IR 05000317/1992030
| ML20127K026 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Calvert Cliffs  |
| Issue date: | 01/13/1993 |
| From: | Larry Nicholson NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20127K017 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-317-92-30, 50-318-92-30, NUDOCS 9301260022 | |
| Download: ML20127K026 (12) | |
Text
.
.
I U.S.NUCLilAlt IlliGULATOltY COhihilSSION ltliGION 1 Iteport Nos.
50-317/92 30; 50 318/92-30 License Nos.
DPit-53/DPit-69 Licensee:
llattimore Gas and lilectric Company Post Office Itox 1475 llattimore, biaryland 21203 Facility:
Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2
-
location:
Lusby, h1aryland Inspection ce.
.ed:
November 22, 1992, through January 2,1993
,
inspectors:
Peter it. Wilson, Senior Itesident inspector Allen G. Ilowe, ltesident inspector Carl F. Lyon, Ilesident inspector Approved by:
5 dtur (4 3 f3,_
-
(/Nicholson, Chief inte
'
Larry )f Projects Section No. l A Itcacto Division of lleactor Projects insprttlon SununarJ:
This inspection report documents resident inspector core, regional initiative, and reactive inspections performed during day and backshift hours of station activities including: plant operations; radiological protection; surveillance and maintenance; emergency preparedness; security; engineering and technical support; and safety assessment / quality verification.
EnuRS:
See lixecutive Summary.
9301260022 930120
PDR ADOCK 05000317 G
. _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ ___ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - - _ - _
_
___ -
_
__
_
_ ___-__ ____ -____-__ _ ______________ __-___ - _
.._______
____________ __________
- _ _ _ _
.
J 13]iCUTIVE SUAth1 ale
,
Otivert Cliffs Nuclear Power Phulilills I ainL2
'
Imperil 01LRepnri Nos. 5LM17/92 30 anli 50-318/92-30 l'lant Operatiom: (Operational safety inspection hiodule 71707, Prompt Onsite Response to Events at Operating Power Reactors 61odule 93702) Operator response to a Unit I automatic reactor trip due to a main generator ground fault was good. Operators controlled
the plant in accordance with the emergency operating procedures and received good support from the plant staff.
Radlulogical Protectinu: (htodule 71707) 11ased on direct observation of access controls and radiological safety practices and discussions with radiological controls personnel, the radiological protection program and implementation was acceptable.
'
i Maluttnantr_atul Surycillante: (hiaintenance Onservations hiodule 62703, Surveillance Observations Afodule 61726) llased on direct observation, review of work packages and test procedures, and discussions with engineering and maintenance personnel, maintenance and surveillances were generally found to be properly prioritired, appropriately supervised, and safely performed in accordance with adequate procedures.
E!ntrgene Preparrihten: (hiodule 71707) An acceptable level of emergency preparedness was found based on inspection of facilities, review of procedures, and discussion with operations and emergency planning personnel.
Stturill: (hiodule 71707) llased on direct observation, security procedures were found to be adequate and professionally implemented.
Engineerine and TecitultitLSuvunrt: (htodule 71707) llG&E's investigations into the trip of both steam generator feed pumps and the failure of the 11 auxiliary feedwater pump tuttiine bearing subsequent to the Unit I trip were appropriate to support continued operation.
Efforts to improve charging pump availability demonstratcd a strong safety perspective.
,
Safetv AssesstntulLQRalltv Verificallon: (htodules 71707,30703) 11ased on direct observation, the onsite and offsite safety review committees continued to be strengths.
Licensee Event Reports were generally found to be of high quality.
<
i
!
I'
_ _,
_... _. -
.
.
.
... _ _ _ ~
_ _ _ _ _
_ _ - _ - _ _
.
.
'
l DEfAILS 1.0 SUhth1AltY OF FACll.lTY ACTIVITil3 Unit i began the period at full power. On November 22, power was reduced to 96% to repair the makeup oil Coat valve for the main generator hydrogen seal oil tank. The unit returned to full power on November 23 following the repair. An automatic reactor trip occurred on November 24 due to a main generator ground fault caused when an inspection window fell into the phase " A" isophase bus duct. Following investigation of the trip, the duct was repaired and the unit returned to full power on November 28. Unit i operated at power for the remainder of the period.
