Text

Proposed Tech Specs Re Extension of Surveillance Interval Re SRs of TSs 3/4.3.1 & 3/4.3.2
	ML20086K514
Person / Time
Site:	San Onofre
Issue date:	07/17/1995
From:	; SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON CO.
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20086K501	List: ML20086K500; ML20086K510; ML20086K514; ML20086K541; ML20086K557; ML20086K565;
References
	NUDOCS 9507200178
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3/4. ~- INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.1 REACTOR PROTECTIVE INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3.1 As a minimum, the reactor protective instrumentation channels anri oypasses of lable 3.3-l'shall be OPERABLE with RESPONSE TIMES as shown in Table 3.3-2.

APPLICABILITY:

As shown in Table 3.3-1.

ACTION:

As shown in Table 3.3-1.

SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS 4.3.1.1 Each reactor protective instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECX, CHANNEL CALIBRATION and CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST operations for the MODES and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-1.

4. 3.1. 2 The logic for the bypasses shall be demonstrated OPERABLE prior to each reactor startup unless performed during the preceding 92 days. The total bypass function shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per refueling interval for each channel affected by bypass operation.

The provisions of Technical Specification 4.0.2 are not applicable.

4. 3.1. 3 The REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME of each reactor trip fu.nction shall be demonstrated to be within its limit at least once per refueling interval. Each test shall include at least one channel per function such that

'all channels are tested at least once every N refueling interval where N is the total number of redundant channels in a specific reactor trip function as shown in the " Total No. of Channels" column of Table 3.3-1.

The provisions of Technical Specification 4.0.2 are not applicable.

4.3.1.4 The isolation characteristics of each CEA isolation amplifier and each optical isolator for CEA Calculator to Core Protection Calculator data transfer shall be' verified at least once per refueling interval during j

shutdown per the following tests:

a.

For the CEA position isolation amplifiers:

1.

With 120 volts AC (60 Hz) applied for at least 30 seconds across the output, the reading on the input does not exceed 0.015 volts DC.

s SAN ON0FRE - UNIT 2 3/4 3-1 AMENDMENT N0. 30 9507200178 950717 PDR ADOCK 05000361 P

PDR

r

..i l

l TABLE 4.3-1 I

REACTOR PROTECTIVE INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREME n5 CllANNEL MODES FOR WHICH i

a5 CilANNEL CilANNEL FUNCTIONAL SURVEILLANCE CilECK _.

CALIBRATION TEST IS REQUIRED 4

FUNCTIONAL UNIT 1, 2, 3*, 4*, S*

H.A.

N.A.

I 1.,

Manual Reactor Trip D(2,4),M(3,4), Q 1, 2 S

2.

Linear Power Le' vel - High Q(4),#(4)

S f(4)

Q and S/U(1) l', 2, 3, 4, 5 3.

Logarittnic Power Level - High 1, 2 S

Q 4.

Pressurizer Pressure'. High 1, 2 S

Q 5.

Pressurizer Pressure - Low 1, 2 S

Q 6.

Containment Pressure - High 1, 2 Q

7.

Steam Generator Pressure - Low 1, 2 S

Q 1

8.

Steam Generator Level - Low S

D(2,4),

Q,#(6) 1, 2 9.

Local Power Density - High

(4,5)

S S(7),D(2,4),

Q,#(6) 1, 2

10. DNBR - Low M(8),#(4,5)

~

S Q

1, 2 Steam Generator Level - High R 11.

1, 2, 3*, 4", 5*

9

@ 12.

Reactor Protection System H.A.

H.A.

Q Logic g

\\

5

)

1

j)\\

E TABLE 4.1-1 (Continued)

E REACTOR PROTECTIVE INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMEN M

MODES FOR WilICH CHANNEL 5

CilANNEL CilANNEL FUNCTIONAL SURVEILLANCE c-

~

CtlECK CALIBRATION TEST IS REQUIRED FUNCTIONAL UNIT N.A.

N.A.

M,(12) 1, 2,-3*, 4", 5*

13.

React'or Trip Breakers S

D(2,4),S(7)

Q(11),#(6) 1, 2 14 Core Protection Calculators

(4,5),M(8)

S Q,#(6) 1, 2

15. CEA Calculators S

Q 1, 2

16. Reactor Coolant Flow-Low S

Q 1, 2

17. Seismic-liigh' S

N.A.

Q 1 (9)

.M 18.

Loss of Load f

1 5

i h

4 1 m

TABLE 4.3-1 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATION With reactor trip breakers in the closed position and the CEA drive system capable of CEA withdrawal.

At least once per Refueling Interval.

Each startup or vhen required with the reactor trip breakers closed (1) and the.CEA drive system capable of rod withdrawal, if not performed in the previous 7 days, j

I (2)

Heat balance only (CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST not included), above 15%

of RATED THERMAL POWER; adjust the Linear Power Level signals and the CPC addressable constant multipliers to make the CPC delta T power and CPC nuclear power calculations agree with the calorimetric calculation if absolute difference is greater than 2%.

During PHYSICS TESTS, these daily calibrations may be suspended provided these calibrations are performed upon reaching each major test power plateau and prior to proceeding to the next major test power plateau.

Above 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER, verify that the linear power (3) subchannel gains of the excore detectors are consistent with the values used to establish the shape annealing matrix elements in the Core Protection Calculators.

Neutron detectors may be excluded from CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

(4)

After each fuel loading and prior to exceeding 70% of RATED THERMAL (5)

POWER, the incore detectors shall be used to determine the shape annealing matrix elements and the Core Protection Calculators shall use these elements.

This CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall include the injection of simulated (6) process signals into the channel as close to the sensors as practi-cable to verify OPERABILITY including alarm and/or trip functions.

Above 70% of RATED THERMAL POWER, verify that the total RCS flow L

(7) rate as indicated by each CPC is less than or equal to the actual RCS total flow rate determined by either using the reactor coolant pump differential pressure instrumentation (conservatively compen-sated for measurement uncertainties) or by calorimetric calculations (conservatively compensated for measurement uncertainties) and if

~

necessary, adjust the CPC addressable constant flow coefficients such that each CPC indicated flow is less than or equal to the actual flow rate.

The flow medsurement encertainty may be included in the BERR1 term in the CPC and is equal to or greater than 4%.

Above 70% of RATED THERMAL POWER, verify that the total RCS flow (8)

' rate as indicated by each CPC is less than or equal to the actual RCS total flow rate determined by calorimetric calculations (conserva-tively compensated for measurement uncertainties).

Above 55% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

(9)

(10) -

Deleted.

SAN ONOFRE-UNIT 2 3/4 3-12 AMENDMENT NO. 88

I f

TABLE 4.3-1 (Continued) e..

TABLE NOTATION _

I Thi quarterly CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall include verification that i

I the correct values of addressable constants are installed in each (11) -

OPERABLE CPC.

At least once per 18 months and following maintenance or adjustment the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall (12)-

of the reactor trip breakers, ion of the undervoltage and shunt trips.

include independent verificat 1

AMENDMENT NO. 101 3/4 3-12a SAN ONOFRE-UNIT 2

1 TABLE 4.3-2 TS ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUM m

CHANNEL MODES FOR WHICH CHANNEL CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL SURVEILLANCE IS REOUIRED TEST CHECK _

CALIBRATION g FUNCTIONAL UNIT 4

1, 2, 3, 4 M 1.

SAFETY INJECTION (SIAS)

N.A.

(6) z 1,2,3 Manual (Trip Buttons)

S (6)

Q 1,2,3 a.

Containment Pressure - High S

(6)

Q

~

Q(3), SA(4) 1, 2, 3, 4 b.

Pressurizer Pressure - Low N.A.

N.A.

c.

d.

Automatic Actuation Logic N.A.

N.A.

(6) 1, 2, 3 CONTAINMENT SPRAY (CSAS) )

2.

Manual (Trip Buttons 1, 2, 3 a.

b.

Containment Pressure --

S (6)

QQ(3), SA(4) 1, 2, 3 High - High N.A.

N.A.

Automatic Actuation Logic c.

N.A.

(6) 1, 2, 3, 4 3.

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION (CIAS)

N.A.

(6) 1, 2, 3, 4 Manual CIAS (Trip Buttons)

T' a.

1, 2, 3 Manual SIAS (Trip Buttons)(5)

(6)

Q S

Q(3),SA(4) 1, 2, 3, 4 O

b.

Containment Pressure - High N.A.

N.A.

c, d.

Automatic Actuation Logic MAIN STEAM ISOLATION (MSIS)

N.A.

(6) 1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3 4.

Manual (Trip Buttons)

S (6)

QQ(3),SA(4) 1, 2, 3 a.

Steam Generator Pressure - Low N.A.

N.A.

b.

Automatic Actuation Logic c.

g 5.

RECIRCULATION (RAS) 1,2,3,4 Refueling Water Storage S

R QQ(3), SA(4) 1, 2, 3, 4 m

a.

5 Tank - Low N.A.

N.A.

l b.

Automatic Actuation Logic x 6.

CONTAINMENT COOLING (CCAS)

N.A.

(6) 1, 2, 3, 4 a

Q(3),SA(4) 1, 2, 3, 4

' l Manual CCAS (Trip Buttons)

?

a.

b.

deleted intentionally N.A.

N.A.

Automatic Actuation Logic E

c.

= -. --

=-- - - - ~ = - - -

= - - - -

7 m

~ ;

.q TABLE 4.3-2 (Continued) v, R

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS e,

5

- ;8 CHANNEL MODES FOR WHICH CHANNEL-CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL SURVEILLANCE FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHECK CALIBRATION TEST.

_JS REQUIRED E

Z 7.

LOSS OF POWER (LOVS, SDVS, or DGVSS) w a.

4.16 kV Emerger.cy Bus Undervoltage (Loss of

.l Voltage)

S (6)

(6) 1, 2, 3. 4 b.

4.16 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage (Degraded Voltage 5

(6).

(6) 1, 2, 3, 4 8.

EMERGENCY FEEDWATER (EFAS) a.

Manual (Trip Buttons)

N.A.

'(6) 1, 2, 3 b.

SG Level (A/B)-Low and AP (A/B) - High S

(6)

Q 1, 2,. 3 w

c.

SG Level (A/B) - Low and No Pressure - Low Trip (A/B).

S.

(6)

Q 1, 2, 3 2

. Automatic Actuation Logic N.A.

N.A.

Q(3) SA(4) 1, 2, 3 d.

w 9.

CONTROL ROOM ISOLATION (CRIS) a.

Manual CRIS (Trip Buttons)

N.A.

R N.A.

b.

Manual SIAS'(Trip Buttons)

N.A.

R N.A.

c.

Airborne Radiation 1.

Particulate / Iodine

.S R

M All

11. Gaseous S

R M

All d.

Automatic' Actuation Logic N.A.

N.A.

R(3)

.All a

10. T0XIC GAS ISOLATION (TGIS) g a.

Manual (Trip Buttons)

N.A.

R

.N.A.

g b.

Chlorine - High S

R M-All c.

Ammonia - High

-S R

M

~All d.

Butane / Propane - High S

R M

All e.

Automatic Actuation Logic N.A.

N.A.

R(3)

.All-E O

~E 1

..It

.~w

.7 a1

..s 1

TABLE 4.3-2 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUM E

[

CHANNEL MODES FOR WlICH CHANNEL CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL SURVEILLANCE z

rp

-CHECK _

CALIBRATION TEST IS REQUIRED _

q g

FUNCTIONAL UNIT

~

N.A.

R N.A.

[

11.

FUEL HANDLING ISOLATION (FHIS)

Manu'al (Trip Buttons) a.

b.

Airborne Radiation S

R H

i. Gaseous N.A.

N. A.'

R(3)

Automatic Actuation Logic -

c.

-N.A.

N.A.

(6)

N.A.

CONTAINMENT PURGE ISOLATION (CPIS) 12.

Manual (Trip Buttons)

S (6)

M 1,2,3,4,6 a.

b.

Airborne Radiation i.

Gaseous W

(6)

M 1,2,3,4,6 W

(6)

M 6

ii.

Particulate iii. Iodine c.

S (6)

M

_1,2,3,4,6 R

Containment Area Radiation (Gamma)

N.A.

(3),(6) 1,2,3,4,6 y

Automatic Actuation Logic

,N.A.

d.

g TABLE NOTATION l.

(1) Deleted.

(2) Deleted.

i i tion (3) ' Testing of Automatic Actuation Logic shall include energization/de-ener relay and verification of the OPERABILITY of each initiation relay.

i tion of each A subgroup relay test shall be performed which shall include the energization/de-e subgroup relay and verification of the OPERABILITY of each subgroup relay.

i t which (4) during plant operation shall be limited to only those relays associated with plant 3E cannot be operated during plant operation.during each COLD SHUTDOWN exc g

Actuated equipment only; does not result in CIAS.

5 (5)

At least once per refueling interval.

5 (6)

With irradiated fuel in the storage pool.

g t

4

__m--__.__2_.-.__.__.m.--u._

3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION _

l BASES I

REACTOR PROTECTIVE and ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES 3/4.3.1 and 3/4.3.2 ETUATIONSYSTEMINSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the reactor prstective and Engineered Safety Features Actuation System instrumentation and bypasses ensure that 1) the associated Engineered Safety Features Actuation System action and/or reactor trip will be initiated when the parameter monitored by each channel or combination thereof reaches its setpoint, 2) the spectfied coincidence logic is maintained,

3) sufficient redundancy is mainteined to permit a channel to be out of service for testing or maintenance, and 4) sufficient system functional capability is available from diverse parameters.

The OPERABILITY of these systems is required to provide the overall reliability, redundancy and diversity assumed available in the f acility design The for the protection and mitigation of accident and transient conditions.

integrated operation of each of these systems is cor.sistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.

When a protection channel of a given process variable becomes inoperable, the inoperable channel may be placed in bypass until the next Onsite. Review Committee meeting at which time the Onsite Review Comittee will review and document their judgment concerning prolonged _ operation in bypass, channel The goal shall be to return the inoperable channel to trip, and/or repair.

service as soon as practicable but in no case later than during the next COLD This approach to bypass / trip in four channel protection systems is 279, 323, 344.and 384.

SHUTOOWN.

consistent with the applicable criteris of IEEE Standards The Core Protection Calculator (CPC) addressable constants are provided to allow calibration of the CPC system to more accurate indications of power level, RCS flow rate, axial flux shape, radial peaking f actors and CE devi,ation penalties.of addressable constant values (see also Technical Specification 6.8.1) ensure that inadvertent misloading of addressable constants into the CPCs is unlikely.

The redundancy and desig'n of the Control Element Assembly Calculators

, (CEAC) provides reactor protection in the event one or both operable.

If the'second CEAC fails, the CPC's will is performed at least every 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .

use DNBR and LPD penalty f actors, which restrict reactor operation to some maximum fraction of RATED THERMAL POWER.

a reactor trip will occur.

The surveillance requirements specified for these systems ensure that the overall system functional capability is maintained comparable to the original The periodic surveillance tests performed at the minimum design standards.

The quarterly frequencies are sufficient to demonstrate this capability.

frequency for the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TESTS for these systems is based on analyses presented in the NRC approved topical report, CEN-327, "RPS/ESFAS Extended Test Interval Evaluation," as supplemented.

The measurement of response time at the specified frequencies provides assurance that the reactor protective and ESF actuation associated with each channel is ccmpleted within the time itmit assumed in the accident analyses.

AMENDMENT NO.101 SAN ONOFRE - UNIT 2 B 3/4 3-1 a

r ATTACHMENT B l

EXISTING TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS AND BASES UNIT 3 I

.m 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.1 REACTOR PROTECTIVE INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3.1 Ac = minimum, the reactor protecHve inttr'r:cntation ch nnch ar.d bypasses of Table 3.3-1 shall be OPERABLE with RESPONSE TIMES as shown in Table 3.3-2.

