ML20114F970

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Rev 1 to Proposed Design Mods & Tech Spec Changes on Grid Voltage Degradation for Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant,Units 3 & 4, Technical Evaluation Rept
ML20114F970
Person / Time
Site: 05000000, Turkey Point
Issue date: 04/08/1983
From: Selan J
LAWRENCE LIVERMORE NATIONAL LABORATORY
To:
NRC
Shared Package
ML20114F973 List:
References
CON-FIN-A-0250, CON-FIN-A-250, FOIA-84-661 UCID-19149, UCID-19149-R01, UCID-19149-R1, NUDOCS 8305160221
Download: ML20114F970 (13)
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This report it a revision of the t eclutical. valu:ir ion documented in a separate report dated August 4, 1982 (UCID-19149) on the proposed design modification and Technical Specification changes for protection of the Class lE equipment from grid voltage degradation for the Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 and 4.

The review criteria are based on several'IEEE standards and the Code of Federal Regulations.

The evaluation compares the submittals made by the plant with the NRC staff positions and the review criteria.

The evaluation finds that the design modifications and the changes to the Technical Specifications will ensure that the Class 1E cquipment will be protected from sustained voltage degradation.

FOREWORD This report is supplied as part of the Selected Operating Reactor Issues Program II being conducted for the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Of fice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Division of Licensing, by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.

The U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission funded the work under the authorization entitled " Selected Operating Reactor Issues Program II,"

B&R 20 19 10 11 1, FIN No. A-0250.

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Page 1

1.

INTRODUCTION.

2 2.

DESIGN BASIS CRITERIA 2

3.

EVALUATION 2

3.1 Existing Undervoltage Protection 4

3.2 Modifications 5

3.3 Discussions.

3.3.1 NRC Staff Position 1:

Second Level ot' Under-iloitage or Overvoltage Protection with a 5

Time Delay 3.3.2 NRC Staf f Position 2:

Interaction of Onsite Power Sources with Load Shed Feature.

7 3.3.3 NRC Staff Position 3:

Onsite Power Source Testing 7

7 3.4 Technical Specifications 8

4.

CONCLUSION 9

REFERENCES ILLUSTRATION Figure 1 Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 and 4 3

Electrical One-Line Diagra

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TECllNICA! RVAl.UATION REPORT (REV1 S10N 1 ) O N Ylli PROl>0 SED DESIGN MODIFICATIONS AND TECitNICal. SI'ECIFICA rl.ON CitANCES ON GRID VOLTAGE DEGRADAT10h FOR THE TURKEY POINT NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT, UNITS 3 AND 4 (Docket Nos. 50-250, 50-251)

James C. Selan Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 1.

INTRODUCTION By letter dated June 3,1977 [Ref.1], the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requested Florida Power and Light Company (FPL), the licensee, to assess the susceptibility of the Class lE electrical equipment to sustained degraded voltage conditions at the offsite power sources and to the interaction between the offsite and onsite emergency power systems at the Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 and 4 In addition, the NRC requested that the the licensee compare the current design of the emergency power syste=s at plant facilities with the NRC staff positions as stated in the June 3, 1977 letter [Ref.1], and that the licensee propose plant modifications, as necessary, the NRC staff positions, or provide a detailed analysis which shows that to meet the facility design has equivalent capabilities and protective features.

Further, the NRC required certain Technical Specifications be incorporated into the facility's operating license.

Ty letters dated July 21, 1977 [Ref. 2], Nove=ber 9, 1979 [Ref. 3],

January 14, 1981 [Ref. 4], May 10,1982 [Ref. 5], August 6, 1982 [Ref. 6],

September 1, 1982 [Ref. 7], and January 3, 1983 [Ref. 8], the licensee proposed certain design modifications, additions to the licensee's Technical Specifica-tions, and limiting conditions of operation (LCO's).

The design modifications include the installation of a degraded voltage protection system for the Class 1E equipment.

The proposed additions to the Technical Specifications and LCO's are in regard to calibrations, surveillance requirements, test requirements, and

" action" statements associated with the proposed voltage protection system.

The purpose of this report is to evaluate the licensee's proposed design modifications, Technical Specification changes, and proposed LCO's to determine that they meet the criteria established by the NRC for the protection of Class lE equipment from grid voltage degradation.

This report is a revision of the technical evaluation documented in a separate report dated August 4, 1982 (UCID-19149) based on new information sub-mitted in References 6, 7, and 8.

