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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA n'ghk[0 NUCLEAR-REGULATORY COMMISSION
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Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board,84 SEP -4 mg:49
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- f In the Matter of
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LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY
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Docket No. 50-322-OL-4
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(Low Power)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station,
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Unit 1)
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1 BRIEF OF SUFFOLK COUNTY IN OPPOSITION TO LILCO'S MOTION FOR LOW POWER OPERATING LICENSE AND APPLICATION FOR EXEMPTION By a separate filing dated August 31, 1984,-Suffolk County and the State of New York have jointly submitted proposed non-argumentative findings of fact as required by this Board.
See ASLB Order, August 9, 1984.
As permitted by the Board's
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August 9 Order, Suffolk County submits this Brief to present certain arguments which are not included in the proposed find-j ings.
This proceeding has focused on LILCO's Supplemental Motion for a Low Power Operating License (the " Motion"), dated March
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20, 1983, and on LILCO's Application for Exemption (the "Appli-cation"), dated May 22, 1984.
The Application, filed after is-suance of the Commission's May 16, 1984 Order (CLI-84-8), has 8409040464 840831 PDR ADOCK 05000322 G
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h in manyl respects superceded the earlier Motion due to the 21 Commission's directive that LILCO can be granted a low power
' operating license only if it demonstrates that it qualifies for an exemption from applicable regulations under 10 C.F.R.
S 50.12(a).
The Commission has held repeatedly that a section 50.12(a)
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j exemption is an extraordinary remedy that should be granted sparingly.
- See, e.g.,
Long Island Lighting Company (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-84-8, NRC slip op.
at 2, note 3 (May 16, 1984); Washing ton Public Power Supply
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System (WPPSS' Nuclear Project Nos. 3& 5), CLI-77-ll, 5 NRC
-719, 723 (1977).
Suffolk County submits that LILCO has failed to meet its burden of proving that it satisfies the high stan-
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dards which apply to the granting of a section 50.12(a) exemp-tion.
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LILCO has failed to meet its burden of proof in four respects.
We summarize LILCO's failures immediately below and will address them in greater detail in the body of this
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brief.1/
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Suffolk County does not address in this Brief every basis for denying LILCO the relief it seeks.
Rather, this Brief l
is intended to highlight some of LILCO's most significant failures, and it must be read in conjunction with the Pro-posed Findings of Fact of Suffolk County and the State of (Footnote cont'd next page)
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1.
Section 50.12(a) specifies that an exemption can be j
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granted only if it is "otherwise in the public interest."
The exemption sought by LILCO is not in the public. interest be-cause:
h (a)
The representatives of the public, the State of New York and Suffolk County, are strongly opposed to the exemption.
This Board, when considering where the public interest lies, should place great weight on the views of such representativesoof the public.
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(b)
The rush to license Shoreham via an exemption has al-ready resulted in a decline of service to LILCO's customers, a result that also is not in the public interest.
The grant of an exemption will likely ex-acerbate this already serious situation.
(c)
The public interest favors full compliance with all
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safety-related regulations.
When a requested exemp-tion goes to safety regulations, as does the one sought by LILCO, the public interest in compliance (Footnote cont'd from previous page)
New York wnich provide further data regarding why this Board should deny the relief LILCO seeks.
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h with safety regulations. requires-denial of the exemption.
Indeed, a Section 50.-12(a) exemption from a safety-related requirement has never been granted in any reported NRC' case, h.
(d)-.The public interest does not favor. the grant of an exemption to permit-operation ~of Shoreham in advance y
of resolution of outstanding emergency planning uncertainties, since the grant of the exemption could result in contamination of'the plant followed by
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abandonment.
This would result in substantial costs which 'might. ultimately have to be borne by the public but no_ attendant benefits to the public.
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(e)
No economic benefit.would accrue ' to the public f rom the grant of the exemption.
In fact, even assuming that the grant of the exemption were to result in the earlier commercial operation of Shoreham, this would result in a $165 million rate increase to be borne by the the public in 1985 alone.
Such a rate increase, which comprises an immediate economic penalty to the public resulting from the grant of the exemption, is not in the public interest.
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( f )' _The' alleged public' interest,in-r'aducing dependence on
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~fo~ reign oil is' irrelevant to thefsxemption requested
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i by LIICO.
This exemption pertains solely to low powerloperation'of Shoreham, and it is undisputed
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cthat-reduction in foreign oll/ consumption would result"from Sh$reham's low power /' operation.
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) i isnotinthe-hublicinterest for a company like
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It LILCO, whic'h.is close to bankruptcy, to be granted an exemption fromis,afety regulati'ons and be permitted to operate a nucidar plant, Operation of a nuclear
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plant is necessarily an activity that entails certain f
risks.
When a' company is close to bankruptcy, common
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sense ihdicates that the comp'any will be under pres-sure to teduce costs in an effort to survive -- a situation which is not conducive to the high levels ofsafethexpectedundertheNRC'sregulations, i
2.
