ML20096H486
| ML20096H486 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 12/14/1995 |
| From: | NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20096H460 | List: |
| References | |
| REF-GTECI-A-46, REF-GTECI-SC, TASK-A-46, TASK-OR GL-87-02, GL-87-2, MP2-SEIS.RPT, MP2-SEIS.RPT-R, MP2-SEIS.RPT-R00, NUDOCS 9601290090 | |
| Download: ML20096H486 (150) | |
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Docket No. 50-336 i B15469 l
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l Attachment 3 Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 2 !
Seismic Evaluation Report l
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l January 1996 l
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9601290090 960122 PDR ADOCK 05000336 p PDR
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- SEISMIC EVALUATION REPORT
, FOR MILLSTONE UNIT 2 i
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! IN RESPONSE TO: !
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NRC GENERIC LETTER 87-02/USI A-46 i ;
- VERIFICATION OF SEISMIC ADEQUACY OF MECHANICAL AND ELECTRICAL !
- EQUIPMENT IN OPERATING REACTORS !
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PREPARED FOR: l 1
NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY P.O. BOX 128 WATERFORD, CT 06385-0128 i
REPORT NUMBER: MP2-SEIS.RPT JOB NUMBER: 0024-00099 REVISION: 0 DATE: DECEMBER 14,1995
SEISMIC EVALUATION REPORT FOR MILLSTONE UNIT 2 l
SECTION TITLE PAGE
1.0 INTRODUCTION
1 2.0 SCOPE / METHOD 1 ,
3.0 PLANT DESCRIPTION AND DESIGN BASIS 3 4.0 RESULTS 10
5.0 REFERENCES
15 TABLES TITLE PAGE TABLE 4.1 Outliers Summary 18 TABLE 4.2 Inaccessible items 22 i
ATTACHMENT TITLE ATTACHMENT A* Excerpts from the MP2 UFSAR ATTACHMENT B* Technical Considerations for the Development of in-Structure Response Spectra on Major Structures. 1 l
ATTACHMENT C Resumes and Training Records of Key VECTRA Personnel J
ATTACHMENT D Peer Review Report ATTACHMENT E* SEWS ATTACHMENT F SVDS ATTACHMENT G OSVS ATTACHMENT H* Raceway Review Area Summary Sheets
(*) Designates attachments that are not included in the NRC Submittal I
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SEISMIC EVALUATION REPORT FOR MILLSTONE 2
1.0 INTRODUCTION
The requirements for seismic design of nuclear power plants have evolved over the years from l the application of commercial building codes earlier in the 1960's, to more sophisticated methods being used today. In view of the extent of these changes in design requirements, the NRC initiated Unresolved Safety issue USl A-46, " Seismic Qualification of Equipment in Operating Piant," in December 1980. In early 1982, the Seismic Qualification Utility Group (SQUG) was formed to develop cost effective means of verifying the seismic adequacy of equipment in j operating plants. The results of the industry efforts in this area, have culminated in the issuance i of Revision 2 of the Generic Implementation Procedure (GIP-2) and a number of supporting l documents and reports. Subsequently the USNRC has documented its rev!ew of the GIP in !
Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report No. 2 (SSER-2) and issued Supplement No.1 to Generic Letter (GL) 87-02. Northeast Utilities provided their response to GL87-02 in a letter dated September 21,1992 (Reference 5.1.9) outlining their proposed schedule and approach. )
The objective of this report is to provide the necessary documentation of the A-46 effort at the Unit 2 of the Millstone Nuclear Power Station referred to hereafter as Millstone 2 (MP2). It will consolidate the documentation required for the Seismic Evaluation Report.
1 2.0 SCOPE / METHOD l l
The primary objective of the A-46 program at MP2, as outlined in NU's Program Manual [5.2.8],
is to verify the seismic adequacy of mechanical and electrical safe shutdown equipment. This program will provide a successful resolution of USI A-46, in addition, NU will utilize the key elements and results to streamline the seismic qualification process for the life of the plant. As discussed in Reference 5.1.9, MP2 intends to comply with the SQUG commitments set forth in i
GIP-2 [5.2.2], including the clarifications, interpretations, and exceptions identified in SSER-2
[5.1.2]. i The essential features of the SQUG approach, for the resolution of A-46, is the use of earthquake experience data, and Generic equipment qualifications and fragility test data. To use i these sources of data, SQUG and EPRI have collected and organized the associated information I and have developed guidelines and criteria for its use. The GIP-2 summarizes the technical l approach and provides detailed implementation and documentation requirements for the application of experience data to verify the seismic adequacy of the safe shutdown equipment.
Implementation of the GIP requirements at MP2 was performed by VECTRA Technologies in accordance with the Project instructions listed in Reference 5.2.6. The peer review was conducted in October 1994 by Drs. R. P. Kennedy and J. D. Stevenson and concluded that the VECTRA walkdowns have been conducted in a competent manner and results were in i accordance with the GIP (Attachment D). The results and observations of the peer reviewers were consistent with the findings of the SRT.
The GIP approach for verifying the seismic adequacy of mechanical and electrical equipment is consistent with the intent of Generic Letter 87-02, " Verification of Seismic Adequacy of Page1 Report MP2-SEIS.RPT
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SEISMIC EVALUATION REPORT FOR MILLSTONE 2 Mechanical and Electrical Equipment in Operating Reactors, Unresolved Safety issue (USI) A- ,
46", including NUREG-1030 (Reference 5.1.3) and NUREG-1211 (Reference 5.1.4). The !
. approach is also consistent with the EPRI Seismic Margins Assessment Program (SMA) described in Reference 5.2.1. The four major steps used for the majority of the equipment to be i evaluated are listed below: {
Selection of Seismic Evaluation Personnel ;
- Identification of Safe Shutdown Equipment j
- Screening Verification and Walkdown .
Outlier identification and Resolution l
1 Several types of individuals, their qualifications,' and their responsibilities for implementing this procedure are described in Section 2 of the GlP. These individuals include: (1) Systems l Engineers who identify the methods and the equipment needed for bringing the plant to a safe ,
shutdown condition, (2) Plant Operations Personnel who have a comprehensive understanding of l the plant layout and the function U 1 operation of the equipment and systems in the plant and l who compare the plant operating procedures to the safe shutdown equipment list for ;
compatibility, (3) Seismic Capability Engineers who perform the Screening Ver!ncation and I Walkdown of the safe shutdown equipment, and (4) Relay Evaluation Personnel who perform the relay functionality review.
The Seismic Capability Engineers must exercise sound engineering judgment during the l S ,reening Verification and Walkdown. Therefore the selection and training of qualified Seismic Capability Engineers for participation on the Seismic Review Teams (SRTs) is an important element of the A-46 program.
The resumes and training records, of key individuals from the VECTRA staff that participated in -
the completion of the A-46 effort at MP2, are included as Attachment C.
Ti;e Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL), and the Relay Evaluation Report are documented in VECTRA Reposts ( References 5.3.3 & 5.3.4). This report will provide, by reference or as attachments, all the documentation associated with the Seismic Evaluation Report; it will also sumn;arize the results of the walkdowns and evaluations.
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3.0 PLANT DESCRIPTION AND DESIGN BASIS i 3.1 General Plant Description !
i The Millstone 2 Plant utilizes a pressurized water Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS). The plant was designed to produce 865 MW of gross electrical power. This plant provides electrical power to all sponsoring utilities in New England.
Combustion Engineering, Inc. was responsible for design and fabrication of all nuclear l steam supply and auxiliary systems and equipment, as well as design and supply of all ;
secondary plant mechanical and electrical equipment which it normally manufactures. {
Bechtel Engineering Corporation was responsible for site development, design of j buildings and secondary systems, and all plant construction.
Millstone 2 incorporates a 2-loop closed-cycle pressurized water type nuclear steam l supply system ; a turbine generator and electrical systems; engineered safety features; j radioactive waste systems; fuel handling systems; structures and other on-site facilities; ;
instrumentation and control systems; and the necessary auxiliaries required for a j complete and operable nuclear power station. l i
The general site arrangement is presented in subsection 3.4 below. !
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3.2 Site Location The Millstone 2 Plant is located in the town of Waterford, Connecticut, on the north shore )
of Long Island Sound and on the east side of Niantic Bay,3.2 miles WSW of the town !
limits of New London and 40 miles SE of Hartford, Connecticut. The site consists of i approximately 500 acres. The minimum exclusion radius of the unit is approximately 2,050 feet. The site provides good local isolation.
3.3 Site Geology and Seismology The Millstone 2 site is located at the southem tip of Millstone Point in Waterford, Connecticut. The site is a low lying peninsula within the Seaboard Lowland section of the New England physiographic province. The Millstone area, like the rest of New England, was covered with glacial ice until approximately 15,000 years ago. The glaciers deposited a thick layer of glacial till and, as they receded, left end moraine and outwash deposits. The bedrock geology is characterized by extensive deformation, metamorphism, and intrusion by igneous bodies.
The geology of the eastem portion of Connecticut is made difficult to decipher by the complex folding and faulting of the Late Paleozoic era. The Millstone site lies approximately 30 miles east of the Triassic Border fault, and approximately 15 miles south of the Honey Hill fault. The area south of the Honey Hill fault is complexly folded.
The site lies on the east limb of the recumbent Hunts Brook syncline which mantles the ;
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t SEISMIC EVALUATION REPORT FOR MILLSTONE 2 The site is located in a geologically complex region characterized by metamorphosed ,
and folded rocks of Ordovician-Silurian age. This area has been affected by four orogenies: the Avalonian (575 million years ago m.y.a), the Taconian (465-445 m.y.a),
the Acadian (400-370 m.y.a), and the Alleghenian (320-260 m.y.a). The surrounding region has also been affected by rifting ranging in age from Triassic to Jurassic. Since then the region has been stable, with the exception of epeirogenic uplift during Cretaceous and Tertiary times, and isostatic rebound, resulting from the removal of the !
weight of ice covering the region during Pleistocene time.
The site lies in an area of low seismic activity. Only 13 earthquakes of Intensity V, Modified Mercalli (MM) or greater, have been recorded within a distance of 50 miles of i the site in more than 300 years. The nearest significant earthquake was at East t Haddam, Connecticut, in 1791, its epicenter was approximately 25 miles north of the site. Even though this earthquake is recorded in the Earthquake History of the United ,
States (USCGS 1965) as having an intensity of Vill MM detailed studies by Rev.
Linehan, Director, Weston Geophysical Observatory, based on newspaper accounts and other records of the time, indicate that the intensity was no higher than VI to Vil MM.
Maximum intensity of ground motion experienced at the site in approximately 300 years of recorded history has not exceeded intensity V MM, which would correspond to an i acceleration of 0.02 to 0.03g.
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Faults believed to be related to Triassic tectonics have been found in the excavation for ;
Millstone 3. Potassium-argon methods of dating clay gouge found within the faults I indicate that the last activity siong these faults occurred approximately 142 m.y.a.; 1 therefore, these faults are not capable features. There is no capable fault at or near the site.
A thick layer of very dense basal till blankets the site. The bedrock surface is irregular and was glacially smoothed. Most major plant safety-related structures are founded on hard, crystalline bedrock.
There has been no commercial mining in the area other than the now inactive granite quarry, located approximately 1,200 feet to tha southeast of the Millstone plant area.
The soils and rock underlying the site are strong, stable materials that are not susceptible to loss of strength, subsidence, or other instabilities during earthquake motion.
i The maximum earthquake potential for the site is evaluated by utilizing maximum !
earthquakes associated with all nearby tectonic provinces and geologic structures. The I analysis is made for two different sets of conditions. First, actual site intensities resulting from larger historical earthquakes are determined. Second, the maximum potential site intensities resulting from hypothetical events are calculated. These hypothetical events are specified as the largest known earthquakes in each adjoining tectonic province.
Each is postulated to occur at the point where its province or structure most closely approaches the site.
The maximum earthquake potential at the site is an Intensity Vil event occurring 10 to 20 km from the site. Murphy and O'Brien (1977) have published an analysis of acceleration-intensity correlation using a new worldwide data base and a variety of Page 4 Report MP2-SEIS.RPT
SEISMIC EVALUATION REPORT FOR MILLSTONE 2 i
statistical models. Their correlation equation relating Intensity I (MM) and peak horizontal ground acceleration gives an average horizontal component peak acceleration of 0.10g. .
3.4 Structures The major structures of the Millstone 2 Plant are the Reactor Building, Enclosure Building, Auxiliary Building, Turbine Building, intake Structure and Warehouse.
The plant arrangement is shown on Figure 1.2-2 of the MNPS-2 FSAR. The Turbine Building for Millstone Unit 2 is an extension to the north of the Unit 1 Turbine Building. A double containment system (described in Sections 5.2 and 5.3 of the FSAR) and referred to as the Containment, houses the NSSS. This Containment is enclosed by the Enclosure Building and is located east of the Turbine Building. A fuel handling facility, ;
radioactive waste processing system, NSSS auMilary equipment, heating and ventilating system components, laboratories, and the Control Room are located in the Auxiliary Building. The Auxiliary Building is located on the east side of the Turbine Building and is adjacent to the west and south sides of the Containment.
The Containment houses the NSSS, consisting of the reactor, steam generators, reactor coolant pumps, pressurizer, and some of the reactor auxiliaries. The Containment is equipped with a polar crane. j i
The Enclosure Building completely envelopes the Containment and provides a filtration l region between the Containment and the environment.
The Turbine Building houses the turbine generator, condenser, feedwater heaters, condensate and feedwater pumps, turbine auxillaries and some of the switchgear assemblies.
As shown in Figure 1.2-2 of the FSAR, the circulating water system consists of an intake structure located on the west side, and the discharge structure located at the quarry southeast of the plant.
The plant layout is shown on Figures 1.2-3 through 1.2-17 of the FSAR.
The Containment Building is a prestressed, post-tensioned concrete cylindrical structure with a 65' radius. It is founded on unweathered rock at elevation -33' The Containment mat also supports the intemal structure as shown in Figures 5.8-14 and 5.8-21 of the FSAR.
The Auxiliary Building consists of a reinforced concrete structure of interconnecting floors and walls. The building is supported on rock, providing a rigid foundation at both elevation -25' and a small area at elevation -45' as shown in Figures 5.8-12 and 5.8-38 of the FSAR.
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1 SEISMIC EVALUATION REPORT FOR MILLSTONE 2 4
The intake structure, located west of the main plant area, is also a reinforced concrete structure founded on bedrock. As shown in Figure 5.8-58 of the FSAR, the structure is primarily a rectangular sheer wall building with the top of the base slab at -27'.
The Turbine Building is a rigid framed steel structure with metal siding and precast I concrete panels on the exterior. The foundations for the steel frame are spread footings bearing on lean concrete backfill which extends to the rock. The turbine-generator pedestal is a low-tuned mass concrete structure which is also founded on lean concrete backfill which extends to the rock (see figures 5.8-12 and 5.8-51 of the FSAR).
, The turbine-generator pedestal is separated from the surrounding floor slabs by Teflon- l lined sliding bearings. The Turbine Building main frame is connected to the Unit 1 Turbine Building by sliding connections so that it is an independent structure.
The Warehouse Building is a three-story reinforced concrete structure. The ground floor is at grade level of 14'-6". It is founded on a controlled select compacted fill. The portion of the building housing the fuel handling area consists of a steel framed structure supported at grade level (see figures 5.8-12 and 5.8-46 of the FSAR).
The refueling water storage tank is also founded on the compacted fill while the condensate storage tank is supported by a very dense glacial till.~
3.5 Plant Seismic Design Basis The seismic design of the Millstone Unit 2 plant is detailed in Section 5.8 of the MNPS 2 FSAR. A brief summary description of the seismic design basis is presented in ,
subsection 3.6 below.
Construction of Unit 2 was authorized by the United States Atomic Energy Commission when it issued Provisional Construction Permit CPPR 76 on December 11, 1970.
Commercial operation commenced in December 1975.
Seismic design and analyses were performed by Bechtel Corporation in the early 1970s.
3.6 Design Basis Seismic input The operating basis earthquake (OBE) used in the design of this plant is based on a ground motion having a maximum horizontal ground acceleration of 0.09g and a vertical ground acceleration of 0.06g, acting simultaneously. For the safe shutdown earthquake (SSE), a maximum horizontal ground acceleration of 0.17g and a vertical ground acceleration of 0.11g are used. The design response spectrum curves for structures supported on rock are shown on Figures 5.8-1 and 5.8-2 of the FSAR, and the design response spectrum curves for structures supported on compacted structural backfill are shown on Figures 5.8-3 and 5.8-4 of the FSAR.
The rock spectrum has amplifications consistent with a Housner shape spectrum, but is heavily enriched for higher frequencies with peak responses over the frequency range from 2Hz to 10Hz. The soll spectrum is similar in shape to a NUREG-0098 spectrum.
SEISMIC EVALUATION REPORT FOR MILLSTONE 2 A synthetic time-history whose response spectrum curve correspoads to the design response spectrum curve is used to generate the response spectrum curves at different elevations within the structure. These are used in analyzing Class I equipment and piping at the respective locations. Comparisons of the response spectra derived from the tim-history and site seismic design response spectra for the damping values of 0.5, 1.0,2.0 and 5.0 in percent of critical damping are shown in Figures 5.8-5,5.8-6,5.8-7 and 5.8-8 of the FSAR. ,
- 3.7 Seismic System Analysis To determine the seismic response of equipment, a time-history analysis is performed on the structural model, using an earthquake as the input ground motion. This analysis l generates the floor acceleration time-histories at the various mass points at which the equipment is located. The equipment response spectrum curve is then generated for each of the floor acceleration time-histories at various damping values and is used in the design of the equipment.
The equipment response spectrum curves are broadened by a smooth curve extended 10 percent each way at the peak response associated with the natural frequencies of the structure. This measure reflects the expected variations in the natural frequencies of the structure due to variations in structural material properties.
Original analyses produced spectra at 0.5% and 1% damping. Subsequent analyses.
from other efforts, such as GL 80-11 produced 5% damping spectra, consistent with the original analyses. Amplified Response Spectra for the Northeast Utilities stations including Millstone Unit No. 2 are controlled by Specification SP-CE-368 (Reference 5.2.4). SSER-2 required detailed information on the procedures and criteria used to generate the licensing basis in-structure response spectra for MP2; the NNECO 120-day
- response letter (Reference 5.1.9) provided the MP2 required information as Enclosure 1 which is also included as Attachment B to this report. ;
3.8 Equipment Seismic Design and Analysis 1 As stated in the FSAR, for all purchased Class I equipment, the vendors were required to submit seismic calculations made in compliance with the equipment specification to demonstrate the capability of the equipment to satisfy the functional requirements under specified seismic conditions. Equipment was not released for delivery without engineering approval of the calculations.
The supports for all Class i equipment were designed for the induced seismic forces.
. There were no significant gaps between the equipment and their supports and, hence, they were not considered in the seismic analysis of the equipment.
All Class ll components and equipment were sufficiently separated from Class I components and equipment so that the Class ll components and equipment will not damage the Class I components and equipment under seismic conditions.
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For certain Class I systems and equipment, where analytical models and normal theory l do not produce results of a significant confidence level, dynamic testing of prototypes or similar equipment was substituted to ensure functional integrity. Test data conform to ,
one of the following-I A. Performance data of equipment which, under the specified conditions, have ,
been subjected to equal or greater dynamic loads than those to be experienced under the specified seismic conditions.
B. Test data from previously testing comparable equipment which, under similar conditions, have been subjected to equal or greater dynamic loads than those specified.
C. Actual testing of equipment in accordance with one of the following methods: j
'1. The equipment is subjected to an artificial time-history response at the elevation of interest. ;
- 2. The equipment is subjected to a sinusoidal excitation, sweeping through ,
the desired range of significant frequencies, using input acceleration ,
amplitudes for the forcing function which simulates the specified seismic -
conditions.
- 3. The equipment is subjected to a transient sinusoidal motion synthesized by a pulse exciting a group of octave filters such that the response of the ,
shaking table and the duration of loading simulates the artificial response spectrum curve at the elevation of interest.
The certified test data and results were required to be submitted for engineering .
approval.
3.9 A-46 Seismic input ;
i The seismic input used in the A-46 effort was the same as the input used for the original :
design as described in subsection 3.7 of this report. Existing design spectra were '
designated as conservative spectra for the USI A-46 effort.
Median-Centered in-structure response spectra were generated for the Auxiliary Building. The detailed spectra generation was submitted by NNECO to the US NRC for staff review (Reference 5.1.10). An SSER (Reference 5.1.11) was issued by the staff documenting the review of these spectra and the method used. The staff determined that the generated median spectra was acceptable for use in the A-46 project. The resulting spectra are well enveloped by the Reference Spectrum for floors below 54'-6".
At the 54'-6" elevation the in-structure demand spectra are more or less equal to the Reference Spectrum.
Effective grade for most structures, which are founded on rock, was conservatively taken at the base of these structures (Typically - 25'-5"). For the Warehouse, and the storage I
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SEISMIC EVALUATION REPORT FOR MILLSTONE 2 tanks in the yard which are founded at plant grade, the effective Grade is 14'-6". Also the Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Foundation located in the Auxiliary Bay of the Turbine Building rests on a shallow-depth of solllayer at elevation 5'-0".
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SEISMIC EVALUATION REPORT FOR MILLSTONE 2 4.0 RESULTS In general, the overall plant equipment was found to be well anchored and seismically rugged.
Raceway distributed systems are very rugged owing to conservative original designs. A number of housekeeping concems were initially identified in the control room; these and others were
? resolved during the outage. In general, there is greater awareness and improved housekeeping practices at this point in part as a result of the A-46 effort.
The seismic screening of components is documented on Screening Evaluation Work Sheets (SEWS) in accordance with the requirements of the GIP, and are provided as Attachment E.
The SEWS are sorted by equipment class. The results are further condensed and summarized en Screening Verification Data Sheets (SVDS), also sorted by class and walkdown teams, and presented as Attachment F. Three VECTRA Seismic Capability Engineers had the primary responsibility for the screening and anchorage evaluations ( Messrs. Abou-Jaoude, Antonopoulos and Chu). The anchorage evaluations are documented on continuation sheets attached to the SEWS and in calculations listed as References 5.3.1 and 5.3.2 when detailed evaluations were required. The plant Cable Tray and Conduit Raceway reviews were conducted on an area basis. Four Raceway samples were selected for limited analytical reviews; the results demonstrated the seismic adequacy of the raceway systems and are documented in Reference 5.3.6. Large flat bottom storage tanks as well as other tanks and heat exchangers were evaluated using the review method of the GIP as documented in References 5.3.1 and 5.3.2. A brief summary is provided in subsection 4.2 with the detailed screening of the Tanks and Heat Exchangers reviews documented with the class 21 SEWS.
Outliers were identified as a result of the equipment screening effort. A summary description of the outliers is provided in subsection 4.4 and Table 4.1. All outliers are documented on Outlier Seismic Verification Sheets (OSVS) and have been included as Attachment G. Each outlier was .
evaluated for compliance with the plant licensing basis. All outliers except the following two l cases were found to meet the plant design basis. Two cases were identified which represented adverse conditions and were reported in accordance with plant procedures by using the ACR process. The two items are a surge tank where the original frequency calculation was in error, ,
and the second was a low voltage switchgear with missing plug welds. Both were dispositioned !
and found not to present any risk to public health and safety. A nonconformance report was issued to document a pedestal crack for the quench tank; this was dispositioned as a Repair.
A proposed resolution has been provided for each outlier. All outliers have not yet been resolved using the outlier resolution procedures of GIP-2, Part II, Section 5. MP2 will continue to evaluate these outliers. In case any outlier remains unresolved, that outile. may also be further evaluated by the Seismic Margin Assessment (SMA) which is being performed in support of the Individual j Plant Examination for Extemal Events (IPEEE) program. It is possible that the IPEEE reviews '
would result in assigning such a low priority to an outlier, because of insignificant safety benefit, that no further actions will be warranted.
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SEISMIC EVALUATION REPORT FOR MILLSTONE 2 4.1 Equipment Screening and Walkdowns Based on the results of the walkdowns and reviews performed by the SRT's the plant equipment was found to have good original seismic design. Electrical cabinets were generally welded to embedded steel members or secured with expansion anchors for smaller wall mounted components; mechanical equipment were typically anchored with cast-in-place or J-bolts. Equipment data such as vendor drawings and original seismic analyses were generally available and retrieved using plant databases. The Seismic II/I conditions in the plant were found to be satisfactory; all identified interactions were related to proximity or housekeeping conoms which have now been resolved. All SSEL equipment with the exception of those listed in Table 4.2 were walked down by at least two seismic capability engineers. The GIPPER (Reference 5.2.9) software was used as the primary tool to record the results and generate the SEWS. Included in the SEWS are seismic capacity versus demand comparison, Bounding Spectrum, GERS, Anchorage and Interaction Caveats. In addition, anchorage evaluations, where applicable, and field notes are included as part of the SEWS.
The evaluation for seismic adequacy of equipment was performed in accordance with the GIP,Section II.4.4. Field Inspections and analyses were performed. Tightness check for concrete expansion anchors were performed by the SRT in accordance with the GlP criteria using a plant work authorization. Cast-in-place or J-bolt evaluations used drawing embedment values. For expansion anchor bolts, minimum embedment values from the GIP were used if the tightness check was acceptable. Reduction factors for " reduced inspections" were utilized in cases where the tightness checks could not be performed. The majority of the required anchorage calculations were performed using the ANCHOR program module which is part cf the GIPPER software package (Reference. 5.2.9) and are included as continuation sheets to the SEWS.
As stated earlier, the SVDS are included in Attachment F and provide P.n cverall summary of the screening results.
4.1.1 Inaccessible items Table 4.2 provides a listing ' the five individual components which were inaccessible during the walkdowns becauss they are located in contaminated areas, moderate to high radiation areas, or areas which are difficult to gain physical access.
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SEISMIC EVALUATION REPORT FOR MILLSTONE 2 4.1.2 Cases Where the Intent of the Caveats are Met Instances in which the intent of a caveat is met without meeting the specific i wording of the caveat rule are identified on the SEWS with an asterisk (*) and further discussed in the comment section of the SEWS. The SRT also conservatively identified cases where additional evaluations or supplemental analyses were performed with an asterisk. A brief description of the occurrences where the intent of the caveat is satisfied without explicit anlyses is provided in the following paragraphs:
The components located at elevation 54*-6" of the Auxiliary Building are tracked i as meeting the intent of the Capacity vs. Demand Caveat given that, as stated in .
the SSER (Reference 5.1.11), the in-structure spectra at that elevation "is more I or less equal to the Capacity Spectrum". The SRT Judged that the intent of this caveat was met. This was also discussed with the peer reviewers who concurred t with the SRT judgment.
The valves located on top of the pressurizer were also tracked as meeting the intent of the Capacity vs. Demand Caveat. The conservative in-structure spectra for that location does not envelop the Reference Spectrum and the elevation where seismic input is received is higher than 40 ft from effective grade. The SRT judged that the intent of the caveat was met since the piping support arrangement was such that the valve accelerations would clearly be less !
- than 3g's which is the implied capacity level for line mounted valves. i A small number of air operated and motor operated valves had actuators extemally braced; instances where the piping was also supported in the same direction in close proximity to the valve body were also tracked as meeting the intent of the Caveat (i.e. Actuator and Yoke not independently braced). Also a few air operated and soler,oid valves are mounted on lines which are less than 1"
in diameter; the SRT reviewd the piping configurations and judged these
- conditions to meet the intent of the caveat since the support arrangement ensured that the piping stresses were acceptable.
. Two floor mounted distribution panels were only 10" deep but had well supported top entry conduits which provided out of plane bracing. The SRT Judged them to
, meet the intent of the equipment class inclusion caveat. !
l Finally the low voltage switchgear breakers do not contain an extemal lateral i
, restraint but are well restrained against lateral movement by the racking rails, front mounted auxiliary contacts, and the support frame. The SRT concluded that this detail also met the intent of the caveat for lateral restraint for low voltage switchgear breakers.
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j 4.2 Tanks and Heat Exchangers Evaluations l
1 Tanks and Heat Exchangers were evaluated by the SRT using the general methodology -
! and acceptance criteria described in Section 7 of the GlP. The SRT reviewed any l l existing analyses and performed supplemental evaluations consistent with the GlP i
- Dethodology. The evaluations are summarized on the class 21 SEWS with the detailed
! calculations documented in References 5.3.1 and 5.3.2. 1 i, :
i There are two large flat bottom storage tanks on the SSEL: The Refueling Water i i Storage Tank (RWST) and the Condensate Storage Tank (CST). The RWST was :
evaluated in Reference 5.3.1 and found to have a significant margin (40%) using the j s GlP conservative criteria. The CST has been recently upgraded for missile protection !
i and the resulting configuration has a 20 ft high concrete ring wall connected at the base !
and the top of the tank shell with 18 chairs utilizing 1-1/4" diameter Maxi-Bolts. No
} reanalysis was necessary for this tank given the conservative redesign documented in !
. Reference 5.3.5. i f 4.3 Raceways Evaluations s
j The Raceway reviews were performed independent of the equipment effort in i e accordance with the criteria given in Section 8 of the GlP. The Cable and Conduit !
l Raceway Review consisted of: !
Plant walkdowns that focused on the inspection of all accessible portions of the i (1)
- installed raceways. The walkdowns were performed on an area basis and ;
i documented on a total of sixteen (16) area summary sheets. This enabled the l 1 -
SRT to confirm that the as-built details were consistent with the intent of the
! original design and installation specification; also, to the extent possible, the l l SRT looked for any seismic performance concems in accordance with the GlP j guidance. The MP2 designs met the inclusion rules set forth in the GIP.
(
) (2) An analytical check of four (4) selected worst-case supports using a set of l Limited Analytical Review (LAR) Guidelines. l The majority of the raceway supports used at MP2 are braced unistrut trapezes. The 1 supports were obviously designed with seismic considere'. ions and are consequently very l rugged.
l The area summary sheets which document the Raceway seismic review walkdowns by 9
the SRT are included in Attachment H. Four (4) configurations were selected for Limited 1 Analytical Review (LAR). The results of the raceway LAR evaluations have been
- and are therefore acceptable. No outliers were identified from this review, i
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SEISMIC EVALUATION REPORT FOR MILLSTONE 2 4.4 Description of Outliers - .
i The methods contained in the GIP, Section 11.5 was utilized for the identification, i documentation, resolution (or proposed resolution) of outliers. l r
An outlier is an item of equipment which does not comply with all of the screening guide'ines provided in the GIP. The GlP screening guidelines were used as a generic basis for evaluating the seismic adequacy of equipment.
The same level and requirements for qualification of personnel were used for the proposed outlier resolution as were utilized for the USI A-46 review. Personnel who ,
were formally SQUG trained as Seismic Capability Engineers, and/or Lead Relay Reviewers and/or Systems Engineers were utilized for the resolution of outliers.
A detailed description of each equipment outlier is provided in the attached OSVS and i summarized in Table 4.1 which groups the outliers by equipment class and the type of identified concem. Attachment G contains the list of outliers (OSVS), resolution and/or ;
proposed method of resolution.
L For those outliers not resolved as of the date of this submittal, the plan for addressing them and the schedule for completing the plan are addressed in the NNECO submittal ,
letter accompanying this report. l l
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SEISMIC EVALUATION REPORT FOR MILLSTONE 2
5.0 REFERENCES
5.1 Codes, Standards and Regulatory Documents 5.1.1 USNRC Generic letter 87-02, Supplement 1, issued May 22,1992.
5.1.2 Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report No. 2 (SSER-2) on Revision 2 of the Generic Implementation Procedure (GlP-2), May 22,1992. -
5.1.3 NUREG-1030," Seismic Qualification of Equipment in Operating Nuclear Power Plants, Unresolved Safety issue A-46," U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C., February,1987.
5.1.4 NUREG-1211, " Regulatory Analysis for Resolution of Unresolved Safety issue A-46, Seismic Qualification of Equipment in Operating Plants," U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C., February 1987.
