ML20128F701

Corrected Evaluation of Main Steam Line Break in Doghouse. Rept Redistributed Due to Copying Error

ML20128F701
Person / Time
Site:	Mcguire, McGuire
Issue date:	05/31/1985
From:	Ray J, Ritchie J, Weidler R DUKE POWER CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20128F691	List: ML20128F687 ML20128F701
References
NUDOCS 8507080326
Download: ML20128F701 (49)

Text

F .

k e DUKE POWER COMPANY McGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION UNITS 1 & 2 EVALUATION OF MAIN STEAM LINE BREAK IN D0GHOUSE PreparedBy:h.f. hdk Date: 5[E 8[6f J. L. Ritchie, Senior Technical Specialfst Checked By: /4 h , N. b ,S r Date: 8/29/M J. K(/ Ray, IIJ, Supervising Design Engineer l Approved By: k.k- Date: y/29[86 ~

l R. R. Weidler, Senior Engineer InspectedBy:}W/[/ te n Date: $~/.19/f6~

) ' R. Herran, Supervising Design Engineer Inspected By: % , f. T b u+ Date: 5/3/ />? f J'. E. Thomas, Senior Engineer a

p r 188R Bi8 PM b

l l MN301211 1

h e MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION UNITS 1 & 2 Doghouse Main Steam Line Break (MSLB) Evaluation I. HISTORY:

Revised information has been received from Westinghouse giving mass / energy release rates for a Main Steam Line Break (MSLB) inside containment. The original Westinghouse information indicated a saturated steam condition from the steam generators; however, revised information identifies steam generator tube uncovery and the formation of superheated steam.

Duke Power had previously assumed the same saturated steam condition for an MSLB in the Doghouses located outside containment as for an MSLB inside containment. Consequently, environmental qualification parameters for the Doghouses were based on original analysis results of 330 F peak temperature. Utilizing the new data from Westinghouse, revised Duke Power environmental analysis with superheated steam conditions indicated a potential increase in Doghouse temperature from the 330 F parameter to approximately 457 F peak Doghouse temperature. Hence, the potential existed that safety related components could be subjected to temperatures higher than the qualification basis of 330 F, and could possibly preclude components from performing their intended safety functions following a postulated MSLB in either Doghouse.

In light of the MSLB activities relative to the Catawba licensing, a meeting was held with the NRC staff on July 20, 1984 to discuss the status of the MSLB activities for McGuire. As a result of this meeting, the NRC staff requested that Duke submit a summary of the preliminary McGuire evaluation that had been conducted. This summary evaluation was submitted on August 8, 1984 with H. B. Tucker's letter to Ms. E. G. Adensam, Chief Licensing Branch No. 4. The preliminary evaluation had shown that for an MSLB in the Doghouse, all essential safety functions are expected -

to be completed before adverse temperature effects due to increased Doghouse temperatures would occur. Spurious actuation of components following initial positioning was also evaluated. Thus, Duke Power had concluded that plant safety would not be adversely affected in the event of a design basis MSLB in the Doghouse.

Mr. Tucker's letter of August 8,1984 also noted that additional analysis /

evaluation would be completed on a schedule consistent with and in support of Catawba licensing to confirm the preliminary evaluation. The final report on the Catawba evaulation was submitted to the NRC staff on March 15, 1985 as Supplement 2 to Significant Deficiency Report No.

413-414/84-16. The results of additional analysis / evaluation for McGuire are presented in this report.

MN301211/1

r . .

h r II. EVALUATION:

Westinghouse performed a steamline break analysis for a spectrum of break sizes and power levels (full power, 70%, 30% and 0%) to determine associated protection system actuation times and predicted superheat initiation times. The analysis was performed using safety analysis assumptions of initial conditions and protection system time responses to provide a conservatively early prediction of steam generator tube bundle uncovery and. therefore, the earliest superheat initiation time. The results of this analysis are described in Attachment 1.

Attachment 2 indicates which equipment is required to remain functional during and/or following an MSLB in the Doghouse. The attachment also shows the time margins between the completion of the required Doghouse equipment actuation and the onset of temperatures higher than the qualification parameters of the equipment at which time the Westinghouse /

Duke analysis conservatively assumes e In addition, Attachment 2 includes results of Duke'quipment failure.

s heat transfer analysis performed on the solenoid valves used to operate the Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIV's) and Steam Generator Power Operated Relief Valves (PORV's) to take into account the temperature / time lag for this' equipment. Attachment 3 contains the revised pages from the NUREG-0588 response that are applic-able to the MSLB in the Doghouse.

Although it is concluded from the evaluation outlined in Attachment 2 that the required equipment has sufficient margin between required actua-tion time and the time when equipment qualification temperature is exceeded, a Westinghouse core reponse analysis for the postulated consequential failure due to an MSLB of the MSIV's, Steam Generator PORV's, and Main Feedwater Isolation Valves that are located in the faulted Doghouse was performed (see Attachment 4). This analysis involves a 1.0 ft2 MSLB upstream of the MSIV in one of the doghouses. The 1.0 ft2 maximum size break area is considered to be appropriate for this analysis because of the following reasons:

1. The conservative computer code PISOL was used by Duke Power in -

performing the Main Steam piping stress analysis. Resultant pipe break stress ratios (actual stress / allowable stress) are all less than 0.6.

2. Any break would most likely be postulated to occur at a branch line connection to the Main Steam piping. These connections in the doghouse involve piping with a maximum cross-sectional area of 0.2 l ft.2 which yields a safety factor of 5.

3. For any postulated break size greater than 1.0 ft.2, under i

conservative " worst case" conditions, all safety actuations occur prior to tube uncovery, and therefore prior to the generation of the superheated steam and resulting harsh environment.

l

4. A 1.0 ft.2 rupture size bounds smaller breaks because it results in

! a more severe cooldown of the reactor coolant system, and thus a i

greater peak heat flux.

I MN301211/2

[ _ ._ . _. __

.4 0 t III.

SUMMARY

• _All electrical. equipment in the faulted Doghouse that is required to automatically actuate on a safety signal will perform its intended function for at least 30 minutes prior to reaching its qualification temperature, with at least a margin of 433% between the time actuation occurs and the time equipment internals exceed their qualification temperature.

• The Westinghouse core response analysis demonstrates that it is acceptable for the MSIV's, Steam Generator PORV's and the Main Feedwater Isolation Valves located in the faulted Doghouse to fail during an MSLB in the Doghouse and still allow safe shutdown of the plant.

In conclusion, the analysis / evaluation outlined above has shown that the higher temperatures generated in the event of an MSLB in the Doghouse will not affect the capability to shutdown the reactor and to maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, and that qualification of all equipment in the Doghouse has been demonstrated.

M S

MN301211/3

_ _ _ . ~ . _ - , _ . _ _ _ _ -

McGuire Units 1 & 2 Doghouse MSLB Evaluation Attachment 1 Page 1 of 2 RESULTS OF WESTINGHOUSE SYSTEMS ANALYSIS Large Break Typical response to large breaks approximately 0.5 ft.2 and greater (power level affects the cut off of break size) in the doghouse main steam line will be as follows:

Reactor trip will occur on overpower AT, low steam line pressure, or low-low steam generator level.

Main feedwater isolation valve (MFIV) closure will occur due to reactor trip and low Tavg or due to safety injection signal.

Safety injection will be initiated upon receipt of a low pressurizer pressure signal or low steam line pressure signal.

The motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps (MDAFP's) will start upon receipt of the safety injection signal or low-low steam generator level.

The turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump (TDAFP) is not required for this break since one MDAFP can supply adequate flow if the other MDAFP fails to start.

• Low steam pressure in the faulted steam generator causes main steam isolation valve (MSIV) closure.