An exemption can be granted only if LILCO demon-strates that there are " exigent circumstances" which favor the grant of an. exemption.: The circumstances in this case do not support the extraordinary relief LILCO seeks:
/ "i On'e circums'cancI to be cynsidered in determining (a) wh$ther an ekomption is justified is whether there is
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.h a need' for the ~ power from the reactor.
It is undisputed -that the power proposed to be generated by.
.Shoreham is not needed for at least 10 years and-maybe longer.= This circumstance militates strongly
'against the grant of the exemption.
~(b)
Another circumstance to be considered'in a section
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50.12(a) proceeding is whether the s may be alternate relief'available in a short time period,-thus making extraordinary relief by way of exemption unnecessary.
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If so, then the exemption should be denied.
In this
-case, it'is undisputed that alternate relief is available to LILCO -- namely, the TDI diesel proceed-J' ing before the Brenner Board.
This circumstance also militates strongly against the grant of the exemp-tion.
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(c)
LILCO has not demonstrated any extraordinary efforts to comply with GDC 17.
While LILCO has attempted to comply with GDC 17, it has failed to show that its attempts are entitled to any specific consideration or weight, or that they dif fer from what is expected of'every NRC license applicant.
Moreover, the evi-dence indicates that LILCO itself has been l
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l responsible for, and could have prevented, many of
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the difficulties it now faces.
The balance of equities certainly does not favor rewarding LILCO with an exemption when the perceived need for an ex-
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emption is at least partially LILCO's f ault.
(d)
The fact that this has been a long proceeding has nothing to do with whether an extraordinary exemption
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should be granted to avoid compliance with a safety regulation.
O (e)
The training benefits which are alleged to result from the grant of an exemption are minimal, if any.
The vast majority, if not all, of the training which 9
would take place during the proposed low power testing program would be provided to operators during LILCO's low power and power ascension testing whether e
or not an exemption is granted.
Further, if LILCO truly believes that the proposed " additional" training benefits are important to safe operation of 9
Shoreham, it should ensure that such training is accomplished regardless whether the exemption is granted.
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3.
LILCO must demonstrate "that, at the power levels for
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which it seeks autaorization to operate, operation would be as safe under the conditions proposed by it, as operation would have been with a fully qualified onsite AC power source."
p CLI-84-8, at 3.
.LILCO has failed to meet this standard.
The J
evidence is clear that-in the event of a loss of offsite power
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l with the alternate AC power configuration proposed by LILCO, j
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power could be supplied to safety loads by two sources.
These two sources share common failure points with each other and with the offsite-power sources, and are nonsafety-related, less
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redundant, more prone to single failures, operator error and l
natural hazards than a fully qualified onsite power system.
A fully qualified source of onsite power provides three fully in-
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dependent sources of power that are also independent of'offsite power sources.
Further, whereas a fully qualified power system would supply power to safety loads in 10 to 15 seconds, the
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alternate power sources proposed by LILCO, under ideal condi-tions, could not supply power for several minutes, and under some circumstances it could take as long as 30 minutes.
Since
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power may need to be supplied to safety loads within 55 to 86 minutes after a LOOP /LOCA event, reliance on the alternate AC power system substantially reduces the margin of safety and
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constitutes a severe reduction in the defense-in-depth
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f%g-J protection which generally is central to the NRC's licensing 0_
concept.
4.
LILCO has applied for an exemption from GDC 17.
How-ever, LILCO has also fail'ed to comply with many other regula-
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- tions, including GDC 1-4,-18, 33-35, 37, 38, 40, 41, 43, 44, and 46, and Part 50, Appendix B.
Further, it is impossible for this Board to make the Section 50.57(a) findings necessary to
.O, the issuance of a low power operating license.
LILCO has
- failed to seek an exemption from these requirements or to offer O,
evidence in support of any implicit request for such an exemp-tion.
Therefore, no low power license can be authorized.
We address each of the foregoing matters in greater detail
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below.
First, however, the County sets forth a brief analysis i
of the legal principles that must govern this Board's decision, g
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The Legal Standard Which This Board Must Follow In CLI-84-8, the Commission set forth generally the re-quirements which LILCO must satisfy in order to be eligible for O
an exemption.
First, LILCO must address the explicit determi-l nations which are required by the plain words of Section 50.12(a).
That Section provides in relevant part:
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s The Commission may, upon application by any interest d person or upon its own initia-tive, grant such exemptions from the re-quirements of the regulations in this Part as it determines are authorized by law and
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will not endanger life or property or the common defense and security and are other-wise in the public interest.
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.,;:wg q It is clear from Section 50.12(a) that LILCO has the burden of ykCs ~..
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..+r demonstrating that the grant of an exemption is in the "public y.;; )
<- L interest."
In addition, however, the Commission established h i; s '-
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two further legal requirements that must be satisfied before an e
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c exemption may be granted:
first, the applicant must demon-3,ig; strate that " exigent circumstances" favor the grant of an ex-d(,ydy r,;;.
