rees Ceedessere Leg Brete Velve 2 some pone Not Regetred Ween None Peettlee Se h ey Imel 2 -16 to +16 taches Nild Not Regetred IS Inverter Centrel Bees BCIC Flew
- MA 54 NA NA NA Mene BPCS Flow " 2 0-520 spe Eersh Not Regetred IS Inverter Contret Seem ACS Flor " 2 0-1300 spe NtId Not Regelred IB towerter Concret Rees LPCS Wolve Peettles 2 Opes-Closed Eersh IB Inverter Control Room Flow Alere tu Plant 125 vec Castrol Room TBNCCIA Res. Bus SLCS Flow
- 54 MA NA NA NA NA
$143 Storage Teek Level
- EA NA NA NA NA NA Resident meer Reeswel Sveree ama Systen Flew
- RA 54 NA NA NA NA RER Rest Escheese
- SA BA NA MA NA NA cettet Temperatore I
I Caeltog beter systee l
f Coettag Eeter Temperatore to
Water Flew Coeltog Water Flow to ESF
- MA R4 EA WA NA NA System Campements
- het Fleet $peclite ,
- Seduedent For Amelysed Acetdest Reage
" Stored In Ceeputer feemory
.y.
hFt.4.6 l
[
l
, , _ . - . , , . , , . . - _ , - - , - - . . - - - - - - - . , , --- -- - - - - , - - - - - ~~ - - r ' - ' ' "' " ^ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ^ ~' -~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ^ ~ ~ ~ )
I Type D l Imot.- t Categer, I konge N lificerlee i Redondance I Power Source I Display I l l 5 3 3 a eter Se.t I I I l l l 1 I Eeteettaa Tank Lewis 3 0-12' l Mild I la incerter l Caetrol Race 1 (2 Chaumels) 6-12' MId I l 13 Inverter I I Level Switch Wish Alare i 120T geg. TEMCC 1A L Control Room I i 125V Ex Plant DC I Teactistfee Sy.ree l I { '
5 Emergency Teattlattes Damper
- E4 EA BA NA I MA ' NA Positton i 1 Power SeepItee 2 l I I I T3 NCE1A (1A Diesel Ceeerster 0-600 Y MId not Regelred l N/A l Control Room I TS nCCIA 0-500 Amp Pald Wet tegelred I 5/A l Control Room LA D/G AMPS 0-500 Amy Mild Not tegelred i N/A I Control Room i I Ra B1d3 . McCla/18 Diese! O.400 V Mild Not tegetred I W/A I Control Bece I Cener.t r W.1t.se i I I ts z... S-stens eer a=ps 0-1500 a=p. Msta I not seg tred I w/a IC tr. a.oe I as stea l Cew r.ter a ,. 0-a00 am,. Mtad I set seg.ared I m/a i coetr.: aco. I I I I i 13 Diesel Build aa 125 TDC 0-150 T wild l Not segstred l N/A l Control Room i I I I i 1A Static lowerter voltage Im. a - tater Fasel F l Mild I Wet sequired l Cen. Plaar 125 TDC I control Room l I I I I !
18 Static laverter Tremble a-tater Fanet F I Mild I Not Required i Cen. Plant 125 TDC l Control Room i I I I I I IC Statte lawrter Weltese Law a - tater Panel F I Mite I Wot teguired I Cem. Plant 125 TDC I Control Room I I l 1 I I Diesel Cenerator la law a - nator Panel F Mild l Not Regetred i Cen. Plant 125 TDC i control Room l sautery T.itage ! I I I I I I I et I ce-erater ta areaker Anm csator r..et r i Mtad I wat seg=tred I Cea. Plant 125 TDC i control moom i Trip i i l I I I N I I ta ote.et Ce w roter a - tator ca et r Mata I set seg.tred l' Cen. Plant 125 TDC i concret soom I s.t a. a.c. I I I I I I ste.et Cew r.ter me.cr.1 a - tater ca.et r i Maid I not seg.ared C... Pla 125 VDC C tr. moo. I uwa i I l l 1 I I Diesel Generater 13 set te a - tater Panel F l Mild s l Bot Required l Cea. Plant 125 VDC I control Woos I a.t. n.d. I I I I I I I I I I
- bet Plant $pectile
- Redondant for Analyzed Accident Range #
.g.