All the above functions will occur before the temperature in the Doghouse exceeds equipment qualification temperatures. Isolation of auxiliary feedwater to the faulted steam generator may be accomplished by the operator by closing the motor operated valves located in the doghouse, or by closing the control valves from the control room or manual isolation valves located in the auxiliary feedwater pump room.

Intermediate Break For intermediate breaks, approximately 0.3 ft.2 to 0.5 ft.2 (power jeyej affects the range of break sizes), response will be as follows:

• Reactor trip will occur on low-low steam generator level. No N that all steam generators will approach low-low level at approximat, che same time.

MDAFP's will start upon receipt of first low-low level signal. TDAFP will start upon receipt of the second low-low level signal.

MFIV closure will occur due to reactor trip and low Tavg.

Safety injection will occur due to low pressurizer pressure.

MN301211

• r McGuire Units 1 & 2 Doghouse MSLB Evaluation Attachment 1 Page 2 of 2 Main steam isolation will occur due to low steam line pressure; this may actually happen after tube uncovery. However, Duke analysis using revised Westinghouse mass energy release data shows that main steam isolation will occur before temperatures in the higher elevations of the doghouses (where the main steam isolation valves are located) exceed the current equipment qualification parameter of 330 F.

Faulted steam generator isolation is accomplished as described for the large break.

Small Break Depending on exact break size and power level, small break (less than approxi-mately 0.3 ft.2) response will be as described for intermediate breaks, or as follows. For a narrow band of break sizes within this category (approximately 0.1 to 0.2 ft.2), the feedwater control system will automatically increase feedwater flow and prevent reactor trip and tube uncovery. Blowdown through the break will be limited to saturated conditions. The operator will initiate reactor trip and position valves from the control room. Faulted steam generator isolation is accomplished as described for the large break.

MN30121I

.-_ . _ - _ _ _ _ . _ . - _ - - _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _. --.- - .. - - ~ - . . . - . - _ -- .-

.r s

Doghouse MSLB Evaluation Attachment 2 Sheet 1 of 16 McGuire 1 & 2 Summary of Electrical Equipment Exposed to Higher MSLB Temperatures Required Preferred To Mitigate Normal Position Effects of Identification Operating During Function Performed MSLB Equipment Number Position MSLB During MSLB Yes No Discussion Valve - Main Steam SM 1, 3, 5 & 7 Open Closed Isolate Steam (1)

Isolation.

• Valves are air operated, Generator to fail closed, with redun-Control Cooling dant normally energized solenoids that deenergize to close on a main steam isolation signal.

• During the " worst case" conditions (70%) power w/0.5 Ft2 Break in com-partment 3) the main steam isolation valves will actuate 338 sec.

after the MSLB and 12 sec. before the atmos-phere temperature reaches 340 F (Qualification Temperature). However, heat transfer analysis -

performed on the sole-noid valves used to operate the main steam isolation valves show that the coil assembly i

i

e 9

Doghouse MSLB Evaluation Attachment 2 Sheet 2 of 16 McGuire 1 & 2 Summary of Electrical Equipment Exposed to Higher MSLB Temperatures Required Preferred To Mitigate Normal Position Effects of Identification Operating During Function Performed MSLB Equipment Number Position During MSLB MSLB Yes No Discussion temperature lags the atmosphere temperature and does not reach 340 F for at least 30 minutes after the MSLB, which is a margin of at least 433%.

• See Attachment 3, page 27, for NUREG-0588 response.

Valve-Steam SV1, 7,13 & 19 Closed Closed Isolate Steam (1)

• Valves are air operated, Generator Power Generator to fail closed, with redun-Op: rated Relief Control Cooling dant normally energized Valve (PORV's) solenoids that deenergize to close. If open, valve' ,

close automatically on a main steam isolation signal.

• During the " worst case" conditions (70%) power w/0.5 ft.2 break in compartment 3) the steam generator PORV's will actuate 338 sec.

after the MSLB and 21

4 Doghouse MSLB Evaluation Attachment 2 4

Sheet 3 of 16 McGuire 1 & 2 Summary of Electrical Equipment Exposed to Higher MSLB Temperatures Required Preferred To Mitigate Normal Position Effects of Identification Operating During Function Performed MSLB Equipment Number Position MSLB During MSLB Yes No Discussion sec. before the atmos-phere temperature reaches 346*F (qualifi-cation temperature).

However, heat transfer analysis performed on

' the solenoid valves used_to. operate the PORV's show that the coil assembly temperature lags the atmosphere temperature and does not reach 346*F for at least 30 minutes after the MSLB, which is a margin of at least 433%

l

• See Attachment 3, page 25 for NUREG-0588 response.

Valva-Main Steam SM9, 10, 11, & 12 Closed . Closed Isolate Steam /

• Valves are air operated, Isolation By-Pass Generator to fail closed, with redun-Control Cooling dant normally energized solenoids that deener-gize to close. If open, valves automatically close on a main steam isolation signal.

3 Doghouse MSLB Evaluation '

Attachment 2 Sheet 4 of 16 4

McGuire 1 & 2 Summary of Electrical Equipment

! Exposed to Higher MSLB Temperatures i:

Required

' Preferred To Mitigate Normal Position Effects of i Identification Operating During Function Performed MSLB Equipment Number Position MSLB During MSLB I

Yes No Discussion i

q

-

• Due to valve size (3"),

1 flow rate will be minimal and cooldown rate will .

J not be exceeded if these valves are lost as a consequence of the l MSLB.

a

• See Attachment 3, page'25.h J

for NUREG-0588 response. .

l Valva-Main Feed- CF26, 28, 30 & 35 Open Closed Valves serve as a

• Electro-Hydraulic water Isolation /  ;

backup to prevent operated valves.

steam generator

• Steam generator overfill ,

overfill and to through the main feed- '

prevent loss of water lines is prevented i feedwater from the by tripping the main steam generator.

feedwater pumps and closing the pump dis-charge isolation valves located in the turbine building. The main  :

feedwater pump and isolation valves close  !

automatically on a high i

steam generator level

9 Doghouse MSLB Evaluation Attachment 2 Sheet 5 of 16 McGuire 1 & 2 Summary of Electrical Equipment Exposed to Higher MSLB Temperatures Requir2d Preferred To Mitigate Normal Position Effects of Identification Operating During Function Performed MSLB Equipment Number Position MSLB During MSLB Yes No Discussion signal. In addition, steam generator overfill can be prevented by closing the feedwater control valves also located in the turbine building. Feedwater control valves close on both a feedwater isola-tion signal and high steam generator level signal.

• Loss of feedwater is prevented through the main feedwater lines by two (2) check valves in series and by closure of the feedwater control valve (located in turbine building) in each flow path. The feedwater control valves close on a feed-water isolation signal.

Doghouse MSLB Evaluation ' -

Attachment 2  :

Sheet 6 of 16  !

McGuire 1 & 2 i Summary of Electrical Equipment -

Exposed to Higher MSLB Temperatures

! i

?

l Required l Preferred To Mitigate Normal Position Effects of I Identification Operating During Function Performed MSLB Equipment Number Position 4

MSLB During MSLB Yes No Discussion i i I

• See Att.'chment 3, page 29a1 for NUREG-0588 response.

{ Valve-Reverse CF134, 135, 136 Closed Closed Valves prevent Purge Isolation & 137 /

• Valves are motor operated '

(Fe:dwater Purge loss of feedwater

• Valves are used only at from the steam low power and are Isolation) generator. normally closed.

• Non-safety grade motor operated valves located in the turbine building can also be used to

! isolate flow.  !

• See Attachment 3, page 24a, for NUREG-0588  ;

response. .