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emption under Section 50.12(a), assuming that LILCO has also i Mn
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demonstrated that in spite of its noncompliance with GDC 17, Pj.f..l:E iM. }
the health and safety of the public would be protected; and pij.
f/. Ud second, the applicant must demonstrate '? that, at the power lev-y 'f.:. ?
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els for which [LILCO] seeks authorization to operate, operation y ;y;,^ h would be as safe under the conditions proposed by it, as
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.w operation would have been under a fully qualified onsite AC j ;);odi r _
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V'Id@y power source."
CLI-84-8, at 2-3.
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i;@l, The three foregoing legal standards are mandatory and f lisi#
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binding on this Board.
Thiu Board has no authority.to deviate
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from those standards, but rather must apply this guidance from
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involves the performance of addi-tional. reactor heatups at the end of -the test program.
Mr.
? Gunther.-testified, however,'that this-training would only be conducted if there.were extra time available at the end of the low power test program before further power ascension'were au-T thorized.
Thus, ' that. asserted " training benefit" is specula-tive, and not entitled to any weight.
Id. at 1324-28.
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Finally, all the tests that will be performed during the low power test program are required, are necessary, and would be performed.in'any event whenever low power operation was
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See Proposed Findings V315, 324, 327.
Thus,.with the possible exception of 72 hours of criticalities, the testing and training that would result from the performance
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of those tests.is not related to the grant of an exemption and cannot be described as comprising an " exigent circumstance" that justifies the grant of an exemption.
Because the testing
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and training would take place in any event, no benefit would be gained as a result of the requested exemption.
Suffolk County urges this Board.to disregard entirely the training benefit alleged by.LILCO for an additional reason.
If
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O LILCO believes that a significant benefit in terms of public health and safety will result from the performance of addition-al criticalities by its personnel, it is incongruous for LILCO to suggest that if the exemption is not granted it would not D
perform such criticalities.
In asserting that it should be given credit for its proposed " additional training," LILCO ar-gues that such training would be beneficial and would enhance D
safety.
However, LILCO seems to be proposing a sort of tradeoff:
give us the exemption and we will do more training; if you do not give us the exemption, we may not do as much D
training (even though the extra training would be beneficial and presumably safety will therefore suffer).
This does not constitute responsible argument by an NRC applicant seeking the D
privilege of operating a nuclear power plant.
Thus, this Board should dismiss that argument in its entirety.
O Mr. McCaffrey also testified regarding LILCO's alleged good faith efforts to comply with GDC 17.
LILCO's testimony in this regard was largely conclusory and was offered by a witness
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without any detailed knowledge of those efforts.
His testimony is entitled to no weight.
The details as to why Mr.
McCaffrey's testimony regarding LILCO's efforts relating to its 3
attempt to comply with GDC 17 must be ignored are set forth in the Proposed Findings of Fact.
We summarize the most sig nificant reasons here.
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First, Mr. McCaffrey lacked personal knowledge and thus
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his testimony was.largely unsupported conclusions.
Although a major portion of the LILCO " efforts" Mr. McCaffrey believes should be considered to constitute exigent circumstances in-volves'LILCO's procurement from TDi of diesels which supposedly were designed and manufactured to meet performance standards identified by LILCO, Mr. McCaffrey did not know what LILCO had or had not done to ensure that the TDI diesels were in fact manufactured to the performance standards in the LILCO specifi-cation.
See Proposed Findings V329-37.
y Although familiar with the existence of quality assurance programs, Mr. McCaffrey could not testify as to how TDI tested the diesel generators manufactured for LILCO to determine their capability to meet performance requirements.
The crankshaft in one of the TDI diesels at Shoreham broke in two in August 1983.
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The cause of the failure was improper design of the crankshaft.
Mr. McCaf frey did not know what LILCO did prior to the actual failure of the crankshaft in Auguat 1983 to determine whether
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the crankshaft was adequately desigaed.
Similarly, Mr.
McCaffrey did not know whether prior to the August 1983 failure LILCO had ever even reviewed the design of the crankshaf t.
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LILCO made no effort to determine whether a crankshaft of that design had been installed in any other TDI generators, and Mr.
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'McCaffrey did not know whether LILCO had.everchad discussions
- with. other - owners of - TDI diesels' concerning the design of that crankshaft prior to the August 1983. failure.
Furthermore, al-
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though Mr.'McCaffrey asserted that LILCO had several means by which it could obtain information concerning engine failures and operating experience, he'did not know whether LILCO had ob-tained or~ attempted to obtain any information about operating p
experience or problems with TDI diesels prior to the August 1983 crankshaft failure.
See Proposed Findings. 1338-41, 356-65.
Y Mr. McCaffrey also asserted that LILCO's pre-operational testing program relating to the TDI diesel generators is an ad-ditional part of LILCO's efforts to comply with GDC-17 which should: be considered to constitute an exigent circumstance that justifies the exemption..That testing program, however, I
resulted in a Notice of Violation of severity level III and a fine of $40,000 imposed upon LILCO by the NRC Staf f as a result of LILCO's having improperly conducted and certified a test i
designed to verify the'TDI generator's capability of running at-its rated loads.
