ML20087C406

Motion to Strike Direct Testimony on Suffolk County Behalf Re Emergency Planning Contention 26.Testimony Predicated on Erroneous Assumptions,Beyond Scope of Contention & W/O Sufficient Foundation.Related Correspondence

ML20087C406
Person / Time
Site:	Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png
Issue date:	03/09/1984
From:	Monaghan J HUNTON & WILLIAMS, LONG ISLAND LIGHTING CO.
To:	Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
Shared Package
ML20087C280	List: ML20087C277 ML20087C290 ML20087C321 ML20087C358 ML20087C406 ML20087C439 ML20087C463 ML20087C481 ML20087C510 ML20087C535 ML20087C565 ML20087C606
References
OL-3, NUDOCS 8403130053
Download: ML20087C406 (11)

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r LILCO, March 9, 1984

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'84 IIAR 12 Ail:00 DNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION * -

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.:n . ! O Eefore the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board In-the Matter of )

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LONG' ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-3

) (Emergency Planning (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, ) Proceeding)

Unit 1) )

MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF DIRECT TESTIMONY ON BEHALF OF SUFFOLK COUNTY REGARDING EMERGENCY PLANNING CONTENTION 26

'Long Island Lighting Company (LILCO) hereby moves to strike portions of the direct testimony of Deputy Inspector Kenneth J. Regensburg, Deputy' Inspector Robert A. Snow, and Po-lice. Officer Vincent R. Stile on behalf of Suffolk County re-garding Emergency Planning Contention 26 dealing with notifica-tion of emergency response personnel. The bases for this

-Motion are as follows:

First, the testimony asserts that the notification of emergency response personnel cannot be implemented in accor-dance-with' applicable regulations and guidelines because of the alleged inadequacy of~nondedicated commercial telephone lines.

The testimony is replete with conclusory references, some di-rect and some indirect, that the commercial. telephone system on

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'Long-Island will overload and breakdown or otherwise be out of l service in1the event of an emergency. These references ~in the 4:

testimony should be struck.

'The alleged inadequacycof non-dedicated commercial tele-

. phone lines for notification of emergency response personnel

_ y- ;was. originally submitted by Suffolk County as paragraph B of Contention 26.1/ ,In'its order of August 19, 1983,.this Board 1/ Conten'tiono26.B. [Not admitted by ASLBl. Under the LILCO Plan,;non-dedicated, commercial telephone lines, with no backup ay means of communication,. are relied upon for notifying essen-tially.all categories of emergency response personnel. The no-

-tification procedures:which are dependent upon commercial tele-phones are:

1. ' Notification by the plan and/or LILCO Customer Ser-

vice ofl(a) Nassau. County, (b) the State of Connecticut, (c) the

U.S. Coast Guard,.and.(d) the Federal Aviation Administra-

tion. (See-Plan:at 3.4-4; Figures 3.3.5 and 3.4.1).

-s2. . Notification'of.BNL, which will. provide all offsite

.." ~ ~.doseLand-accident assessment and-projection' personnel. (Plan, Attachment 2.2.1, cat 2; Figure 3.3.5).

3. -Notification by " key" emergency response personnel

-who are. employed by LILCO, by means of pagers which must'be ac-

-cessed by commercial telephones. (Plan,?at 3.4-4 and 3.4-5).

. . 4.7 Notification offall other emergency response person-nel who are employed by.LILCO,~by means of telephone calls from

.other emergency workers. (OPIPf3.3.2).

5. Notification of. reception hospitals, ambulance and

fire / rescue ~ dispatch stations, bus companies, relocation cen-lter,=and,Lapparently, the American Red Cross and all other i 'non-LILCO organizations and personnel relied upon.in the LILCO

" Plan. (See OPIPs 3.6.4 and 3.6.5).

LILCO's reliance upon commercial' telephones for most noti-

! ;_, - fficationcof.offsitefresponse personnel is inappropriate. Com-

. ;_- mercial J telephones , are subj ect to overload, or may be out of l service-in the event of an emergency. The possibility of over-3-

(footnote continued)

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s denied' Contention.26.B. .Specifically, the Board stated:

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, The_ subject matter of this subcontention is the alleged inadequacy of nondedicated com-

. mercial telephone. lines for notification of emergency. response personnel. Contention EP11 specifically addressed this issue dur-

. ing Phase-IEof this proceeding; that conten-

. tion was dismissed.as a sanction for the In-tervenors' intentional f ailure to co4aply with orders of the. Board, (" Memorandum and

- Order Confirming-Ruling on Sanctions for In-tervenors' Refusal to Comply with Order to

- Participate in Prehearing Examination,"

p LBP-82-115, 16 NRC , December 122, 1983).

' We will.not relitigate issues which were raisedLin Phase I Once again, in its testimony filed on Contention 26,

[ JSuffolk County seeks to circumvent this Board's Order-and-relitigate this issue. Such testimony, identified specifically hereinafter,.should be struck.

