ML20127G574

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Forwards 850107 Rept of 841218 Incident Re Blade Guide Removal W/Associated Control Rod Inserted.Control Rod 22-43 Viewed for Orientation of Fuel Support Piece.Blade Guide Removed Under Impression That Control Rod Was Withdrawn
ML20127G574
Person / Time
Site: Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png
Issue date: 01/17/1985
From: Steiger W
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING CO.
To: Eselgroth P
NRC
Shared Package
ML20127B461 List:
References
FOIA-85-190 NUDOCS 8506250485
Download: ML20127G574 (4)


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4 January 7, 1985 TO:

W. E. Steiger Plant Manager 7

RE:

Report on the Incident on the Evening of December 18, 1984: Blade Guide Removal with Associated Control Rod Inserted i

At approximately 2000 on December 18, 1984 control rod 30-19 was tagged out i

hydraulically in the full out position. This procedure was performed in order that the associated blade guide might be reoriented in the correct diro: tion.

The blade guide had been previously oriented in the reverse direction to facilitate installation of the neutron sources into the reactor.

4 At approximately 2015, the refueling crew under the guidance of the Assistant Shif t Test Director correctly reoriented the 30-19 blade guide. A QCD repre-sentative was also present on the refuel bridge during the evolution, and it was decided to take advantage of his presence to conclude those open issues which remained from the fuel support piece misorientation problem (LDR 2564).

A camera was to be used to view the correct orientation of approximately five fuel support pieces under the observation of QCD. The ASTD left the refuel O

bridge to return the master sign-off card associated with the withdrawn control The ASTD rod, to the Control Room in order that other work might progress.

was the assigned refueling deck supervisor representing the Reactor Engineer for the evolutions in process. The ASTD was not required to be on the deck for observation only.

The camera was lowered in the open channel to control rod 22-43 to view the orientation of that fuel support piece. The alignment of the core place pin to the fuel support piece indent was not visible. To obtain a more clear view, the crane / bridge operator grappled the blade guide and removed the blade guide.

The blade guide was in the correct orientation for fuel load. The operator was apparently under the impression that the control blade had been withdrawn as with the previous cell. Control rod 22-43 was fully inserted, however.

When the refuel bridge operator realized that the control blade was fully' inserted, he contacted and consulted with the ASTD. The ASTD proceeded to 4

the deck and supervised the reinstallation of the blade guide into the proper orientation.

It was noted that the blade guide returned to its position smoothly and that the control rod never " toppled over". At approximately 2030, the Wa:ch Engineer was notified of the incident.

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Incident Report, December 18, 1984 Page two g)

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The following SNPS management personnel were notified at the times and by the individual noted:

2110 J. Alexander by F. Hearty 2130 J. A. Scalice by J. Alexander (unable to reach W. E. Steiger at the same time) 2150 J. Alexander arrived on site 2200 W. E. Steiger by Watch Engineer 2250 R. Gutmann by J. Alexander Correction General Electric Company provided a recommended inspection plan to verify the integrity of control blade 22-43.

The General Electric recommendation called for a visual inspection of the eight surfaces of the control rod from the bridge with binoculars, for control rod movement during observation and for friction testing. The inspection was conducted under the controls of an MWR and under th.e surveillance of QCD. The results of the inspection indicated that no damage had occurred to the control blade and that no further correction was required.

Cause

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The apparent cause of the incident was confusion on the part of the bridge operator due to doing two different tasks with the refueling bridge in quick succession and due to the absence of supervision or of an independent, knowledgeable checker during the secon' event. The first task involved re-orientation of control rod blade guid's in accordance with STP-3.

During this task, the_ASTD,,was present_on_t.h_e_ bridge _and_ served as supervision,to i d that the as,sociated control rod be /

removed and(This_evolut(on,requ retagged out. l The second task involved re-inspection

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support casiing as req'uired by the corrective actions of LDR 2564. This

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fuel support casting had already been verified by Reactor Engineering, however, the correct orientation was not apparent to the QC examiner when reviewed from the video tape.

The second event was to allow QCD a second opportunity to view fuel support casting 22-43.

Simple viewing of the fuel support piece with an underwater camera does not require control rod movement. The ASTD was not on the refueling deck during the second event. Consequently, the ASTD was not available to provide backup or a second check to the actions of the operator (which would have averted the incident). The ASTD did not feel that he was required to be on the deck during the fuel support casting orientation reverification because Reactor Engineering had already verified correct alignment and because the event was supposed to involve observation only.

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,e Incident R port, Dscambar 18, 1984 Page three O

No station procedures were violated in this incident.

Submitted:

O J

F. Alexande Approved:

A. Scalice JFA/km cc:

R. Gutmann D. Terry O

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