APPLICABILITY:

As shown in Table 3.3-1.

ACTION:

As shown in Table 3.3-1.

SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS 4.3.1.1 Each reactor protective instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECX, CHANNEL CALIBRATION and CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST operations for the MODES and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-1.

4.3.1.2 The logic for the bypasses shall be demonstrated OPERABLE prior to each reactor startup unless performed during the preceding 92 days. The total bypass function shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per refueling interval for each channel affected by bypass operation.

The provisions of Technical Specification 4.0.2 are not applicable.

4.3.1.3 The REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM RESP.ONSE TIME of each reactor trip function shall be demonstrated to be within its limit at least once per refueling interval.

Each test shall include at least one channel per function such that all channels are tested at least once every N refueling intervals where N is the total number of redundant channels in a specific reactor trip function as shown in the " Total No. of Channels" column of Table 3.3-1.

The provisions of Technical Specification 4.0.2 are not applicable.

4.3.1.4 The isolation characteristics of each'CEA isolation amplifier and each optical isola, tor for CEA Calculator to Core Protection Calculator data transfer shall be verified at least once per refueling interval during shutdown l

per the following tests:

a.

For the CEA position isolation amplifiers:

~

1.

With 120 volts AC (60 Hz) applied for at least 30 seconds across' the output, the reading on the input does not exceed 0.015 volts DC.

5.

~~Pressurizer Pressure - Low S~~

~~Qg 1, 2 a~~

~~y 6.~~

~~Containment Pressure - High S~~

~~Qg 1, 2 o~~

7.

~~Steam Generator Pressure - Low S~~

~~Qg 1, 2 8.~~

~~Steam Generator Level - Low S~~

~~Qg 1, 2 9.~~

~~Local Power Density - High S~~

~~D(2,4),~~

~~QQ,#(6) 1, 2~~

~~(4,5)~~
~'
~~10. DNBR - Low S~~
S(7),D(2,4)
QS,f(6) 1, 2 M(8), #(4,5)
~~11. Steam Generator Level - High S~~
~~Qg 1, 2 E~~
~~12. Reactor Protection System.~~
E Logic N.A.
N.A.
Qg 1, 2, 3 *, 4*, 5*
5 h
m.
.c a
TABLE 4.3-1 (Continued)
_g.
REACTOR PROTECTIVE INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 8
Q CHANNEL MODES FOR WHICH E
CHANNEL CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL SURVEILLANCE FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHECK CALIBRATION TEST IS RE0UIRED E
]
~~13. Reactor Trip-Breakers N.A.~~
N.A.
M,(12) 1, 2, 3*,
4*, 5*
14.
Core Protection Calculators S
D(2,4),S(7),
Q0(11),f(6) 1, 2 f(4,5),M(8)
~
15.
CEA Calculators S
f Qg,f(6) 1, 2 16.
Reactor Coolant Flow-Low S
f Qg 1, 2
~~17. Seismic-High S~~
Qg 1, 2 18.
Loss of Load S
N.A.
Qg 1 (9) hs M
E E
JuP
TABLE 4.3-1 (Continued).
TABLE NOTATION
- With reactor trip breakers in the closed position and the CEA drive system capable of CEA withdrawal.
- At least once per Refueling Interval.
O rat (leaitlonce?pe6120fdaysJnTaTSTAGGEREDiTESTfBASIS;
[*L M At(leastionce'each5120fdays?
(1)
- Each startup or when required with the reactor trip breakers closed and the CEA drive system capable of rod withdrawal, if not performed in the previous 7 days.
(2)
- Heat balance only (CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST not included), above 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER; adjust the Linear Power Level signals and the CPC addressable constant multipliers to make the CPC delta T power and CPC nuclear power calculations agree with the calorimetric calculation if absolute difference is greater than 2%. During PHYSICS TESTS, these daily calibrations may be suspended provided these calibrations are performed upon reaching each' major test power plateau and prior to proceeding to the next major test power plateau.
(3)
- Above 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER, verify that the linear power subchannel gains of the excore detectors are consistent with the values used to estab-lish the shape annealing matrix elements in the Core Protection Calculators.
(4)
- Neutron detectors may be excluded from CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
(5)
- After each fuel loading and prior to exceeding 70% of RATED THERMAL POWER, the incore detectors shall be used to determine the shape annealing matrix elements and the Core Protection Calculators shall use these elements.
(6)
- This CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall include the injection of simulated process signals into the channel as close to the sensors as practicable to verify OPERABILITY including alarm and/or trip functions.
(7)
- Above 70% of RATED THERMAL POWER, verify that the total RCS flow rate as indicated by each CPC is less than or equal to the actual RCS total flow rate determined by either using the reactor coolant pump differential pres-sure instrumentation (conservatively compensated for measurement uncertain-ties) or by calorimetric calculations (conservatively compensated for measurement uncertainties) and if necessary, adjust the CPC addressable constant flow coefficients such that each CPC indicated flow is less than or equal to the actual flow rate.
The flow measurement uncertainty may be included in the BERR1 term in the CPC and is equal to or greater than 4%.
(8)
- Above 70% of RATED THERMAL POWER, verify that the total RCS flow rate as indicated by each CPC is less than or equal to the actual RCS total flow rate determined by calorimetric calculations (conservatively compensated formeasurementuncertainties).
(9)
- Above 55% of RATED THERMAL POWER.
(10) - Deleted.
SAN ONOFRE - UNIT 3 3/4 3-12 AMENDMENT N0.
TABLE 4.3-1 (Continued)
TABLE NOTATION (11) -
The gearterly 120 Eddy 2STAGGERE0}TESTIBAS!$ CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST-shall include verifi2sti6h that"thi'ceFFsat"Talu'es of addressable constants are installed in each OPERABLE CPC.
- (12)
At least once per'18i months and following maintenance or adjustment of the reactor trip. breakers, the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall includa independent verification of the undervoltage and shunt trips.
s t
SAN ONOFRE - UNIT 3 3/4 3-12a AMENDMENT NO.
..... ~..
'l i.
I i
i TABLE 4.3-2 m
ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS E
53 CHANNEL MODES FOR WHICH 6
CHANNEL CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL SURVEILLANCE h
FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHECK CALIBRATION TEST IS REQUIRED 1
E 1.
SAFETY INJECTION (SIAS)
U a.
Manual (Trip Buttons)
N.A.
N.A.
(6) 1, 2, 3, 4 u
b.
Containment Pressure - High S
(6)
QS 1, 2, 3 c.
Pressurizer Pressure - Low S
(6)
QO 1,2,3 d.
Automatic Actuation Logic N.A.
N.A.
Qi*g(l)(3), SA(4) 1, 2, 3, 4 2.
CONTAINMENT SPRAY (CSAS) a.
Manual (Trip Buttons)
N.A.
N.A.
(6) 1, 2, 3 b.
Containment Pressure --
High - High S
(6)
Q0 1, 2, 3 c.
Automatic Actuation Logic N.A.
N.A.
Qyj(1)(3), SA(4) 1, 2, 3 w
3.
CONTAINMENT ISOLATION (CIAS) a.
Manual CIAS (Trip Buttons)
N.A.
N.A.
(6) 1, 2, 3, 4 w
b.
Manual SIAS (Trip Buttons)(5)
N.A.
N.A.
(6) 1, 2, 3, 4 0
c.
Containment Pressure - High S
(6)
QG 1,2,3 d.
Automatic Actuation Logic N.A.
N.A.
Qg(l)(3), SA(4) 1, 2, 3, 4
~
4.
MAIN STEAM ISOLATION (MSIS) a.
Manual (Trip Buttons)
N.A.
N.A.
(6) 1, 2, 3 b.
Steam Generator Pressure - Low S
(6)
Q@
1,2,3 c.
Automatic Actuation Logic N.A.
N.A.
Qgj(1)(3), SA(4) 1, 2, 3 5.
RECIRCULATION (RAS)
D a.
Refueling Water Storage h
Tank - Low S
R QB 1,2,3,4 b.
Automatic Actuation Logic N.A.
N.A.
Q}j(1)(3), SA(4) 1, 2, 3, 4 g
z" 6.
CONTAINMENT COOLING (CCAS) 5 a.
Manual CCAS (Trip Buttons)
N.A.
N.A.
(6) 1, 2, 3, 4 b.
deleted intentionally c.
Automatic Actuation Logic N.A.
N.A.
Q (1)(3), SA(4) 1, 2, 3, 4
TABLE 4.3-2 (continued)
ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS z
O CHANNEL MODES FOR WHICH E
CHANNEL CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL SURVEILLANCE h
FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHECK CALIBRATION TEST IS REQUIRED 4
7.
l LOSS OF POWER (LOVS, SDVS, or DGVSS) a.
4.16 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage (Loss of Voltage)
S (6)
(6) 1, 2, 3, 4 b.
4.16 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage (Degraded Voltage S
(6)
(6) 1, 2, 3, 4 8.
EMERGENCY FEEDWATER (EFAS) w a.
Manual (Trip Buttons)
N.A.
N.A.
(6) 1, 2, 3 7
b.
SG Level (A/B)-Low and AP (A/B) - Hi S
(6)
QS 1,2,3
-l SG Level (A/B) gh w6 c.
- Low and No Pressure - Low Trip (A/B)
S (6)
Q9 1,2,3 d.
Automatic Actuation Logic N.A.
N.A.
Qyj(3)SA(4) 1, 2, 3 9.
CONTROL ROOM ISOLATION (CRIS) a.
Manual CRIS (Trip Button;)
N.A.
N.A.
R N.A.
b.
Manual SIAS (Trip Buttons)
N.A.
N.A.
R N.A.
c.
Airborne Radiation
~~i. Particulate / Iodine S~~
R M
All ii. Gaseous S
R M
All d.
Automatic Actuation Logic N.A.
N.A.
R(3)
All isy
~~10. T0XIC GAS ISOLATION (TGIS) a.~~
Manual (Trip Buttons)
N.A.
N.A.
R N.A.
2p b.
Chlorine - High S
R M
All c.
Ammonia - High S
R M
All d.
Butane / Propane - High S
R
>M All e.
Automatic Actuation Logic N.A.
N.A.
R(3)
All
TABLE 4.3-2 (continued)
ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS m
CHANNEL MODES FOR WHICH E
CHANNEL CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL SURVEILLANCE FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHECK CALIBRATION TEST IS REQUIRED o
8
g
~~11. FUEL HANDLING ISOLATION (FHIS) tp a.~~
Manual (Trip Buttons)
N.A.
N.A.
R N.A.
g b.
Airborne Radiation
~~i. Gaseous S~~
R M
[
c.
Automatic Actuation Logic N.A.
N.A.
R(3) l l
~~12. CONTAINMENT PURGE ISOLATION (CPIS) a.~~
Manual (Trip Buttons)
N.A.
N.A.
(6)
N.A.
b.
Airborne Radiation i.
Gaseous S
M 1,2,3,4,6 ii.
Particulate W
M 1,2,3,4,6 iii. Iodine W
M 6
c.
Containment Area Radiation (Gamma)
S (6)
M 1,3,3,4,6 R.
d.
Automatic Actuation Logic
- N.A.
N.A.
(3), (6) 1,2,3,4,6 v
y TABLE NOTATION g
(1) Deleted.
(2) Deleted.
l (3) Testing of Automatic Actuation Logic shall include energization/de-energization of each initiation relay and verification of the OPERABILITY of each initiation relay.
(4) A subgroup relay test shall be performed which shall include the energization/de-energization of each subgroup relay and verification of the OPERABILITY of each subgroup relay. Relays exempt from testing during plant operation shall be limited to only those relays associated with plant equipment which cannot be operated during plant operation.
Relays not testable during plant operation shall be tested during each g
COLD SHUTDOWN exceeding 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months unless tested during the previous 6 months.
xg (5) Actuated equipment only; does not result in CIAS.
s g
(6) At least once per Refueling Interval.
With irradiated fuel in the storage pool.
,9 7A QTE Et@ ht giiE68120Zds951b g 1JAGiGERED EESg g5 p]
R
+** 5 At?1 eastyonce j,eathp20j(daysj
_ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ = _ _ _
~
3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION BASES 3/4.3.1 and 3/4.3.2 REACTOR PROTECTIVE and ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the reactor 3rotective and Engineered Safety Features Actuation System instrumentation and )ypasses ensure that 1) the associated Engineered Safety Features Actuation System action and/or reactor trip will be initiated when the parameter monitored by each channel or combination thereof reaches its setpoint, 2) the specified coincidence logic is maintained,
~~3) sufficient redundancy is maintained to permit a channel to be out of service for testing or maintenance, and 4) sufficient system functional capability is available from diverse parameters.~~
The OPERABILITY of these systems is recuired to provide the overall reliability, redundancy and diversity assumec available in the facility design for the protection and mitigation of accident and transient conditions.
The integrated operation of each of these systems is consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.
When a protection channel of a given process variable becomes inoperabl',
e the inoperable channel may be placed in bypass until the next Onsite Review Committee meeting at which time the Onsite Review Committee will review and j
document their judgement concerning prolonged operation in byaass, channel trip, and/or repair.
The goal shall be to return the inoperaale channel to service as soon as practicable but in no case later than during the next COLD i
SHUTDOWN. This.a)proach to bypass / trip in four channel protection systems is consistent with t1e applicable criteria of IEEE Standards 279, 323, 344 and 384.
The Core Protection Calculator (CPC) addressable constants are provided to allow calibration of the CPC system to more accurate indications of power level, RCS flow rate, axial flux shape, radial peaking factors and CEA deviation penalties. Administrative controls on changes and periodic checking of addressable constant values (see also Technical Specifications 3.3.1 and 6.8.1) ensure that inadvertent misloading of addressable constants into the CPCs is unlikely.
The redundancy and design of the Control Element Assembly Calculators (CEAC) provides reactor protection in the event one or both CEAC's becomes in-operable.
If one CEAC is in test or inoperable, verification of CEAC position i
is performed at least every 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .
If the second CEAC fails, the CPC's will use DNBR and LPD penalty factors, which restrict reactor operation to some maximum fraction of RATED THERMAL POWER.
If this maximum fraction is exceeded a reactor trip will occur.
The surveillance requirements specified for these systems ensure that the overall system functional capability is maintained comparable to the original design standards. The periodic surveillance tests aerformed at the minimum frequencies are sufficient to demonstrate this capa)ility. The q=rterly 120 da9fstaggeredttest frequency for the bistable ~ CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TESTS for~these
'sistems is based'on t-he pl~ ant; specific!analys'esishich7WWeibaiedson analyses
~
presented in the NRC approved ~ topical report",*CEN-327; *"RPS/ESFAS" Extended Test Interval Evaluation," as supplemented.
The measurement of response time at the specified frequencies provides assurance that the reactor protective and ESF actuation associated with each channel is completed within the time limit assumed in the accident analyses.
SAN ONOFRE - UNIT 3 B 3/4 3-1 AMENDMENT NO.
i l
i ATTACHMENT E PROPOSED REVISION TO PCN-299, SUPPLEMENTS 1 THROUGH 4 UNIT 2 l
i
1 l
i RPS Instrumentation-Operating 3.3.1 i
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS;(continued)
~j a
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.1.6

