IR 05000348/1992033
| ML20127G866 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 12/31/1992 |
| From: | Barr K, Sartor W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20127G836 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-348-92-33, 50-364-92-33, NUDOCS 9301220100 | |
| Download: ML20127G866 (12) | |
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DEC 311992 Report flos.:
50-348/92-33, 50-364/92-33 Licensee:
Southern fluclear Operating Company, Inc.
600 tiorth 18th Street Birmingham, AL 35291-0400 Docket tios.:
50-348 and 50-364 License fios.: f4PF-2 and tiPf-8 Facility flame:
Farlcy 1 and 2 Inspection Conducte :
December 7-11, 1992
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.f Inspector:__
W. M. Sartor 3 r.
Date igned~
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leam Members:
J. Kreh E. Fox, f1RR/PEPB F. M us (Battelle)
Approved by: _
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K. Barr, Chio Date signed Emergency Preparedness Section Radiological Protection and Emergency Preparedness Branch Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards SUMMARY Scope:
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This routine, announced inspection involved the observation and evaluation of the annual emergency preparedness exercise.
Emergency organization activation and response were selectively observed in the Control Room, Technical Support Center (TSC), Operational Support Center (0SC), and Emergency Operations facility (EOF). The inspection also included a review of the exercise scenario and observation of part of the licensee's post-exercise critique.
Results:
In the areas inspected, violations or deviations were not identified.
The licensee's emergency response organization demonstrated the ability to implement the Emergency Plan and Implementing Proceduies in a manner which provided adequate protection for the health and safety of the public.
Exercise strengths included the command and control in both the TSC and EOF and the timely accountability of personnel within the protected area.
Although there were no major problems observed, the licensee acknowledged the need for increased management attention during 1993 as the licensee makes a transition in the manner in which the E0F is staffed.
9301220100 921231 PDR ADOCK 05000340
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A REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Eicensee Employees
- B. Bell, Superintendent, Electrical Maintenance
'W. Byrne, Site Supervisor, Safety Audit and Engineering Review
- S. Casey, Supervisor, Systems Performance
- S. freeman, Senior Engineer, Safety Audit and Engineering Review
- R.11111, General Manager, Nuclear Plant
- W. Lee, Emergency Planning Coordinator
- J. McGowan, Manager, Safety Audit and Engineering Review
- M. Mitchell, Superintendent, Health Physics
- J. Osterholtz, Manager, Technical Nuclear
- L. Stinson, Assistant General Manager, Plant Operations
- J. Thomas, Manager, Maintenance
- W. Warren, Supervisor, Technical Training
- L. Williams, Manager, Training
- J. Woodard, Vice President
- R. Vanderbye, Emergency Preparedness Coordinator
- B. Vanlandingham, Supervisor, Cperations Training Other licensee employees contacted during this in3pection included craftsmen, engineers, operators, mechanics, security force members, technicians, and administrative personnel.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission G. Maxwell, Senior Resident inspector
- Attended exit interview
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2.
Exercise Scenario (82302)
The scenario for the emergency exercise was reviewed to determine whether provisinns had been made to test the integrated emergency response capability and a major portion of the basic elements within the licensee's Emergency Plan, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14) and Section IV.F of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50.
The scenario for this daytime, full participation exercise (State and local governments fully participating and federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) evaluated) was reviewed in advance of the scheduled exercise date and discussed with licensee representatives prior to the exercise. The exercise scenario was well organized and of sufficient detail for both the licensee's emergency response organization and the offsite agencies to demonstrate the exercise objectives.
The scenario sequence of events was relatively straight forward with all levels of emergency classifications separated by sufficient time to allow the activation of the emergency response facilities to progress in an
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orderly response and not unduly challenge the response.
The E0F responded from Birmingham the previous day with a separate drill. On the day of the graded exercise they were pre-staged in the Training Center and responded at the appropriate time, i
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No violations or deviations were identified.
3.