5.1.5 Not Used 5.1.6 IEEE 344-1975, "lEEE Recommended Practice for Seismic Qualification of Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations," Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 1975.
5.1.7 NRC Regulatory Guide 1.100, Revision 1, Seismic Qualification of Electrical and Mechanical Equipment for Nuclear Power Plants," U.S. Nuclear Regulator Commission, August 1987.
5.1.8 Alan Waring (USNRC) letter to John F. Opeka (Northeast Utilities), dated November 25,1992.
5.1.9 J.F. Opeka (Northeast Utilities) letter to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
- Resolution of Unresolved Safety issue A-46," NU Letter B14244, dated Septer.:ber 21,1992.
5.1.10 J.F. Opeka (Northeast Utilities) letter to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 1 Commission, " Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 2 , Generic Letter 87- I 02, Supplement 1, USl A-46, dated July 7,1994.
5.1.11 Guy S. Vissing (USNRC) letter to John F. Opeka (Northeast Utilities)," Generic Letter 87-02, Supplement 1 USl A-46 Resolution Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2 - Floor Response Spectra", dated March 22,1995.
l Page 15 Report MP2-SElS.RPT
l SEISMIC EVALUATION REPORT FOR MILLSTONE 2 5.2 Technical Criteria and Design Basis Documents 5.2.1 EPRI NP-6041-SL R1, "A Metnodology for Assessment of Nuclear Power Plant Seismic Margin," August 1991.
l 5.2.2 " Generic Implementation Procedure (GlP) for Seismic Verification of Nuclear Plant Equipment," Revision 2, as corrected on February 14,1992.
5.2.3 Millstone 2 Plant Updated Final Safety Analysis Report.
5.2.4 Northeast Utilities Specification SP-CE-368, " Specification for control of l i Amplified Response Spectra (ARS) Dria", Revision O. l 5.2.5 Not Used l
} 5.2.6 VECTRA ( formerly ABB impell) Project instructions 0240-099-02,03 & 04 !atest revision. l 5.2.7 VECTRA ( formerly ABB Impell) Project Quality Plan 0240-099, latest revision. l i 5.2.8 Northeast Utilities, " Program Manual for Resolution of USl A-46 and Generic Letter No. 87-02," Rev.1, Berlin, CT, dated August 1994.
5.2.9 Stevenson & Associates, The GIPPER User's Manual, Latest Revision.
5.3 Evaluation Reports and Calculations 4
5.3.1 VECTRA Calculation MP2OR " Millstone Unit 2 Detailed Analysis of A-46 Equipment", Revision O.
5.3.2 VECTRA Calculation MP2 ORT 3 " Millstone Unit 2 Outliers with Potential Anchorage Modifications", Revision O.
5.3.3 VECTRA Report 03-0240-1367 " Preferred Safe Shutdown Paths for Millstone Unit 2", Revision 2
]
5.3.4 VECTRA Report MP2-RELAY.RPT
- Relay Evaluation Report for Millstone j Unit 2", Revision 0 '
[ 5.3.5 NNECO CST calculations 90-032-422-EC(2) and 90-032-423-EC(2). l I
5.3.6 VECTRA Calculation 0024-099-C002, " Raceway Evaluation", Revision 0.
1 Page 16 Report MP2-SElS.RPT
1 SEISMIC EVALUATION REPORT FOR MILLSTONE 2 i
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t SEISMIC EVALUATION REPORT FOR MILLSTONE 2 r
l TABLE 4.1 .
t UNRESOLVED OUTLIERS I SPECTRA EXCEEDANCE:
3 EQUIP COMPONENT ID DESCRIPTION OF OUTLIER CONDITION RECOMMENDED RESOLUTION CLASS ;
1 22E-MCC / B52 . The conservative FRS is not enveloped by 1.5 X BS for 22E- . Review spectra exceedance based on IPEEE assessment MCC and function during GERS for B52 MCC. and determine if median-centered spectra are needed to ,
- resolve the capacity vs. demand outlier condition. [
2 22E . The conservative FRS is not enveloped by 1.5 X BS. . Review spectra exceedance based on IPEEE assessment and determine if median-centered spectra are needed to .
resolve the capacity vs. demand outlier condition. .
4' UB5 . The conservative FRS is not enveloped by 1.5 X BS. . Review spectra exceedance based on IPEEE assessment gnd determine if median-centered spectra are needed to !
I rMve the capacity vs. demand outlier condition.
. Caveat 4 - Transformer coils are not top braced or have "A" . Confirm that the transformer hold-down bolt material is A-frame, extemal evaluation of coil support indicated that hold- 325 or better. If not replace existing bolts with A-325 bolts. ;
~
down bolts for the transformer should be A-325 or better. The Otherwise the transformer evaluation may be further refine SRT could not confirm bolt material during walkdown. based on less conservative spectra. !
Reference VECTRA Clac. No. MP2 ORT, section 5.4, Rev. O OTHER:
EQUIP COMPONENT ID DESCRIPTION OF OUTLIER CONDITION RECOMMENDED RESOLUTION CLASS .
7 2-CHW-11 . Valve actuator is independently braced to building steel cross . Review piping isometric and/or piping calculation to ;
bracing at coliimn line E. determine seismic stresses at valve yoke.
i s
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_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ . - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - . . _ __-_m._ _ ___ ___. .-___._ . , _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -
2 EISMIC EVALUATION REPORT FOR MILLCTONE 2 TABLE 4.1 ADJACENT CABINETS NOT BOLTED TOGETHER:
EQUtP COMPONENT ID DESCRIPTION OF OUTLIER CONDITION RECOMMENDED RESOLUTION CLASS 14 D11/ D12 / D21/ D22 / VR11 . D11 and D12 are not bolted to adjacent VR11 distribution . Bolt D11 and D12 to VR11; D21 and D22 to VR21. The
/ VR21 panel. Similarly, D21 and D22 are not bolted to VR21. The subject distribution panels should be bolted at the top.
SRT is of the opinion that adjacent cabinets should be bolted together even though no essential relays are present; the basis for this recommendation is the data represented in EPRI GERS report (NP-5223-SL) for distribution panels. The report indicated that circuit breakers were more sensitive to high frequency input. Therefore bolting the cabinets together eliminates any pounding and any potential breaker trips would be precluded.
20 C25A / C25B / C80 . Adjacent cabinet C80 is not bolted to C25B, since C25A and . Bolt cabinet C80 to adj& cent C258 and C26 cabinets.
C25B cabinets act as one unit, seismic impact is not precluded.
In addition, C80 cabinet is not bolted to adjacent C26 cabinet.
20 RCO2A1/ RCO2B / RCO2B2 / . RCO2A1 is part of the ESAS cabinets, the TSI C20 cabinet at . Bolt the ESAS cabinets to adjacent TSI C20 and RC22 RC02C / RCO2C3 / RCO2D4 / South side and the Annunciator logics RC22 cabinet at North cabinets.
RC05B / C06X side are not bolted to ESAS cabinets.
. In addition, C06X cabinet is not bolted to adjacent TSI C20 . In addition, bolt cabinet C06X to TSI C20 and C08X.
and C08X cabinets. Therefore, seismic impact is not precluded.
. Similarly, seismic impact is not precluded for the RPS panel . Similarly, bolt cabinet RCOSA to RCOSE RC058 which is one section of the single cabinet RC05 and is located next to RC05A section which is not bolted to adjacent cabinet RCOSE.
Page 19 Report MP2-SEIS.RPT
CEISMIC EVALUATION REPORT FOR MILLSTONE 2 l
TABLE 4.1 UNACCEPTABLE INSTALLATION (FIELD CONDITION):
EQUIP COMPONENT ID DESCRIPTION OF OUTLIER CONDITION RECOMMENDED RESOLUTION CLASS 15 DB1/ DB2 . The battery racks bolts do not meet the GlP screening criteria . A number of different options are available in order to due to the gaps under the base being as large as 2.75". resolve the outlier-Therefore, the anchorage capacity does not exceed the - Grout all gaps under base that are larger than 1/4".
l demand due to high shear and tension forces on the bolts as a - Install additional cross-bracing in the front of the racks to result of the large gaps under the base. Also, the longitudinal distribute longitudinal forces to more bolts.
I bracing on the front of the rack is intermittent, therefore given - Provide botting of the top back members of the rack to the the gaps under the anchorage load redistribution to locations wall behind.
with no gap may cause load path concem with the rack - Perform necessary structural evaluation of the battery members. racks to determine if recommended changes will meet the GIP criteria. i 21 X-82 . Quench tank Hx X-82 does not meet the GIP screening . Structurally repair the cracked pedestal. When the criteria since the tank anchorage capacity does not exceed the concrete pedestal is repaired the X-82 anchorage will be demand and the concrete pedestal on the fixed end connection seismically acceptable per VECTRA anchorage evaluation is cracked. Refer to VECTRA calc. No MP2 ORT 3, section 5.3, that is attached to the SEWS.
Rev. O for tank evaluation.
MAINTENANCEITEMS:
EQUIP COMPONENT ID DESCRIPTION OF OUTLIER CONDITION RECOMMENDED RESOLUTION CLASS 20 C01X . Some intemal relay panels are loose and/or missing bolts for . Loose bolts on intemal panels may be due to i C01X cabinet. maintenance activities during the outage. Verify that I missing bolts are installed to relay panels inside C01X ,
cabinet. i 20 C05 / C05R / C06 / C06R . Top bolt between adjacent cabinets C05 and C06 is loose. . Tighten top bolt between C05 and C06 cabinets.
{'
. For C05 cabinet bottom wireway cover not secured, no . Secure wireway cover at bottom of C05 cabinet.
screws ,
. C05R and C06R are bolted together with three bolts. There is . Shim and tighten top and bottom bolts between C05R and a 1/8" gap at top and 1/4" gap on bottom bolt on the C06R side. C06R cabinets. ;
i Page 20 Report MP2-SEIS.RPT i
CEISMIC EVALUATION REPORT FOR MILLSTONE 2 TABLE 4.1 RESOLVED OUTLIERS EQUIP COMPONENT ID DESCRIPTION OF OUTLIER CONDITION RESOLUTION CLASS 2 22F . The front of 22F SWGR sections were not anchored to the . Outlier has been resolved, see OSVS.
embedded plate.
9 F38A / F388 . The conservative FRS is not enveloped by 1.5 X BS. . Outlier has been resolved, see OSVS.
9 F52 . The realistic FRS is not enveloped by 1.5 X BS. . Outlier has been resolved, see OSVS.
10 F14C / F14D / X-34A . The conservative FRS is not enveloped by 1.5 X BS. . Outlier has been resolved, see OSVS.
11 F1 A / F1B . Block walls surrounding compressor do not have safety . Outlier has been resolved, see OSVS.
related marking. The SRT conservatively assumed that seismic interaction with Waste Gas Compressor can not be precluded.
, 20 C08 / C08R . There is a line of lockers 43" away south of C08 and C08R . Outlier has been resolved, see OSVS.
cabinets which may cause seismic interaction. Although there
! are no essential relays within these cabinets, the SRT recommends that the lockers be secured or removed as part of '
Good housekeepino practices.
21 T3 . Tank T3 does not meet the GIP screening criteria since it is a . Outlier has been resolved, see OSVS.
large vertical tank supported by legs. A detailed tank When the A-46 outlier condition was discovered a -
evaluation was performed to qualify the tank anchorage and temporary design was installed to resolve the outlier prior
. connections between anchor bolts and the tank shell. See to start-up. PDCR 2-95-040 has been prepared and VECTRA Calc No. MP2 ORT 3, section 5.1, Rev. O for the tank approved to replace the temporary design with a evaluation. Based on the evaluation, the tank anchor bolts fail permanent design modification. [ Reference NNECO calc.
due to insufficient tension capacity; the tank legs fail in No. 95-ENG-1198 M2, Rev.1 dated 11/6/95].
bending; and the concrete floor punching shear capacity is in addition, an Operability Evaluation of the RBCCW Surge exceeded Tank T3 was performed (VECTRA Calc No. MP2T3OPER Rav. 0). The evaluation concluded that tank T3 was operable under normal operatin0 conditions.
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Page 21 Report MP2-SEIS.RPT t
SEISMIC EVALUATION REPORT FOR MILLSTONE 2 TABLE 4.2 INACCESSISLE ITEMS ,
EQUIP COMPONENT ID DESCRIPTION OF INACCESSIBILITY RESOLUTION CLASS 8 2-CS-13.1 A . This valve is located in a pit in the vicinity of the Refueling . Given the lack of any overall interaction concems Water Storage Tank and requires special confined space identified in the plant and the well supported piping permits systems, the SRT judged that a drawing review was sufficient to establish the seismic adequacy of the salve.
9 F142 . The fan F142 support structure and its anchorage is . Based on the review of the documents, the SRT has inaccessible (located at roof of 480V SWGR room). Visual determined that the anchorage for fan F142 is adequate.
inspection was performed by the SRT at floor El. 36'-6* and reviewed the fan support details by drawings. The fan is supported by 4 - L4" X 4" X 1/2" angles contained inside the roof opening with a total of 12 - 1/2" diameter Hitti bolts ( 5 1/2" minimum embeddment), and one C7 X 14.75 channel welded to existing W10 beam.
10 X36A . The coil / plenum structure is located in the NE comer of "A" . Tightness check was not performed due to high Safeguards room. Clearance with East and West walls is contamination and accessibility of the anchors. Based on approximate 18". This small clearance precluded SRT to the results of tightness checks that were performed by the closely examine or perform tightness check on the anchor SRT on other MP2 components, a reasonable assurance is bolts. Thus, the SRT can only provide a visual inspection of provided that anchorage at MP2 have been property the West baseplates and anchors. installed.
20 C25A / C258 . C25A and C25B cabinet anchorage is inaccessible due to a . Perform additional documentation search to see if the metal cover (used to preclude personnel tripping hazard and is C25A and C258 anchorage details can be found to not shown on civil drawings or vendor prints. Therefore, the determine the seismic adequacy of the anchorage. Based SRT could not evaluate the seismic adequacy of the on the result of anchorage reviews at MP2 the SRT has anchorage. good confidence that the anchorage details are adequate.
21 X22 . The Letdown Heat Exchanger is located in highly . The SRT believes that the design drawings accurately contaminated area and locked high radiation areas reflect the as-built condition based on the good agreement between design dwgs and as-built configuration of other SSEL components.
Page 22 Report MP2-SEIS.RPT
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} SEISMIC EVALUATION REPORT FOR MILLSTONE 2 i
I i
l i ATTACHMENT A i
I Excerpts from the MP2 UFSAR i
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SEISMIC EVALUATION REPORT FOR MILLSTONE 2 ATTACHMENT B Technical Considerations for the Development of in-Structure Response Spectra on Major Structures.
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l SEISMIC EVALUATION REPORT FOR MILLSTONE 2 i
ATTACHMENT C RESUMES AND TrU NING RECORDS OF l KEY VECTRA Technologies PERSONNEL (53 Paces)
Charbel Abou-Jaoude (6 Pages)
Dimitrios Antonopoulos (8 Pages)
Charlie Beck (6 Pages)
James Buckley (5 Pages )
Sing Chu (6 Pages)
Bob Courcy ( 7 Pages)
Steve Reichle (7 Pages)
John Reilly (3 Pages)
Aziz Saber (5 Pages)
CHARBEL M. ABOU-JAOUDE, P.E.
EXPERTISE Mr. Abou-Jaoude is a Project /Sewice Area Manager in VECTRA's Boston Office, with a broad technical and managerial experience in the power industry. His areas of '
technical expertise are Structural Mechanics and Seismic Design; he has an in-depth knowledge of various industry codes / standards such as Sections lll & XI of the ASME Code, ANSI B31.1, IEEE-344 and 382, various USNRC Reg. Guides and NUREG Reports, WRC Bulletins, AISC, and ACl-349. He is well versed. in the Generic implementation Procedure developed by the Seismic Qualification Utility Group for the resolution of USI-A-46, and the methodologies developed by the industry for the response to Generic Letter 88-20 as outlined in NUREG-1407; he has completed the SQUG/EPRI sponsored A-46 and Seismic IPEEE training courses and has participated in several A-46/IPEEE walkdowns as an SRT member. Mr. Abou-Jaoude has also participated in Post-Earthquake Investigations at industrial facilities in Califomia. While at VECTRA, he has lead the engineering efforts of various work scopes; his responsibilities have included: Criteria development, training and personnel development, project execution, interface with regulators and outside organizations, and overall project management.
Currently, Mr. Abou-Jaoude is the Project Manager for the Northeast Utilities A-46 projects (Connecticut Yankee, Millstone Units 1&2). He is also the Project Manager for the IPEEE peer review of the Perry Plant. He is the Project Engineer for the PECo (Peach Bottom 2&3) IPEEE/A-46 and PSE&G (Salem 1&2) A-46 projects and an SRT member of the Wolf Creek and Limerick 1&2 IPEEE efforts. At Connecticut Yankee, Mr. Abou-Jaoude has been instrumental in the successful completion of the project; he has provided cost effective resolutions to a number of outliers, and lead the development of implementation procedures for the procurement of new and replacement equipment. Mr. Abou-Jaoude is also serving as peer reviewer for A-46/IPEEE efforts at the CP&L plants (4 sites) and the Perry Plant.
Mr. Abou-Jaoude was the Assistant Project Manager for the Civil / Structural effort at TU Electric CPSES Unit 2 Project. He had primary management responsibility for the work of 80 engineers in the Electrical Raceways, Seismic Equipment Qualification, and Seismic II/I disciplines. This effort involved the design validation of existing Raceway-designs, issuance of new designs, establishing the qualification basis of all BOP Seismic Cat 1 and NSSS C1E equipment, procurement of new and replacement equipment, structural evaluation of non seismic commodities using an A-46 walkdown
- based approach, and field engineering to support the completion and start-up of Unit 2.
l
\
CHARBEL M. ABOU-JAOUDE Page Two l
. 1 EXPERTISE (Cont'd)
Prior to his Unit 2 assignment at CPSES Mr. Abou-Jaoude was the Assistant Project Manager for the Secondary Water Chemistry improvement Project at Consumers Power (Palisades). This project involved modifications to the existing blowdown l system, the addition of various equipment items, and the installation of 2000 ft. of l piping. The design effort was completed in a period of six months with a peak staff of 40 engineers; the design has been successfully implemented and its operation has ;
provided improvements beyond the plant's initial expectations. In addition to this l project he was involved in a number of projects for Consumers Power: He was the Project Engineer for consulting work related to the resolution of 79-14 piping and pipe support issues; he also was the Project Engineer for a modification to install a reactor head' shielding which involved generating the amplified response spectra and i performing the seismic analysis and qualification of the lifting ring / shielding structure. j Mr. Abou-Jaoude has also worked on a number of piping and equipment qualificaticn i
projects for Commonwealth Edison and Northern States Power. He was the Project >
Engineer for the development of criteria to evaluate integral welded attachments for Prairie Island; the completion of this effort provided successful closure of an NRC 79-14 1 I
issue.
Previously Mr. Abou-Jaoude lead a group of 18 engineers, working on the seismic qualification of SOP components, in support of a successful SQRT audit for TU Electric's Comanche Peak Station Unit 1. He was responsible for the technical adequacy, budget and schedule of the following scope:
Preparation of summary packages and supporting calculations to demonstrate the seismic qualification of storage tanks, heat exchangers, pumps, valves, the diesel generator set, piping, and other electrical components (motors, battery racks, control panels, and instrumeritation devices).
- Evaluation of mechanical equipment rerating, under Section XI of the ASME Code, for revised design conditions such as pressures, temperatures, nozzle loads, and or acceleration values (approx. 200 stress reports).
Mr. Abou-Jaoude was also involved in the Comanche Peak cable tray hanger design validation effort. He was a group lead responsible for qualifying cable tray systems.
i This required detailed dynamic analysis and evaluation of structural members and anchorages. He was involved in the development of criteria for modification reduction I
l CHARBEL M. ABOU-JAOUDE Page Three EXPERTISE (Cont'd) techniques. He also worked on the dynamic testing of full scale cable tray systems and provided analytical results for correlation with measured test data.
Prior to joining ABB Impell, Mr. Abou-Jaoude has worked in the Middle-East on the construction of several commercial and industrial reinforced concrete buildings. He has also worked as a field engineer responsible for the installation and maintenance of equipment at an automotive refurbishing plant in the United Arab Emirates.
EDUCATION M.S., Civil Engineering, December 1985 University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan B.E., Mechanical Engineering, July 1984 American University of Beirut. Box 110236, Beirut, Lebanon PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS Professional Engineer - State of Connecticut, License No.18527 4 American Society of Civil Engineers American Society of Mechanical Engineers Tau Beta Pi Honor Society Chi Epsilon Honor Society PUBLICATIONS Lee, B. J., Abou-Jaoude, C. M., and De Estrada, M., " Issues of Control Panel Rigidity in Seismic Qualification," Proc. of 1991 Pressure Vessels and Piping (PVP) Conference, Vol. 220.
Lee, B. J., and Abou-Jaoude, C. M., "Effect of Base Uplift on Dynamic Response of Electrical and Mechanical Equipment," Proc. of 1992 Pressure Vessels and Piping (PVP) Conference, Vol. 237-2.
Roche, T.R., Abou-Jaoude, C.M., et al, " Comparison Between Analytical and Test Results for Transformer Base Details," Proc. of 1993 Pressure Vessels and Piping ,
(PVP) Conference, Vol. 256-2. !
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DIMITRIOS ANTONOPOULOS Technical Lead Engineer Civil / Structural PROFFAR!ONAL EXPERipMCE Mr. Antonopoulos is a Technical Lead Engineer with VECTRA Technologies and has over twenty (20) years experience in structural engineering analysis and design of nuclear power, industrial and commercial facilities. He is responsible for supervising a staff of twelve engineers for structural and mechanical consulting services. He has particular expertise in the analysis and design of plant concrete and steel structures, including vessels, foundations for various equipment, seismic equipment qualification and support of piping systems in accordance with applicable industry codes. Mr.
Antonopoulos is also assigned as a member of the Seismic Review Team on the USI A-46 SQUG and IPEEE projects for Northeast Utilities and PECO Energy Company. He .
has been trained by EPRl/SQUG/IPEEE and is certified as a Seismic Capability Eng neer.
l Ar. Antonopoulos is currently the Project Engineer for the PORV/SV piping system ,
Design Change Package project for Public Service Electric and Gas Salem Units 1 and !
- 2. This project addresses issues associated with PORV and SV actuation in response to NRC concerns identified in NUREG-0737 (ll.D.1). In addition, he is involved as the Lead Structural Engineer with the Digital Feedwater and Annunciator projects for Salem Units 1 and 2. He is responsible for the overall structural support, including equipment qualification for the various plant design change packages. On previous assignments :
he was involved as the Lead Structural Engineer with the Control Room lighting modification projects for Salem Units 1 and 2. The projects included an analysis and design of a temporary work platform for replacing existing light fixtures in accordance with NUREG-0700 requirements, and support of the new light fixtures. The design was performed for deadweight, live and seismic inertia effects, in accordance with PSE&G Seismic II/l Program. The ANSYS computer code was utilized to develop and analyzo static and dynamic finite element models for the platform.
Mr. Antonopoulos was assigned to Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation Nine Mile Point Unit 1 Design Basis Reconstitution Program project where he prepared the Design Criteria Document (DCD) for plant reinforced concrete structures.
Mr. Antonopoulos was assigned to Ohio Edison's Nilas Generating Station DOE WSA-SNOX Demo Plant Project as a Lead Senior Structural Engineer. In this capacity, he was responsible for the design of foundations which supported duct towers, high RPM fans, tanks, and various equipment / buildings. The STAAD-Ill structural program
was utilized in the analysis and design of spread footings, mats and pile cap foundations.
DIMITRIOS ANTONOPOULOS Page 2 PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE (Cont'd)
Mr. Antonopoulos was assigned to BECo's Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Salt Service Water Pump Evaluation Project. The evaluation was performed for deadweight, intemal pressure and seismic inertia effects in accordance with the requirements of ASME BPVC Section Ill. The AL 3YS computer code was utilized to develop and analyze finite element models for the vertical pump columns and the flanged column section region. .-
Mr. Antonopoulos was assigned to GPUN Three Mile Island Unit 1 skew loaded clam evaluation project as a Lead Support Engineer. Employing the finite element method and utilizing ANSYS the skewed pipe clamps were evaluated for non-standard load application and checked against sliding. Similarly, the stresses in the pipe wall induced by a lug wem evaluated. This project successfully demonstrated that 58 skewed pipe clamps were acceptable and field modifications were avoided.
Mr. Antonopoulos was assigned to Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation Nine Mile Point Unit 1 Project where he was involved in numerous pipe support evaluations to support plant restart.
Prior to joining VECTRA, Mr. Antonopoulos was employed by Cygna Energy Services where his experience included an assignment as Group Leader for the pipe support and baseplate analysis and design effort for the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant.
In this capacity he was responsible for the supervision of a staff of 20 engineers involved in the analysis and design effort. He was also responsible for the development of work instructions and design criteria, and for setting specifications for the design of special purpose software for pipe support analysis.
Mr. Antonopoulos was assigned to Boston Edison Civil / Structural Group for over a year as a resident engineer providing engineering support on various PDC packages. In addition, he was responsible for writing and/or revising engineering specifications dealing with painting, grouting and miscellaneous fasteners.
Mr. Antonopoulos was responsible for performing analysis and design of upper internals storage cask for Northem States Power Prairie Island Units 1 & 2. The cask was designed to meet radiation shielding and NUREG-0612 requirements. The cask was of cylindrical shape and was used for transporting the upper internals of the reactor vessel
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from the reactor building to its permanent location at the plant site for long term storage.
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DIMITRIOS ANTONOPOULOS Page 3 PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE (Cont'dn Mr. Antonopoulos was also responsible for performing analysis and design of IDNS RAGEMS facilities for CECO's Dresden, Quad Cities and Zion Plants. The steel facilities were designed for wind and/or seismic loads in accordance with the requirements of the UBC code and were supported by the roofs of existing structures or the ground which involved design of footings and slabs on ground. Mr. Antonopoulos was responsible for interfacing with the architect to produce all necessary specifications and architectural details as well as interfacing with HVAC and electrical groups to bring the project to its successful completion. ..
Mr. Antonopoulos was also responsible for performing analysis of postulated reactor vessel and upper intemals lead drops for NUREG-0612. This work was performed for RG&E's Ginna Plant and .t involve'd finite element models using ANSYS, and both elastic and plastic analyses. This project successfully demonstrated that these drops were acceptable and expensive crane modifications were avoided, in an earlier assignment, l Ar. Antonopoulos served as Assistant Project Engineer for the reanalysis of masonry walls for 1.E. Bulletins No. 80-11 for Millstone Unit 1. On this project he was responsible for various phases of the analysis and modification design effort. In addition, Mr. Antonopoulos supervised the field effort for installing the blockwall modifications.
Mr. Antonopoulos on three occasions was loaned to area engineering firms were he i performed structural engineering analysis and design of industrial facilities (General Motors, Paint Shop in Framingham, MA) and various high rise commercial buildings. i 1
Mr. Antonopoulos has been involved in structural analysis and design at Stone and i Webster Engineering Corporation. Responsibilities on various projects included analysis and design of reinforced concrete structures, pipe rupture restraints, l
equipment supports, embedded plates for pipe rupture restraints, pipe supports, cable tray and conduit supports. His project assignments included Beaver Valley Unit 2, North Anna Unit 1, Shoreham, Montague, and Nine Mile Point Unit 2. As a Senior Engineer in the Structural Division, Mr. Antonopoulos was relied upon to prepare
DIMITRIOS ANTONOPOULOS Page 4 4 PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE (Cont'd) structural designs for some of the more complex plant buildings. !n particular, he was responsible for the analysis and design of the fuel handling structure which contained
- the spent fuel pool for the Beaver Valley Unit 2 Nuclear Station. This project involved I 3-D finite element modeling for dead, live, wind, tomado, seismic and thermal loadings.
He was responsible for all phases of the production effort including analysis, design and :
drafting.
1 EDUCATION i i
M.S., Structural Engineering Northeastern University, Boston, MA :
l B.S., Civil Engineering University of Massachusetts Dartmouih, North Dartmouth, MA REGISTRATION Professional Engineer in the States of Massachusetts and Rhode Island PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATION i Member - American Institute of Steel Construction I Member - American Concrete Institute I
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1 DIMITRIOS ANTONOPOULOS, P.E.
CIVIL / STRUCTURAL TECHNICAL LEAD ENG.INEER i
l EXPERIENCE HIGHLIGHTS Over eighteen (18) years experience in structural engineering analysis and design of nuclear power, industrial ans commercial facilities.
Ten (10) years experience as Project Engineer ar.d Supervisor on various nuclear power projects.
EXPERIENCE
SUMMARY
^
. Project Engineer for PSE&G's Salem Units 1 and 2 PORV/SV piping system !
modification projects (92-94).
.- Seismic Review Team member on USi A-46 (SC UG) and IPEEE projects for Northeast Utilities and PECO Energy Company (93-94).
. Lead Structural Engineer for PSE&G's Salem Units 1 and 2 Digital Feedwater (ADFCS),
Control Room lighting modifications and Annunciator projects (90-94).
. Developed Design Criteria Document (DCD) for plant reinforced concrete structures for NMPC's Nine Mile Point Unit i Design Basis Reconstitution Program (92).
Group Leader for Vermont Yankee's pipe support and baseplate evaluation project in support of NRC Bulletins 79-02 and 79-14 (81-83).
Assistant Project Enginee Dr Northeast Utilities Millstone Unit 1 Block Wall Reanlaysis Project in support of NRC Lulletin 80-11 (80-81).
. Analysis and design of reinforced concrete and steel structures, foundation design of steel towers, high RPM fans and various equipment / facility buildings (73-80, 83-86, 91-92).
. Other experience includes: Seismic Qualification of equipment, design of pipe rupture restraints, eva! cation of structural elements due to load drops for NUREG-0612, specification and design criteria development and review of shop drawings for concrete I and steel structures (75-94). l I
PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS )
Member - American Institute of Steel Construction '
Member - American Concrete Institute
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CHARLES E. BECK, P.E. j EDUCATION 1
Ph.D. Candidate, Electrical and Computer Engineering, Illinois institute of Technology (llT) ,
MS, Electrical and Computer Engineering, llT l BS, Electrical Engineering, University of Notre Dame i l
FORMAL TRAINING I e US Navy Nuclear Power School l
. SOUG " Equipment Selection" and " Relay Evaluation" training courses (by MPR I Associates)
. BWR " Introduction to Power Plant Operation"(by Commonwealth Edison Company) .
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. " Electrical Power System Survey" course (by Commonwealth Edison Company) l
. " Nuclear Codes, Standards, and Regulatory Requirements" (by General Physics Corporation) e " Fire Protection for Power Plants"(by Professional Loss Control) e " Project Engineer" and " Project Management" training courses (by ABB 1mpell Corporation)
PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS Licensed Professional Engineer in IL, MA, MI, MN, and WI Senior Member - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
Member - American Nuclear Society
- National Society of Professional Engineers
- National Fire Protection Association
- Program Committee for the American Power Conference PROFICIENCIES 1
. Analysis, Design, and Modifications for Electrical Systems. )
e Nuclear Station Systems Engineering. l
. IEEE Standards, NEMA Standards, NUREGs, NRC Generic Letters & Information I Notices.
