Text

Proposed Tech Specs Revising TS 3/4.7.4,3/4.7.4.1 & 3/4.7.4.2 for Byron & 3/4.7.4,3/4.7.4.1 & 3/4.7.4.2 for Braidwood,To Address Concerns of Generic Ltr 91-13 Re Esws Failures at multi-unit Sites
	ML20126F310
Person / Time
Site:	Byron, Braidwood
Issue date:	12/22/1992
From:	; COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20126F303	List: ML20126F301; ML20126F310;
References
	GL-91-13, NUDOCS 9212300231
	Download: ML20126F310 (23)
	v • d • e

}.

+

ATTACHMENT B PROPOSED CIIANGES TO APPENDIX A, TECHNICAL BPECIFICATIONS, OF FACILITY OPERATING LICENBES NPF-37 AND NPF-66 Revision to:

3/4.7-12 3/4.7-12a-3/4.7-12b B3/4 7-3 4

i 3

9212300231 921222 PDR ADOCK 05000454 p

PDR

PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.4 ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER SYSTEM j

LIMITING CONDITION FOR-OPERATION 3.7.4 At least two independent Essential Service Water Systems,.ech ef which includes a loop and a ceeling t;wer; shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

a.

With only one Essential Service Water System OPERABLE, restore at least two Essential Service Water Systems to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS 4.7.4 - At least two Essential Service Water Systems shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a.

At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) servicing safety-related equipment that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position'is in its correct position.

b.

At least once per 18 months during shutdown, by verifying that:

1)

Each automatic valve servicing safety-related equipment or isolating the non-nuclear safety-related portion of the system actuates to its correct position on a Safety Injecti'on test signal, and 2)

Each Essential Service Water System pump starts automatically on a Safety Injection test signal, c.

".t Icast one; pcr 31 d;,2, by strifying thst-each c; cling ::wcr fea

[j;f j[Cf _ }^ b; 0[E[IOL[ by _ SPC;if j^;ti;i..J.5 gpargpc; for ay,-leatt O

3 u m.nuwca anu u.cou unsu go.

w u,vnen vy v.au..

y inarcu.nv onu VOTifying 30 Obn0FGel briekegi Gi digi &d6tish Of thi fill Gettritti Mhe-cooMng -te.e r.

BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 7-12

. - -.. =

4 h

PLANT' SYSTEMS-3/4.7.4 ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER SYSTEM.

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.4.1 A Un'it 2 (Unit 1) Essential Service Water pump shall be available.

to support Unit 1 (Unit 2) operation.

g APPy"LITY:{ Unit 2 (Unit 1) in MODES-S and 6Awith n. Al in N reactor nuel.

54m

i" Unit 1 (Unit 2) in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4; w%

ACTION:

If neither Unit 2 (Unit 1) Essential Service Water pump is available, restore one pump to available status within 7 days or pTace Unit 1 (Unit 2) in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.4.1 A Unit 2 (Unit 1) Essential Service Water pump shall be demonstrated-available by ::ne:11y :d n (.04t2) crecabieing t:

t:rting and :r:::t th: Unit 1 (Urit 2) :y-te :

43 sqpet un ont a.

At least once per day by verifying that:

24 koors

-1)

2'1 (lil) h :ar;;h:d if th: 2A (l',) S:: t hl k rV S:

5tr ; 7 h th: er !dh ; 7 = S : 242 (It2) h : rgh:d

--i f th:-2S (IS) S:: ti:1 krvie 'd:.t:r ; 7 h th n:il:th pr;, r4 l

-2) th: fellowiet-valv:: c: :;: = ::;:b h :f 5:teg :;:::t:d <r x th: Centml 5:::

- )

SX001A, CX005, SX010A, SX027t., 0XO30, 0XO34 :nd OX143A if the A p 7 h th: = :i-1:b h ; 7, =

b)

SX^^18,- SX0^5, ' SX0150, SX0273, r4 OX100 if th: 0 ;-- i:

the'ref1 e h m D

g b.