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2.

DESIGN BASIS CRITERIA The design basis criteria that were applied in determining the f

acceptability of the system modification to protect the Class lE equipment from degradation of grid voltages are as follows:

i (1) General Design Criterion 17 (GDC 17), " Electric Power Systems," of Appendix A " General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants," Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Part 50 (10 CFR 50) [Ref. 9].

(2) IEEE Standard 279-1971, " Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations" [Ref. 10].

(3) IEEE Standard 308-1974, " Class lE Power Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations" [Ref. 11).

(4) NRC staff positions as stated in a letter dated June 3, 1977

[Ref. 1).

3.

EVALUATION 3.1 EXISTING UNDERVOLTAGE PROTECTION The present undervoltage protection design utilizes two undervoltageThe rolays on each of the 4160-volt Class lE buses (Buses A and B of Figure 1).

ralays are instantaneous type HGA which respond at 40% - 50% of 4160 volts.

These relays are used as loss-of-voltage protection.

The relay logic (2-out-of-2) is such that actuation of one relay

( A1. or A2) on "A" bus in conjunction with the actuation of its interconnected relay (B1 or B2) on "B" bus will initiate the of f site source disconnection, load shedding, diesel generator starting and subsequent los' : quencing on both buses.

For example, the starting of diesel generator 3 and the dis-connection of startup transformer 3 is initiated by the actuation of relay Al cn bus 3A and relay 32 on bus 3B or the actuation of relay Al and the starting saquence of diesel generator 4.

This logic sche =e results in two separate

-and redundant circuits.

The load shedding feature is not bypassed when the Class lE buses are

.being supplied by the diesel generators.

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3.2 MODIFICATIONS The licensee is proposing design changen to the existlag indervoltage prctoction system and are as follows:

(1) The logic of the existing relays will be reconnected such that the offsite source disconnection, load shedding, diesel generator starting, and load sequencing will occur only for that bus on which the loss of voltage occurs.

The logic will remain 2-out-of-2 but the scheme on bus A will now be independent of that on

, f bus B.

(2) The installation of two additional instantaneous relays (type ITE27H) with a definite-time delay and two inverse-time relays (type IAV) with a definite-time delay on each 480-volt Class 1E load center.

Both sets of relays will be in a 2-out-of-2 coin-cident logic scheme.

The instantaneous relays will protect the Class lE equipment at both the 4 kV and 480-volt icvels from j

sustained degraded voltages under accident conditions.

The inverse-time relays will also protect the Class lE equipcent at both voltage levels under non-accident conditions.

Actuation of either set of relays will initiate the tripping of the incoming 4 kV feeder breakers, diesel generator starting, load shedding, and subsequent load sequencing.

Both sets of the relays (instan-taneous and inverse time) are also interlocked with the

'b' contact of diesel generator breaker to disable the load-shedding feature when the diesel generators are en line and to reinstate the feature following breaker tripping.

(3) The proposed setpoints for the instantaneous relays and the inverse-ti=e relays, respectively, on each load center bus for the a.bove undervoltage protection design changes' arc as follows:

480-volt Class lE Setpoint Load Centers 3A

  • 431 volts
    • 419 volts 3B 411 volts 426 volts 3C 412 volts 427 volts 3D 423 volts 436 volts 4A 410 volts 427 volts -

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i 4C 396 volts 413 volts 4D 398 volts 412 volts

  • All the instantaneous relays have a voltage setpoint tolerance of + 5 volts with a definite-time delay of 10 seconds.
    • All the inverse-time relays have a voltage setpoint tolerance of + 5 volts with a time delay of 60 seconds

+ 30 seconds.

3.3 DISCUSSIONS This section presents a statement on the NRC staff position from their June 3,1977 letter [Ref.1] followed by an evaluation of the licensee's

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3.3.1 NRC Staff Position 1:

Second Level of Undervoltage or Overvoltage Protecti'on with a Time Delay This position is to be met by the licensee meeting certain criteria.

Each criterion has been evaluated against the licensee's proposal and is addressed below.

~ (1)

"The celection of voltage and time setpoints shall be deter-mined from an analysis of the voltage requirements of the safety-related loads at all onsite system distribution levels."

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The licensee's analysis demonstrated that the proposed under-voltage protection setpoints as defined in Section 3.2, with their associated time delays of 10 seconds and 60 seconds +

30 seconds, will protect the Class lE equipment from sustained degraded voltages under accident and non-accident conditions.

l (2)

"The voltage protection shall include coincidence logic to preclude spurious trips of the offsite power sources."