Unit 2 operated at power with no notable events during the inspection period.
On January 1, hir. C. Poindexter became Chairman of the lioard and Chief 11xecutive Of0cer of 11G&li following the retirement of hir G. hicGowan. hir. hicGowan will continue as a member of the lloard of Directors. in addition to the Nuclear Energy Division, the Fossil Energy Division began reporting to hir. G. Creel, whose title was modined to Senior Vice President - Generation.
2.0 P1, ANT OPEllATIONS 2.1 OptIntintli1LSaftty_Ynificatinti The inspectors observed plant operation and verified that the facility was operated safely and in accordance with licensee procedures and regulatory requirements, llegular tours were conducted of the following plant areas:
-- control room
-- security access point
-- primary auxiliary building
-- protected area fence
-- radiological control point
-- intake structure
-- electrical switchgear rooms
-- diesel generator rooms
-- auxiliary feedwater pump rooms
-- turbine building Control room instruments and plant computer indications were observed for correlation between channels and for conformance with technical specification (TS) requirements.
Operability of enginected safety features, other safety related systems and onsite and offsite power sources was verified. The inspectors observed various alarm conditions and confirmed that operator response was in accordance with plant operating procedures.
Itoutine operations surveillance testing was also observed. Compliance with TS and implementation of appropriate aci.on statements for equipment out of service was inspected.
Plant radiation monitoring system indications and plant stack traces were reviewed for unexpected changes. legs and records were reviewed to determine if entries were accurate and identified equipment status or deficiencies. These records included operating logs, turnover sheets, system safety tags and temporary modifications log. Plant housekeeping
_
- _. ____-_-___________-___-________ -
__ - _
. -__ - _ - _. - - -..-.- - - - - _ - -. -. - - _ - -- _- - - -
4
'
controls were monitored, including control and storage of Dammable material and other potential safety hazards. The inslutors also examined the condition of various fire protection, meteorological, and seismic monitoring systems. Control room and shift manning were compared to regulatory requirements and portions of shift turnovers were observed.
j The inspectors found that control room access was properly controlled and that a professional atmosphere was maintained, in addition to normal utility working hours, the review of plant operations was routinely conducted during backshifts (evening shifts) and deep backshifts (weckend and midnight shifts). Extended coverage was provided for 55 hours6.365741e-4 days <br />0.0153 hours <br />9.093915e-5 weeks <br />2.09275e-5 months <br /> during backshifts and 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br /> during deep backshifts. Operators were alert and displayed no signs of inattention to duty or fatigue.
The inspectors obserwd an acceptable level of performance during the inspection tours
detailed above.
i l
2.2 Followuo of Events Occurring DutiDg Insocetion Period During the inspection period, the inspectors provided onsite coverage and followup of
.
unplanned events. Plant parameters, performance of safety systems, and licensee actions j
were reviewed. The inspectors con 0rmed that the required noti 0 cations were made to the NitC. During event followup, the inspectors reviewed the corresponding CCI-ll8N (Calvert Cliffs Instruction, " Nuclear Operations Section initiated Iteporting llequirements")
documentation, including the event details, root cause analysis, and corrective actions taken
to prevent recurrence. The following events were reviewed.
i a.
Unit 1 Automatic Itcattor Trip On November 24 an automatic reactor trip on Unit I occurred due to a main generator ground fault. The fault was caused when an upper inspection window on the isophase bus i
duct came loose and fell inside the phase " A" bus duct. The gasket from the tempered glass viewing window contacted the 25 kV bus disconnect link assembly and caused a phase to-
,
ground short. The gasket caught fire and the generator ground fault protection relay tripped the generator Geld and switchyard bus breakers, deenergizing the circuit. The Dre self-l extinguished in less than five minutes. The loss of generator output resulted in a turbine trip, which caused a reactor trip, b
The plant responded as expected to the trip, with two exceptions. The steam generator feed pumps (SOFPs) both tripped on high discharge pressure. Number 11 and 13 auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pumps were started by the control room operators to control steam generator level. After operating for approximately 35 minutes, the 11 AFW pump turbine
- inboard bearing temperature suddenly rose abnormally high. The pump was immediately l
s g.