At least once per 31 days, by running the available pump for 15 l

minutes.

1-

1) The available Essential Service Water pump is capable of being:

manually started from the Main-Control Room, and

2) An Essential Service Water flowpath ls established, or capable of being established from the Main Control Room, from Unit 2 (Unit 1) to Unit'l (Unit 2).

O ITS 1 3/

Amendment No. 24 Y

l

+ - - -

w,ur-rr-t 1-q'-

v

-d-

-1r--'s v

~

'+

PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.4 ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.4.2 The Essential Service Water System Unit Crosstie shall be either open or capable of being opened from the Main Control. herd es a flow / path between Unitf1and2.

s APPLICABILITY:

1, 2, 3, and 4.

Esw hd Serum wder ACTION:

^7 d ^' k i ^

With one or both of the crosstie valve (s) closed and not capable of a.

beina opened from the; Control Room, within 7 days restore the valve (s)

M'^

to available status or o affected valve (s) open; pen the affected valve (s), and maintain the otherwise be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTOOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

b.

The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS i

4.7.4.2 The Essential Service Water System Unit Crosstie shall be demonstrated available:

eAch j

At least oncAper 92 days by cyclingscrosstie valve ISX005 and d.

i 2SX005; or(verify valve is locked open with power re oved.

b.

The provisions o Spec!fication 4.0.4 are not applicable.

{

+

l 1

f BYRON - UNITS 3 & 1 3/4 7-12b Amendment No. 24 i

+-

m PLANT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.7.1.5 MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVES The OPERABILITY of the main steam line isolation valves ensures that no more than one steam generator will blowdown in the event of a steam line rupture.

This restriction is required to: (1) minimize the positive reactivity effects of the Reactor Coolant System cooldown associated with the blowdown, and (2) limit the pressure rise within containment in the event the steam line rupture occurs within containment, The OPERABILITY of the main steam isolation valves within the closure times of the Surveillance Requirements are consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.

3/4.7.2 STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITATION The limitation on steam generator pressure and temperature ensures that the pressure-induced stresses in the steam generators do not exceed the maximum allowable fracture toughness stress limits.

The limitations of 70*F and 200 psig are based on a steam generator RT f 60*F and are sufficient NDT to preve.,t brittle fracture.

3/4. 7.* 3 COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the Component Cooling Water System ensures that sufficient cooling capacity is available for continued operation of safety-related equipment during normal and accident conditions.

The redundant cooling capacity of this system, assuming a single failure, is consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.

3/4.7.4 ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the F.ssential Service Water System ensures that-sufficient cooling capacity is available 'for continued operation of safety-related equipment during normal and accident conditions.

The redundant cooling capacity of this system, assuming a single f ailure, is consistent with the assumptions used in the accident conditions within acceptable limits.

(ngtek -

3/4.7.5 ULTIMATE HEAT SINK Two cooling tower basins contain water that is immediately available for station cooling.

A volume of 200,000 gallons in each basin is reserved for supply:

to the auxiliary feedwater system (FSAR Q10.1-1) and 90,000 gallons as a minimum inventory for other plant cooling requirements (FSAR Q10.35-1).

Alternatively, the inventory of 200,000 gallons is available for transporting heat released from one unit following a loss-of-coolant accident and the second unit during an orderly shutdown.

Since this inventory would be exhausted in about I day, achievement of the design basis reouirement of cooling capability for 30 days is dependent upon redundant makeup systems.

BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3/4 7-3

Technical Specification Bases-

-Insert A The OPERABILITY of the unit-crosstic along with tho. availability of an Essential Service Water pump in the shut-down unit ensures the availability of sufficient redundant cooling capacity for the operating unit.

b 1

I

.l

ATTACHMENT C EVALUATION OF BIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS Byron Station has evaluated the proposed amendment and has determined that it involves no significant hazards considerations.

According to 10CFR50.92(c), a proposed amendment to an operating license involves no significant hazards if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not:

1.

Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or 2.

Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any_ accident previously evaluated; or 3.

Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The proposed amendment makes several changes to Byron's Technical-Specifications.

These changes are:

deleting UHS component description and relocating requirements from 3/4.7.4; revising the applicability statement for 3.7.4.1; replacing bus requirements with a requirement that an SX pump is capable of being started from the Main Control Room;ing a surveillance to deleting specific flowpath requirements in 4.7.4.1.a.2; add ensure the available SX pump can be-started from the Main control Room; clarifying the applicability statement for 3/4.7.4.2; clarifying 4.7.4.2.a requirements; and adding a sentence to the Bases describing the crosstie.

-A.

The proposed changes do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

Periodic testing of the Essential Service Water system crosstie and manipulating during a loss of service water accident have been-addressed by Commonwealth Edison (CECO) for Byron and Braidwood stations during-the.NRC's review of CECO's LCO Relaxation Program and the licensing of Byron Unit 2.

Byron Station adopted Technical Specifications governing the availability of the third SX pump and the crosstie valves.

to support an operating unit.

These commitments have been-previously reviewed and accepted by the NRC, NRC SER dated November 23, 1988 documents that the NRC staff found the Technical Specifications issued in Amendment 24. acceptable.

The-proposed changes do not affect the application of the Technical Specifications.

The additional surveillance provides an additional limitation and is therefore more stringent than the current requirements.

The rewording

Y N

- t ensures:that the specifications are applied uniformly.

The proposed change to 3.7.4.1 is more restrictive 1than the existing: specification to ensure that an SX pump:from-a shut down unit is always available to support operation of the opposite unit.- Adding:to the Bases has~no-impact on plant-operation; the~ requirements that ensure that the crosstie will serve its design function are in Specification 3/4.7.4.2.

B.

The proposed changes do not create the. possibility:of a new:

or different kind of accident from anyfaccident previously evaluated.

The change is consistent with the previously approved Technical Specifications that were added to address 1 concerns-not controlled.by existing Technical Specifications.- The:

proposed ~ changes to the original Technical-Specifications enhance readability without changing the requirements.

The modified specifications are consistent with previous single failure analysis critoria, since they do not delete or modify any current requirements that were utilized in the accident analysis.-

The proposed addition of controls to verif pump availability increases the level of. protection.:y'SX Since there are no changes to equipment.or e new accidents or f ailures are created.quipment operation,: no C.

- The proposed changes do not involve'a-significant" reduction in a margin of safety.

The Bases for Technical Specification'3/4.7.4 states that-the operability of the SX, system ensures that sufficient. cooling-capacity is available-for continued' operation of safety-related-equipment.

.The proposed changes retain controls to ensure that cooling capacity is available~for both units without deleting the requirements for. operability ofiany:-

other Technical Specification.

These editorial changes-provide enhancements--and do'not' compromise the system's: -

ability to-fulfill the function described in the bases.1 The NRC= review of-the original Technical. Specifications concluded:

that Byron's SX-system has suitableiredundancy--to transfer heat'from structures', systems'and components-important;to safety to a heat sink underLboth normal operating and accident conditions.

The change to the Bases emphasizes-the:

~

importance of the SX crosstie feature.

The-refinements to-the. Technical Specifications enhance the availability?offthe

- SX system and crosatie.

Based:on the above evaluation, Byron Station has-concluded 1thatL these changes-do not involve:significant hazards consideration.-

1 M

i 6

-e e

ea4' wa-e yv v v v

e mi rs-T t

t r T

l ATTACRMENT D ENVIRONMENTAL ASSEBBMENT Commonwealth Edison has evaluated the proposed amendment against the. criteria for and identification of licensing and regulatory actions requiring environmental assessment in accordance with 10CFR51.21.

The original Technical Specifications were issued as Amendment 24 to Facility Operating Licenses NPF-37 and NPF-66.