h;Ft.4.6
y
[}
e Type D Instrueest Category Range Omaltiteat ten u Redundance i Power Source i Dioelay I I
Fwer suprites (ceer'd) 2 !
l 11 il l Diesel Generator Bettery Ammmaciator Panet P Mild Not Regelred I Cea. Plant 125 TDC I Control Roou l Changer Tremble I l l l 1 1 I Diesel sealdtas 125 TDC see Ammusciator Mild Not Required l Cee. Plant 125 TDC lI Centrol Room lI Creemd er Law Tetrage I I i 1B Statte laverter Static A - later Wild not Required I Cee. Plant 125 TDC Centrol Room I Switch Bypese I l' I I H Diesel Ceeerster IS Tremble a====eteter F114 Not Required l Cea. Plant 125 TDC I Control Room i I Diesel Cenerater IB Ante Start a - tater Mild i Not Required l Cee. Plant 125 TDC I Control Room l I I .
Diesel Generater 13 a=== tag a====etater Mild I not Required l Cem. Plant 125 TDC l Control Room I i l I i Diesel Cenerater la Breaker a====etater Mild I met Required l Ces. Plant 125 TDC l control Rooo I Tripped l l 1 l 1 1 I I I Diesel Generator 13 Test Amaneciator I Mild i Not Required l Cee. Plant 125 TDC l Centrol Room i I I I I i 125TDC tus Plant Charger Correst 0-200A I Mild I Wet Required I MA I Elect. Pg. Ret l I i i l I 125vDC Em Plant Sattery Correst 100 + 200A I Mild l Not Required i NA I Elect. Pg. RaI I I I I I i 125TDC Ra Plant Battery Tottage 0-150 TDC I Mild l Not Required I WA l Elect. Fg. RuI I I I I I i 125 TDC Bu Plant see Tie Carrent 100+200A l Mild I Wet Required i MA I Eleet. Eq. RmI I I I I I I Rs Plast Battery Charger Amannefator l M11d I Wet Required l Bu Plant 125 TDC I Control Room I i Fattere l TEMCCIA Reg. Rue l l
! I I I Ra Fleet 125 TDC Cremad Anamnetator Mild ' Not Required l Rs Plant 125 TDC l control Room I I TBMCCIA Res. Rue l l I I l 125VDC Cenerater Plant 100-0-200A Mild ' Not Regatred I MA I Elect. E4. Se i
Battery Current I l l l I l 125 TDC Cenerator Plant 0-200A ' Mild Not Required 1 MA l Elect. Eq. Ra' l l Charger Correst l' ll I I I l l l l
! i l t i i l i i i 1
- not riant sPeettac
.g-WP1.4.4
N
' ' ,y I
9 s
, B 4x 8 4 2 2 E g E $ $
i
- i. .
ut*
m E E 8 3 3
. I 1 1
.t l E R 8
i o o i g
I l
I 3= 5.
= E i
f l
f 8
, ,3 I
1
- is
- I
'Ig sy 15 I n 3
E g g
. = c, e I
I e t*
3 i
b
- 1
- & 1 1 u
- - m 9
i i
i
TFr* E Instruest Catesery Range Quellfication Redundance Power Source Display Centalmeest Area Radiattem Eigh Basse Area Mootter 1 Apprestestely $ R/hr to Marsh 2 Chaemele IB leverter Control Room (2 Chaemela) Cent. 314g. alsh to 108 t/hr 15 Diesel Generator Sad. Area Radiattee Mootter I.TT Beector 311dtag er 2 0.1 to 10 afkr (5 Ch.) Mild seceedary C+etataneet t 18 laverter Local and 01 to 100 t/hr (2 Ch.) Mild 18 Inverter Control Room Coet. 31dg. Eigh Rad. IS Inverter Control Room Area Radiation Monitor 15 Diesel Generater Centrol Room Area Radiaties Terbine 3 1141ag i 3 0.1 to 10 t/Br (6 Ch.) Mild Other Chaseele is leverter Local and Control Room I Airborne Radleecttwo
! naterials teleased free Fleet Commee Release Puiet Noble 2 FIBG 3 10-7-103 ict/cc Mild srtuc 4 TBMCC la Reg. Bus Local and Genes (For I er 2 $ tack SF1HG 4 1G*I-105 pC1/cc Mild FING 3 ** TEMCC la Control Room 31euers) it CT2 1 Part. & Belegens 3 to-I to 10-2 pC1/e1 Mild 1 detector with m H W H00 UPS/18 D/G Radio-( Cheetstry Lab
. 3 detectore/2 separate Besse Radie-games spectreecepy Revires. Lab j tereteele 1
[
Emwireme"Radiattee and hadleecttwity to,1ree - airherme radie- 3 104 pC1/cc 3 iC1/cc mild 7 Air semplere a H00 Urs m malegees and Particulatee Termen Electric Coop Flaat and Revirmasset 3 2 Setendere 0-1000 m/ar Mild 303 0-5a N/A Local Badiattee scale met calibrated 3034 0-508 O-100 R/Br te last cal.
