ML20095B670
| ML20095B670 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | San Onofre  |
| Issue date: | 12/06/1995 |
| From: | Rosenblum R SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20095B667 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9512110147 | |
| Download: ML20095B670 (16) | |
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i UNITED STATES OF AMERICA l
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i
Application of SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA l EDISON COMPANY, H R. for a Class ~103 Docket No. 50-361 !
License to Acquire, Possess, and Use l a Utilization Facility as Part of- Amendment Application ]
No. 153 Unit No. E of the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY, H R . pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90, hereby ;
submit Amendment Application No. 153.
This amendment application consists of Proposed Change Number NPF-10-449 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-10. Proposed Change Number NPF-10-449 is a request to change Technical Specf#ication (TS) Section 4.3 " Fuel Storage" to allow fuel assemblies having a maximum U-235 enrichment of 4.8 weight percent (w/o) to be stored in both the spent fuel racks and the new fuel racks.
Additionally, TS Section 3.7.18 " Spent Fuel Asseinbly Storage," Figures 3.7.18-1 " Unit 1 Fuel Minimum Burnup vs Initial Enrichment for Region II Racks," and 3.7.18-2 " Units 2 and 3 Fuel Minimum Burnup vs Initial Enrichment for Region II Racks," are being revised and relabeled. A single value is being provided as a burnup limit for unrestricted storage of Unit 1 spent fuel assemblies in Region II rack locations. Another single value is being provided as a burnup limit for storage of Unit I spent fuel in the Region II peripheral rack locations. Therefore, the current Figure 3.7.18-1 is being replaced with a curve applicable to Units 2 and 3 fuel assemblies and relabeled appropriately.
9512110147 951206 PDR ADOCK 05000361 P ._ .PDR
Subscribed on this day of , 1995.
Respectfully submitted, SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDIS0N COMPANY By: ! M V
Richard M. Rosenblum Vice President State of California County of San Diego OnIAf6f95 before me,3MBALA b.M'CARTHYfAICTAAY ?4SYG personally appeare? ?)cHAAb M. ROSENat 4tM , personally known to me to be the person whose name is subscribed to the within instrument and acknowledged to me that he executed the same in his authorized capacity, and that by his signature on the instrument the person, or the entity upon !
behalf of which the person acted, executed the instrument.
WITNESS my hand and official seal. '^^^^^^^^^------
N A.MC CAirrtfy k y comemm~ y signature M & tA / d .
I c "
wc~ se.Courcy
. m u. ,m
_ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _f l
b UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Application of SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY, H E . for a Class 103 Docket No. 50-362 License to Acquire, Possess, and Use a utilization Facility as Part of- Amendment Application i
, Unit No. 3 of the San Onofre Nuclear No. 137 Generating Station 4 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY, H E . pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90, hereby submit Amendment Application No. 137. '
This amendment application consists'of Proposed Change Number NPF-15-449 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-15. Proposed Change Number NPF-15-449 is a ,
request to change Technical Specification (TS) Section 4.3 " Fuel Storage" to allow fuel assemblies having a maximum U-235 enrichment of 4.8 weight percent 2
(w/o) to be stored in both the spent fuel racks and the new fuel racks. l t
Additionally, TS Section 3.7.18 V3 pent fuel Assembly Storage," Figures 3.7.18-1 " Unit 1 Fuel Minimum Burnup vs Initial Enrichment for Region II Racks," and 3.7.18-2 " Units 2 and 3 Fuel Minimum Burnup vs Initial Enrichment for Region II Racks," are being revised and relabeled. A single value is being provided 4 as a burnup limit for unrestricted storage of Unit I spent fuel assemblies in Region II rack locations. Another single value is being provided as a burnup limit for storage of Unit I spent fuel in the Region II peripheral rack locations. Therefore, the carrent figure 3.7.18-1 is being replaced with a curve applicable to Units 2 and 3 fuel assemblies and relabeled appropriately.
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Subscribed on this day of , 1995..
