ML20127F261
| ML20127F261 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 12/21/1992 |
| From: | Balmain P, Brian Bonser, Skinner P, Starkey R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20127F210 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-424-92-27, 50-425-92-27, NUDOCS 9301200183 | |
| Download: ML20127F261 (16) | |
See also: IR 05000424/1992027
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UNITfD STATES
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NUCLEAls REGULATORY COMMISSION
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101 MARIETTA STREE T, N.W.
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ATLANTA. GEORGI A 30323
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Report Nos.:
50 424/92-27 and 50-.425/92-27
Licensee: Georgia Power Company
P. O. Box 1295-
Birmingham, AL 35201
Docket Nos.:
50-424 and 50-425
License Nos.:
NPF-68 and NPF-81-
Facility Name:
Vogtle 1 and 2
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Inspection Conducted:
October 25 - Noveniber 28, 1992
Inspector:
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Bh R. Bon.ser, Senior Resident Inspector
Date Signed
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A .,5 Kr$ey, Resident Inspector
Date Signed
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P. ATBalinaT67 Resident inspector
Date' Sighed
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Accompanied by: J
. Starefos ,
Approved by:
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P' Skinner / Chief
Date Signed
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Reactor Projects Section 3B
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
Scope:
This routine, inspection entailed-inspection in the following
areas: plant operations, surveillance, maintenance,-review of-
corporate engineering and design change support,- and follow-up.
Results:
One non-cited violation (NCV) was . identified.-
The NCV involved the failure of-the site to act upon-information
provided from the corporate office regarding a potential valve
operability issue.
The issue-involved the identification of-
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- several safety related motor operated valves (MOV) that may not
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- develop sufficient thrust to operate under certain: differential
pressure (DP) conditions that could be experienced during the
recirculation phase of' safety injection (paragraph' 2d).
The 1A diesel generator (OG) exp2rienced a failure to start.during
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testing. When the operator depressed the manual push button -in an-
9301200183 921221
ADOCK 0500
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attempt to start the DG, 'the engine . failed to roll. A similar
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incident occurred in July 1990 (paragraph 2f).
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During the. inspection period the_ licensee performed a procedure to
ensure the centrifugal charging pump alternate mini-flow relief
lines were filled and vented.
Both Unit I and ? lines contained a
minimal amount of air. While performing the procedure the
licensee determined that the setpoints on the Unit 2 relief valves
had drifted outside their required tolerances.- A review of the
work order history on these valves by the licensee and resident-
inspectors did not provide an explanation for the setpoint drift-
(paragraph 4b).
The inspectors observed the licensee's annual re-call drill.
Scheduling the drill on the Thanksgiving holiday week proved
beneficial because it utilized personnel in positions they did not
normally fill. Overall the licensee's response to the drill was
satisfactory and the objectives were met (paragraph 29).
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REPORT DETAILS
1,
Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
- J. Beasley, Assistant General Manager Plant Operations
- P. Burwinkel, Plant Engineering Supervisor
S. Bradley, Reactor Engineering Supervisor
W. Burmeister, Manager Engineering Support
- S. Chesnut, Manager Engineering Technical Support
C. Christiansen, Safety Audit and Engineering Review Supervisor
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- C. Coursey, Maintenance Superintendent
- R. Dorman, Manager Training and Emergency Preparedness
G. Frederick, Manager Maintenance
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- B. Gabbard, Nuclear Specialist'
- M. Griffis, Manager Plant Modifications
M. Hobbs, Instrumentation and Controls Superintendent
- K. Holmas, Manager Health Physics and Chemistry
D. Huyck, Nuclear Security Manager
- W. Kitchens, Assistant General-Manager Plant Support
- R. LeGrand, Manager Operations
- G. McCarley, Independent Safety Engineering Group Supervisor
R. Moye, Plant Engineering Supervisor
- M. Sheibani, Nuclear Safety and Compliance Supervisor
- W. Shipman, General Manager Nuclear Plant
- C. Stinespring, Manager Administration
J. Swartzwelder, Manager Outage and Planning
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C. Tynan, Nuclear Procedures Supervisor
- J. Williams, Supervisor Work Planning and Controls
Other licensee employees contacted included tcchnicians, supervisors,-
engineers, operators, maintenance personnel, quality control inspectors,
and office personnel.