In the SER that issued the amendment, dated November 23, 1988 the NRC noted that-the amendments met the eligibility criteria, for categorical exclusion set forth in 10CFR51.22 (c) (9).

The-NRC had previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involved no significant hazards consideration.

The changes proposed in this request meet the criteria for a categorical exclusion as provided f or under 10CFR51.22(c) (2).

This determination is based on the fact that this change is being proposed as an amendment to the regulations in chapter 10 of-the Code that are corrective or of a minor or nonpolicy nature and do not substantially modify existing regulations.

=,

9 ATIACHMENLE DETAILED _DESCBIETJONDF THE PSOEOSED_ CHANGES Desuiption of the Current Operating License (OL) Requirements:

Specifications 3/4.7.4 requires that at least two independent Essential Service Water Systems be operable whenever a unit is in Modes 1 2,3, or 4.

Bases for the Current OL Requirements:

The operability of the Essential Service Water System ensures that sufficient.

cooling capacity is available for continued operation of safety related equipment during 4

normal and accident conditions. Tte redundant cooling capacity of this system, -

assuming a single failure, is consistent w!th the assumptions in the safety analyses.

Description of the Need for Amendog the Technical Specifications:

f This proposed amendment to Braldwood Statloc Technical Specifications is being Letter _(GL) 91-13, Request for Information Related to the Resolution of Gene) 130, " Essential Service Water System Failures at Multi Unit Sites." in the Commonwealth Edison Company (CECO) response to GL 91-13 by letter dated March 1 16,1992, D. J Chrzanowski to T; E. Murley, Braidwood Station wmmitted to incorporating the current Byron Station Technical Saecifications regarding Essential Service Water Systems, including any refinements that Byron Station may make as a result of their operating experience.

This issue has been previously addressed by Byron and Braidwood Stations as a.

result of a concern identified by the USNRC during their review of WCAP 10526, Byron Generating Station Limiting Condition for Operation Relaxation Program. The Byron-Station response to this issue resulted in their current Technical Specifications. Prior to the issuance of the first Unit 1 OL, NPF-59, Braidwood Station made similar commitments by letter dated' August 6,1986, A. D. Miosi to H. R. Denton. The USNRC.

reviewed and accepted both responses.

mi.0/2382/3 9

-m y

4 e ww

Dos <:ription of the Proposed Amendment:

Braldwood Station proposes to add Specifications 3/4.7.4.1 which would roc ulre one Essential Service Water pump on a shut down unit (Mode 5, Mode 6, and wth no fuel in the reactor vessel) to be.available to support the other unit when it is in an operating mode (Modes 1,2,3f and 4).

Braidwood Station also proposes to add Specification 3/4.7.4.2 which would require the Essential Service Water System Unit Crosstle to be open, or capable of being opened from the Main Control Room, whenever either, or both, units are in an operating mode (Modes 1,2,3, and 4).

Braidwood Station alu proposes to amend the Bases for Specifications 3/4.7.4 to address Essential Service Water System Unit Crosstle and the availability of an Essential Service Water pump on a shut down to provide redundant cooling capacity to -

an operating unit.

I Additionally, Braidwood Station proposes to delete Specification 4.7.4.b.

Basis for the Proposed Amendment:

The proposed Specifications 3/4.7.4.1 ensure that an Essential Service Water pump on a shut down unit be available to support an operating unit providing redundant cooling capacity. These proposed Specifications are the same as the current Byron Station Technical Specifications with the following exceptions:

1.

The order of the statement of applicability has been reversed to emphasize the importance of the available Essential Service Water pump on the shut down unit to the operating unit, 2.

The phrase "and with no fuel in the reactor vessel" was added to the statement of applicability for the shut down unit to ensure that the Essential Service Water pump was always available to support the operating unit regardless of the condition of the shut down unit, 3.

The wording of Specification 4.7.4.1 was reworded for clarny, 4.

The word " day" was replaced with "24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months "in Specification 4.7.4.1.a for consistency with other Specifications, 5.