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. (footnote continued);

load is'particularly. acute under the LILCO Plan because, in ad-dition to the heavy telephone use by the public which is likely

.in the. event of an emergency,-LILCO employees will themselves be making extensive use of the telephone lines. In addition to.

using'the' lines.for all the. notification purposes listed above, the Plan also contemplates LILCO personnel contacting all schools, hospitals, nursing / adult homes, other specialffacili-ties, and handicapped persons infthe EPZ, to verify their

, awareness of.an emergency, the need to evacuate, and to arrange for assistance. ~ (See OPIPs 3.6.4. and 3.6.5). If commercial telephone ~ lines were not available to LILCO,' practically none of'the.offsite response personnel could be notified, and-no as-pect of its Plan could be implemented. Given both the enhanced probability'of; commercial telephone line overload, and the~im-1 pact of telephone unavailability onLthe implementation of the p -

_LILCO' Plan,LLILCO's' reliance upon commercial telephones means

.there can be no assurance'that the Plan can or will be imple-

• 'mented.

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o Second,'several sections of the County's testimony are irrelevant because they proceed upon an erroneous interpreta-tions of applicable regulat'onsi and guidelines. The County's testimony assumes that after receiving notification from the Shoreham Plant that an emergency has been declared, LERO must notify emergency response workers within 15 minutes. There is no such requirement.2/ The County's .eference to 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.D.3 is misplaced. That section deals with the capability of the licensee to notify offsite au-thorities (in this case,'LERO) within 15 minutes after declaring an emergency. That section does not address the sub-ject of the notification of emergency response personnel by offsite authorities, nor does it impose any 15- minute limita-tion t<ithin which emergency response personnel must be notified.

There is no such 15-minute limitation in applicable reg-ulations and guidelines. The County is attempting to lift out of context the 15-minute limitation applicable to notification of LERO by the licensee and apply that limitation to a facet of _

the emergency response plan where it has no application. In fact, LILCO is aware of no regulation gr guideline which j2/

s In support of their argument at Page 17 of their testimo-ny, the County refers to the 15-minute limitation as the limi-tation "which we understand is the benchmark under NRC regulations for notifying emergency response personnel. See 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.D.3."

f imposes a 15-minute' limitation on the time f)r notifying emer-gencyLresponse personnel or even suggests such limitation as a

" benchmark" for the notification of emergency response person-nel. 10'C.F.R. Section 50.47(b)(6) refers to " prompt communi-

. cations" to. emergency personnel. The requirement is for

" prompt communications" and not for notification within any 15-minute limitation. Those portions of the Suffolk County testi-mony which'are predicated upon the erroneously assumed 15-minute limitation should be struck.3/

Portions of the County's testimony proceed on the erro-neous premise that the LILCO Transition Plan must provide for

- immediate notification of an emegency to every location where there is_a RECS telephone. Such is'not the case. In cases where' state and local government, and perhaps other governmen-tal entities, are active participants in the applicable emer-gency response plan, then they are " response organizations"

- within the meaning of lLO C.F.R. Section 50.47(b)(5) and (6).

In the present case, however, Suffolk County and the State of New York.have refused to participate as response organizations.

The entity created by LILCO to carry out the emergency response

' function, pursuant to.the decision of this Board, is LERO.

3/ In addition, the issue of whether LILCO's on-site organi-

- zation has the capability to notify the'off-site organization (i.e., LERO) within 15 minutes was the subject of Phase I of this proceeding, as to which the County defaulted. This pro-vides an additional reason for striking all references to the alleged 15-minute criterion.

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Thus, on the facts of the present case, the only entity on the RECS system recuired to be initially notified in the event of a declaration of an emergency is LERO.

Third, portions of the County's testimony amount to conclusory statements and opinions for which there is no basis in the record. For example, on page 22 of their testimony, at lines 1 through 6, the County witnesses state that LILCO's emergency response personnel are not as likely to respond to an emergency as would be Suffolk County police officers. The tes-timony offers no factual basis to support this conclusion.

Certainly, the qualifications of the County's witnesses would not qualify as experts qualified to offer such conclusions or opinions based upon their training or expertise. Moreover, these kinds of issues have been addressed in connection with

'other contentions and therefore the testimony should be struck because it is repetitious-and cumulative.

Fourth, some of the County testimony is based upon an erroneous reading of the LILCO Plan. Accordingly, this testi-mony has no basis in fact and should be struck. For example, at pages 37 and 38 of their testimony, Suffolk County makes in-correct statements with respect to the number of telephone

! calls which could be handled at the Hicksville Customer Service Office.

In some instances, the same testimony should be struck on more than one basis. Where applicable, the additional bases will be stated specifically.

Adequacy of Non-Dedicated Commercial Telephone Lines The following testimony, identified by page and line, should be~ struck because it attempts to relitigate the question of the adequacy of non-dedicated commercial telephone lines.