Onsite Emergency Organization (82301)
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The licensee's organization was observed during the exercise to
determine whether the requirements of Paragraph IV.A of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 (as addressed in the Emergency Plan) were implemented
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with respect to descriptions, responsibilities, and assignments of the onsite emergency response organization.
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The inspector determined that the initial onsite emergency _ organization was adequately established and that primary and alternate assignments for the positions in the augmented emergency organization were clearly I
designated. During the exercise the inspector observed that staff was available to fill key functional positions within the initial onsite emergency organization.
Following the decision to activate the
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Technical Support Center (TSC), designated individuals were notified and
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responded to the TSC to assume the duties of assigned emergency positions.
Likewise, following the Emergency Director's decision to activate the Emergency Operations facility (E0F) and the required travel time, designated personnel responded and staffed the EOF in accordance with their preassigned responsibilities.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Emergency Response Support and Resources (82301)
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This area was observed to determine whether arrangements for requesting and effectively using assistance resources'were'made,_whether arrangements to accommodate State and local personnel at the E0F were
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adequate, and whether other organizations capable of augmenting the planned response were identified as specified by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3),
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Paragraph IV.A of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, and guidance promulgated in Section ll.C of NUREG-0654 (Revision 1).
An inspector noted that the licensee's Emergency Plan and Procedures identified other organizations _ capable of augmenting the planned
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- response.
The scope of this exercise included liaison representatives from both Alabama and Georgia in the EOF.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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5.
Emergency Clt.ssification System (82301)
This area was observed to verify that a standard emergency classification and action level scheme was in use by the licensee as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and Paragraph IV.C of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, and to determine whether that scheme was adequately implemented.
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The licensee's emergency procedures were used to identify and classify i
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each emergency condition and to escalate to more severe classifications
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as the simulated accident progressed.
The licensee's classifications and emergency declarations were appropriate throughout the exercise.
The Notification of Unusual Event was declared by the Shift Supervisor at 0721 based on a failed open atmospheric relief.
The Alert,was declared at 0809 on the basis of the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) leak i
rate exceeding 50 gpm.
The Site Area Emergency was declared at 0944 by
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the Emergency Director on the basis of the plant conditions of a small break LOCA causing a safety injection and spray actuation.- At 1123 a General Emergency was declared based on the failure of all three fission product barriers.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Notification Methods and Procedures (82301)
This area was observed to determine that procedures had been established
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for notification by the licensee of State and local response organizations and emergency personnel, and the content of initial and
followup messages to response organizations had been established; and a
means to provide early notification to the population within the plume exposure pathway had been established as required by-10 CFR 50.47(b)(5),
10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.0, and the specific criteria in NVREG 0654,Section II.E.
The inspector reviewed _the licensee's procedures for providing emergency information to Federal, State, and local response organizations, and for alerting and mobilizing the licensee's-augmented emergency response organization.
The inspector noted that _ implementing procedures for notifications had been established and were adequate to provide-guidance to personnel for initial notification to the State and-local
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authorities.
The notifications made during the exercise were timely and~
provided the appropriate information to offsite authorities.
The Alert Notification System (ANS) _for alerting the public within the -
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plume _ exposure pathway emergency planning zone (EPZ))was actuated'during_
the exercise.
The system consisted of siren zones _and tone alert
radios.
This-area was evaluated by FEMA.
No violations or deviations were1 identified.
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7.
Emergency Communications (82301)
This area was observed to verify that provisions existed for prompt i
communications among principal response organizations and emergency
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personnel as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(6), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.E, and the specific criteria in NUREG 0654, Section ll.F.
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The inspector observed that adequate communications capability existed
among the licensee's emergency organizations, and between the licensee's-
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emergency response organizations and offsite authorities.
No
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communication problems were observed.
- No violations or deviations were identified.
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Public Education and information i
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information was provided to the media and the public with press releases issued during the exercise from the News Media Center located in the Northview High School in Dothan.
1hese activities were not observed by the NRC during this exercise.
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9.
Emergency Facilities and Equipment (82301)
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This area was observed to determine whether adequate emergency
facilities and equipment to support an emergency response were provided
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and maintained as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E,
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Paragraph IV.E, and the specific criteria in NUREG 0654, Section ll.H.