4

O 4

Doghouse MSLB Evaluation Attachment 2 Sheet 7 of 16 McGuire 1 & 2 Summary of Electrical Equipment Exposed to Higher MSLB Temperatures Required Preferred To Mitigate Norraal Position Effects of Identification Operating During Function Performed MSLB Equipment Number Position MSLB During MSLB Yes No Discussion Valves-Feedwater CF126, 127, 128 & Closed Closed Valves serve as a /

• Valves are motor operated Supply to upper 129 backup to prevent gate valves Nozzle. steam generator

• Steam generator overfill overfill and to through the upper nozzle prevent loss of lines is prevented by feedwater from the tripping the main feed-steam generator, water pump and closing the pump discharge isolation valves located in the turbine building.

The main feedwater pump and isolation valves are tripped closed auto-matically on a high steam generator level signal.

In addition, steam gen-erator overfill can be prevented by closing the feedwater control valves also located in the turbine building.

I

Doghouse MSLB Evaluation Attachment 2 Sheet 8 of 16 McGuire 1 & 2 Summary of Electrical Equipment Exposed to Higher MSLB Temperatures Required Preferred To Mitigate Normal Position Effects of

Identification Operating During Function Performed MSLB Equipment Number Position MSLB During MSLB Yes No Discussion Feedwater control valves close on both a a

feedwater isolation signal and high steam generator level signal.

• toss of feedwater through the upper nozzle lines is

prevented by redundant check valves in series.

• See Attachment 3, page 24h' for NUREG-0588 response.

i Valves-Tempering CF151, 153, 155 & Open Closed Valves serve as a /

• Valves are motor operated j Isolation 157 backup to prevent gate valves.

steam generator

• Steam Generator overfill overfill and to through the tempering prevent loss of lines is prevented by feedwater from tripping the main feed-steam generator. water pump and closing the pump discharge iso-lation valves located in the turbine building.

i

9 Doghouse MSLB Evaluation Attachment.2 Sheet 9 of 16 McGuire 1 & 2 Summary of Electrical Equipment Exposed to Higher MSLB Temperatures Required Preferred To Mitigate Normal Position Effects of Identification Operating During Function Performed MSLB Equipment Number Position -MSLB During MSLB Yes No Discussion The main feedwater pump and isolation valves close automatically on a high steam generator level signal. In addi-tion, steam generator overfill can be pre-vented by closing the feedwater control valves also located in the Turbine Building. Feed-water control valves close on both a feed-water isolation signal and high steam generator level signal.

• Loss of feedwater through the tempering lines is prevented by one (1) check valve in each flow path.

• Valves close on safety injection signal.

f Doghouse MSLB Evaluation -

Attachment 2 Sheet 10 of 16 McGuire 1 & 2 Summary of Electrical Equipment Exposed to Higher MSLB Temperatures Required Preferred To Mitigate Normal Position Effects of Identification Operating During Function Performed MSLB Equipment Number Position MSLB During MSLB Yes No Discussion

• See Attachment 3, page 24t ,

for NUREG-0588 response.

Valva-Auxiliary CA38, 42, 46, 50, Open Open Valves supply J

• Electric motor operated Feedwater Iso- 54, 58, 62 & 66 Auxiliary Feed- gate valves with manual lation water flow and initiation.

isolate the

• Flow to the faulted steam faulted steam generator can be isolated generator. by closing the control valves located in the feedwater pump room, by closing manual isolation valves or by tripping the pumps that are not required.

• See Attachment 3, page 22a & 24 for NUREG-0588 response.

Valves-Steam SV25, 26, 27 & Open Closed Valve serve as a /

• Electric motor operated G:ntrator PORV 28 backup to isolate gate valves with manual Isolation steam generator initiation.

I to control cooling

e Doghouse HSLB Evaluation-Attachment 2 Sheet 11 of 16 McGuire 1 & 2 Summary of Electrical Equipment Exposed to Higher MSLB Temperatures Required Preferred To Mitigate Normal Position Effects of Identification Operating During Function Performed MSLB Equipment Number Position MSLB During MSLB Yes No Discussion

• The PORV's are the primary source for isolating the steam generator pressure boundaries (see valves number SV1, 7, 13 & 19 above).

• See Attachment 3, page 24d for NUREG-0588 response.

Valves-Main SM 83, 89, 95 Open Closed Valves serve as a Steam Low Point & 101

/

• Air operated gate valves backup to isolate with manual initiation.

Drain Isolation the steam gene-

• Drains are orificed to rator pressure prevent excess steam boundary to flow. Limited flow control cooling through orifice will not affect cooldown during MSLB.

• The solenoid valves for these operators are non-safety related and are not listed on NUREG-0588 response.

n '

Doghouse MSLB Evaluation '

Attachment 2 Sheet 12 of 16 McGuire 1 & 2 Summary of Electrical Equipment Exposed to Higher MSLB; Temperatures Required Preferred To Mitigate Normal Position Effects of Identification Operating During Function Performed MSLB Equipment Number Position MSLB During MSLB Yes No Discussion Valves-Auxiliary SA 48 & 49 Closed Either Not Applicable /

• The turbine driven aux-Fecdwater Pump See Discussion iliary Feedwater Pumps Turbine Steam are not required for Suppy Isolation any steam line break.

Assuming a single failure of one motor driven pump, adequate time is avail-able for the operator to realign the other motor driven pump to supply'flou to intact steam generators Both the motor and turbino driven auxiliary feedwate r pumps are located in the feedwater pump room so they are not affected by the steam line break.

• See Attachment 3, page 26, for NUREG-0588 response.

Instrumentation- CAFT5091 - - -

/

• This equipment may fail Auxiliary Feed- CAFT5101 under the higher MSLB water Flow CAFT5111 temperatures. However, Transmitters CAFT5121

l c '

Doghouse MSLB Evaluation ; '

Attachment 2 Sheet 13 of 16 McGuire 1 & 2 Summary of Electrical Equipment Exposed to Higher MSLB Temperatures Required-Preferred To Mitigate Normal Position Effects of Identification Operating During Function Performed MSLB Equipment Number Position MSLB During MSLB Yes No Discussion Post-Accident monitoring of the auxiliary feed-water function can be accomplished by the steam generator level transmitters which will not be affected by a steamline break in the Doghouse since the level transmitters are located in the containment.

• See Attachment 3, page 66 for NUREG-0588 response.

Instrumentation- CFLS6440 - - -

0:ghouse Water CFLS6450

/

• The function of these Level Trans- CFLS6460 transmitters is to deter-citters CFLS6470 mine water level for pipe CFLS6480 breaks not associated CFLS6490 with the MSLB.

CFLS6500

• See Attachment'3, page 30a ,.

for NUREG-0588 response.

CFLS6510 CFLS6520 CFLS6530 CFLS6540 CFLS6550

3

• • ^ # *% ,

+-

( .

h -

- - L w _ e Doghouse MSLB Evalur. tic ~n- - *i ;

. Attachment 2' -

s -

Sheet 14 of 16

4. ,

b McGuire.1 & 2 ,, - "

,. Summary of Electrical Equipment " ,

CXposed to Higher MSLB Temperatures o

C 3 .. ,

~

_ Required

" ~

Preferred To Mitigate

++.-"- Normal Position '

Effects of -'

s q Identification Operating During Function Performed '

1. MSLB d

Equipment Number Position  ;'

i HSLB During MSLB _

Yes No - Discus _ sio_n . -

Centrol and Power - -

Circuits ~

J

• A' review to determine

, , s ,

functional requirements

' 3- and/or failure modes of j all doghouse components and cables was performed.

