ML20126A844

Response by CA Energy Commission (CEC) in Opposition to Licensee 800124 Motion for Summary Disposition Re CEC Issue 5-2.General Design Criteria 16 & 50 Established in 10CFR50, App A,Does Not Prohibit Controlled Filtered Venting

ML20126A844
Person / Time
Site:	Rancho Seco
Issue date:	02/04/1980
From:	Ellison C, Lanpher L CALIFORNIA, STATE OF
To:	Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
Shared Package
ML20126A836	List: ML20126A832 ML20126A837 ML20126A839 ML20126A844
References
NUDOCS 8002260426
Download: ML20126A844 (8)

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CALI?]RNIA E'.;IRG Y C0"1IS SION ' 3 RESPO::5I TJ LICE NSEE ' S ' OTIC" F:3 SUMMAn DISP 05:!'0?.

OF CO?: TINT:3Nd 5-2 3Y THE C ALIFOR:::2

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Er.ergy Co nission ("CE:") sub its this "ecoonse to the Licensee's motion for summary dispositi:n of CI: Issue ';;. -

5-2, filad Jar :ary 24, 1-?l; . :EC Issae 5-2 pr.:idet as l follows:

1 "Whether the containcent building should I be modified to provide overpressurination protection with a controlled filtered venting system to mitigate unavoidable releases of radior.uclides?'

.The Licensee bases its mo: ion principally upon the premise that Rancho Seco meets the General Design Criteria for aclear power plants set forth in 19 C.F.R. Part 50, Aprendix A. and

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• 7:r the convenience of the Beard, the CEC has ' allowed the Corm of the Licensee's ' lotion in desi;niting 1: 3 R e s po r.s e ,

Mcwever, we note that :he correct designation el the surfect o f this motion is " CEC Issue \' . 5-2", nat "Cor: en tion -2 " .

The Licensee's phrace is 1..preter insofar as i: ignores the "intercated state" sta:as of the CEC. ice 10 J.7.R. see:Lon 2.?!5(c).

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that therefore the Licensing Board is not empowcre_ to e x a r. _ :.

other safety measures such as controllcd filtered 'centing. See Licensee's Brief in Support of Its Motion for Summary Disp: 2;; ion of Contention 5-2 by the California Energy Commission (hereafter

" Licensee's Brief"), at p. 3-5. However, the General Desig.-

Criteria are minimum standards which do not preclude this 3:ard frc:

considering such additional measures which may be necessar'; o ensure public safety. The introduction to the General Design Criteria makes this point explicitly:

"These General Design Criteria establish minimum requirements for the principal design criteria for water-cooled nuclear power plants similar in design and location to plants for which construction permits to be generally applicable to other types

, of nuclear power units and are iatended I to provide guidance in establishing the principal design criteria for such other units.

There will be some water-cooled power plants for whicn the General Design Criteria are not sufficient and for which additional criteria must be identified and satisfied in the interest of public safety."

l 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix A (emphasis supplied)

The Commission's authority to require controlled filtered venting, and hence this Board's,1/ is limited only by the l

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1. The Commission's June 21, 1979, order delegated to this 30ard l its authority to require any measures necessary to ensure tha: l Rancho Seco will respond to feetwater transients safely. ,

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- ll require ent :ha; tha Beard find tha it "w___ provide subs;antial, add;;i nal ::ot e cti n v .icP is requ; red for the pub;_c heal:

and safety :: the c:mmon defense ar.i securi y". 10 ^ F.R. section 50._39. This au hority is .:t dimin;shed b; the issuance cf an operating 1;:ense, whic' presumably included a deterrinatier that the f acilit-i meets General Casign Cr;teria. See Gulf States Util-itie s C:mpa.-; (River Bend Station, .'n i t s 1 and 2), A1AB-444, 6 NRC 760, 76- (1977).1, The Licensee 's me: ion further sug;ests that this Board c:uld not require ;ontrol;2d diltered venting at E2ncho Se:o because I sucP a system would .ecessarily violate Criteria Nos. 16 and 30 o f the 10 C . F . R . 50, Appendix A, General Design Criteria. See Licensee'J 3rief at p. 5 - @; A f f i d a *.* i: vf Robert A. Dieteric'c at

p. 3. The CIC disputes this "f act" and therefore su: mary disposi-tion based upon it is not appropria:e. See Affidavi: of Daniel Nix, attached.