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The inspector observed activation, staffing, and operation of the.
emergency response facilities to include the Control Room, TSC, OSC, and the E0F. The facilities and their dedicated equipment facilitated the emergency response.
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In accordance with thel specifications of the licensee's Emergency Plan,-
designated areas within the Control Room, Security Control Building, Service Building Auditorium,-and Maintenance Shop comprised the OSC.
All OSC activities were accomplished in a timely and effective manner.
These locations were also assembly areas for the site accountability conducted following the Site Area Emergency declaration.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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10.
. Accident Assessment (82301)
t This area was observed to_ assure that methods, systems,:and equipment
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for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequences:of _
a radiological emergency condition were in use as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9), 10 CFR 50, Appendix _E, Paragraph IV.B. and the specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section II I.
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The accident assessment program reviewed by the inspector included an
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engineering assessment of plant status and an assessment of radiological hazards to both onsite and offsite personnel resulting from the
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simulated accident.
The dose assessment function and radiological monitoring teams was initially with the TSC staff but later transferred to the E0F staff.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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11.
Protective Responses (82301)
l This area was observed to verify that guidelines for protective actions _
during the emergency, consistent with federal guidance, were developed and in place, and protective actions for emergency workers, including evacuation of nonessential personnel were implemented promptly as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10), and the specific criteria in
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The inspector verified that the licensee had emergency procedures for formulating 3rotective action recommendations (PARS) for the offsite populace witlin the 10 mile EPZ.
Protective actions were quickly formulated and transmitted to the State and local authorities within 15 minutes of the declaration of the General Emergency.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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12.
Exercise Critique (82301)
The licensee's critique of the emergency exercise was observed'to determine the deficiencies identified as a result of the exercise, and weaknesses noted in the licensee's emergency response organization were formally presented to licensee management for_ corrective actions as required.by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E,-Paragraph:IV.F, and specific criteria in NUREG 0654, Section ll.N.
On December-10, 1992, the licensee conducted evaltator/ controller-critiques prior to the formal presentation to facility management on the
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following day.
The licensee's critique to their management on
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December 11 was comprehensive and addressed items considered =for improvement.
No violations or deviations were identified.
13.
Action on Previous Inspection findings (92701)
(Closed)
Exercise Weakness (EW) 50-348,364/91-23-01:
Control Room staff failed to make initial notifications in accordance with
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procedures. This issue cas closed based on observations during this exercise which included prompt and complete initial notifications made -
to all offsite authorities.
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14.
federal Evaluation Team Report The report by the federal Evaluation Team (Regional Assistance Committee and FEMA Region IV staff) concerning the activities of offsite agencies i
during the exercise will be forwarded by separate correspondence.
15.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and results were summarized on December 11, 1992, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1.
The Exercise Team Leader described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results, fio proprietary information is contained in this report.
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Olssenting comments were not received from the licensee.
Attachments:
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Exercise Objectives and flarrative Summary
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1992 FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY EXERCISE OBJECTIVES December 9, 1992
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1.
Participating Organizations Full Participation:
Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC),
Alabama Power Company, State of Alabama, Houston County, State of Georgia and Early County.
11.
Purpose A.
To meet the requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix E, 44CFR350.9 and NUREG 0654/ FEMA REP-1, Rev. 1.
B.
To conduct a full scale exercise that will include the mobilization of SNC, Alabama Power Company, state and local personnel and resources adequate to verify the capability of participating organizations to respond to an accident scenario requiring response.
111.
Southern Nuclear Operating Company and Alabama Power Company Objectives A.
On site 1.
Demonstrate that control room staff can assess the event, classify the event, take corrective measures to control the event and activate emergency response procedures.
2.
Demonstrate that plant staff can activate and staff the Technical Support Center (TSC) and perform accident response activities including:
a.
Dose Assessment b.
Off site notification and protective action recommendations c.
Reclassification of emergency status d.