Plant & Envires. Badteactive 3 no portable teetopte unne not se ptred unee meme Fort.1 met. amelysis device.
- met Flant Spectiac
- Sew =* For amelysed accident asese T Secorded Coettamenely i TI Stored la Comyster numery WP1.46 d
f .(,
.f e ,
I Type E Instrument Category Range Qualification Redundance Power Snurce Displav Meteorology Wind Direction 3 10 M I,II 0-540* Mild Not Regelred la Diesel Cenerator Control Room Switchgear j
100M t,ft 0-540' Mild Not Required IB Diesel Cenerator Control Room Switchgear Wind Speed -
3 l 1
10M I,II 0-300 mph Mild - Not Required IB Diesel Cenerator Centrol Room Switchaear 100M I," O-100 mph Not Required Mild IB Diesel Generator Control Room Switchgear Atmospheric Stability I,II 3 -5'C to +5'c Mild Not Required IB Diesel Cenerator Control Room Switchgear j Accident Samples
- 1. Primary Coolant & Sump 3 FASS System-Pr!. Coolant Mild / Harsh None TBMCC IA Various as required Cross Activity . Any range 1 10-8 C1/cc Mild 3 t? nits IA D/C Ess. Power Radio-with dilution Chemistry Lab Camma Spect. Ar.y range 1 10-8 C1/cc 3 detector /2 spect.
Mild 14 D/C Ess. Power Radio-with dilution unite Cheelstry Lab Boron Concentration 0.1-10 ppe - eseple Mild hA Station Power Radio-dilution can be used Cheetstry Lab for entended range Chloride Any rante through Mild NA lA D/C Ess. Power Radio-dilution Chemistry Lab Dissolved H2 or TC No None None None t
Dissolved 02 Chemets are available NA NA Radio-Chemistry Lab pH 1-16 2 (Mits IA D/C Ess. Power Radio-Chemiserv I.sh
- hot Plant Specific I
" Recorded Continuously II Stored in Computer Memory 4Pl.4.6 ,
i Il 11IlI1I1IIIIIIIIIIIlII1IIIIIIiIIIIIIIII
- b e
v L e y
' l r o t s - s ot l l Di ie a a d e c c ah o o RC L t i
l!IilIlIlI1lIlIIIIIIIIiII1IIII1IIIIIIlIIIIII!II r
e e w c o r P a
e .
S s e
r E e y y w C r r o / e e P D t t t t A a a
, I B s i l
'llIIIIIIIlI ll IIII1IIIIIIIIIIIIi1I s
, r
. t e
t t c e e
p o
m s
e 2 c 2 W n /
a s d d r n o l e S.
u t l d c a S.
e e R t e re A.
et nP e di I n n n o 3 u 2i n IIiiI n
o i
t a
e t -
f i 3 1
l d d a w a i l t u t i a Q M M n c
c e
/ v .
t l cp e l
o 8 p
- x 0 E) e 1 o %
g o r5 n 1tt e7 a w ee o R
gl ni L+ (
ad 1 r 0t 2 h 0i 5 yt 1 m 2 ni - i -
Aw 0L 0 y _
r _
o _
g _
e 3 _
t a _
C e
l p
m a
S b
a c r y p i 4r o c
f i
f s c A o e p
r S t t
- t e c n e e t n
E e n p a
m n S u i l r a a P e t t m 6 p s n m t o
y n o a g 2 N 4
. T I C C N 0 1
- P W
lI .l'
ATTACHMENT 2 Justification for Deviations from Regulatory Guide 1.97 and Comments Reactor Water Level Comment: Reactor water level is the only identified Type A variable.