-e v.
,r,',.
..,,
w.
,-.-y.,
,e
-, ~..,,,,,,,,, -,, -,
,ry-,.,
,.,,,,,,,3
.,.,, -,,,, _.. _, _,
,,,.m,-,,,m--_,--y,_..,--ny.--
,,,o__
v w-c,~.-,
w
-,, - -., -, - -,, -,. -., -.
,-h-
.
_
_ -
_ _ _ _ _ _ _. - _ _ _ _ - _
_
_
.-
_
_ ___
f
.
'
.
'
e secured, but subsequent investigation revealed that the bearing was destroyed. BG&B conducted investigations into the SGFP tripping and the 11 AFW pump failure to supplement the normal post trip review and evaluation. The results of these investigations are discussed in section 7 below.
Inspectors observed good response to the transient in the control room and at the isophase bus duct. Operators controlled the plant in accordance with the emergency operating
'
procedures and received good support from the plant staff, including safety and fire protection, security, maintenance, systems engineering, and various supervisors and senior
'
management.
Immediately after the plant was placed in a stable condition, the isophase bus duct was cordoned off and a Significant incident Finding Team (SIFT) was appointed by tne Plant General Manager to conduct an investigation. Inspectors attended the post trip review and noted that it produced a comprehensive and clear list of action items to be completed before
'
and after unit restart.
The isophase bus ducts have inspection windows installed at several locations along their length. The safety glass in each a dow opening is held in place by a rubber gasket.
n Carpenters were removing scaV g over the isophase bus ducts when the phase "A" glass inspection plate fell into the duc he carpenters heard the plate fall in and saw the flames from the burning gasket before caing the area and informing the control room.
BG&E's post trip inspection and testing revealed no damage to the bus or generator, except for carbon residue on the bus from the burned gasket. The bus and duct were cleaned and the inspection window was repaired.
The glass plate was retrieved from the duct. It was in one piece but shattered, and a foot print was visible in the dust spanning the shattered area. Other footprints and hand prints were visible on nearby duct work and I beams. The SIFT concluded that the phase "A" inspection window had been stepped on, cracked, and loosened in its gasket, probably during recent maintenance on piping supports in the vicinity. They concluded that the glass did not fall in immediately when it was stepped on. Continuous, normal vibrat:on probably loosened the glass later to the point that it fell in the duct.
As part of the corrective actions, the condition of the other inspection windows was checked.
The phase "C" glass was also found cracked and was replaced. Although the bus ducts are inaccessible under normal conditions, caution signs and barriers were installed to warn personnel of the danger of high voltage associated with them. The remaining corrective actions focused primarily on reemphasizing personal safety and awareness through promulgation and discussion of the near miss accident to site personnel.
i i
l l
. ~. -, _,, _
_ _.. _ _ _.,
,
... -.
.
-
,
,_
_
_ _ _. _ _ _ _ _, _.
,
- _ _ _.
.
.
.
.
Following repair of the duct, completion of bus and generator testing, and resolution of the SOFP and AFW pump questions, the unit returned to power operation on November 28.
Inspectors concluded that operator response to the event was good and that ilG&E corrective actions and followup were appropriate.
3.0 ItADIGl OGICAl, CONTitOI.S During tours of the accessible plant areas, the inspectors observed the implementation of selected portions of the licensee's Radiological Controls Program. The utilizaJ.on and compliance with special work permits (SWPs) were reviewed to ensure detailed descriptions of radiological conditions were provided and that personnel adhered to SWP requirements.
The inspectors observed that controls of access to various radiologically controlled areas and use of personnel monito s and frisking methods upon exit from these areas were adequate.
Posting and control of radiation areas, contaminated areas and hot spots, and labelling and control of containers holding radioactive materials were verified to be in accordance with licensee procedures.
IIcalth Physics technician control and monitoring of these activities were determined to be adequate. Overall, an acceptable level of performance was observed.