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Oglethorpe Power Company Representative
- T. Mozingo
NRC-Resident Inspectors
- B.
Bonser
- D. Starkey
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- P. Balmain
- J. Starefos
- Attended Exit Interview
An alphabetical list of-abbreviatia s is located h the last paragraph-
of the inspection report.'
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2.
Plant Operations - (71707)
a.
General
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The inspection staff reviewed plant operations throughout the
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reporting period to verify conforman'ce with regulatory require .
ments, Technical Specifications (TS), and administrative controls.
Control logs, shift supervisors' logs, shift relief records,
limited Condition for Operation (LCO) status logs, night orders,
standing orders, and clearance logs were routinely reviewed.
Discussions were conducted with plant operations, maintenance,
chemistry and health physics, engineering support and technical
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support personnel.
Daily plant status meetings were routinely
attended.
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Activities within the control room were monitored during shifts
and shift changes.
Adions observed were conducted as required by
the licensee's procedures.
The complement of licensed personnel
on each shift met or exceeded the tninimum required by TS.
Direct
observations were conducted of control room panels, instrumenta-
tion and recorder. traces impurtant to safety. Operating parame-
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ters were observed to verify they were within TS limits. The
inspectors also reviewed Deficiency Cards (OCs) to determine
whether the licensee was appropriately documenting problems and
implementing corrective actions.
Plant tours were taken during the reporting period on a routine
basis.
They included, but were not limited to the turbine build-
ing, the auxiliary building, electrical equipment rooms, cable
spreading rooms, Nuclear Serdce Cooling Water System (NSCW)
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towers, Diesel Generator (UG) buildings, Auxiliary Feedwater
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System (AFW) builditas, and the low voltage switchyard.
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During plant tours, housekeeping, security: equipment status a1d
radiation control practices were observed.
The inspectors verified that the licensee's health physics (HP)
policies / procedures were followed. This included.nbservation of
HP practices and review of area surveys, radiation work permits,
postings,-and instrument calibration.
The inspectors verified the the security organizition was proper-
ly manned and security personnel were capable of performing their
assigned functions; persons and packages were chu ked prior to
entry into the Protacted Area (PA); yehicJes sera properly
authorizeA searctied, and escorted witMn the'M; persons within
the PA displayed photo identification badges; and personnel in
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vital uen were 7 uthorized.
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b.
Unit 1 Summary
The unit began the period operating at 100% power and operated at
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full power throughout the inspection period.
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c.
Unit 2 Summary
The unit began the period operating at 100% power and operated at
full power throughout the inspection period.
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d.
MOV Operability Review
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During an NRC Headquarters audit of the Vogtle Motor Operated.
Valve (MOV) program (G.L. 89-10) during the week of November 9 at
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the licensee's corporate office in Birmingham, Alabama, a concern
was raised associated with the timeliness of the licensee's
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implementation of corrective acH on. The issue involved the
identification of several- safet; related MOVs that may not develop -
sufficient thrust to operate under certain postulated DP
conditions. An example of this is the inability of these motor
operators to close _and isolate-a passive failure leak. This
requirement to consider a passive failure leak is only applicable
during the recirculation phase of safety injection.
The corporate en0ineering group analyzing the M0V thrust require-
ments transmitted this information to the plant. A Standing Order
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(C-92-07) was developed which would require certain operator
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actions to reduce the DP across the valves under certain passive-
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failure conditions.
The Standing Orcer contained detailed steps
to start or stop Residual Heat Removal (RHR) pumps or Centrifugal
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Charging Pumps (CCP), and to sequence valve operation to reduce
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the system DP to ensure that the valves in question would operate.
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The inspectars identified two concerns after a review of the-
compensatory actions in the Standing Order and the details
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surrounding the transmittal of the potential = operability concern
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from the corporate office to the site
One concern involved the
timeliness of actions.