. 10CFR21,10CFR50 (Appendix B) and 10CFR50.59. ,
e Developing Test Plans and Performing Electrical Tests. Technical Writing. l
. Computer-aided Power System Analysis. l
. Large-scale Project Management.
i CHARLES E. BECK, P.E. Page Two EXPERIENCE
SUMMARY
Mr. Beck is the Engineering Manager for Kiran Consultants, Incorporated. His project !
management responsibilities include assuring compliance with client requirements, !
scheduling and monitoring major tasks, optimizing the use of personnel and other '
resources, and controlling project budgets. He has performed detailed system reviews for Licensee Event Reports, operability issues, NRC Information Notices, and Root Cause !
investigations. He wrote test plans, conducted laboratory tests, and wrote test reports on safety-related relays and motors. He wrote a training program for motor refurbishment, !
including the Student Handout, the Instructor's Guide, and visual sids. l l
Previous experience includes a multi-million dollar, four year, multi-disciplinary, Human )
Factors project to upgrade Annunciator Systems. Other DCRDR projects incilu'de modifications to Control Room Lighting and HVAC, Control Panel layout, and DG Control i Systems.
I l
Mr. Beck was the " Lead Relay Reviewer" for a SQUG Relay Evaluation. He has j performed and reviewed calculations and design changes for Motor-Operated Valves, in response to Generic Letter 89-10 requirements. He has provided audit support and other consulting services, including EDSFl preparations, DET support, and ECCS System logic
. reviews. He has extensive design experience in minor plant changes, ranging from simple i relay substitutions, to reactor mode switch rewiring, to replacements of Station Batteries, i He has performed operability assessments for potentially degraded systems, reviewed mechanical and structural modifications for electrical interactions, and performed Safety Evaluations and Technical Quality Reviews to assure acceptability of designs.
Mr. Beck directs a section of seven engineers. He is responsible for ensuring technical quality and client satisfaction, for productivity, and for training. His section performs specialty consulting tasks related to power system analysis, topical issues (such as motor operated valves), component testing, and environmental qualification of electrical equipment. Included with these tasks are verification of compliance with applicable codes, standards, regulations, and client-specific procedures. '
Mr. Beck has twenty yeam of experience in the operation, maintenance, and design of nuclear power plants. This includes four years with Comed's BWR Engineering Department, where he performed all phases of modification design. He held a two-year assignment at Qued Cities Nuclear Station, in the role of onsite representative of the corporate engineering office. He was involved in over fifty significant projects as a BWR l design engineer, including modifications, conceptual studies, operability assessments, and i responses to Nuclear Licensing issues. I
1 l
l CHARLES E. BECK, P.E. Page Three EXPERIENCE
SUMMARY
(Cont'd)
Mr. Beck served in the US Navy Nuclear Program for nine years, supervising up to 130 operators and technicians. He was responsible for Electrical Distribution and Reactor Control on three nuclear powered ships. With his background as a navy nuclear operator and as a BWR design engineer, he has performed project work from both the Electrical and the Systems Engineering perspectives.
TECHNICAL PUBLICATIONS
" Expert System Applications in Nuclear Plants: Discussion of the Key Issues, "lEEE '
Transactions on Nuclear Science v39 n5: 1992.
" Concepts of Reactor Physics, Without the Mathematics, "lEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science v39 n3, Part II: 1992.
" Video / CAD Animation: A Technical Tool to Simplify the Human Task In Nuclear Plant Maintenance," Conference Record, IEEE SMC Intemational Conference: 1992.
" Addressing External Constraints for Al in Nuclear Power Applications," Conference Record, IEEE Nuclear Science Symposium: 1992.
" Minimizing Installation impact of Human Factors Projects," Conference Record, IEEE Nuclear Science Symposium: 1992.
"A Bibliography of Expert Systems as Applied to Nuclear Power Plants," IEEE Transactions on Energy Conversion v8 ni: 1993. ]
"Modelling Extemal Constraints: Applying Expert Systems to Nuclear Plants," Proceedings of the American Power Conference: 1993.
l
" Impact of Transient inrush on MOV Starting" Conference Record of the 1993 IEEE:
Nuclear Science Symposium, San Francisco, CA: 1993.
"Modelling of Nuclear Plant System Interactions Using a ' Layered-Data' Concept." IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science v41 n4, Part I: 1994.
"On-Site Motor Refurbishment Shop." Conference Record of the 1994 IEEE Nuclear Science Symposium, Norfolk, VA: 1994.
CHARLES E. BECK, P.E. Page Four TECHNICAL PUBLICATIONS (Cont'd)
" Analysis of Simultaneous Unbalanced Faults Using Three-Port Network Theory,"
Proceedings of the American Power Conference: 1995.
"A Qualification Test for Relay Contacts as isolation Devices in Nuclear Power Plants,"
accepted for IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science: 1995.
Organizer, Chairman, and Moderator for the " Nuclear DC Systems Roundtable," a technical presentation and panel discuss;on in the American Power Conference:
1993 -1995.
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l SPECIALTIES '
ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING AND DESIGN APPLICABLE TRAINING Mr. Buckley has attended the training course sponsored by the SQUG Committee for Safe Shutdown Equipment Selection and Relay Screening and Evaluation which qualifies him as a Lead Relay Reviewer. He has served as lead Relay Reviewer,for the. ,
following A-46 / IPEEE plants:
. Public Service Electric and Gas Company (PSE&G)- Salem Generating Station Unit 1
. Public Service Electric and Gas Company (PSE&G)- Salem Generating Station Unit 2
. Northeast Utilities Service Company (NUSCO) - Connecticut Yankee
. Northeast Utilities Service Company (NUSCO)- Millstone Unit 1
. Northeast Utilities Service Ccmpany (NUSCO)- Millstone Unit 2
. Boston Edison Company Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station P_ROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE Mr. Buckley is the Supervisor of Design and Drafting for VECTRA's Boston office Design / Engineering Section of the Electrical Systems Division. He has over 24 years of experience in the engineering, design and installation of electrical systems for power generation and various industrial facilities including pulp and paper projects and water /
sewerage treatment plants.
Prior to this assignment, he was the Project Engineer for the Boston Edison Pilgrim l Station Annunciator Project, which performed a complete redesign of the existing '
system including the preparation of three Plant Design Change (PDC) packages. The project scope was to rearrange the Control Room annunciator windows and revise the associated electrical schematics, wiring diagrams, cable block diagram, cable and raceway schedules, process and instrumentation diagrams and functional control diagrams.
1 1
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JAMES J. BUCKLEY Page Two f 1 i EXPERIENCE (Cont.)
l Previously, Mr. Buckley served as Lead Engineer for the Electric Load Management ;
! System project, a data collection effort for NUSCO's Millstone Unit 1 Station. He also !
- held the same position for an identical project at NUSCO's Connecticut Yankee Station.
l Prior to this assignment, Mr. Buckley was assigned to the Carolina Power and Light, Brunswick Plant, Appendix R separation analysis documentation review. He also supported the Niagara Mohawk, Nine Mile Unit 1, project which consisted of 125VDC
- system modifications, fuse and molded-case switch additions to the 425VD,C.
l distribution boards and addition of battery monitoring systems for 125VDC batteri'e s. '
- In a previous assignment, he was a Project Engineer on the Commonwealth Edison, i Dresden Unit 2 Annunciator Modifications Project. This modification addressed the i
{ human engineering deficiencies associated with the plant annunciator system.
- j. Changes to the system included auditor / :xx!ing, ringback and flashrate adjustment and reflash. These changes resulted in extensive revisions to the plant's wiring and schematic drawings. '
- Previously, he was the Lead Electrica! Design / Engineer for the No. 4 Chemical
. Recovery Boiler Project for Miramichi Pulp and Paper. His responsibilities included checking electrical specifications and calculations, development of the wiring design for
- connection of field cables as well as the design of raceways, grounding, lighting, etc.
His earlier assignments at VECTRA included experience in an as-built verification of j wiring diagrams for control panels and the development of design change packages required to resolve any deficiencies and updating all affected drawings for Boston i Edison's Pilgrim Station. Other activities at Pilgrim Station included lighting design of the Computer Room, answering Engineering Service Requests (ESR), issuing and resolving Potential Conditions Adverse to Quality (PCAQ), writing and implementing Maintenance Work Request (MWR), evaluating plant conditions for circuit isolations and
- the preparing Appendix R Plant Design Change Packages. These packages included
- cable rerouting, and the installation of fire detection and suppression systems.
[' His previous assignments include a staff position on the Equipment Qualification Program team for Northeast Utilities and at the Seabrook Station which also included walkdown assignments. Earlier assignments with VECTRA include the electrical design of the Appendix R Emergency Lighting System for Connecticut Yankee.
1 A
JAMES J. BUCKLEY Page Three l EXPERIENCE (Cont) _
in an assignment at the NYPA Fitzpatrick plant, Mr. Buckley was responsible for :
coordinating the installation of electrical modifications in accordance with 10 CFR 50, 1 Appendix R. His responsibilities included the layout of equipment, conduit routir,g and J design of conduit supports.
l Mr. Buckley previously worked with the C.T. Main Corporation Pulp and Paper Division l where he was responsible for the electrical design of recovery boiler systems in,cluding. l precipitators, evaporators, and air compressors for the Ngodwana Mill Expansion Program in South Africa, in connection with this work, he was also responsible for raceway layout and design, and field engineering support. He prepared the secondary electrical power drawings, motor control conter arrangements, computerized cable schedules, and related PLC drawings. He was assigned to the site for four months for I the checkout.and start-up of the recovery boiler, anc the review of the electrical i subcontractor's work. Other projects included the design of paper machines, power !
boilers, coal and wood yards and turbine generators.
With Metcalf & Eddy, Mr. Buckley was involved in the electrical design of various water and sewerage treatment plants. His work included a three month field assignment to determine the sources of computer analog and digital inputs associated with the computerization of an existing sewage treatment plant in St. Paul, Minnesota.
4 In an earlier assignment, he spent three months overseas providing engineering support for the construction of military air base facilities in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
KnUCATION Attended Northeastem University's Lincoln College
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PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE J
Mr. Chu is a Senior Engineer in the Engineering Mechanics Services Area of VECTRA's !
Boston Office. He has nine years of experience in areas of seismic engineering, I systems engineering, design baseline documentation, cost and scheduling, computers, and emergency preparedness.
Systems Engineering NUSCO - Presently Mr. Chu is involve in the NRC's Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) A-46
" Seismic Qualification of Equipment in Operating Plants" for Millstone Units 1 & 2. His responsibilities include equipment and relay screening verification and walkdown, and outlier identification and resolution. Mr. Chu is also responsible for all GIP databases' control and maintenance. All tasks are perform in accordance with the SQUG, " Generic implementation Procedure for Seismic Verification of Nuclear Plant Equipment" with Stevenson & Associates GIPPER software v2.03. ,
Mr. Chu is also assigned as a member of the Seismic Review Team on the USI A46 SQUG and IPEEE projects for NUSCO and PECO Energy Company. He has completed training by EPRl/SQUGliPEEE and is certified as a Seismic Capability Engineer.
PECo / PSE&G - Mr. Chu is also involved in USI A46 and IPEEE projects at Peach Bottom Atomic Power Stations and Salem Stations.
NUSCO - Staff augmentation for Seismic Equipment Qualification at Connecticut Yankee and Millstone Unit 1. Responsible for seismic qualification activities associated with new replacement equipment such as electrical instrument and cabinets, mechanical components, and valves, etc..
Staff augmentation for High Energy Line Break HELB at Millstone Unit 2. l Responsibilities included identifying all high energy lines within the plant, documentetion and drawing search, plant wide walkdown, developed I maintain HELB databases, and generated final calculations.
Project team member for Connecticut Yankee A-46 project, final NRC report ,
submitted 12/93. Responsibilities included equipment / relays walkdown, evaluations, !
and final report generation.
l SING CHU Page Two PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE (Cont'd)
FPL - Mr. Chu functioned as an engineer in support of the As-Built in-Service Inspection Project. In this capacity, Mr. Chu performed field walkdowns and generated ,
engineering calculations to qualify noncompliance to the existing field conditions. I Structural and stress analyses were performed by using STAAD lli and MATHCAD.
Design Baseline Documentation PECo - Mr. Chu developed the 480 Volt Load center and the 480 Volt Motor-Control Center Design Baseline Documents (DBDs) for both PBAPS and LGS. His duties included researching the system design, modifications, plant specifications, and licensing documents. Mr. Chu was also responsible for writing draft and final sections of the DBDs ensuring technical accuracy and completeness in accordance with PECo
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Cost and Scheduling NMPC - Mr. Chu served as the Financial Administrator to the Nine Mile Point Units 1 &
2 engineering mechanics project. In addition, he was our Syracuse Branch Office Administrator. Mr. Chu was mainly responsible for forecasting and scheduling of NMPC's Work Task Assignments. He also monitored and tracked all purchase orders and job expenditures to ensure that they are within their specific contracted limits. Mr. !
Chu's other responsibilities are as follows: '
Assisting in setting up Structural Evaluation System (SES) database for the Seismic Upgrade Program Translate NUPIPE-SW piping models to SUPERPIPE using the same geometry, material properties, support configuration, and boundary conditions.
Provide forecasts and schedules for NMPC's Work Task Assignments, monitors and tracks all purchase orders and job expenditures to ensure that they are within their specified contracted limits.
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l SING CHU Page Three PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE (Cont'd) i Track actual vs. projected resource allocation, production, and expenditure. Used i ABB Impell's Project Engineering System to support project engineers with job tasks !
I progress and activities information.
Established and maintained databases for the NMPC Maintenance Walkdown/ISI and 50.59 program.
Responsible for maintenance, setup, networking, supplies, and procurement.of ABB impell Syracuse office computer system.
Iowa Electric - Mr. Chu assisted the project engineer in cost and scheduling for the Duane Amold Offsite Emergency Plan Project. His main responsibilities were to monitor overall budget and schedule for the project in accordance with contract requirements and to provide project progress (% completed) and financial status to the client.
Emergency Preparedness NMPC/LILCO - Mr. Chu was involved in the development of the NRC exercise and emergency preparedness drill scenarios for NMPC's Nine Mile Point Unit 2. He also I reviewed and developed LILCO Shoreham Station's 1988 FEMAINRC graded exercise. l In both capacities, Mr. Chu's main task was to generate drill information based upon !
raw data input. His primary involvement was to generate both in-plant and offsite l radiological data using HP-85 Dose Assessment Program and various spreadsheet and I database programs he developed. This included ingestion pathway, core damage, in-plant chemistry, effluent monitoring, and plant status calculations. He has also generated all the necessary maps such as EPZ survey, ingestion pathway, in-plant dose and D.O.E. Environmental Survey for these exercises. Mr. Chu provided support as a controller at the Technical Support Center (TSC) for SNPS.
NHY - Mr. Chu was assigned to New Hampshire Yankee's Seabroo.k Station as a document / production controller. Here, he helped to establish and track the completion of several hundred open items between several consulting firms required to revise the New Hampshire Radiological Emergency Response Plan. He has also provided input
, to assist in completing Seabrook's Offsite Emergency Plan.
SING CHU Page Four r
PROFFRSIONAL EXPERIENCE (Cont'd)
Subsequent to _this assignment, Mr. Chu was assigned to ABB Impell's Plant Engineering Division to assist in completing Niagara Mohawk's Nine Mile Point Unit 1 pipe hangers and supports analysis using CAD and SAEMIS (Computer Aided ,
Engineering Management Information System). Duties included generating support
, and hanger drawings using CAD, creating mathematical model, and running analysis per set requirements.
l Prior to joining ABB Impell Corporation, Mr. Chu worked as an electrician aide for a !
large electrical contractor. !
pr1UCATION B.S. Aerospace Engineering l
Polytechnic University, Farmingdale/ Brooklyn, New York l
TRAINING COURSES !
1992 ,
- EPRI IPE Individual Plant Examination of Extemal Events Seismic Margin Assessment Training Course, Dec.1992
- Stevenson & Associates SQUG Generic implementation Procedure GlPPER computer program training course, Nov.1992.
- EPRI STERI Training Seminar - Seismic Technical Evaluation of Replacement items '
in Nuclear Power Plants NP-7484, Jan.1995 HONORS AND AFFILIATIONS Who's Who Among Students in American Universities and Colleges REGISTRATION Engineer in Training, New York l
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ROBERT J. COURCY PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE Mr. Courcy has over 22 years experience in structural engineering analysis / design and supervision of projects for nuclear and fossil power generation and industrial facilities.
He is presently an Engineer IV with VECTRA's Eastern Region Civil / Structural Group in Boston. In this position he fills the role of a Project Engineer, Analyst and Procedures Writer, responsible for the supervision and technical aspects of projects involving building structures, equipment supports, piping, tubing and conduit systems, as well as seismic equipment qualification. Mr. Courcy is also assigned as a member of the Seismic Review Team on the USl A-46 SQUG project for Northeast Utilities. He has been trained by EPRl/SQUG/IPEEE and is certified as a Seismic Capability Engineer.
Specific projects include the following:
. Seismic Eauipment Qualification for Northeast Utilities' Connecticut Yankee Atornic Power Station (CYAPS). Responsible for seismic qualification activities associated with the purchasing and installation of new safety-related cabinets, electrical and mechanical components, raceways, valves, etc. for refueling outage Cycle 17 at CYAPS, j
e Design Basis Reconstitution (DBR) project for Niagara Mohawk's Nine Mile Station 1. Responsible for the design verification of the DBR document and i calculations for the analysis of reinforced concrete.
Reactor Water Pipe Replacement project for Boston Edison's Pilgrim Station.
Responsible for the writing / preparation of the Plant Design Change (PDC)
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document and interface with the pipe supplier and BECo's Construction ,
Management group.
. Service Water Pipe Replacement project for Commonwealth Edison's Zion Plant. Responsible for the preparation of the pipe support design / evaluation procedures.
. Fuel Pool Cooling System pipe replacement at Vermont Yankee for Yankee Atomic Electric co. Responsible for the design / evaluation of equipment and pipe supports.
. Conduit evaluation project for Texas Utilities' Comanche Peak Station.
Responsible for the design / evaluation of conduit supports.
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l ROBERT J. COURCY Page Two j PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE (Cont'dl I l
e Control Room Lighting project for Public Service Electric & Gas (PSE&G) Salem 1 ;
and 2 plants. Responsible for the development of the conceptual design for the i Control Room lighting supports and connection details.
- DOE SNOx project for Ohio Edison's Niles Plant. Subcontracted from ABB . i Environmental Systems. Responsible for the conceptual design, analysis and details for the following: l Sixteen 50'-0" structural steel towers with interconnecting bridges for the !
support of a 7'-0" diameter flue gas duct system.
l A rigid frame stee' structure to support a gas / gas heat exchanger unit.
i Development of a procurement, fabrication and delivery specification for l structural steel. ;
- Instrument Tubing Evaluation project for Rochester Gas & Electric's Ginna Plant.
Responsible for the layout, analysis and support of various instrument tubing systems and the interface with RG&E's Construction Management group. ]
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. Major Pipe Support Evaluation / Modification project for NMPC's Nine Mile Station, j Responsible for the analysis to determine stiffnesses and load capacities of all l pipe supports.
l Prior to joining VECTRA, Mr. Courcy served eight and a half years as a Supervising Engineer for Cygna Energy Services. For approximately six years, he was Group Leader for the Site Engineering Office at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS), responsible for the supervision and technical direction of the group. While in charge of this group, he was responsible for the resolution of all problems associated with new construction, and modification projects.
Major projects that he was involved with included:
. Anoendix "R"- Responsible for conduit layout, support design and resolution of on-going problems with the excavation and placement of major concrete duct bank.
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ROBERT J. COURCY Page Three PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE (Cont'd) ,
. Blockwalls - Responsible for the development of modifications details for all new l structural steel reinforcing members. :
. Scram Discharge Volume - Redesigned pipe supports and resolved pipe and pipe f support problems.. TM1 - Developed modifications of piping, tubing and supports. ;
. MCC Environmental Enclosures - Responsible for the design of structural steel i enclosures and conduit tubing and pipe supports. Earlier, Mr. Courcy was in charge of a ten man design team at Millstone 1 where he was involved in the l
design and installation of numerous duct, pipe and conduit supports, along with l the design and installation of six MCC enclosures and a structural steel extension )
to the building steam tunnel. I Originally Mr. Courcy represented Bcston Edson Company as part of the craft supervision team during the NRC IE 79-02 and 79-14 Bulletin effort at PNPS.
Prior to joining Cygna, Mr. Courcy served over ten years as a structural designer / engineer at Charles T. Main, Inc. in Boston in their Pulp and Paper Division. In this capacity he was responsible for the structural analysis of several major structures such as recovery and power boiler buildings, paper machine and evaporator buildings, and warehouse structures. The analysis included steel framing, concrete floors and foundations, and equipment supports. !
Projects he worked on during his tenure at Charles T. Main included:
. Scott Paner Co. - Design of a bleach plant building and digester enclosure tower i
. Boise Cascade - Design of a paper machine building and renovation of an existing building into a storage facility. ;
. Fraser Paoer Co. - Design an extension to an existing paper machine building to !
house a new in-line coater machine, a boiler building and several tank foundations.
. Union Camo Co. - Design of a recovery boiler building, an evaporator building and a black liquor pump house.
ROBERT J. COURCY Page Four i i
I EDUCATION 1
A.S. Structural Engineering, Northeastern University, Boston Massachusetts '
PROFESSIONAL REGISTRATION I
l Registered Professional Engineer (Structural)- Massachusetts 1 i
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STEPHEN P. REICHLE ERQEESSlQWiEMERIENGL -
Mr. Reichle has over 20 years of power plant engineering, design, maintenance, and -
operations experience. As Technical Services Consultant for Mechanical Systems in
- VECTRA's Boston office he is currently assigned as the Project Manager for the Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA) project for the New York Power Authority. This project consists of updating the FHAs for both the James A. FitzPatrick and Indian Point 3 nuclear plants. The project also includes the preparation of an analysis that assesses the effects of pipe rupture, inadvertent actuation and manual use of fire protection systems on safety-related equipment at JAF and IP3.
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Mr. Reichie is also currently serving as the Systems Project Engineer on the NRC's i Unresolved Safety issue (USI) A-46 projects for: Northeast Utilities (Millstone 1,2 and Connecticut Yankee), Philadelphia Electric (Peach Bottom and Limerick) and Public Service Electric & Gas (Salem). In this role, he is responsible for the identification of safe shutdown paths and the development of a Success Path Component List for each unit. These NRC .
programs deal with the seismic adequacy, or margin of equipment in operating plants.
Previously, Mr. Reichle served as the Project Manager for the Appendix R Compliance Program and Fire Barrier Upgrade Projects at the Pilgrim Station. Mr. Reichle managed these programs for over two years, with tasks including the development of Appendix R shutdown analyses, the development of associated operating procedures, the review and upgrade of all Appendix R fire barriers, and the design of various electrical and mechanical system modifications. This project was staffed with approximately 25 engineers and technicians.
Mr. Reichle served as the Project Engineer, and managed the engineering resources, during the update of the J. A. FitzPatrick Fire Protection Reference Manual, and supported l the update of the Fire Protection Program Manual for Indian Point Unit 3. Both of these '
projects involved the update of fire protection and Appendix R programs to include the changes made by modifications, and the preparation of a new manual that included both programs.
Mr. Reichle also served as the Project Engineer for an Appendix R project for Northeast Utilities Millstone 3 Nuclear Power Plant. This project consisted of four major tasks: 1) review the plant's safe shutdown methodology and equipment list to ensure completeness
- 2) identify which components might be affected for each fire area,3) identify the worst case fire scenario (in terms of equipment loss) for each fire area, and 4) identify and prioritize the operator actions that need to be taken in each fire area.
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i l STEPHEN P. RElCHLE Page Two
[ EXPEpiphlCE (Cont'd) i-
[ Prior to this assignment, Mr. Reichie performed a design baseline verification of the ,
Emergency Operating Procedures (EOP) for Nine Mile Point 1, and determined the impact of operating safety related systems with normally open manual valves at the system's e interfece with non-safety related portions of the system. His responsibilities on these l projects included the preparation of verification packages to document design basis of input
- partmeters to EOP flowcharts, preparation of various design calculations, and preparation of a report on the boundary valves. Also included within this project was a rejew of the i i plant's Service Water System and the effect of increased lake water temperature. I o i Mr. Reichle has also served as a technical specialist in support of Viennial fire protection l audits at the H.B. Robinson, Brunswick and Shearon Harris nuclear power plants. During ,
j these audits, he served as the Systems Engineer reviewing station operating practices, '
j programs and procedures used to ensure safe shutdown of the plants in the event of a fire. ,
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1 Mr. Reichle has prepared Design Baseline Documents (DBDs) for the feedwater and fire 3
protection systems at the PECO Peach Bottom and Limerick nuclear plants. This project 4
consicted of conducting the necessary research to identify the boundaries, interfaces and 2
- requirements of the individual systems. The documents also describe how each of the
! systems satisfies their design input and output requirements, and what modifications have l impacted the system's original design basis. Mr. Reichle also participated in the Appendix R update project for the Limerick Nuclear Station by reviewing the new and updated i shutdown methods identified for each fire area, and assisting in the resolution of shutdown concems identified during the review process.
Mr. Reich!e has also served as the Project Manager for thc single failure analysis of the lj ECCS sub-systems, and their support systems, for the Connecticut Yankee plant. This project included the identification and review of potential equipment failures for each of the
- systems, including mechanical, electrical and instrumentation, during injection and recirculation modes in response to a LOCA.
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in conjunction with the above single-failure analyses, a review of the CY surveillance procedures was performed. This review was conducted to ensure that all ECCS redundant or required components were included in the appropriate procedure, and that proper .
i surveillances were being performed to assure operability of the systems. i, i l l l i
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e STEPHEN P. RElCHLE Page Three l
EXPERIENCE ICont'd Prior to joining VECTRA, Mr. Reichle was a Senior Engineer at Cygna Energy Services and i assisted in the preparation of the Appendix "R" review for NUSCo's Millstone 1,2 and Connecticut Yankee generating stations. As a member of this project, he was assigned tasks such as developing safe shutdown scenarios and identifying equipment which needed to be protected, establishing ssfe shutdown fire areas, performing walkdowns of fire areas to verify the adequacy of exisung barriers (including doors, dampers, and penetration seals),
identifying barrier deficiencies, preparing justifications for exemption requestsand nyaking recommendations for upgrading fire barriers or their penetrations to the required fire L \"
resistance rating.
Mr. Reichle also participated in preparing a conceptual design of a seismic hot shutdown I system for the Yankee Rowe Nuclear Plant. This project reviewed the feasibility of providing a standby, portable pumping system made up of standard commercial grade components, that would deliver water to the steam generators and/or main coolant system 1 in the event no other method was available. Included in this project was the identification I system demands, sizing of components, identification of water sources, and providing an estimated cost to install the system. '
in a previous assignment, Mr. Reichie served as Lead Engineer for the development of surveillance and maintenance procedures for the Shoreham Power Station. His responsibilities included the identification of maintenance and inspection requirements for all ;
mechanical balance of plant equipment. He established the parts requirements, special tools, rigging and handling instructions for those procedures. Mr. Reichle also supervised l additional tasks for the Shnreham Station including:
l . Development of Fire Protection Program Description and Associated l Procedures l . Development of Maintenance Program Description
. NUREG-0612 Heavy Loads Analysis, and Procedure Preparation
. Preparation of Refueling Procedures
. Design, Analysis, and Fabrication of Fuel Handling and Reactor Head Strongback Before joining Cygna, Mr. Reichle held the position of Lead Applications Engineer for the Jamesbury Corp., a manufacturer of fluid control equipment. His responsibilities included supervising technical analysis, sizing equipment, selecting mater:al and accessories, and resolving field installation and operational problems of motor-operated valves.
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' i STEPHEN P. REICHLE Page Four !
i EXPERIENCE (Cont'd)
Mr. Reichte was responsible for sizing valve actuators (both pneumatic and electric) given the system operating conditions. For motor operated valves this task included determining -
the necessary torque output, then selecting the appropriate gear train configuration and motor size. For nuclear projects, motor sizing included considerations of both normal and degraded voltage conditions.
i Earlier in his career, Mr. Reichie worked with Stone & Webster Engineering Cqtporapon 1 where he was the responsible engineer for liquid and solid radioactive waste systems; a '
Responsibilities associated with this position included: development of system design and flow diagrams, engineering, selection of equipment and layout, preparation of equipment !
specifications and purchase requisitions. Other duties included review of system piping l diagrams, and resolution of field installation problems. Mr. Reichle also assisted in the ;
development of a spare parts program and database for Millstone Unit 3.
In h's initial assignment at Stone and Webster, Mr. Reichle assisted in the preparation of a i
systsm operations manual for Connecticut Yankee. This work included the writing of system descriptions and operating procedures for the waste evaporator degasifier, aerated drains, and steam generator blowoff.
Before Mr. Reichie's employment with Stone & Webster, he spent s!x years in the U. S.
Navy Nuclear Submarine Program where he qualified as an Engineering Watch Supervisor.
EDUCATION B.S., Mechanical Engineering, Central New England College A.S., Mechanical Engineering, Worcester Junior College U.S. Navy Nuclear Power School and Prototype Training Graduate Work, F're Protection Engineering, Worcester Polyteconic Institute PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES Member, American Society of Mechanical Engineers Member, Society of Fire Protection Engineers 1
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STEPHEN P. REICHLE TECHNICAL SERVICES CONSULTANT EXPERIENCE HIGHLIGHTS Twenty (20) years of experience in nuclear systems design, analysis, fire protection, 10CFR50 Appendix R safe shutdown analysis and related areas of the nuclear power industry.
. VECTRA 1985 to present Technical Services Consultant CYGNA Energy Services 1981 to 1985 Lead Engineer Jamesbury Valve 1979 to 1981 Lead Applications Engineer , ,
Stone and Webster Eng. 1974 to 1979 Operations Services Engineer i- '
U.S. Navy 1968 to 1973 Nuclear Power Program EXPERIEMCE
SUMMARY
. Proje:t Manager for NYPA (JAF and IP3) Fire Hazards Analysis update and Suppression Effects Analysis (1993 - present)
. Proje:t Manager for NUSCO (Conn. Yankee) Single Failure Analysis of ECCS Sub-systems (1988 - 1989).
. Project Manager or Project Engineer for several 10CFR50 Appendix R Analysis and fire protection projects:
BECo (Pilgrim Station) Appendix R Analysis and Fire Barrier Upgrade (1985 -
1988)
NYPA (JAF and IP3) Fire Protection Reference Manual and FHA (1990 - 1992)
NUSCO (MP3) Appendix R Shutdown Methodology Review (1989)
. Project Engineer (System) for several USl A-46 and seismic IPEEE projects:
NUSCO (Conn. Yankee, Millstone 1 and 2) 1992 - present PECo (Peach Bottom 1 and 2, Limerick 1 and 2) (1992 - present)
- PSE&G (Salem 1 and 2) (1993 - present)
. Project Engineer for NMPC (NMP2) Design Basis Document project (1992 - 1993).
. Lead Engineer for radwaste systems design for new construction BWR.
. Preparation of conceptual designs and design change packages for various nuclear systems and components.
. Applications Engineer for the section of valves and actuators to meet client specifications.
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JOHN W. REILLY PROFEBalONAL EXPERIENCE Mr. Reilly is an Engineer lll with the Boston Office of VECTRA. He is presently assigned to the High Energy Une Break (HELB) Analysis for Northeast Utilities' Millstone Unit 2 Powei Station. His responsibiltlies on this project include identtfying plant frontline and auxiliary systems and paths required to sooomplish the specified plant safe shutdown functions. In addition, he performed the analyses associated with pipe whip and Jet loads which impacted the safe shutdown components.
Previously he was assigned to the Motor Operated Valve (MOV) modification project (NRC G.L 89-10) for Boston Edison Company's Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station. His tasks included, but were not limited to: preparation of plant design change packages, safety evaluations and procurement sph,.hions for the MOV upgredes.
He was also recently assigned to the Boston Edison Company Setpoint Control Program. The primary objective of this program was to increase the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station operating cycle from 18 months to 24 months by identifying the goveming criteria for such a change. The overall approach in developing the setpoint calculations was to determine a total loop unoorMinty based on instrument error, including statistically analyzing actual plant calibmtlen and surveillanos data to reflect a high confidence level drift value to bound the actual instrument's drtft over a 24 month interval.