~~NOTE-------------------~~

Not required to be performed until 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months after THERMAL POWER 2 15% RTP.
Verify linear power subchannel gains of 92 120 days
~~~~"~~
the excore detectors are consistent with the values used to establish the shape 1
annealing matrix elements in the CPCs.
SR 3.3.1.7

~~NOTES------------------~~

I.
The CPC CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall include verification that the orrect values of addressable constants are installed in each OPERABLE CPC.
1 2.
Not required to be performed for logarithmic power level channels until 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months after reducing THERMAL POWER below 1E-4% RTP and only if reactor trip circuit breakers I
(RTCBs) are closed.
1 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on each 92 d y: 30?diyi i
channel except power range neutron flux.
b#illBSTAGGERED" l
TESTi! BASIS.$
"*~"
4:FuwMM::ds.:aa4N SR 3.3.1.8

~~NOTE-------------------~~

Neutron detectors are excluded from the CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
djjj] l[120 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION of the power 92 day:
~~"
range neutron flux channels.
(continued)
SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 3.3-6 AMENDMENT NO.
1
RPS Instrumentation-Opsrating 3.3.1 SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.1.9

~~NOTE-------------------~~

Neutron detectors are excluded from CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION on each 24 months channel, including bypass removal functions.
SR 3.3.1.10 Perform a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on each 24 months CPC channel.
SR 3.3.1.11 Using the incore detectors, determine the Once after each shape annealing matrix elements to be refueling prior used by the CPCs.
to exceeding 85% RTP SR 3.3.1.12 Perform a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on each Once within I
operating bypass removal function.
93,12gdays prior to each reactor startup I
1 SR 3.3.1.13

~~NOTE-------------------~~

Neutron detectors are excluded.
Verify RPS RESPONSE TIME is within 24 months on a limits.
STAGGERED TEST BASIS i
I
{
l SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2 3.3-7 AMENDMENT NO.
RPS Instrumentation-Shutdown 3.3.2 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D.
(continued)
D.2 Place one affected I hour automatic trip channel in bypass and place the other in trip.
E. Required Action and E.1 Open all RTCBs.
I hour associated Completion Time not met.
4 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS w
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.2.1 Perform a CHANNEL CHECK of each logarithmic 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months power channel.
SR 3.3.2.2 Perform a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on each 92 6ys logarithmic power channel.
30.fdays,s,.,_
onta STAGG[REDjgE((
BA1 SR 3.3.2.3 Perform a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on each Once within operating bypass removal function. 92J2gdays prior to each reactor startup (continued) SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 3.3-12 AMENDMENT N0.
CEACs 3.3.3 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. Receipt of a CPC C.1 Perform CHANNEL 12 hours channel B or C cabinet FUNCTIONAL TEST on high temperature affectedCEAC(s). AND alarm. Once per 12 hours until high temperature alarm is cleared. D. One or two CEACs with D.1 Perform CHANNEL 24 hours three or more FUNCTIONAL TEST on autorestarts during a affected CEAC. 12 hour period. E. Required Action and E.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion Time of Condition B, C, or D not met. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.3.1 Perform a CHANNEL CHECK. 12 hours SR 3.3.3.2 Check the CEAC autorestart count. 12 hours SR 3.3.3.3 Perform a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. 92 days 60;^daisich?i STAGGEREDITEST BAS!S"" (continued) SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2 3.3-16 AMENDMENT NO.
RPS Logic and Trip Initiation 3.3.4 -ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME E. Required Action and E.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion Time of Condition A, AND B, or D not met. E.2 Open all RTCBs. 6 hours 08 One or more Functions with more than one Manual Trip, Matrix Logic, Initiation Logic, or RTCB channel inoperable for reasons other than Condition A or D. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.4.1 Perform a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on each 31 days RTCB channel. SR 3.3.4.2 Perform a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on each 92l120 days RPS Logic Channel. "'~ 18 months SR 3.3.4.3 Perform a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST, including separate verification of the undervoltage and shunt trips, on each RTCB. SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2 3.3-20 AMENDMENT NO.
RPS Logic and Trip Initiaticn 3.3.4 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.5.2 Perform a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of each 92 day; 30?difi ESFAS channel, including byp :: rc = 1 bhTi~1 STAGGERED" function:. IESJ M Ig""^^ SR"T3:3, :5:.3 N? Perf6rmWCHANNEL5. FUN. CT.IONALYTES.Tf6f2auch _120.[g y- .v< o SR 3.3.5.34 Perform a CHANNEL CALIBRATION of Function 18 months 5 Recirculation Actuation Signal, including bypass removal functions. SR 3.3.5.45 Perform a CHANNEL CALIBRATION of each ESFAS 24 months ~ channel, with the exception of Function 5, including bypass removal functions. SR 3.3.5.66 Verify ESF RESPONSE TIME is within limits. 24 months on a
~
STAGGERED TEST BASIS SR 3.3.5.6Z Perform a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on each once within automatic bypass removal channel. 93 ;120 days priBF"to each reactor startup SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2 3.3-25 AMENDMENT NO.
l ESFAS Logic and Manual Trip j 3.3.6 j ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME F. Required Action and F.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion j Time of Conditions for AND i Safety Injection Actuation Signal, F.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours Containment Isolation Actuation Signal, Recirculation Actuation Signal, or Containment Cooling Actuation Signal not met. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.6.1

~~NOTE--------------------~~

Testing of Actuation Logic shall include the verification of the proper operation of each initiation relay. Perform a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on each 93 1203 ESFAS logic channel. days"'" (continued) SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 3.3-29 AMENDMENT NO.
-;J / RPS Instrumentation-Operating B 3.3.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.4 (continued) REQUIREMENTS located in the control room to detect deviations in channel outputs. The Frequency is modified by a Note indicating this Surveillance need only be performed within 12 hours after reaching 20% RTP. The 12 hours after reaching 20% RTP is required for plant stabilization, data taking, and flow verification. The secondary calorimetric is inaccurate at lower power levels. A second Note in the SR indicates the SR may be suspended during PHYSICS TESTS. The conditional suspension of the daily calibrations under strict administrative control is necessary to allow special testing to occur. SR 3.3.1.5 The RCS flow rate indicated by each CPC is verified to be less than or equal to the RCS total flow rate every 31 days. The Note indicates the Surveillance is performed prior to exceeding 85% RTP, or within 12 hours after THERMAL POWER is 2 85% RTP. This check (and, if necessary, the adjustment of the CPC addressable flow constant coefficients) ensures that the DNBR setpoint is conservatively adjusted with respect to actual flow indications as determined by a calorimetric calculation. Operating experience has shown the specified Frequency is adequate, as instrument drift is minimal and changes in actual flow rate are minimal over core life. SR 3.3.1.6 The three vertically mounted excore nuclear instrumentation detectors in each channel are used to determine APD for use in the DNBR and LPD calculations. Because the detectors are mounted outside the reactor vessel, a portion of the signal from each detector is from core sections not adjacent to the detector. SR 3.3.1.6 ensures that the preassigned gains are still proper. The 92 120 day Frequency is adequate because the demonstFited long term drift of the instrument channels is minimal. (continued) SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2 8 3.3-31 AMENDMENT NO.
RPS Instrumentation-Operating B 3.3.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.7 REQUIREMENTS (continued) A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on each channel is performed every M }0 days ( M STAGGERElg ESE BA{f{nction when needed.to, ensure th 1 channel will perform its intinilsd u The SR is modified by two Notes. Note 1 is a requirement to verify the correct CPC' addressable constant values are installed in the CPCs when the CPC CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed. Note 2 allows the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST for the Logarithmic Power Level-High channels to be performed 2 hours after power drops below 1E-4% RTP and is required to be performed only if the RTCBs are closed. Not required if performed within the surveillance interval. The RPS CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST consists of three overlapping tests as described in Reference 7. These tests verify that the RPS is capable of performing its intended function, from bistable input through the RTCBs. They include: Bistable Tests A test signal is superimposed on the input in one channel at a time to verify that the bistable trips within the specified tolerance around the setpoint. This is done with the affected RPS channel trip channel bypassed. The requirements for this verification are outlined in Referencey8gndy9. Matrix Loaic Tests Matrix Logic tests are addressed in LC0 3.3.4. This test is performed one matrix at a time. It verifies that a coincidence in the two input channels for each function removes power from the matrix relays. During testing, holding power is applied to the matrix relay test coils and prevents the matrix relay contacts from assuming their de-energized state. This test will detect any short circuits around the bistable contacts in the coincidence logic, such as may be caused by faulty bistable relay or trip channel bypass contacts. (continued) ~ SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2 B 3.3-32 AMENDMENT N0.
RPS Instrumentation-Operating B 3.3.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE' TriD Path Tests REQUIREMENTS (continued) Trip path (Initiation Logic) tests are addressed in LC0 3.3.4. These tests are similar to the Matrix Logic tests, except that test power is withheld from one matrix relay at a time, allowing the initiation circuit to de-energize, thereby opening the affected set of RTCBs. The RTCBs must then be closed prior to testing the other three initiation circuits, or a reactor trip may result. The Frequenc,y of M 120 days is based on hTpTihtingEQ Q Fip6iftibiliiidf6Hithi Filiability analysis jife*sisted in ] tbpiisil'FipWt"tE@327, "RPS/ESFAS Extended Test Interval Evaluation" (Ref. 8 yd]). The CPC and CEAC channels and excore nuclear instrumentation channels are tested separately. The excore channels use preassigned test signals to verify. proper channel alignment. The excore logarithmic channel test signal is inserted into the preamplifier in)ut, so as to test the first active element downstream of tie detector.- The power range excore test signal is inserted at the drawer J input,.since there is no preamplifier. The quarterly CPC CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed using software. This software includes preassigned addressable constant values that may differ from the current values. Provisions are made to store the addressable constant values on a computer disk prior to testing and to reload them after testing. A Note is added to the Surveillance Requirements to verify that the CPC CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST includes the correct values of addressable constants. SR 3.3.1.8 A Note indicates that neutron detectors are excluded from CHANNEL CALIBRATION. A CHANNEL CALIBRATION of the' power range neutron flux channels every M 120 days ensures that the channels are reading accurately a6d'within tolerance responds"tB a) measured parameter within the necessary range (Ref. 8 W6dy. The Surveillance verifies that the channel and accuracy. CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drift between successive calibrations to ensure that the channel remains operational (continued) i j -SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2 B 3.3-33 AMENDMENT NO. 1 J
RPS Instrumentation-Operating B 3.3.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.11 (continued) REQUIREMENTS Incore detectors are inaccurate at low power levels < 15%. THERMAL POWER should be significant but < 85% to perform an accurate axial shape calculation used to derive the shape annealing matrix elements. By restricting power to s 85% until shape annealing matrix elements are verified, excessive local power peaks within the fuel are avoided. Operating experience has shown this Frequency to be acceptable. SR 3.3.1.12 SR 3.3.1.12 is a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST similar to SR 3.3.1.7, except SR 3.3.1.12 is applicable only to bypass functions and is performed once within 9%Q29 days prior to each startup. Proper operation of bypass permissives is critical during plant startup because the bypasses must be in place to allow startup operation and must be removed at the appropriate points during power ascent to enable certain reactor trips. Consequently, the appropriate time to verify bypass removal function OPERABILITY is just prior to startup. The allowance to conduct this Surveillance within 90120, days of startup is based,on E31]ii;Ed in t]op;QE$ t;spby1i basedron the reliability analysis present ical report"CEN-327,"RPS/ESFASExtendedTestInterval Evaluation" (Ref. BIsiid 9). Once the operating bypasses are removed, the bypassbraust not fail in such a way that the associated trip Function gets inadvertently bypassed. This feature is verified by the trip Function CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST, SR 3.3.1.7. Therefore, further testing of the bypass function after startup is unnecessary. SR 3.3.1.13 This SR ensures that the RPS RESPONSE TIMES are verified to be less than or equal to the maximum values assumed in the safety analysis. Individual component response times are not modeled in the analyses. The analyses model the overall or total elapsed time, from the point at which the parameter exceeds the trip setpoint value at the sensor to the point at which the RTCBs open. Response times are conducted on an 24 month STAGGERED TEST BASIS. This results in the interval 1 (continued) SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2 B 3.3-36 AMENDMENT N0. i
RPS Instrumentation-Operating i B 3.3.1 'i BASES p . SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.13.(continued) REQUIREMENTS between successive surveillances of a'given channel of n x 24 months, where n is the number of channels in the i-l function. The Frequency of 24 months is based upon l operating experience, which has shown that random failures of instrumentation com)onents causing serious response time degradation, but not c1annel failure, are infrequent occurrences. Also, response times cannot be determined at power, since equipment operation is required. Testing may l be performed in one measurement or in overlapping segments, l with verification that all components are tested. A Note is added to indicate that the neutron detectors are excluded from RPS RESPONSE TIME testing because they are passive devices with minimal drift and because of the difficulty of simulating a meaningful signal. Slow changes in leakage of neutrons with core burnup are compensated for by performing the daily calorimetric calibration (SR3.3.1.4). REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 20. 2. 10 CFR 100. 3. .IEEE Standard 279-1971, April 5, 1972. 4. SONGS Units 2 and 3 UFSAR, Chapter 15, 5. 10 CFR 50.49. 6. PPS Setpoint Calculation CE-NPSD-570, Revision 3. 7. UFSAR, Section 7.2. 8. CEN-327, June 2, 1986, including Supplement 1, March 3, 1989. 9E] Days!p RP5(ESFAS%Ei[F#did!fTFitJ1;ht'6fiTi1X EN1 HitNhJ(3 kfgg0 StageredlTistin atiS0NGSLUnitsiRSnd galyjagjgjgbylj!,g10jpg}jggppgyJjgderj}9)g SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 B 3.3-37 AMENDMENT N0.