The initial dis'covery of the potsM ial
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valve operability issue was in January 1992, and the compensatory
actions described above were not-implemented by:the site until-
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November 11, 1992. The site had been verbally informed of this
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issue in January'but had not taken any action.
Normally when the-
site is notified by formal correspondence from the corporate
office of an action, the item is entered into the site commitment
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tracking system.
in this case that d H not occur.
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The other concern was associated with tb uyo of Standing Orders.
The detailed information contained in'Abe StMding Order is the
type of information that would normally be contained in an abnor-
mal operating procedure (0P) or emergency operating procedure
(EOP).
The inspectors were concerned that this dnailed operating
information may not be appropriate in a Staading Order since the
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standing order does not receive the same level of review as a
procedure.
Normally the Plant Review Board (PRB) is responsible
for review of E0Ps and abnormal operating procedures.
In this
case, revisions were made to the E0Ps incorporating the operator
actions for a passive failure. When the E0P thanges were reviewed
by the PRB a decision was made to prepare a Standing Order instead
of revising the E0Ps.
The PRS decided that t'ne revised E0Ps could
be misleading to the operators curing an event and that it was
safer and more appropriate to place thest instru;tions in a
Standing Order.
The licensee reviewed the innpectors concern
regarding the us , and impiementation of Standing Orders and has
$nitiated a Standing Order revisk by the Independ:nt Safety
Engineering Group (ISEG). The iH pectors will monitor the ISEG
review.
The failure of the site to perfc. m a timely evaluattan of the
valve operabil:ty information anc promptly issue comrensatory
actions is a violat'on of 10 CFR Ch Aependix 0 Criterion XVI,
Corrective Action.
Criterion XVI ,cluires that cosAttions adverse
to quality be promptly identified And corrected-
This violation
will not be subject to caforces ent actinn t'cause the licensee's
efforts in ided ifying and arrecting the Violatic meet the
criteria specifici in 56ction VII.B of the Enfo.cthsuit Policy.
This violatien . ideid if f ed as Non-cite. Violation (NCV)
Sp-424,425/92-?7-01: Failure Te .ake Ytnely Corrective action On
Potential M0t' Uperabil ity Issue,
e.
Engineering Perscanel Qualifications
During the revior of the MOV program several of the lices.2ee
calculations to seppcrt the MGV program were resiewed.
The
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inspectors reviewed the qualification and training of seseral of
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the engineers that perigrmed these calculations.
The requirements for personnel qualificatica are contained in TS 6.3.1.
This TS requirss that personnel meet the minimum education
and experience of Regulatory Guide 1.8, Revision 2.
The TS also
allows a person to perform specific task as long as they are
trained and qualified.
The treining and qualification require-
mentt are also spec (fied in southern C7mpany Services (SCS) Plant
Vogtle Operational Support Policy and Procedure Manual 010604.2-1
dated October 31, 1987
Training and qualification information for four mechanical and
three electrical engineers was reviewed by the inspectors. The
records indicate that all of the personnel were well experienced
and qualified and met the minimum training requirements.
However,
due to changes in required training there were varying degrees of
training records in the individual folders.
There was no master
index as to what records were needed making record auditing
di f ficul t . The inspectors observations in this area were
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discussed with engineering management during the audit debrief on
November 13, 1992.
f.
Diesel Generator lA Failure
At 2:22 a.m., on November 18, 1992, with Vogtle Unit I at 100%
power a control room operator attempted to start the 1A DG for a
normal monthly surveillance.
When the operator depressed the DG
start push button the DG did not start.
Shift supervision at that
time believed that the operator had not held the manual start push
button a sufficient length of time to start the diesel.
Further
investigation by shift personnel did not identify any evidence of
a problem and DG 1A was started successfully at 2:34 am.
The DG
ran without further problems and the surveillance was completed
satisfactorily.
A similar incident had occurred in July 1990.
The investigation
into that event revealed that once the DG start push button is
depressed the electrical relays close resulting in initiation of
the sequence to air roll the diesel engine. The 1990 event had
been caused by malfunctioning air start pilot valves.
All
operations personnel had been trained on this incident.