Thus, in May 1982, LILCO performed a diesel test which did not meet LILCO's own test acceptance criteria or the. verification requirements in LILCO's test procedure; in the face of these facts, the LILCO Test Engineer and LILCO's '
4 Operational Quality Assurance inspectors nonetheless signed and o
accepted the test results.
The results that were considered
" acceptable" by LILCO did not in fact i.idicate the engine's ca-pability of running at 3900 KW for two hours as required, but h
rather indicated capability of running for 15 minutes at a
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range of values from 3500 to 3850 KW.
Despite Mr. McCaf f rey's assertions that LILCO's pre-operational test program should be O
given special credit by this Board, the NRC Staff stated that the diesel generator testing by LILCO " demonstrates a lack of aggressiveness on the part of LILCO to pursue, identify and re-O solve associated problems that can affect the reliability of the diesel generators, including attention to detail during performance data review and approval of the test results of
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[its] pre-operational test program."
The NRC Staff itself stated that such actions "are necessary to demonstrate that the components will perform satisfactorily in service."
See Pro-posed Findings 1342-47.
Furthermore, despite LILCO's lack of aggressiveness and I) f ailure to obtain information concerning operational experience with other TDI diesels, in March 1983, based on a review of LILCO's own documents and reports, the NRC Staff determined 5) that the TDI diesels' reliability for continuous operation and for standby electric power'was questionable.
Based on LILCO's O O
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own documents, as of March 1983 the Staff was able t'o identify 47 separate, incidents and/or failures that had occurred in just the 12-month period prior to March 1983.
Although these fail-ures. led the NRC Staff to conclude that there was "an immediate concern" with respect to the reliability of the TDIs, LILCO did not even disassemble those machines to examine them until more than five months later -- that is, af ter one of the crankshaf ts
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broke in two in Augast 1983.
See Proposed Findings 1348-54.
Finally, despite Mr. McCaffrey's belief that LILCO's ef-
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forts relating to the TDI diesels are entitled to weigh in favor of granting an exemption, the evidence showed that infor-mation concerning serious problems with TDI diesels installed
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at the San Onofre and Grand Gulf nuclear plants, as well as in marine service for non-nuclear organizations, was available long before the August 1983 crankshaft failure.
Mr. McCaffrey
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was unable to say whether LILCO knew of such problems or in f act did anything in an attempt to learn of such problems.
See Proposed Findings 357-65.
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Thus, Mr. McCaffrey's conclusory assertions that LILCO's efforts to comply with GDC 17 were made in good faith and enti-tle LILCO to an exemption because ' they constitute exigent cir-cumstances, are contradicted by the evidence.
Suffolk County l
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isubmits::that Mr. McCaffrey.'s testimony'should be disregarded-in
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iG-its entirety.
The need to disregard Mr. McCaffrey's testimony is all the more important because-the Board committed serious error when 3
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- it barred admissionuof the testimonyfof Suffolk County's wit-
,nesses Mess'rs. Hubbard,and Bridenbaugh on precisely the same s ub'j ec t. - See Tr. 2373-90.
The prefiled testimony of Messrs.
'HubbardLand Bridenbaugh. established that LILCO had. failed to take reasonable actions with respect to the TDIs'to ensure com-I pliance.with GDC 17,:that LILCO's failures began in 1974 and to.
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continued through the early 1980's, and that the f ailures in-l
_volved, among other things, LILCO's quality assurance efforts Q)-
and'preoperational testing efforts which were discussed by Mr.
J McCaffrey.
For reasons which are not clear in the record, this Board denied admission of the Hubbard/Bridenbaugh testimony y
even though it had admitted Mr. McCaffrey's testimony on the i
same basic subject.
And, even after the Board's ruling, it'de--
nied the County's motion to strike Mr. McCaffrey's testimony.
1 Ig' See.Tr. 2866-72.
There-is a denial of due process.when the Board' admits one party's testimony on a subject and denies tes -
i timony by another party on the'same basic subject matter.
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1 We' bring this to the Board's attention at this time so I) that it.has an opportunity, before an initial decision is is-
. sued, to remedy its error.
To remedy its error, the Board should reconvene the hearing for the limited purpose of hearing ri-the Hubbard and Bridenbaugh testimony.
Their testimony will establish that contrary to the allegations of LILCO's witness Mr. McCaffrey, the evidence is' clear that LILCO did not take n
reasonable steps to ensure compliance with GDC 17; rather, LILCO repeatedly and consistently closed its eyes to repeated indications of serious deficiencies with the TDI diesels for
'O many years.
Thus, the fact that LILCO now needs to seek an ex-4 emption is largely due to its own failure to take reasonable actions in the past.
Suf folk County submits -that if its evi-
~O dence had been admitted, there would be no conclusion for the Board to reach other than that it would be irresponsible for the NRC to reward LILCO's past failures by the grant of an ex-0 1
emption at this time.