Personnel Accountability for all personnel on-site e.
Radiation Monitoring Team (RMT) Dispatch and Control f.
Site access control and admittance of essential personnel g.
Dispatch and control of re-entry teams 3.
Demonstrate the capability to turn over EOF functions to the EOF staff when the EOF is activated and staffed.
4.
Demonstrate the capability to augment EOF staff with non-essential plant personnel.
S.
Demonstrate the adequacy of the plant's communication system including:
a. Communication links to Corporate Emergency Operations Center (E0C)
b. News Media Center (NMC)
c. Interplant communications d. Communication links to state' and local authorities 6.
Demonstrate the capability to perform radiological monitoring.
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B.
Off-Site 1.
De90nstrate that corporate staff can be activated in a timely fashion and dispatched to FNP.*
2.
Demonstrate that Corporate Headquarters Emergency Operations Center (EOC) staff can provide initial support for:
a.
EOF activation *
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Logistics c.
Support organization notification d.
Briefing of company management e.
News release preparation 3.
Demonstrate that EOF staff cant a.
Assume the dose assessment function and the RMT direction and control function from the TSC staff.
b.
Assume the logistics, manpower and engineering function from the EOC.
c.
Prepare and coordinate news releases and activate * the NMC.
4.
Demonstrate that the Public Information Organization can respond to media and public inquiries, establish a rumor control center, and issue and coordinate news releases.
IV.
State and Local Objectives See Attachment 1 (Any state or local objective that cannot be demonstrated due to conditions inconsistent with the scenario will be demonstrated in a separate drill.)
V.
Joint Objectives (SNC, Alabama Power Company, State of Alabama, State of Georgia, Houston County and Early County)
1.
Demonstrate that all parties-can coordinate news releases and conduct a joint news conference.
2.
Demonstrate that adequate technical information can be exchanged among involved agencies.
VI.
Exercise Limits The plume exposure exercise will begin prior to 8 A.M. CST and conclude-by 2:30 P.M. CST.
- T6 be tested in_ a separate drill the day before the exercise.
This will:-
allow pre-staging of these_acti_vities'on the day of the exercise.
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3.0 NARRATIVE SUMMARY
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The scenario will begin at 0710 (central time) with a Unit I steam generator (SG) atmospheric relief valve (PCV 3371B) failing open, due to a controller (PK3371B) failure.
The PCV then fails to reseat.
As a result of the atmospheric relief lif ting, reactor power increases, resulting in a slight overpower condition.
Both high flux and overpower delta temperature rod stops occur. A main steam flow high alert is received indicating excessive steam flow from the 10 SG.
The operators should attempt to close the atmospheric relief.
All attempts to close the valve from the main control board (MCB) or hot shutdown panels will be unsuccessful.
When the atmospheric relief fails to close, the operators should commence a ramp down in power due to the over-power condition.
It is expected that operators will then be sent to the main steam valve room to manually isolate the atmospheric relief valve using one of two isolation valves
(Q1NilV004C/0).
The manual isolation will be successful at 0745.
The Shift Supervisor (SS) should contact the the on-call Operations Manager and Emergency Director (ED) about the failed valvo.
The SS/ED should
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declare a NOUE based on the failed open atmospheric relief.
FNP-0 EIP-9 and 26 i
should be implemented at this time for the NOUE classification. Mechanical maintenance and I & C personal should be contacted to investigate and start repairs to the effected components.
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At 0735 containment radiation monitors will begin to upscale due to a small Reactor Coolant System (RCS) leak in the containment.
Between 0740 and 0804 containment and possibly plant vent stack radiation monitors will go into
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Containment mini purge will automatically isolate if not previously isolated by the operators. Any small radioactive release that occurs at this time will be below reportability limits, it is anticipated that the operators will determine that the leak rate is in excess of Technical Specifications at
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this time. A0P 1 RCS Leakage procedure should be entered at this time, and a ramp down in power commenced.
The Operations Manager, ED and RM should again be contacted.
No escalation of the emergency classification is expected at this time.