No postulated cable

j. failures were identified

which would cause spurious repositioning of valves required to mitigate the consequences of a doghouse MSLB.

l

• All safety-related control circuits in the Doghouses were reviewed

• to determine if any  :

cable failures could '

affect other safety-related circuits. All safety-related control

Doghouse MSLB Evaluation Attachment 2 Sheet 15 of 16 McGuire 1 & 2 Summary of Electrical Equipment Exposed to Higher MSLB Temperatures Required Preferred To Mitigate Normal Position Effects of Identification Operating During Function Performed Equipment Number Position MSLB MSLB During MSLB Yes No Discussion components in the Dog-houses are protected by separate fuses that are coordinated with upstream feeder breakers to avoid affecting any other related circuits.

Cable-5/G PORV EP/HYPALON, - - -

and MSIV Control TEFZEL and XLPE /

• The S/G PORV & MSIV insulated cable control cables provide power to the redundant normally energized S/G PORV & MSIV air control solenoids. As stated above, these solenoids deenergize to close automatically on a main steam isolation signal. In the unlikely event of a cable failure, open or short, power to the s3Tenoids would be e

Doghouse MSLB Evaluation Attachment 2 Sheet 16 of 16 McGuire 1 & 2 Summary of Electrical Equipment Exposed to Higher MSLB Temperatures Required Preferred To Mitigate Normal P6sition Effects of Identification Operating During Function Performed MSLB Equipment Number Position MSLB During MSLB Yes No Discussion lost and the solenoids would go to their deenergized safety position. Additionally, the S/G PORV's & MSIV's preferred position during a MSLB is closed.

Therefore, the solenoid cables are not essential to mitigate the con-sequences of a MSLB.

• See response to

' NUREG-0588, Attachment 3, pages 33, 34, 35, 36 & 37

• See Note 2.

NOTES:

(1) Although it is desirable that valve (s) properly position, the Westinghouse analysis for the core response (Attachment 4) due to the consequential failure of the main steam isolation valves, PORV's, and the main feedwater isolation valves located in the faulted Doghouse has demonstrated that the reactor can be safely shutdown and maintained in a safe shutdowr condition, even if these valves fail in the faulted doghouse.

(2) Valves that actuate on a safety signal (Main Steam Isolation, Feedwater Isolation, High Steam Generator Level, etc.) will not resposition after actuation.because of electrical circuit design features such as isolation, interlocks and protectivt devices.

9

McGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION - UNITS 1 AND 2 Page 22a

SUMMARY

OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF CLASS 1E EQUIPMENT Rev. O LOCATED OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT AND EXPOSED TO HELB ENVIRONMENT EQUIPMENT ID: Valve Motor Operators - Aux. MANUFACTURER: Limitorque MODEL #: SMB Order Numbers:

Feedwater Isolation 383584-A & 391179-A, -B (Doghouse)

HELB ENVIRONMENT OPERABILITY OPERABILITY ACCURACY ACCURACY ENVIRONMENT TO WHICH REQUIRED IN DEMONSTRATED REQUIRED DEMONSTRATED (1) QUALIFIED HELB (% OF SPAN) (% OF SPAN)

ENVIRONMENT (2)

Temp: 240 F Temp: 340 F Continuous Continuous N/A N/A Press: 8.85 psig Press: 105 psig RH: 100% RH: 100%

(Note 5)

QUALIFICATION REPORT: Limitorque Test Report: B0058, Appendix B, 1/11/80 (MDM-1205.34-0002) n c, x 3(D 3.2 W 7 C E

METHOD: Test

• o,, c_

~ " Bi S.

~ " G ST

?"

5" 2

MSEA 0

o  !

McGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION - UNITS 1 AND 2 Page 24

SUMMARY

OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF CLASS 1E EQUIPMENT Rev. 4 LOCATED OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT AND EXPOSED TO HELB ENVIRONMENT EQUIPMENT ID: Valve Motor Operators - Aux. MANUFACTURER: Rotork MODEL #: NA-1 Feedwater Isolation (Doghouse) 4 i

l HELB ENVIRONMENT OPERABILITY OPERABILITY ACCURACY ACCURACY ENVIRONMENT TO WHICH REQUIRED IN DEMONSTRATED REQUIRED DEMONSTRATED 4

(1) QUALIFIED HELB (% OF SPAN) (% OF SPAN) ,

ENVIRONMENT (2)

Temp: 240 F Temp: 340 F Continuous Continuous N/A N/A Press: 8.85 psig Press: 70 psig RH: 100% RH: 100%

(Note 5) 4 I

QUALIFICATION REPORT: For operators with S/N below B-4800 - Rotork Test Reports N11/4, December 1970; TR116, October 1973; TR222, June 1975 (MCM-1205.34-0001). h[$

to g g E mgc s ;

For operators with S/N above B-4800 - Wyle Report 43979-1, Rev. A, dated 12/19/78 o,, g E$

(MCM-1205.34-0010). m n3a

-wro METHOD: Test 7-b*

gm MSEA E

I.

o _

i .

9 McGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION -10 NITS 1 AND 2 Page 24a

SUMMARY

OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF CLASS 1E EQUIPMENT. Rev. 4-LOCATED OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT AND EXPOSED TO HELB ENVIRONMENT

' EQUIPMENT ID

Valve Motor Operators - Reverse MANUFACTURER: Rotork MODEL #: NA-1  !

Purge Isolation

, (Doghouse)

J

, HELB ENVIRONMENT OPERABILITY OPERABILITY. ACCURACY ACCURACY ENVIRONMENT TO WHICH REQUIRED IN DEMONSTRATED DEMONSTRATED REQUIRED 4

(1) QUALIFIED HELB .

(% OF SPAN) (% OF SPAN)

, ENVIRONMENT (2) i r

Temp: 240*F Temp: 340 F Continuous Continuous N/A N/A

, Press: 8.85 psig Press: 70 psig  ;

RH: 100% RH: 100% i (Note 5) -

QUALIFICATION REPORT: For operators with S/N below B-4800 - Rotork Test Reports N11/4, December 1970; TR116, FRgn' 2 October 1973; TR222, June 1975 (MCM-1205.34-0001) ' W iiTS.F ;

w"E o k ; *T '

For operators with S/N above B-4800 - Wyle Report 43979-1, Rev. A dated 12/19/78 (MCM-1205.34-0010). 72E METHOD: Test BuPX ""

!P ~

to ,

g" 2  :

! MSEA 8 r i

1

McGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION - UNITS 1 AND 2 Page 24b

SUMMARY

OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF CLASS 1E EQUIPMENT Rev. 4 LOCATED OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT AND EXPOSED TO HELB ENVIRONMENT EQUIPMENT ID: Valve Motor Operators - MANUFACTURER: Rotork MODEL #: NA-1 Feedwater Supply to Upper Nozzle (Doghouse)

HELB ENVIRONMENT OPERABILITY OPERABILITY ACCURACY ACCURACY ENVIRONMENT TO WHICH REQUIRED IN DEMONSTRATED REQUIRED DEMONSTRATED (1) QUALIFIED HELB (% OF SPAN) (% OF SPAN)

ENVIRONMENT (2)

Temp: 240 F Temp: 385 F Continuous Continuous N/A N/A Press: 8.85 psig Press: 70 psig RH: 100% RH: 100%

(Note 5)

QUAllFICATION REPORT: For operators with S/N below B-4800 - Rotork Test Reports N11/4, December 1970;'TR116, October 1973; TR222, June 1975 (MCM-1205.34-0001).

az. o =

For operators with S/N above B-4800 - Wyle 43979-1, Rev. A, dated 12/19/78 $ d$.h (MCM-1205.34-0010) o g. g g o@E*

METHOD: Test

'AzE 83 Y

5" n

MSEA g

~

McGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION - UNITS 1 AND 2 Page 24c j

SUMMARY

OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF CLASS 1E EQUIPMENT Rev. 4 LOCATED OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT AND EXPOSED TO HELB ENVIRONMENT-EQUIPMENT ID: Valve Motor Operators - MANUFACTURER: Rotork MODEL #: NA-l'

. Tempering Isolation

'(Doghouse) -

i HELB ENVIRONMENT OPERABILITY OPERABILITY ACCURACY ACCURACY ENVIRONMENT TO WHICH REQUIRED IN DEMONSTRATED- REQUIRED DEMONSTRATED

' (1) QUALIFIED HELB (% OF SPAN) (% OF SPAN)

ENVIRONMENT (2)  ;

i Temp: 240 F Temp: 340 F Continuous Continuous N/A. N/A

, Press: 8.85 psig Press: 70 psig RH: 100% RH: 100%

' QUALIFICATION REPORT: For operators with S/N below B-4800 - Rotork Test Reports N11/4, December 1970; TR116, October 1973; TR222, June 1975 (MCM-1205.34-0001).

yggg g gg.p r, O - e.