4.0 MAINTENANCE AND SUltVEll.l.ANCE 4.1 Mainknance Observation The inspector reviewed selected maintenance activities to assure that:
the activity did not violate technical specification limiting conditions for operation and
-
-
that redundant components were operable; required approvals and releases had been obtained prior to commencing work;
--
procedures used for the task were adequate and work was within the skills of the
-
trade; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel;
-
--
where necessary, radiological and fire preventive controls were adequate and implemented; quality veritication hold points were established where required and observed; and
--
--
equipment was properly tested and returned to service.
__ _ _ _ _ - - - _ _ - - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _-
_ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _.
d
.
4
The work observed was performed safely and in accordance with proper procedures, inspectors noted that an appropriate level of supervisory attention was given to the work depending on its priority and dif0eulty. Notable observations are included below for selected activities. hiaintenance activities reviewed included:
hiO 19206510 Replace Unit I hiain Stack Itadiation hionitor Drive Assembly hiO 19208334 Install TA l 92-136 to clear hanging control roorn alarm due to 1 AR-2320, the generator core monitor recorder Inspectors discussed the proposed temporary alteration (TA) with control n>om and
maintenance personnel. The TA, the work package, and the compensatory measures in3falled to cover the removal of the recorder alarm were reviewed. Technicians discovered a discrepancy between the controlled prints and the technical manual and were unable to i
positively identify the required leads to be lifted to complete the TA. As a result, the TA was not completed and the package was returned to systems engineering for further review,
.
The inspectors concluded that the preparation of the work package was inadequate and that
'
the technicians' actions were appropriate.
I h10 19206665 Repack 12 charging pump i
4.2 Eurveillance Observation
!
The inspectors witnessed / reviewed selected surveillance tests'to determine whether properly
approved procedures were in use, details were adequate, test instrumentation was properly calibrated and used, technical specifications were satisfied, tesdng was performed by i
quali0ed personnel, and test results satis 0ed acceptance criteria or were properly dispositioned, i
The surveillance testing was performed safely and in accordance with proper procedures.-
inspectors noted that an appropriate level of supervisory attention was given to the testing
"
- depending on its sensitivity and difficulty. Notable observations are included below for selected activities. The following surveillance testing activities were reviewed:
.
i STP O-5-1 Auxiliary Feedwater System hionthly Surveillance Test I
STPO31 Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation System Logic Test-STP O 73A-2 SW Pump Performance Test
!
.
I a
,-
, A -, - - - ~.--.
ni
..,~ i. -
in
.-- -, - - - -, - ~. < - - - -, - -
~ ~,, + -
~
.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
'
.
!
.
,
,
i The 21 saltwater pump initially failed the STP due to high differential pressure. Subsequent
investigation revealed that the pump discharge pressure gage and the test gage sensing line had been blown down with nitrogen the previous day and some nitrogen remained in the line.
,
The line was vented and the STP was reperformed satisfactorily the next day. An issue
'
i report was generated to investigate the inadequate venting of the sensing line and recommend appropriate corrective action.
5.0 EMEltGENCY PitEPAltEDNESS The inspectors touced the onsite emergency response facilities to verify that these facilities were in an adequate state of readiness for event response. The inspectors discussed program implementation with the applicable personnel. The resident inspectors had no noteworthy nndings in this area.
6.0 SECUltlTY During routine inspection tours, the inspectors observed implementation of portions of the security plan. Areas observed included access point search equipment operation, condition of physical barriers, site access control, security force staffing, and response to system alarms and degraded conditions. These areas of program implementation were determined to be adequate. No unacceptable conditions were identl6cd.
,
7.0 FNGINEERING AND TECilNICAL SUPPOitT The inspectors reviewed selected design changes and modifications made to the facility which the licensee determined were not unreviewed safety questions and did not require prior NitC approval as described by 10 CFit 50.59. Particular attention was given to safety evaluations,
.
Plant Operations Review Committee approval, procedural controls, post modification testing, procedure changes resulting from tcis modification, operator training, and UFSAR and drawing revisions. The following actr.ities were reviewed:
7.1 Charging Pump Availability During the inspection period, the inspectors reviewed various llG&E initiatives to improve chemical and volume control system (CVCS) charging pump availability. The CVCS charging pumps (three per unit) are positive displacement triplex plunger pumps. These pumps automatically stan when a safety injection signal is generated. Calvert Cliffs UF5All
'
requires the flow from at east one charging pump to mitigate the consequences of certain small break loss of coolan accidents. Calvert Cliffs Technical Speci6 cation 3.4.1.2 requires at least two charging pumn s to be operable in operating modes 1 through 4. The availability of these pumps has been auversely affected by gas binding and excessive packing leakage.