Prior to this project, Mr. Reilly was assigned to the Public Servios Electric & Gas Company Erosion-Corrosion modelling effort. This task consisted of the engineering support necessary to model all susceptible systems and lines for Salem Units 1 & 2 and the Hopeereek Generating Stations, including but not limited to, developing the plant configuration (heat balance) file for each unit, developing the water chemistry file for each unit, running flow analyses where required and generating specific component susceptibility reports for each system.
Mr. Reilly was previously assigned to the NRC's USl A46/SQUG project for Northeast l Utilities Service Company, Millstone Unit 2 and Connecticut Yankee plants. He was !
responsible for the identification of those systems and safe shutdown paths used to sooomplish the plant safe shutdown functions as well as the components necessary to <
align these paths. All paths and components were chosen based on a safety classification approach with the application of the SQUG GIP criteda such that the integrity of the Reactor Coolant System pressure boundary was maintained and the reactor was shut down and maintained in a safe shutdown condition. In addition to the above, Mr. Reilly was responsible for the preparation of the Safe Shutdown Paths report for Millstone Unit 2.
JOHN W. REILLY PAGE2 PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE Prior to this project, Mr. Reilly was assigned to the Erosion / Corrosion Project at NUSCo's Connecticut Yankee and Millstone 1,2 and 3 nuclear power stations where '
he served as a lead reviewer of historical E/C-related piping modifications and deficiencies. This information was used to determine the plants' operability status after the Millstone 2 extraction steam line failure.
Mr. Reilly was also previously assigned to a project at Boston Edison's Pilgrim Station during which time he worked on a multi-disciplined project team to establish the design performanoe, installation and test req':irements for a hydrogen injection system. The system's primary function was to suppress the radiolysis of water in the reactor vessel by providing, controlling and delivering hydrogen gas into the feedwater.
In addition, he assisted in the development of the SQtlG Safe Shutdown Equipment List for the Connecticut Yankee Station. His responsibilities Induded the review of PalD's and electrical drawings to identify safe shutdown equiprner.t, as well as sharing lead responsibility in the preparation of component specific data psickages for the safe shutdown equipment identified as requiring a deta' led selsmic review.
In an earlier assignment for New York Power Authorky, Mr. Rei'ly pipared a detailed Fire Hazard Analysis for the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant as part of a Fire Protection Program upgrade. The project also included a review of modifloation packages to determine impact on licensing commitments, safe shutdown capabilities, and fire protection / detection.
Mr. Reilly also prepared Section 6.0 of the Fire Protection Program Manualtitled " Fire Area / Zone Analyses" as a part of this project. This included a combustible loading analysis for all plant fire zones and a station walkdown to gather now, and verify current, fire protection information.
Prior to this project, Mr. Reilly was assigned to a project involving the substentiation of heat exchanger performance parameters and tubing minimum wall criteria for Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation's Ginna Nuclear Power Station. This effort included developing heat exchanger performance calculations, ductile analyses, vibration analyses and fatigue analyces based on existing, probable and possible equipment loadings to determine required heat transfer surface and minimum tube well requirements.
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JOHN W. RElLLY PAGE 3 l
PROFESSIONAL EDEiiWNCE Other responsibilities and experience incide in-house responsbility for computer troubleshooting and upgrading, including both hardware and software maintenance; on-site walkdown planning preparation; electronic communications between regional offices via configuration files and modems; and database and report development as necessary for project commitments.
EQUCATION B.S., Mechanical Engineering, University of Notre Dame,1988 .
B.A., Liberal Arts, Stonehill College,1987 LICENSES AND REGIRTRATION Engineer-in-Training License i
AZlZ SABER PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE :
i Mr. Saber is an Engineer IV in the Boston Office Civil / Structural Group. He has over eight years of experience in the power industry, and extensive experience in the design and installation of suspended distributed systems. He has an in depth knowledge of .
dynamic analysis and structural design; he is well versed in the use of various finite element codes (STRUDL, ANSYS, ADINA, NASTRAN) and the design criteria for '
nuclear power structures (Reinforced Concrete and Steel). Mr. Saber is an active member of ACI Committee 533 on precast panels.
Mr. Saber is currently involved in the IPEEE and A46 projects for NUSCo, PECo, NYPA ,
and PSE&G. He is certified as SRT by the SOUG. Mr. Saberis responsible for' review of the plant safe shutdown equipment list and the evaluation of equipment anchorage, concrete pedestals, and support details.
1 Mr. Saber has performed detailed analysis on tanks, pumps, motor operated valves, heat exchangers and associated piping and supports using finite element anlaysis and detailed calculations.
- Prior to his transfer to the Boston Office, Mr. Saber was assigned to the Comanche Peak Unit Civil / Structural Project as a site lead. He provided the coordination of the field engineering activities of the electrical raceways group in support of the construction and completion of the CPSES U2 designs.
Mr. Saber has worked on various other CPSES Unit 1 projects. He has worked on the Mechanical Equipment List project and with the Cable Tray and Cable Tray, Hangers Group. He was the lead engineer for the Field Engineering Group responsible for supporting activities and resolving any field problems with authorization to approve any design changes and assure their adherence with the design specifications and code requirements.
Mr. Saber was also responsible for revising and updating the technical project design l methodology and the installation and inspection specification for electrical raceways.
He also designed and analyzed cable trays and components using computer aid programs and graphics and detailed calculations.
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i AZlZ SABER Page Two EXPERIENCE (Cont'd)
While assigned to the Train C Conduit project, Mr. Saber designed and analyzed l conduit systems and supports for seismic loads using systems frequency, projected i and/or tributary span methods. He was a lead engineer in the System Interaction Group for engineering evaluations of postulated interactions resulting from seismically induced failures of non-safety-related conduits incident upon
. - safety-related systems, structures and components. His responsibilities included j writing engineering design change notices to update and revise the project criteria, i training personnel for using the field walkdown criteria and the l plant documents; namely FSAR, structural drawings, composite piping drawings,'HVAC l layout drawings, flow diagrams,0-list and electrical wiring diagrams to resolve the i postulated interactions based on field conditions along with engineering techniques.
t j Prior to joining VECTRA, Mr. Saber was a structural engineer responsible for designing and analyzing seismic loading structural supports in power plants utilizing computer programming and graphics. He supervised the installation of those supports *with the authorization to issue any field changes and assure their adherence with the design specifications and code requirements.
EDUCATION M.S., Civil Engineering, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor B.S., Civil Engineering, The American University of Beirut, Lebanon ,
PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS Professional Engineer, State of Texas American Concrete Institute American Society of Civil Engineers The Masonry Society 9
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SEISMIC EVALUATION REPORT FOR MILLSTONE 2 1
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! ATTACHMENT D i
! PEER REVIEW REPORT i
! (6 Pages) i i
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JO State Street. Wobten. Manach artis ol801 Stevenson & Assodates u m m m0rm m m ma A structurni-mechanicalconsulting engineeringfirm BOSTON CLEVELAND November 3,1994 Steve W. Wainio Northeast Ut ilities Service Company Millstone NuclearPower Station Route 156 Waterford, Connecticut 06385
Subject:
Millstone, Unit 2 Peer Review l
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^
Dear Mr. Wainio:
l Please let this letter serve as a report on the peer review walkdown for the A-46 (SQUG) and IPEEE l evaluation of the Millstone Unit 2 (M2) plant. The peer review was conducted by Drs. R. P. Kennedy and 1 !
D. Stevenson on October 17 and 18,1994. Walkdowns were conducted before the Screening Evaluation Worksheets (SEWS) were reviewed. A sampling of SEWS were subsequently reviewed and generally found to be in good ord:r w.'th comments as shown in Attachment A. General and specific comments on the walktowns and the SEWS reviewed are provided below.
Accessible areas of the plant were reviewed excluding the Containment and high radiation areas. Areas which were inaccessible due to radiological concerns were the Containment, and a few areas in the Auxiliary building including the Boric Acid Storage area, charging pump room, and the RHR areas.
The walkdown has been conducted in a competent manner and results are in accordance with the guidance of the Generic Implementation Plan (GIP) and NP-6041 documentation. The vast majority of the findings noted in this letter were already found and documented by the walkdown team, so the peer resiewers believe this walkdown to have been conducted in a thorough and professional manner. The M2 plant has been found to be in good condition with respect to seismic ruggedness owing to good original design and modifications made to meet information bulletins and notices during the past fifteen years. Nothing was found that would be considered a challenge to the design basis of the plant.
During the peer review walkdowns a number of observations were made for the consideration of the A-46 and IPEEE seismic capability engineers (SCE). Some general conditions were noted:
- Plug welds are predominantly used to anchor electrical buses at M2. The peer reviewers have found problems with plug weld integrity at another nuclear plant. An instance of a cracked plug weld and a raised (deformed) baseplate not in contact with the embedded steel suggests a closer inspection of plug weld integrity might be called for. The peer reviewers recommend that a plant weld inspector evaluate a small sample of the plug welds to determine their acceptability, particularly with respect to the issue of weld metal fusion to the embedded channels.
- Vibration isolators on the local control panel of the Emergency Diesel Generators H7A and H7B are manufactured of cast iron. One of them was found to be cracked. Although the peer reviewers agree with the SCE'sjudgment that they are acceptable because the " ears" act as travel limit stops
(and, furthermore, the cracked isolator passed a reasonable rug test), it is recommended that the cracked isolator be replaced. The peer reviewers agree that the other isolators that are not cracked are acceptable.
- Finally, the Auxiliary and Turbine buildings are in contact with one another at discrete column locations at Elevation 54.5' along Column Line E. The concern is not so much with change in structural response since the Turbine building mass at that elevation is significantly smaller than the Auxiliary building, but rather with the potential for impact loads that could be generated in the Switchgear room immediately adjacent to this column line. In the judgment of the peer resiewers, this is estimated to have a small effect, but an evaluation is recommended to verify thisjudgment.
By virtue of such an evaluation, the effect ofload transfer can also be determined, although it is once again estimated not to be significant and is not considered a design basis operability issue.
1 A-46 and IPEEE Related Comments Diesel Generator Area Non-SafetyRelatedFa t in "B" Area A non-safety related fan supported on a steel frame above the "B" diesel generator or.ly is anchored on one side by 2 steel bolts. There is no anchorage on the other side of the fan. This ahould be evaluated to assess its potential as an interaction concern for 1 the emergericy diesel generstor. I Local Control Panel or. "B" Diesel Generator Skid The local control panel is supposted on 4 steel ,
springs (vibration isolators). The spring housing has interlocking " ears" which act as travel limit I stops. Although the spring housing is manufactured of cast iron material, the velocity that could be generated before the ears engage is not enough to fracture the cast iron housing in the judgment of the SCEs and the peer reviewers. One of the cast iron housings on the "B" generator local control panel is cracked. The isolator passed a reasonable tug test; however, it is recommended that the l cracked isolator be replaced.
1 F-38 Supply Fan The supply fan is supported on a steel, braced frame on vibration isolators. Even if the isolators were to fail, the fan is well confined and will not displace significantly or fall.
"B" Diesel Generator There are no issues with the diesel generator itself.
T-041 Panet Regarding the SEWS, the SCE's should providejustification for the use of a the
" medium" amplification factor of 4.5 .
XAId Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) The tank is well anchored and adequate piping flexibility is also evident. Large storage containers adjacent to the RWST could pose an interaction hazard and should be moved away or be properly restrained in some manner.
- SA Lower & Uccer 4160V Switcheear Rooms Buses 24C, D &E These buses are subject to the inspection of plug weld adequacy discussed in the general issues at the beginning of this letter report. Bus 24D in the upper switchgear room is i subject to the impact issue also discussed in the generalissues section at the beginning of this report.
East and West DC Switcheear Rooms Distribution Panels & Inverters The wall mounted distribution panels and the floor-mounted inverters are well supported and have no perceivable issues.
VR11-FloorMountedDistribution Pane! The panel has marginal anchorage and is tall (approx.
90") and narrow (depth of approx.12"). Currently, this item is classified as an outlier and. it is l under evaluation. It may be resolved by use of the newly developed median-centered amplified floor i a
response spectra.
l V201A (DC1) The adjacent battery char gers are not tied together. These chargers are being 1 replaced in their entirety per PDCR # 2-025-93 and SQR # 93-134, thus this issue is considered I resolved.
V201B (DC2) This battery charger has no isso:s.
UAC4 Consider weak way bending of the base channels.
Battery Rooms l
Station Batteries The racks in one battery room are shimmed at one end up to 2 inches high due to the sloping floor. The anchor bolts are subject to bolt bending and should be evaluated for this effect. The longitudinal bracing on the front face of the rack is at the ends only where the force would need to be transferred to the shimmed bolts. The load path and longitudinal stiffness of the rack should be evaluated to ensure it is Hgher than about 10 Hz and that the anchor bolts at the end can react the forces without failing. The batteries are about 15 years old which is the qualified life for these batteries according to M2 personnel. M2 should investigate with the manufacturer if the qualified life can be extended to 20 years (including seismic effects); otherwise, the batteries may need to be replaced. The surrounding masomy block walls are a HCLPF candidate for focused scope (and modified focused scope) plants.
Turbine Buildine Buses 22E & F light metal (sheet metal) base channels support the buses and are stitch welded to embedded steel. The channels should be checked to assure they can carry the superstructure's load to the welds.
2-CIDV-11 The peer reviewers agree with the SCEs that this valve is an outlier because the operator is braced , and there is no nearby support of the valve body and pip AFWPumps No issues were noted for the motor or turbine driven pumps.
t Auxiliary Buildine MCCBJ1 & B61 These MCCs are housed in environmental enclosures. B51 has small gaps with respect to its longitudinal direction with the enclosure (1/4") on one end and a cable tray hanger
(<1/8") on the other. The gap with the enclosure should be checked. The interference with the cable tray hanger isjudged negligible because of the relatively light mass of the hanger. The B61 MCC has no such problems.
P41A,B &C & P42A&B The HPSI and LPSI pumps (Elevation -45.5') are well anchored. The bolts on the LPSI pumps are close to the steel edge such that only one side (the bearing side) can be confidently relied upon to take out shear. This should be considered in the analysis. The HPSI pumps have lateral alignment blocks, while the LPSI pumps have no alignment pins or lateral blocks.
P11A,B & C The RBCCW pumps (Elevation -25.5') are well anchored. The pumps do have lateral alignment blocks.
Warehouse Building T-4&4 & B The _ diesel fuel oil day tanks appear well an$orel with a bottom, gusseted ring girder i to which the bolts are secured. The bolt type is unknown so in ultrasonic test may be needed to determine its length (ifit is not a J-type bolt). The surro;mdir.g block walls may govern the plant HCPLF since they are relatively tall and at the top of the Warehouse building where the seismic demand will be the greatest.
ControlRoom l ControlRoom Celling The ceiling appears to be adequately secured such that there will be no general failure of the ceiling. The aluminum diffusers above the center of the room are secured by tie-wrap to the T-bars and will not fall. The T-bars are secured by threaded rod to a light metal strut grid which in turn is supported by rods and wire to the concrete floor above. The attachment of the rods to the T-bars is by a clamp which is positively bolted together so it can not inadvertently open under seismic excitation. The lights are safety wired. Acoustic tile: may fall, especially at the outer periphery of the control room; however, they arejudged to be acceptable since they do not pose a credible interaction concern.
ControlRoom Cabinets The control room cabinets are generally well anchored. There are numerous " seismic housekeeping" issues which result in potential seismic interactions such as shift lockers adjacent to the main control board and storage of materials (storage cabinets, ladders, etc.)
adjacent to selected cabinets. It is recommended that M2 develop a seismic housekeeping plan for the main control room to provide guidance regarding the placement ofitems in proximity to safety-related cabinets and equipment. Various cabinets lined up adjacent to one another were found not )
to be bolted (tied) together, particularly where they were of different manufacture. Noted -
I occurrences of this were C06X not tied to an adjacent cabinet, C26 not tied to CSO, C80 not tied to C25B, and C08 not tied to ACT-5. Finally, at one location in the main control board, one internal frame bolt connecting one section of the main control board to another was found loose. All of these occurrences were found by the SCEs and the peer reviewers concur with their findings.
I i
l Intake Structure j P-5A,B&C The edge distance on the anchorage of the service water pumps should be considered.
IPEEE Only Reinted Comments The piping is laterally well restrained. No issues were noted for safety-related piping and it can be screened at the 0.5g PGA HCLPF value.
Building capability assessments are being made by Dr. John Reed of J. Benjamin Associates and are being reported separately from this report.
The equipment reviewed that was not covered in the A-46 program is discussed below.
Battery Rooms '~
Station Batteries The surrounding masonry block walls are a HCLPF candidate for focused scope (and modified focused scope) plants.
East and West DC Switchcear Rooms V201C (DC3) The adjacent battery chargers are not tied together. These chargers are being replaced in their entirety per PDCR # 2-025 93 and SQR # 93 134; thus, this issue is considered resolved.
Lower & Uoner 4160V Switchcear Rooms Buses 24A &B and 25A &B These buses are subject to the inspection of plug weld adequacy discussed in the general issues at the beginning of this letter report. Buses in the upper switchgear I toom are subject to the impact issue discussed also in the general issues section at the beginning of this report.
Intake Structure MCCs B-42 & B-13 The HCLPF would be governed by the MCC anchorage or the surrounding masonry block walls.
If you have questions or comments, please contact the undersigned.
Very truly yours, Ve truly yours,
~
John D. Stevenson Robert P. Kennedy Seismic Review Walkdown Engineer Seismic Review Walkdown Engineer cc: S.Pornprasert,NU 7
Attachment A SEWS Review Comments
- 1) Reference ID 2-HV-139A-Class 0, Ventilation Damper Inlet to Fan F112A It is recommended that for this Class O component that a reference be made to the applicable demand spectra. Line 5 of Seismic Capacity vs. Demand section should reflect this spectral reference. In addition for Class O, since no bounding spectra is identified, Line 4 should reflect the basis of the capacity (e.g.
Judgment, calculations, etc.)
- 2) Reference ID 2 SW-3,2A-TK-Class 0, Air accumulator for 2 S3.2A For this Class O component, capacity vs. demand is a needed consideration so Ibelieve that the first sentence in the comments is inappropriate. It is obvious you have done so in your Anchor calculation. Line items 4 and 5 should reflect what assumptions made in this regard.
- 3) Reference ID P122A-Class 6, Vertical Pumps Agree with conclusion reached except that Caveat 3 check oflong unsupported piping should be "Yes" rather than "N/A."
- 4) Reference Id-2-CHW-11 (Rev. O)-Class 7, Fluid-Operated Valve Agree with SEWS
- 5) ID: SV-4188 (Rev,0) Class 8, Motor-Operated and Solenoid-Operated Valves Agree with SEWS
- 6) ID: DV10-Class 14 Distribution Panels If seismic adequacy of a panel is by tug test it is recommended the estimated amount of the tug and the weight of the panel should be given. In particular the tug should exceed the peak of the demand spectra times the mass of the panel.
7)ID: DC2-Class 16, Battery Charger Agree with SEWS 8)ID: RSI-Class 20, Auto Transfer Switch RSI Estimated amount of tug should be given.
SEISMIC EVALUATION REPORT FOR MILLSTONE 2 F
i ATTACHMENT E SEWS (See Table of Content for Page No.'s)
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i l SEISMIC EVALUATION REPORT FOR MILLSTONE 2 .
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l ATTACHMENT F svDs (26 Pages)
12/11/9510 41 AM SCREENING VERIFICATION DATA SHEET (SVDS) Page01 Eq. Eq ID Rev Sys/Eq Desc Bldg. FI El. Rm or Rw/CI Base Et (40'? Cap. Demd. Cap > Caveats Anchor interact Equip Cl No Spec. Spec Demd7 OK? OK7 OK7 OK7 0 2-FW-43A-TK 0 AFW / BACKUP AIR FOR 2-FW-43A TB 14.50 AUX FD VLV STA 14 50 Yes BS GRS Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes 0 2-FW-438-TK 0 AFW / BACKUP AIR FOR 2-FW-4BA TB 14.50 AUX FD VLV STA 14.50 Yes BS GRS Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes 0 2-HV-139A 0 HVAC / VENTILATION DAMPER, INLET TO AB 14.50 A BATT RM 36 50 N/A ABS RRS Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes FAN F112A 0 2-HV-1398 0 HVAC / VENTILATION DAMPER, INLET TO AB 14.50 B BAIT RM 36 50 N/A ABS RRS Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes FAN F112B 0 2-HV-140A 0 HVAC / VENTiiATION/ FIRE DAMPER TO AB 14.50 PLEN BX 36.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes FANS F112A&B 0 2-HV-140B O HVAC / VENTILATION / FIRE DAMPER TO AB 14 60 Pit-N RY 36.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes FANS F112A&B l 0 2-HV-141 0 HVAC / WEST DC SWGR ROOM SUPPLY AB 14 Sn i9 00 Shtt 36.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes DAMPER 0 2-HV-142 0 HVAC / VENTILATION DAMPER AB 14 50 B DC SWGR 36.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes 0 2-HV-145A 0 HVAC / VENTILATION DAMPER AB 14 50 A BATT RM 36.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes 0 2-HV-145B 0 HVAC / VENTILATION DAMPER AB 14.50 A BATT RM 36 50 N/A ABS RRS Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes 0 2-HV-146 0 HVAC / VENTILATION DAMPER AB 14 50 BTWN A&B BATT 36 50 N/A ABS RRS Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes 0 2-HV-14 7 0 HVAC / VENTILATION DAMPER AB 14.50 BTWN A&B BATT 36.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes 0 2-HV-155A 0 HVAC / WEST DC SWGR ROOM AB 14.50 B DC SWGR 36.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes EXHAUST / FIRE DAMPER 0 2-HV-1558 0 HVAC / EAST DC SWGR ROOM AB 14.50 A CEDM 36.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes EXHAUST / FIRE DAMPER 0 2-HV-155C 0 HVAC / EAST DC SWGR ROOM AB 14.50 A DC SWGR 36.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes SUPPLY / FIRE DAMPER 0 2-HV-156A 0 HVAC / WEST DC SWGR ROOM AB 14 50 B DC SWGR 36.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes N/A Yas Yes Yes SUPPLY / FIRE DAMPER 0 2-HV-156B 0 HVAC / EAST DC SWGR ROOM AB 14 50 A CEDM 36.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes SUPPLY / FIRE DAMPER 0 2-HV-157A 0 HVAC / WEST DC SWGR ROOM AB 14.50 B DC SWGR 36.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes SUPPLY / FIRE DAMPER i Certrfication: Certification:
All the information contained on this Screening Verification Data Sheet (SVDS) is, to the best of The information provided to the Seismic Capability Engineers regarding systems and operations our knowledge and belief, correct and accurate. "All information" includes each entry and of the equipment contained in the SVDS is, to the best of our knowledge and belief, correct and conclusion (whether venfed to be seismically adequate or not). accurate.
Approved: (Signatures of all Seismic Capability Engineers on the Seismic Review Team (SRT) Approved: (One signature of Systems or Operations Engineer is required if the Seismic Capabildy are required, there should be atleast two on the SRT. All signatories should agree with all the Engineerc deem it necessary.)
entries and conclusions. One signatory should be a licensed professional engineer.)
l Dimitrios Antonopoulos Pnnt or Type Name d
Signature l/ //!1[~l D&te Pnnt or Type Name l
Sgnature l
Date l
l Charbel Abou-Jaoude ldM Mwd (
/44._ l /2 - // 91^ l l l l Pnnt or Type Name ~Sqnature Date Print or Type Name Signature Date i I I I I I l Pnnt or Type Name Sgnature Date Pnnt or Type Name Sgnature Date
12/11/9510.41 AM SCREENING VERIFICATION DATA SHEET (SVDS) PageC2 Eq Eq. ID Rev Sys/Eq. Desc Bldg. FI El. Rm or Rw/Cl Base El <40'? Cap. Demd. Cap > Caveats Anchor interact Equip Cl No Spec. Spec Demd7 OK7 OK7 OK7 OK7 0 2-HV-157B 0 HVAC / EAST DC SWGR ROOM AB 14.50 A DC SWGR 36.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes SUPPLY / FIRE DAMPER 0 2-HV-157C 0 HVAC / WESTST DC SWGR ROOM AB 14.50 A DC SWGR 36.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes SUPPLY / FIRE DAMPER 0 2-HV-158 0 HVAC / CABLE VAULT TO EAST BATTERY AB 14 50 A BATT RM 36.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes ROOM VENTILATION / FIRE DAMPER 0 2-HV-159 0 HVAC / CABLE VAULT TO WEST BATTERY AB 14.50 B BATT RM 36.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes ROOM VENTILATION / FIRE DAMPER 0 2-HV-2038 0 HVAC / CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION AB 36.50 CR HVAC RM 54.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes SUPPLY DAMPER 0 2-HV-204A 0 HVAC / CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION AB 3S.59 CR HVAC RM 54.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes SUPPLY / FIRE DAMPER 0 2-HV-2048 0 HVAC / CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION AB 36.50 CR HVAC RM 54.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes SUPPLY / FIRE DAMPER 0 2-HV-206A 0 HVAC / 'A* CONTROL RM EXH FAN F31 A AB 36.50 CR HVAC RM 54 50 N/A ABS RRS Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes DISCH DAMPER 0 2-HV-2068 0 HVAC / *B' CONTROL RM EXH FAN F31 A AB 36.50 CR HVAC RM 54.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes DISCH DAMPER 0 ' L-D 0 HVAC / CONTROL RM EXH FAN RECIRC AB 36.50 CR HVAC RM 54.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes
, DAMPER 0 HVAC / OUTSIDE AIR TO D/G ROOM FAN WH 14.50 B D/G 38.50 Yes BS GRS Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes 2-HV-2538 l 0 F27 VENTILATION DAMPER 0 2-HV-7,oA 0 HVAC / A D/G ROOM EXHAUST WH 14.50 A D/G 38.50 Yes BS GRS Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes VENTILATION DAMPER 0 2-HV-2558 0 HVAC / B D/G ROOM EXHAUST WH 14 50 0 D/G 38.50 Yes BS GRS Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes VENTILATION DAMPER 0 2-HV-256A 0 HVAC / A D/G ROOM INTAKE WH 14.50 A D/G 38 50 Yes BS GRS Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes '
VENTILATION DAMPER Certification: Certification:
All the information contained on this Screening Verification Data Sheet (SVDS) is, to the best of The inMrmation provided to the seismic Capability Engineers regarding systems and operations our knowledge and belief, correct and accurate. "All information" includes each entry and of the equipment contained in the SVDS is, to the best of our knomiedge and behef, correct and conc lusion (whether venfied to be seismically adequate or not). accurate Approved: (Signatures of all Seismic Capability Engineers on the Seismic Review Team (SRT) Approvee (One signature of Systems or Operations Engineer is required if the Seismic Capability are required, there should be atleast two on the SRT. All signatones should agree w!th all the Engineers deem it necessary.)
entnes and conclusions. One signatory should be a licensed professional engineer.)
l Dimitrios Antonopoulos M Sgriature l /[f[ l l l l Pnnt or Type Name Date Print or Type Name Signature Date l Charbel Abou-Jaoude l d' M- k XA4 l /2.// 7f l l l l Pnnt or Type Name Sgnature Date Pnnt or Type Name Sgnature Date i I I I I I I Pnnt or Type Name Sqnature Date Print or Type Name Sgnature Date
e 12/11/9510.41 AM SCREEN!NG VERIFICATION DATA SHEET (SVDS) Page03 Eq. Eq. ID Rev Sys/Eq. Desc Bidg. F1 EL Rm or Rw/Cl Base El. <40'? Cap. Demd. Cap > Caveats Anchor interact Eque i Cl No Spec _ Spec Demd? OK7 OK7 OK7 OK7 0 2-HV-2568 0 HVAC / B D/G ROOM INTAKE WH 14.50 B D/G 38.50 Yes BS GRS Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes VENTit.ATION DAMPER 0 2-HV-257A 0 HVAC / A D/G ROOM RECIRC WH 14.50 A D/G 38.50 Yes BS GRS Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes VENTILATION DAMPER 0 2-HV-2578 0 HVAC / B D/G ROOM RECIRC WH 14.50 8 D/G 38.50 Yes BS GRS Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes VENTILATION DAMPER 0 2-HV-333 0 HVAC / EAST 480V SWGR ROOM SUPPLY AB 36.50 EAST 480V 54.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes FIRENENTILATION DAMPER 0 T49A 0 DG / A DIESEL ENGINE STARTING AIR WH 14.50 A D/G 14.50 Yes BS GRS Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes TANK A 0 T498 0 DG / A DIESEL ENGINE STARTING AIR WH 14.50 A D/G 14.50 Yes BS GRS Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes TANK B 0 T49C 0 DG / B DIESEL ENGINE STARTING AIR WH 14.50 B D/G 14.50 Yes BS GRS Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes TANK C 0 T490 0 DG / 8 DIESEL ENGINE STARTING AIR WH 14.50 B D/G 14.50 Yes BS GRS Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes TANK D 0 T98 0 HVAC / CHILLED WATER SURGE TANK AB 54.50 CHILL EXP TK 54.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes 1 22E-MCC 0 ELEC AC / 480V BUS 22E (805) MCC TB 36.00 VEST 4T/ SWGR 36 50 N/A ABS CRS No Yes Yes Yes No SECTION 1 22F-MCC 0 ELEC AC / 480V BUS 22F (B06) MCC AB 36 50 EAST 480V 36.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes SECTION 1 B51 0 ELEC AC / 480V MCC BUS B51 (22-1E) AB 14.50 SFP SKIMMER PP 14.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Akt-A 1 861 0 ELEC AC / 480V MCC BUS B61 (22-1F) AB 14.50 PMP GAMD SK 14 50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 1 B62 0 ELEC AC / 480V MCC BUS B62 (22-2F) AB 06.50 CR HVAC RM 36.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 2 22E O ELEC AC / 480V BUS 22E (805) TB 36.50 WEST 480V SWGR 36.50 N/A ABS CRS No Yes Yes Yes No 2 22F 0 ELEC AC / 480V BUS 22F (B06) AB 36.50 EAST 480V 36.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes No Yes No 4 UAC1 0 ELEC AC / REGULATING TRANSFORMER AB 14.50 EAST DC GEAR 14.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes UAC1 Certrfication: Certification:
AM the information contained on this Screening Venfication Data Sheet (SVDS) is, to the best of The information provided to the Seismic CapabiHty Engineers regarding systems and operations our knowledge and belef, corred and accurate. *AR information" encludes each entry and of the equipment contained in the SVDS is, to the best of our knowledge and behef, correct and conclusion (whether venfied to be seismicaRy adequate or not). accurate.