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LILCO-Ha's Failed to-Establish:that Low-Power Op, ration of Shoreham1with the 7)-
Alternate AC. Power System Would Be As Safe As Low Power Oper'ation Would.Have Been "With a' Fully Qualified Onsite AC Power' Source k
01 The_ Commission's guidance in:CLI-84-8 makes clear that LILCO must demonstrate thatc operation of Shoreham with the r
alternate AC powernsystem would bejas safe as operation of Q
Shoreham with a1 fully qualified onsite AC power system.
As set forth in.the earlier discussion'of the legal standard, this Commission guidance is' binding:
the question.is not whether i
operation o'f Shoreham with the. alternate power system.would, in
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' the judgment of Ethis Board, -be safe enough, but rather whether operation of Shoreham with the alternate power system would be t
lO as safe as operation would have been with fully qualified TDI diesels.
Suffolk County submits that the ' evidence makes clear that LO :
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the required "as safe as" finding cannot be made.
The Proposed i
Findings document the reasons that the as safe as standard has not been met.
We will briefly highlight here some of the com-y parisons which lead to this conclusion.
-If'Shoreham' operated with the set of fully-qualified I) onsite diesels originally proposed, its sources of onsite emer-gency power would have been fully seismically qualified, fully
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L protected *against fires -in accordance with Appendix R, and h.-
'fullyTredundant.
r:ach of the three TDI diesels is-a. completely
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independent power source capable of. supplying safety loads dur-ting-low power operation in the event of a-loss of offsite power.. The TDIs.do not share fuel systems, starting mecha-nisms, output.or input lines, or control mechanisms,-and each I
one is physically isolated from the others1in its own Category I building.. The TDIs are also' fully independent of the offsite l
l sources of AC-power..
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In contrast, the elements of the proposed alternate AC power-configuration, consisting of a set of four EMD diesels i
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'and the 20 MW gas turbine, are not seismically qualified, are j'
not protected against fires in accordance with Appendix R, and do not have.the same level of redundancy.
Indeed, in contrast i
t to the three independent power trains which could supply the
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safety loads in the qualified configuration, there are only two in the alternate configuration.
Thus, from mere physical con-figuration -- three fully safety-related AC power sources vs.
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two nonsafety-related power sources -- it is clear that the "as safe.as" standard cannot be met.
In addition, portions of LILCO's alternate. configuration. share common elements with the
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offsite-power system, and also share common features with each other; thus, unlike the fully qualified configuration, the l
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alternate configuration is neither. independent of the offsite
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power system nor are the-elements of that configuration inde-
. pendent of each --o ther.
See Proposed Findings. V12-13, 265-67, 280-304.
Furth'ermore, the set-of four EMD diesel generators is
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sub' ject-to single' failures that would disable'the entire set of diesels because those units share a common fuel' system, a com-mon starting system, common output cables a*d common controls.
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Id. at 1104-30.
As noted above, LILCO's originally proposed fully quali-
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fled diesel generator system included both fixed. fire detection and fixed fire extinguishing systems for each individual gener-ator, and each was located in its own separate compartment.
By
)f contrast, the EMDs do not contain any fire detection equipment not any fixed or remotely operated fire extinguishing or miti-gating system.
Furthermore, the EMDs are substantially more
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vulnerable to fire and explosion as a result of their fuel sys-tem and battery starting system, than a fully qualified source of onsite power.
The vulnerability of the EMDs to fire is par-
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.ticularly significant because the EMDs are not separated by fire walls,.and a fire in one EMD would likely result in the unavailability of all the EMDs.
See Proposed Findings 131-52.
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8 The originally proposed fully qualified source of onsite O-power included'a detailed and comprehensive alarm system which
-was annunciated in the control room.
That system permitted early detection of abnormal conditions and provided an opportu-S-
nity for corrective action to be taken prior.to an actual shut-down of one of the TDIs.
By contrast, the abnormal condition alarms associated with the EMDs and the gas turbine are not O
annunciated in the control room, but rather in the individual switchgear cubicles located next to that equipment outside-the plant building.
The only alarm. signals annunciated in the con-D trol room are those which indicate an actual shutdown of the equipment.
Therefore, with the alternate configuration, there is no opportunity for corrective action prior to an actual shutdown of the equipment.
See Proposed Findings 153-63, 260-62.
O A fully qualified source of onsite power is fully automat-ic, requiring no manual operator actions.
The TDI diesels started, synchronized, accepted load, and distributed load to systems requiring power without any operator intervention, and
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within 10-15 seconds.
By contrast, the alternate power config-uration requires many manual operations -- for example, in order to connect the EMDs to the necessary electrical loads, at least 18 separate manual operations are required.
Not only
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i di does the operation of the.. alternate power configuration require 5
"A substantially more time -- at an absolute minimum th'ree to five minutes but.perhaps as much as 30 minutes -- the need for so much manual action makes the alternate configuration substan-l3.
tially more vulnerable to human error than a fully qualified system, which is fully automatic.