\
I Respectfully submitted, SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY 1
i By: Mh -
Richard M. Rosenblum ,
j Vice President i
State of California ,
County of San Diego ,
8 On /AfGf 5 ' before me, EAA6AAA A. Mc-CAATNyfUCWf personally appeared RicMMb Af. 205ENB4 nh , personally known to me to be the person whose name is subscribed to the within instrument and acknowledged to me that he executed the same in his authorized capacity, and that by his signature on the instrument the person, or the entity upon behalf of which the person acted, executed the instrument.
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WITNESS my hand and official seal. - - -
SAnaARA A.MC CAMHV Signature h a. k q Q'jleL.I
-w =. . f M
4 DESCRIP' TION AND-SAFETY l ANALYSIS- !
5
.OF PROPOSED CHANGE NPF-10/15-449 t
j - Proposed Change Number'449 (PCN-449) is a request to revise San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS) Units 2 and 3 Technical S)ecification (TS) Section C - 4.3 " Fuel Storage," Section 3.7.18 ' Spent Fuel Assen)1y Storage,"_ Figure !
' 3.7.18-1 " Unit 1 Fuel Minimus Burnug vs Initial Enrichment for Region II !
- . . Racks," Figure 3.7.18 2 " Units 2 an< 3 Fuel Minimum Burnup vs Initial 1 - Enrichment for Region II Racks," ant to renumber pages in TS Section 3.7 to ;
j support the above changes. j I Technical Specification ::morovement Procram
) - (PCN-299) "echn' ca' Spec" fications:
]
! Unit 2: See Attachment "A"-
- Unit 3
- See Attachment "B" .,
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' Revised Technical Specification Imorovement Procram' I'
(PCN-299) Techn- cal Specifications: !
Unit 2: See Attachment "C" ;
Unit 3:
See Attachment "D" l b '
j' SUIMARY of CHANGE
) This is a request to revise TS Section 4.3 " Fuel Storage" to allow fuel assemblies having a maximum U-235 enrichment of 4.8 weight percent (w/o) to be i
stored in both the spent fuel racks and the new fuel racks. Evaluations .
i performed to support this change did not consider reactor core operation. If required, additional technical specification changes may be requested to support core operation during Cycle 9 following the completion of the core reload analysis. The core reload analysis for Cycle 9 is in progress. '
I TS Section 3.7.18 " Spent fuel Assembly Storage," Figures 3.7.18-1 " Unit 1 Fuel -
1 Minimum Burnup vs Initial Enrichment for Region II Racks," and 3.7.18-2 " Units i 2 and 3 fuel Minimum Burnup vs Initial Enrichment for Region II Racks," are being revised and relabeled. A single value is being provided as a burnup limit for unrestricted storage of Unit I spent fuel assemblies in Region II rack locations. Another single value is being provided as a burnup limit for
. storage of Unit 1 fuel in the Region II peripheral pool locations. Therefore, the current Figure 3.7.18-1 is being replaced with a curve applicable to Units
- . 2 and 3 fuel assemblies and relabeled appropriately. Figure 3.7.18-2 will ,
include revised data:
- Figure 3.7.18-1 " Minimum Burnup vs Initial Enrichment for Unrestricted ,
i Placement of SDNGS 2 and 3 Fuel.in Region II Racks" .
Figure 3.7.18-2 " Minimum Burnup vs Initial Enrichment for Placement of SONGS 2 and 3 Fuel in Region II Peripheral Pool Locations" l
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The TS 3.7.19 page is being renumbered from page 3.7-35 to 3.7-36, an editorial' change.
The Bases for TS 3.7.17 and TS 3.7.18 are being changed. Attachment F is ;
- provided for infomation, and includes the TS Bases changes required by the increase in fuel enrichment to 4.8 w/o.
DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE outhern California Edison Company (Edison) plans to increase the allowable 1 maximum fuel-pin enrichment from 4.1 w/o to 4.8 w/o for the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Units 2 and 3. This change will be reflected in the design features section, TS 4.3 " Fuel Storage," and will allow fuel assemblies having a maximum U-235 enrichment of 4.8 w/o in both the spent fuel racks and the new
- fuel racks. Increasing the maximum fuel-pin enrichment from 4.1 w/o to 4.8 *
- w/o will allow an increase of the current cycle length (from approximately 520 Effective Full Power Days (EFPD) to approximately 600 EFPD), resulting in economic benefit.
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Additionally, TS 3.7.18 " Spent Fuel Assembly Storage," Figures 3.7.18-1 " Unit 1 Fuel Minimum Burnup vs Initial Enrichment for Region Il Racks," and 3.7.18-2
" Units ? ynd 3 Fuel Minimum Burnup vs Initial Enrichment for Region II Racks,"
e are beiusrevised by this proposed change.
Figure 3.7.18-1 (Unit l' Fuel Minimum Burnup vs Initial Enrichment for Region
- II Racks) is being eliminated, and single values are to be used in its place
18.0 GWD/T for interior storage locations '
. 5.5 GWD/T for peripheral storage locations Figure 3.7.18-2 (Units 2 and 3 Fuel Minimum Burnup vs Initial Enrichment for Region II Racks) will be renumbered to Figure 3.7.18-1 and relabeled. Also, Edison has recalculated the curve de i
allowance for boraflex degradation (picted gaps) in thein this fuel spent Figure to increase the racks.
A new Figure 3.7.18-2 will be provided. The new figure provides lower burnup criteria for storage of Unit 2 and 3 spent fuel in the Region 11 peripheral locations where neutron leakage is substantial. >
Thus, both Figures 3.7.18-1 and 3.7.18-2 will be for Units 2 and 3 fuel assemblies and include revised data:
- Figure 3.7.18-1 " Minimum Burnup vs Initial Enrichment for Unrestricted
. Placement of SONGS 2 and 3 Fuel in Region II Racks" l Figure 3.7.18-2 " Minimum Burnup vs Initial Enrichment for Placement of SONGS 2 and 3 Fuel in Region II Peripheral Pool Locations" The changes to the new burnup curves for Units 2 and 3 fuel and the " single value" criteria for Unit 1 fuel storage are also reflected in TS 4.3, " Fuel Storage."
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4 . To avoid adding a page numbered as 3.7-32a, pages in TS Section 3.7 are being ,
renuebered. Therefore, TS 3.7.19 is included to show the renumbering change '
from page 3.7-35 to.3.7-36.
Although the boron' concentration remains at 1850-PPM, the Bases for TS 3.7.17 :
j is.being revised.as shown in Attachment F for information. Completely ;
- misloading the Region II racks with un-irradiated fuel is considered .
j unrealist' c and the criticality analysis based on this case provides overly :
7 conservative results. The criticality analysis for the Region II racks now i j considers inadvertent loading of nine un-irradiated fuel assemblies in a 3x3 j array as the postulated worst case scenario. l
-The Bases for TS 3.7.18 is being ch anged to reflect the enrichment increase to
- 4.8 w/o. !
1 DISCUSSION l The results of criticality, radiological, and decay heat analyses show that l 1 the existing new and spent fuel storage racks, and supporting systems and components'have been adequately designed to accommodate the storage and l .
handling of San Onofre Units 2 and 3 fuel with a maximum fuel-pin enrichment ,
i of 4.8 w/o. For postulated accident conditions in the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP),
L a minimum concentration of 1850 PPM (1800 PPM + 50 PPM uncertainty) soluble i boron is-required. The criticality analyses also show that SONGS Unit 1 fuel
A detailed report entitled " EVALUATION OF THE HANDLING AND STORAGE OF 4.8 W/0 ENRICHED FUEL" is provided in Attachment E. This report is summarized as follows:
FUEL ASSEMBLY DESCRIPTIONS l Two fuel sembly designs are currently stored in the Units 2 and 3 spent fuel 1 storage 4.ks:
1 .
i (1) Asea Brown Boveri/ Combustion Engineering (ABB/CE), Zircaloy-clad, 16x16 fuel assemblies (2) Westinghouse, Stainless-steel-clad, 14x14 Unit 1 fuel assemblies Table 1 provides the characteristics of the two assembly types.