On November 18, licensee management, upon being informed of the DG
1A malfunction, declared the DG inoperable as of 2:22 a.m.,
and
initiated an investigation into the cause of the DG failure to
start.
Based on the indications following the failure, event
investigation efforts focused on the air start system.
Follow-up
on this DG failure will be documented in NpC Inspection Report
(IR) 50-424,425/92-30.
g.
Drill Observation
On the evening of November 24, the inspectors observed an after
hours recall drill. The major objectives of the drill were to
make off-site and on-site notifications, to recall off-duty
personnel, to timely activate the emergency response facilities
(TSC, OSC & EOF) after normal working hours, and to perform a site
assembly and accountability.
The licensee concluded that the
objectives of the drill were met. The inspectors made the
following observations:
a number of key management / supervisory
personnel were on vacation at the time and many positions were
filled by individuals that were trained in their position but had
little experience in performing their duties in these positions;
the TSC was activated in about an hour, however, personnel
arriving first were not thoroughly familiar with the set-up of the
facility; TSC personnel were unsure how to activate the status
loop between the CR and the TSC; emergency facility managers did
not appear to fully understand their options on individuals that
did not meet Fitness for Duty (FFD) requirements on alcohol
consumption, although their actions were correct.
The inspectors
will review the licensee's follow-up actions.
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The inspectors concluded that scheduling the drill during the
Thanksgiving holiday week proved beneficial since it utilized
personnel in positions they did not normally fill. Overall the
licensee's response to the drill was satisfactory and the objec-
tives were met.
h.
Unplanned Pressurization of RHR Suction Piping
On November 23, Unit 1 Control Room Operators observed an increase
in RHR pump suction pressure for both trains of RHR. Subsequent
investigation revealed that during a Post Accident Sampling System
(PASS) sample of the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) back leakage
occurred through several PASS valves (3/8 inch sample line)
resulting in pressurization of the RHR pump suction piping.
According to an Emergency Response Facilities (ERF) printout, the
pressure in the RHR suction piping increased to approximately 500
psig (suction relief setpoint 450110 psig), at which time the
suction relief valves, 1-PSV-8708 A/8, lifted slightly and
relieved pressure to the Pressurizer Relief Tank (PRT).
The
relieving of the suction relief valves maintained the RHR system
below its design pressure of 600 psig. However, the licensee is
investigating the apparent discrepancy between the actual _ and-
required relief valve setpoints (DC 1-92-216.) The event was
terminated by the isolation of the PASS system and
depressurization of the RHR system. At no time during the event
was the relief capacity of the relief valves approached by the
leak through the PASS system. The licensee has initiated an
interim corrective action by attaching a " Caution Tag" to the to 1
HV-8220, RCS Hot' Leg Pass Sample Isolation Valve, handswitch
located in the Control Room. The tag requires licensed operators
to " monitor RHR pressure when 1 HV-8220 is open, and if the RHR-
pressurizes, then shut 1-2702-04-012," a manual isolation valve
near the PASS panel. The licensee has written a Design Change
Request,93-005, to add a check valve rated for RCS pressure and
temperature between the PASS Sample Cooler Rack and valve 1-2701-
U4-012.
This design change will be incorporated in a Mi_nor
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Departure from Design (MDD).
The same problem was identified on
Unit. 2 during construction and a check valve was installed-to
correct the problem. As a result, Unit 2 has not_ experienced the
back leakage problems of Unit 1.
The inspectors will follow-up on
the. licensee's long term corrective actions'and investigation into
the relief valve setpoint discrepancy.
One non-cited violation was identified.
3.
-Surveillance Observation.(61726)
Surveillance tests were reviewed by the inspectors to verify procedural
and performance adequacy.
The completed tests reviewed were examined
for necessary test prerequisites, instructions, acceptance criteria,
technical content, data collection, independent verification where
required, handling of deficiencies noted, and review of completed work.
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The tests witnessed, in whole or in part, were inspected to determine .
that approved procedures were available, equipment was calibrated,
prerequisites were met, tests were conducted according to procedure,
test results were acceptable and systems restoration was completed.