For operators with S/N above B-4800 - Wyle 43979-1, Rev. A, dated 12/19/78 , [hS (MCM-1205.34-0010) *g2g

, ro v-

" " G R. t I METHOD: Test m-

sm i c MSEA

h McGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION - UNITS 1 AND 2 Page 24d SUPWARY OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF CLASS IE EQUIPMENT Rev. 0 LOCATED OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT AND EXPOSED TO HELB ENVIRONMENT EQUIPMENT ID: Valve Motor Operators - S/G MANUFACTURER: Rotork MODEL #: NA-1 PORV Isolation (Doghouse) t t

HELB ENVIRONMENT OPERABILITY OPERABILITY ACCURACY ACCURACY ENVIRONMENT TO WHICH REQUIRED IN DEMONSTRATED REQUIRED DEMONSTRATED (1) QUALIFIED HELB

(% OF SPAN)

. (% OF SPAN)

ENVIRONMENT (2)

Temp: 240 F Temp: 340 F Continuous- Continuous N/A Press: 8.85 psig N/A

, Press: 70 psig

! RH: 100% RH: 100%

(Note 5) i I

QUALIFICATION REPORT: For operators with S/N below B-4800 - Rotork Test Reports N11/4,' December 1970; TR116, 8NFd

October 1973; TR222, June 1975 (MCM-1205.34-0001). S neye en r c ,

For operators with S/N above 8-4800 - Wyle 43979-1, Rev. A, dated 12/19/78 o5E*

(MCM-1205.34-0010) [5 3, E

""GR METHOD: Test T, o~.

.a s gm s

i 8 MSEA

9 McGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION - UNITS 1 AND 2 Page 25

SUMMARY

OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF CLASS 1E EQUIPMENT Rev. 4 LOCATED OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT AND EXPOSED TO HELB ENVIRONMENT EQUIPMENT ID: Valve Solenoid Operators - 5/G MANUFACTURER: Valcor MODEL #: V70900-21-3 PORV's (Doghouse)

HELB ENVIRONMENT OPERABILITY- OPERABILITY ACCURACY ACCURACY ENVIRONMENT TO WHICil REQUIRED IN DEMONSTRATED REQUIRED DEMONSTRATED (1) QUALIFIED HELB (% OF SPAN) (% OF SPAN)

ENVIRONMENT (2)

Temp: 300 F* Temp: 346 F 5.6 min. 30 min. N/A N/A Press: 8.85 psig Press: 87 psig (Note 11)

RH: 100% RH: 100%

• Doghouse environment at time safety function completed - Ref. MCC-1381.05-00-0156.

E N 8'?

e ne o QUALIFICATION REPORT: Test Reports QR70900-21-1 Rev. A (MCM-1210.04-0118); QR52600-515 Rev. B (MCM-1210.04-0115);

MR70905-21-3-1 (MCM-1210.0119) *@

y

,ggm

-m c N -*-

METHOD: Test & Similarity ""GE J

T" 5"

E MDIC

O McGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION - UNITS 1 AND 2 Page 25a

SUMMARY

OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF CLASS 1E EQUIPMENT Rev. 4 LOCATED OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT AND EXPOSED TO HELB ENVIRONMENT EQUIPMENT ID: Valve Solenoid Operators - MANUFACTURER: Valcor MODEL #: V70900-21-3 Main Steam Isolation By pass (Doghouse)

HELB ENVIRONMENT OPERABILITY OPERABILITY ACCURACY ACCURACY ENVIRONMENT TO WHICH REQUIRED IN DEMONSTRATED REQUIRED DEMONSTRATED (1) QUALIFIED HELB (% OF SPAN) (% OF SPAN)

ENVIRONMENT (2)

Temp: 240 F Temp: 346 F Continuous Continuous N/A N/A 4 Press: 8.85 psig Press: 87 psig RH: 100% RH: 100%

(Note 5) v

' agom na n m De :T C

QUALIFICATION REPORT

Test Reports QR70900-21-1 Rev. A (MCM-1210.04-0118); QR52600-515 Rev. B (MCM-1210.04-0115);

• o.

MR70905-21-3-1 (MCM-1210.0119) 4 2E METHOD: Test & Similarity T" E"

c 8

MDIC

McGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION - UNITS 1 AND 2 Page 26

SUMMARY

OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF CLASS 1E EQUIPMENT Rev. 4 LOCATED OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT AND EXPOSED TO HELB ENVIRONMENT EQUIPMENT ID: Valve Solenoid Operators - Aux. MANUFACTURER: ASCO MODEL #: NP 8316E34E Feedwater Pump Turbine Steam Supply Isolation (Doghouse) llELB ENVIRONMENT OPERABILITY OPERABILITY ACCURACY ACCURACY ENVIRONMENT TO WHICH REQUIRED IN DEMONSTRATED REQUIRED DEMONSTRATED (1) QUALIFIED HELB (% OF SPAN) (% OF SPAN)

ENVIRONMENT (2) 1 Temp: 240 F Temp: 346 F Continuous Continuous N/A N/A Press: 8.85 psig Press: 110 psig RH: 100% Ril: 100%

(Note 5) m>ox E G8 S

• n ll E.

• ii 5 2 QUALIFICATION REPORT: Test Report: AQS21678/TR (MCM-1210.04-0117) E$*2g

$ h METHOD: Test 5"

t 8

MDIC

e McGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION - UNITS 1 AND 2 . Page 27

SUMMARY

OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF CLASS 1E EQUIPMENT Rev. 4 LOCATED OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT AND EXPOSED TO HELB ENVIRONMENT EQUIPMENT ID: Valve Operator - MSIV MANUFACTURER: Atwood & Morrill MODEL #: 34" MSIV w/ Chicago Fluid (Doghouse) Pwr. actuator HELB ENVIRONMENT OPERABILITY OPERABILITY ACCURACY l

ACCURACY ENVIRONMENT TO WHICH REQUIRED IN DEMONSTRATED REQUIRED DEMONSTRATED (1) QUALIFIED llELB (% OF SPAN) (% OF SPAN)

ENVIRONMENT (2)

Temp: 325 F* Temp: 340 F 5.6 min. 30 min. N/A N/A

, Press: 8.85 psig Press: 110 psig (Note 4)

RH

100% RH: 100% (Note 11)

• Doghouse environment at time safety function completed - Ref. MCC-1381.05-00-0156.

I *

' ENER Wa%F

QUALIFICATION REPORT: Test Report Procedure No. 20139500 dated 5/1/79 (MCM-1205.34-0005) y g j-i

% xE METHOD: Test mwP%

m-De

• CN

! De 8

p MSEA

_ _ _ ~

McGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION - UNITS 1 AND 2 Page 29a

SUMMARY

OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF CLASS 1E EQUIPMENT Rev. 4 LOCATED OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT AND EXPOSED TO HELB ENVIRONMENT EQUIPMENT ID: Valve Operator - Main MANUFACTURER: Borg Warner MODEL #: 12" Gate w/ Elect Hyd.