RPS Instrumentation-Shutdown B 3.3.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.2.1 (continued) REQUIREMENTS sensor or the signal processing equipment has drifted outside its limits. The Frequency, about once every shift, is based on operating experience that demonstrates the rarity of channel failure. Thus, performance of the CHANNEL CHECK guarantees that undetected overt channel failure is limited to 12 hours. Since the probability of two random failures in redundant channels in any 12 hour period is extremely low, the CHANNEL CHECK minimizes the chance of loss of protective function due to failure of redundant channels. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more frequent, checks of channel OPERABILITY during normal operational use of the displays associated with the LCO required channels. SR 3.3.2.2 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL' TEST on each channel, except p's71 ower range neutron flux, is performed every 93 30 days o STAGGERE_DITESTsBASIS to ensure the entire diannel sill f g ; g. M Edid function when needed. This SR is identical to SR 3.3.1.7. Only the Applicability differs. The RPS CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST consists of three overlapping tests as described in the FSAR, Section 7.2 (Ref. 3). These tests verify that the RPS is capable of performing its intended function, from bistable input through the RTCBs. They include: Bistable Tests A test signal is superimposed on the input in one channel at a time to verify that the bistable trips within the specified tolerance around the setpoint. This is done with the affected RPS channel trip channel bypassed. The setpoint shall be left set consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint analysis. (continued) SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2 B 3.3-47 AMENDMENT NO.
p RPS Instrumentation-Shutdown i B 3.3.2 j -BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.2.3 REQUIREMENTS (continued) SR 3.3.2.3 is a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST similar-to SR 3.3.2.2, i except SR 3.3.2.3 is applicable only to bypass functions and is t performed once within M !120 days prior to each startup. This SR .j is identical to SR 3.3.1.127 Only the Applicability differs. i i Proper operation of bypass permissives is critical during plant startup because the bypasses must be in place to allow startup operation and must be removed at the appropriate l points during power ascent to enable certain reactor trips.. Consequently, the appropriate time to verify bypass removal function OPERABILITY is just prior to startup. The allowancetoconductthiihtKspeciffUre,portibiWdionthes Surveillan startup is based on P7pl reliability analysis"prisiiii6d*iH"t'hiiibs1"FepuWCEN-327, "RPS/ESFAS Extended Test Interval Evaluation" (Ref. 6 Whd g). Once the operating bypasses are removed, the bypaEis must not fail in such a way that the associated trip Function gets inadvertently bypassed. This feature is. verified by the trip Function CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST, SR 3.3.2.2. Therefore, further testing of the bypass function after startup is unnecessary. SR 3.3.2.4 l SR 3.3.2.4 is the performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION every j 24 months. This SR is identical to SR 3.3.1.9. Only the Applicability differs. I J CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument channel excluding the sensor. The Surveillance verifies that the channel responds to a measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy. CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drift between successive calibrations to' ensure that the channel remains operational between successive tests. Measurement error determination, setpoint error determination, and calibration adjustment must be performed consistent with the plant specific setpoint analysis. The channel shall be left calibrated consistent with the assumptions of the current-plant specific setpoint analysis. (continued) SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2 B 3.3-49 AMENDMENT NO.
i RPS Instrumentatien-Shutd wn f B 3.3.2 BASES (continued) i REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 20. 2. 10 CFR 100. 3. SONGS Units 2 and 3 UFSAR, Section 7.2. 4. PPS Setpoint Calculation CE-NPSD-570. 5. NRC Safety Evaluation Report. t 6. CEN-327, June 2, 1986, including Supplement 1, March 3, 1989. "5gRPS/ESFA5!EtEWdidiTsitHhtEWil? NETS'stT5hifEff120 7 DipsistapjefsdKTektini?AtySONGSi0ni_tsi2inhdif3 ~~ Ca.16_01_a t_i onIN.d.ia_beM 09/ 0102AS_92.40_02 *fN6Veinbs31993. hm-omm m,. -m mm m i 1 J SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2 B 3.3-51 AMENDMENT NO.
CEACs B 3.3.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.3.2 (continued) REQUIREMENTS that demonstrates the rarity of more than one channel failing within the same 12 hour interval. SR 3.3.3.3 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on each CEAC channel is performed every 93 60 days b'hlsj$T6GGEREDJ;TESTEBA5 entire channel will perform itf* intended}S to ensure the function when needed. The quarterly CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed using test software. The Frequency of 93 60 days onTH STAGGERED}TESTjB3SISisbasedonthereliabilityahilysis presented in topical report CEN-327, "RPS/ESFAS Extended TestIntervalEvaluation"(Ref.4pydf5). SR 3.3.3.4 SR 3.3.3.4 is the performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION every 24 months. CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument channel including the sensor. The Surveillance verifies that the channel responds to a measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy. CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drift between successive calibrations to ensure that the channel remains operational between successive surveillances. Measurement error determination, setpoint error determination, and calibration adjustment must be performed consistent with the plant specific setpoint analysis. The channel shall be left calibrated consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint analysis. The Frequency is based upon the assumption of an 24 month calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis and includes operating experience and consistency with the typical 24 month fuel cycle. (continued) SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2 8 3.3-60 AMENDMENT N0. 1
q CEACs B 3.3.3 BASES (continued) REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 20. 2. 10 CFR 100. 3. SONGS Units 2 and 3 UFSAR, Section 7.2. 4. CEN-327, June 2, 1986, including Supplement 1, March 3, 1989. 5.f ~'RPS/ESFAS Extended TeitintiNal Eval'uatfori fd'120
~~^"'~~ Days Staggered Testing at SONGS Units 2 < and 3~~'~~""~~
Calculation 3gspengy/y0-392p002,,Ngvempy;p93. S 1 4 SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 B 3.3-62 AMENDMENT NO.
RPS Logic _and Trip' Initiation s B 3.3.4-BASES ACTIONS D.1 (continued) If the affected RTCB cannot be opened, Required Action E is entered. This would only occur if there is a failure in the Manual Trip circuitry or the RTCB(s). E.1 and E.2 Condition E is entered if Required Actions associated with Condition A, B, or D are not met within the required Completion Time or, if for one or more' Functions, more than one Manual Trip, Matrix Logic, Initiation Logic, or RTCB channel is inoperable for reasons other than Condition A or D. If the RTCBs associated with the inoperable channel cannot be opened, the reactor must be shut down within 6 hours and all the RTCBs opened. A Completion Time of 6 hours'is reasonable, based on operating experience, for reaching the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems and for opening RTCBs. All RTCBs should then be opened, placing the. plant in a MODE where the LCO does not apply and ensuring no CEA withdrawal occurs. SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.4.1 and 3.3.4.2 REQUIREMENTS A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on each RTC8IbihdjRPS Logic channel channel is performed every 31 days"iWiWry 120Tdayi respectivelytoensuretheentirechannelwi1T'piFfdfmits intended function when needed. The RPS CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST consists of three overlapping tests as described in Reference 3. These tests verify that the RPS is capable of performing its-intended function, from bistable input through the RTCBs. The first test, the bistable test, is addressed by SR 3.3.1.7 in LC0 3.3.1. This SR addresses the two tests associated with the RPS Logic: Matrix Logic and Trip Path. (continued) SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2 B 3.3-74 AMENDMENT NO.
1 -ESFAS Instrumentation B-3.3.5 i BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.5.1 (continued) REQUIREMENTS will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION. Agreement' criteria are determined by the plant staff based-on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, ~ including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the match criteria,.it may be an -indication that the l sensor or the signal processing equipment has drifted i outside its limit. If the channels are within the match 1 criteria, it is an indication that the channels are j OPERABLE. r The Frequency, about once every shift, is based on operating experience that demonstrates channel failure is rare.
~~Thus, performance of the CHANNEL CHECK guarantees that undetected overt channel failure is limited to 12 hours. Since the i~~
probability of two random failures in redundant channels in ) any 12 hour period is low, the CHANNEL CHECK minimizes the chance of loss of protective function due to failure of redundant channels. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more frequent, checks of channel OPERABILITY during normal operational use of displays associated with the LC0 required channels. SR 3.3.5.2Fihd?SRW3 T 5?3 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is p!375p to ensure thE" en erformed every 92 30 days En N ST3pq{R!@TESRBA$J5[f6MS!!(3 channel will* perform ifs intehded function when needed. 4 The CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is part of an overlapping test sequence similar to that employed in the RPS. This sequence, consisting of SR 3.3.5.2, SRY3!375?3 F*SR 3.3.6.1, and SR 3.3.6.2, tests the entire ESFAS"fFaii~ths bistable input through the actuation of the individual subgroup relays. These overlapping tests are described in Reference 1. SR 3.3.5.2 and SR 3.3.6.1 are normally performed together and in conjunction with ESFAS testing. SR 3.3.6.2 verifies that the subgroup relays are capable of actuating their respective ESF components when de-energized. ShetllM]MpWfpyd7E9Effg12g!diyggdgfgSJ35 SRpg.T5Q anmaB!isite (continued) SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2 B 3.3-100 AMENDMENT N0.
g-n ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.5-1 BASES REQUIREMENTS ~ (continued) SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.5.2KshdTSRM3!37573' These tests verify that the ESFAS is capable of performing its intended function, from bistable input through the actuated components. SRs 3.3.6.1 and 3.3.6.2 are addressed in LC0 3.3.6. SR 3.3.5.2 includes bistable tests. A test signal is superimposed on the input in one channel at a time to verify that the bistable trips within the specified tolerance around the setpoint. This is done with the affected PPS trip channel bypassed. SR 3.3.5.34 and SR ~3.3.5.45 CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument channel including the detector and the bypass removal functions. The Surveillance verifies that the channel responds to a measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy. CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drift between successive calibrations to ensure that the channel remains operational between successive surveillances. Measurement error determination, setpoint error determination, and calibration adjustment must be performed consistent with the plant specific setpoint analysis. The channel shall be left calibrated consistent with the assumptions of the current. plant specific setpoint analysis. The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an un)lanned transient if the j Surveillance were performed with tie reactor at power. SR 3.3.5.56 1 This Surveillance ensures that the train actuation response times are within the maximum values assumed in the safety analyses. Response time testing acceptance criteria are included in Reference 9. ESF RESPONSE TIME tests are conducted on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS of once every 24 months. The 24 month Frequency is (continued) SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2 B 3.3-101 AMENDMENT NO.
s ESFAS Instrumentation l B 3.3.5 P ' BASES SURVEILLANCE-SR 3.3.5.56 (continued) REQUIREMENTS consistent with the typical industry refueling cycle and is based upon plant operating experience, which shows that random failures of instrumentation components causing serious response time degradation, but not channel failure, are infrequent occurrences. SR 3.3.5.67 SR 3.3.5.67 is a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST similar to SRt 3.3.5.2fihdi5RT3737tif3 except SR 3.3.5.67 is perforinEd within93"120"diys~pHo,rtostartupandisonlyapplicable to bypass 'fd6ctions. Since the Pressurizer Pressure-Low bypass is identical for both the RPS and ESFAS, this is the same Surveillance performed.for the RPS in SR 3.3.1.13. The CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST for proper operation-of the bypass permissives is critical during plant heatups because the bypasses may be in place prior to entering MODE 3 but must be removed at the appropriate points during plant startup to enable the ESFAS Function. Consequently,just prior to startup is the appro)riate time to verify bypass function OPERABILITY. Once tie bypasses are removed, the ) bypasses must not fail in such a way that the associated ESFAS Function is inappropriately bypassed. This feature is verified by SR 3.3.5.2. The allowance to conduct this test once within 93 120 days prior to each reactor startup is based on W[pliii6p'speERIE rep 6EtYbsiddibhthereliabilityanalysisp?esistEd'lif-^~ upiEil"' Vip 0Ft*CEN-327, "RPS/ESFAS Extended Test Interval Evaluation" (Ref. 8 g g y,). i (continued) SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2 B 3.3-102 AMENDMENT N0.
ESFAS Instrumentation-B 3.3.5 BASES (continued) REFERENCES 1. SONGS Units 2 and 3 UFSAR, Section 7.3. 2. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A. 3. IEEE Standard 279-1971. 4. SONGS Units 2 and 3 UFSAR, Chapter 15. 5. 10 CFR 50.49. ] 6. PPS Setpoint Calculation CE-NPSD-570. 7. SONGS Units 2 and 3 UFSAR, Section 7.2. 8. CEN-327, May 1986, including Supplement 1, March 1989. 9. Licensee Controlled Specification 3.3.10, "RPS/ESFAS Response Times." 10".q" gjRP5/ESFA5!Estindsd?TiitMWtFNiT?TiTK1Hitf6HYf6F5i120 Di 's!S tijiifed $Tssfi WyntsS0NGSiO6 i ts:!!2sssiiE3F"*~" $hMlNlS$h8555$19815AE$5$$2AE$$5sik88$lMll! l SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 B 3.3-103 AMENDMENT NO.
ESFAS Logic and Manual Trip B 3.3.6 BASES - 1 SURVEILLANCE Trio Path (Initiation Loaic) Tests REQUIREMENTS (continued) These tests are similar to the Matrix Logic tests, except that test power is withheld from one matrix relay at a time, allowing the initiation circuit to de-energize, opening one contact in each Actuation Logic channel. The initiation circuit lockout relay must be reset (except for EFAS, which lacks-initiation circuit-lockout relays) prior to testing.the other three initiation circuits, or an ESFAS actuation may result. Automatic Actuation Logic operation is verified during Initiation Logic testing by verifying that current is interrupted in each trip leg in the selective two-out-of-four j actuation circuit logic whenever the initiation relay is de-energized. A Note is added to indicate that testing of Actuation Logic shall include verification of the proper. - l operation of each initiation relay. The., Frequency of 92 J20 days is based on Q Tgt W psyjf s, Esp.ortsbasedf6W]thereliabilityanalysispresen rep WCEN 327*,* "RPS/ESFAS Extended Test Interval Evaluation" (Ref. 2 @ ]). SR 3.3.6.2 The Subgroup Relay Test of each Actuation Logic channel tests only the individual subgroup relays Individual ESFAS subgroup relays must be tested, one at a time, to verify the individual ESFAS components will actuate when required. Proper operation of the individual subgroup relays is verified by de-energizing each relay in response to a test signal, energizing the relay by releasing the test signal and verifying at least one connected component or pair of contacts is observed to actuate when the relay deenergizes. The 184 day Frequency is based on operating experience and ensures individual relay problems can be detected within this time frame. The actual justification is based on CEN-403, " Relaxation of Surveillance Test Interval for ESFAS Subgroup Relay Testing" (Ref. 3). Some components cannot be tested at power since their actuation might lead to plant trip or equipment damage. (continued) SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 B 3.3-124 AMENDMENT N0. 4 -,s. ~ --,,._m., -,r,
ESFAS Logic and Manual Trip-B 3.3.6 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.6.2 (continued)
~~REQUIREMENTS Reference 1 lists those relays exempt from testing at power, with an explanation of the reason for each exception.~~
Relays not tested at power must be tested in accordance with the Note to this SR. SR 3.3.6.3 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on the manual ESFAS actuation circuitry, de-energizing relays and providing manual actuation of the function. This test verifies that the manual trip push buttons are capable of opening contacts in the Actuation Logic as designed. The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at a Frequency of once every 24 months. REFERENCES 1. SONGS Units 2 and'3 UFSAR, Section 7.3. 2. CEN-327, May 1986, including Supplement 1, March 1989. 3. CEN-403. d}g[$PS7ESFASMitF6d6difisyHiifffiTdREi/aTu;ig6Ef6g)2q [ajj/SS.tagered3Testingiat! SONGS!Unitii2fandj37lglopJ Da s i I SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2 8 3.3-125 AMENDMENT NO. w, + - - - - -, - ,.,e y w-- el