Listed below are surveillances which were either reviewed or witnessed:
Surveillance No.
Title
14644-2
SSPS Slave Relay K 643 Train A Test
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28911-1
Weekly Class lE Battery Inspection
Unit 1-C train
14806-2
Containment Spray Pump and Check
Valves Inservice Test
24812-1
Delta T/T Avg loop 3 Protection
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Channel II ACOT
14980-2
Diesel Generator Operability Test B-
Train
14701-1
A-Train, Reactor trip Breakers UV &
Shunt Trip Test
24555-1
Containment H2 Monitor Train A ACOT
and Calibration
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14986-C
Security DG Operability Test
No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Maintenance Observation (62703)
a.
General
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The inspectors observed maintenance activities, interviewed
personnel, and reviewed records to verify 1that work was conducted
in accordance with approved procedures, TS,'and applicable indus-
try codes and standards.
The inspectors also frequently verified-
that redundant components were operable, administrative controls
were followed, clearances were adequate, personnel were qualified,
correct replacement parts were used, radiological controls were
proper, fire protection was adequate, adequate post-maintenance
-testing was performed, and independent verification-requirements
were implemented.
The -inspectors independently: verified .that
selected equipment was properly returned to service.
Outstanding work requests were reviewed to ensure that the licens-
ee gave priority to safety-related maintenance activities.
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The inspectors witnessed or reviewed the following maintenance-
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activities:
MWO NOS.
WORK OESCRIPTION
29203020,3021
SG 3 & 4 Water Level Control
19201861
Battery Cell Replacement
19202700
DG Sequencer Board Investigation (UV
Detection Channel 2)
A9201246
Relief Valve Test Proc. 28207-
T-0PER-92-05
CCP Alternate Mini-flow Relief Valve-
Venting Unit 1
T-0PER-92-06
CCP Alternate Mini-flow Relief Valve
Venting Unit 2
19203033
DGlA Air start Investigation
b.
Failure of Unit 2 CCP Alternate Mini-flow Relief Valves During Venting
On October 26, the licensee approved procedures T-0PER-92-05 and
T-0PER-92-06, CCP Alternate Mini-flow Relief . Valve' Venting, for
Units 1 and 2 respectively.
The purpose of the procedure was to
provide a temporary means-to vent the CCP' alternate. mini-flow
piping. through relief valves until a permanent change can be
implemented in response to failures of a similar mini-flow design
at the Shearon Harris plant Information Notice (IN) 92-61).
The
procedure was successfully performed on Unit 1 on November 5.
The
inspectors witnessed performance of the procedure on both Unit 1
trains, did not observe any discrepancies, and noted that the
relief valves lifted within their allowable set-point range.
Both
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valves were vented by-injecting demineralized water into the
alternate mini-flow piping using a small hand pump, which in--
creased the line pressure to the point at which the relief valve
would lift and vent any trapped air. A pressure gauge was in-
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stalled on the piping to monitor the venting and relief valve
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lifting. The inspector did not-detect significant amounts of air
vented during this process on either train.
On November 6, the-inspectors observed the licensee venting-the
Unit 2 B train CCP alternate mini-flow piping. During the'perfor-
mance of- the procedure, relief valve 2PSV-8510B lifted at- approxi-
mately 2400 psi.
The valve is required to lift at 2200166_psig.
The licensee declared CCP B inoperable and entered 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> LC0'for
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TS 3.5.2, ECCS Subsystems. The licensee replaced the relief valve
with a spare valve under Maintenance Work Order (MWO) 29203358 and
exited the LC0 on November 7.
The inspectors observed subsequent =
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bench testing of the malfunctioning valve and noted that the valve
lifted consistently at about 2400 psig.
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On November 10, the inspectors observed the licensee venting the
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Unit 2 A train CCP alternate mini-flow piping.
Relief valve 2PSV-
8510A began lifting at approximately 1960 psig, which is below its
required setpoint.
The procedure was subsequently reperformed
using an air driven hydro pump. The relief lifted consistently at
approximately 2050 psig u' sing this pump.
