Text

Amends 86 & 64 to Licenses NPF-68 & NPF-81 Respectively. Amends Revise TS 3/4.3 & 3/4.8
	ML20084R763
Person / Time
Site:	Vogtle
Issue date:	05/31/1995
From:	Berkow H; Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	; Southern Nuclear Operating Co, Georgia Power Co, Oglethorpe Power Corp, Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia, City of Dalton, GA
Shared Package
ML20084R765	List: ML20084R763; ML20084R776;
References
	NPF-68-A-086, NPF-81-A-064 NUDOCS 9506090403
	Download: ML20084R763 (22)
	v • d • e

UNITED STATES y:

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

'2 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20556 @ 01 o

9.....g GEORGIA POWER COMPANY OGLETHORPE POWER CORPORATION MUNICIPAL ELECTRIC AUTHORITY OF GEORGIA CITY OF DALTON. GEORGIA yDGJJLfifCTRIC GENERATING PLANT. UNIT 1 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 86 License No. NPF-68 1.

The Nuclear Regulatory Comission (the Comission) has found that:

A.

The application for amendment to the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Unit 1 (the facility) Facility Operating License No. NPF-68 filed by the Georgia Power Company, acting for itself, Oglethorpe Power Corporation, Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia, and City of Dalton, Georgia (the licensees), dated December 29, 1994, as supplemented by letter dated May 2, 1995, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Comission's rules and regulations as set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of t.e Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.

There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Comission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; D.

The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the comon defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Comission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

9506090403 950531 PDR ADOCK 05000424

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. 2.

Accordingly, the license is hereby amended by page changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No.

NPF-68 is hereby amended to read as follows:

Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 86

, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, both of which are attached hereto, are hereby incorporated into this license. GPC shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3.

This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days from the date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

/

'rL a

He ert N. Berkow, Director Project Directorate II-2 Division of Reactor Projects - I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Technical Specification Changes Date of Issuance:

May 31, 1995 1

'f* *'00 ye 4%

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION f

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20566 4 001

- - - - ,o GEORGIA POWER COMPANY OGLETHORPE POWER CORPORATION MUNICIPAL ELECTRIC AUTHORITY OF GEORGIA CITY OF DALTON. GEORGIA V0GTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT. UNIT 2 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 64 License No. NPF-81 1.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A.

The application for amendment to the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Unit 2 (the facility) Facility Operating License No. NPF-81 filed by the Georgia Power Company, acting for itself, Oglethorpe Power Corporation, Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia, and City of Dalton, Georgia (the licensees), dated December 29, 1994, as supplemented by letter dated May 2,1995, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations as set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; 8.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.

There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; D.

The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

I

2.

Accordingly, the license is hereby amended by page changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No.

NPF-81 is hereby amended to read as follows:

Technical Soecifications and Environmental Protection Plan The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 64

, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, both of which are attached hereto, are hereby incorporated into this license.

GPC shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3.

This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days from the date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION R

w He bert N. Berkow, Director Project Directorate II-2 Division of Reactor Projects - I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Technical Specification Changes Date of Issuance: May 31, 1995 Y

t' I

4 ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 86 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-68 DOCKET NO. 50-424 8ND TO LICENSE AMENDMENT N0. 64 t

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-81 DOCKET NO. 50-425 i

Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change.

Remove Paaes Insert Paaes XV XV 3/4 3-22 3/4 3-22 3/4 3-27a 3/4 3-27a 3/4 8-1 3/4 8-1 3/4 8-2 3/4 8-2 3/4 8-3 3/4 8-3 3/4 8-10 3/4 8-10 8 3/4 3-1, 2 B 3/4 3-1, 2 B 3/4 3-3, 4 B 3/4 3-3, 4 B 3/4 3-5, 6 B 3/4 3-5, 6 B 3/4 8-1, 2 B 3/4 8-1, 2 B 3/4 8-3 8 3/4 8-3, 4 L

INDEX BASES SECTION PAQf 3/4.0 APPLICABILITY...............................................