Feedwater Isolation Valves Oper.

(Doghouse)

NVD P/N 88500 HELB ENVIRONMENT OPERABILITY OPERABILITY ACCURACY ACCURACY ENVIRONMENT TO WHICH REQUIRED IN DEMONSTRATED REQUIRED DEMONSTRATED (1) QUALIFIED HELB

(% OF SPAN) (% OF SPAN)

ENVIRONMENT (2)

Temp: 240 F Temp: 345 F Continuous Continuous N/A N/A Press: 8.85 psig Press: 110 psig RH: 100% Ril: 100%

(Note 5)

QUALIFICATION REPORT: Test Report No. 1989, dated 05/18/83 EN 8'M e r+ e m

• MEIEL METHOD: Test  ::i52 aga c_

-% c, gg gt

?b$

m-g n2 2

MSEA E

t 1,

McGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION - UNITS l'AND 2' Page 30a

SUMMARY

OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF CLASS IE EQUIPMENT Rev. 3 LOCATED OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT AND EXPOSED TO HELB ENVIRONMENT EQUIPMENT ID: Level Switch MANUFACTURER: Magnetrol MODEL #: A103F-3X-Y-MPG-TDM-(Doghouse) SIM04DC-SIM04DC-SIMD4DC 4

HELB ENVIRONMENT OPERABILITY OPERABILITY ACCURACY ACCURACY ENVIRONMENT TO WHICH REQUIRED IN DEMONSTRATED DEMONSTRATED REQUIRED (1) QUALIFIED HELB (% OF SPAN) (% OF SPAN) i ENVIRONMENT (2)

Temp: 240 F Temp:285 F 15 seconds Continuous 10.25" 0.25"

, following a main feedwater line break 3

e

! QUALIFICATION REPORT: Duke QTF Report TR-053 and TR-060. gg

• E E E. ,

i Ci.. 2 <

] METHOD: Test +, 5 g [ ,

S"!;;a m~

a 5"

MDIC 8 4

s McGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION - UNITS 1 AND 2 Page 31

SUMMARY

OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF CLASS 1E EQUIPMENT Rev. 4 LOCATED OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT AND EXPOSED TO HELB ENVIRONMENT EQUIPMENT ID: Stem Mounted Limit Switches MANUFACTURER: NAMCO. MODEL #: EA180, EA740 (Doghouse)

HELB ENVIRONMENT OPERABILITY OPERABILITY ACCURACY ACCURACY ENVIRONMENT TO WHICH REQUIRED IN DEMONSTRATED REQUIRED DEMONSTRATED (1) QUALIFIED HELB

(% OF SPAN) (% OF SPAN)

ENVIRONMENT (2)

Temp: 240 F Temp: 340 F Continuous Continuous N/A N/A Press: 8.85 psig Press: 70 psig RH: 100% RH: 100%

(Note 5)

QUALIFICATION REPORT: NAMC0 Test Report QTR-106 dated 9/2/81 (MCM-1205.34-0009) and d'# ER NAMC0 Test Report QTR-111, Rev. O dated 10/01/81 (MCM-1205.34-0008)

%QE CIE?u mm METHOD: Test

., 5 g E

'3 "' 6 0 E"

1 **

5" tt 8

MSEA l

McGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION - UNITS 1 AND 2 Page 33

SUMMARY

OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF CLASS 1E EQUIPMENT Rev. 3 LOCATED OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT AND EXPOSED TO HELB ENVIRONMENT EQUIPMENT ID: Cable - Control MANUFACTURER: Brand Rex MODEL #: XLPE Insulation (Procurement (Doghouse) Specs: MCS-1354.02-4, 5, 7 &

& 9 & MCS-1354.04-14)

HELB ENVIRONMENT OPERABILITY OPERABILITY ACCURACY ACCURACY ENVIRONMENT TO WHICH REQUIRED IN DEMONSTRATED REQUIRED DEMONSTRATED (1) QUALIFIED HELB (% OF SPAN) (% OF SPAN)

ENVIRONMENT (2)

Terp: 240 F Temp: 346 F Continuous Continuous N/A N/A (Note 5) 8'if QUALIFICATION REPORT: Test Reports FC4113 (MCM-1354.00-0007) FC5120-1 (MCM-1354.00-0023) and FC5120-3 '(MCM-1354.00-0024)'j-E[

,2 E. S 2

$N aa1o c:

METHOD: Test

}((((

S k .E' o ".

tQ 2

8 EPSS e

k a

McGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION - UNITS 1 AND 2 Page 34 4

SUMMARY

OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF CLASS 1E EQUIPMENT Rev. 3 LOCATED OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT AND EXPOSED TO HELB ENVIRONMENT EQUIPMENT ID: Cable - Instrumentation MANUFACTURER: Eaton (Samuel Moore) MODEL #: EP/Hypalon Insulation (Doghouse) (Procurement Specs:

MCS-1354.03-1, 2, 3 & 5 &

MCS-1354.04-2 & 5)

HELB ENVIRONMENT OPERABILITY OPERABILITY ACCURACY ACCURACY ENVIRONMENT TO WHICH REQUIRED IN DEMONSTRATED DEMONSTRATED REQUIRED (1) QUALIFIED HELB (% OF SPAN) (% OF SPAN)

ENVIRONMENT (2)

Terp: 240 F Temp: 340 F Continuous Continuous N/A N/A (Note 5)

QUALIFICATION REPORT: Test Report F-C3683 (MCM-1354.00-0006) yggy e ,+ e o O =a.

355a METHOD: Test o E,

• g S'"!;;a T'

5" 1

8 EPSS 3

McGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION - UNITS 1 AND 2 Page 35

SUMMARY

OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF CLASS 1E EQUIPMENT Rev. 3 LOCATED OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT AND EXPOSED TO HELB ENVIRONMENT EQUIPMENT.ID: Cable - Control, Instrumentation, MANUFACTURER: Okonite MODEL #: EP, EP/Hypalon, & Hypalon and Power (Doghouse) Insulation (Procurement Specs: MCS-1354.01-1, 2 &

MCS-1354.02-4, 6, 9 &

MCS-1354.03-4)

HELB ENVIRONMENT OPERABILITY OPERABILITY ACCURACY ACCURACY ENVIRONMENT TO WHICH REQUIRED IN DEMONSTRATED REQUIRED DEMONSTRATED (1) QUALIFIED HELB

(% OF SPAN) (% OF SPAN)

ENVIRONMENT (2)

Temp: 240 F Temp: 340 F Continuous Continuous N/A N/A (Note 5) t FR QUALIFICATION REPORT:

Test28,Reports June N1, May 2, 1975 1979 (MCM-1354.00-0012; (MCM-1354.00-0010);

110E, November FN-1, 12, 1970 (MCM-1354.00-0016); July 3, 1978 (MCM-13 gg November 5, 1982 (MCM-1354.00-0022); G1, February 17, 1976 (MCM-1354.00-0045) m c

onzo METHOD: Test j@,

mamm li! & >

,, a g' ~

e"n 8

EPSS

McGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION - UNITS 1 AND 2- Page 36 .