Manual action is needed to terminate reactor water level increase during an increase in feedwater flow (runaway feedpump) transient. The reactor does automatically scram on high reactor water level, but the feedpump does not automatically trip on high water level. The water level increase needs to be terminated to avoid exceeding the maximum level analyzed for contained energy in the Containment Building in the event of a LOCA. Otherwise, the operability of the Containment Building, if a LOCA occurred, following the increase in feedwater flow transient could be challenged.
Deviation: Range of -30 to +30 inches with 0" nominal operating level. -30 corresponds approximately to the top of core. Environmentally qualified channels not recorded.
Justification: The most important information supplied by water level instrumentation is whether water level is normal and whether the core is covered during a transient or accident. As discussed in the cover letter, water level above the top of core provides adequate core cooling. Once the water level drops below the top of core, other methods and hence indication of adequate core cooling are needed (e.g. Alternate Core Spray Flow, Containment Building water level). Therefore, the installed qualified instrumentation.
.provides the information needed. Following a Maximum Credible Accident (MCA),
the Containment Building is flooded to core midplane. The CB water level instruments provide the necessary water level indication during the flood up condition. Core midplane is at 330 inch on a 0-500 inch scale. Recording not needed for determination of adequacy of core cooling.
Nuclear Instrumentation Deviation: Not environmentally qualified for harsh environment.
Justification: During an accident involving adverse environmental conditions in the Containment Building (CB), the reactor will quickly scram, so neutron flux instrumentation will not be needed. The nuclear instrumentation and rod position indication are sufficiently separated that confirmation of shutdown may be obtained, if desired, prior to the failure of the nuclear instrumentation and rod position indications. During a transient, including an Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS), in which the Nuclear Instrumentation is needed, adverse environmental conditions will not exist, so the instrumentation will be able to function during appropriate events.
RCS Soluble Boron Concentration Grab Sample Comment: The LACBWR Boron Inject System is a manual non-safety grade system.
WPl.4.6 Reactor Presssure Deviation: LACBWR has 1 harsh environmentally qualified 0-1400 psig instrument with 2 backup 0-1600 psig instruments that are qualified for a mild environment vs. redundant harsh environment qualified 0-1500 psig instruments.
Justification: Scale - The primary system low set safety valve is set to relieve at less than 1400 psig.
. Qualification / redundancy - In the case of a large break, Containment Building pressure is available as a diverse parameter to serve as a backup to the harsh environment qualified reactor pressure instrument.
Drywell Sumo Level Comment: LACBWR has a Containment Building rather than a drywell and Reactor Building as do the General Electric designed BWRs. Waste water generated in the Containment Building is collected in the 2 Retention Tanks. Therefore, Retention Tank level indication provides similar information to drywell sump level indication in a GE plant.
Deviation: Retention Tank Level indicators are not qualifed for harsh environments. No installed recorder.
Justification: Retention Tank Level indication is useful in detecting a leak, by evaluating changes in level indication. Operators take periodic readings of the level indication and the rate of water accumulation is calculated daily and if a significant unexpected change is observed. The level indication is only useful in detecting a leak, not in responding to a
-break. If a major LOCA occurred causing environmentally harsh conditions in the C.B., there would be no need for Retention Tank level indication. Even during reflood, C.B. level instrumentation is monitored, not Retention Tank level. Therefore, Retention Tank level instrumentation would be operable when useful and is sufficient.
Containment Pressure Deviation: Range recommended is -5 psig to design pressure, which is 60 psig.
Range of 1. channel is -5 to 200 psig, the other 0-70 psig.
Justification: The channels are redundant in the analyzed accident range of 0-48.5 psig. Vacuum breakers set at -0.5 psig are installed to prevent an excessive negative pressure. Refer to Reference 5 for a discussion of C.B.
pressure indication.