Specification 4.7.4.1.a.1 was revised to be allinclusive of what is actually required for an Essential Service Water pump to be manually started from the Main Control Room. The current Specification only requires that the associated alternating current electrical bus be energized, and

-ZNLD/2382/1

6.

Specification 4.7.4.1.a.2 was reworded to require that an Essential Service Water flowpath between units be established, or be capable of being established from the Main Control Room, rather than listing specific valves required to be operable. This revision arovides flexibility for maintenance / outage activities on the s lut down unit without affecting the ability of the available Essential Service Water pump on the shut down unit to provide a redundant cooling capacity for the operating unit.

The requirements of proposed Specifications 3/4.7.4.1 have been administratively imposed since the initial O' L.NPF 59, for Braldwood Station Unit 1 and are documented with the USNRC by letter dated August 5,1986, A. D. Miosi to H. R.

Denton.

The proposed Specifications 3/4.7.4.2 requires that the Essential Service Water Unit Crosstle be open, or capable of being opened from the Main Control Room, to ensure that the redundant cooling capacity of the Essential Service Water Systems of one unit be available to support the other unit. These proposed Specifications are the same as the current Byron Station Technical Specifications with the following exceptions:

1.

The statement of applicability was revised from " MODES 1,2,3, and 4" to "Any Unit in MODES 1,2,3, anti 4." This change was made to emphasize the importance of the availability the the Essential Service Water Unit Crosstle as long as either unit is in an operating mode, and 2.

Other editorial revisions were made to improve the clarity of the Specifications.

The requirements of proposed Specifications 3/4.7.4.2 were implied by the.

flowpath rec ulrements committed to in the August 5,1936 letter, A. D. Miosi to H. R.

Denton, anc have been administratively imposed at Braldwood Station to address those times when one unit is shut down and the other unit is operating. When both units are operating, the operability of the Essential Service Water System Unit Crosstle is demonstrated by Specification 4.7.3.3.b.

The aroaosed revision to the Bases for Specifications 3/4.7.4 is to address the proposec acdition of Specifications 3/4.7.4.1 and 3/4.7.4.2.

ZNLD/2382/2 I

Braidwood Station pro ses to delete Specification 4.7.4.b because of the undue burden expended to satist the Specification with no associated increase in the level of safety provided to protect he health and safety of the public. The Essential Service Water System Return Valves, OSX165A and OSX165B, are located in valve pits outside of plant buildings but within the Protected Area. These valves are maintained open with power removed as required by the current Specification. The undue burden of this Specification is to verify the the valves are open every 31 days. With power removed, there is no valve position indication available in the Main Control Room. The only way to verify the valves to be open requires the valve pit covers to be removed so that an operator can physically verify valve positions. These valves are not used to isolete the Essential Service Water Systems and, in fact, have not been manipulated since the issuance of the initial OL, NPF-59, for Braldwood Station Unit 1. If these valves were to be closed, there would be significant changes in Essential Service Water System parameters indicated on instrumentation in the Main Control Room which is continuously monitored by ilcensed operators. Braldwood Station would continue to maintain these valves open with power removed and verify valve position periodically with plant administrative procedures if this proposed amendment is approved.

Schedular Requiromonts:

There are no schedular restrictions associated with this change.

ZNLD/2382/3

AUACIA4ENLE-PflOEOSED_CHANGESIOAPIENRIXA IECHNICALSEEClEICATIONSI9B EACILIIY_OEEBAllNG. LICENSES NEE-7 RAND _Neezz Revised Pages 3/4 7-12 B 3/4 7-3

)

i New Pages 3/4 7/12a 3/4 7-12b

-ZNLD/2382/4

s PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.4 ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER $YSTEM LlHITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

_,X 3.7.4 At least two independent Essential Service Water Systems shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With only one Essential $ervice Water System OPERA 8LE, restors at a.

least two Essential Service Water Systems to OPERA 8LE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in at least H0T STAN08Y within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

~

$URVE!LLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.4 At least two Essential Service Water Systems shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

/' ' tast once per 31 days by verifying that each' valve (manual..

a.

p

operated, or automatic) servicing safety-related equipment tn is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position is in its arrect position.