SUMMARY

OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF CLASS 1E EQUIPMENT Rev. 3 LOCATED OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT AND EXPOSED TO HELB ENVIRONMENT EQUIPMENT ID: Cable - Control MANUFACTURER: Okonite MODEL #: Tefzel 280 Insulation (Doghouse)

(Procurement Spec:

MCS-1354.04-6) liELB ENVIRONMENT OPERABILITY OPERABILITY ACCURACY ACCURACY ENVIRONMENT TO WilICH REQUIRED IN DEMONSTRATED REQUIRED DEMONSTRATED (1) QUALIFIED llELB (% OF SPAN) (% OF SPAN)

ENVIRONMENT (2)

Temp: 240 F Temp: 341 F Continuous Continuous N/A N/A (Note 5)

QUALIFICATION REPORT:

Test Report K-0-1, September 1979 (MCM-1354.00-0011), and K-8-1, April 4, 1981 (MCM-1354.00-0044) g g y 0"!- E "U n O

• METHOD: Test E iiS 2

• $*c C " 3i 3.

o

G O mm 5"

"1 "

EPSS

McGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION - UNITS 1 AND 2 Page 37

SUMMARY

OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF CLASS 1E EQUIPMENT Rev. 3 LOCATED OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT AND EXPOSED TO HELB ENVIRONMENT EQUIPMENT ID: Cable - Control and Power MANUFACTURER: Anaconda' MODEL #: EP Insulation and (Doghouse)

EP/Hypalon Insulation (Procurement Specs:

MCS-1354.01-2 & 4, &

MCS-1354.02-3, 6 & 9 HELB ENVIRONMENT OPERABILITY OPERABILITY ACCURACY ACCURACY ENVIRONMENT TO WHICH REQUIRED IN DEMONSTRATED REQUIRED DEMONSTRATED (1) QUALIFIED HELB

(% OF SPAN) (% OF SPAN)

ENVIRONMENT (2)

Terp: 240 F Temp: .346 F Continuous Continuous N/A N/A (Note 5)

QUALIFICATION REPORT: Test Reports F-C4350-2 (MCM-1354.00-0008) and F-C4350-3 and Supplement (MCM-1354.00-0009)

????

N C S- E <

OO*

METHOD: Test 5[y ? "

SzE S"sii ! eued

~."

CN '

I r

EPSS G

~

McGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION - UNITS 1 AND 2 Page 66

SUMMARY

OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF CLASS 1E EQUIPMENT Rev. 4 LOCATED OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT AND EXPOSED TO HELB ENVIRONMENT EQUIPMENT ID: Transmitter - MANUFACTURER: Rosemount MODEL #: 11530D5 Auxiliary Feedwater Flow (Doghouse)

HELB ENVIRONMENT OPERABILITY OPERABILITY ACCURACY ACCURACY ENVIRONMENT TO WHICH REQUIRED IN DEMONSTRATED REQUIRED DEMONSTRATED (1) QUALIFIED HELB

(% OF SPAN) (% OF SPAN)

ENVIRONMENT (2)

Temp: 240 F Temp: 350 F Continuous Continuous 28.13%

Press: 8.85 psig 128.13%

Press: 120 psig RH: 100% RH: 100%

(Note 5)

[k$$

QUALIFICATION REPORT: Wyle Test Report 45592-1 (MCM-1210.0178)

• EEE GiS2 METHOD: Test

. Bi$

""Ga T"

3 **

5"

' 1 8

MDIC

McGuire Units 1 & 2 Page 3N1

• dogh'ouse MSLB Evaluation Revision 3 Attachment 3 Page 20 of 21 MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION UNITS 1 AND 2 ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF CLASS 1E EQUIPMENT LOCATED OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT AND EXPOSED TO HELB ENVIRONMENT Note 1 The methods employed to evaluate pipebreaks and to determine the resulting environmental parameters are discussed in Duke Power Company Report MDS/PDG-77-1. The Evaluation of the Effects of Postulated Pipe Failures Outside Containment for McGuire Nuclear Station.

Note 2 The pipe rupture environment is assumed to exist for 21/2 hours based on 30 minutes at the peak temperature after which action by the operator isolates the break and allows the Auxiliary Building temperature to decrease to normal in 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. Use of the term " Continuous" indicates operability required /

demonstrated throughout the pipe rupture period.

The pipe rupture environmental analysis for the Doghouse was conducted separate-ly taking into consideration different sizes of main steam line breaks. All equipment located in the Doghouse is identified under " Equipment ID."

Note 3 Rotork Test Report TR-3025 shows that when the qualified temperature for these valves is exceeded, the torque switches may fail on the next operation of the valves. Since at least one additional operation is available after the valve's temperature qualification has been exceeded, the valve can be relied upon to move to its safety position. No further safety function is required.

Note 4 The test was conducted for 30 minutes, however, the Class 1E solenoids which operate the FWIV's de-energize upon initiation of containment isolation and allow the FWIV's to close within 5 seconds. With the solenoid valves de-energized, the FWIV's will remain in a closed position indefinitely.

Note 5 This equipment is not required to mitigate the consequences of a MSLB in the doghouse. Therefore, the " Pipe Rupture Environment" parameters are for the HELB for which the equipment is required.

Note 6 The HELB analysis has identified pipe breaks resulting in higher temperatures; however, there are no cables exposed to temperatures above 330 F, except in the doghouse which is addressed separately.

MdGuire Units 1 & 2 Doghousa MSLB Evaluation

• Attichment 3 Page 3N2 Page 21 of 21 Revision 2

^

Note 7 The components listed are general application devices. These components are installed in metal enclosures and depending on their specific design applica-tion, may be located in various areas of the Auxiliary Building. This table addresses the qualfication of these components with respect to the worst-case pipe break environment applicable to the components locati.on.

Note 8 The qualified operating temperature is based on the maximum current flowing through the fuse or resistor and appropriate fuse or resistor derating.

Note 9 The only during the requirement accident. of the optical isolator is to retain its input integrity Note 10 Accuracy demonstrated is the shift in the actual resistance due to the change in temperature during the accident.

Note 11 The 30 minute " Operability Demonstrated" parameter is based on Duke Power Company's McGuire Nuclear Station Evaluation of Main Steam Line Break in the Doghouse.

i McGuire - Units 1 & 2

Doghouse MSLB, Evaluation Attachment 4 Page 1 of 6 M6UIRE STEAM LINE BREAK CORE RESRMISE ANALYSIS WITH CONSB2UENTIAL FAILURES DUE 70 3]PEllHEATED STEAM Backcround .

The M6uire letter to the NRC concerning the effects of superheated steam mass

, and energy releases outside containment provided justification of safety related

< operation prior to equipnent qualification (EQ) envelopes being exceeded. In addition, Duke Power provided arguments that the equipnent would renain in their actuated positions even if the EQ envelopes were subsequently exceeded. As a result of liRC review on the environmental effects of superheated steam on equipnent in the Catawba plant doghouses, Duke Power has requested this additional analysis of the effect of a consequential failure of affected equipnent at M6uire.

Identification of Causes and Accident Descriotion The stean release arising from a rupture of a main stean line would result in an 4 initial increase in steam flow which decreases during the accident as the steam pressure falls. The energy removal from the RCS causes a reduction of coolant temperature and pressure. In the presence of a nega'tive moderator tenperature coefficient, the cooldown results in an insertion of positive reactivity. If the most reactive rod cluster control assembly (RCCA) is assumed stuck in its

. fully withdrawn position after reactor trip, there is an increased possibility that the core will become critical and return to power. A return to power following a steam line rupture is a potential problen mainly because of the high power peaking factors which exist assuming the most reactive RCCA to be stuck in its fully withdrawn position. The core is ultimately shut down by the boric acid injection delivered by the Safety Injection System.

].

The analysis of a main steam line rupture was perfonned in support of the M6uire OFA transition licensing subnittal (Reference 1) to demonstrate that the follcuing criteria are satisfied:

Asstaning a stuck RCCA with or without offsite power, and assuming a single failure in the engineered safety features, the core remains in place and j intact. Radiation doses do not exceed the guidelines of 10CFR100.