Approved: (Signatures of all Seismic Capabihty Engineers on the Seismic Review Team (SRT) Approved: (One signature of Systems or Operations Engineer .s required if the Seismic Capabihty are required; there should be atleast two on the SRT. AN sgnatories should agree with au the Engineers deem it necessary.)
entnes and conclusions. One signatory should be a licensed professional engineer.)
t l Dimitrios Antonopoulos Pnnt or Type Name l 8 Signature l/ // !f f l Date Pnnt or Type Name l
Signature l l '
Date l Charbel Abou-Jaoude l C. /#[4,,M l /1. //- 7f l l l l Pnnt or Type Name Signature Date Pnnt or Type Name Signature Date
! l l i l l l Pnnt or Type Name Sgnature Date Pnnt or Type Name Signature Date i
12/11/9510 41 AM SCREENING VERIF! CATION DATA SHEET (CVDS) Page04 Eq. Eq. ID Rev Sys/Eq. Desc Bldg FI El. Rm or Rw/Cl Base El. <407 Cap. Demd. Cap > Caveats Anchor Interact Eque Cl No Spec. Spec Demd? OK7 OK7 OK7 OK7 4 UAC2 0 ELEC AC / REGUt.ATING TRANSFORMER AB 14.50 WEST DC GEAR 14.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes UAC2 4 UAC3 0 ELEC AC / REGULATING TRANSFORMER AB 14.50 EAST DC GEAR 14.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes UAC3 4 UAC4 0 ELEC AC / REGULATING TRANSFORMER AB 14.50 WEST DC GEAR 14 50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes UAC4 5 P4 0 AFW / TERRY TURBINE AUXILIARY FEED TB 1.50 TERRY TURBINE 1.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes PUMP 5 P9A O AFW/ A AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP TB 1.50 ELEC AUX FD PP 1.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes ASSEMBLY 5 P98 0 AFW/ 8 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP TB 1.50 ELEC AUX FD PP 1.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes ASSEMBLY 6 P122A 0 HVAC / 'A' DC SWGR RM CHILLED WATER TB 14.50 CHILLER 14.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes PUMP 6 P1228 0 HVAC / U DC SWGR RM CHILLED WATER TB 14.50 CHILLER 14 50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes PUMP 6 PSA 0 SW / A SERVICE WATER PUMP CW 14.00 SW PUMP 14.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 6 PSB 0 SW / B SERVICE WATER PUMP CW 14 00 SW PUMP 14.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 6 PSC 0 SW / C SERVICE WATER PUMP CW 14 00 SW PUMP 14.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 7 2-CH-507 0 RCS / ISOt.ATION TO RCP LEAKOFF RV (2- RB -3.50 LOOP 2 -3.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes CH-199) 7 2-CHW-11 0 HVAC / CHILLED WATER SUPPLY HDR TB 14.50 TBCCW PP&HX 14.50 Yes BS GRS Yes No N/A Yes No XTIE CONTROL VALVE 7 2-CHW-12 0 HVAC / CHILLED WATER SUPPLY HDR TB 14 50 TBCCW PP&HX 14.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes XTIE CONTROL VALVE 7 2-CHW-13 0 HVAC / CHILLED WATER RETURN HDR TB 14.50 TBCCW PP&HX 14.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes XTIE CONTROL VALVE 7 2-CHW-14 0 HVAC / CHILLED WATER RETURN HDR TD 14.50 TBCCW PP&HX 14.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes XTIE CONTROL VALVE Certification: Certification:
All the information contained on this Screening Verification Data Sheet (SVDS) is, to the best of The information provided to the Seismic Capability Engineers regarding systems and operations our knowledge and belief, correct and accurate. "All information" includes each entry and of the equipment contained in the SVDS is, to the best of our knowledge and belief, correct and conclusion (whether verified to be seismically adequate or not). accurate.
Approved: (Signatures of all Seismic Capability Engineers on the Seismic Review Team (SRT) Approved: (One signature of Systems or Operations Engineer is required if the Seismic Capability are required, there should be atleast two on the SRT. All signatories should agree with all the Engineers deem it necessary.)
entnes and conclusions. One signatory should be a licensed professional engineer.)
l Dimitnos Antonopoulos lh. O m
- - l /E!//!p[ l l l l Pnnt or Type Name Sgnature ' Date Pnnt or Type Name Signature Date l Charbel Abou-Jaoude l d M/ M., h l/J.//.7f" l l l l Pnnt or Type Name Sqnature Date Pnnt or Type Name Sgnature Date i I I I I I I Pnnt or Type Name Signature Date Pnnt or Type Name Sgnature Date
12/11/95 10:41 AM SCREENING VERIFICATION DATA SHEET (SVDS) PageO5 Eq. Eq ID Rev Sys/Eq. Desc Bktg. Fi El. Rm or Rw/Cl Base El. <40'? Cap. Demd. Cap > Caveats Anchor Interact Equip Cl No Spec. Spec Demd7 OK? OK7 OK7 OK7 7 2-CHW-3 0 HVAC / CHILLED WATER SUPPLY TB 14.50 TBCCW PP&HX 14.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes CONTROL VALVE 7 2-CHW-33 0 HVAC / CHILLED WATER SUPPLY TB 14.50 TBCCW PP&HX 14 50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes CONTROL VALVE 7 2-FW-43A 0 AFW/ #1 STEAM GENERATOR AUX TB 14.50 AUX FD VLV STA 14.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes FDWTR REGULATING VALVE 7 2-FW-438 0 AFW / #2 STEAM GENERATOR AUX TB 14.50 AUX FD VLV STA 14.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes FDWTR REGULATING VALVE 7 2-SW-111 0 SW / A CHILLER TO QUARRY CONTROL TB 14 50 CHILLER 14.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes VALVE 7 2-SW-113 0 SW / B CHILLER TO A CHILLER TB 14.50 CHILLER 14.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes DISCHARGE VALVE 7 2-SW-231 A 0 SW / A D/G HEAT EXCHANGER SERVICE WH 14.50 DG ROOMS 14 50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes WATER BYPASS VALVE 7 2-SW-2318 0 SW / 8 D/G HEAT EXCHANGER SERVICE WH 14.50 DG ROOMS 14.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes WATER BYPASS VALVE 7 2-SW-3.2A 0 SW / A SERVICE WATER HEADER TB 14.50 TBCCW HX AREA 14.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes SUPPLY TO TBCCW STOP VALVE 7 2-SW-3 28 0 SW/ B SERVICE WATER HEADER TB 14.50 TBCCWHX AREA 14.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes SUPPLY TO TBCCW STOP VALVE 7 2-SW-90A 0 SW / A SERVICE WATER PUMP CW 14.00 SW PUMP 14.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes DISCHARGE STRAINER FLUSH VALVE 7 2-SW-908 0 SW / B SERVICE WTR PUMP DISCHARGE CW 14.00 SW PUMP 14.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes STRAINER FLUSH VALVE 7 2-SW-90C 0 SW / C SERVtCE WATER PUMP CW 14.00 SW PUMP 14.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes D!SCHARGE STRAINER FLUSH VALVE 7 2-SW-97A 0 SW / SERVICE WATER PUMP HDR X-TIE CW 14.00 SW PUMP 14.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes CONTROL VALVE Certification: Certification:
All the information contained on this Screening Venfication Data Sheet (SVDS) is, to the best of The information provided to the Seismic Capability Engineers regarding systems and operations our knowledge and beiet, correct and accurate. "An information" includes each entry and of the equipment contained in the SVDS is, to the best of our knowledge and belief, correct and conclusion (whether venfied to be seismica!Iy adequate or not). accurate.
Approved (Sgnatures of a5 Seismic Capability Engineers on the Seismic Review Team (SRI) Approved. (One signature of Systems or Operations Engineer is required if the Seismic Capability tre required, there should be atleast two on the SRT. AH signatories should agree with au the Er@cers rWm it necessary.)
entries and conclusions. One signatory should be a licensed professional engineer.)
l Dimitrios Antonopoulos Pnnt or Type Narne lh8 u Sgrfature l /h/[f[
date l Print or Type Name l
Sgnature l
Date l
l Charbet Abou-Jaoude lC.M7fbM-- l/E N-9f l l l l Pnnt or Type Name Sqnature Date Pnnt or Type Name Signature Date i I I I I I I Pnnt or Type Name Sgnature Date Pnnt or Type Name Sqnature Date
12/11/951041 AM SCREENING VERIFICATION DATA SHEET (SVDS) Page C 6 Eg Eq. ID Rev Sys/Eq. Desc Bidg. F1 El. Rm or Rw/Cl Base El <40*7 Cap. Demd. Cap > Caveats Anchor interact Eque Cl No Spec. Spec Demd7 OK7 OK7 OK7 OK7 7 2-SW-97B 0 SW / SERVICE WATER PUMP HDR X-TIE CW 14 00 SW PUMP 14 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes CONTROL VALVE 8 2-CS-131 A 0 HPSI / RWST OUTLdT HEADER A YD 4.50 RWST PP CHASE 4.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes ISOLATION VALVE 8 2-HV-214A 0 HVAC / CONTROL ROOM 'A' AB 36.50 CONTROL RM 36.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes REFRIGERATION CYCLE CLG COilINLET VALVE 8 2-HV-2148 0 HVAC / ' CONTROL ROOM A' AB 36.50 CONTROL RM 36.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes REFRIGERATION CYCLE CLG Colt INLET VALVE 8 2-HV-215A 0 HVAC / CONTROL ROOM 'B' AB 36.50 CONTROL RM 36.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes REFRIGERATlON CYCLE CLG COilINLET VALVE 8 2-HV-2150 0 HVAC / CONTROL ROOM 'B' AB 36.50 CONTROL RM 36.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes REFRIGERATION CYCLE CLG COIL INLET VALVE 8 SV-4188 0 MS / TERRY TURBINE TRIP THROTTLE TB 1.50 TERRY AUX FD PMP 1.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes VALVE 9 F112A 0 HVAC / 'A' DC BATTERY RM EXHAUST FAN AB 36 50 A DC BATT 36.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 9 F1128 0 HVAC / 'B' DC BATTERY RM EXHAUST FAN AB 36.50 B DC BATT 36.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 9 F142 0 HVAC / EAST 480V RM EXHAUST FAN AB 36.50 EAST 480V 54.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 9 F31A 0 HVAC / 'A' CONTROL RM EXHAUST FAN AB 36 50 CR HVAC RM 54 50 N/A ABS RRS vas Yes Yes Yes Yes 9 F318 0 HVAC / 'B' CONTROL RM EXHAUST FAN AB 36 50 CR HVAC RM 36.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 9 F38A 0 HVAC / *A' DG ROOM VENT FAN WH 14 50 A D/G 38 50 N/A ABS CRS No Yes Yes Yes No 9 F388 0 HVAC / *B' DG ROOM VENT FAN WH 14 50 B DIG 38 50 N/A ABS CRS No Yes Yes Yes No 9 F52 0 HVAC / EAST 480V ROOM SUPPLY FAN AB 54.50 UPPER 4160V 71.50 N/A ABS RRS No Yes Yes Yes No 10 F133 0 HVAC / UPPER 4160V SWGR ROOM CLG AB 54.50 UPPER 4160V 54.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes FAN CettWication: Cert @ cation:
All the informahon contained on this Screening Verification Data Sheet (SVDS) is, to the best of The information provided to the Seismic Capabildy Engineers regarding systems and operations our knowedge and behef, correct and accurate. "All information" includes each entry and of the equipment contained in the SVDS is, to the best of our knowledge and beief, correct and conclusion (whether venfied to be seismically adequate or not) accurate.
Approved. (Signatures of all Seismic Capability Enrlneers i on the Seismic Review Team (SRT) Approved: (One signature of Systems or Operations Engineer is required if the Seismic Capability are required, there should be atieast two on the SRT. All signatone? should agree vnth all the Engineers deem it necessary.)
entries and conclusions. One signatory should be a licensed professional engineer.)
I Dwnitrios Antonopoulos ]@ 8g mama dy I/7 / l l l l Pnnt or Type Name Selfnature Date Pnnt or Type Name Sgnature Date l Charbel Abou-Jaoude l (* M7, AbC l /1. // - 7 (" l l l l Pnnt or Type Name Sgnature Date f%d or Typs Name Sgnature Date i I I I I I I Pnnt or Type Name Sgnature Date Pnnt or Type Name Signature Date
12/11/951041 AM SCREENING VERIFICATION DATA SHEET (SVDS) PageC7 Eq Eq ID Rev Sys/Eq. Desc Bkig F1 El. Rm or Rw/Cl Base El. <40"> Cap. Demd. Cap > Caveats Anchor interact Equrp Cl No Spec. Spec Demd7 OK7 OK7 OK7 OK?
10 F134 0 HVAC I LOWER 4160V SWGR ROOM CLG AB 45 00 CABLE VAULT 45 00 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes COft 10 F14A 0 HVAC / 'A' CONTAINMENT RB -3 50 N. END FUEL POOL 0.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes RECIRCULATION COOLING UNIT FAN 10 Ft4B 0 HVAC i 'B' CONTAINMENT RB -3.50 N. END FUEL POOL 0.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes RECIRCULATION COOLING UNIT FAN 10 F14C 0 HVAC / 'C' CONTAINMENT RB 36.50 N. END FUEL POOL 36 50 N/A ABS CRS No Yes Yes Yes No RECIRCUI.ATION COOLING UNIT FAN 10 F14D 0 HVAC / U CONTAINMENT RB 36.50 N. END FUEL POOL 36 50 N/A ABS CRS No Yes Yes Yes No RECIRCULATION COOLING UNIT FAN 10 F21A 0 HVAC / 'A' CONTROL ROOM A/C SYS UNIT AB 36.50 CR HVAC RM 36.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes FAN 10 F218 0 HVAC / 'B' CONTROL ROOM A/C SYS UNIT AB 36 50 CR HVAC RM 36.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes FAN to F36A 0 HVAC / 'A' CONTROL ROOM A/C AIR CLG AB 36.50 CR HVAC RM 54.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes COND FAN 10 F36B 0 HVAC / 'B' CONTROL ROOM A/C AIR CLG AB 36 50 CR HVAC RM 54 50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes COND FAN 10 F54A 0 HVAC / EAST DC SWGR RM A/C UNIT FAN AB 14 50 HALLWAY AREA 14 50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 10 F54B 0 HVAC / WEST DC SWGR RM A/C UNIT FAN AB 14 50 HALLWAY AREA 14.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 10 X-34A 0 RBCCW / CEDM COOLER 'A' RB 38.50 TOP MISSILE SHIELD 38 50 N/A ABS CRS No Yes Yes Yes No 10 X181A 0 HVAC I A' WEST 480V LOAD CENTER TB 36 50 WEST 480V SWGR 36.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes ROOM CLG COtt 11 F22A 0 HVAC / 'A' CONTROL ROOM A/C AB 36.50 CR HVAC RM 56.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes COMPRESSOR 11 F22B 0 HVAC / *B' CONTROL ROOM A/C AB 36.50 CR HVAC RM 36.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes COMPRESSOR 14 C58A 0 I SERVICE WATER PUMP PANEL CW 14 00 SW PUMP 14 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 14 C58B 0 i SERVICE WATER PUMP PANEL CW 14 00 SW PUMP 14 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Certification: Certification:
All the information contamed on this Screening Venfication Data Sheet (SVDS) is, to the best of The information provided to the Seismic Capabihty Eng neers regarding systems and operations our knowledge and behef. correct and accurate. "All infom'ation" includes each entry and of the equipment contamed in the SVDS is, to the best of our knowledge and belief, correct and concluson (whether venfied to be seismically adequate or not). accurate.
Approved. (Signatures of all Seismic Capability Engmeers on the Seismic Revew Team (SRT) Approved. (One signature of Systems or Operations Engineer is required if the Seismic Capability tre required, there should be atleast two on the SRT. All signatones should agree with all the Engineers deem it necessary.)
entnes and conclusions. One sgnatory should be a hcensed professional engmeer )
l Dem!tnos Antonopoulos l 8 l/2 / [l l l l Pnnt or Type Name Sufnature Date Pnnt or Type Name Sgnature Date l Charbel Abou-Jaoude lC./77.kK v1 h l /.f N 71~ l l l l Pnnt or Type Name '
Sgnature Date Pnnt or Type Name Sgnature Date i I I I I I I Pnnt or Type Name Sqnature Date Pnnt or Type Name Sgnature Date
12/11/951041 AM SCREENING VERIFICATION DATA SHEET (SVDS) Page08 Eq Eq.ID Rev Sys/Eq Desc Bldg. Fl El. Rm or Rw/Cl Base EL <40'? Cap. Demd. Cap > Caveats Anchor Interact Equip Cl No Spec Spec Demd? OK7 OK7 OK7 OK7 14 C58C 0 1 SERVICE WATER PUMP PANEL CW 14.00 SW PUMP 14 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 14 D11 0 ELEC DC /125VDC DISTRIBUTION PANEL AB 14.50 EAST DC GEAR 14.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes No Yes Yes No D11 14 D12 0 ELEC DC /125VDC DISTRIBUTION PANEL AB 14.50 EAST DC GEAR 14.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes No Yes Yes No D12 14 D21 0 ELEC DC /125VDC DISTRIBUTION PANEL AB 14 50 WEST DC GEAR 14.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes No Yes Yes No D21 14 D22 0 ELEC DC I 120VDC DISTRIBUTION PANEL AB 14.50 WEST DC GEAR 14.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes No Yes Yes No D22 14 DS1 0 ELEC DC / FUSED DISCONNECT SWITCH AB 14.50 A DC BATT 14.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes DS1 14 DS2 0 ELEC DC / FUSED DISCONNECT SWITCH AB 14 50 B DC BATT 14.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes DS2 14 DV10 0 ELEC DC /125VDC VIT AL PANEL DV10 AB 14 50 EAST DC GEAR 14.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 14 DV20 0 ELEC DC /125VDC VITAL PANEL DV2O AB 14.50 WEST DC GEAR 14.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 14 FLP-5 0 HVAC / EAST DC SWITCHGEAR ROOM AB 14.50 EAST DC GEAR 14.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes HALON FIRE SYSTEM PANEL 14 FLP-6 0 HVAC / WEST DC SWITCHGEAR ROOM AB 14.50 WEST DC GEAR 14.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes HALON FIRE SYSTEM PANEL 14 VA10 0 ELEC AC /120VAC VITAL INST PANEL AB 14.50 EAST DC GEAR 14.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes VA10 14 VA20 0 ELEC AC /120VAC VITAL INST PANEL AB 14.50 WEST DC GEAR 14.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes VA20 14 VA30 0 ELEC AC /120VAC VITAL INSTRUMENT AB 14.50 EAST DC GEAR 14.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes PANEL VA30 14 VA40 0 ELEC AC /120VAC VITAL INSTRUMENT AB 14.50 WEST DC GEAR 14.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes PANEL VA40 14 VR11 0 ELEC AC /120VAC INST PANEL VR11 AB 14.50 EAST DC GEAR 14.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes No Yes Yes No 14 VR21 0 ELEC AC /120VAC INST PANEL VR21 AB 14.50 WEST DC GEAR 14 50 N/A ABS RRS Yes No Yes Yes No Certification. Certification:
All the information contained on this Screening Venfication Data Sheet (SVDS) is, to the best of The information provided to the seismic Capability Engineers regarding systems and operations our knowledge and be8ief, correct and accurate. "All information" includes each entry and of the equipment contained in the SVDS is, to the best of our knowledge and belef, correct and conclusion (whether verified to be seismically adequate or not). accurate.
Approved (Signatures of all Seismic Capability Engineers on the Setsmic Review Team (SRT) Approved (One signature of Systems or Operations Engineer is required if the Seismic Capabil#
are requrred, there should be atleast two on the SRT. All signatones should agree with all the Engineers deem it necessa y.)
entnes and conclusions. One signatory should be a licensed professional engineer.)
I Dimitrios Antonopoulos l . Mfx,A l /Z!#!gf" l l l l Pnnt or Type Name Sgnature Date Pnnt or Type Name Sqnature Date l Charbel Abou-Jaoude l C /77 /96 r'1'- l M.##- W l l l l Pnnt or Type Name Sgnature Date Pnnt or Type Name Sgnature Date i I l l l l l Pnnt or Type Name Sgnature Date Pnnt or Type Name Sqnature Date
. . _ . _ _ . _ _ _= - _ m m - -_ m____ -- ~m. _. _ _ _ _ _. . . . __ _ __.
12/11/95 2.53 PM SCREENING VERIFICATION DATA SHEET (SVDS) Page#9 Eq Eq.ID Rn Sys/Eq. Desc Bldg. FI EL Rm or Rw/Cl Base El <40'? Cap. Demd. Cap > Caveats Anchor Interact Equip CI No Spec. Spec Demd? OK7 OK7 OK7 OK7 15 DB1 O ELEC OC i BATTERY 201 A (DB1) AB 14 50 A DC BATT 14.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes No No Yes No 15 DB2 0 ELEC DC / BATTERY 201B (DB2) AB 14.50 B DC BATT 14.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes No No Yes No 16 DC1 0 ELEC AC I A BATTERY CHARGER BUS AB 14.50 EAST DC GEAR 14.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 201A 16 DC2 0 ELEC AC / B BATTERY CHARGER BUS AB 14.50 WEST DC GEAR 14.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 201B 16 VIP 1 0 ELEC DC / INVERTER NO 1 AB 14.50 EAST DC GEAR 14 50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes-16 VIP 2 0 ELEC DC / INVERTER NO 2 AB 14 50 WEST DC GEAR 14.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 16 VIP 3 0 ELEC DC 1 INVERTER NO 3 AB 14 50 EAST DC GEAR 14 50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 16 VIP 4 0 ELEC DC / INVERTER NO 4 AB 14.50 WEST DC GEAR 14 50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 17 H7A 0 DG / A EMERGENCY DIESEL WH 14.50 A D/G 14.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes GENERATOR 17 H7B 0 DG / B EMERGENCY DIESEL WH 14.50 8 DIG 14.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes GENERATOR 18 LT-3001 0 CVCS I RWST LEVEL YD 14.50 N SIDE RWST 14.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 18 LT-3002 0 CVCS / RWST LEVEL YD 14.50 N SIDE RWST 14.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 18 LT-3003 0 CVCS / RWST LEVEL YD 14.50 NE SIDE RWST 14.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 18 LT-3004 0 CVCS / RWST LEVEL YD 14.50 NE SIDE RWST 14.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 18 LT-5282 0 COND / CST LEVEL YD 14.50 CST SHACK 14.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 18 PDC-6475 0 SWiSW STRAINER A DIFF PRESS CW 14.00 SW PUMP 14.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes i CONTROLLER 18 PDC-6481 0 SWISW STRAINER B DIFF PRESS CW 14.00 SW PUMP 14.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes CONTROLER 18 PDC-6488 0 SW/SWSTRAINER C DIFF PRESS CW 14.00 SW PUMP 14 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes CONTROLER 20 C01 0 1 MAIN CONTROL BOARD C01 (FRONT) CB 36.50 CONTROL RM 36 50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 20 C01R 0 / MAIN CONTROL BOARD C01 (REAR) CB 36.50 CONTROL RM 36.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 20 CO1X 0 / ACCESS CONTROL DOOR ALARM CB 36.50 CONTROL RM 36.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes No Yes Yes No DITRIBUTION PANEL Certdication: Certrfication:
AR the information contained on this Screening Verification Data Sheet (SVDS) is, to the best of The information provided to the Seismic Capability Engineers regarding systems and operations ,
our knowledge and belief, corred and accurate. *AR information" includes each entry and cf the equipment contained in the SVDS is, to the best of our knowledge and behef, correct and conclusion (whether venfed to be seismicany adequate or not). accurate.
Approved. (Signatures cf an Seismic Capability Engineers on the Seismic Revew Team (SRT) Approved: (One signature of Systems or Operations Engineer is required if the Seismic Capabihty are required; there should be atleast two on the SRT. AR signatories should agree with aR the Engineers deem it necessary.)
entries and conclusions. One signatory should be a li nsed professional engineer.)
i Dimitms Antompoubs l .O l lT/Uff [ l l l l Pnnt or Type Name Sqnature ' Date Pnnt or Type Name Sqnature Date l Charbel Abou-Jaoude jdM da J #" ' l D H- W l l l l Pnnt or Type Name Sgnature Date Pnnt or Type Name Sgnature Date I I I I I i 1 Pnnt or Type Name Sgnature Date Pnnt or Type Name Sgnature Date
12/11/9510.41 AM SCREENING VERfFICATION DATA SHEET (SVDS) Page 010 Eq Eq. ID Rev Sys/Eq. Desc Bldg. FI El. Rm or Rw/C1 Base El. <407 Cap. Demd. Cap > Caveats Anchor Intered Equip ;
Cl No Spec. Spec Demd7 OK7 OK7 OK7 OK7 20 CO2 0 / MAIN CONTROL BOA'ID CO2 (FRONT) CB 3a50 CONTROL RM 36.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 20 CO2R 0 i MAIN CCNTROL BOARD CO2 (REAR) CB 36 50 CONTROL RM 36.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes '
20 CO3 0 t MAIN CONTROL BOARD CO3 (FRONT) CB 36.50 CONTROL RM 36 50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 20 CO3R 0 1 MAIN CONTROL BOARD C03 (REAR) CB 36.50 CONTROL RM 36 50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 20 C04 0 / MAIN CONTROL BOARD C04 (FRONT) CB 36 5C CONTROL RM 36.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 20 COS 0 t MAIN CONTROL BOARD C05 (FRONT) CP 36.50 CONTROL RM 36.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes No Yes No No 20 C05R 0 1 MAIN CONTROL BOARD C05 (REAR) CB 36 50 CONTROL RM 36.50 WA ABS RRS Yes No Yes No No 20 C06 0 / MAIN CONTROL BOARD C06 (FRONT) CB 36 50 CONTROL RM 36.50 WA ABS RRS Yes No Yes No No 20 C06R 0 t MAIN CONTROL BOARD C06 (REAR) CB 36.50 CONTROL RM 36.50 WA ABS RRS Yes No Yes No No 20 C06X 0 / MAIN CONTROL BOARD C06X CB 36.50 CONTROL RM 36.50 WA ABS RRS Yes No Yes No No 20 C07 0 1 MA!N CONTROL BOARD C07 (FRONT) CB 36 50 CONTROL RM 36 50 WA ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 20 C07R 0 1 MAIN CONTROL BOARD C07 (REAR) CB 36.50 CONTROL RM 36.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 20 COS 0 / MAIN CONTROL BOARD C08 (FRONT) CB 36.50 CONTROL RM 36.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes No No 20 C08R 0 t MAIN CONTROL BOARD C08 (REAR) CB 36 50 CONTROL RM 36 50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes No No 20 C10 0 t SAFE SHUTDOWN PANEL AB 54 50 UPPER 4160V 54 50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 20 C25A 0 1 CONTROL ROOM VENT CONTROL CB 36.50 CONTROL RM 36.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes No Unk No No CABINET 20 C258 0 t CONTROL ROOM VENT CONTROL CB 36.50 CONTROL RM 36.50 NA ABS RRS Yes No Unk No No CABINET 20 C39 0 / DIESEL GENERATOR H7B CONTROL WH 14.50 B D/G 14.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes CABINET 20 C70A 0 / BOTTLE-UP PANEL C70A AB 36.50 EAST 480V 36 50 WA ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 20 C708 0 i BOTTLE-UP PANEL C708 AB 36.50 EAST 480V 36.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 20 C80 0 t VITAL SWITCHGEAR VENT CONTROL CB 36.50 CONTROL RM 36.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes No Yes No No CABINET 20 F22A-PNL 0 HVAC / 'A' CONTROL ROOM A/C AB 36.50 CR HVAC RM 36.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes ,
COMPRESSOR PANEL 20 F228-PNL 0 HVAC / 'B' CONTROL ROOM A/C AB 36.50 CR HVAC RM 36.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes COMPRESSOR PANEL Certrheaten: Certdicaten:
AR the information contained on this Screening Verification Data Sheet (SVDS) is, to the best of The information provided to the Seismic Capability Engineers regarding systems and operations our knowledge and belief, correct and accurate. "All inforrnaton" indudes each entry and of the equipment contained in the SVDS is, to the best of our knowledge and behef, correct and condusion (whether venfied to be sersmically adequate or not). accurate.
Approved: (Signatures of all Seismic Capability Engineers on the Seismic Review Team (SRT) Approved: (One signature of Systems or Operations Engineer is required if the Seismic Capability are required, there should be atleaa two on the SRT. All signatones should agree with au the Engineers deem it necessary.)
entries and conclusions. One sgnatory should be a licensed professenal engineer.)
I Dmtnos Antonopoulos Pnnt of Type Name l .8 Sogndure l #[//!r(
(late l Pnnt or Type Name l
Sgnature l l Date l Oharbei Abou-Jaoude l#M di- 3 -~'1' --
l M //- Y l l l l Pnnt or Type Name S gnature Date Pnnt or Type Name Sgnature Date l I I I I I I Pnnt or Type Name Sqnature Date Pnnt or Type Name Signature Date
12/11/9510 41 AM SCREEMING VERIFICATION DATA SHEET (SVDS) Page011 Eq Eq ID Rev Sys/Eg Desc Btdg. FI El Rm or Rw/Cl Base El <40'7 Cap. Demd. Cap > Caveats Anchor interact Equip Cl No Spec. Spec Demd7 OK7 OK7 OK? OK7 20 RCO2A1 0 / ESAS ACTUATION CAB: NET CB 36 50 CONTROL RM 36 50 N/A ABS RRS Yes No Yes No No 20 RCO2B 0 / ESAS ACTUATION CABINET 5 CB 36 50 CONTROL RM 36 50 N/A ABS RRS Yes No Yes No No 20 RCO2B2 0 # ESAS ACTUATION CABINET CB 36 50 CONTROL RM 36.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes No Yes No No 20 RCO2C 0 t ESAS ACTUATION CABINET 6 CB 36 50 CONTROL RM 36 50 N/A ABS RRS Yes No Yes No No 20 RCO2C3 0 # ESAS ACTUATION CABINET CB 36 50 CONTROL RM 36 50 N/A ABS RRS Yes No Yes No No 20 RCO204 0 1 ESAS ACTUATION CABINET CB 36 50 CONTHOL RM 36.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes No Yes No No 20 RC058 0 iRPS PANEL B LOOP CB 36.50 CONTROL RM 36 50 N/A ABS RRS Yes No Yes No No 20 RC30A-1 0 / SPEG-200 CABINET RC-30A-1 CB 36 50 BEHIND C01R 36 50 N/A ABS RRS 'les Yes Yes Yes Yes 20 RC308 0 i SPEG-200 CABINET RC-308 CB 36 50 BEHIND CO3R 36 50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 20 RC308-1 0 # SPEC-200 CABINET RC-300-1 CB 36 50 BEHIND C01R 36 50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 20 RC31A 0 / SPEC-200 CABINET RC-31 A CB 36 50 NEAR C01 36 50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 20 RC31B 0 / SPEC-200 CABINET RC-31B CB 36 50 NEAR COI 36 50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 20 RS1 0 ELEC AC / AUTO TRANSFER SWITCH RS1 AB 14 50 EAST DC GEAR 14.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 20 RS2 O ELEC AC / AUTO TRANSFER SWITCH RS2 AB 14 50 WEST DC GEAR 14.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 20 T040 0 ELEC / DIESEL GENERATOR PANEL WH 14 50 A D/G 14 50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 20 TO41 0 ELEC / OtESEL GENERATOR PANEL WH 14.50 B D/G 14.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 20 X169A_PNL 0 / X169A COMPRESSOR CONTROL PANEL TB 14 50 CHILLER 14 50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 20 X1698_PNL 0 / X1698 COMPRESSOR CONTROL PANEL TB 14 50 CHILLER 14 50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Cert;fication: Certincation; AR the information contained on this Screening Venfication Data Sheet (SVDS) is, to the best of The information provided to the Seismic Capability Engineers regarding systems and operations our knowledge and belief, correct and accurate. "AR information" includes each entry and of the equipment contained in the SVDS is, to the best of our knowledge and behef, correct and conclusion (whether venfied to be seismically adequate or not). accurate.