In addition, the increased-complexity involved in the electrical circuitry of the 3
alternate configuration decreases the reliability of that con-figuration compared to the much less complex circuitry related to fully qualified TDI diesel generators.
See Proposed Find-ings 1164-89, 253, 263-64, 275-79.
Each of these comparisons demonstrates that the alternate C) configuration is less reliable and more vulnerable to failures than a fully qualified source of onsite AC power would be.
Although LILCO's witnesses relied upon the maintenance and operating history of the EMD diesels to assert that they are a reliable source of power, their testimony was based on incom-plete and inconsistent records, they were not personally'famil-
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iar with the maintenance _ records, and their assertions were largely contradicted by the records themselves or shown to be-without factual basis or relationship to the particular diesels
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at issue.
The LILCO witnesses did not controvert or rebut the l l
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County's testimony concerning the 20 MW gas turbine. - See k
Proposed Findings 1203-74.
LILCO urged in-its closing argument that the Board should make the necessary'"as safe as" finding because LILCO asser ts that its evidence indicates that under the alternate AC. power supply which it has proposed, it will be able to supply power 3
the safety loads before the 2200 degree temperature limit is to reached in the event of a loss of offsite power and loss of coolant accident sequence.
However, this proposed comparison j'
ignores the mandatory directive of the Commission.
The ques-tion is not whether assuming a certain time frame is available (55 or 86 minutes or whatever it may be), the alternate AC p
power configuration may be able to supply power to the safety loads.
Rather, the question is whether operation with the alternate AC power system is as safe as operation would be if
)
there were fully qualified onsite diesels.
Clearly, it is not.
If the TDI diesels were fully opera-I tional and qualified, then in the event of a LOOP /LOCA, power would be supplied to the safety loads, fully automatically, from three redundant sources in approximately 15 seconds.
If everything works perfectly with the alternate AC power system, power will not be supplied for 3-5 minutes if the 20 megawatt
01 el O
O' 8
G-9 9
9 9
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O.
gas turbine is used, and; for 10-15 minutes if the E!4Ds are El used.
In. addition, because with the. alternate AC_ power system, many manual operations are'necessary to power the safety loads
.while, in contrast, the supply of power from a fully qualified O
onsite AC power system is fully automatic, there will be a re-duced margin of safety under the alternate AC power configura-tion:
for a period od time after a LOOP /LOCA, temperatures O
will rise in the reactor core from the decay heat from low power testing while the Shoreham operators are waiting and wondering whether the alternate AC power supply will in fact
'6 come on.
See Proposed Findings 1306-09.
If the alternate AC power supply does not come on, there will less time thereafter for emergency corrective actions to be t$ ken than would be the O
case with the TDI diesels wherein the operators would know within 15 seconds whether the onsite AC power supply was work-ing.
This constitutes a direct and clear reduction in the O
level of defense-in-depth safety which is a hallmark under the NRC's regulatory process.
()
Low power operation with the alternate configuration is also not as safe as operation with a fully qualified source of emergency onsite power because of the increased vulnerability O
of the alternata configuration to seismic events and the safe shutdown earthquaka (SSE).
The evidence presented by Suffolk O O
4 Ol 6
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I I
9 9
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County,Lwhich was-substantially uncontroverted by LILCO and the
'A-i
' ficant potential that as i
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'. NRC Staff', was.that there is a s gn the result of the SSE, the 138 KV and the 69 KV systems (even Las_ enhanced with the 20 MW gas-turbine) will fail.. These two
'0 sources of offsite power;would fail in an SSE whether there were qualified onsite diesel generators or not.
The signifi-i l~
cant fact, however, is'that if.there were three fully qualified
'6 diesel generators available, by. definition they would be 4
predicted to survive an SSE.
Accordingly, after an SSE which disabled the 138 KV. and 69 KV systems, under LILCO's originally
.;O-proposed qualified config1 ration, there still would be three independent AC. power sources, any one of which could meet low i-power safety load requirements.
In contrast, under LILCO's
- O proposed alternate AC power configuration, after the SSE (as-suming failure of the 138 and 69 KV systems), only the EMD die-sels would remain.
See Proposed Findings 115-71, 79-80.
- O The EMDs however, also have a substantial potential for failure during an SSE because of the seismic vulnerability of 23' their common fuel line and output cables, the. potential for
. soil liquefaction in the area where they are located, and the l
potential for failure of the masonry walls in the non-emergency O
switchgear room.
Id.
The details concerning these seismic vulnerabilities of the alternate AC power configuration, and t '
4
n f.
the~results of failures due to a seismic event upon the ability
=of,that. configuration to supply power to emergency loads, are set forth in the Proposed Findings of Fact.
i Although there was some. testimony by LILCO and Staff wit-nesses concerning the existence of testing and operating proce-dures relating to the alternate-AC power configuration, the J
only evidence concerning the adequacy of the surveillance pro-cedures for the EMDs and'for the gas turbine was provided.by
.the County's witnesses.