Moreover, as a matter of law, the General Design Criteria which the Licensee claims prohibits controlled filtered venting do not. Cri:erion No. 16 states:

" Criterion 16 - Containment design. Reactor containment and associated sys: ems shall be provided to establish an essentially leak-tight barrier against the uneentrolled release of radioacitivity to the environment and to

2. The Comm' asica is authorized to amend licenses based uper safety conditions ne: withstanding its prior licensinc decisiens pursuan to section IS6(a) of the Atenic Ene:;gy Act. See F:.

Pierce C:llities Authority of the Ci:1 of Ft. Pierce v. United States cf America an? the Nuclear Rc aula tory s'ammiss.On, 600 F.2d 3% (D.C. Cir. 1979).

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assure t P '. : thi cor.: air men: design cor. iticns in ; ortant to safet; ars not ex:s ed ed f as 1cc .

as pos:ulated i:cident :and;;i: .s requ;re.

(1C :.P.R. 5:, Appenfix A, enphasis supplied) .

_ . By defini :an, con rolled filtered centing foes no: permit "uncontrclied re' eases of radi:ac tivity to the environ:ent."

_ I:s purpose is to prevent :: titigate sucP releases, and $.snce it is consistent wl:n tne reanir.g o:. Crl:eri:n No. ,:. _ Sim _arly, Criterion No. 50, whi:P the Licensee also clains prohibits controlled filtered ventir.g , onl; require s cor. tai. ment of pressures from design basis accidents:

" Criterion 50 - Contain:ent design basis. The reactor contair. rent stru:ture, including access openings, penetrations,:Ki the containment heat removal system shall be designef so that the cor.t airmen struct,5:e and its r.:ernal ::mparp-ments can accennodate, without exceedir; the design lea.% age rate and with suf ficient margin, the calculated cressure and temperature conditions resulting from any loss-of-coolant accident.

. . .H (10 C . F .R . 50, AppendiF. A) l The Licensee itself asserts that controlled filtered venting -

is meant to mitigate accidents more severe thar the design basis accident. E.g. Affidavit of Rcbert A. Dieterich, paragraph 3. Its ,

I simultaneous contentien that centrolled filtered ventir; will violate criterion :;o.  ;

.] is cor.troverted by its own assertion. l Controlled filtered v:nting wculd not lessen the the ability l 1

of Rancho Secc to contain design basis .7.ccidents because it would l l

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be actuated only by . ore sev2:e . cifsnts. A ordir 7;y, the Licensee's argument hnt control _-: ! f itered

_ ertin: c uld /_;; ate criterion No. 50 is .tithcut sri:.

Finally, even if controll:d f;_ tered vanting seculf cause a violation of these criteria, :his Board could order the Licerree to implement such a system if it finds such action is necessary to ensure public safe:y. The General Design Criteria expressly allow such exceptions: l "Also, there may be water-cooled nucln"- l power units for which the fulfillment cf I some of the General Design Criteria mai not be necessary or appropriate. For the General Design Criteria mus: be identified and justified." (1: C.F.R. 50, Appendix A, Introductica).

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Several issues before this 3 card concern possibib sansiti' cities '

1 unique to the Babcock and Wilcox design. E.c. Board Questien No. I 1

l 3; Hurch and Castro Contentions Nos. 2, 6, 21, and 26. Following i 1

1 the hearings, the Board may conclude that such sensitivities (or other f actors) justify consideration of controlled filtered  ;

1 venting even if it departs frem some of the General Design Criteria. )

l The Licensee also urges the Board not to consider controlled filtered venting systems because they are meant to mitigate Class-9 accidents. Licensee's Brief a: p. 6-S. In support cf this argument it cites the Commission's his:Oric policy of not considering :he environmental impacts of such accidents in its licensing decisions.