0
- - - -
.... -
.
., -
-
,,.-4
.-
sr-,-
. - -
.,.---3 s
-..,,,
-e.----,-
-.. -
-. _ _ _ - _ ___________________ _ _ __ _ __ _ _ _______ _ _ _ _ _ _ _______ _. _ _ - _ _.
.
.
The inspectors found that BG&E had developed several initiatives to improve charging pump availability. These included both modi 0 cations and maintenance program changes.
Initiatives which have already been implemented include the following:
Charging pump stuf0ng box packing material was changed from glass filled
nylon material to polyethylene and bronic.
To minimite particulate contamination, the charging pump repack procedure
was revised to ensure that the pump seal water lines were thoroughly flushed prior to returning the pump to service.
The procurement of improved quality plungers to minimire seal wear.
- Maintenance orders for charging pump seal replacement have been
preapproved to eliminate maintenance planning delays.
Vents were installed in the pumps' suction stabillrcrs to allow for periodic
venting to minimire gas binding.
These initiatives have been successful in improving the availability of the charging pumps.
BG&E informed the inspectors of several other planned initiatives to further improve charging pump availability, including further packing material upgrades and a seal water filtration system.
F The inspectors concluded that BG&E was taking aggressive action to improve charging pump availability. The initiatives which have already been implemented have significantly reduced pump outage times. These actions demonstrated a strong BG&E safety perspective.
7.2
&rJLEgmp Trin D ing Reactor Trio W
During the Unit 1 trip on November 24, both steam generator feed pumps (SGFPs) tripped on high discharge pressure. Loss of one or both SGFPs has occasionally occurred in the past, on both uaits. During the post trip review for the November 24 trip, however, the Superintendent of Nuclear Operations (S-NO) stated that he considered the loss of the SGFPs
_
on a routine trip from full power to be abnormal. Operations and the NRC considered that
the loss of the SGFPs presented an unnecessary challenge to the auxiliary feedwater system.
' Die S-NO requested an evaluation from plant engineering prior to u.'it restart.
l Plant engineering investigated the issue and concluded that the feed regula:ing valve (FRV)-
l_
shutting time after a unit trip was too fast to be compensated for by the SGif speed control-l system. SOFP speed cannot be lowered fast enough to make up for the pressux rise caused
,
!
by the FRV shutting to its post trip position. The result is a loss of SGFP on high discharge pressure, f
I
'
- -
- --.
...
.
.
.-
.-
-
.
.
- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
. _ _ - _ _
l
.
.
i
While plant engineering considered this to be a degraded equipment condition, they concluded that there were no operability concerns associated with the issue, lirlefly, the SGFPs were not credited in the FSAR accident analysis and are not in the TSs. A
'
mod 10 cation which installs a new feedwater control system that will correct the challenges to the SGFP high discharge pressure trip is scheduled for the Unit 21993 refueling outage and
,
the Unit 1 1994 refueling outage plant engineering concluded that unit restart was therefore i
I justined, based primarily on high reliability of the AFW system and the small number of challenges expected to the system until the modification is installed. The justincation for
!
'
recommending unit restart with the condition was documented in a memorandum to the General Supervisor of Nuclear Plant Operations.
Inspectors discussed the issue with operations and engineering personnel and reviewed the
.
restart recommendation. They concluded that the recommendation was appropriate.
7.3 11 AFW Pump Turbine lleatlE_Ealhlic
,
Following the Unit I trip on November 24. the 11 auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pump turbine inboard bearing failed. Inspection revealed that the bearing suffered accelerated wear that
'
led to premature failure. Plant engineering's preliminary investigation concluded that the-
.
accelerated wear was due in part to too low of an oil temperature, at least two turbine fast starts at the low temperature, possible high sump level, and previous bearing damage. The root cause analysis of the bearing failure was still in progress as the inspection period ended.
The investigation was being tracked to completion by the issue report system and the POSRC.