The licensee then
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declared CCP A inoperable and entered the LCO.
The LC0 was exited
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based on verbal determination from Westinghouse that operability-
was not affected by the low setpoint.
The Westinghouse deter-
mina; ion was based on a revised calculation of ECCS flow rates
based on the A-train CCP alternate mini-flow relief valve being
fully open at 90% of 1960 psig and concluded that the lower relief
pressure did not have an adverse affect on the accident analyses.
The licensee replaced the valve on November 11.
The inspectors were initially concerned that the improper relief
pressures indicated that the relief valves had been improperly
calibrated or that previous maintenance activities resulted in a
change to the relief valve setting.
Based on this concern the
inspectors reviewed the MWO history of the unit 2 valves. This
review identified that the A-train valve (2PSV-8510A) was last
verified by bench testing and lifted at the required setpoint in
April-1990. The valve was then placed in storage and-in October.-
1991, was installed in the CCP A alternate mini-flow piping.
This
valve has had two previous instances where the "as'found"
setpoints were-low.
The valve was reworked following both of_-
these instances. The B train valve (2PSV-85108) was last verified-
to lift at the required setpoint in April 1992.
The valve had
been reworked due to leakage prior on two prior occasions. The
MWO history did not reveal any abnormal lift setpoints.
As part of the corrective actions, since the cause of the
setpressure drifts could not be determined, the licensee currently
plans for a vendor representat.ive to validate the bench testing
procedure and to witness disassembly of the two relief' valves.
The inspectors reviewed the followup letter submitted to the
licensee from Westinghouse.
The inspectors concluded that the-
licensees actions were appropriate following_ discovery of the
failures and have no immediate concern with the operability of the-
CCP subsystems since the reliefs were replaced _with properly.
calibrated spares. The inspectors will ' follow this investigation,
c.
Unit 1 Battery Cell Failures-
In NRC IR 92-23 :the~ inspector noted a declining trend in the
performance of the Unit I lE station batteries.
During this
inspection period a cell in the _ID battery failed TS cell float
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voltage surveillance requirements and a _ cell in the IC battery did
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not meet TS category A float voltage limits and marginally met- the-
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category B allowable limits.
Both cells were replaced. Cell # 12
in the 10 battery failed its surveillance requirements on-
October 29, when its float voltage was measured at 2.068 volts.
Before failing the surveillance this cell was being tracked by the
licensee as a problem cell due to its erratic voltage trend. The
inspector observed the replacement of this cell.
Prior to its
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removal the inspector was shown a cloudy rust-like discoloration
in the electrolyte solution localized to the lower one inch of the
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cell jar. The licensee has noted this discoloration in the last
two or three failures.
On November 4, float voltage on cell #38
in the 1 C battery was measured at 2.101 volts and was replaced.
The ins)ector questioned why the licensee did not immediately
enter tie two hour LC0 action statement since the initial reading
was 2.10 volts.
The inspector found that the initial reading was
confirmed with a more accurate voltmeter. .This reading was 2.101
volts which is greater than the TS allowable limits.
The licensee
replaced this cell shortly after performing the surveillance.
In NRC IR 92-23 it was noted that the licensee has plans to
replace, during the next Unit I refueling outage, those original C
train battery cells that have not already been replaced. The
licensee decided during this inspection period to replace the
entire battery with new cells during the next Unit I refueling
outage. Replacing the entire battery will ensure uniform cell
voltage characteristics.
Prior to initial operation of Unit 1 a
large number of cells were replaced in the C battery. This may
have caused a non-uniform cell voltage behavior and contributed to
the recent cell failures.
The inspector reviewed the major loads which are supplied by the C
train DC electrical system and noted that it supplies loads for
the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump (TDAFW) and Channel
III vital AC instrumentation.
The inspectors were concerned with
the performance of the C battery since it provides power to the
TDAFW system.
The inspector observed single cell discharge tests on two cells
that had been removed.
Cell #38 from battery IC was determined to
have 112% of its design capacity and cell #12 from battery 10 had
100% of its design capacity.