Approved: (Signatures of aR Seismic Capability Engtneers on the Seismic Review Team (SRT) Approved: (One signature of Systems or Operations Engineer is required if the Seismic Capability are required; there should be atleast two on the SRT. AR signatories should agree with as the Engineers deem it necessary.)
entnes and conclusions. One signatory should be a licensed prokssional engineer.)
l Danitrios Antonopoulos l 8 a l /Mhr(l l l l Pnnt or Type Name Sgr(ature ' Dste Pnnt or Type Name Sqnature Date I Charbel Abou-Jaoude l dM bd *C lE%El l l l Pnnt or Type Name Sgnature Date Pnnt or Type Name Sgnature Date l I I I I I I Pnnt or Type Name Sgnature Date Pnnt or Type Name Sgnature Date
l l
12/11/9510.30 AM SCREENING VEMFICATIDM DATA SNEET(SVDS) Page0 1 l
1
! ES Eq.ID Rev Sys/Eq. Desc Bldg. Fi El. Rm or RuWCl Base El. <40'? Cap. Demd. Cap > Cavests Anchor Interact Egulp Cl No -
Spec. Spec Demd? OK7 OK7 OK7 OK7
, 21 T40 0 COND / CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK YD 14.50 CST & HX AREA 14.50 MA MA N/A N/A Yes Yes N/A Yes l 21 T41 0 CVCS / REFUELING WATER STORAGE YD 14.50 RWST & HX AREA 14.50 MA N/A N/A N/A Yes Yes N/A Yes i TANK l- 21 T48A 0 DG / A DIESEL ENGINE FUEL OfL SUPPLY WH 38.50 DG DM TANK 38.50 N/A N/A N/A N/A Yes Yes N/A Yes l DAY TANK 21 T488 0 DG / B DIESEL ENGINE FUEL Olt SUPPLY WH 38.50' DC DAY TANK 38.50 MA N/A N/A N/A Yes Yes N/A Yes DAY TANK 21 X-24 0 RBCCW / PRIMARY DRAIN TANK AND RB -22.50 NE CORNER -22.50 N/A N/A NA N/A N/A Yes N/A Yes OUENCH TANK COOLERS 21 X169A 0 HVAC /'N DC SWGR RM CHILLER TB 14.50 CHILLER 14.50 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Yes N/A Yes l CONDENSER
! 21 X1698 0 HVAC / W DC SWGR RM CHILLER TB 14.50 CHILLER 14.50 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Yes N/A Yes
! CONDENSER Certificehon. Certifiestion.
All the informahon contained on this Screenmg Venfication Data Sheet (SVDS) is, to the best of The information provided to the Selenc CM Engmeets regarding systems and operations our knowledge and belief, correct and accurale *All information" includes each entry and of the equipment contained in the SVDS is, to the best of our knowledge and belief, conect and conclusion (whether venfied to be seistrucelly adequale or not). accurate Approved: (Signatures of all Seismc Capability Engmeers on the Seesec Review Team (SRT) Approved: (One signature of Systems or Opershons Engmeer is rosy dred if the Seisme Capabety are requwed, there should be atleest two on the SRT. All signatones should agree with all the Engmeets deem it necessary.)
entries and conclusens. One signatory should be a licensed professional engmeer.)
I Deniinos Anianopouio. Ih. #[rd I /2d//rf I I I I Print or Type Name Signature ' Date Print or Type Name Signature Date l Charbei m Pnnt or Type Name I o/71/OL Signature A+' I 2"- ff I Date Pnnt or Type Name I
Signature I
Date l
i I I I I I l Pnnt or Type Name Signature Date ' Pnnt or Type Name Signature Date
12/11/95 10:41 AM SCREENING VERIFICATION DATA SHEET (SVDS) Page01 Eq Eq. ID Rev Sys/Eq. Desc Bldg. FI EL Rm or Rw/Cl Base El. <40'? Cap. Demd. Cap > Caveats Anchor interact Equip Cl No Spec. Spec Demd7 OK7 OK7 OK7 OK?
O 24 fV-261 0 HVAC / LOWER SWGR ROOM AB 45.00 CABLE VAULT 45 00 N/A ABS RRS Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes FIRENENTILATION DAMPER 0 2-HV-262 0 HVAC / LOWER SWGR ROOM AB 45.00 CABLE VAULT 45.00 N/A ABS RRS Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes VENTILATION DAMPER 0 2-HV-264 0 HVAC / LOWER SWGR ROOM AB 45 00 CABLE VAULT 45.00 N,A ABS RRS Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes FIRENENTILATION DAMPER 0 2-HV-265 0 HVAC I EAST 480V SWGR ROOM AB 54.50 OPP m 4e6GV 56.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes FIRENENTilATION DAMPER 0 2-HV-274 0 HVAC I EAST 480V SWGR ROOM AB 54.50 UPPER 4160V 66.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes FIRENENTILATION DAMPER 0 2-HV-278 0 HVAC / UPPER SWGR ROOM AB 54.50 UNtR 4160V 64.75 N/A ABS RRS Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes VENTILATION DAMPER 0 2-HV-279 0 HVAC I LOWER SWGR ROOM AB 45.00 CAet E VAULT 45.00 N/A ABS RRS Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes VENTILATION DAMPER 0 2-SW-3 2A- 0 SW / AIR ACCUMULATOR FOR 2-SW-3.2A TB 14.50 TBCCW HX AREA 14.50 Yes BS GRS Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes TK 0 2-SW-3.2B- 0 SWI AIR ACCUMULATOR FOR 2-SW-3.28 TB 14.50 TBCCWHX AREA 14.50 Yes BS GRS Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes TK 0 H-26 0 RBCCW / BORIC ACID EVAPORATOR AB -5.50 BA EVAPORATOR -5.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes PACKAGE O X-64 0 RBCCW / SAMPLE COOLER (RACK) AB 14.50 SAMPLE SINK 14.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes O X-65 0 RBCCW / SAMPLE COOLER (RACK) AB 14.50 SAMPLE SINK 14.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes 1 8 52 0 ELEC AC / 480V MCC BUS BS2 (22-2E) WH 38.50 EB HVAC RM 38.50 N/A GERS CRS No Yes Yes Yes No 2 001 0 ELEC DC /125VDC EMERGENCY BUS D01 AB 14.50 EAST DC GEAR 14.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 2 D02 0 ELEC DC /125VDC EMERGENCY BUS D02 AB 14 50 WEST DC GEAR 14 50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 3 240 0 ELEC AC / 416KV EMG BUS 240 (A4) AB 54.50 UPPER 4160V 54 50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 5 P19A 0 CVCS / 'A' BORIC ACfD TRANSFER PUMP AB -550 BAST AREA -5 50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 5 P198 0 CVCS I'B' BORIC ACO TRANSFER PUMP AB -5.50 BAST AREA -5.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 5 P41A 0 HPSI / 'A* HPSI PUMP AB -45.50 A SAFEGUARDS -45.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Certrheation: Certrhcation:
All the information contained on this Screening Verification Data Sheet (SVDS) is, to the best of The informabon provided to the Seismic Capability Engineers regarding systems and operations our knowledge and belief, correct and accurate. "All information" includes each entry and of the equipment contained in the SVDS is, to the best of our knowledge and belief, correct and conclusion (whether verrhed to be seismically adequate or not). accurate.
Approved: (Signatures of all Seismic Capability Engmeers on the Seism.c Review Team (SRT) Approved: (One signature of Systems or Operations Engineer is required if the Seismic Capabehty are required, there should be atieast two on the SRT. All signatories should agree with all the Engineers deem it necessary.)
entries and conclusions. One signatory should be a licensed professional engineer.)
l Sing Chu Pnnt or Type Name l M d&
Agnature I < 2/u/9r i Dat6 Pnnt or Type Name I
Sgnature I l Date l Dimitrios Antonopoulos Pnnt or Type Name
.M - -
Sigrfature I / // Of l Date 1 l l Pnnt or Type Name Signature Date i I I I I I l Pnnt or Type Name Sgnature Date Pnnt or Type Name Sgnature Date
12/11/9510.41 AM SCREENING VERIFICATION DATA SHEET (SVDS) Pago 02 Eq. Eq. ID Rev Sys/Eq. Desc Bldg. FI EL Rm or Rw/Cl Base El. c40"I Cap. Demd. Cap > Caveats Anchor interact Eque Cl No Spec. Spec Demd? OK7 OK? OK7 OK7 5 P41B 0 HPSI /1T HPSI PUMP AB -45 50 C SAFEGUARDS -45 50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 5 P41C 0 HPSI / U HPSI PUMP AB -45.50 B SAFEGUARDS -45 50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 6 P42A 0 LPSII A LOW PRESSURE SAFETY AB -45.50 A SAFEGUARDS -45.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes INJECT 10'1 PUMP ASSEMBLY 6 P42B 0 LPSI/ B LOW PRESSURE SAFETY AB -45.50 BSAFEGUARDS -45 50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes INJECTION PUMP ASSEMBLY 7 2-CH-192 0 CVCS I RWST HEADER OUTLET CONTROL AB -25.50 CH PMP AREA -25.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes VALVE 7 2-CH-196 0 RCS 1 RCP BLEEDOFF CONTROL VALVE EB -5.50 W PP PEN -5.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 7 2-CH-210X 0 CVCS / DILUTION CONTROL VALVE AB -5.50 BAST AREA -550 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 7 2-CH-506 0 RCS / RCP BLEEDOFF INSIDE CTMT RB -3.50 SW CORNER -3.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes CONTROL VALVE 7 2-CH-510 0 CVCS / BORIC ACID PUMP AB -5_50 CAST AREA -5.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes RECIRCULAT10N VALVE 7 2-CH-511 0 CVCS / BORIC ACID PUMP AB -5 50 BAST AREA -5.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes RECIRCULATION VALVE 7 2-CH-512 0 CVCS / VCT MAKEUP CONTROL VALVE AB -5.50 BAST a.REA -5.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 7 2-CH-515 0 RCS / LETDOWN HEADER SIAS ISOLATION RB -0.50 l0.*.* CGRhth -3 50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 7 2-CH-516 0 RCS / LETDOWN HEADER CIAS CTMT RB -3.50 ISW CORNER -3.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes ISOLATION 7 2-CH-517 0 CVCS / AUX SPRAY CHARGING HEADER RB -3.50 SW CORNER -3.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes SUPPLY VALVE 7 2-CH-518 0 CVCS I LOOP 2A CHARGING HEADER RB -3.50 SW CORNER -3.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes ,
7 2-CH-519 0 CVCS / LOOP 1A CHARGING HEADER RB -3.50 SW CORNER -3.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 7 2-CN-241 0 COND / CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK TO TB 14.50 NE CORNER 14.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes HOTWELL LEVEL CONTROL VALVE ;
7 2-FW-12A 0 AFW/ #1 S/G AUXILIARY FEED SUPPLY EB 38.50 E PP PEN 38.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes ,
AIR ASSIST CHECK VALVE Certificaton: Certification:
All the information contained on this Screenmg Verification Data Sheet (SVDS) is, to the best of The infomiation provided to the Seismic Capability Engineers regarding systems and operations our knowledge and belief, correct and accurate. "All information" includes each entry and of the equipment contained in the SVDS is, to the best of our knowledge and belef, correct and conclusion (whether venfied to be seismically adequate or not). accurate Approved. (Signatures of all Seismic Capability Engineers on the Seismic Review Team (SRT) Approved: (One signature of Systems or Operations Engineer is required if the Seismic Capabihty .
are required; there should be atleast two on the SRT. All signatories should agree with all the Engineers deem it necessary.) l entres and conclusions. One signatory should be a licensed professional engsneer.)
l Sing Chu Pnnt or Type Name l
, )Sgnature CO l /Mt/M Dale l l l l Pnnt or Type Name Segnature Date l Drnstrios Antonopoulos Pnnt or Type Name l k l /4[/!( l Date Pnnt or Type Name l
Signature l
Date l
S@ nature i I l l 1 l I I Pnnt or Type Name Segnature Date Pnnt or Type Name Segnature Date '
L
. _ _ . . _ . . _ _ - ___u_.________._ . _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ . . - _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ - _ . _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . . . - _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ . _ _ . _ . _ _ _ .____..._.___..a
12/11/95 10:41 AM SCREENING VERIFICATION DATA SHEET (SVDS) PageC 3 Eq Eq ID Rev Sys/Eg Desc Biog. FI EL Rm or Rw/Cl Base EL (40'? Cap. Demd. Cap > Caveats Anchor interact Equp t Cl No Spec. Spec Demd7 OK7 OK7 OK7 OK7 7 2-FW-12B 0 AFW/ #2 S/G AUX FEED SUPPLY AIR EB 38 50 W PP PEN 38.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes ASSIST CHECK VALVE 7 2-FW-5A 0 AFW / #1 S/G MAIN FEED SUPPLY AIR EB 38.50 E PP PEN 38.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes ASSISTCHECKVALVE ASSEMBLY 7 2-FW-50 0 AFW / #2 S/G MAIN FEED SUPPLY AIR EB 38.50 W PP PEN 38.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes ASSIST CHECK VALVE ASSEMBLY 7 2-MS-190A 0 MS / #1 STEAM GENERATOR EB 54.50 E PP PEN 54.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes ATMOSPHERIC DUMP CONTROL VALVE 7 2-MS-190B 0 MS / #2 STEAM GENERATOR EB 54.50 W PP PEN 54.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes ATMOSPHERIC DUMP CONTROL VALVE 7 2-MS-220A 0 MS / STEAM GENERATOR SURFACE EB -5.50 E PP PEN -5.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes BLOWDOWN CONTROL VALVE 7 2-MS-220B 0 MS / STEAM GENERATOR SURFACE EB -5.50 E PP PEN -5.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes BLOWDOWN CONTROL VALVE 7 2-MS-239 0 MS / #2 STEAM GENERATOR SAFETY EB 54.50 W SRV PLATFORM 54.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes RELIEF VALVE 7 2-MS-240 0 MS / #2 STEAM GENERATOR SAFETY EB 54.50 W SRV PLATFORM 54.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes REllEF VALVE 7 2-MS-241 0 MS / #2 STEAM GENERATOR SAFETY EB 54.50 W SRV PLATFORM 54.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes RELIEF VALVE 7 2-MS-242 0 MS / #2 STEAM GENERATOR SAFETY EB 54.50 W SRV PLATFORM 54.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes RELIEF VALVE 7 2-MS-243 0 MS / #2 STEAM GENERATOR SAFETY EB 54.50 W SRV PLATFORM 54.50 NA ABS RRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes i RELIEF VALVE 7 2-MS-244 0 MS / #2 STEAM GENERATOR SAFETY EB 5& 50 v.* 0RV h.mWORM 54.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes RELIEF VALVF ,
t 7 2-MS-245 0 MS / #2 STEAL GENERATOR SAFETY EB 541;G vv SRV PLATFORM 54.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes RELIEF VALVE Certification: Certification:
All the information contained on this Screening Venfication Data Sheet (SVDS) is, to the best of The information provded to the Seismic Capabihty Engeneers regarding systems and operations our knowledge and belief, correct and accurate. "All information' includes each entry and of the equipment contained in the SVDS is, to the best of our knowledge and behef, correct and conclusion (whether venfied to be seismically adequate or not). accurate.
Approved: (Signatures of all Seismic Capability Engmeers on the Seismic Review Team (SRT) Approved: (One signature of Systems or Operations Engineer is required if the Seismic Capability are regtnred, there should be atleast two on the SRT. An signatones should agree with all the Engineers deem it necessary.)
entnes and conclusions One signatory should be a licensed professional engineer.)
l Sing Chu l CL l /M,eM l l l l Pnnt or Type Name Sgnature Dat'e Pnnt or Type Name Sgnature Date l
l Dimitrios Antonopoulos l .M m l/ / [l l l l Pnnt or Type Name SgnaIure ' Date Pnnt or Type Name Signature Date l I I I I I l Pnnt or Type Name Sgnature Date Pnnt or Type Name Sgnature Date
12/11/9510 41 AM SCREENING VERIFICATION DATA SHEET (SVDS) PageO4 Eq Eg ID Rev Sys/Eq Desc Bldg. FI EL Rm or Rw/Cl Base El. <40'? Cap. Demd. Cap > Caveats Ar@or Interact Equip Cl No Spec. Spec Demd? OK7 OK7 OK7 OK7 7 2-MS-246 0 MS / #2 STEAM GENERATOR SAFETY EB 54.50 W SRV PLATFORM 54.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes RELIEF VALVE 7 2-MS-247 0 MS I #1 STEAM GENERATOR SAFETY EB 54.50 E SRV PLAT FORM 54.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes RELIEF VALVE 7 2-MS-248 0 MS 181 STEAM GENERATOR SAFETY EB 54.50 E SRV PLATFORM 54.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes RELIEF VALVE 7 2-MS-249 0 MS I #1 STEAM GENERATOR SAFETY EB 54.50 E SRV PLATFORM 54.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes RELIEF VALVE 7 2-MS-250 0 MS / #1 STEAM GENERATOR SAFETY EB 54.50 E SRV PLATFORM 54.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes RELIEF VALVE 7 2-MS-251 0 MS / #1 STEAM GENERATOR SAFETY EB 54.50 E SRV PLATFORM 54.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes RELIEF VALVE 7 2-MS-252 0 MS / #1 STEAM GENERATOR SAFETY EB 54 50 E SRV PLATFORM 54.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes RELIEF VALVE 7 2-MS-253 0 MS / #1 STEAM GENERATOR SAFETY EB 54.50 E SRV PLATFORM 54 50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes RELIEF VALVE 7 2-MS-254 0 MS / #1 STEAM GENERATOR SAFETY EB 54 50 E SRV PLATFORM 54.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes RELIEF VALVE 7 2-MS-64A 0 MS / #1 STEAM GENERATOR MA!N STEAM EB 54.50 E PP PEN 54.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes fSOLATION VALVE 7 2-MS-64B 0 MS I #2 STEAM GENERATOR MAIN STEAM EB 54 50 W PP PEN $4.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes ISOLATION VALVE 7 2-RB-13.1 A 0 RBCCWI A SHUTDOWN COOLING HEAT AB -45.50 SDC HX AREA 4550 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes EXCHANGER OUTLET STOP VALVE 7 2-RB-13.1B 0 RBCCW/ B SHUTDOWN COOLING HEAT AB -45 50 SDC HX AREA -45.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes EXCHANGER OUTLET STOP VALVE 7 2-RB-41 B 0 RBCCW / RBCCW HEAT EXCHANGER 18A AB -25.50 RBCCY/ HX -25.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes HEADER B OUTLETVALVE l Certificaton: Certdicstion:
f.Il the information contained on thrs Screening Venfication Data Sheet (SVDS) is, to the best of The information provided to the Seismic Capabildy Engineers regardmg systems and operations our knowledge and belief, correct and accurate. "All informaton" includes each entry ar:d of tne equipment contained in the SVDS is, to the best of our knowledge and behef, coned and conclusion (whether venfied to be seismically adequate or not). accurate.
Approved. (Signatures of all Seismic Capability Engmeers on the Seismic Revew Team (SRT) Approved. (One signature of Systems or Operations Engineer is required if the Seismic Capabihty are required, there should be atleast two on the SRT. All signatories should agree with all the Engineers deem it necessary )
entnes and conclusions. One signatory should be a licensed professional engineer )
l Sing Chu Pnnt or Type Name l QL Sijnature c4 I <2/y k I Date Pnnt or Type Name i
Sgnature I
Date l
l Dimitnos Antonopoulos Pnnt or Type Name l .M -
Sgnature l/M/!ff l Date Pnnt or Type Name l
Sgnature l
Date l
i I i l I I I Pnnt or Type Name Sqnature Date Pnnt or Type Name Sqnature Date
12/11/95 to 41 AM SCREENING VERIFICATION DATA SHEET (SVDS) Page0 5 Eq Eq.10 Rev Sys/Eq. Dese Bldg. F4 El. Rm or Rw/Cl Base El. <40*? Cap. Demd. Cap > Caveats Anchor interact Equp Cl No Spec. Spec De-nd? OK7 OK7 OK7 OK7 7 2-RB-4.1 E O RBCCW / RBCCW HEAT EXCHANGER 18C AB -25.50 RBCCW HX -25.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N//i Yes Yes HEADER A OUTLETVALVE 7 2-RB-68.1 A 0 RBCCW / ESF ROOM COOLING 36A AB -45.50 A SAFEGUARDS -45.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes RBCCW OUTLET VALVE 7 2-RB48.1B 0 RBCCW / ESF ROOM COOLING 36B AB -45.50 B SAFEGUARDS -45.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes RBCCW OUTLET VALVE 7 2-RC-200 0 RCS / PRESSURIZER SAFETY VALVE RB 38.50 PRESS TOP 38.50 N/A ABS CRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 7 2-RC-201 0 RCS / PRESSUR!ZER SAFETY VALVE RB 38.50 PRESS TOP 38 50 N/A ABS CRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 7 2-RC-402 0 RCS / PRESSURIZER PORV RB 38.50 PRESS TOP 38 50 N/A ABS CRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 7 2-RC-404 0 RCS / PRESSURIZER PORV RB 38.50 PRESS TOP 38.50 N/A ABS CRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 7 2-RC-406 0 RCS / REACTOR VESSEL DRAIN HEADER RB -3.50 ALL AREAS -3.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes CONTROL VALVE 7 2-St-306 0 LPSI / SHUTDOWN COOLING FLOW AB -45.50 A SAFEGUARDS -45.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes CONTROL VALVE ASSEMBLY 7 2-St-657 0 LPSt / SHUTDOWN COOLING HEAT AB -45.50 A SAFEGUARDS -45.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes EXCHANGER FLOW CONTROL VALVE 7 2-SW-102 0 SW / 'A' SERVICE WATER HEADER TB 14.50 CHILLER 14.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes CHILLER X-170 CONTROL VALVE 7 2-SW-104 0 SW / 'B' SERVICE WATER HEADER TB 14.50 CHILLER 14.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes CHILLER X-170 CONTROL VALVE 8 2-CH-501 0 CVCS / VCT TO CHARGING SYSTEM AB -25.50 DEGASIFIER -25.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes OUTLET VALVE 8 2-CH-508 0 CVCS / B BAT OUTLET GRAVITY FEED AB -5'50 BAST AREA -5 50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 8 2-CH-509 0 CVCS / A BAT OUTLET GRAVITY FEED AB -5.50 BAST AREA -5.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 8 2-CH-514 0 CVCS / BORIC ACID PUMP DISCHARGE TO AB -5.50 BAST AREA -5.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes CHARGING PUMP SUCTION 8 2-RC-403 0 RCS / PRESSURIZER PORV BLOCK VALVE RB 38 50 PRESS TOP 38.50 Ff3 ABS CRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 8 2-RC 405 0 RCS / PRESSURIZER PORV BLOCK VALVE RB 38.50 PRESS TOP 38 50 , ffA ABS CRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes Cutification. Certification:
j All the information contained on this Screening Verification Data Sheet (SVDS) is, to the best of The information provided to the Seismic Capability Engrneers regarding systems and operations our knowiedge and belief, correct and accurate. "All informaten" includes each entry and 6lthe eqd; ant contarned in the SVDS is, to the best of our knowiedge and behef, correct and conclusion (whether venfied to be seismically adequate or not). accurate.
Approved; (Signatures of all Seismic Capability Engineers on the Seismic Review Team (SRT) Approved: (One signature of Systems or Operations Engineer is required if the Seismic Capabihty are required, there should be atleast two on the SRT. All signatories should agree with all the En@cers deem it necessary.)
entnes and conclusions. One signatory should be a licensed professional engineer.)
l Sing Chu l GL l t2/w/hr i I l l Print or Type Name ) Sgnature Date Pnnt or Type Name Sqnature Date l Dimitrios Antonopoulos I .M I/ /!r[ l l 1 l Pnnt or Type Name Signature D'ate Pnnt or Type Name Signature Date I i l I I I i Pnnt or Type Name Sqnature Date Pnnt or Type Name Signature Date
t 12/11/951041 AM SCREENING VERIFICATION DATA SHEET GVDS) Page06 i Eg Eq. ID Rev Sys/Eq. Desc Bldg. Fi El. Rm or Rw/Cl Base El. <40'? Cap. Demd. Cap > Caveats Anchor Interact Equip Cl No Spec. Spec Demd7 OK7 OK7 OK7 OK7 8 2-Sl414 0 51/ #1 SAFETY INJECTION TANK OUTLET RB 14.50 NE CORNER 14.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes VALVE ;
8 2-Sl415 0 LPSI / LPSI HEADER TO LOOP 1 A EB -5.50 W PP PEN -5.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes INJECTION VALVE I 8 2-S1424 0 St I #2 SAFETY INJECTION TANK OUTLET RB 14.50 SE CORNER 14.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes VALVE '
8 2-Sl425 0 LPSI / LPSI HEADER TO LOOP 1B EB -5.50 W PP PEN -5.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes i INJECTION VALVE i 8 2-S1434 0 St i #3 SAFETY INJECTION TANK OUTLET RB 14.50 SW CORNER 14.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes VALVE 8 2-S*-635 0 LPSI / LPSI HEADER TO LOOP 2A EB -5.50 W PP PEN -5.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes INJECTION VALVE 8 2-Sl444 O SII#4 SAFETY INJECTION TANK OUTLET RB 14.50 NW CORNER 14.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes VALVE 8 2-SI-645 0 LPSII LPSI HEADER TO LOOP 2B EB -5.50 W PP PEN -5 50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes NA Yes Yes INJECTION VALVE 8 2-SI-651 0 SI / SHUTDOWN COOLING SUCTION RB -3.50 SW CORNER -3.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes HEADER CTMT ISOLATION VALVE O 2-Sl452 0 SI / SHUTDOWN COOLING SUCTION RB -22.50 SW CORNER -22.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes i HEADER ISOLATION VALVE 8 2-Sl454 0 HPSII B HPSI HEADER STOP VALVE AB -45.50 BSAFEGUARDS -45.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 8 2-St-656 0 HPSI/ A HPSI HEADER STOP VALVE AB -45.50 A SAFEGUARDS -45.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 9 F15A 0 HVAC / 'A' ESF ROOM COOLING FAN AB -45.50 A SAFEGUARDS -45.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 9 FISB 0 HVAC / 'B' ESF ROOM COOLING FAN AB -45.50 BSAFEGUARDS -25 50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 10 X36A 0 HVAC / 'A' SAFEGUARDS (ESF) ROOM AIR AB -45.50 A SAFEGUARDS -45.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes REC FAN CLG COIL 10 X368 0 HVAC / U SAFEGUARDS (ESF)~ ROOM AIR AB -45.50 A SAFEGUARDS -45.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes REC FAN CLG Colt Certification: Certification:
All the information contained on this Screening Venfication Data Sheet (SVDS) is, to the best of The information provided to the Seismic CapabiMy Engineers regarding systems and operations !
our knowledge and belief, correct and accurate. "All information" includes each entry and of the equipment contained in the SVDS is, to the best of our knowledge and belief, correct and i conclusion (whether venfied to be seismically adequate or not). accurate. l l
Aprrowed. (Signatures of all Seismic Capability Engineers on the Setsmic Review Team (SRT) Approved:(One signature of Systems or Operations Engineer is required if the Seismic Capability are re.;uired; there should be atleast two on the SRT. All signatories should agree with all the Engineers deem it necessary.) l cntnes and conclusions. One signatory should be a licensert professional engineer.) ;
l Sing Chu l O l / 2[y[o( l l l l Pnnt or Type Name 9gnature Dath Pnnt or Type Name Sgnature Date }
l Dimitrios Antonopoulos l 8 SgnatGre
- l/ # [l l l l Pnnt or Type Name ' Date P=t or Type Name Signature Date i I I -
i I I I Pnnt or Type Name Signature Date Pnnt or Type Name Segnature Date
[
L
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12/11/9510 41 AM SCREENING VERIFICATION DATA SHEET (SVDS) PageO7 Eq. EQ ID Rev Sys/Eq. Desc Bktg. FI El. Rm or Rw/Cl Base El <40'? Cap. Demd. Cap > Caveats Anchor Interact Equip Cl No Spec. Spec Demd7 OK7 OK7 OK7 OK7 11 FIA 0 RBCCW / WASTE GAS COMPRESSOR 'A' & AB -25.50 WASTE GAS COMP -25.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes Unk Unk AFTERCOOLER 11 F1B 0 RBCCW / WASTE GAS COMPRESSOR 'B' & AB -25.50 WASTE GAS COMP -25.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes Unk Unk AFTERCOOLER 14 NPY402 0 1 PRESSURIZER FORV REMOTE PANEL AB 14 50 EAST DC GEAR 14.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 14 NPY404 0 / PRESSURIZER PORV REMOTE PANEL AB 14.50 WEST DC GEAR 14.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 18 C126 0 BA / RACK C126 FOR BORIC ACtD TANK AB -5.50 RACK C126 -5.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes LEVEL INSTRUMENT 18 C140 0 / INSTRUMENT RACK C140 CE -3 50 C140 -3.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 18 C172 0 t INSTRUMENT RACK C172 CE 14 50 C172 14 50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 18 C173 0 / INSTRUMENT RACK C173 CE 14 50 C173 14.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 18 C203 0 / INSTRUMENT RACK C203 CE 14.50 C203 14.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 18 C204 0 / INSTRUMENT RACK C204 CE 14.50 C204 14.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 18 C205 0 / INSTRUMENT RACK C205 CE 14.50 C205 14.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 18 C206 0 t INSTRUMENT RACK C206 CE 14.50 C206 14.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 18 C207 0 / INSTRUMENT RACK C207 CE 14 50 C207 14.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 18 C211 0 / INSTRUMENT RACK C211 CE -3 50 C211 -3.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 18 C252 0 IINSTRUMENT RACK C252 CE 14.50 C252 14.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 18 C254 0 / INSTRUMENT RACK C254 CE -3 50 C254 -3.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 18 C255 0 / INSTRUMENT RACK C255 CE -3 50 C255 -3.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 18 PT-8113 0 CSAS ICONTAINMENT PRESSURE AB -5.50 E PEN 14.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes TRANSMITTERS 18 PT-8114 0 CSAS / CONTAINMENT PRESSURE AB -5.50 E PEN 14.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes TRANSMITTERS 18 PT-8115 0 CSAS / CONTAINMENT PRESSURE AB -5.50 W PEN 14.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes TRANSMITTERS 18 PT-8116 0 CSAS / CONTAINMENT PRESSURE AB 14.50 W PEN 14.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes TRANSMITTERS Certr5 cation: Certification:
AB the information contained on this Screening Venfication Data Sheet (SVDS) is, to the best of The information provided to the Seismic Capabihty Engineers regarding systems and operations cur knowledge and belief correct and accurate. "AR information" includes each entry and of the equipment contained in the SVDS is, to the best of our knowledge and belief, correct and conclusion (whether venfied to be seismicaity adequate or not) accurate.
Approved. (Signatures of all Seismic Capability Engineers on the Seismic Review Team (SRT) Approved: (One signature of Systems or Operations Engineer is required if the Seismic Capability gre required, there should be atleast two on the SRT. All signatores should agree with all the Engineers deem it necessary.)
entres and conclus'ons. One signatory should be a licensed professional engineer )
l Sing Chu l dd; l u[r,[9i l l l l Pnnt or Type Name > Sgnature Date Pnnt or Type Name Signature Date l Dimrtnos Antonopoulos l .
l/ / r[ ] l l l Print or Type Name Sg6ature D' ate Pnnt or Type Name Segnature Date i I I ! I I I Pnnt or Type Name Sqnature Date Pnnt or Type Name Sgnature Date
_ _ _ _- _ _ __ =
12/11/951041 AM SCREEMING VERIFICATION DATA SHEET (SVDS) PageS8 Eq. Eq.ID Rev Sys/Eq. Desc Badg. Fi EL Rm or Rw/Cl Base El. <40*7 Cap Demd. Cap > Caveats Anchor interact Equep CI No Spec. Spec Demd7 OK7 OK7 OK7 OK7 18 TT-351X 0 / SHUTDOWN COOLING TEMPERATURE AB -45.50 A SAFEGUARDS -45.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes TRANSMITTER 18 TT-351Y 0 / SHUTDOWN COOLING TEMPERATURE AB -45.50 A SAFEGUARDS -45.50 NA ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes TRANSMITTER 19 TE-112CA 0 RCS / RCS LOOP 1A COLD LEG CE -3.50 LOOP 1 -3.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes TEMPERATURE RTD 19 TE-112CC 0 RCS / RCS LOOP 1 A COLD LEG CE -3.50 LOOP 1 -3.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes TEMPERATURE RTD 19 TE-112HA 0 RCS / RCS LOOP 1 HOT LEG CE -3.50 LOOP 1 -3.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes TEMPERATURE RTD 19 TE-112HB 0 RCS I RCS LOOP 1 HOT LEG CE -3.50 LOOP 1 -3.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes WA Yes Yes TEMPERATURE RTD 19 TE-112HC 0 RCS / RCS LOOP 1 HOT LEG CE -3.50 LOOP 1 -3.50 Yes BS N Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes TEMPERATURE RTD 19 TE-112HD 0 RCS I RCS LOOP 1 HOT LEG CE -3.50 LOOP 1 -3.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes TEMPERATURE RTD 19 TE-122CB 0 RCS / RCS LOOP 2B COLD LEG CE -3.50 LOOP 2 -3.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes TEMPERATURE RTD 19 TE-122CD 0 RCS / RCS LOOP 28 COLD LEG CE -3.50 LOOP 2 -3.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A .