M et M eci.

b.

4 MMS." ;r.

00X1050 ;hel' h c;r'" ;d ;;;r : : ;;u;r r;;;.;; 'r; the velv ;;;reten-44-least On;; ;;r 31 0;y;.

At least once per 18 months during shutdown..by verifying that:

c.

1)

Each automatic valve servicing safety-related equipment or isolating the non-nuclear safety-related portion of the systee actuates to its correct position on a Safety injection test signal, and 2)

Each Essential Service Water System pump starts automatically on a Safety injection test signal.

BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 7-12

.r_

9

.p w

+ " ^ - -- -

%"4a+

7

1 PLANT _ SYSIEMS ESSENIlAL_SERylCE_WATEBSYSIEM LIMITJNG_CONDITIONf0ROEEBATION 3.7.4.1 A Unit 2 (Unit 1) Essential Service Water pump shall be available to support Unit 1 (Unit 2) operation.

AEELlCA0lLIIY: Unit 1 (Unit 2) in MODES 1,2,3, and 4, with Unit 2 (Unit 1) In MODES 5 and 6 and with no fuel in the reactor vessel.

ACIlON:

If neither Unit 2 (Unit 1? Essential Service Water pump is available, restore one pump to available status with n 7 days or place Unit 1 (IJnit 2) in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

SURVEILLANCEEEQUlBEMENIS 4.7.4.1 A Unit 2 (Unit 1) Essential Service Water pump shall be demonstrated available to support Unit 1 (Unit 2) operation:

a.

At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months by verifying that:

1)

The available Essential Service Water pump is capable of being manually started from the Main Cor; trol Hoom, and 2)

An Essential Service Water flowpath is established, or ca aabte of being established from the Main Control Room, from Unit 2 (Un t 1) to Unit 1 (Unit 2).

b.

At least once por 31 days by running tbc "allable Essential Service Water pump for 15 minutes.

BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 7-12a Amendment No.

j ZNLD/2382/4 i

ELANI_S.YSIEMS ESSENIIALSERVICE_WAIEftSYSTEM LIMII1NG.CONDlI1RNf0fLOEEBATJON 3.7.4.2 Tho Essential Servico Water System Unit Crosstle shall be open, or capable of being opened from the Main Control Room, to provido an Essential Servico Water flowpath betwoon Unit 1 and Unit 2.

AEEllCADILLIX: Any Unit in MODES 1,2,3, and 4.

ACIlON:

a.

With one or both of the crosstle valvo(s) closed and not capable of being opened from the Main Control Room, within 7 days restore the valve (s)d to available status or open the affected valve (s), and maintain the affecte valvo(s) open; otherwiso be in at loast HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN in the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months , b.

The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE _BEQUlBEMENIS 4.7.4.2 The Essential Service Water System Unit Crosstle shall be demonstrated availablo:

a.

At least onco por 92 days by cycling each crosstle valve,1SX005 and 2SX005, or verifying the valve is locked open with power removed, b.

The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable.

BRAIDWOOD UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 712b Amendment No.

ZNLD/2382/5

\\

l PLANT SYSTEMS BASES v

3/4.7.1.$ MAIN $'l ' ? Mpl[,0LATION VALVES The OPERABILI.. of the main steam line isolat.f on values ensurea.that imo more than one steam generator will blowdown in.the event of a steam.line rupture.

This restriction is required to: (1) minimize the positive reactivity effectsoftheReactorCoolantSystemcooldownassociatedwiththeblowdownIne and (2) limit the pressure rise within containment in the event the steam I rupture occurs within containment.

The OPERA 81LITY of the main steam isolation valves within the closure times of the Surveillance Requirements are consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.