It is proposed to increase the maximum fuel-pin enrichment of the ABB/CE new 4
fuel assemblies to 4.8 w/o.
t NEW FUEL STORAGE RACK DESCRIPTION .
. The new fuel storage racks provide for safe storage of un-irradiated fuel assemblies in a geometry which prevents criticality under all normal and accident conditions. The new fuel storage racks are designed to protect the 1 t
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L stored assemblies against possible impact loading due to handling of neighbor
- assemblies, an' to guide the assemblies into their locations in the new fuel storage racks. J The new fuel storage racks provide dry storage for 80 fuel assemblies at a ;
, nominal centerline spacing of 29-inches. !The racks are fabricated from j stainless steel.
a SPENT FUEL STORAGE RACK DESCRIPTION The. s >ent fuel storage racks provide for storage of new and spent fuel :
. assem> lies in appropriate regions of the SFP, while maintaining a coolable l
. geometry, )reventing criticality, and protecting the fuel assemblies from excess mecianical or thermal loadings. Each unit is licensed to store its own ;
fuel and.the resulting byproduct material from that fuel. Additionally, SONGS
, 1 fuel, miscellaneous storage items, and the failed rod storage baskets may be d
stored in the SONGS 2 and SONGS 3 racks.
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l Fuel is stored in two regions within each pool:
h (1) Region III (312 (2) Region (1230locations) locations ) l i Region I l
{ Region I consists of two high density fuel racks, each with 156 cells in a 12x13 matrix. The nominal dimensions of each rack are 125.5 inches by 135.9 inches. The cells within a rack are interconnected by grid assemblies and stiffener clips to form an integral structure. Region I is typically used to L
store un-irradiated fuel, and fuel which has not achieved the minitaum required burnup for unrestricted storage in Region II. Region I can hold a full core off load (217 fuel assemblies), plus 95 additional assemblies.
. Region II i Region II (1230 locations) has six high density fuel racks, four with 14x15 i cells and two with 13x15 cells The nominal dimensions of the 14x15 racks are i 124.82 inches by 133.67 inches; the nominal dimensions of the 13x15 rack are 115.97 inches by 133.67 inches. Region II is designed to accommodate 1 irradiated fuel which meets a ) redetermined burnup. Placement of fuel in Region II racks is restricted )y burnup and enrichment limits, or by i prescribed storage patterns which are administrative 1y controlled by Licensee Controlled Specifications.
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Table 2 provides a summary listing of the data describing the Region I and Region-II spent fuel storage racks.
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1 CRITICALITY ANALYSES 1 The SONGS 2 and 3 new fuel storage racks, spent fuel storage racks, and fuel handling equipment can safely accommodate unshimmed (no burnable poison rods -
including IFBA, Gd, or Er), new, 4.8 w/o enriched fuel. The neutron multiplication factor (k-eff) is less than 0.95 for all normal and postulated accident conditions. A minimum SFP boron concentration of 1850 PPM (1800 PPM
+50PPMuncertainty)isrequiredforaccidentconditions.
New Fuel Storage Racks:
The acceptance criteria for criticality for the new fuel storage racks can be found in NUREG-0800, ' Standard Review Plan', and the NRC's 'OT Position for Review And Acceptance Of Spent Fuel Storage And Handling Applications.'
i For new fuel storage racks, the neutron multiplication factor (k-eff) 4 shall be less than about 0.95 when fully loaded and flooded with potential moderators such as unborated water fire extinguishant
- aerosols. K-eff will not exceed 0.98 with fuel of the highest anticipated reactivity in place assuming optimum moderation.
Edison's analyses show that under all normal and postulated accident conditions, k-eff is less than 0.95 when the new fuel storage racks are fully loaded with new, unshimmed 4.8 w/o fuel assemblies.