- Yes TEMPERATURE RTD 19 TE-122HA 0 RCS / RCS LOOP 1 HOT LEG CE -3.50 LOOP 2 -3.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes TEMPERATURE RTD 19 TE-122HB 0 RCS / RCS LOOP 2 HOT LEG CE -3.50 LOOP 2 -3.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes TEMPERATURE RTD 19 TE-122HC 0 RCS / RCS LOOP 2 HOT LEG CE -3.50 LOOP 2 -3.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes TEMPERATURE RTD 19 TE-122HD 0 RCS 1 RCS LOOP 2 HOT LEG CE -3.50 LOOP 2 -3.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes TEMPERATURE RTD _
Cert 6 cation Certeficehon.
AN the information contained on this Screening Ver6cahon Data Sheet (SVDS) is, to the best of The informahon provided to the Seesme Capatnlity Engmeets regarding systems and operatioru our knowledge and belief, correct and accurate. "All informahon" meludes each entry and of the equipment contained in the SVDS is, to the best of our knowledge and belief, correct arrs conclusson (whether versed to be seismicaNy adequate or not). accurate.
Approved: (Signatures of all Seismic Capability Engmeets on the Seismic Review Team (SRT) Approved. (One signature of Systems or Opersbons Engmeer is requwed if the Seismic Capability are required; there should be atleast two on the SRT. AN signatones should agree with aN the Engmeers deem it necessary.)
entnes and conclusions. One signatory should be a licensed professional engmeer.)
l Sing Chu Pnnt or Type Name l M CA Siel nature l e t./u/6 l Date Pnnt or Type Name 1
Signature l
Date l
i Dimitrios Antonopoulos l .M %
SignJture l /E / [ l l l~ l Pnnt or Type Name Date Pnnt or Type Name Segnature Date i I I l l I I Pnnt or Type Name Signature Date Pnnt or Type Name Signature Date
12/11/9510.41 AM SCREENING VERIFICATION DATA SHEET (SVDS) Page 09 '
a Eq. Eq. ID Rev Sys/Eq Desc EMdg. FI EL Rm or Rw/Cl Base El. <40'? Cap. Demd. Cap > Cavests Anchor Intered Equip Cl No Spec. Spec Demd? OK7 OK7 OK7 OK?
19 TE-351X 0 / SHUTDOWN COOUNG TEMPERATURE AB 4 5.50 A SAFEGUARDS -45.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes ELEMENT t
19 TE-351Y 0 / SHUTDOWN COOLING TEMPERATURE AB -45.50 A SAFEGUARDS -45.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes
- ELEMENT ,
t t
4 l
[
t I
l Certrfication: Cert 6 cation. ,
, . 1 AE the informebon contained on this Screenmg Vertflestion Data Sheet (SVDS) is, to the best of The information prended to the Seemec Capotely Engineers regardmg systems and operations i our knowledge and belief, correct and accurate *AE mformahon" includes each entry and of the equipment contained in the SVDS is, to the best of our knowledge and belief, correct and conclusson (whether vermed to be seemically adequate or not). accurate Approved. (Signatures of a5 Seemic Capotely Engmeers on the Seeme Remew Team (SRT) bad. (One segnature of Systems or Opershons Engmeer is requesd if the Seesme Capotely are required, there should be atleast two on the SRT. AR signatones should agree with mR the Engmeets deem it necessary.)
entnes and conclusens. One signatory should be a licensed pmfessional engmeer.)
l Sing Chu l c CM l / 93~l l~ l l
- Pnnt or Type Name O., .cn Date Pnnt or Type Name Signature Date l Dimitnos Antonopoulos Pnnt or Type Name l M SignafGre l/2[ ~ Dete - Pnnt or Type Name l
Signature l
Date l
l l l l l l l
, Print or Type Name Signature Date Pnnt or Type Name Segnature Date
_ . - . - - - . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . - . . _ , - _ . . . - , . . - . .- _ . _ , . . . . . ~ . - . - - . . . _ . _ . - . , . _ _ - . - . , . - . , _ _ - . . _ _ . - . - . _ . . - . . - __
12/11/9510.30 AM SCREENING VERwlCATION DATA SHEET (SVDS) Page01 Eq. Eq ID Rev Sys/Eq. Desc Bldg. F1 El. Rm or Rw/Cl Base El. <40'? Cap. Demd. Cap > Caveats Anchor Interact Equip Cl No Spec. Spec Demd? OK? OK7 OK7 OK7 21 H-24 0 RBCCW / DEGASiFIER VENT CONDENSER AB -2 M O DEGASIFIER -25 50 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Yes N/A Yes 21 T3 0 RBCCWi RBCCW SURGE TANK EB 71.00 RBCCW SURGE TANK 71.00 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A No N/A No 21 T38 0 RCS / PZR RELIEF OUENCH TANK CE -3.50 C140 -3 50 N/A NA N/A N/A N/A Yes N/A Yes 21 T8A 0 BA / BORIC ACIO TANK AB -5 50 BAST AREA -5 50 N/A N/A N/A N/A Yes Yes N/A Yes 21 T88 0 BA1 BORIC ACIO TANK AB -5 50 BAST AREA -5.50 N/A WA N/A N/A Yes Yes N/A Yes 21 X-51 0 RBCCW / DEGASIFIER EFFLUENT COOLER AB -5 50 DEGASIFIER -5 50 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Yes N/A Yes 21 X-82 0 RBCCW / QUENCH TANK HEAT EB 38.50 E PP PEN 38.50 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A No N/A No EXCHANGER 21 X18A 0 RBCCW/ A RBCCW HEAT EXCHANGER AB -25.50 RBCCW HX -25.50 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Yes N/A Yes 21 X188 0 RBCCWI B RBCCW HEAT EXCHANGER AB -25.50 RBCCW HX -25 50 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Yes N/A Yes 21 X18C 0 RBCCW / C RBCCW HEAT EXCHANGER AB -25.50 RBCCW HX -25.50 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Yes WA Yes 21 X20A 0 RBCCW / A SPENT FUEL POOL COOUNG AB -5.50 SFP HEAT -5 50 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Yes N/A Yes HEAT EXCHANGER EXCHANGER 21 X200 0 RBCCW / B SPENT FUEL POOL COOUNG AB -5.50 SFP HEAT -5.50 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Yes N/A Yes HEAT EXCHANGER EXCHANGER 21 X21 0 CVCS I REGEN HEAT EXCHANGER RB 5 50 C RCP AREA 5.50 WA N/A N/A N/A N/A Yes N/A Yes 21 X22 0 RBCCWI LETDOWN HEAT EXCHANGER AB -5 50 LETDOWN HX AREA -5 50 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Yes N/A Yes 21 X23A 0 LPSI / A SHUTDOWN t JOLING HEAT AB -45.50 A SAFEGUARDS -45.50 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Yes N/A Yes EXCHANGER 21 X238 0 LPSI / B SHUTDOWN COOUNG HEAT AB -45.50 BSAFEGUARDS -45.50 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Yes N/A Yes EXCHANGER Certification: Certification All the information contained on this Screening Venfication Data Sheet (SVDS) is, to the best of The information provided to the Seismic Capability Engir eers regarding systems and operations our knowledge and belief, correct and accurate. "All information" includes each entry and of the equipment contained in the SVDS is, to the best of our knowledge and belief, correct and conclusion (whether venfied to be seismically adequate or not). accurate.
Approved: (Signatures of all Seismic Capabdity Engineers on the Seismic Review Team (SRT) Approved (One signature of Systems or Operations Engineer is required if the Setsmic Capability are required; there should be atleast two on the SRT. All signatories should agree with all the Engineers deem it necessary.)
entnes and conclusions. One signatory should be a licensed professional engineer.)
I Sing Chu l dq db l / 2/u[93" l l l l Pnnt or Type Name S4 nature Date Pnnt or Type Name Sgnature Date l Dimitrios Antonopoulos Pnnt or Type Name l - Mu Sgnature I/ /!9[ l
' bate Pnnt or Type Name l
Signature I
Date I
1 I I I I I l Pnnt or Type Name Sgnature Date Pnnt or Type Name Sgnature Date
12/11/9510-41 AM SCREENING VERIFICATION DATA SHtEET(SVDS) Page 01
- P Eq. Eq.10 . Rev - Sys/Eq. Desc Bldg. FI EL Rm or Rw/Cl Base EL <407 Cap. Demd. Cap > Caveats Anchor Intered Equip ;
Cl No Spec. Spec Demd7 OK7 OK7 OK7 OK7 5 P11A 0 RBCCW / A RBCCW PUMP AB -25.50 lRBCCW HX -25.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes !
5 F 118 0 RBCCWI B RBCCWPUMP AB -75 50 lRBCCW HX -25.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 5 P11C 0 RBCCW/ C RBCCWPUMP AB -25 50 lRBCCW HX -25.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes ,
i i
I t
t CertWicahon Certipeahon All the information contained on this Screening VenHcshon Data Sheet (SVDS) is, to the best of The information provided to the Seismic Capotely Engmeets regardng systems and opershons our knowledge and belief, correct and accurate "AH informahon" includes each entry and of the equipment contamed in the SVDS is, to the best of our knowledge and belief, correct and conclusion (whether verdied to be seesmically adequate or not). accurate Approved: (Signatures of eB Seismic Capatnhty Engineers on the Seesmic Review Team (SRT) Approved: (One signature of Systems or Opershons Engmeer is required if the Seemsc Capately are requwed; there should be atleast two on the SRT. AE signatories should agree with as the Engwieers deem it necessary.)
entnes and conclassons. One signatory should be a licensed professioral engmeer.) ,
I Sing Chu I h C L.
signature I /=hhr l l 1 i Pnnt or Type Name Date Print or Type Name Signature Date i D=tnos Antonopouios Pnnt or Type Name Ibd Sijnature Iad/II' I Date Pnnt or Type Name I
Signature I
Date I
l Charbel Abou-Jaoude l d 87 k l /2 # if l l l l Pnnt or Type Name Signature Date Pnnt or Type Name Segnature Date
- - --- - - - - - - - --- - - -- - - - -~-
12/11/9510.41 AM SCREENING VERIFICATION DATA SHEET (SVDS) Page01 Eq. Eq. ID Rev Sys/Eq. Desc Bldg. FI EL Rm or Rw/C4 Base EL <40F7 Cap. Demd. Cap > Caveats Anchor intered Equip Cl No Spec. Spec Demd7 OK7 OK7 OK7 OK7 4 UBS O ELEC AC / 480V XFMR TO 22E TB 36.50 WEST 480V SWGR 36.50 N/A ABS CRS No No' Yes Yes No 4 UB6 0 ELEC AC / 480V XFMR TO 22F AB Z.50 FAST 480V 36 50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 5 P18A 0 CVCS / A CHARGING PUMP AB -25.50 CH PMP AREA -25.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 5 P188 0 CVCS / B CHARGING PUMP AB -25.50 CH PMP AREA -25,50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 5 P18C 0 CVCS / C CHARGING PUMP AB -25.50 CH PMP AREA -25.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 2-CH-910 0 CVCS / CHEMICAL METERING PUMP AB -25.50 CH!"wieAREA -25.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes OUTLET SOLENOID VALVE i Certificahon. Certificahon AR the information contained on this Screening Venfication Data Sheet (SVDS) is, to the best of The information provided to the Seisme Capabinty Engineers regarding systems and operabons our knowledge and behef, correct and accurate "AR kJu... ;i,i-? includes each entry and of the equipment contained in the SVDS is, to the best of our knowledge and benef, correct and conclusion (whether verified to be seismicaRy adequale or not). accurate Approved: (Signatures of an Seismic CapabiNty Engineers on the Seismic Review Team (SRT) Approved- (One signature of Systems or Operations Engineer is requwed if the Seisme Car %
are requwed; there should be atleast two on the SRT. AR signatones should agree with at the Engineers deem it necessary.)
entnes and conclusions. One signatory should be a licensed professional engmeer.)
l Sing Chu l fA l /t/,f/g l l l l Pnnt or Type Name Jignature Date Pnnt or Type Name Signature Dale l Charbel Abou-Jaoude l O- M -/ da d l /2 //* TI l l l l Pnnt or Type Name Sagnature Date Pnnt or Type ttame Signature Date i I l l l -l 1 Pnnt or Type Name Signature Date Pnnt or Type Name Sagnature Date i
t
_ _ . . ~ _ . . _ ,_ -_ .
12/11/9510-41 AM SCREENING VERIFICATION DATA SNEET (SVDS) Page#1 Eq Eq. ID Rev Sys/Eq. Desc Bldg. FI EL Rm or Rw/Cl Base El. <40'? Cap. Demd. Cap > Caveats Anchor Interact Equip Cl No Spec. Spec Demd? OK7 OK7 OK7 OK? ,
3 24E O ELEC AC / 4.16KV EMG BUS 24E (A5) AB 31.50 LOWER 4160V 31.50 NA ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes ,
20 C38 0 / DIESEL GENERATOR H7A CONTROL WH 14.50 A D/G 14.50 NA ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes CABINET 1
5 1
l f
Certdicahon Cert #ication:
As the informahon contained on this Screening Venficahon Data Sheet (SVDS) is, to the best of The information provided to the Seenc Capetsty Engmeets regardmg systems and operations i our knowledge and belief, correct and accurate. *All informahon" includes each entry and of the equipment contained in .he SVDS is, to the best of our knowledge and belief, correct and i conclusion (whether venfied to be seisecaNy adequate or not). accurate Approved: (Segnatures of aN Seemic CapatAty Engmeers on the Seenc Review Team (SRT) Approved: (One signature of Systems or Opershons Enyneer is required if the Seem6e Capability !
are requwed; there should be atleast two on the SRT. AR 6. ^.,A. should agree with at the Engmeets deem R necessary.) - l entnes and conclusions. One signatory should be a licensed professional engmeer.)
l Robert Courcy 87 s l/ / 6l l l l Prmt or Type Name M / Dbte Pnnt or Type Name Segnature Date l
l Charbel Abou-Jaoude Pnnt or Type Name l dM[d. Signature dau a - l U // T T l l l l l Date Pnnt or Type Name Sagnature Date i I I I I l 1 4
Pnnt or Type Name Signature Date Prmt or Type Name Signature Date
12/11/951041 AM SCREENING VERIFICATION DATA SHEET (SVDS) Page#1 Eq. Eq. ID Rev Sys/Eq. Desc Bldg. FI EL Rm or Rw/Cl Base EL <40'? Cap. Demd. Cap > Caveats Anchor interact Equip CI No Spec. Spec Demd7 OK7 OK7 OK7 OK?
3 24C 0 ELEC AC / 4.16KV EMG BUS 24C (A3) AB 31.50 LOWER 4160V 31.50 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes ,
i i
Certrfication: Certificaten i AN the information contained on this Screening Venficebon Data Sheet (SVDS) is, to the best of The '. "-.eu provided to the Seismic Capatslity Engmeers regarding systems and operations our knowledge and belief, correct and accurate. "AN information* includes each entry and of the equipment contained in the SVDS is. to the best of our knowledge and behef, correct and conclusion (whether venfied to be seismicaNy adequate or not). accurate.
Approved: (Signatures of aN Seismic CapatWNty Engmeers on the Seismic Review Team (SRT) Approved- (One signature of Systems or Opersbons Engineer is required if the Seismic Capat2ty are required, there should be atleast two on the SRT. AN signatones should agree with all the Engineers deem it necessary.)
entnes and conclusions. One signatory shoukt be a licensed professional engmeer.)
l Robert Courcy h% l/ / 8l l l l Pnnt or Type Name Sign / ITalb Pnnt or Type Name Signature Date l Dmmes Antonopoulos l M --
Segniture l /2// fl
' Date l l l Pnnt or Type Name Pnnt or Type Name Segnature Date i I I I I i 1 Pnnt or Type Name Signature Date Pnnt or Type Name Signature Date
l SEISMIC EVALUATION REPORT FOR MILLSTONE 2 l l
ATTACHMENT G osvs (See Table of Contents for Page Numbers) l i
- .. . _ . ._ ._~. . _ . . - . . . - . _. - - - . -
MILLSTONE 2 A-46 TABLE OF CON'IENTS SEWS
& CLASS l 1D NO. OF PAGES 1 1 22E-MCC / BS2 2 ,
2 2 22E 1 3 2 22F 1 4 4'UB5 2 5 7 2-CHW-11 1 6 9 F38A / F38B 2 7 9 FS2 2 8 10 F14C / F14D / X-34A 2 9 11TF1 A / F1B 2 10 14lD11/ D12 / D21/ D22 / VR11/ VR21 2 ,
11 15!DB1/ DB2 2 12 20lC01X 1 13 20iC05 / C05R / C06 / C06R 2 14 20;C08 / C08R 2 15 20lC25A / C25B / C80 2 16 20!RC02A1/ RCO2B / RC02B2 / RCO2C / RCO2C3 / RC02D4 / RC05B / COSX 2 17 21IT3 2 18l 21iX-82 2 l ll TOTAL NUMBER OF PAGES FOR SEWS >n t 32 Page 1 OF 1
NUSCO MILLSTONE UNIT 2 GIP Ri;v 2, Corrected 2/14/92 OUTLIER SEISMIC VERIFICATION SHEET (OSVS) Sheet 1 of 2 ID : 22E-MCC (Rev. 0) l Class : 1. Motor Control Centers Description : 480V BUS 22E (B05) MCC SECTION Building : TB / WH Floor El. : 36.50 / 38.50 Room, Row / Col: WEST 480V SWGR & EB HVAC RM
- 1. OUTLIER ISSUE DEFINITION - Mechanical and Electrical Eautoment
- a. Identify all the screening guidelines which are not met. (Check more than one if several guidelines could not be satisfied.)
Capacity vs. Demand X Caveats Anchorage Seismic Interaction Other
- b. Describe all the reasons for the outlier (i.e., if all the listed outlier issues were resolved, then the signatories would consider this item of equipment to be verified for seismic adequacy).
The conservative FRS is not enveloped by 1.5 X BS for 22E-MCC and function during GERS for B52 MCC.
- 2. PROPOSED METHOD OF OUTLIER RESOLUTION (Octional)
- a. Defined proposed method (s) for resolving outlier.
Review spectra exceedance based on IPEEE assessment and determine if rnedian-ce.,tertd spectra are needed to resolve the_a.apacity vs. demand outlier condition,
- b. Provide information needed to implement proposed method (s) for resolving outlier (e 9., estimate of fundamental frequency).
l N/A l
- 3. COMMENTS This OSVS is generated for the following SSEL components:
22E-MCC and BS2.
NUSCO MILLSTONE UNIT 2 GIP R7,v 2, Correct;d 2/14/92 OUTLIER SEISMIC VERIFICATION SHEET (OSVS) Sheet 2 of 2 ID : 22E-MCC (Rev. 0) ~l Class : 1. Motor Control Centers Description : 480V BUS 22E (805) MCC SECTION Building : TB / WH Floor El. : 36.50 / 38.50 Room, Row / Col: WEST 480V SWGR & EB HVAC RM
- 4. CERTIFICATlON:
The information on this OSVS is, to the best of our knowledge and belief, correct and accurate, and resolution of the outlier issues listed on the previous page will satisfy the requirements for this item of equipment to be verified for seismic adequacy:
Approved by: 8 .o Date:
/L[f.[rf R *. c OR, - a/9./g r
- . ) /^ - ll. fS~
i
NUSCO MILLSTONE UNIT 2 GIP RGv 2, CorrGetsd 2/14/92 OUTLIER SEISMIC VERIFICATION SHEET (OSVS) Sheet 1 of 1 ID : 22E (Rev. 0) _
l Class : 2. Low Voltage Switchgear Description : 480V BUS 22E (BOL, Building : TB Floor El. : 36.50 Room, Row / Col: WEST 480V SWGR
- 1. OUTLIER ISSUE DEFINITION - Mechanical and Electrical Eauloment
- a. Identify all the screening guidelines which are not met. (Check more than one if several guidelines could not be satisfied.)
Capacity vs. Demand X Caveats Anchorage Seismic interaction Other
- b. Describe all the reasons for the outlier (i.e., if all the listed outlier issues were resolved, then the signatories would consider this item of equipment to be verified for seismic adequacy).
l The conservative FRS is not enveloped by 1.5 X BS. l
- 2. PROPOSED METHOD OF OUTLIER RESOLUTION (Ontional)
- a. Defined proposed method (s) for resolving outlier.
Review spectra exceedance based on IPEEE assessment and determine if median-centered spectra are needed to resolve the capacity vs. demand outlier condition,
- b. Provide information needed to implement proposed method (s) for resolving outlier (e.g., estimate of fundamental frequency).
l N/A l
- 3. COMMENTS
- 4. CERTIFICATION:
The information on this OSVS is, to the best of our knowledge and belief, correct and accurate, and resolution of the outlier issues listed above will satisfy the requirements for this item of equipment to be verified for seismic adequacy:
Approved by: 8 rwu A Date: / 2d (~
- c. m.,4a M nnr
NUSCO MILLSTONE UNIT 2 GIP R:V 2, Corr:ctrd 2/14/92 OUTLIER SEISMIC VERIFICATION SHEET (OSVS) Sheet 1 of 1 l
lD : 22F (Rev. 0) l Class : 2. Low Voltage Switchgear Description : 480V BUS 22F (B06)
Building : AB l Floor El. : 36.50 l Room, Row / Col: EAST 480V
- 1. OUTLIER ISSUE DEFINITION Mechanical and Electrical Eauloment
- a. Identify all the screening guidehnes which are not met. (Check more than one if several guidelines could not be satisfied.)
Capacity vs. Demand Caveats Anchorage X l Seismic Interaction Other
- b. Describe all the reasons for the outlier (i.e., if all the listed outlier issues were resolved, then the signatories ,
would consider this item of equipment to be verified for seismic adequacy).
l The front of 22F SWGR sections were not anchored to the embedded plate. l
- 2. PROPOSED METHOD OF OUTLIER RESOLUTION (Ontional)
- a. Defined proposed method (s) for resolving outlier.
l Install missing plug welds in the front of SWGR sections per manufacturer provided holes. l
- b. Provide information needed to implement proposed method (s) for resolving outlier (e g., estimate of fundamental frequency).
l N/A l
- 3. COMMENTS I
An ACR was generated to rectify this adverse condition and plug welds were installed in the front per manufacturer recommendations (reference ACR 00501 dated 2/21/95 and NNECo cale No. NCR9514e-1195M2).
Consequently, a safety evaluation was generated indicating 22F does not have any safety concerns and is operable as-is. The ACR work was performed during RFO12 under work order M2 95-03188. The outlier has been resolved. Therefore, this component has been verified as seismically adequate.
LCERTIFICATION:
The information on this OSVS is, to the best of our knowledge and belief, correct and accurate, and satisfies the requirements for this item of equipment to be verified for seismic adequacy:
Approved by: M u Date: / 2[/[F c'. rh. AG L L n ul"/'li
/
NUSCO MILLSTONE UNIT 2 GIP Ray 2, CorrsctId 2/14/92 OUTLIER SEISMIC VERIFICATION SHEET (OSVS) Shtst 1 of 2 ID : UB5 (Rev. 0) l Class : 4. Transformers Description : 480V XFMR TO 22E Building : 1 B Floor El. : 36.50 Room, Row / Col: WEST 480V SWGR
- 1. OUTLIER ISSUE DEFINITION - Mechanical and Electrical Eauloment
- a. Identify all the screening guidelines which are not met. (Check more than one if several guidelines could not be satisfied.)
Capacity vs. Demand X Caveats X Anchorage Seismic Interaction Other
- b. Describe all the reasons for the outlier (i.e., if all the listed outlier issues were resolved, then the signatories would consider this item of equipment to be verified for seismic adequacy).
The conservative FRS is not enveloped by 1.5 X BS.
Caveat 4 - Transformer coils are not top braced or have "A" frame, external evaluation of coil support indicated that hold-down bolts for the transformer should be A-325 or better. The SRT could not confirm bolt material during walkdown. Reference VECTRA Calc. No. MP2 ORT, section 5.4, Rev. O.
- 2. PROPOSED METHOD OF OUTLIER RESOLUTION footlorial) i
- a. Defined proposed method (s) for resolving outlier.
Review spectra exceedance based on IPEEE assessment and determine it median-centered spectra are needed to resolve the capacity vs. demand outlier condition.
Confirm that the transformer hold-down bolt materialis A-325 or better. If not replace existing bolts with A-325 bolts. Otherwise the transformer evaluation may be further refined based on less cnnservative spectra.
- b. Provide information needed to implement proposed method (s) for resolving outlier (e.g., estimate of fundamental frequency).
lN/A l
- 3. COMMENTS
NUSCO MILLSTONE UNIT 2 GlP RIv 2, Corrected 2/14/92 OUTLIER SEISMIC VERIFICATION SHEET (OSVS) Sheet 2 of 2 ID : UBS (Rev. 0) l Class : 4. Transformers Description : 480V XFMR TO 22E Building : TB Floor El. : 36.50 Room, Row / Col: WEST 480V SWGR
- 4. CERTIFICATION:
The information on this OSVS is, to the best of our knowledge and belief, correct and accurate, and resolution of the outlier issues listed on the previous page will satisfy the requirements for this item of equipment to be verified for seismic adequacy:
Approved by: Ok Date: /2/9/95 J '
C./??. 4 Jh ^ - /2./t if i
NUSCO MILLSTONE UNIT 2 GIP R:V 2, Corr;ct;d 2/14/92 OUTLIER SEISMIC VERIFICATION SHEET (OSVS) Shzt 1 of 1 l ID : 2-CHW-11 (Rev. 0) l Class : 7. Fluid-Operated Valves Description : CHILLED WATER SUPPLY HDR XTIE CONTROL VALVE Building : TB l Floor El. : 14.50 l Room. Row / Col: TBCCW PP&HX
- 1. OUTLIER ISSUE DEFINITION - Mechanical and Electrical Eauloment
- a. Identify all the screening guidelines which are not met. (Check more than one if several guidelines could not be satisfied.) ,
Capacity vs. Demand Caveats X Anchorage Seismic Interaction Other
- b. Describe all the reasons for the outlier (i.e., if all the listed outlier issues were resolved, then the signatories would consider this item of equipment to be verified for seismic adequacy).
l Valve actuator is independently braced to building steel cross bracing at column line E. l
- 2. PROPOSED METHOD OF OUTl IFR RESOLUTION (Ontionall
- a. Defired proposed method (s) for resolving outlier.
TeG piping isometric and/or piping calculation to determine seismic stresses at valve yoke. l
- b. Prov de ir formation needed to implement proposed method (s) for resolving outlier (e.g., estimate of funds mental frequency).
l N/A l
- 3. COMMENT 4
- 4. CERTIFICATION:
The information on this OSVS is, to the best of our knowledge and belief, correct and accurate, and resolution of the outlier issues listed above will satisfy the requirements for this item of equipment to be verified for seismic adequacy:
l Approved by:
O[w, -
Date: # 4 ft(
C'/Yl./QL S w R. m 9r i
NUSCO MILLSTONE UNIT 2 GIP Riv 2, Corrected 2/14/92 OUTLIER SEISCIC VERIFICATION SHEET (OSVS) Sheet 1 of 2 ID : F38A (Rev. 0) l Class : 9. Fans Desenption : 'A' DG ROOM VENT FAN Building : W4 l Floor El. : 14.50 l Room. Row / Col: A D/G
- 1. OUTLIER ISSUE DEFINITION - Mechanical and Electrical Eaulomant
- a. Identify all the screening guidelines which are not met. (Check more than one if several guidelines could not be satisfied.)
Capacity vs. Demand X Caveats Anchorage Seismic Interaction Other
- b. Describe all the reasons for the outlier (i.e., if all the listed outlier issues were resolved, then the signatories would consider this item of equipment to be verified for seismic adequacy).
l The conservative FRS is not enveloped by 1.5 X BS. l
- 2. PROPOSED METHOD OF OUTLIER RESOLUTION iOptional)
- a. Defined proposed method (s) for resolving outlier.
l Spectra exceedance nas been resolved. See discussion below. l
- b. Provide ir.formaaor. needed to implement proposed method (s) for resolving outlier (e.g., estimate of fundamentalfreque cy).
l N/A l
- 3. COMMENTS i This OSVS is generated for F38A and F388.
Capacity vs. Demand - The existing design for the Warehouse Structure ( a two story Bldg. founded on a controlled soil backfill at El.14'-6") are very conservative and result in an exceedance of the response spectrum for frequencies above approximately 8 Hz.
Based on the use of vibration isolators at the fan support points, and the presence of flexible duct connections on both ends of the fan, the SRT estimates that the overall frequency will be below 5 Hz. The conservative design spectra are well enveloped for frequencies between 2 and 7 Hz. The site spectrum is very well enveloped by the Bounding Spectrum. The fan is supported from elevation 36' (i.e.,22' from grade, < 40') but does not meet the 8 Hz caveat of the GIP because of the vibration isolators.
It is the SRTs judgment that the spectra exceedance are of no consequences for the seismic adequacy of this component in view of the following:
- Conservative Design Spectra is used for Capacity vs. Demand comparison.
- Spectra with high frequency content is typically not damsging for a mechanical component such as a fan (damage typically attributed to structural type failures or clearance concems)
- Similar fans mounted on vibration isolators with lateral stops are very well represented in the earthquake experience data and the 8 Hz rule may not be appropriate for such components.
Therefore the SRT judges that this fan meets the intent of the GIP screen lig and is seismically adequate.
NUSCO MILLSTONE UNIT 2 GIP R;v 2, Corrected 2/14/92 OUTLIER SEIS'CIC VERIFICATION SHEET (OSVS) Sheet 2 of 2 ID : F38A (Rev. 0) l Class : 9. Fans Description : 'A' DG ROOM VENT FAN Building : WH l Floor E!. : 14.50 l Room, Row / Col: A D/G
- 4. CERTIFICATlON:
The information on this OSVS is, to the best of our knowledge and belief, correct and accurate, and satisfies the requirements for this item of equipment to be verified for seismic adequacy:
Approved by: . M[.,wa Date: /7///[gf am./ G u e n n. ii . , c J
l
NUSCO MILLSTONE UNIT 2 GIP Rrv 2, Correct d 2/14/92 OUTLIER SElSMIC VERIFICATION SHEET (OSVS) Sheet 1 of 2 ID : FS2 (Rev. 0) l Class : 9. Fans Description : EAST 480V ROOM SUPPLY FAN Building : AB l Floor El. : 54.50 l Room. Row / Col: UPPER 4160V
- 1. OUTLIER ISSUE DEFINITION - Mechanical and Electrical Equipment
- a. Identify all the screening guidelines which are not met. (Check more than one if several guidelines could not be satisfied.)
Capacity vs. Demand X Caveats Anchorage Seismic Interaction Other
- b. Describe all the reasons for the outlier (i.e., if all the listed outlier issues were resolved, then the signatories would consider this item of equipment to be verified for seismic adequacy).
l The realistic FRS is not enveloped by 1.5 X BS. See discussion below. l
- 2. PROPOSED METHOD OF OUTLIER RESOLUTION (Ontional)
- a. Defined proposed method (s) for resolvir g outlier.
l Spectra exceedance has been resolv$d. _ l
- b. Provide information needed to impleme1t propose:! method (s) for resolving outlier (e.g., estimate of fundamental frequency).
l N/A l l
- 3. COMMENTS Capacity vs. Demand - This fan is suspended from elevation 71'-6" of the Auxiliary Bldg. with lateral braces to the wall between elevations 54'-6" and 71'-6"in the upper switchgear room. The realistic spectra at elevation 71'-6"is enveloped by the Reference Spectrum in the E-W direction but exceeds it in the N-S direction by about 15% for frequencies between 8 Hz and 30 Hz. Based on the use of vibration isolators at the fan support points, and the presence of flexible duct connections on both ends of the fan, the SRT estimates that the overall frequency will be below 5 Hz.