As detailed in the Proposed Findings
~
)
of Fact, the County's witnesses testified that the surveillance testing procedures do not adequately or effectively assure re-liable operation of either the EMD diesels or the 20 MW gas 7
turbine.
Moreover,- there is no evidence that the NRC Staff has even-reviewed, much less approved, the surveillance procedures being proposed by LILCO.
See Proposed Findings 1190-200,
)
254-59.
Finally, the.NRC Staff has stated that at least 16 addi-l tional technical specification requirements, and at least nine license conditions must be imposed upon and implemented by LILCO before the proposed low power operation would be accept-able to the Staff.
See Proposed Findings 1187-88, 257, 295-98.
y-The'need for so many additional technical specification A
.,.. +
~. ~
Q-4
' requirements:andclicense1 conditions before the proposal would
- O-
,/
- even be _ acceptable to' the Staf f provides a. fur ther ' indication that operation?with Lthe proposed-AC power. configuration ~would not be as safe as operation with.a fully qualified source of AC
,O:
power.
In short, Suffolk County submite'that the evidence
[O establishes that with the alternate AK: power configuration, there would be a reduced margin of safety which, in turn, means i
that the level of defense :in depth protection provided for a a
- O Shoreham emergency is reduced..Given the largely i
uncontroverted facts relating to the increased-vulnerability i-and decreased reliability of emergency AC power given the 1[
alternate configuration as compared to a qualified configura-
[
tion,s it is ' impossible to find that operation of Shoreham with the alternate AC~ power system would be as safe as operation q
- O with a fully qualified onsite diesel system.
In this regard, Suffolk County is compelled to bring to g).
the Board's attention another serious error which.was committed i
on the record.
Suffolk County offered into evidence the testi-mony of Messrs. Minor and Weatherwax 'for the purpose of-
!O demonstrating that operation of Shoreham with the alternate AC power configuration would not be as safe as operation'of t-
'O '
58 -
l-l'
J I
Shoreham with a' fully qualified onsite power system.
Messrs.
Minor and Weatherwax had performed both qualitative.and quanti-thtive'(PRA) analyses in support of their opinions, and their prefiled testimony documented the fact that low power operation of Shoreham with the alternate AC power system is quantifiably less safe than low power operation with a fully qualified AC power system.
The prefiled testimony 'of Messrs. Minor and Weatherwax established that a loss of offsite power transient during low power operation is seven times more likely to lead to a core vulnerable condition with the alternate configuration than with a fully qualified source of onsite AC _ power, and that the likelihood that the plant would experience an event leading to core vulnerability during low power operation is 2-1/2 times g
greater under the alternate configuration than it would be under the qualified configuration.
Such testimony was directly
-responsive to the comparsion mandated by the Commission in 3
CLI-84-8.
The Board clearly erred in striking this testimony.
Al-g though there is no regulatory requirement for PRA-type analy-ses,.that is quite beside the point, and does not support the Board's assertion that a probabalistic risk assessment is not
)
"a proper method to be used in this proceeding."
See Tr. 2858.
L These witnesses chose to utilize probabalistic analyses as part 3
59 -
p
- of their comparison of the relative safety of the alternate AC
)
power configuration and a fully qualified AC power system.
While there may be no regulatory requirement to perform PRA analyses, there clearly is also no regulatory bar to the use of probabalistic data, if available, to evaluate the relative
-safety of operation in different configurations.
This Board cited no precedent for barring this testimony, and the NRC Staff admitted that not only is there no prohibition upon the performance or use of PRA data in NRC proceedings, but in fact the-Staff has actually required PRAs in some proceedings.
See Tr. 2856-57.
We bring this to the Board's attention at this time so
)
that it may remedy the error prior to its issuance of a partial initial decision.
The Board may remedy this error by promptly reconvening the proceeding and admitting this testimony for cross-examination.
If this testimony is admitted, we submit that the testimony will establish even more clearly than is now established on the record that low power operation with the
)
alternate AC power configuration proposed by LILCO is less safe than operation with fully qualified onsite source of power.
)
? )
[
V.
LILCO Has Failed to Establish ~ that It t
Complies with All NRC Regulations or That it Has Sought an Exemption From NRC Regulations In its Application for: Exemption, LILCO. states that it:
i
[S]eeks.an exemption under Section 50.12(a)
- f rom that portion of General Design-Crite--
~
rion-17, and from other applicable regulations, if any, requiring that the TDI diesel. generators be. fully adj udicated prior to conducting the low power testing described in LILCO's March 20 motion.
Application at 4 (emphasis supplied).
Despite its seeking of f
an exemption from "other applicable regulations, if any," the evidence LILCO presented at trial fails even to address, much less establish any basis for, granting LILCO an exemption from any regulations in addition to GDC 17.
In fact, however, it is clear from a review of NRC regula-tions that LILCO does need exemptions from regulations other than GDC-17 because it has failed to comply with those other regulations.
Suffolk County submits, as set forth in the Affi-davit of Messrs. Minor and Bridenbaugh, filed
'?