Primary Containment Isolation Valves Position Deviation: Valve position indication not environmentally qualified for a harsh environment. This applies to the following valves: Reactor Building Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV), MSIV Bypass Valve, Containment Building Dampers, 4-Inch Vent Header Internal Valve, Retention Tank Discharge Valve, Heating Steam Condensate Return Valve and Decay Heat Blowdown Valve. There is WPl.4.6 no position indication for the Shutdown Condenser Condensate Leg Drain Valve.
. Valve positions are not recorded.
Comment: Position indication is planned to be installed for the Shutdown Condenser Condensate Leg Drain Valve as a result of the Detailed Control Room Design Review, which is under review by the NRC.
Justification: All these valves close automatically on diverse containment isolation signals. The Major Primary System Leak Procedure requires that manual valves be closed if automatic valves do not close automatically. All but the RBMSIV are air-operated and fail close on loss of air. All but the Heating Steam Condensate Return Valve, fail close on loss of power. A manual valve in the Heating Steam Condensate Return line is maintained locked closed during Operational Conditions 1 and 2.
A redundant isolation valve located in the Turbine Building operable from the control room is installed on the main steam and vent header lines. Similar capability is being installed for the Retention Tank discharge line, which is isolated except during a Retention Tank discharge. The Decay Heat Blowdown
' Valve is maintained closed during power operation. It is used for water level control during startups and while shutdown.
Containment isolation capability was reviewed under the Systematic Evaluation Program and is not an issue here. It is discussed to demonstrate the assurance of containment isolation post-accident and so the relative unimportance of valve position indication.
Containment isolation will occur at the enset of a large break LOCA situation.
Indication would be expected to indicate initially. Verifying containment isolation is one of the first steps of the Major Primary System Leak Procedure. Following a small break, the indication would definitely be expected to be working for a period of time.
If the isolation valve indications fail following a LOCA, diverse parameters can be used to determine if the Containment Building is isolated. Containment Building pressure and stack (SPING 4) radioactivity would provide information on containment isolation. A comparison of Containment Building High Range Area Radiation Monitor indication and stack activity with expected relative values based on design leakage rate can be conducted to determine if the containment is isolated.
Based on the fail-safe failure mode of the containment isolation valves, that indication is ' expected to - be functioning initially, and the availability of the diverse parameters, harsh environmental qualification is not necessary for containment isolation valves position indication.
Due to the nature of the containment isolation system, valve position is not a parameter which needs to be trended. The valves would close or fail close at the beginning of the accident. Closure signals would not be reset during an accident, so valves would not reopen.
WPl.4.6 1
' Radioactivity Concentration or Radiation Level in Circulating Primary Coolant Deviation: No primary coolant in-line radioactivity or radiation level monitor.
Justification: In a BWR, monitoring offgas activity levels is a demonstrated method.of detecting fuel and cladding degradation. Redundant offgas monitors are installed which cover normal operating range to approximately the Technical Specification limit. For post-accident conditions, the CB activity and radiation monitors will show increased levels if the fuel cladding is.
damaged. A correlation has been developed and posted which relates the CB High Range Area Radiation Monitor indication to fuel damage. With the combination of offgas and Containment Building monitors, breaches in cladding or-fuel _can be detected, so the purpose of the recommended primary coolant radioactivity concentration or radiation level monitor is fulfilled.
Containment Hydrogen Concentration Deviation: Range 0-25% vs. recommended 0-30%.
Comment: Redundant hydrogen analyzers are located in Containment Atmosphere Post Accident Sampling System pathway outside the Containment Building.
Justification: Since the LACBWR fuel is clad with stainless steel, hydrogen
. generation will be significantly lower than at other BWR's. Refer to Reference 6 for discussion of hydrogen monitoring at LACBWR.
Y_ent e Flow R Ea Deviation: No stack flow rate instrumentation.
Justification: Flow rate is approximated by number of stack blowers
. operating. The control switches with on/off indication for the 2 blowers are located in the control room. Individual sample monitor flow rate is available locally..
Airborne Radioactive Materials Released from the Plant - Particulates and halonens (Sampling with Onsite-Analysis capability)
Deviation: Range 10-7 to 10-2 pCi/ml vs. recommended 10-3 to 102 pCi/ml.