Under normal conditions, k-eff is less than 0.72 for dry storage in the new fuel storage racks. K-eff is 0.856 at the optimum water density of 0.045 gms/cc. K-eff is 0.904 when the racks are completely flooded with unborated water.
The proposed design of the higher enriched fuel will result in a slight weight 4
increase. However, this weight increase does not impact the evaluation of the new fuel racks because the weight considered in the analysis was conservative and bounds the weight of the higher enriched fuel.
Spent fuel Storage Racks:
The criticality acceptance criteria for the spent fuel storage racks can be found in NUREG-0800, ' Standard Review Plan', and the NRC's '0T Position For Review And Acceptance Of Spent Fuel Storage And Handling Applications.'
For spent fuel storage racks, the neutron multiplication factor (k-eff) shall be less than or equal to 0.95, including all uncertainties, under all normal and postulated accident conditions.
The final k-eff for the spent fuel storage racks is calculated taking the following into consideration:
Axial Burnup Effects Neutron absorbing material (Boraflex)
Boraflex Gaps Manufacturing Tolerances
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(5) Eccentric Loading f (6) Calculational Biases And' Uncertainties- i i
'The accidents' considered for.the spent fuel storage racks include:'
- 1) Fuel Assembly Dropped Horizontally On Top Of The Racks .
{2)
Fuel Assembly Dropped Vertically Into A Storage Location-Already ,
.Containing A Fuel Assembly l Fuel Assembly Dropped To The SFP Floor- !
Loss Of Cooling Systems Fuel Misloading Accidents 3
' Heavy Load Drops -i Seismic Events :
Boron Dilution j
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The proposed design of_ the higher enriched fuel will result in a slight weight
. increase. However, the seismic event is bounded by the analyses performed for
- the.rerack project, submitted to the NRC on February 16, 1990. l
, t A boron dilution accident-is not analyzed since the spent fuel storage racks !
- have k-eff of 0.941 for Region I and 0.948 for Region II at a soluble boron (
! concentration of 0 PPM. !
I For accident conditions, the double contingency principle of ANSI /ANS-8.1-1983
- (formerly ANSI N16.1-1975) is applied. This principle states that one is not i
- required to assume two unlikely, independent, concurrent events to ensure ;
!- protection against a criticality accident. Therefore, for those' accidents during which k-eff increases, the presence of soluble boron may be credited, ,
l since the absence of boron would be a second unlikely event. 1 Edison's analyses show that under all normal and postulated accident F conditions, k-eff is less than 0.95 when the Region I racks are fully loaded p with new, unshimmed, 4.8 w/o fuel assemblies.
! Edison's' analyses show that under all normal and postulated accident
! conditions, k-eff is less than 0.95 when the Region II racks are loaded with i SONGS 1,' 2, and 3 fuel assemblies which meet the burnup criteria of proposed TS 3.7.18 or are stored in compliance with the Licensee Controlled i
Specifications.
Evaluations of postulated accidents were performed to meet the requirements of e the OT Position. These evaluations have shown that k-eff remains below 0.95 when credit is taken for the presence of boron and administrative controls.
I BORAFLEX EROSION OR DISSOLUTION.
- j. Recently, elevated silica concentrations have been observed in SFPs of
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numerous plants. SONGS has also experienced elevated silica concentrations in
.the SFP. This elevated concentration originates from erosion of the boraflex panels.
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i- Calculations have been perfomed to investigate the criticality consequences :
due to the loss of Boraflex thickness in the SONGS 2 and 3 spent fuel storage racks. Up to a 50% decrease in Boraflex thickness has been> evaluated.
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- Conservatively assuming un-irradiated 5.1 w/o fuel,'and a 6 inch random ~ gap in j l
l every boraflex panel, about 20% of the boraflex thickness can be lost in !
l Region I.before k-eff reaches 0.95 at a soluble boron concentration of 0 PPM. !