Page and Line References Reasons to Strike 6, lines 12 Attempts to relitigate commercial thru 19 telephones.

22, lines 12 Attempts to relitigate commercial thru 19 telephones.

34, lines 21 Attempts to relitigate commercial thru 23 telephones. (This testimony also should be struck because it is part of a body of testimony which proceeds upon the erroneous premise that there is a 15-minute time limitation, after LERO receives notification that an emergency has been declared, within which LERO must notify emergency response workers.)

41, lines 8 Attempts to relitigate commercial thru 13 telephones. (Additionally, this testimony should be struck because it offers conclusory statements for

'which thre are no supporting facts.

There is no basis upon which these witnesses can testify that every paged worker will attempt to telephone somebody to verify the paged message.)

47, lines 11 Attempts to relitigate commercial thru 23 telephones.

51, lines 1 Attempts to relitigate commercial thru 6 telephones. (This testimony is also subject to strike because it is not relevant to the contention for which $t is proffered and, in fact, raises role conflict issues addressed in connection with other contentions.)

I 53, lines 8 Attempts to relitigate commercial thru 20 telephones. (Additionally, this testimony should be struck because it offers conclusory statements for which there are no supporting facts.

There is no basis upon which these witnessee can testify that emergency workers will call their home, friends and relatives before calling out emergency workers. In addition, to the extent that this testimony addresses role conflict, it should be-struck as repetitious and cumulative of testimony on other contentions.)

55, lines 4 Attempts to relitigate commercial thru 11 telephones.

60,.line 22 Attempts to relitigate commercial thru page 61, telephones.

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( TESTIMONY BASED ON ERRONEOUS INTERPRETATIONS OF APPLICABLE REGULATIONS Page and Line References Reasons to Strike 12, line 21 All of this testimony proceeds upon thru page,17, the erroneous assumption that there line 20 is a 15-minute time limitation within which emergency workers must be notified. (Additionally, page 16, lines 8-9 and 15-18, should be struck because there is no factual basis in the record to support these conclusory statements that "the LILCO paging system might malfunction.") (Emphasis added).

f 30, line 6 All of this testimony proceeds upon the thru 15 erroneous assumption that there is a 15-minute time limitation within which emergency workers must be notified.

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31,-line 11 All of this testimony should be struck thru page 35, because it proceeds on the erroneous line 12 premise that various governmental entities, such as Suffolk County, are " response organizations" within the meaning of 10 C.F.R. S 50.47(b)(5) and (6). Such is not the case in this proceeding.

52, line 15 All of this testimony proceeds upon thru page 52, the erroneous assumption that there

'line 16 is a 15-minute time limitation within which emergency workers must be notified.

TESTIMONY BEYOND SCOPE OF CONTENTION AND/OR WITHOUT SUFFICIENT FOUNDATION Page and Line References Reasons to Strike 20, line 11 This testimony makes numerous thru page 21, assumptions for which there is no line 2 basis in the record. Upon what basis can these witnesses assume that a call made by a customer service operator to a LERO emergency worker will be more time consuming than a call made by one police officer to another off-duty police officer? This testimony is based upon rank speculation. Finally, the testimony seems to raise questions as'to the adequacy of the training of LERO workers. Training issues are addressed in other contentions and testimony as to training is irrelevant-to the issues presented by Contention 26.

21, line 20 This testimony is based on speculation thru page 22, and assumptions which find no factual l line 12 basis in the record. Additionally, the 1

testimony seeks to raise issues being addressed in other contentions. For example, the issue of role conflict, raised at the top of page 22, is not relevant to the issues presented by Contention 26.

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Page and Line References __ Reasons to Strike 38, lines 13 This testimony should be struck thru 22 because it addresses issues relating to training and role conflict. There is no factual basis in the record to suggest that these witnesses are competent to discuss these issues nor that the issues are relevant to Contention 26.

45, line 16 There is no factual basis in this

.thru page 46, record to support the conclusions set line 17 forth in this testimony. Upon what basis do these witnesses presume to testify that LERO workers, in violation of their training, will leave the area covered by the pager system while they are on duty?

Additionally, upon what basis do these witnesses conclude that persons who are paged will choose to ignore the page?

'48, line 1- This testimony, including the footnote thru page 50, incorporated therein, has no factual line 7 -basis in the record relating to Contention 26. This testimony repre-sents an effort by Suffok County to relitigate the role conflict and credibility issues presented in other contentions. For exanple, on page 49, upon what factual basis to these witnesses preoffer an opinion that "without some kind of confirma-tion before hand, many persons [who have been paged] will not really believe that there is an emergency requiring them to report for duty."

This testimony should be struck.

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Respectfully submitted, LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY i

By f/)df'k/ -

James E.-Farnham K. Dennis Sisk Jessine A. Monaghan HUNTON & WILLIAMS P. O. Box-1535 g Richmond, Virginia 23212 4

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