-= ATTACHMENT F PROPOSED REVISION TO PCN-299, SUPPLEMENTS 1 THROUGH 4 UNIT 3
RPS Instrumentation-Operating 3.3.1 i i l SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY ~\\ ) SR 3.3.1.6

~~NOTE-------------------~~

Not required to be performed until 1 12 hours after THERMAL POWER 2 15% RTP. Verify linear power subchannel gains of 93 i120 days ( """~ ~ the excore detectors are consistent with the values used to establish the shape .) annealing matrix elements in the CPCs. SR 3.3.1.7

~~NOTES------------------~~

1. The CPC CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST 1 shall include verification that the J correct values of addressable constants are installed in each OPERABLE CPC. 2. Not required to be performed for logarithmic power level channels until 2 hours after reducing THERMAL POWER below 1E-4% RTP and only if reactor trip circuit breakers (RTCBs) are closed. Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on each 92 days 307d5Fs channel except power range neutron flux. bnTaiSTAGGERE0" TESTiBASIS~~^" - - ~ ~ ~ - SR 3.3.1.8

~~NOTE-------------------~~

Neutron detectors are excluded from the CHANNEL CALIBRATION. Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION of the power 92-dayq*120 range neutron flux channels. d6yy (continued) i SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3 3.3-6 AMENDMENT NO.
RPS Instrumentation-Operating 3.3.1 SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY I SR 3.3.1.9

~~NOTE-------------------~~

Neutron detectors are excluded from CHANNEL CALIBRATION. 1 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION on each 24 months channel, including bypass removal functions. SR 3.3.1.10 Perform a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on each 24 months CPC channel. SR 3.3.1.11 Using the incore detectors, determine the Once after each shape annealing matrix elements to be refueling prior l used by the CPCs. to exceeding 85% RTP SR 3.3.1.12 Perform a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on each Once within ) operating bypass removal function. 93,}2gdays prior to each reactor startup l SR 3.3.1.13

~~NOTE-------------------~~

Neutron detectors are excluded. l l Verify RPS RESPONSE TIME is within 24 months on a limits. STAGGERED TEST j BASIS 1 i l l SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3 3.3-7 AMENDMENT NO. 1 1 I
h RPS Instrumentation-Shutdown 3.3.2 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D. (continued) D.2 Place one affected I hour automatic trip channel in bypass and place the other in trip. E. Required Action and E.1 Open all RTCBs. I hour associated Completion Time not met. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.2.1 Perform a CHANNEL CHECK of each logarithmic 12 hours power channel. SR 3.3.2.2 Perform a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on each 92 6 : logarithmic power channel. 30!dih"K3Fi STAGGER,Eg((J, EkN 4 SR 3.3.2.3 Perform a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on each Once within operating bypass removal function. 93J20,toeach days prior reactor startup (continued) SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 3 3.3-12 AMENDMENT NO.
CEACs 3.3.3 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. Receipt of a CPC C.i Perform CHANNEL 12 hours channel B or C cabinet FUNCTIONAL TEST on high temperature affected CEAC(s). AND alarm. Once per 12 hours until high temperature alarm is cleared. D. One or two CEACs with D.1 Perform CHANNEL 24 hours three or more FUNCTIONAL TEST on autorestarts during a affected CEAC. 12 hour period. E. Required Action and E.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion Time of Condition B, C, or D not met. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILIANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.3.1 Perfom a CHANNEL CHECK. 12 hours SR 3.3.3.2 Check the CEAC autorestart count. 12 hours SR 3.3.3.3 Perform a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. 92 tys 6'0fdifi?usIs STAGGERED [T,ESJ $0!}$ r (continued) I i SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 3 3.3-16 AMENDMENT NO.
RPS Logic and Trip Initiation 3.3.4 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME i E. Required Action and E.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion Time of Condition A, AND B, or D not met. E.2 Open all RTCBs. 6 hours 0.8 One or more Functions with more than one Manual Trip, Matrix Logic, Initiation Logic, or RTCB channel inoperable for reasons other than Condition A or D. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.4.1 Perform a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on each 31 days RTCB channel. SR 3.3.4.2 Perform a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on each 93 120 days ""~ RPS Logic Channel. 18 months SR 3.3.4.3 Perform a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST, including separate verification of the undervoltage and shunt trips, on each RTCB. (continued) SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3 3.3-20 AMENDMENT N0. .l
RPS Logic and Trip Initiation 3.3.4 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY I SR 3.3.5.2 Perform a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of each 92 hy: 30!dsyi ESFAS channel, including bypc:: r=c=1 BWu? STAGGERED
~~functica:.~~
lEj{jjLBgl{"~~" [3g3J3jjj QPitf6mWCt(ANNEQFUET10NAETESTr6fgiijg ROJggg !Sgs;ghaggggags;n gtajgrgnigig SR 3.3.5.34 Perform a CHANNEL CALIBRATION of Function 18 months 5, Recirculation Actuation Signal, including bypass removal functions. SR 3.3.5.45 Perform a CHANNEL CALIBRATION of each ESFAS 24 months channel, with the exception of Function 5, including bypass removal functions. SR 3.3.5.56 Verify ESF RESPONSE TIME is within limits. 24 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS SR 3.3.5.67 Perform a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on each Once within automatic bypass removal channel. 93 120 days pri6F to each reactor startup SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 3 3.3-25 AMENDMENT N0. I l
ESFAS Logic and Manual Trip 3.3.6 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME F. Required Action and F.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion Time of Conditions for AND Safety Injection Actuation Signal, F.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours Containment Isolation Actuation Signal, Recirculation Actuation Signal, or Containment Cooling Actuation Signal not met. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.6.1

~~NOTE--------------------~~

Testing of Actuation Logic shall include the verification of the proper operation of each initiation relay. Perform a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on each 92!120I ESFAS logic channel. days""" (continued) SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 3 3.3-29 AMENDMENT NO.
RPS Instrumentation-Operating B 3.3.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.4 (continued) REQUIREMENTS located in the control room to detect deviations in channel outputs. The Frequency is modified by a Note indicating this Surveillance need only be performed within 12 hours after reaching 20% RTP. The 12 hours after reaching 20% RTP is required for plant stabilization, data taking, and flow verification. The secondary calorimetric is inaccurate at lower power levels. A second Note in the SR indicates the SR may be suspended during PHYSICS TESTS. The conditional suspension of the daily calibrations under strict administrative control is necessary to allow special testing-to occur. SR 3.3.1.5 The RCS flow rate indicated by each CPC is verified to be less than or equal to the RCS total flow rate every 31 days. The Note indicates the Surveillance is performed prior to exceeding 85% RTP, or within 12 hours after THERMAL POWER is 2 85% RTP. This check (and, if necessary, the adjustment of the CPC addressable flow constant coefficients) ensures that the DNBR setpoint is conservatively adjusted with respect to actual flow indications as determined by a calorimetric calculation. Operating experience has shown the specified Frequency is adequate, as instrument drift is minimal and changes in actual flow rate are minimal over core life. SR 3.3.1.6 The three vertically mounted excore nuclear instrumentation detectors in each channel are used to determine APD for use in the DNBR and LPD calculations. Because the detectors are mounted outside the reactor vessel, a portion of the signal from each detector is from core sections not adjacent to the detector. SR 3.3.1.6 ensures that the preassigned gains are still proper. The 93 120 day Frequency is adequate because the demonstFE'ted long term drift of the instrument channels is minimal. j (continued) j i SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3 8 3.3-31 AMENDMENT N0.
RPS Instrumentation-Operating B 3.3.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.7 REQUIREMENTS (continued) A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on each channel is perfonned every M 3Q days bMilSTAGGERED}TESTTBA$15, to ensure the entire channel will perform it's interidid function when needed. The SR is modified by two Notes. Note 1 is a requirement to verify the correct CPC addressable constant values are installed in the CPCs when the CPC CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed. Note 2 allows the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST for the Logarithmic Power Level-High channels to be performed 2 hours after power drops below 1E-4% RTP and is required to be performed only if the RTCBs are closed. Not required if performed within the surveillance interval. The RPS CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST consists of three overlapping tests as described in Reference 7. These tests verify that the RPS is capable of performing its intended function, from bistable input through the RTCBs. They include: Bistable Tests A test signal is superimposed on the input in one channel at a time to verify that the bistable trirs within the specified tolerance around the setpoir t. This is done with the affected RPS channel trip channel Lypassed. The requirements for this verification are outlined in References 8 liriq9. Matrix Loaic Tests Matrix Logic tests are addressed in LC0 3.3.4. This Last is performed one matrix at a time. It verifies that a coincidence in the two input channels for each Function removes power from the matrix relays. During testing, holding power is applied to the matrix relay test coils and prevents the matrix relay contacts from assuming their de-energized state. This test will detect any short circuits around the bistable contacts in the coincidence logic, such as may be caused by faulty bistable relay or trip channel bypass contacts. (continued) SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 3 8 3.3-32 AMENDMENT N0.
RPS Instrumentation-Operating B 3.3.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE Trio Path Tests REQUIREMENTS (continued) Trip path (Initiation Logic) tests are addressed in LC0 3.3.4. These tests are similar to the Matrix Logic tests, except that test power is withheld from one matrix relay at a time, allowing the initiation circuit to de-energize, thereby opening the affected set of RTCBs. The RTCBs must then be closed prior to testing the other three initiation circuits, or a reactor trip may result. Thq Frequency of 93120 days is based on Qyjit:1p#gij reportVbasediondhe reliability analysis presented in M CEN 327, "RPS/ESFAS Extended Test Interval Evaluation" (Ref. 8 Md]). The CPC and CEAC channels and excore nuclear instrumentation i channels are tested separately. The excore channels use preassigned test signals to verify proper channel alignment. The excore logarithmic channel test signal is inserted into the preamplifier input, so as to test the first active element downstream of the detector. The power range excore test signal is inserted at the drawer j input, since there is no preamplifier. The quarterly CPC CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed using software. This software includes preassigned addressable constant values that may differ from the current values. Provisions are made to store the addressable constant values on a computer disk prior to testing and to reload them after testing. A Note is added to the Surveillance Requirements to verify that the CPC CHANNEL FL'NCTIONAL TEST includes the correct values of addressable constants. SR 3.3.1.8 A Note indicates that neutron detectors are excluded from CHANNEL CALIBRATION. A CHANNEL CALIBRATION of the power range neutron flux channels every 93120 days ensures that the channels are reading accurately and"within tolerance (Ref. 8 hhid19). The Surveillance verifies that the channel responds" tis measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy. CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drift between successive calibrations to ensure that the channel remains operational (continued) SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 3 B 3.3-33 AMENDMENT N0.
~.. RPS Instrumentation-Operating B 3.3.1 BASES . SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.11 (continued) REQUIREMENTS Incore detectors are inaccurate at low power levels < 15%. THERMAL POWER should be significant but < 85% to perform an accurate axial shape calculation used to derive the shape annealing matrix elements. By restriciting power to s 85% until shape annealing matrix elements are verified, excessive local power peaks within the fuel are avoided. Operating experience has shown this-Frequency to be acceptable. SR 3.3.1.12 SR 3.3.1.12 is a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST similar to SR 3.3.1.7, except SR 3.3.1.12 is applicable only to bypass functions and is performed once within 93[1.20 days prior to ' l each startup. Proper operation of hypass pFFmissives is critical during plant startup because the bypasses must be in place to allow startup operation and must be removed at the appropriate points during power ascent to enable certain reactor trips. Consequently, the appropriate time to verify bypass removal function OPERABILITY _ is just prior to startup. The allowance to conduct this Surveillance within 93320 days of startup is based on g}Jh;Ed in topicaltWp][Q13Rigg basedE6H the reliability analysis presenf Fsii6?t"CEN-327,"RPS/ESFASExtendedTestInterval Evaluation" (Ref. BYsWd 9). Once the operating bypasses are removed, the bypasEs"iiiust not fail in such a way that the associated trip Function gets inadvertently bypassed. This-feature is verified by the trip Function CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST, SR 3.3.1.7. Therefore, further testing of the bypass function after startup is unnecessary. SR 3.3.1.13 H This SR ensures that the RPS RESPONSE TIMES are verified to be less than or equal to the maximum values,assuped in the safety analysis. Individual component response ti'nes are a not modeled in the analyses. The analyses model the overall or total elapsed time, from the point at which the parameter exceeds the trip setpoint value at the sensor to the point at which the RTCBs open. Response times'are conducted on an-24 month STAGGERED TEST BASIS. This results in the interval (continued) SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 3 B 3.3-36 AMENDMENT N0. e r m -,y--
RPS Instrumentation-Operating B 3.3.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE. SR 3.3.1.13 (continued) REQUIREMENTS i =between successive surveillances of a given channel of n x 24 months, where n is the number of channels in the t function. The Frequency of 24 months is based.upon operating experience, which has shown that random failures of instrumentation components causing serious response time degradation, but not channel failure, are infrequent occurrences. Also, response' times cannot be determined at power,.since equipment operation is required. Testing may t be performed in one measurement or in overlapping segments, with verification that all components are tested. A Note is added to indicate that the neutron detectors are excluded from RPS RESPONSE. TIME testing because they are passive devices with minimal drift and because of the-difficulty of simulating a meaningful signal' Slow changes in leakage of neutrons with core burnup are compensated for by performing the daily calorimetric calibration (SR3.3.1.4). REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 20. 2. 10 CFR 100. 3. IEEE Standard 279-1971, April 5,1972. 4. SONGS Units 2 and 3 UFSAR, Chapter 15. 5. 10 CFR 50.49. 6. PPS Setpoint Calculation CE-NPSD-570, Revision 3. 7. UFSAR, Section 7.2. 8. CEN-327, June 2, 1986, including Supplement 1, i March 3, 1989. 9 RPS/ ESFASjiEiteidid ET65 t'[s IHt'sHT&TIEifililiU6sifb ~Q' Day @stSts gspsdsTEsfih YstsSONG ~~ [aj,Q(gjlgp@ppf[01,01QjgS?fjpfgpgj{py@pjpl{gj}[ SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 3 8 3.3-37 AMENDMENT NO. 7 ,.s.