- For Region II, about 7% of the Boraflex can be lost before k-eff reaches 0.95 .
at a soluble boron concentration of 0 PPM. The current SFP water silica level :
- indicates that the loss of boraflex'has resulted in negligible thickness l
! decrease.
s t To date,. four boraflex surveillance coupons from each unit have been tested. l The first coupon was removed during the Cycle 6 refueling outage; the second ;
coupon was removed during the Cycle 7 refueling outage; the third and fourth coupons were removed during the Cycle 8 refueling outage. The results of the
- - coupon tests and inspections show that the boraflex is performing within the ;
j EPRI acceptance criteria for the coupon Boron-10 density, thickness, length, l;
! and width.
a l Edison will continue to monitor the boraflex integrity through the boraflex :
!. coupon surveillance program; silica levels in the pool will continue to be :
l monitored; and, industry (EPRI) experience with boraflex erosion will continue i l
to be closely followed. q k DECAY HEAT l The Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) analysis performed to calculate the maximum fuel cladding temperature and SFP cooling system design .
requirements includes assumptions which bound the use of 4.8 w/o enriched fuel assemblies. For decay heat analyses a conservative cycle length of 635 EFPD ;
wat assumed. In addition to increasing the enrichment, the proposed fuel !
management plans decrease the reload batch size from 108 assemblies to 104 ;
assemblies or less. As a result, the calculated SFP heat loads assuming an .
enrichment of 4.8 w/o are less than the current analyses of record in the i UFSAR.
i RADIOLOGICAL EVALUATION ;
Edison's analyses show there is no significant impact on waste generation, ,
effluents, personnel exposure during fuel handling, or the radiological consequences of fuel handling or pool boiling accidents from increasing the ,
enrichment from 4.1 w/o to 4.8 w/o. .
The NRC has reviewed the anticipated widespread use of extended burnup fuel in l commercial Light Water Reactors and has concluded (Federal Register 53 FR 6040. February 29,1988) that there are no significant adverse radiological or ,
non-radiological impacts associated with the use of extended fuel burnup i and/or increased enrichment. Moreover, the NRC has issued NUREG/CR-5009, !
" Assessment of the Use of Extended Burn-up Fuel in Li l which found no significant impact for fuel up to 5o w/ght Water and burnup to 60Reactors,"
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- 4. . The current UFSAR source tern for design basis fuel handling accidents assumes .
'a maximum fuel assembly burnup of 60,000 MWD /T. Increasing the enrichment to ;
-4.8 w/o does not push discharge burnups above 60,000 MWD /T. Therefore, the !
! current UFSAR radiological consequences analyses for fuel handling' accidents '
4 bound the proposed enrichment increase.
I SAFETY ANALYSIS
- 1. Will operation of the facility in accordance with this proposed ;
change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated? l Response: No.
There is no increase in the probability of an accident because the )
physical characteristics of a fuel assembly are not changed when i fuel enrichment is increased. No changes will be made to any >
safety related equipment or systems. Fuel assembly movement will ;
continue to be controlled by approved fuel handling procedures.
Fuel cycle designs will continue to be analyzed with Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)-approved codes and methods to ensure ;
the design bases for San Onofre Units 2 and 3 are satisfied. :
I The double contingency principle of American National Standards i Institute /American Nuclear Society (ANSI /ANS) Standard 8.1-1983 !
can be applied to any postulated accident in the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) which could cause reactivity to increase. In conjunction '
with administrative controls for heavy loads and impact zones, a boron concentration of 1850 parts per million (PPM) (the current !
Technical Specification (TS) limit) is sufficient to maintain k-eff less than or equal to 0.95 for all normal and postulated ,
accident conditions.
Regarding the new fuel storage racks, there is no postulated ,
accident which could cause reactivity to increase above 0.95 for '
all moderator densities from 0.0 to 1.0 grams / cubic centimeter (gms/cc). ;
The radiological consequence analyses performed in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) include the development of ,
source terns which bound discharge fuel burnups to 60,000 megawatt days per ton (MWD /T). Increasing the San Onofre Units 2 and 3 enrichment to 4.8 weight percent (w/o) does not result in discharge fuel assembly burnu)s greater than 60,000 MWD /T. Thus, the consequences of the fuel landling accident are unchanged from the current UFSAR bases.