June 13, 1984 2y.ition on Phases in. response to LILCO's Motion for Summar_. ?
.I.and II,l / that LILCO fails to comply with ta6 following d
15/
See Suffolk-County and State of New Yo Memorandum in Op-position to LILCO's May 22 Motions for h mmary Disposition on Phase I.and II of LILCO's Proposed Low Power Testing,
l June 13, 1984. -
General Design Criteria:
GDC 1-4, 18, 33-35, 37, 38, 40, 41,
- 43, 44, 46.
In addition, LILCO has failed to comply with 10 C.F.R.
Part 50, Appendix B, relating to quality assurance.
LILCO is not in-compliance with GDC 1-4 because its proposed new plant configuration does not include any safety-related or seismically or environmentally qualified onsite AC power sys-tems.
LILCO does not comply with GDC 18, 53-35, 37, 38, 40, f
41, 43, 44, and 46 because there is no onsite emergency AC power source in the proposed Shoreham plant configuration and since there is no such source, the transfer from of fsite to
'D onsite power cannot be tested as required by those criteria.
Finally, the proposed alternate plant configuration has not been designed, installed, tested, nor will it be operated in accordance with the criteria set forth in Part 50, Appendix B.16/
There is no evidence that would either support a finding that LILCO complies with the foregoing regulations or establish bases for exemptions from these regulations.
Thus, this Board n
must rule that LILCO has failed to support its Application for an Exemption and thus that the exemption is denied.ll/
q 16/
These bases are described in the County /New York submis-sion of June 13 and will not be repeats-in greater detail at this time.
17/
In addition, LILCO has also failed to document that it 7;
meets the requirements of 10 C.F.R.
S 50.57(a).
We will
( Footnote cont' d next page) 9 e
VI.
-LILCO's Request for an Exemption for Phase I nd II Prior to the Issuance
{)
of Security Findings Must Be Danied During its closing argument on August 16, LILCO urged that
- )
even though the Board had established a security proceeding, this Board could issue a decision granting the exemption for Phases I and II prior to rendering any decision on the security
[)
matters.
This issue was not properly before the Board at closing argument since it was not part of the issues that were litigated during the Augut hearing.
However, Suffolk County D
will briefly respond to LILCO's argument.
First, the Board has no authority to issue a license for Phase I or Phase II because under the Atomic Energy Act, the Board and the NRC have authority only to issue construction permits and operating licenses.
The Board has no authority to issue a no power license o_ a license to load fuel.
Rather than burden this brief with further argument on this subject, Suffolk County refers the Board's attention to pages 5-11 of D
(Footnote cont'd from previous page) not repeat in this brief the arguments that have previous-ly been made by Suffolk County in its Memorandum filed June 13, 1984 in response to the LILCO summary disposition g
motions.
Please refer to pages 27-43 of Suffolk County's June 13 filing for the reasons.that the Section 50. 57(a) findings cannot be made.
3 e
Suffolk County's Opposition to LILCO's Motion for Summary 1984) in w'ich Suffolk h
Disposition ~on Phase I and II (June 13, County establishes that any such Phase I and II licenses would be illegal.
Second, LILCO asserted during its August _16 argument that there are'no possible security implications during Phases I and II.
LILCO's assertions are merely lawyers' arguments.
Suffice it to say in this pleading that Suf folk County believes that at any time that fuel loading and cold criticality testing is
)
being undertaken, there are security concerns which are rele-vant and must be considered.
In this regard, Suffolk County reminds the Board that in the North Anna proceeding, the li-censing board required full security implementation for the loading of fuel.
See Virginia Electric and Power Company (North Anna Power Station, Units 1 and 2), LPB-77-64, 6 NRC
)'
808, 813 (1977).
LILCO's security plan is deficient at this
_ time for the reasons set forth in the County /New York security i
l contentions.
Thus, there is no basis on which a Phase I or II f
license could now be issued.
VII. Conclusion f
The foregoing brief must be read in conjunction with the l
Proposed Findings which have submitted jointly by the State of L
=
7-LNew York and Suffolk County.
We submit that_the evidence I;
demonstrates that LILCO has failed to establish that it is en-titled to an exemption from GDC 17 or from the other regula-tions with which it does not comply.
Further, the evidence in-I dicates that LILCO has failed to establish that it can satisfy the requirements of Section 50.57(a).
For all'the foregoing reasons, Suffolk County submits that this Board should rule L
that LILCO has failed to meet its burden of proof and, accord-f-
ingly, the exemption and low power. license request are denied.
?-
Respectfully submitted, Martin Bradley Ashare Suffolk County Department of Law Veterans Memorial Highway Hauppauge, New York 11788
/
l i
0 He/bbrt H. Brow /V Lawrence Coe Lanpher 3
Karla J.
Letsche Cherif Sedky KIRKPATRICK, LOCKHART, HILL, CHRISTOPHER & PHILLIPS 1900 M Street, N.W.,
Suite 800 Washing ton,
D.C.
20036 Attorneys for Suffolk County i
August 31, 1984 e
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