3/4.7.2 STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITATION The limitation on steam generator pressure and temperature ensures that the pressure induced stresses in the steam generators do not exceed the maximum allowable fracture toughness stress limits.

The limitations of 70*F and 200 psig are ba6 ed on a steam generator RT" NOT. of 60'f and are suf ficient tn prevent brittl+ f ractiere 3/4.7.3 COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the Component Cooling Water System ensures that sufficient cooling capacity is available for continued operation.of safety-related equipment during normal and accident conditions.

The redundant cooling capacity of this system, assuming a single failure, is consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.

3/4.7.4 ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the Essential Service Water System ensures that sufficient cooling capacity is available for continued operation of safety-related equipment during normal and accident conditions. The redundant cooling capacity of this system, assuming a single failure, is consistent with the

.lkKE b'""""'* assumptions used in the accident conditions within acceptable limits.

3/4.7.5 ULTlHATE HEAT SINK The Ilmitations on the ultimate heat sink level and temperature ensure that sufficient cooling capacity is available to either 1) provide normal--

cooldown of the facility, or 2) to mitigate the effects of accident conditions within acceptable limits.

The limitations on minimum water level and maximuoi-temperature are based on providing a 30-day cooling water supply to safety related equipment without exceeding their design basis temperature and is consistent with the recommenda-tions of Regulatory Guide 1.27, " Ultimate Heat Sink for Nuclear Plants,"

March 1974.

BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 8 3/4 7-3 u

I insert A The OPERABILITY of the unit crosstle along with the availability of an Essential Service Water purnp in the shut down unit ensures the availability of sufficient redundant cooling capacity for the operating unit, 1

ZNLD/2382/6 L

+

A AUACllMENEG EVALUATION _OESIGNIEICANUJAZA13DS_CONSIDEBAllONS Braldwood Station has evaluated this proposed amendment and determined that it involves no significant hazards consideratlons. According to Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50, Section 92, l'aragraph (c 10 CFR 50.92(c)), a proposed amendment to an o 3erating license involves no)s[ignificant hazards considerations i operation of the fac lity in accordance with the proposed amendment would not:

1.

Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or 2.

Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or 3.

Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Braldwood Station proposes to add Specifications 3/4.7.4.1 which would roculre one Essential Service Water pump on a shut down unit (Mode 5, Mode 6, and w th no fuel in the reactor vessel) to be available to support the other unit when it is in an operating mode (Modes 1,2,3, and 4).

Braldwood Station also proposes to add Specification 3/4.7.4.2 which would require the Essential Service Water System Unit Crosstle to be open, or capable of being opened from the Main Con'.rol Room, whenever either, or both, units are in an operating mode (Modes 1,2,3, and 4).

Braldwood Station also proposes to amend the Bases for Specifications 3/4,7.4 to address Essential Service Water System Unit Crosstle and the availability of an Essential Service Water pump on a shut down to provide redundant cooling capacity to an operating unit.

Additionally, Braidwood Station proposes to delete Specification 4.7.4.b.

ZNLD/2382/5

A*.

The proposed changes do not involve o signifk: ant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

No additional plant equipment will be Installed as a result of any of the proposed changes. Additionally, none of the proposed changes will require currently installed plant equipment to be operated in a now or different manner. Therefore, none of the proposed changes will increase the probability of any accident that has been previously evaluated.

The proposed addition of Specification 3/4.7.4.1 which requires an Essential Service Water pump on a shut down unit be available to support an operating unit and the proposed addition of Specification 3/4.7.4.2 which requires the Essential Service Water System Unit Crosstle to be open, or capable of being open from the Main Control Room, any time one or more units are operating are simply the formalization of commitments mac e to the USNRC by letter dated August 5,1986, A. D. Mlost to H. R.

Denton. These commitments were made as the resu t of a concern identified by the USNRC regarding a loss of essential service water acc! dent during their review of WCAP 10526, Byron Generating Station Limiting Cond'tlon for Operation Relaxation Program. These commitments were made to reduce the consequences of a loss of essential service water accident.