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Therefore, this pro)osed change will not involve a significant increase in the pro) ability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
- 2. Will operation of the facility in accordance with this proposed change create the possibility of a new'or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
No.
The proposed changes do not involve any physical changes to the plant or any changes to the method in which the plant is operated.
They do not affect the performance or cualification of safety .
related ec uipment. Fuel handling accicents were previously considerec. Therefore, the possibility of a new or different kind !
of accident from any accident previously evaluated is not created.
- 3. Will operation of the facility in accordance with this proposed change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety 7 No.
For the SFP, the NRC acceptance criteria is k-eff less than or equal to 0.95 under all normal and accident conditions and including uncertainties. For the new fuel storage racks, k-eff must remain less than 0.95 if completely flooded with unborated water, and must remain below 0.98 in an optimum moderation event.
Analyses have been perfcnned which demonstrate that these acceptance criteria will continue to be met when the enrichment is increased to 4.8 w/o.
The current UFSAR design bases SFP decay heat loads bound the proposed enrichment increase due to the reduced fuel batch size.
Radiological effects of fuel handling accidents are unchanged by this enrichment increase.
The )roposed design of the higher enriched fel will result in a slig1t weight increase. However, the seismic event is bounded by the analyses performed for the rerack project.
Therefore, there will not be a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
Safety and Sionificant Hazards Determination Based on the above Safety Analysis, it is concluded that: (1) the proposed change does not constitute a significant hazards consideration as defined by 10 CFR 50.92; and (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by the proposed change. Moreover,
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because this action does not involve a significant hazards consideration, it !
will also not result in a condition which sig.?ificantly alters the impact of l the station on the environment as described _in the NRC Final Environmental Statement.
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[; Table 1 FUEL ASSEMBLY DATA FOR SONGS 1, 2 -AND 3 ll SONGS 1 SONGS 2&3
$ Naximun Fuel-Pin Enrichment (w/o)- 4.0 4.8*
Cladding Type SS Zr Rod Array '14x14 ' 16x16 .
Fuel Rod Pitch (in.)** 0.556 0.506 Number of Rods Per Assembly 180 236 2
' Fuel Rod Outer Diameter (in.) 0.422' O.382 Fuel Pellet Diameter (i .) 0.3835 0.325***
Active fuel Length (in. 120.0' 150.0 q 0.025 Cladding Thickness (in. 0.0165 l
, Number of Guide Tubes 16 5 l i Guide Tube Outer Diameter (in.) 0.535 0.980 1 1
' Guide Tube Inner Diameter (in.) 0.511 0.900
, . Guide Tube Material SS Zr
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- The' current maximum enrichment is 4.1 w/o.
It is proposed to increase the maximum enrichment to 4.8 w/o.
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! ** Fuel rod' pitch is the spacing between fuel rods measured as the i l_ distance from centerline to centerline of the rod. All three fuel i assembly types are square pitch arrays.
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- In the future, the fuel pellet diameter may increase to 0.3255 inches. There will be no im)act on criticality because the'present analyses assume a fuel stacc height density'which bounds the small amount of additional fuel which would result from the increase in fuel pellet diameter.
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Table 2 SPENT FUEL RACK DATA (EachUnit)-
Reaion I Reaion II Number of Storage 312 1230 Locations Number of Rack Two 12x13 Four 14x15 Arrays Two 13x15 Center-to-Center 10.40 8.85 Spacing (inches)
Cell Inside Width.
(inches) 8.64 8.63 Type of Fuel SONGS 2 and 3 ' SONGS 2 and 3 16x16 and/or 16x16 and/or SONGS 1 14x14 SONGS 1 14x14
/
Rack Assembly Outline 126 x 136 x 198.5 125 x 134 x 198.5 Dimensions'(inches) (14 x 15) 116 x 134 x 198.5 (13x15) 1 i