The SRT judges the spectra exceedance in the N-S direction to be minor, and that the fan is seismically adequate based on the following:
- The exceedance are small (approx.15%) and occur in tne higher frequencies which are typically not damaging for a mechanical component, and will not result in structural type failures,
- The isolators (Vibration Eliminator Comp. model 2KW1-ST2) are specifically designed to accommodate and limit vertical and lateral displacements, and are very rugged for this relative!y light weight fan.
Therefore the SRTjudges that this fan meets the intent of the GIP and is seismically adequate.
l
NUSCO MILLSTONE UNIT 2 GlP Rav 2, Correct;d 2/14/92 OUTLIER SEISMIC VERIFICATION SHEET (OSVS) Sheet 2 of 2 ID : F52 (Rev. 0) l Class : 9. Fans Desenption : EAST 480V ROOM SUPPLY FAN Building : AB l Floor El. : 54.50 l Room. Row / Col : UPPER 4160V 1
- 4. CERTIFICATION:
l The information on this OSVS is, to the best of our knowledge and belief, correct and accurate, and satifies the )
requirements for this item of equipment to be verified for seismic adequacy:
Approved by: .
8 w Date: /r y F l
C. S. & J%w' t
/2. //. *1[
NUSCO MILLSTONE UNIT 2 GIP R&v 2, Corr 2ctrd 2/14/92 OUTLIER SEISMIC VERIFICATION SHEET (OSVS) Sheet 1 of 2 ID : F14C (Rev. 0) l Class : 10. Air Handlers Desenption : 'C' CONTAINMENT RECIRCULATION COOLING UNIT FAN Building : RB Floor El. : 36.50 Room, Row / Col: N. END FUEL POOL
- 1. OUTLIER ISSUE DEFINITION - Mechanical and Electrical Eauloment
- a. Identify all the screening guidelines which are not met. (Check more than one if several guidelines could not be satisfied.)
Capacity vs. Demand X Caveats
- Anchorage Seismic Interaction Other
- b. Describe all the reasons for the outlier (i.e., if all the listed outlier issues were resolved, then the signatories would consider this item of equipment to be verified for seismic adequacy).
l The conservative FRS is not enveloped by 1.5 X BS. l
- 2. PROPOSFr) MFTHOD OF OUTLIER RESOLUTION (Ontionall l
- a. Defined proposed method (s) for resolving outlier.
Generate realistic, median-centered, in-structure SSE spectra for the ReactT5uilding internal structure at floor El. 38'-6" or evaluate the components based 0.1 conservstive design spectra, it should be noted that the SRT considers the design basis FRS to be very ccnservative based on ,
the results obtained when the Auxiliary building median-centered spectra were developed under l VECTRA Calc. No. OO24-OOO99-A46-1.
- b. Provide information needed to implement proposed method (s) for resolving outlier (e g., estimate of fundamental frequency).
N/A No additional action required (see comment below)
- 3. COMMENTS This OSVS is generated for the following SSEL components:
F14C, F14D, and X-34A.
VECTRA Calc. No. 0024-00099.000-DES-5, Rev. O was performed to qualitatively estimate A-46 median-centered spectra for the Reactor building intemal structure at floor El. 38'-6". The calculation concluded that if median-centered spectra were to be generated for the Reactor building at El. 38'-6", they will be enveloped by 1.5 X Bounding spectra of USl A-46. In addition, original qualification analysis (Reference Westinghouse Seismic Analysis Report NO. TO-JRP-84 titled Reactor Containment Fan Coolers Nuclear Power Station- Unit 2 Millstone ,
. Point Co.) exist for these components which demonstrated their seismic adequacy. Therefore, the SRT considers l that the outlier has been resolved and these components have been verified as seismically adequate.
l 1
NUSCO MILLSTONE UNIT 2 GIP RGv 2, Corrected 2/14/92 OUTLIER SEISMIC VERIFICATION SHEET (OSVS) Sheet 2 of 2 ID : F14C (Rev. 0) l Class : 10. Air Handlers Description : 'C' CONTAINMENT RECIRCULATION COOLING UNIT FAN Building : RB Floor El. : 36.50 Room, Row / Col: N. END FUEL POOL
- 4. CERTIFICATION:
The information on this OSVS is, to the best of our knowledge and belief, correct and accurate, and satisfies the requirements for this item of equipment to be verified for seismic adequacy:
, Approved by:
h ,o Date: /3.f/rf O. fh. W Lp . e. 11 u. 9[
1 l
l l
l l
l l
1 I
l
NUSCO MILLSTONE UNIT 2 GIP R;v 2, CorrectId 2/14/92 OUTLIER SEISMIC VERIFICATION SHEET (OSVS) Sheet 1 of 2 ID : F1A(Rev. 0) l Class : 11. Chillers Description : WASTE GAS COMPRESSOR 'A' & AFTERCOOLER l
Building : AB Floor El. : -25.50 Room, Row / Col: WASTE GAS COMP
- 1. OUTI IFR ISSUE DEFINITION - Mechanical and Electrical Eauloment
- a. Identify all the screening guidelines which are not met. (Check more than one if several guidelines could not be satisfied.)
Capacity vs. Demand Caveats Anchorage Seismic Interaction X Other
- b. Describe all the reasons for the outlier (i.e., if all the listed outlier issues were resolved, then the signatories would consider this item of equipment to be verified for seismic adequacy).
Block walls surrounding compressor de not have safety related marking. The SRT conservatively assumed that seismic interaction with Waste Gas Compressor can not be precluded.
- 2. PROPOSED METHOD OF OUTLIER RESOLUTION footional)
- a. Defined proposed method (s) for resolving outlier.
Perform an IPEEE evaluation to determine whether or not the block walls should be evaluated to determine their seismic capacity since the Waste Gas Compressor is a pressure boundary for the RBCCW system.
The IPEEE group performed an evaluation (reference NU Memo NE-95-SAB-322, dated 8/8/95) and concluded the following:
"Due to its small size (1" -line # 1"-HBD(B)-114), a break in this line would not cause a significant flow diversion such that normal system makeup would be overwhelmed and lead to RBCCW system failure. Therefore, further evaluation of the block walls surrounding the Waste Gas Compressor is unnecessary.
- b. Provide information needed to implement proposed method (s) for resolving outlier (e.g., estimate of fundamental frequency).
lN/A l
- 3. COMMENTS This OSVS is generated for the following SSEL components:
F1 A, and F18.
Based on the evaluation performed in step 2a above, the outlier has been resolved. Therefore, this component requires no further action.
NUSCO MILLSTONE UNIT 2 GIP RIv 2. Correct;:d 2/14/92 OUTLIER SEISMIC VERIFICATION SHEET (OSVS) Sheet 2 of 2 ID : F1A(Rev. 0) l Class : 11. Chillers l Description : WASTE GAS COMPRESSOR 'A' & AFTERCOOLER l Building: AB Floor El. : -25.50 Room, Row / Col: WASTE GAS COMP l
- 4. CERTIFICATION:
The information on this OSVS is, to the best of our knowledge and belief, correct and accurate, and satifies the requirements for this item of equipment to be verified for seismic adequacy:
Approved by: k*oJ @_ da Date: 82/9[96
$Emn / Zl9bf i
I
NUSCO MILLSTONE UNIT 2 GlP Rsv 2, Corrscted 2/14/g2 OUTLIER SEISMIC VER!FICATION SHEET (OSVS) Sheet 1 of 2 ID : D11 (Rev. 0) l Class : 14. Distnbution Panels Description : 125VDC DISTRIBUTION PANEL D11 Building : AB l Floor El. : 14.50 l Room. Row / Col: EAST DC GEAR
- 1. OUTLIER ISSUE DEFINITION - Mechanical and Electrical Equipment
- a. Identify all the screening guidelines which are not met. (Check more than one if several guidelines could not be satisfied.)
Capacity vs. Demand Caveats X Anchorage Seismic Interaction 3 Other l
- b. Describe all the reasons for the outlier (i.e., if all the listed outlier issues were resolved, then the signatones would consider this item of equipment to be verified for seismic adequacy).
D11 and D12 are not bolted to adjacent VR11 distribution panel. Similarly, D21 and D22 are not bolted to VR21. The SRT is of the opinion that adjacent cabinets should be bolted together even though no essential relays are present; the basis for this recommendation is the data represented in EPRI GERS report (NP-5223 SL) for distribution panels. The report indicated that circuit breakers were more sensitive to high frequency input. Therefore botting the cabinets together eliminates any pounding and any potential breaker trips would be precluded.
- 2. PROPOSED METHOD OF OUTLIER RESOLUTION (Optional)
- a. Defined proposed method (s) for resolving outlier.
Bolt D11 and D12 to VR11; D21 and D22 to VR21. The subject distribution panels should be bolted at the top.
- b. Provide information needed to implement proposed method (s) for resolving outlier (e.g., estimate of fundamental frequency).
lN/A l l
- 3. COMMENTS This OSVS is generated for the following SSEL components:
D11, D12, VR11 D21, D22, VR21 By bolting the distribution panels as discussed in 2a above the seismic impact is eliminated and therfore any potential breaker trips are precluded.
NUSCO MILLSTONE UNIT 2 GIP RIv 2, Corr:ct;d 2/14/92 OUTLIER SEISMIC VERIFICATION SHEET (OSVS) Sheet 2 of 2 ID : D11 (Rev. 0) l Class : 14. Distribution Panels Description : 125VDC DISTRIBUTION PANEL D11 Building : AB l Floor El. : 14.50 l Room, Row / Col .: EAST DC GEAR
- 4. CERTIFICATION; The information on this OSVS is, to the best of our knowledge and belief, correct and accurate, and resolution of the outlier issues listed on the previous page will satisfy the requirements for this item of equipment to be verified for seismic adequacy:
Approved by: . 8[u Date: /3 y!f[
0./??. k L J S' n
/2 // 1T i
NUSCO MILLSTONE UNIT 2 GIP R::V 2, CorrzctId 2/14/92 OUTLIER SEISMIC VERIFICATION SHEET (OSVS) Sheet 1 of 2 ID : DB1 (Rev. 0) l Class : 15. Batteries on Racks Description : BATTERY 201 A (DB1)
Building : AB l Floor El. : 14.50 l Room, Row / Col: A DC BATT
- 1. OUTLIER ISSUE DEFINITION - Mechanical and Electrical Eaulomant l
- a. Identify all the screening guidelines which are not met. (Check more than one if several guidelines could not be satisfied.)
Capacity vs. Demand Caveats X I Anchorage X Seismic Interaction j Other 1 i
- b. Describe all the reasons for the outlier (i.e., if all the listed outlier issues were resolved, then the signatories l
would consider this item of equipment to be verified for seismic adequacy). J The battery racks bolts do not meet the GIP screening criteria due to the gaps under the base i being as large as 2.75". Therefore, the anchorage capacity does not exceed the demand due to high shear and tension forces on the bolts as a result of the large gaps under the base. Also, the longitudinal bracing on the front of the rack is intermittent, therefore given the gaps under the anchorage load redistribution to locations with no gap may cause load path concern with the rack i members.
ILEltOPOSED METHOD OF OUTLIER RESOLUTION (Optional)
- a. Defined proposed method (s) for resolving outlier.
A number of different options are available in order to resolve the outlier:
- Grout all gaps under base that are larger than 1/4".
- Install additional cross-bracing in the front of the racks to distribute longitudinal forces to more bolts.
- Provide bolting of the top back members of the rack to the wall behind.
- Perform necessary structural evaluation of the battery racks to determine if recommended changes will meet the GIP criteria.
- b. Provide information needed to implement proposed method (s) for resolving outlier (e.g., estimate of fundamental frequency).
l Design engineers to discuss options with plant construction and evaluate accordingly l
, 3. COMMENTS This OSVS is generated for the following SSEL components: l DB1 and DB2
l l
NUSCO MILLSTONE UNIT 2 GIP Rav 2, Corr;cttd 2/14/92 OUTLIER SEISMIC VERIFICATION SHEET (OSVS) Sheet 2 of 2 )
ID : DB1 (Rev. 0) l Class : 15. Batteries on Racks I Desenption : BATTERY 201A (DB1) l Building : AB l Floor El. : 14.50 l Room. Row / Col: A DC BATT
- 4. CERTIFICATION:
)
l The information on this OSVS is, to the best of our knowledge and belief, correct and accurate, and resolution of the outlier issues listed on the previous page will satisfy the requirements for this item of equipment to be verified for seismic adequacy: )
Approved by: M o Date: /7/g/rf c.m % rn- ,
- n. a u
NUSCO MILLSTONE UNIT 2 GlP RIV 2, Corrreted 2/14/92 OUTLIER SEISMIC VERIFICATION SHEET (OSVS) Sheet 1 of 1 ID : C01X (Rev. 0) l Class : 20. Instrumentation and Control Panels and Cabinets Description : ACCESS CONTROL DOOR ALARM DITRIBUTION PANEL
~
Building : CB l Floor El. : 36.50 l Room, Row / Col: CONTROL RM
- 1. OUTI IFR ISSUE DEFINITION - Mechanical and Electrical Eauloment
- a. Identify all the screening guidelines which are not met. (Check more than one if several guidelines could not be satisfied.)
a Capacity vs. Demand Caveats X
- Anchorage Seismic Interaction Other
- b. Describe all the reasons for the outlier (i.e., if all the listed outlier issues were resolved, then the signatories would consider this item of equipment to be verified for seismic adequacy).
l Some internal relay panels are loose and/or missing bolts for C01X cabinet. l
- 2. PROPOSED METHOD OF OUTLIER RESOLUTION (Ontional)
- a. Defined proposed methed(s) for resolving outlier.
Loose bolts on interr.al panels may be due to maintenance activities during the outage. Verify that missing bolts are instslied to relay panels inside C01X cabinet.
- b. Provide inforriation needed to implement proposed method (s) for resolving outlier (e.g., estimate of fundamental frequency).
l N/A l
- 3. COMMENTS
- 4. CERTIFICATION:
The information on this OSVS is, to the best of our knowledge and belief, correct and accurate, and resolution of the outlier issues listed above will satisfy the requirements for this item of equipment to be verified for seismic adequacy:
Approved by: I wa - Date: / f/p[
G/??.h6w Se n.n w
NUSCO MILLSTONE UNIT 2 GIP REv 2, Corr ct;d 2/14/92 OUTLIER SEISMIC VERIFICATION SHEET (OSVS) Sheet 1 of 2 ID : C05 (Rev. 0) l Class : 20. Instrumentation and Control Panels and Cabinets Description : MAIN CONTROL BOARD C05 (FRONT)
Building : CB l Floor El. : 36.50 l Room. Row / Col: CONTROL RM ,
l
- 1. OUTLIER ISSUE DEFINITION - Mechanical and Electrical Eauloment
- a. Identify all the screening guidelines which are not met. (Check more than one if several guidelines could ;
not be satisfied.) j Capacity vs. Demand Caveats X Anchorage .
Seismic Interaction X Other
- b. Describe all the reasons for the outlier (i.e., if all the listed outlier issues were resolved, then the signatories would consider this item of equipment to be verified for seismic adequacy).
Top bolt between adjacent cabinets C05 and C06 is loose.
For C05 cabinet bottom wireway cover not secured, no screws.
C05R and C06R are bolted together with three bolts. There is a 1/8" gap at top and 1/4" gap on bottom bolt on the C06R side.
- 2. PROPOSED METHOD OF OUTLIER RESOLUTION (Ontional)
- a. Defined proposed method (s) for resolving outlier.
Tighten top bolt between C05 and C06 cabinets in addition, secure wireway cover at bottom of C05 cabinet.
Shim and tighten top and bottom bolts between COSR and C06R cabinets,
- b. Provide information needed to implement proposed method (s) for resolving outlier (e.g., estimate of .
fundamental frequency). l l N/A l
- 3. COMMENTS This OSVS is generated for the following SSEL components:
C05 C05R C06 l C06R The preferred method for tieing cabinets together to prevent seismic impact is by bolting but any other methods l are acceptable provided an evaluation is performed.
NUSCO MILLSTONE UNIT 2 GIP R;v 2, Corr:ct;d 2/14/92 OUTLIER SEISMIC VERIFICATION SHEET (OSVS) Sheet 2 of 2 ID : C05 (Rev. 0) l Class : 20. Instrumentation and Control Panels and Cabinets Description : MAIN CONTROL BOARD C05 (FRONT)
Building : CB l Floor El. : 36.50 l Room, Row / Col : CONTROL RM
- 4. CERTIFICATION:
The information on this OSVS is, to the best of our knowledge and belief, correct and accurate, and resolution of the outlier issues listed on the previous page will satisfy the requirements for this item of equipment to be verified for seismic adequacy:
Approved by:
\
/ dem f Date: / z./9/pf I
d /72. JLn i2. // TT l
1 l
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NUSCO MILLSTONE UNIT 2 GIP Rav 2, Correct:d 2/14/92 OUTLIER SEISMIC VERIFICATION SHEET (OSVS) Shnt 1 of 2 ID : C08 (Rev. 0) l Class : 20. Instrumentation and Control Panels and Cabinets Description : MAIN CONTROL BOARD C08 (FRONT)
Building : CB l Floor El. : 36.50 l Room, Row / Col : CONTROL RM
- 1. OUTLIER ISSUE DEFINITION - Mechanical and Electrical Enuinment
- a. Identify all the screening guidelines which are not met. (Check more than one if several guidelines could not be satisfied.)
Capacity vs. Demand Caveats Anchorage Seismic interaction X Other
- b. Describe all the reasons for the outlier (i.e., if all the listed outlier issues were resolved, then the signatories would consider this item of equipment to be verified for seismic adequacy).
There is a line of lockers 43" away south of C08 and C08R cabinets which may cause seismic interaction. Although there are no essential relays within these cabinets, the SRT recommends that the lockers be secured or removed as part of good housekeeping practices.
- 2. PROPOSED METHOD OF OUTLIER RESOLUTION (Octional)
- a. Defined proposed method (s) for resolving outlier.
~
l Potential interaction has been resolved. l
- b. Provide information needed to implement proposed method (s) for reso;ving outlier (e.g., estimate of fundamental frequency).
l N/A l
- 3. COMMENTS This OSVS is generated for the following SSEL components:
C08, and C08R.
The SRT performed an additional walkdown at the MP2 control room on 11/3/95 to assess the l'eusekeeping corrective actions that have taken place since the seismic walkdown. The walkdown confirmed that the seismic interaction concerns have been removed (reference NU Millstone Station Materiel Condition Program Manual, for addressing seismic interaction concerns). Therefore, the seismic interaction outlier has been resolved.
I
NUSCO MILLSTONE UNIT 2 GIP R:;v 2, Corrected 2/14/92 OUTLIER SEISMIC VERIFICATION SHEET (OSVS) Sheet 2 of 2 ID : C08 (Rev. 0) l Class : 20. Instrumentation and Control Panels and Cabinets Description : MAIN CONTROL BOARD C08 (FRONT)
Building : CB l Floor El. : 36.50 l Room, Row / Col: CONTROL RM
- 4. CERTIFICATION:
The information on this OSVS is, to the best of our knowledge and belief, correct and accurate, and the outlier issues listed on the previous page satisfies the requirements for this item of equipment for seismic adequacy:
Approved by: M ,,,d Date: / g/9[q_(~
C./l?.hL A n /2 //. 9 7 '
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- =_ _ - - . . - _ _ _
NUSCO MILLSTONE UNIT 2 GIP Rav 2, CorrIct;d 2/14/92 OUTLIER SEISMIC VERIFICATION SHEET (OSVS) Sheet 1 of 2 ID : C25A (Rev. 0) l Class : 20. Instrumentation and Control Panels and Cabinets Desenption : CONTROL ROOM VENT CONTROL CABINET Building : CB l Floor El. : 36.50 1 Room Row / Col: CONTROL RM i
- 1. OUTLIER ISSUE DEFINITION - Mechanical and Electrical Eauloment
- a. Identify all the screening guidelines which are not met. (Check more than one if several guidelines could not be satisfied.)
l Capacity vs. Demand l
Caveats X l Anchorage X Seismic Interaction X Other
- b. Describe all the reasons for the outlier (i.e., if all the listed outlier issues were resolved, then the signatories would consider this item of equipment to be verified for seismic adequacy).
Adjacent cabinet C80 is not bolted to C258, since C25A and C258 cabinets act es one unit, seismic impact is not precluded. In addition, C80 cabinet is not bolted to adjacent C26 cabinet.
There are file cabinets located approx. 24" behind C25A and B cabinets which may cause seismic interaction. The SRT considers this seismic interaction as part of good housekeeping practicos and notified MP2 station personnel.
C25A and C25B cabinet anchorage is inaccessible and is not shown on civil drawings. Therefore, the SRT could not evaluate the seismic adequacy of the anchorage.
- 2. PROPOSED METHOD OF OUTLIER RESOLUTION (Ontional)
- a. Defined proposed method (s) for resolving outlier, Bolt cabinet C80 to adjacent C258 and C26 cabinets.
Perform additional documentation search to see if the C25A and C25B anchorage details can be found to determine the seismic adequacy of the anchorage. Based on the result of anchorage reviews at MP2 the SRT has good confidence that the anchorage details are adequate.
- b. Provide information needed to implement proposed method (s) for resolving outlier (e.g., estimate of fundamental frequency).
l N/A l
- 3. COMMENTS This OSVS is generated for the following SSEL components:
C25A, C25B, and C80.
The SRT performed an additional walkdown at the MP2 control room on 11/3/95 to assess the housekeeping corrective actions that have taken place since the seismic walkdown. The walkdown confirmed that the seismic
t NUSCO MILLSTONE UNIT 2 GIP Rrv 2, Corr:ctId 2/14/92 i OUTLIER SEISMIC VERIFICATION SHEET (OSVS) Sheet 2 of 2 ID : C25A (Rev. 0) l Class : 20. Instrumentation and Control Panels and Cabinets ,
Description : CONTROL ROOM VENT CONTROL CABINET Building : CB l Floor El. : 36.50 l Room, Row / Col : CONTROL RM interaction concerns have been removed (reference NU Millstone Station Materiel Condition Program Manual, for cddressing seismic interaction concems). Therefore, the seismic interaction outlier has been resolved.
The preferred method for tieing cabinets together to prevent seismic impact is by bolting but any other methods are acceptable provided an evaluation is performed.
- 4. CERTIFICATION:
The information on this OSVS is, to the best of our knowledge and belief, correct and accurate, and resolution of the outlier issues listed on the previous page will satisfy the requirements for this item of equipment to be verified for seismic adequacy: ;
l Approved by: kd a Date: /Z/f/rf c m.4 L 1 m a. vr l
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1 NUSCO MILLSTONE UNIT 2 GlP Rev 2, C5rrected 2/14/92 Sh;et 1 of 2 OUTLIER SEISMIC VERIFICATION SHEET (OSVS)
ID : RCO2A1 (Rev. 0) l Class : 20. Instrumentation and Control Panels and Cabinets !
Description : ESAS ACTUATION CABINET Building : CB l Floor El. : 36.50 l Room, Row / Col : CONTROL RM
- 1. OUTLIER ISSUE DEFINITION - Mechanical and Electrical Eautoment i
- a. Identify all the screening guidelines which are not met. (Check more than one if several guidelines could ,
not be satisfied.) ,
Capacity vs. Demand j
Caveats X Anchorage Seismic Interaction X Other I
- b. Describe all the reasons for the outlier (i.e., if all the listed outfier issues were resolved, then the signatories would consider this item of equipment to be verified for seismic adequacy).
RCO2A1 is part of the ESAS cabinets, the TSI C20 cabinet at South side and the Annunciator logics RC22 cabinet at North side are not bolted to ESAS cabinets. In addition, C06X cabinet is i not bolted to adjacent TSI C20 and C08X cabinets. Therefore, seismic impact is not precluded. l Similarly, seismic impact is not precluded for the RPS panel RC05B which is one section of the single cabinet RC05 and is located next to RC05A section which is not bolted to adjacent cabinet RC05E.
There are file cabinets located approx. 39" behind the ESAS and C06X cabinets which may cause seismic interaction. _
- 2. PROPOSED METHOD OF OUTLIER RESOLUTION (Octional)
- a. Defined proposed method (s) for resolving outfier.
Bolt the ESAS cabinets to adjacent TSI C20 and RC22 cabinets. Similarly, bolt cabinet RCOSA to RC05E, and cabinet C06X to TSI C20 and C08X.
- b. Provide information needed to implement proposed method (s) for resolving outlier (e.g., estimate of fundamental frequency).
l N/A l
- 3. COMMENTS This OSVS is generated for the following SSEL components: j RCO2A1 l RCO2B RCO2B2 RCO2C RCO2C3 RCO2D4 RC05B C06X
NUSCO MILLSTONE UNIT 2 GIP R2v 2, Corr;cted 2/14/92 OUTLIER SEISMIC VERIFICATION SHEET (OSVS) Sheet 2 of 2 ID : RC02A1 (Rev. 0) l Class : 20. Instrumentation and Control Panels and Cabinets Description : ESAS ACTUATION CABINET Building : CB l Floor El. : 36.50 l Room, Row / Col: CONTROL RM The SRT performed an additional walkdown at the MP2 control room on 11/3/95 to assess the housekeeping corrective actions that have taken place since the seismic walkdown. The walkdown confirmed that the seismic interaction concerns have been removed (reference NU Millstone Station Materiel Condition Program Manual, for addressing seismic interaction concems). Therefore, the seismic interaction outlier has been resolved.
The preferred method for tieing cabinets together to prevent seismic impact is by bolting but any other methods are acceptable provided an evaluation is performed.
- 4. CERTIFICATION:
The information on this OSVS is, to the best of our knowledge and belief, correct and accurate, and resolution of the outlier issues listed on the previous page will satisfy the requirements for this item of equipment to be verified for seismic adequacy:
Approved by: , M w,e Date: /,y!fj' 1
c'. /7). & J L j a /2. // 9F t
i I
i
. . . =-. . .- - _. . - . . . . _ -. -
NUSCO MILLSTONE UNIT 2 GlP Riv 2, Corrected 2/14/92 OUTLIER SEISMIC VERIFICATION SHEET (OSVS) Sheet 1 of 2 ID : T3 (Rev. 0) l Class : 21. Tanks and Heat Exchangers Description : RBCCW SURGE TANK Building : EB Floor El. ; 7*.00 Room, Row / Col : RBCCW SURGE TANK
- 1. OUTLIER ISSUE DEFINITION -Tanks and Heat Frehanaers
- a. Identify all the screening guidelines which are not met. (Check more than one if several guidelines could not be satisfied.)
Shell Buckling Anchor Bolts and Embedment X Anchorage Connections X Flexibility of Attached Piping Other
- b. Describe all the reasons for the outlier (i.e., if all the listed outlier issues were resolved, then the signatories would consider this item of equipment to be verified for seismic adequacy).
Tank T3 does not meet the GIP screening criteria since it is a large vertical tank supported by legs. A detailed tank evaluation was performed to qualify the tank anchorage and connections between anchor bolts and the tank shell. See VECTRA Calc No. MP20RT3, section 5.1, Rev. O for the tank evaluation. Based on the evaluation, the tank anchor bolts fait due to insufficient tension capacity; the tank legs f ail in bending; and the concrete floor punching shear capacity is exceeded.
- 2. PROPOSED METHOD OF OUTLIER RESOLUTION (Optional)
- a. Defined proposed method (s) for resolving outlier.
l Outlier has been resolved. I
- b. Provide information needed to implement proposed method (s) for resolving outlier (e g., estimate of fundamental frequency).
lN/A l
- 3. COMMENTS When the A-46 outlier condition was discovered a temporary design was installed to resolve the outlier prior to start-up. PDCR 2-95-040 has been prepared and approved to replace the temporary design with a permanent design modification. [ Reference NNECO calc. No. 95-ENG-1198 M2, Rev.1 dated 11/6/95].
In addition, an Operability Evaluation of the RBCCW Surge Tank T3 was performed (VECTRA Calc No.
MP2T3OPER Rev. 0). The evaluation concluded that tank T3 was operable under normal operating conditions.
NUSCO MILLSTONE UNIT 2 GIP Rrv 2, Corrected 2/14/92 OUTLIER SEISMIC VERIFICATION SHEET (OSVS) Sheet 2 of 2 ,
ID : T3 (Rev. 0) l Class : 21. Tanks and Heat Exchangers Description : RBCCW SURGE TANK !
Building : EB Floor El. : 71.00 Room, Row / Col: RBCCW SURGE TANK
- 4. CERTIFICATION:
The information on this OSVS is, to the best of our knowledge and belief, correct and accurate, and resolution of ,
the outlier issues listed on the previous page will satisfy the requirements for this item of equipment to be verified '
for seismic adequacy:
Approved by: i,o Date: / 2/9/9f-
-a 05m, a$ /2lffsf I
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1 NUSCO MILLSTONE UNIT 2 GIP R;v 2, Corr 2ct;d 2/14/92 OUTLIER SEISMIC VERIFICATION SHEET (OSVS) Sheet 1 of 2 ,
ID : X-82 (Rev. 0) l Class : 21. Tanks and Heat Exchangers Description : QUENCH TANK HEAT EXCHANGER Building : EB l Floor El. : 38.50 l Room. Row / Col: E PP PEN ;
I
- 1. DUTLIER ISSUE DEFINITION -Tanks and Heat Exchanoers
- a. Identify all the screening guidelines which are not met. (Check more than one if several guidelines could !
not be satisfied.) l Shell Buckling Anchor Bolts and Embedment X )
Anchorage Connections Flexibility of Attached Piping Other l I
- b. Describe all the reasons for the outlier (i.e., if all the listed outlier issues were resolved, then the signatories would consider this item of equipment to be verified for seismic adequacy).
Quench tank Hx X-82 does not meet the GIP screening criteria since the tank anchorage capacity does not exceed the demand and the concrete pedestal on the fixed end connection is cracked.
Refer to VECTRA calc. No. MP2 ORT 3, section 5.3, Rev. O for tank evaluation.
- 2. PROPOSED MEUiOD OF OUTLIER RESOLUTION (Ontional)
- a. Defined proposed method (s) for resolving outlier.
' Structurallylepair the cracked pedestal. When the concrete pedestalis repaired the X-82 archorage will be seismically acceptable per VECTRA anchorage evaluation that is attached to the SliWS. I
- b. Provide information needed to implement proposed method (s) for resolving outlier (e.g., estimate of fundamental frequency).
lN/A l
- 3. COMMENTS ,
I
NUSCO LILLSTONE UNIT 2 GIP R v 2, Corrected 2/14/92 OUTLIER SEISMIC VERIFICATION SHEET (OSVS) Sheet 2 of 2 ID : X-82 (Rev. 0) l Class : 21. Tanks and Heat Exchangers Description : QUENCH TANK HEAT EXCHANGER Building : EB l Floor El. : 38.50 l Room, Row / Col: E PP PEN
- 4. CERTIFICATION:
The information on this OSVS is, to the best of our knowledge and belief, correct and accurate, and resolution of the outlier issues listed on the previous page will satisfy the requirements for this item of equipment to be verified for seismic adequacy:
i Approved by: 0b Date: / 2/9[g(
b 0 O S xo s 't /
i2./r/1c I
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1 SEISMIC EVALUATION REPORT FOR MILLSTONE 2 ATTACHMENT H Raceway Review Area Summary Sheets (See Table of Contents for Page Numbers) ,
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