The-inspector also discussed with
engineering personnel the affect of a failed cell- if it were to
remain in the battery.
During a full discharge, a cell with
reduced capacity could discharge to a level lower than the rest of
the battery, possibly reverse polarity, and ultimately reduce the
capacity of the entire battery.
Based on the results of the
single cell discharge tests, the inspectors concluded that the C
train and D train batteries will fulfill their safety function
prior to replacement of the two cells.
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d.
Storage of Transient Materials Near Safety Related Equipment
,
In August 1992, the licensee initiated a Request for Engineering
Review,(RER)- 92-0298, to identify areas in the plant where
material is stored which could interact with safety related or
Seismic Category 1 components.
Seismic components which may
experience interaction with unrestrained equipment during an Safe
Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) were identified by Operations,
Chemistry, and Maintenance Departments. Once identified,-the
storage areas were divided into areas that represented
unacceptable potential interactions and where-items should be
secured in place, areas where items can remain in place without
restrictions, and areas where no storage would be permitted. The
-
licensee acted promptly to take the actions recommended by the RER
by identifying suitable auxiliary building equipment storage
locations and moving items where necessary. The original scope of
the RER considered only the auxiliary building, the fuel handling
building, and the control building. The licensee expanded the
scope of this review to include fire water pump houses, liquid
nitrogen storage facility, NSCW chlorination building, the main
steam valve rooms, the NSCW towers, the DG buildings, the AFW pump
houses, and additional rooms within the control building.
The inspector performed a walkdown of storage areas in both
auxiliary buildings. The licensee has made_significant progress
in moving or securing transient materials and in identifying these
rooms suitable for use as storage areas.
Some equipment, such as
welding machines, must be anchored in place and a plan is being
developed (RER 92-0438) to ensure that-a proper method is used to
restrain such equipment.
Rooms that will be used as designated
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storage areas will be clearly labeled as such.
Prior to RER 92-
0298, the licensee had previously designated a "high radiation"
storage area on level 1 of the auxiliary building where transient
high radiation items are stored until processed for offsite
disposal.
'
A follow-up RER, RER 92-0439, has been initiated which will
evaluate other areas in the fuel handling building and the
auxiliary building which were not identified in RER 92-0298. The
inspector determined that_the licensee is_taking appropriate
actions to control storage of transient materials to prevent
interaction with safety related or seismic category 1 components.
The inspectors will monitor the progress of this licensee
initiative during future plant walkdowns.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Review of Corporate Engineering and Design Change Support (40703, 37838)
During this reporting period the inspectors visited the Southern Nuclear
Operating Company offices.in Birmingham, Alabama. The_ objective of the-
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visit was to review current activities of corporate engineering and
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licensing which support Vogtle. The inspectors met with representatives
q
of Southern Nuclear and Southern Company Services which provides the
engineering support for Southern Nuclear.
Each person contacted
discussed current projects in their area of responsibility which
directly related to support of site activities.
Discussions with the Southern Nuclear Manager of Maintenance and Support
highlighted several areas of ongoing work in support of the site.
These
included support in the resolution of several current plant problems and
areas of improvement.
The inspectors also reviewed several licensing
activities with the Licensing Manager and reviewed a list of current TS
submittals.
The inspectors received an update on the status of the
Individual Plant Examination (IPE) which the licensee plans to submit by
the end of 1992.
The licensee has determined that no design changes are
necessary based on the projected results of the IPE.
The Southern Nuclear Manager of Engineering for Vogtle discussed his
group's interface with the site engineering group. .He particularly
emphasized the goal of completing design change package.t at least six
months prior to implementation on site.
This goal was previously
discussed in NRC IR 92-04 and the licensee appears at this time to be
completing the reviews and submitting the change packages to the site
prior to the six-month time frame. This gives the site sufficient time
to prepare for implementation.
During.the design review process, status
meetings are held at 10%, 50%, and 90% completion stages so that DCP
progress can be reviewed and necessary changes made prior to package
completion.
Southern Nuclear engineering personnel attempt to meet on
site with their counterparts once per month to discuss program status.