But that policy should not guide the Scard in this un:que inquiry.

This case presents sound legal and policy reasons for considering Class-9 accidents. This hearing is not a licensir.; procee ing , and the preparation of an environmental impact statemen; is not an issue here. Hence, the Commission's policy provides little guidance to the Board in this case. More importantly, the Commission's June 21 order makes clear that the subject of this hearing is the adequacy of the Commission's May 7 Order - an order that sought in essence to prevent the Three Mile I.cland accident from being repeated at Rancho Seco. Three Mile Island was a Class-9 accident. See "NRC Staff Response to Board Question No.

4 Regarding the occurrence of a Class-9 Accident at Three Mile Island," August 24, 1979, In re Public Service Electric and Gas Co.

(Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit No. 1), Docket No. 50-272;

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see also In re Pennsylvania Power and Light and Allegheny Electric Cooperative (Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2),

Docket Nos. 50-387 and 50-388; " Memorandum and Order Concerning Class-9 Accident Contention" (October 19, 1979) published in Muclear Regulation Reporter, Vol. 2, t30,426. .

The purpose of this hearing is to consider the potential for a Class-9 accident at Rancho Seco. The Board can not conduct the hearing ordered by the Commission without considering Class-9 accidents. For this reason, this hearing is distinguishable from those licensing proceedings cited by the Licensee where the Commis-sion's interim policy was applied to exclude Class-9 accidents generally. More in point is the recent opinion in the matter of Pennsylvania Power and Light Company and Allegheny Electric Cooperative, supra. There a Licensing' Board ruled it would hear

a contention involving, inter alia, -itigatic. measures for Class-9 accidents. The Board noted trat thu :cmr_ss_- 's pol _:7 excl_ ling Class-9 accidents is not absolute. ;i .ere the _i%e11..::d of a Class-9 accident at a particular reactor is greater c.a n for Yehctors generally, the Board hel,. that the p:lici dess obtain.

Furthermore, the Board in Pennsylvania Power I; reed that foll;i.ing Three Mile Island "it can no longer be said that the probabil;;y of such an accident occurring is so 10w or remote as : preclufe discussion" (Ibid, ii3 0,4 2 6. 0 4 ) . It therefore admittef the contention, even though the subject of the hearing was the licensing of a boiling water reactor unlike TMI-2. The cery purpose of the instant hearing is to consider the implications of the TMI-2 accident at a substantially identical facility. Theref:re, the case for considering such accidento here is eve- stronesr thas ;r Pennsilvania Power. That decision and the Commission's June 21 Order provide compelling support for the consideration of such accidents in this proceeding.

Finally, the Licensee's motion asserts that the Board should not hear this issue because controlled filtered venting is not

" commercially available". The CEC agrees with the Licensee that considerable developmental work would be necessary before such a system could be implemented at Rancho Seco. Tne CEC also agrees with the Licensee that it should not be made te solve generic reactor safety problems alone.

However, the CEC understands that the NRC is study;n the generic feasibility of such systems. Furthermcre, muir of the

de tele:; , ental . cork that wculd precede the backfitting of Rancho Seco with such a system is specific to that facility. 'Zh 2 expertise necascary to accomplish this work is available.  ::ix ; paragraph

5. If the evidence brought forward in the hearing suggests that the site specific feasibility of controlled filtered venting can not be determined at this time because of generic problems, the Board can make appropriate findings. But if the evidence suggests otherwise, the Board may determine that the Licensee should conduct a specific feasibility study. Nothing in MRC rules or this Board's mandate limits its authority to order such a study.

In conclusion, the Licensee seeks to dispose of this issue without examining the merit of implementing controlled filtered venting at Rancho Seco. Nothing in Du authoriti=:s that govern, this hearin; )

directs the Board to avoid such safety questions. Indeed, this I Board's mandate is the opposite. The Licensee's ' notion should be l

denied.

I Dated: February 4, 1980 bi d,

./snectfully su# m tte

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CHRI OPHER ELLISOS I

.. N O LAWRENCE C. LANPtER h

Attorneys for the California Energy Commission

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