Although DNB and possible clad perforation following a steam pipe rupture are not necessarily unacceptable, the OFA analysis, in fact, shows that no l

DNB occurs for any rupture assuming the most reactive assembly stuck in its fully withdrawn position.

l The major rupture of a steam line is the most limiting cooldown transient and is I analyzed at zero power with no decay heat. Decay heat would retard the cooldown thereby reducing the return to power. A detailed analysis of this transient with the most limiting break size, a double-ended rupture, was perfonned for the McGuire OFA transition.

l i

i

, , , , , - - > - - , - - - , . - - , - . , ,-, , . - , , . , , , , _ , , - ~ ,n , - - - - - - - , , - - , , - - . - - - - e , - - , -~

. . .. . McGuire - Units 1 & 2 2 Doghouse MSLB, Evaluation Attachment 4 Page 2 of 6' The following functions provide the protection for a steam line rupture:

1. Safety Injection Systen actuation from any of the following:

a. Two-out-of-three low stem line pressure signals in any one loop.

b. Two-out-of-four 1m pressurizer pressure signals.

c. Wo-out-of-three high containment pressure signals.

2. The overpower reactor trips (neutron flux and delta-T) and the reactor trip occurring in conjunction with receipt of the safety injection signal.

3. Redundant isolation of the main feedwater lines.

Sustained high feedwater flow would cause additional cooldown. Therefore, in addition to the normal control action which will close the main feedwater valves a safety injection signal will rapidly close all feedwater control valves and feedwater isolation valves, trip the main feedwater pmps, and close the feedwater pmp discharge valves.

4. Trip of the fast acting steam line stop valvese (designed to close in less than 5 seconds) on:

a. Wo-out-of-three low stem line pressure signals in any one loop.

b. Two out-of-four high-high contairrnent pressure signals.

c. Wo-out-of-three high negative steam line pressure rate signals in any one loop (used only during cooldown and heatup operations).

Fast-acting isolation valves are provided in each steam line; these valves will fully close within 10 seconds of a large break in the steam line. For breaks downstream of the isolation valves, closure of all valves would completely -

terminate the blowdown. For any break, in any location, no more than one steam generator would experience an uncontrolled blowdown even if one of the isolation valves fails to close, unless a consequential failure results in reopening of both MS1Vs in the doghouse. This would cause an additional cooldown of the primary system, with a possible increase in the peak return to power. The l following section of this report docments the analysis of these effects and j consequences.

Besides the MSIVs, the affected equipnent in the doghouse are the steam generator power-operated relief valves and the main feedwater isolation valves.

' The PORVs are assmed to open as a result of a consequential failure due to superheated steam. The consequential reopening of the main feedwater isolation valves would not affect the transient since the safety injection signal also trips the main feedwater pumps, and closes the feedwater control and feedwater pump discharge valves.

1. main stem isolation valves (MSIVs) l i

McGuire - Units 1 & 2 Doghouse MSLB, Evaluation Attachment 4 3 Page 3 of 6 Analysis of Effects and Consecuences Method of Analysis 1

The analysis of the stean line rupture has been performed to detennine:

1. The core heat flux and RCS temperature and pressure transients resulting from the cooldown following the steam line break described below. The LOFTRAN code modified for the calculation of superheated steam enthalpy has been used.

2. The thennal and hydraulic behavior of the core following the steam line break. An evaluation of the transient statepoints from this analysis verifies that the DNB design basis is met.

The analysis assmptions are the same as those of the OFA transition steam line break analysis, with exceptions noted herein. The most restrictive single failure in the safety injection systen is assmed. The major difference of this analysis is the assmption of a consequential failure of affected equipnent in the doghouse due to superheated steam. Specifically, the following scenario of events is analyzed:

2

1. A 1.0 ft rupture occurs in one of the steam lines upstream of the MSlV in one of the two doghouses. This case bounds smaller breaks because it results in a more severe cooldown of the reactor coolant system, and thus a greater peak heat flux.

2. All four steam generators blow down through the break until steam line isolation occurs by closure of the MSIVs.

3. Following steam line isolation, initially only the faulte.d loop stean generator (loop 1) blows down. Saturated steam is released to the doghouse c until tube bundle uncovery occurs, after which the stean exiting the break l becomes superheated. -

l

4. The MSIVs in the affected doghouse are assmed to reopen when the superheated steam enthalpy reaches 1210 Btu /lb. This is conservative since the enthalpy is lower than that which resulted in the EQ envelope being exceeded in the compartment analyses perfonned for the Duke Power plants.

The result is an u1 controlled blowdown of both affected steam generators (loops 1 and 2).

To ensure conservatism in the analysis, cases were analyzed for both a " late" and a " predicted" time of uncovery of the steam generator tube bundle. In addition, cases were analyzed with reactivity feedback calculations based on the core properties associated with an assumed stuck RCCA positioned in either the loop 1 or loop 2 core sectors.

McGuire - Units 1 & 2

• **

• Doghouse MSLB, Evaluation 4 Attachment 4 Page 4 of 6 Besults A time sequence of events for the four cases analyzed is shown in Table 1. As shown by Table 1, the consequential MS1V failures do not affect the peak return to power for any case. For the cases in which reactivity feedback is calculated based on loop 2, the additional cooldown induced by the HSIV failures resulted in an increase in core heat flux. However, the heat flux reained belcu the peak value attained earlier in the transient.

A detailed evaluation of the transient statepoints for all cases analyzed verifies that the DNB design basis is met (i.e. DNBR above the limit value of 1.30) and the conclusions of the M6uire OFA transition licensing submittal remain valid.

Reference

1. Duke Power Transmittal to NRC, " Safety Evaluation for McGuire Units 1 and 2 Transition to Westinghouse 17x17 Optimized Fuel Assemblies."

O

McGuire - Units 1 & 2 t -

. o- , -

Doghouse MSLB, Evaluation 5

Attachment 4 Page 5 of 6 TABLE 1 TIME SEQUDIE OF EVDfIS Case 1 - Late Tube Uncovery, Reactivity Calculations Based on Loop 1.

Event Time (see)

Ste m line ruptures 0 Steam line isolation occurs 9 Criticality attained 28 Peak heat flur. reached 248 Steam generatch tube bundle uncovery occurs 335

> Consequential failure of MSI'is in affected doghouse 344 Case 2 - Late Tube Uncovery, Reactivity Calculations Based on Loop 2.

Event Time (see)

, Stem line ruptures ,

0

'f '

Ste n line isolation occurs , 9 Critictlity attained 49 Peak heat flux reached 268 Stem Be'nerator tube bundle uncovery occurs 540 i

3 q. Consequential failure of MSIVs in effected do5 house 5 95 Case 3 - Predicted Tube Uncovery, aeoa ,ity calculations Based on Loop 1.

Event Time (see)

Stem line ruptures j 0 Stem line isolatiicn occurs - 9 Criticality attained -

28 Sten generator tube bundle uncover:{ occurs 228

~

Peak h'et.t. flux reached  ; 23 0 Consequential failure of MSIVs'in affected doghouse 274 -

T j

~ "

McGuire - Units 1 & 2

. . 40 - Doghouse MSLB, Evaluation 6 Attachment 4 Page 6 of 6 Case 4 - Predicted Tube Uncovery, Reactivity Calculations Based on Loop 2.

Zy2D1 Time (sec)

Steam line ruptures O Steam line isolation occurs 9 Criticality attained 49 Peak heat flux reached 26 8 Stean generator tube bundle uncovery occurs 334 Consequential failure of MSIVs in affected doghouse 548 9

e i

D q 6 9

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