The proposed coincident logic of 2-out-of-2 will preclude spurious trips from the of f site sources.

(3)

"The time delay selected shall be based on the following conditions."

(a)

"The allowable time delay, including margin, shall not exceed the maximum time delay that is assumed in the FSAR accident analysis." _

The proposed 10-second time delay in addt ton to the 18 seconds for diesel generator loading under accident condi-tions does not exceed the 50-second time delay assuned in the FSAR accident analysis.

(b)

"The time delay shall minimize the effect of short duration disturbances from reducing the availability of the offsite power sources.

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The proposed time delays of 10 seconds and 60 seconds +

30 seconds for both accident and non-accident conditions respectively., were selected to minimize the effects of short duration transients from reducing the availability of the of fsite power sources.

(c)

"The allowable time duration of a degraded voltage condition at all distribution system levels shall not result in failure of safety systems or components."

The licensee's voltage analysis has shown that the proposed time delays (10 seconds and 60 seconds 1 30 seconds) will not cause any failure of any equipment connected to or associated with the Class lE power system.

(4)

"The undervoltage monitors shall automatically initiate the dis-connection of of fsite power sources whenever the voltage setpoint and tiac delay limits have been exceeded."

The operation of the IAV relays on the 480-volt Class 1E load centers, in a 2-out-of-2 coincident logic, will automatically initia te the disconnection f rom the of f site source whenever the voltage and time delay setpoints are exceeded.

The operating time of the IAV relay is such that as the rate of voltage degra-dation increases, the associated time delay becomes shorter.

Should a degraded voltage occur concurrent with a safety injection signal, the relays (ITE 27H) located on the 480-volt Class lE load center buses, in a 2-out-of-2 coincident logic, will initiate the auto-disconnection from the degraded offsite source after a definite-time delay (10 seconds).

(5)

"The voltage monitors shall be designed to satisfy the require-ments of IEEE Standard 279-1971."

The proposed design modifications to the undervoltage protection scheme meet all the requirements of IEEE 279-1971.

(6)

"The Technical Specifications chall include limiting conditions for operation, surveillance requirements, trip setpoints with minimum and maximum limits, and allow.7ble values for the second-level voltage protection monitors."

The licensee submitted proposed Technical Specifications changes for the design modifications which included limiting conditions for operation, surveillance requirements, and the trip setpoints.

O e

e 3.3.2 NRC Staff Position 2:

Interaction of Onsitz pw:

Sources with Load Shed Featurc The second position requires the syste: be designed to prevent cutomatic load shedding of the e=ergency buses oncc the onsite sources are supplying power to all sequenced loads.

If an adequate basis can be provided for retaining the load-shed feature, the licensee must assign maximum and min-imum values to the setpoint of the load-shed feature.

These setpoints must be be d2cumented in the Technical Specifications.

The load-shedding feature must clso be reinstated if the onsite source supply breakers are tripped.

The licensee is bypassing the load-shed feature once the onsite scurces are supplying the Class 1E buses.

This bypassing is accomplished by th2 interlocking of the load-shed relays with the "b" contact of the diesel gansrator breaker.

Tripping of the breaker will automatically reinstate the lecd-shed feature.

3.3.3 NRC Staff Position 3:

Onsite Power Source Testing The third position requires that certain test requirements be included in the Technical Specifications.

These tests are to "... demonstrate the full functional operability and independence of the onsite power sources at laast once per 18 months during shutdown." The tests are to simulate less of offsite power in conjunction with a safety-injection actuation signni and to si=ulate interruption and vubsequent reconnection of onsite powar sources. These tests will verify the proper operation of the load-shed systsm, the load-shed bypass circuitry, and that there is no adverse inter-l cction between the onsite and offsite power sources.

l l

Existing Technical Specifications include tests which demonstrate tha full functional operability and independence of the onsite power sources by simulating a loss-of-of fsite power to verify diesel generator starting and loading.

Then.a safety injection signal is simulated to verify that the Class 1E loads are sequenced on.

Conducting this test will test all the components l

ustd to verify the p. roper operation of the load-shed feature, load-shed bypassing, and cuto-reinstatement and insure that there is no adverse interaction between the onsite and offsite sources.

3.4 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS The licensee has provided appropriate Technical Specification changes en the design modifications to the undervoltage protection syste=.