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At approximately 0810 the shift crew should be able to determine that
the RCS leak rate is in excess of 50 gpm.
The SS/E0 should declare an ALERT j
emergency classification at this time.
FNP-0-EIP-9 and 26 should now be utilized for the alert classification.
The TSC should be activated-at this time if not previously done. The ED and RM may decide to staff the E0F'at this time.
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At 0820 the charging flow control valve (FCV-122)-fails open due to-a failed air line, causing charging flow to go to maximum and pressurizer level. to go up.
Upon recognizing the situation the operators should have FCV-122
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bypassed and isolated locally.
I & C should be contacted to repair the failed.
air line.
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At 0910, a problem with the DEHC system causes a main turbine load rejection of 150 MW.
The load rejection causes RCS temperature and pressure to rise dramatically due to the steam dumps being in off for the performance of an STP.
The shift crew should verify the turbine is in hold or place it in manual at this time and commence stabilizing the RCS through the use of control rods and/or boron control.
At approximately 0921 a gross failed fuel detector alarms actuates along with radiation monitors adjacent to RCS letdown.
These alarms are due to approximately 1% failed fuel caused by the transients that the plant has just experienced. A0P-32 high RCS activity should be implemented at this time.
Partial evacuation of unnecessary personel from the auxiliary building should occur at this time. An escalation of-the emergency classification is not expected at this time.
At approximately 0940 a small break LOCA occurs as indicated by a rapidly falling RCS pressure and a rapidly rising containment pressure to greater than 27 psig causing a safety injection (SI) and spray actuation.
Based on plant conditions the ED should escalate the Emergency classification to a SITE AREA EMERGENCY at this time.
FNP-0-CIP-9 and 26 should
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be utilized again at this time.
The plant emergency alarm should be sounded, requiring all plant personal to assemble in their designated assembly areas.
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The operating crew should enter the appropriate emergency response procedures for the SI.
The A train CCW pump will trip requiring the operators to trip the A train charging and RHR pumps to prevent damage.
Only one train of safety injection is now available.
The IB containment fan cooler fails to operate causing a reduction in the containment pressure reduction capability.
At approximately 1020 a large break LOCA occurs as indicated by RCS pressure equalizing with containment pressure.
Low head safety injection flow into the RCS begins.
It is not expected that the ED will upgrade the emergency classification at this time.
At 1030 the running IC charging pump bearings begin to overheat as indicated by the charging pump high oil temperature alarm on the MCB.
After investigating, the shift crew should place the IB charging pump on the B train, if not previously done. After starting the IB charging pump, the IC charging pump should be secured.
At 1049 the RWST lo level alarms annunciate, which will require placing the emergency core cooling system in cold leg recirculation per ESP-1.3.
At 1114 the RWST lo-lo level alarm annunciate, which will require placing the containment spray system in recirculation per ESP-1.3.
When the IB spray pump is placed in recirculation mode the pump will develop a pump seal leak, causing water from the containment sump to be sprayed into the pump room.
By 1119 penetration room radiation monitor and plant vent stack radiation monitors will be alarming, indicating a_ release is in progress,
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The ED should declare a GENERAL EMERGENCY at this time based on the failure of all three fission product barriers.
If not previously done both the TSC and the E0f will be fully staffed at this time.
The TSC will provide dose assessment, off site notification, protective action recommendations, personal accountability, environmental monitoring, site access control, and emergency repair party activities.
The EOF staff will continue the efforts to track the plume and provide environmental monitoring and dose assessment.
The EOF staff will be further challenged with licensing questions, public information, engineering and logistics support activities.
The News Media Center (NMC) will be activated and staffed by representatives from SNC, APC, the State of Alabama, the State of Georgia, liouston County and Early County. Media and public interest will be simulated and news releases will be prepared and released.
The exercise will terminate once the radiation monitoring teams have tracked the plume, the E0F has been staffed and is performing E0F activities and the NMC has conducted a press conference.
Termination will be coordinated with the State of Alabama and the State of Georgia if occurring prior to 1300 Central time.
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