RPS Instrumentation-Shutdown B 3.3.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.2.1 (continued) REQUIREMENTS sensor or the signal processing equipment has drifted outside its limits. The Frequency, about once every shift, is based on operating experience that demonstrates the rarity of channel failure. Thus, performance of the CHANNEL CHECK guarantees that undetected overt channel failure is limited to 12 hours. Since the probability of two random failures in redundant channels in any 12 hour period is extremely low, the CHANNEL CHECK minimizes the chance of loss of protective function due to failure of redundant channels. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more frequent, checks of channel OPERABILITY during normal operational use of the displays associated with the LC0 required channels. SR 3.3.2.2 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on each channel, except power range neutron flux, is performed every 92 30 days oh?i STAGGERED 7 TEST? BASIS to ensure the entire thannel ki1T p^erfend ~its" intended function when needed. This SR is identical to SR 3.3.1.7. Only the Applicability differs. The RPS CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST consists of three overlapping tests as described in the FSAR, Section 7.2 (Ref.3). These tests verify that the RPS is capable of performing its intended function, from bistable input through the RTCBs. They include: Bistable Tests A test signal is superimposed on the input in one channel at a time to verify that the bistable trips within the specified tolerance around the setpoint. This is done with the affected RPS channel trip channel bypassed. The setpoint shall be left set consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint analysis. I f 1 (Continued) l SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3 B 3.3-47 AMENDMENT NO. l l (
RPS Instrumentation-Shutdown B 3.3.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.2.3 REQUIREMENTS (continued) SR 3.3.2.3 is a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST similar to SR 3.3.2.2, except SR 3.3.2.3 is applicable only to bypass functions and is performed once within 93 !120 days prior to each startup. This SR is identical to SR 3.3.1.12;* Only the Applicability differs. ~ Proper operation of bypass permissives is critical during plant startup because the bypasses must be in place to allow startup operation and must be removed at the appropriate points during power ascent to enable certain reactor trips. Consequently, the appropriate time to verify bypass removal function OPERABILITY is just prior to startup. The allowance to conduct this Surveillance within_93120 days of startup is based on atplint:specifiqrsport?basediion the reliability analysis"hrsWhidd*fiiT6pnaT*F5p6Ft"CEN-327, "RPS/ESFASExtendedTestIntervalEvaluation"(Ref.6{Q iiiu)st not fail in such a way that the associated tripOnce the opera 7. Function gets inadvertently bypassed. This feature is verified by the trip Function CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST, SR 3.3.2.2. Therefore, further testin function after startup is unnecessary.g of the bypass SR 3.3.2.4 SR 3.3.2.4 is the performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION every 24 months. This SR is identical to SR 3.3.1.9. Only the Applicability differs. CHANNEL CALIBRATION 's a complete check of the instrument channel excluding the sensor. The Surveillance verifies that the channel responds to a measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy. CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drift between successive calibrations to ensure that the channel remains operational between successive tests. Measurement error determination, setpoint error determination, and calibration adjustment must be performed consistent with the plant specific setpoint analysis. The channel shall be left calibrated consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint analysis. (continued) SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 3 8 3.3-49 AMENDMENT NO.
RPS Instrumentation-Shutdown B 3.3.2 BASES (continued) REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 20. 2. 10 CFR 100. 3. SONGS Units 2 and 3 UFSAR, Section 7.2. 4. PPS Setpoint Calculation CE-NPSD-570. 5. NRC Safety Evaluation Report. 6. CEN-327, June 2, 1986, including Supplement 1, March 3, 1989. GE[RPS7ESEASTEitE6did!TistHHtFHis1FET&TeitT5hif6]@~20 DsyliSie ispidiTestihgi(Ati!SONGSI0riltM2fsiin3" ~ qalp@lf}jjppgjfjpg/j]pjgf2}}jop2fyiq@ ppg}g. m SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 3 8 3.3-51 AMENDMENT N0.
CEACs 1 B 3.3.3 t BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.3.2 (continued) REQUIREMENTS that demonstrates the rarity of more than one channel failing within the same 12 hour interval. SR 3.3.3.3 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TES_T on each CEAC channel is performed 'j every M gg days E q E jT(GGEREDf(tSisBASIS to ensure the i entire channel will perform its Htihdid function when needed. The-quarterly CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed 'l using test software. The Frequency of M 60 days sh!X PREdd}TESTIBASISisbasedontherelialiflityaWilysis STAGGERE0 4 in~tBpEsT report CEN-327, "RPS/ESFAS Extended Test Interval Evaluation" (Ref. 4 gg). SR 3.3.3.4 SR 3.3.3.4 is the performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION every 24 months. CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument channel including the sensor. The Surveillance verifies that the. channel responds to a measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy. CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drift between successive calibrations to ensure that the channel remains operational between successive surveillances. Measurement error determination, setpoint error determination, and calibration adjustment must be performed consistent with the plant specific setpoint analysis. The channel shall be left calibrated consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint analysis. The Frequency is based upon the assumption of an 24 month calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis and includes operating experience and consistency with the' typical 24 month fuel cycle. (continued) SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 3 8 3.3-60 AMENDMENT N0.
CEACs B 3.3.3 BASES (continued) REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 20. 2. 10 CFR 100. 3. SONGS Units 2 and 3 UFSAR, Section 7.2. 4. CEN-327, June 2, 1986, including Supplement 1, March 3, 1989. 5~l~~^' RPS/ESFAS' Eitiridsd' Test'~Inti~6/al~ Ei/a16atibn~fo~r~~120 '~~~~ Days Sta gered Testing at SONGS Units 2 and 3~~~~~' Calculatgn,,Numgey09(g10;AS92-pdO2,Ngvembef;1993. 7 SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 3 B 3.3-62 AMENDMENT NO.
l l RPS Logic and Trip Initiation B 3.3.4 BASES ACTIONS Ql (continued) If the affected RTCB cannot be opened, Required Action E is entered. This would only occur if there is a failure in the Manual Trip circuitry or the RTCB(s). E.1 and E.2 Condition E is entered if Required Actions associated with Condition A, B, or D are not met within the required Completion Time or, if for one or more Functions, more than one Manual Trip, Matrix Logic, Initiation Logic, or RTCB channel is inoperable for reasons other than Condition A or D. If the RTCBs associated with the inoperable channel cannot be opened, the reactor must be shut down within 6 hours and all the RTCBs opened. A Completion Time of 6 hours is reasonable, based on operating experience, for reaching the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems and for opening RTCBs. All RTCBs should then be opened, placing the plant in a MODE where the LC0 does not apply and ensuring no CEA withdrawal occurs. SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.4.1 and 3.3.4.2 REQUIREMENTS A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on each RTCBTah'd!RPS Logic channel channel is performed every 31 days *"sisd*silefy !120!dnyi respectively to ensure the entire channel wi1T^VeFfonn its intended function when needed. The RPS CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST consists of three overlapping tests as described in Reference 3. These tests verify that the RPS is capable of performing its intended function, from bistable input through the RTCBs. The first test, the bistable test, is addressed by SR 3.3.1.7 in LC0 3.3.1. This SR addresses the two tests associated with the RPS Logic: Matrix Logic and Trip Path. (continued) SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 3 8 3.3-74 AMENDMENT N0. 1
ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.5-BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.5.1 (continued) REQUIREMENTS will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION. Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the match criteria, it may be an indication that the sensor or the signal processing equipment has drifted outside its limit. If the channels are within the match criteria, it is an indication that the channels are OPERABLE. l l The Frequency, about once every shift, is based on operating experience that demonstrates channel failure is rare.
Thus, performance of the CHANNEL CHECK guarantees that undetected overt channel failure is limited to 12 hours. Since the probability of two random failures in redundant channels in any 12 hour period is low, the CHANNEL CHECK minimizes the chance of loss of protective function due to failure of redundant channels. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more frequent, checks of channel OPERABILITY during normal operational use of displays associated with the LC0 required channels.
SR 3.3.5.24 hdESR F3!3!Si3 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TES.T is performed every 92 30 days bh M STAGGERED?TESifBASI SEf 6 ESRI3!31572 to ensure th'd" entire * ~ bMnhs1"Wi11*iisFf6Fm~itI*ihtindsd' function when needed. The CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is part of an overlapping test sequence similar to that employed in the RPS. This and SR 3.3.6.2, tests the entire ESFAS~ff5s?573? SR 3.3.6.1, sequence, consisting of SR 3.3.5.2, SRT3T3 "ths bistable j input through the actuation of the individual subgroup ) relays. These overlapping tests are described in ~ Reference 1. SR 3.3.5.2 and SR 3.3.6.1 are normally performed together and in conjunction with ESFAS testing. SR 3.3.6.2 verifies that the subgroup relays are capable of actuating their respective ESF components when de-energized. sri 3y3lglS;;3Qqpe rforn66didVdrg123diipfgyrj fflESQS, phange pasggmogaljefugctyng (continued) SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 3 B 3.3-100 AMENDMENT NO.
ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.5 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.5.2FahF SRW3!3?S?3 (continued) REQUIREMENTS These tests verify that the ESFAS is capable of performing its intended function, from bistable input through the actuated components. SRs'3.3.6.1 and 3.3.6.2 are addressed in LCO 3.3.6. SR 3.3.5.2 includes bistable tests. A test signal is superimposed on the input in one channel at a time to verify that the bistable trips within the specified tolerance around the setpoint. This is done with the affected PPS trip channel bypassed. SR 3.3.5.34 and SR 3.3.5.45 CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument channel including the detector and the bypass removal functions. The Surveillance verifies that the channel responds to a measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy. CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drift between. successive calibrations to ensure that the channel remains operational between successive surveillances. Measurement error determination, setpoint error determination, and calibration adjustment must be performed consistent with the plant specific setpoint analysis. The channel shall be left calibrated consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint analysis. The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an un)lanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with tie reactor at power. SR 3.3.5.56 This Surveillance ensures that the train actuation response times are within the maximum values assumed in the safety analyses. Response time testing acceptance criteria are included in Reference 9. ESF RESPONSE TIME tests are conducted on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS of once every 24 months. The 24 month Frequency is (continued) SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 3 B 3.3-101 AMENDMENT N0.
l ESFAS Instrumentation I B 3.3.5 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.5.66 (continued) REQUIREMENTS consistent with the typical industry refueling cycle and is based upon plant operating experience, which shows that random failures of instrumentation components causing serious response time degradation, but not channel failure, are infrequent occurrences. SR 3.3.5.67 SR 3.3.5.67: is a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST similar to sri 3.3.5.27 dI5RT3 3 5, except SR 3.3.5.6 is perforiEd within M.120" days p]r]ior to startup and i}s only applicable to bypass fErictions. Since the Pressurizer Pressure-Low bypass is identical for both the RPS and ESFAS, this is the same Surveillance performed for the RPS in SR 3.3.1.13. The CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST for proper operation of the bypass permissives is critical during plant heatups because the bypasses may be in place prior to entering MODE 3 but must be removed at the appropriate points during plant startup to enable the ESFAS Function. Consequently,just prior to startup is the appropriate time to verify bypass function OPERABILITY. Once the bypasses are removed, the bypasses must not fail in such a way that the associated ESFAS Function is inappropriately bypassed. This feature is verified by SR 3.3.5.2. The allowance to conduct this test once within W 120 days Priortoeachreactorstartupisbasedongji reportTh_ased?on the reliability analysis prese}isf@{ijg nt"id in ibpiesT*FijiaFt"CEN-327, "RPS/ESFAS Extended Test Interval-Evaluation" (Ref. 8 g d g0,). 7 (continued) SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 3 8 3.3-102 AMENDMENT NO.
ESFAS Instrumentation i-B 3.3.5 BASES (continued) REFERENCES 1. SONGS Units 2 and 3 UFSAR, Section 7.3. 2. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A. 3. IEEE Standard 279-1971. 4. SONGS Units 2 and 3 UFSAR, Chapter 15. 5. 10 CFR 50.49. 6. PPS Setpoint Calculation CE-NPSD-570. 7. . SONGS Units 2 and 3 UFSAR, Section 7.2. I 8. CEN-327, May 1986, including Supplement 1, March 1989. 9. Licensee Controlled Specification 3.3.10 "RPS/ESFAS Response Times." }0j.][gjRPS/ESfA5}[E8fshdsd&Tdif5HtiffA}!EiiiTuitT5iQf(eQ23 Di{MStaggeredj8TeMi ng fitsSONGSi:06itM23hd!3 Edh15!18d$$52EL91gjg9Eyjpg21[3gsgjQ)1g i l 4 SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 3 B 3.3-103 AMENDMENT NO.
ESFAS Logic and Manual Trip B 3.3.6 BASES SURVEILLANCE Trio Path (Initiation Loaic) Tests REQUIREMENTS (continued) These tests are similar to the Matrix Logic tests, except that test power is withheld from one matrix relay at a time, allowing the initiation circuit to de-energize, opening one contact in each Actuation Logic channel. The initiation circuit lockout relay must be reset (except for EFAS, which lacks initiation circuit lockout relays) prior to testing the other three initiation circuits, or an 1 ESFAS actuation may result. Automatic Actuation Logic operation is verified during Initiation Logic testing by verifying that current is interrupted in each trip leg in the selective two-out-of-four actuation circuit logic whenever the initiation relay is de-energized. A Note is added to indicate that testing of Actuation Logic shall include verification of the proper operation of each initiation relay. Th. Frequency of,the } reliability analysis presen'tEd in f6)pical t 93 20 days is based on [i@dttspigfi reporEbasedions 1Fep6?t*CEN 327',""RPS/ESFAS Extended Test Interval Evaluation" (Ref.2'sf4). ]a SR 3.3.6.2 The Subgroup Relay Test of each Actuation Logic channel tests only the individual subgroup relays Individual ESFAS subgroup relays must be tested, one at a time, to verify the individual ESFAS components will actuate when required. Proper operation of the individual subgroup relays is verified by de-energizing each relay in response to a test signal, energizing the relay by releasing the test signal and verifying at least one connected component or pair of contacts is observed to actuate when the relay deenergizes. The 184 day Frequency is based on (perating experience and ensures individual relay problems c.an be detected within this time frame. The actual justification is based on CEN-403, " Relaxation of Surveillance Test Interval for ESFAS Subgroup Relay Testing" (Ref. 3). Some components cannot be tested at power since their actuation might lead to plant trip or equipment damage. (continued) SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 3 8 3.3-124 AMENDMENT NO.
ESFAS Logic and Manual Trip B 3.3.6 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.6.2 (continued) REQUIREMENTS Reference 1 lists those relays exempt from testing at power, with an explanation of the reason for each exception. Relays not tested at power must be tested in accordance with the Note to this SR. 1 SR 3.3.6.3 4 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on the manual ESFAS manual actuation of the function. j actuation circuitry, de-energizing relays and providing This test verifies that the manual trip push buttons are capable of opening contacts in the Actuation Logic as ^ designed. The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at a Frequency of once every 24 months. REFERENCES 1. SONGS Units 2 and 3 UFSAR, Section 7.3. 2. CEN-327, May 1986, including Supplement 1, March 1989. 3. CEN-403, a 'gjlgRPS/ESf*AS3itihdsd RNifDhfiWi13NH;ii2fshd E37Tsiff6%f6Q2g DaystStaggeredliestingist' SONGSturiit Cal.:.c_ slat _ioMNaiibi60_9/u1 4 N6VimbeU1 AS93;C0' 00_2W:mm.m.9_97! 0 m mmmmm m ~ m a SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3 8 3.3-125 AMENDMENT NO.