Specifically, th2 proposed changes included:

(1) Voltage an'd time delay trip setpoints with tolerances of the undervoltage relaying system (see Section 3.2).

(2) The required coincident logic (minimum 2-out-of-2)..

9

o (3) Surveillance requirements for a channel check at 1 cast once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, a channel f unctional test at least once per 31 days and a channel calibration at least once per 18 months (refuelfng).

(4) Limiting conditions for operation including action statements when the number of required channels is less than the minimum number required.

4.

CONCLUSIONS Based on the information submitted by Florida Power and Light Company, it hns been determined that the proposed design modifications comply with NRC Steff Position 1.

All of the staff's requirements and design basis criteria hava been met.

The voltage and time delay trip settings will protect the Clcss lE equipment from sustained degraded voltages from the offsite sources.

The licensee is bypassing the load-shed feature by using the

'b' of th9 diesel generator breaker to prevent an adverse interaction when the onsite scuress are supplying the Class lE buses. The licensee is proposing to auto-rainstate the load-shed feature following diesel generator breaker tripping.

Thus, NRC Staff Position 2 is met.

The existing Technical Specifications include tests which have been roviewed and found to meet the requirements of NRC Staff Position 3.

Accordingly, I recommend that the NRC accept the, proposed design cadifications ahd Technical Specification changes to protect the Class lE cquiprent from sustained degraded voltages.

e.

, e.

REFERENCE.4 1.

NRC letter to Florida Power and Light Company (FPL), dated June 2,1977.

2.

FPL letter (R. E. Uhrig) to NRC (George Lear), dated July 21, 1977.

3.

FPL letter (R. E. Uhrig) to NRC (W. G. Gammill), dated November 9, 1979.

4.

FPL letter (R. E. Uhrig) to NRC (T. M. Novak), dated January 14, 1981.

5.

FPL letter (R. E. Uhrig) to NRC (T. M. Novak), dated May 10, 1982.

6.

FPL letter (R. E. Uhrig) to NRC (D. G. Eisenhut), dated August 6, 1982.

7.

FPL letter (R. E. Uhrig) to NRC (S. A. Varga), dated Septe=ber 1, 1982.

8.

FPL letter (R. E. Uhrig) to NRC (S. A. Varga), dated January 3, 1983.

9.

Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Part 50 (10 CFR 50), General y

Design Criterion 17 (GDC 17), " Electric Power Systems" of Appendix A "Ceneral Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants."

10.

IEEE Standard 279-1971, " Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations."

11.

IEEE Standard 308-1974, " Criteria for Class lE Power Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations."

6

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DISCLAIMER This document *ss prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government not any agency thereof, nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, expressed or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or procesa disclosed, or represents that les use would not Infringe privately owned i'M",'.

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\\ucear nformation anc Resource Service 1345 Connect. cut Avenue fN! 4tn hoor Wash:n;to, O C 20036 (202,296-7552 l

j August 6, 1984 James M. Felton, Director Division of Rules and Records Office of Adminstration U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission N OF INFORMATON Washington, D.C. 20555 ACT REQUEST FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT REOUEST h((Ikd[p[

[-/d f[

Previous Related Request: FOIA 84-378 (BELL)

/

Dear Mr. Felton:

Pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C.

522, as amended, the Nuclear Information and Resource Service re-quests the following documents regarding consideration by NRC of earthquake activitity in emergency planning.

Please consider " documents" to include reports, studies, test results, correspondence, memoranda, meeting notes, meeting minutes, working papers, graphs, charts, diagrams, notes and summaries of conversations and interviews, computer records, and any other forms of written communication, including internal NRC Staff memoranda.

In your response, please identify which documents correspond to which requests below.

Pursuant to this request, please provide all documents pre-pared or utilized by, in the possession of, or routed through the NRC related to:

1. NRC Staff and Commission consideration of the potential complicating effects of external events such as earthquakes upon emergency response planning.

In our opinion, it is appropriate in this case for you to waive copying and search charges, pursuant to 5 U.S.C.

552 (a) (4) ( A) "because furnishing the information can be considered as primarily benefiting the general public."

The Nuclear Information and Resource Service is a non-profit organization serving local organizations concerned about nuclear power and providing information to the general

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I.

-a

\\

\\ public.

Information required by 10 CFR 9.14a was provided by letter dated August 3, 1984.

Sincerely, 5

Nina Bell Assistant Director cc: File

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