IlG&E and the inspectors were concerned that predictive maintenance had failed to detect the impending bearing failure prior to the Unit I trip when the pump was required to work, The bearing had run hotter than expected during a recent surveillance, but subsequent testing showed the temperature Battening out at an acceptable level. Some miscommunication had t
attributed the higher temperature to a recent overhaul, when in fact the pump had been
'
overhauled but the turbine was not. Vibrations on the bearing had actually decreased since previour readings. An oil sample was taken the week before the unit trip and showed higher than normal levels of some metals, most notably tin, silver, and aluminum, but these results were not received by llG&B until after the trip.
In summary, it appeared that several parts of the engineering organization had information that if consolidated might have led to a prediction of imminent bearing failure. As a result, the Superintendent of Technical Support appointed a task team and established a reasonable time table to develop a logical means to consolidate all of the system and component performance information into a single repository document that will be a useable tool for
>
system engineers to determine performance. Inspectors discussed the AFW pump turbine bearing failure with surveillance test, performance, and system engineering and considered that IlG&E's actions were appropriate to enhance the predictive maintenance program.
- a
.
._
_ _. _,
i
.
.
.
8.0 SAFETY ASSESSMENT AND QUALITY VERIFICATION 8.1 Plant Ooerations and Safety Review Committec The inspectors attended several Plant Operations and Safety Review Committee (POSRC)
meetings. TS 6.5 requirements for required member attendance were verified. The meeting agendas included procedural changes, proposed changes to the TS, Facility Change Requests, and minutes from previous meetings. Items for which adequate review time was not available were postponed to allow committee members time for further review and comment.
Overall, the level of review and member participation was adequate in fulfilling the POSRC responsibilities. No unacceptable conditions were identified.
8.2 Review of Written Reoorts The inspectors reviewed LERs and other reports submitted to the NRC to verify that the event details were clearly documented, the root causes were accurately described, and the corrective actions were adequate. The inspectors evaluated whether additional information was required, whether generic implications were indicated, and whether the event warranted onsite followup. The following LERs were reviewed with respect to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73 and the guidance provided in NUREG 1022:
Unit 1:
LER 92-007 Safety Concern involving Isolation of Pump Recirculation Flow for Testing LER 92-008 Plant Trip Due to Ground Fault in the Isolated Phase ilus Duct System Unit 2:
LER 92-007 Safety Concern involving Isolation of Pump Recirculation Flow for Testing Generally, the LERs were found to be of high quality with good documentation of event
'
analyses, root cause determinations, and corrective actions.
8.3 Offsite Safety Review Committee On December 4, the inspectors attended portions of the Offsite Safety Review Committee (OSSRC) meeting. The OSSRC composition and agenda were in compliance with the requirements of TS 6.5.4. All committee members were involved in the discussions of the issues and reviews were thorough and insightful. The inspectors concluded that the function of the OSSRC continued to be a strength.
-
-.-. -
- -
. -. - - - - -
-
-
-
-
- - -
t
.
.
..
.
9.0 MANAGEMENT MEETINGS During this inspection, periodic meetings were held with station management to discuss inspection obsenations and findings. At the close of the inspection period, an exit meeting was held to summarire the conclusions of the inspection. No written material was given to the licensee and no proprietary information related to this inspection was identified.
An Enforcement Conference was held with BG&E on December 2 at the NRC Region 1 Office in King of Prussia, Pennsylvania, to discuss the circumstances surrounding the two improper high radiation area entries documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-317 and 318/92-25. Mr. R. Denton, Vice President - Nuclear Energy, and members of his staff met with Mr. J. Wiggins, Deputy Director of Reactor Projects, and members of the NRC staff.
The results of the conference will be promulgated via separate correspondence.
9.1 Attendance at Management Meetings Conducted by Region Based Inspectors Inspection Reporting Dale Subicci Report No.
Insocetor 12/3/1992 Engineering 50-317/92-32 A. lehmeier 50-318/92-32 12/11/1992 IST Program
'0-317/92-31 IL Gregg o
50-318/92 31 l
l l
l
.
. -
.
_ _ _ _ -._., _ _.__ __ _ _ _. _ _ _