B 3/4 0-1 3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3/4.1.1 B0 RATION CONTR0L..........................................

B 3/4 1-1 3/4.1.2 B0 RATION. SYSTEMS..........................................

B 3/4 1-2 3/4.1.3 MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES................................

B 3/4 1-3 3/4.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS...................................

B 3/4 2-1 3/4.2.1 AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE....................................

B 3/4 2-1 3/4.2.2 and 3/4.2.3 HEAT FLUX HOT CHANNEL FACTOR and NUCLEAR ENTHALPY RISE HOT CHANNEL FACTOR - F"...................

B 3/4 2-2 AH 3/4.2.4 QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO................................

B 3/4 2-4 3/4.2.5 DNB PARAMETERS...........................................

B 3/4 2-4 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.1 and 3/4.3.2 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM and ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION.................

B 3/4 3-1 3/4.3.3 MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION................................

B 3/4 3-4 l

)

3/4.3.4 TURBINE OVERSPEED PROTECTION..............................

B 3/4 3-6 i

i V0GTLE UNITS - 1 & 2 XV Amendment No. 86 (Unit 1)

Amendment No. 64 (Unit 2) l

TABLE 3.3-2 (Continued) g h

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION 5

MINIMUM d

TOTAL NO.

CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF CHANNELS TO TRIP OPERABLE MODES ACTION

[

6.

Auxiliary Feedwater (Continued)

N b.

Stm. Gen. Water Level -

Low-Low *

(LOOP 1 LOOP 2 LOOP 3 LOOP 4 LIO517 LIOS27 LIO537 LIO547 LIO518 LIOS28 LIO538 LIO548 LIO519 LIO529 LIO539 LIO549 LIO551 LIO552 LIO553 LIO554) 1)

Start Motor-Driven Pumps 4/stm. gen.

2/stm. gen.

3/stm. gen.

1, 2, 3 20 w2 in any oper-in each ating stm. gen operating w

A, stm. gen.

~

2) Start Turbine-Driven Pump 4/sta. gen.

2/stm. gen.

3/sta. gen.

1, 2, 3 20 in any in each gg 2 operating operating g3 stm. gen.

stm. gen.

c.

Safety Injection Start Motor-Driven Pumps See Functional Unit 1. above for all Safety Injection gg initiating functions and requirements.

gg d.

Loss of or Degraded 4.16 kV**

l ESF Bus Voltage i

Start Motor-Driven Pumps 4/ bus 2/ bus 3/ bus 1, 2, 3 29

__gg ii Start Turbine-Driven Pump 4/ bus 2 from 3/ bus 1, 2, 3 29-pp either bus SO

See Specification 3.3.3.6

- See functional unit 8

1 i

JABLE 3 3-2 (Continued)

ACTION STATEMENTS (Continued) b) With one channel inoperable in each unit, restore each inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 7 days OR within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months initiate and maintain operation of one CREFS in the emergency mode #.

c) With two channels inoperable in a unit, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months either

, 1) lock closed the affected and lock open the unaffected OSA intake dampers OR 2) initiate and maintain operation of one CREFS in each unit in the emergency mode #.

d) With three channels inoperable, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months either 1) lock closed the OSA intake dampers of the unit with two inoper-able channels and lock open the other OSA intake dampers and either restore the remaining affected channel to OPERABLE status within 7 days OR initiate and maintain operation of one CREFS in the emergency mode # in the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months OR

2) initiate and maintain operation of one CREFS in each unit in the emergency mode #.

e) With four channels inoperable, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months initiate and maintain operation of one CREFS in each unit in the emergency mode #.

ACTION 29 - a.

With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , an additional channel may be bypassed for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months for surveillance testing of other channels per Specification 4.3.2.1.

b.

With two or more channels inoperable for one bus, satisfy the minimum channels OPERABLE requirement by restoring one or more channels to OPERABLE status within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

The initiated CREFS shall be Train B unless Train B is inoperable.