The proposed addition to the Bases of Specifications 3/4.7.4 only serve to describe the addition of proposed Specifications 3/4.7.4.1 and 3/4.7.4.2. Therefore this proposed change will not increase the consequences of any accident provfously evaluated, y

The deletion of Specification 4.7.4.b will not cause any physical conditions to be changed at the plant. The Essential Service Water System Return Valves, OSX165A and OSX1658, will continue to be maintained in the open position with aower removed.

Valve position will be verified less frequently than the current Specificaulon and be governed by plant administrative procedures. However,if these valves were to be closed, there would be significant changes in Essential Service Water System parameters indicated on instrumentation in the Main Control Room which is continuously monitored by licensed operators. This does not represent an increase in the consequences of any accident previously evaluated.

B.

The proposed changes do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident pieviously evaluated.

No additional plant equipment will be installed as a result of any of the proposed changes. Additionally, none of the proposed changes will require currently :nstalled.

plant equipment to be operated in a new or different manner. The proposed additions of Specifications 3/4.7.4.1 and 3/4.7.4.2 and the addition to the Bases of Specifications 3/4.7.4 formalize commitments made to the USNRC by letter dated August 5,1986, A.

D. Miosi to H. R. Denton, and already incorporated into plant administrative procedures. The deletion of Specification 4.7.4.b affects only the manner and frequency by which the Essential Service Water System Return Valves, OSX165A and OSX1658, will be verified in the open position. Therefore, there is no possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated occurring as a result of these proposed changes.

l l

ZNLD/2382/13 l

C.

The W changes do not involve a sigr# cant reduction in tlw margin of safedy.

The margin of safety was increased when Braldwood Station committed to make an Essential Service Water pump on a shut down unit available to support an operating unit by providing additional redundant cooling capacity. This commitment was made by letter dated August 5,1986, A. D. Miosi to H. R. Denton. The proposed additions of Specifications 3/4.7.4.1 and 3/4.7.4.2 and the addition to the Bases of Specifications 3/4.7.4 formalize that commitment in the OL. Formalizing that commitment has no offect on the margin of safety. The proposed deletion of Specification 4.7.4.b affects only the manner and frequency by which the Essential Service Water System Return Valves, OSX165A and OSX165B will be verified in the open position. However,if these valves were to be closed, there would be significant changes in Essential Service Water System parameters indicated on instrumentation in the Main Control Room which is continuously monitored by licensed operators. Therefore, this proposed :

1 change also has no effect on the margin of safety.

Based on the above evaluation, Braldwood Station has concluded that these changes do not involve a significant hazards consideration.

ZNLD/2382/8 -

t ATTAGilMENT11 ENVlBONMENTAL ASSESSMENT STATEMENT Graidwood Station has ovaluated the proposed amendmont against the critoria for and identification of liconsing and regulatory actions requiring environmental assessment in accordance with 10 CFR 51.21. It has boon dolormined that the proposed changos moot the critoria for a categorical exclusion as provided fcr under 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9).

This dolormination is based on the following:

1.

Thoso changos are being proposed as an amendment to a licenso for a reactor pursuant to 10 CFR 50 which chan00 a requiroment with rospect to:

a.

Addin0 a requiromont to have an Essential Servico Water pump on a shut down unit available to support an operating unit, b.

Adding a requiremont to have the Essential Servico Water Unit Crosstlo open, or capable of bein0 opened from the Main Control Room, whenover one, or both, units are in an operatinD modo, and c.

Dolating a requiromont to verify that the Escontial Servico Water Systom Roturn Valvos, OSX165A and OSX165B, are open with power removed at least onco por 31 days.

2.

the amendment involvos no significant hazards considoration, 3.

thoto is no significant incroaso in the amot'nts of any offluents that may be roloased offsito, and 4.

there is no significant increase in individual or cumulativo occupational radiation exposure.

ZNLD/2382/G

..

ML20126F310

Text

Navigation menu

Search