Justification: Higher concentrations can be analyzed by reducing quantity of filter media to be analyzed.
Shutdown Condenser Shell Side Water Level Deviation: Not qualified for harsh environment and range is -16 inches to
.+16 inches vs. recommended top to bottom.
WPl.4.6 a
. Justification:' Range is adequate to cover normal operating band of -6 inches-to +6 inches. The accident which creates a harsh environment is a major loss of coolant. During a major loss'of coolant, the Shutdown Condenser is not needed as a condenser, though it may be'needed as a pathway ta the Manual Depressurization Valves for_the primary system. Therefore, during a major loss of coolant shell side water level indication would not be needed and it's lack of harsh-environmental qualifications does not constitute a problem.
Alternate Core Spray Flow Comment: Flow instrument located outside Containment Building.
Containment and Turbine Building Effluent Radioactivity Comment: The Containment Building and Turbine Building. share a common release point - the stack. The PING 3 and SPING 4 monitor isokinetic sample streams of the stack effluent. The SPING 4 is located in an area for which it is environmentally qualified (mild). In case of a main steam line break outside containment, the SPING 4 could be adversely affected, but the PING 3 would not.
be.
Plant and Environs Radioactivity (portable instrumentation)
Deviation: No portable isotopic analysis device.
Justification: A detector and gamma spectroscopy terminal can be moved to an offsite location if the need or desire arises. Portable radiation monitors will give quick indication of plume pathway and deposition, which is more important than isotopic determination in the short term. Samples can be taken and analyzed'in the laboratory.
Estimation of Atmo_sah_eric Stability.
Deviation: Range or -5*C to +5'C rather than the recommended -5*C to +10*C.
- i. Justification: The stability class if the temperature difference is +4*C or greater-is Class G. Therefore, no additional useful information is gained with the range extended from +5'C to +10*C.
Sump Grab SanDle Deviation: The guidance recommends capability be installed for obtaining containment sump, ECCS pump room sumps and other similar auxiliary building sump liquid samples. No specific containment sump or Retention Tank sampling capability is installed external to the Containment Building.
Comment: As discussed earlier, there is no auxiliary building at LACBWR. The Containment Building contains much of the equipment installed in other plants' i
auxiliary buildings.
I WPl.4.6 I
Justification: Since the Retention Tanks will contain a diluted primary coolant following a LOCA, sampling the primary coolant will provide a conservative estimate of Retention Tank activity in the shorter term.
Following CB floodup to core midplane, the Reactor Coolant PASS sample will be indicative of water in the reactor vessel and Containment Building.
Dissolved H9 or Total Gas Deviation: No capability for analyzing dissolved H2 or Total Gas in water samples.
Justification: Since the LACBWR fuel is clad with stainless steel, very little H2 will be generated, so analysis capability is not required. See Reference 6 for discussion of low H2 generation. Capability exists for analyzing H2 concentration in containment air.
Conta_i_nment Air Hydrogen - Grab Samg e.
Deviation: Range of 0-100% Lower Explosive Limit, which is approximately 4-75% H2 vs. recommended 0-10% H2
- Justification: The monitor covers the explosive range, which is the range of concern. The Containment Air Post Accident Sampling System in-line analyzers cover the range of 0-25% so it is unlikely that the grab sample would be additionally analyzed for H2 . The Containment Building is ventilated during normal operation, so there is no buildup of gases.
Containment Air Oxygen - Grab Sample Deviation: Range of 0-25% vs. recommended 0-30%.
Justification: More than adequate to cover normal breathing range and expected post-accident containment concentration. The source of the containment spray system is demineralized water stored in an overhead storage tank. The available range is adequate to determine if a combustible atmosphere exists. Since the Containment Building is ventilated during normal operation, there would be no buildup of gases prior to an accident.
Contai.nme_n_t_ _an_d_ Turbine _Suildina Area Ra_d_ia_t_ ion Monitors Comment: The Turbine Building and Containment Area Radiation monitors are recorded on a multipoint recorder, however, a strip chart recorder is installed for the Containment Building High Range Area Radiation Monitor.
One channel of the Containment Building High Range Area Radiation Monitor is also stored in computer memory.
WPl.4.6