1 l l 1 l s ENCLOSURE 2 COST /8ENEFIT ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED CHANGE NPF-10/15-434 l l 1
DATE: 19-Aug-94 SITE WORK REQUEST NOTICE WORK REQUEST:. PPSMX EVALUATION FORM UNIT: BOTH FUNDING: EXPENSE' REQUESTING ORG.: LICENSING INITIATOR: FRED BRIGGS l DESCRIPTION: PPS & MATRIX SURVEILLANCE TSIP The PPS & Matrix and CPC surveillances are currently performed every 92 days and the Ni surveillance every 31 days. In accordance with CBLA, Licensing has proposed to change the requirement for these tests to every 120 days. i i
~~= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = _ _ _ _ = =~~
BUDGET CATEGORY: (X) Licensing () Operational () Safety () Reliability () Productivity BACKGROUND: l i Testing for the PPS and Matrix, NI and CPC currently totals 2,600 mhs annually for two units. j Based on the proposed schedule, this would be reduced to 1,470 mhs for an annual i savings of 1,130 mhs. Less frequent testing would also reduce the wear, and ultimate replacement, of 16 NI drawers. The associated material and labor that would be saved by NOT having to replace the 16 drawers is $432K and 288 mhs respectively. This equates for a onetime savings of $615K.
~~= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =~~
COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS: PREPARED BY: Diane Metzger COST, K $, UNESCALATED BENEFIT, K $ EVALUATION YEAR OF CONSTR: 1994 C8 SAVINGS / YR: 54 PW BENEFIT / DIRECT COST: 77 ANNUAL SAVE PW: 539 PW COST: 12.8 W.O. LEVEL COST: 90 ONETIME SAVE PW: 615 PW COST (Var OH): 90 TOTAL PW BENEFIT: 1,154 NET PW, K$: 1,064 COST BENEFIT BASIS / QUALIFICATIONS: Calculated AS IF Recovery by Year 2013. The net benefit of changing the scheduled PPS & Matrix, CPC and NI surveillances to every 120 days equates to $1,064K for two units.
ENCLOSURE 6 UNITS 2 AND 3 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS PCNs 405 AND 434 MARKUPS i
l v L 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.1 REACTOR PROTECTIVE INSTRUMENTATION t t LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3.1 As a minimum, the reactor protective instrumentation channels and by) asses of Table 3.3-1 shall be OPERABLE with RESPONSE TIMES as shown in Taale 3.3-2. APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3-1. ACTION: As shown in Table 3.3-1. SURVEILLANCE ?E0UIREMENTS 4.3.1.1 Each reactor protective instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL CALIBRATION and CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST operations for the MODES and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-1. D 4.3.1.2 The logic for the bypasses shall be demonstrated OPERABLE prior to if-each reactor startup unless performed during the preceding 93120)Idays. The "a total bypass function shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least bddE per E refueling interval for each channel affected by bypass operation. The provisions of Technical Specification 4.0.2 are not applicable, i 4.3.1.3 The REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME of each reactor trip function shall be demonstrated to be within its limit at least once per refueling interval. Each test shall include at least one channel per function such that all channels are tested at least once every N refueling interval where N is the total number of redundant channels in a specific reactor trip function as shown in the " Total No. of Channels" column of Table 3.3-1. The provisions of Technical Specification 4.0.2 are not applicable. 4.3.1.4 The isolation characteristics of each CEA isolation amplifier and each optical isolator for CEA Calculator to Core Protection Calculator data transfer j shall be verified at least once per refueling interval during shutdown per the following tests: a. For the CEA position isolation amplifiers: 1. With 120 volts AC (60 Hz) applied for at least 30 seconds across the output, the reading on the input does not exceed 0.015 volts DC. SAN ON0FRE-UNIT 2 3/4 3-1 AMENDMENT N0.
TABLE 4.3-1 @? REACTOR PROTECTIVE INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 5 CHANNEL MODES FOR WHICH c CHANNEL CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL SURVEILLANCE 2 FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHECK CALIBRATION TEST IS RE0VIRED N 1. Manual Reactor Trip N.A. N.A. 1, 2, 3*, 4*, 5* 2. Linear Power Level - High S D(2,4),M**(3,4),QO 1, 2 Q{4),#(4)" 3. Logarithmic Power Level - High S
~~(4)~~
QO and S/U(1) 1,2,3,4,5 4. Pressurizer Pressure - High S Qg 1, 2 5 5. Pressurizer Pressure - Low S QO 1, 2 6. Containment Pressure - High S Qg 1, 2 7. Steam Generator Pressure - Low S QB 1, 2 ~ 2-8. Steam Generator Level - Low S Qg 1, 2 f 9. Local Power Density - High S D(2,4), QO,f(6) 1, 2 5 f(4,5) Q-l l
~~10. DNRR - Low S~~
~~S(7),D(2,4), QO,#(6) 1, 2 M(8),f(4,5) Ng~~
~~11. Steam Generator Level - High S~~
QO 1, 2 Eg 12 Reactor Protection System Logic N.A. N.A. QO, 1, 2, 3*, 4*, 5* + 5 O ~ ' ~~ - - -
---.- =-~. O g TABLE 4.3-1 g REACTOR PROTECTIVE INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS h CHANNEL MODES FOR WHICH y CHANNEL CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL SURVEILLANCE FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHECK CALIBRATION TEST IS REQUIRED q
~~13. ' Reactor Trip Breakers N.A.~~
~~N.A. M,(12) 1, 2, 3*, 4*,-5* 14. Core Protection Calculators S D(2,4),S(7) Qg(11),f(6) 1, 2 f(4,5),M(8)~~
~~15. CEA Calculators S~~
~~f Qg,f(6) 1, 2 1s-~~
~~16. Reactor Coolant Flow-Low S~~
~~f Qg 1, 2 {~~
~~17. Seismic-High S~~
~~QS 1, 2 1 e. { 18. Loss of Load S N.A. Q9, 1 (9) Y E5s is n 5 l 4ar5 m a - n-m ' - - -+- % 9'% %-t-e-- a u-eww e Mte 4--~~
~~+m+-~~
~~wi-e -*e-9- 4.--PW~~
My
"*-e e we-'=4 M + eue F-P i++w v m a
TABLE 4.3-1 (Continued) TABLE NOTATION With reactor trip breakers in the closed position and the CEA drive Y s AfstemcapableofCEAwithdrawal. least once per Refueling Interval. Y 9 O-RAthleastionceipeN120)da'ysionfa' STAGGEREDITEST BASIS? 2
~~Jy6Attleasppnceteacg120 Jays (~~
' ~ ' ' ~ ' g d (1) - Each startup or when required with the reactor trip breakers closed and the CEA drive system capable of rod withdrawal, if not performed in the previous 7 days. (2) - Heat balance only (CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST not included), above 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER; adjust the Linear Power Level signals and the CPC addressable constant multipliers to make the CPC delta T power and CPC nuclear power calculations agree with the calorimetric calculation if absolute difference is greater than 2%. During PHYSICS TESTS, these daily calibrations may be suspended provided these calibrations are performed upon reaching each major test power plateau and prior to proceeding to the next major test power plateau. (3) - Above 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER, verify that the linear power subchannel gains of the excore detectors are consistent with the values used to establish the shape annealing matrix elements in the Core Protection Calculators. (4) - Neutron detectors may be excluded from CHANNEL CALIBRATION. (5) - After each fuel loading and prior to exceeding 70% of RATED THERMAL POWER, the incore detectors shall be used to determine the shape annealing matrix elements and the Core Protection Calculators shall use these elements. (6) - This CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall include the injection of simulated process signals into the channel as close to the sensors as practicable to verify OPERABILITY including alarm and/or trip functions. (7) - Above 70% of RATED THERMAL POWER, verify that the total RCS flow rate as indicated by each CPC is less than or equal to the actual RCS total flow rate determined by either using the reactor coolant pump differential pressure instrumentation (conservatively compensated for measurement uncertainties) or by calorimetric calculations (conservatively compensated for measurement uncertainties) and if necessary, adjust the CPC addressable constant flow coefficients such that each CPC indicated flow is less than or equal to the actual flow rate. The flow measurement uncertainty may be included in the BERR1 term in the CPC and is equal to or greater than 4%. (8) - Above 70% of RATED THERMAL POWER, verify that the total RCS flow rate as indicated by each CPC is less than or equal to the actual RCS total flow rate determined by calorimetric calculations (conserva-tively compensated for measurement uncertainties). j (9) - Above 55% of RATED THERMAL POWER. (10) - Deleted. SAN ONOFRE-UNIT 2 3/4 3-12 AMENDMENT N0.
f p a n 4 o 4 mm2,,- n<.a x w ---s, i 4 u TABLE 4.3-1-(Continued) TABLE NOTATION . k, . (11) - The q=rterly 120Fday;TSTAGGEREDETEST? BASIS? CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall include verifiEsti6n"thn"the"ciFFsst'9 slues of addressable constants are U-installed in each OPERABLE CPC. (12) - At least once per 18 months and following maintenance or adjustment of the reactor trip breakers, the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall include independent verification of the undervoltage and shunt trips. 1 I h 1 l SAN ONOFRE-UNIT 2 3/4 3-12a AMENDMENT NO. y-r-
TABLE 4.3-2 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS h o CHANNEL MODES FOR WHICH 5 CHANNEL CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL SURVEILLANCE j FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHECK CALIBRATION TEST IS REQUIRED E 1. SAFETY INJECTION (SIAS) U a. Manual (Trip Buttons) N.A. N.A. (6) 1,-2, 3, 4 w b. Containment Pressure - High S (6) Q9 1,2,3 c. Pressurizer Pressure - Low S (6) QS 1,2,3 d. Automatic Actuation Logic N.A. N.A. Q*j(3),SA(4) 1, 2, 3, 4 2. CONTAINMENT SPRAY (CSAS) a. Manual (Trip Buttons) N.A. N.A. (6) 1, 2, 3 b. Containment Pressure -- High - High S (6) QB 1,2,3 c. Automatic Actuation Logic N.A. N.A. Qpj(3), SA(4) 1, 2, 3 3. CONTAINMENT ISOLATION (CIAS) u 3 a. Manual CIAS (Trip Buttons) N.A. N.A. (6) 1, 2, 3, 4 b. Manual SIAS (Trip Buttons)(5) N.A. N.A. (6) 1, 2, 3, 4 u de c. Containment Pressure - High S (6) QS 1,2,3 d. Automatic Actuation Logic N.A. N.A. Qg(3), SA(4) 1, 2, 3, 4 ~ 4. MAIN STEAM ISOLATION (MSIS) a. Manual (Trip Buttons) N.A. N.A. (6) 1, 2, 3 h b. Steam Generator Pressure - Low S (6) QB 1, 2, 3 2 c. Automatic Actuation Logic N.A. N.A. Qg*g(3), SA(4). 1, 2, 3 { t 5. RECIRCULATION (RAS) a. Refueling Water Storage p di Tank - Low S R QB 1,2,3,4 b. Automatic Actuation Logic N.A. N.A. Qg(3), SA(4) 1, 2, 3, 4 g 4 6. CONTAINMENT COOLING (CCAS) 2 a. Manual CCAS (Trip Buttons) N.A. N.A. (6) 1, 2, 3, 4 ? b. deleted intentionally c. Automatic Actuation Logic N.A. N.A. Q$j(3), SA(4) 1, 2, 3, 4
TABLE 4.3-2 (Continued) ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS CHANNEL MODES FOR WHICH CHANNEL CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL SURVEILLANCE-S FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHECK CALIBRATION TEST IS REQUIRED N h' LOSS OF POWER (LOVS, SDVS, or DGVSS) 7. a. 4.16 kv Emergency Bus Undervoltage (Loss of H Voltage) S (6) (6) 1, 2, 3, 4 N b. 4.16 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage (Degraded Voltage S (6) (6) 1, 2, 3, 4 8. EMERGENCY FEEDWATER (EFAS) a. Manual (Trip Buttons) N.A. N.A. (6) 1, 2, 3 b. SG Level (A/B)-Low and Y 3 c. SG Level (A/C) - Low and No 1,2,3 f AP (A/B) - High S (6) QB w Pressura - Low Trip (A/B) S (6) Q9 1,2,3 3 m d. Automatic Actuation Logic N.A. N.A. Q*j(3) SA(4) 1, 2, 3 g 9. CONTROL ROOM ISOLATION (CRIS) a. Manual CRIS (Trip Buttons) N.A. N.A. R N.A. b. Manual SIAS (Trip Buttons) N.A. N.A. R N.A. M c. Airborne Radiation y i. Particulate /Iedinc?D61stEd S R M ^11 2 '~ ^ S R M All R ii. Gaseous d. Automatic Actuation Logic N.A. N.A. R(3) All
~~10. T0XIC GAS ISOLATION (TGIS) g m~~
a. Manual (Trip Buttons) N.A. N.A. R N.A. b. Chlorine - High .S R M All c. Ammonia - High S R M All 5 d. Butane / Propane - High S R M All e. Automatic Actuation Logic N.A. N.A. R(3) All 2 P
TABLE 4.3-2 (Continued) ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS vi CHANNEL MODES FOR WHICH Q CHANNEL CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL SURVEILLANCE FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHECK CALIBRATION TEST IS RE0UIRED o 8
~~j 11.~~
~~FUEL HANDLING ISOLATION (FHIS) 7 a. Manual (Trip Buttons) N.A. N.A. R N.A. g b. Airborne Radiation~~
~~i. Gaseous S~~
R M [ c. Automatic Actuation Logic N.A. N.A. R(3) 12. CONTAINMENT PURGE ISOLATION (CPIS) a. Manual (Trip Buttons) N.A. N.A. (6) N.A. b. Airborne Radiation i. Gaseous S M 1,2,3,4,6 ii. Particulate W M 1,2,3,4,6 iii. Iodine W M 6 c. Containment Area Radiation (Gamma) S (6) M 1,2,3,4,6 w2 d. Automatic Actuation Logic N.A. N.A. (3), (6) 1,2,3,4,6 TABLE NOTATION (1) Deleted. w (2) Deleted. l (3) Testing of Automatic Actuation Logic shall include energization/de-energization of each initiation relay and verification of the OPERABILITY of each initiation relay. (4) A subgroup relay test shall be performed which shall include the energization/de-energization of each subgroup relay and verification of the OPERABILITY of each subgroup relay. Relays exempt from testing during plant operation shall be limited to only those relays associated with plant equipment which cannot be operated during plant operation. Relays not testable during plant operation shall be tested during g each COLD SHUTDOWN exceeding 24 hours unless tested during the previous 6 months. En I g (5) Actuated equipment only; does not result in CIAS. (6) At least once per refueling interval. w 5 With irradiated fuel in the storage pool. e ~ SQAt}il easts onceg eacid120 niays:gMSTAGGERERE!HB$SM TEE ls'tphiciqjidW120Td&yslo T
~~0 P Att q~~
l
3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION BASES 3/4.3.1 and 3/4.3.2 REACTOR PROTECTIVE and ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES i. ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the reactor protective and Engineered Safety Features Actuation System instrumentation and bypasses ensure that 1) the associated Engineered Safety Features Actuation System action and/or reactor trip will be initiated when the parameter monitored by each channel or combination thereof reaches its setpoint, 2) the specified coincidence logic is maintained,
~~3) sufficient redundancy is maintained to permit a channel to be out of service for testing or maintenance, and 4) sufficient system functional capability is available from diverse parameters.~~
j o The OPERABILITY of these systems is required to provide the overall reliability, redundancy and diversity assumed available in the facility design ( for the protection and mitigation of accident and transient conditions. The integrated operation of each of these systems is consistent with the assumptions j used in the accident analyses. y When a protection channel of a given process variable becomes inoperabler j the inoperable channel may be placed in bypass until the next Onsite Review Committee meeting at which time the Onsite Review Committee will review and document their judgment concerning prolonged operation in bypass, channel trip, j and/or repair. The goal shall be to return the inoperable channel to service as soon as practicable but in no case later than during the next COLD SHUTDOWN. 1 This approach to bypass / trip in four channel protection systems is consistent j with the applicable criteria of IEEE Standards 279, 323, 344 and 384. The Core Protection Calculator (CPC) addressable constants are provided to q allow calibration of the CPC system to more accurate indications of power level, i RCS flow rate, axial flux shape, radial peaking factors and CEA deviation penalties. Administrative controls on changes and periodic checking of I addressable constant values (see also Technical Specifications 3.3.1 and 6.8.1) i ensure that inadvertent misloading of addressable constants into the CPCs is unlikely. The redundancy and design of the Control Element Assembly Calculators (CEAC) provides reactor protection in the event one or both CEAC's becomes i inoperable. If one CEAC is in test or inoperable, verification of CEAC position ] is performed at least every 4 hours. If the second CEAC fails, the CPC's will use DNBR and LPD penalty factors, which restrict reactor operation to some maximum fraction of RATED THERMAL POWER. If this maximum fraction is exceeded a reactor trip will occur. i The surveillance requirements specified for these systems ensure that the overall system functional capability is maintained comparable to the original 1 design standards. The periodic surveillance tests performed at the minimum y i frequencies are sufficient to demonstrate this capability. The q=rterly :120 9 dayfstaggefedjtest-frequency for the bistablelCHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TESTS for"these i systems is based on de plan.t-specificianalyses 4hich werelb'a.sedton analyses p resent d in the NRC Snterva$ Evaluation,, approved" top ~ical'reportTCEN-327,'"RPS/ESFAS"ExtendedTest as supplemented. The measurement of response time at the specified frequencies provides assurance that the reactor protective and ESF actuation associated with each channel is completed within the time limit assumed in the accident analyses. SAN ON0FRE - UNIT 2 B 3/4 3-1 AMENDMENT N0.