The inspectors met with representatives of SCS and discussed several
ongoing projects. One project of particular interest to the inspectors
was the long term project to install an Integrated-Plant Computer to
replace Proteus, ERF,-Emergency Response Data System, and the Radiation
Monitoring System.
These modifications will be completed during' future
refueling outages.
The inspectors noted the wide range of projects being performed for the.
site by corporate support departments.
The prevailing attitude at
Southern Nuclear is that the corporate staff functions to support the
L
site.
This attitude is reflected in the professionalism of the corpo-
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rate staff and the good working relationship which appears to exist
.between the corporate staff and the site.
6.
Follow-up (92701)
(Closed) Part 21 50-424,425/P21-136, Defect-In'DSRV-16-4 Enterprise
Standby DG Jacket Water _ Pump Shaft Caused by Incorrect Tapers Machined
-on Shaft.
On September 4,1992, Cooper Industries notified the licensee of a
potential defect with the jacket water pump shaft of the DSRV-16-4
Enterprise Standby _DG.
The cause of the defect was incorrect machining
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of the pump shaft taper on thafts supplied by a vendor to Cooper-
Enterprise. Only 8 shafti purchased by two other utilities were known
to have the defect, but because there was the possibility of the defect
being present in previously supplied parts, all utilities hich had
receised jacket water pump shaf ts from the affected it.t were included in
the notification.
Vogtle determined that three shafts from the affected lot,02-425 03 AF,
are in warehouse stores,
inspection by the licensee, vendor, and
resident inspector, determined that none of the three spare shafts were
defective. Also, as described in the Part 21 notification, due to the
physical differences between the jacket water pump ge'tr and the
incorrectly machined shafts, it is unlikely that a defective shaft could
be assembled in a jacket water pump.
Even if assembly were to occur,
shaft failure would occur within a short period of time.
Vogtle has
experienced many operating hours on the existing installed jacket water
pumps with the pumps performing as designed.
The inspector concluded that Vogtle does not have in inventory any of
the defective jacket water pump shafts as described in the Part 21
notification.
1his item is considered closed.
7.
Exit Meeting
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on November 30,
1992, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1.
The inspector
inspected and discussed in detail the inspection
described the a-
t
findings listed
)w.
No dissenting comments were received from the
licensee,
lhe i
isee did not identify as proprietary any of the
material providea o or reviewed by the inspectors during the inspec-
tion.
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2
JT[M NO._
[LEJCRIPTION AND REFER [!4C[
NCV 424,425/92-27-01
Failure to Take Timely Corrective Action
on Potential MOV Operability issue. (Para-
graph 2d)
8.
Abbreviations
- Alternating Current
ACOT
- Analog Channel Operational Test
AT W
- Auxiliary feedwater System
CCp
- Centrifugal Charging Pump
CfR
- Code of federal Regulations
CR
- Control Room
- Deficiency Card
i
- Diesel Generator
DP
- Differential Pressure
DSRV
- Designation for Diesel Engine
- Emergency Core Cooling Systems
- Emergency Operations facility
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- Emergency Response Data System
E0P
- Emergency Operating Procedures
ERT
- Emergency Response facilities
ESTAS
- Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System
ffD
- Instrumentation and Controls
IN
- Information Notice
- Individual Plaat Examination
IR
- Inspection Report
ISEG
Independent Safety Engineering Group
LC0
- Limiting Condition for Operation
MDD
- Minor Departure from Design
- Motor Operated Valve
MWO
- Maintenance Work Order
Non-Cited Violation
NRC
- Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
- Nuclear Service Cooling Water System
- Operations Support Center
- Protected Area
- Post Accident Sampling Svstem
- Plant Review Board
- Pressurizer Relief Tank
- Pounds per Square inch - Gaugo
RER
- Request for Engineering Review
Reactor Protecti9n S). tem
-
Safety Audit And Engineering Review
SAER
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SCS
- Southern Company Services
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- Safety Parameter Display System
SSPS
- Solid State Protection System
- Turbine Driven Auxiliary feedwater System
TS
- Technical Specifications
- Techrical Support Center
USS
- Unit Shift Supervisor
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