V0GTLE UNITS - 1 & 2 3/4 3-27a Amendment No. 86 (Unit 1)

Amendment No. 64 (Unit 2)

. 3/4.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3/4.8.1 A.C. SOURCES _

OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.8.1.1 As a minimum, the following A.C. electrical power sources shall be OPERABLE:

a.

Two physically independent circuits between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class IE Distribution System, each with an automatic load sequencer, and b.

Two separate and independent diesel generators, each with:

1)

A day tank containing a minimum volume of 650 gallons of fuel (52% of instrument span) (LI-9018, LI-9019),

2)

A separate Fuel Storage System containing a minimum volume of 68,000 gallons of fuel (76% of instrument span) (LI-9024, LI-9025),

3)

A separate fuel transfer pump, ar.d 4)

An automatic load sequencer.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

a.

With one offsite circuit of the above-required A.C. electrical power sources inoperable due to other than an inoperable automatic load sequencer, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the remaining A.C. sources by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.1.a within I hour and at least once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months thereafter.

Restore the offsite circuit to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

b.

With either diesel generator inoperable due to other than an l

inoperable automatic load sequencer, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of l

the above required A.C. offsite sources by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.1.a within I hour and at least once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months thereafter.

If the diesel generator became inoperable due to any cause other than an inoperable support system, an independently testable component, or preplanned preventive maintenance or testing, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the remaining OPERABLE diesel gener-ator by performing Surveillance Requirements 4.8.1.1.2.g.1 and 4.8.1.1.2.a.5 within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months *#, unless the absence of any potential common mode failure for the remaining diesel generator is demonstrated.

Restore the inoperable diesel generator to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

This test is required to be completed regardless of when the inoperable diesel generator is restored to OPERABILITY.

The diesel shall not be rendered inoperable by activities performed to support testing pursuant to the ACTION Statement (e.g., an air roll).

V0GTLE UNITS - 1 & 2 3/4 8-1 Amendment No. 86 (Unit 1)

)

Amendment No. 64 (Unit 2) i

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION ACTION (Continued) c.

With one offsite circuit and one diesel generator of the above required A.C. electrical power sources inoperable due to other than an inoperable automatic load sequencer, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the remaining A.C. offsite source by performing Surveillance Require-ment 4.8.1.1.1.a within I hour and at least once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months thereafter, and, if the diesel generator became inoperable due to any cause other than an inoperable support system, an independently testable component, or preplanned preventative maintenance or testing, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the remaining OPERABLE diesel generator by performing Surveillance Requirements 4.8.1.1.2.g.1 and 4.8.1.1.2.a.5 within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months *, unless the OPERABLE diesel generator is already operating #, or the absence of any potential common mode failure for the remaining diesel generator is demonstrated.

Restore at least one of the inoperable sources to OPERABLE status within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

Restore the other A.C. power source (offsite circuit or diesel generator) to OPERABLE status in accordance with the provisions of 3.8.1.1, ACTION Statement a or b, as appropriate, with the time requirement of that ACTION Statement based on the time of initial loss of the remaining inoperable A.C. power source. A successful test of diesel generator OPERABILITY per Surveillance Requirements 4.8.1.1.2.g.1 and 4.8.1.1.2.a.5 performed under the ACTION Statement for an OPERABLE diesel generator or a restored to OPERABLE diesel generator satisfies the diesel generator test requirement of ACTION Statement b.

d.

With one diesel generator inoperable in addition to 2110N b. or c.

above, verify that:

1.

All required systems, subsystems, trains, components, and devices that depend on the remaining OPERABLE diesel generator as a source of emergency power are also OPERABLE, and 2.

When in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the steam-driven auxiliary feedwater pump is OPERABLE.

t If these conditions are not satisfied within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30. hours.

e.

With two of the above required offsite A.C. circuits inoperable, restore at least one of the inoperable offsite sources to OPERABLE status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

Following restoration of one offsite source, follow ACTION Statement a with the time requirement of that ACTION Statement based

This test is required -to be completed regardless of when the inoperable EDG is restored to OPERABILITY.

The diesel shall not be rendered inoperable by activities performed to support testing pursuant to the ACTION Statement (e.g., an air roll).