3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3 REACTOR PROTECTIVE INSTRUMENTATION i LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3.1 As a miniinum, the reactor protective instrumentation channels and by] asses of Table 3.3-1 shall be OPERABLE with RESPONSE TIMES as shown in Ta)1e 3.3-2. APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3-1. ACTION: As shown in Table 3.3-1. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.3.1.1 Each reactor protective instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL CALIBRATION and CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST operations for the MODES and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-1. 4.3.1.2 The logic for the bypasses shall be demonstrated OPERABLE prior to each ( reactor startup unless performed during the preceding 92 120? days. The total la. bypass function shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once~per refueling { interval for each channel affected by bypass operation. The provisions of Technical Specification 4.0.2 are not applicable. 4.3.1.3 The REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME of each reactor trip function shall be demonstrated to be within its limit at least once per refueling interval. Each test shall include at least one channel per function such that all channels are tested at least once every N refueling intervals where N is the total number of redundant channels in a specific reactor trip function as shown in the " Total No. of Channels" column of Table 3.3-1. The provisions of Technical Specification 4.0.2 are not applicable. 4.3.1.4 The isolation characteristics of each CEA isolation amplifier and each optical isolator for CEA Calculator to Core Protection Calculator data transfer shall be verified at least once per refueling interval during shutdown per the following tests:
~~a. For the CEA position isolation amplifiers:~~
1. With 120 volts AC (60 Hz) applied for at least 30 seconds across the output, the reading on the input does not exceed ) 0.015 volts DC. SAN ONOFRE - UNIT 3 3/4 3-1 AMENDMENT N0.
TABLE 4.3-1 v, E REACTOR PROTECTIVE INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS e5;; rn CHANNEL MODES FOR WHICH-CHANNEL CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL SURVEILLANCE E FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHECK CALIBRATION TEST IS REQUIRED Z 1. Manual Reactor Trip N.A. N.A f 1, 2, 3*, 4*, 5* w 2. Linear Power Level - High S D(2,4),Mt3(3,4), QS 1, 2 Qf4},f(4)' 3. Logarithmic Power Level - High S f(4) QQ and S/U(1) 1,2,3,4,5 4. Pressurizer Pressure - High S Qg 1, 2 5. Pressurizer Pressure - Low S QQ 1, 2 g y 6. Containment Pressure - High S Qg 1, 2 7. Steam Generator Pressure - Low S Qg 1, 2 8. Steam Generator Level - Low S f Qg 1, 2 9. Local Power Density - High S D(2,4), QO,f(6) 1, 2 ~ f(4,5) 10. DNBR - Low S S(7),D(2,4) QO,f(6) 1, 2 M(8),f(4,5)
~~11. Steam Generator Level - High S~~
~~f Qg 1, 2 E~~
~~12. Reactor Protection System Logic N.A.~~
~~N.A. Qj*j 1, 2, 3*, 4*, 5* 5 O x-~~
~~-s:,~~
,.,y TABLE 4.3-1 (Continued) g REACTOR PROTECTIVE INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS CHANNEL MODES FOR WHICH E CHANNEL CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL SURVE!LLANCE-g FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHECK CALIBRATION TEST IS REQUIRED } 13. Reactor Trip Breakers N.A. N.A. M,(12) 1, 2, 3*, 4*, 5* 14. Core Protection Calculators 'S D(2,4),S(7), Q9(11), f(6) 1, 2 f(4,5),M(8) ~
~~15. CEA Calculators S~~
~~f Qg,f(6) 1, 2 16. Reactor Coolant Flow-Low S f QB 1, 2 k. 17. Seismic-High S f 9.0 1, 2 .S 18. Loss of Load S N.A. Qg 1 (9) Y l 9 5 h l 5 N i-k W .::::= M M w ~ M* T% "L. - :!L .T - - :- = - T': r~~
r. :1 - - -,r _Y_
u ".?'.. 7Y.- ~ V, v.:, a
i i TABLE 4.3-1 (Continued) TABLE NOTATION - With reactor trip breakers in the closed position and the CEA drive system y capable of CEA withdrawal. e - At least once per Refueling Interval. T O mat 31eastionce3p_eN120Tdays f*D-1At].leasti:oncejeach120lday@knialSTAGGEREDjTESTjBASIS! 2 s E. (1) - Each startup or when required with the reactor trip breakers closed and the CEA drive system capable of rod withdrawal, if not performed in the previous 7 days. l (2) - Heat balance only (CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST not included), above 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER; adjust the Linear Power Level signals and the CPC addressable constant multipliers to make the CPC delta T power and CPC nuclear power i calculations agree with the calorimetric calculation if absolute difference is greater than 2%. During PHYSICS TESTS, these daily calibrations may be suspended provided these calibrations are performed upon reaching each' major test power plateau and prior to proceeding to the next major test power plateau. (3) - Above 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER, verify that the linear power subchannel gains of the excore detectors are consistent with the values used to estab-lish the shape annealing matrix elements in the Core Protection Calculators. (4) - Neutron detectors may be excluded from CHANNEL CALIBRATION. (5) - After each fuel loading and prior to exceeding 70% of RATED THERMAL POWER, the incore detectors shall be used to determine the shape annealing matrix elements and the Core Protection Calculators shall use these elements. (6) - This CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall include the injection of simulated process signals into the channel as close to the sensors as practicable to verify OPERABILITY including alarm and/or trip functions. (7) - Above 70% of RATED THERMAL POWER, verify that the total RCS flow rate as indicated by each CPC is less than or equal to the actual RCS total flow rate determined by either using the reactor coolant pump differential pres-sure instrumentation (conservatively compensated for measurement uncertain-ties) or by calorimetric calculations (conservatively compensated for measurement uncertainties) and if necessary, adjust the CPC addressable constant flow coefficients such that each CPC indicated flow is less than or equal to the actual flow rate. The flow measurement uncertainty may be included in the BERR1 term in the CPC and is equal to or greater than 4%. (8) - Above 70% of RATED THERMAL POWER, verify that the total RCS flow rate as indicated by each CPC is less than or equal to the actual RCS total flow rate determined by calorimetric calculations (conservatively compensated for measurement uncertainties). (9) - Above 55% of RATED THERMAL POWER. (10) - Deleted. SAN ONOFRE - UNIT 3 3/4 3-12 AMENDMENT NO.
TABLE 4.3-1 (Continued) TABLE NOTATION (11) - The quarterly 120rddy)tSTAGGERE0iTEST~ BASIS CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall 4 ".,x include verifiEati'6n"thst"ths'^c6ffsEt*VhlDes of addressable constants are installed in each OPERABLE CPC. (12) - At least once per 18 months and following maintenance or adjustment of the reactor trip breakers, the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall include independent verification of the undervoltage and shunt trips. SAN ON0FRE - UNIT 3 3/4 3-12a AMENDMENT NO.
.t:
I[
t -l! TABLE 4.3-2 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS g CHANNEL MODES FOR WHICH o CHANNEL CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL SURVEILLANCE FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHECK CALIBRATION TEST IS REOUIRED 1. SAFETY INJECTION (SIAS) e a. Manual (Trip Buttons) N.A. N.A. (6) 1, 2, 3, 4 u b. Containment Pressure - High S (6) QB 1,2,3 c. Pressurizer Pressure - Low S (6) QB 1,2,3 d. Automatic Actuation Logic N.A. N.A. Qfj(1)(3), SA(4) 1, 2, 3, 4 2. CONTAINMENT SPRAY (CSAS) a. Manual (Trip Buttons) N.A. N.A. (6) 1, 2, 3 b. Containment Pressure -- High - High S (6) QB 1,2,3 c. Automatic Actuation Logic N.A. N.A. Qjfj(1)(3), SA(4) 1, 2, 3 u 3. CONTAINMENT ISOLATION (CIAS) 2 a. Manual CIAS (Trip Buttons) N.A. N.A. (6) 1, 2, 3, 4 u b. Manual SIAS (Trip Buttons)(5) N.A. N.A. (6) 1, 2, 3, 4 d> c. Containment Pressure - High S (6) QB 1, 2, 3 d. Automatic Actuation Logic N.A. N.A. Qfj(1)(3), SA(4) 1, 2, 3, 4 4. MAIN STEAM ISOLATION (MSIS) f Manual (Trip Buttons) N.A. N.A. (6) 1, 2, 3 a. b. Steam Generator Pressure - Low S (6) QO 1, 2, 3 g c. Automatic Actuation Logic N.A. N.A. Qjj(1)(3), SA(4) 1, 2, 3 { 5. RECIRCULATION (RAS) D a. Refueling Water Storage l Tank - Low S R QB 1,2,3,4 l b. Automatic Actuation Logic N.A. N.A. Qjj(1)(3), SA(4) 1,2,3,4 g i z 6. CONTAINMENT COOLING (CCAS) 5 a. Manual CCAS (Trip Buttons) N.A. N.A. (6) 1, 2, 3, 4 b. deleted intentionally ~ + c. Automatic Actuation Logic N.A. N.A. Qfj(1)(3), SA(4) 1, 2, 3, 4
TABLE 4.3-2 (Continued) ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS m E CHANNEL MODES FOR WHICH oz CHANNEL CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL SURVEILLANCE h FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHECK CALIBRATION TEST IS RE0VIRED w h 7. LOSS OF POWER (LOVS, SDVS, or DGVSS) S a. 4.16 kv Emergency Bus Undervoltage (Loss of Voltage) S (6) (6) 1, 2, 3, 4 b. 4.16 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage (Degraded Voltage S (6) (6) 1, 2, 3, 4 8. EMERGENCY FEEDWATER (EFAS) a. Manual (Trip Buttons) N.A. N.A. (6) 1, 2, 3 b. SG Level (A/B)-Low and K AP (A/B) - High S (6) Q9 1,2,3 u D c. SG Level (A/B) - Low and No Pressure - Low Trip (A/B) S (6) QB 1,2,3 u h d. Automatic Actuation Logic N.A. N.A. Qg(3)SA(4) 1, 2, 3 9. CONTROL ROOM ISOLATION (CRIS) a. Manual CRIS (Trip Buttons) N.A. N.A. R N.A. b. Manual SIAS (Trip Buttons) N.A. N.A. R N.A. na c. Airborne Radiation ~$ i. Particulate /Iedinc!DslEfEd S R F All 2 ii. Gaseous S R M All g " " " ~ ~ " ^ d. Automatic Actuation Logic N.A. N.A. R(3) All N
~~10. T0XIC GAS ISOLATION (TGIS) g a.~~
Manual (Trip Buttons) N.A. N.A. R N.A. gj b. Chlorine - High S R M All c. Ammonia - High S R M All 2o d. Butane / Propane - High S R M All e. Automatic Actuation Logic N.A. N.A. R(3) All
TABLE 4.3-2 (continued) ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS CHANNEL MODES FOR WHICH m E CHANNEL CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL SURVEILLANCE FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHECK CALIBRATION TEST IS RE0VIRED o 8
g

11. FUEL HANDLING ISOLATION (FHIS) tp a.
~~Manual (Trip Buttons) N.A. N.A. R N.A. g b. Airborne Radiation~~
~~i. Gaseous S~~
~~R M [ c. Automatic Actuation Logic N.A. N.A. R(3)~~
~~12. CONTAINMENT PURGE ISOLATION (CPIS) a.~~
Manual (Trip Buttons) N.A. N.A. (6) N.A. b. Airborne Radiation i. Gaseous S (6) M 1,2,3,4,6 ii. Particulate W (6) M 1,2,3,4,6 iii. Iodine W (6) M 6 c. Containment Area Radiation (Gamma) S (6) M 1,3,3,4,6 N.A. N.A. (3), (6) 1,2,3,4,6 R. d. Automatic Actuation Logic c w TABLE NOTATION h (1) Deleted. (2) Deleted. (3) Testing of Automatic Actuation Logic shall include energization/de-energization of each initiation relay and verification of the OPERABILITY of each initiation relay. (4) A subgroup relay test shall be performed which shall include the energization/de-energization of each subgroup relay and verification of the OPERABILITY of each subgroup relay. Relays exempt from testing during plant operation shall be limited to only those relays associated with plant equipment which cannot be !E operated during plant operation. Relays not testable during plant operation shall be tested during each g COLD SHUTDOWN exceeding 24 hours unless tested during the previous 6 months. x [g (5) Actuated equipment only; does not result in CIAS. s g (6) At least coce per Refueling Interval. 1r
~~With irradiated fuel in the storage pool.~~
Y O eat' 1 ea's't3ncy[p;b$120fdsyiyJrQQSTAGGERfDETEST;!j[BASIpy '** hat ^1eastyoncegeach)120fdays 3 A m ~_ _
3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION BASES 3/4.3.1 and 3/4.3.2 REACTOR PROTECTIVE and ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the reactor protective and Engineered Safety Features Actuation System instrumentation and bypasses ensure that 1) the associated Engineered Safety Features Actuation System action and/or reactor trip will be initiated when the parameter monitored by each channel or combination thereof reaches its setpoint, 2) the specified coincidence logic is maintained,
~~3) sufficient redundancy is maintained to permit a channel to be cut of service for testing or maintenance, and 4) sufficient system functional capability is available from diverse parameters.~~
The OPERABILITY of these systems is recuired to provide the overall reliability, redundancy and diversity assumec available in the facility design for the protection and mitigation of accident and transient conditions. The integrated operation of each of these systems is consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses. When a protection channel of a given process variable becomes inoperable, the inoperable channel may be placed in bypass until the next Onsite Review Committee meeting at which time the Onsite Review Committee will review and document their judgement concerning prolonged operation in bypass, channel trip, and/or repair. The goal shall be to return the inoperable channel to service as soon as practicable but in no case later than during the next COLD SHUTDOWN. This a]proach to bypass / trip in four channel protection systems is consistent with tie applicable criteria of IEEE Standards 279, 323, 344 and 384. The Core Protection Calculator (CPC) addressable constants are provided to allow calibration of the CPC system to more accurate indications of power level, RCS flow rate, axial flux shape, radial aeaking factors and CEA deviation penalties. Administrative controls on clanges and periodic checking of addressable constant values (see also Technical Specifications 3.3.1 and 6.8.1) ensure that inadvertent misloading of addressable constants into the CPCs is unlikely. The redundancy and design of the Control Element Assembly Calculators (CEAC) provides reactor protection in the event one or both CEAC's becomes in-operable. If one CEAC is in test or inoperable, verification of CEAC position is performed at least every 4 hours. If the second CEAC fails, the CPC's will use DNBR and LPD penalty factors, which restrict reactor operation to some maximum fraction of RATED THERMAL POWER. If this maximum fraction is exceeded a reactor trip will occur. The surveillance requirements specified for these systems ensure that the overall system functional capability is maintained comparable to the original design standards. The periodic surveillance tests aerformed at the minimum frequencies are sufficient to demonstrate this capa)ility. The quartcrly 120 y day staggered' test frequency for the bistable CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TESTS for"these ~ a systems is' based on ne plant-specific l analyses which wer~e' based'on analyses g presented in the NRC approved topical report,'CEN-327,'"RPS/ESFAS' Extended Test Interval Evaluation," as supplemented. The measurement of response time at the specified frequencies provides assurance that the reactor protective and ESF actuation associated with each channel is completed within the time limit assumed in the accident analyses. SAN ON0FRE - UNIT 3 B 3/4 3-1 AMENDMENT N0.
b t I-L L 1 i i 1 i ENCLOSURE 3 ASEA BROWN BOVERI-COMBUSTION ENGINEERING l REPORT 09/010-AS93-C-002 I RPS/ESFAS EXTENDED TEST INTERVAL EVALUATION FOR 120 DAYS STAGGERED TESTING .i I 1 i l h-I. I l r
ASEA BROWN BOVERI g November 3, 1993 OPS-93-0943 r Mr. Richard St. Onge Southern California Edison company 23 Parker Street Irvine, CA 92718
~~Subject:~~
~~RPS/ESFAS Extended Test Interval Evaluation for 120 Days Staggered Testing at SONGS Units 2 and 3~~
~~Dear Mr. St. Onge:~~
The attached report is provided for your use and information. The report can be used to support the relaxation of the RPS/ESFAS surveillance interval at SONGS Units 2 and 3. The purpose of this' report is to evaluate the change in unavailability from extending the RPS/ESFAS test intervals at SONGS Units 2 and 3 from the current ninety (90) days sequential testing to one hundred and twenty (120) days staggered testing. The results show that the unavailability for the 120 day staggered test interval is smaller than the unavailability for the 90 days sequential test interval currently in place. If there are any questions regarding the attached report, please contact me at (203) 285-3262. 1 Sincerely, Y tv Ruper Weston Consulting Engineer ABB COMBUSTION ENGINEERING, Inc. / PAW Attachm ent SCNG502.vp1 cc D. Finnicum (ABB-CE) J. Herbst (A38-CE) R. Jaquith (ABB CE) CRC - 2 copies ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Power NOV Comouston Engeeenng. Inc 1000 Peosoect Has Acad Teephone (2C3) 688-1911 Post Ofice Bos 500 Fan (203) 285 9512 wncsu. Connectcut 06035 0000 Teen 99297 COMBEN WSOA}}

ML20086K514

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Dear Mr. St. Onge:

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= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = _ _ _ _ = =

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Dear Mr. St. Onge:

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