V0GTLE UNITS - 1 & 2 3/4 8-2 Amendment No. 86 (Unit 1)

Amendment No. 64 (Unit 2)

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS LINITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION ACTION (Continued) on the time of the initial loss of the remaining inoperable offsite i

a.c. circuit.

f.

With two of the above required diesel generators inoperable, demon-strate the OPERABILITY of two offsite A.C. circuits by performing the requirements of Specification 4.8.1.1.1.a. within I hour and at least once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months thereafter; restore at least one of the inoperable diesel generators to OPERABLE status within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months or be in at least l

HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months . Following restoration of one diesel generator unit, follow ACTION Statement b with the time requirement of that ACTION Statement based on the time of initial loss of the remaining inoperable diesel generator. A successful test of diesel OPERABILITY per Surveillance Requirements 4.8.1.1.2.g.1 and 4.8.1.1.2.a.5 performed under this ACTION Statement for a restored to OPERABLE diesel satisfies t

the diesel generator test requirements of ACTION Statement b.

g.

With less than the above minimum required A.C. electrical power sources OPERABLE due to an inoperable automatic load sequencer, restore the inoperable automatic load sequencer to OPERABLE status within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY.within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.8.1.1.1 Each of the above required independent circuits between the offsite transmission network and the Onsite Class 1E Distribution System shall be:

a.

Determined OPERABLE at least once per 7 days by verifying correct breaker alignments, and indicated power availability.

4.8.1.1.2 Each diesel generator shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a.

In accordance with the frequency specified in Table 4.8-1 or, a STAGGERED TEST BASIS by:

1)

Verifying the fuel level in the day tank (LI-9018, LI-9019),

2)

Verifying the fuel level in the fuel storage tank (LI-9024, LI-9025),

3)

Verifying the fuel transfer pump starts and transfers fuel from the storage system to the day tank, 4)

Verifying the diesel starts

and accelerates to at least 440 RPM with generator voltage and frequency at 4160 + 170, -135 volts and 60 1.2 Hz. lhe diesel generator shall be started for this test by using one of the following signals:

All diesel generator starts for the purpose of surveillance testing as required by Specification 4.8.1.1.2 may be preceded by an engine prelube period as recommended by the manufacturer so that the mechanical stress and wear on the diesel engine is minimized.

V0GTLE UNITS - 1 & 2 3/4 8-3 Amendment No. 86 (Unit 1)

Amendment No. 64 (Unit 2)

f ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS A.C. SOURCES SHUTDOWN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.8.1.2 As a minimum, the following A.C. electrical power sources shall be OPERABLE:

a. One circuit betwesn the offsite transmission network and the Onsite Class IE Distribution System, including the loss of power and undervoltage a

function of the associated automatic load sequencer, and l

b. One diesel generator with:

1)

A day tank containing a minimum volume of 650 gallons (52% of instrument span) (LI-9018, LI-9019) of fuel, 2)

A fuel storage system containing a minimum volume of 68,000 gallons of fuel (76% of instrument span) (LI-9024, LI-9025),

3)

A fuel transfer pump, and 4)

The loss of power and undervoltage function of the associated automatic load sequencer.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6.

ACTION:

With less than the above minimum required A.C. electrical power sources OPERABLE, immediately suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS, positive reactivity changes, movement of irradiated fuel, or crane operation with loads over the fuel storage pool, and provide relief capability for the Reactor Coolant System in accordance with Specification 3.4.9.3.

In addition, when in MODE 5 with the reactor coolant loops not filled, or in MODE 6 with the water level less than 23 feet above the reactor vessel flange, immediately initiate corrective action to restore the required sources to OPERABLE status as soon as possible.

SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS 4.8.1.2.1 The above required A.C. electrical power sources shall be l

demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of each of the requirements of Specifications 4.8.1.1.1, 4.8.1.1.2 (except for Specification 4.8.1.1.2.h, i, and j), and 4.8.1.1.3.>

4.8.1.2.2 At least once per 18 months during shutdown, verify the loss of power and undervoltage function of the associated automatic load sequencer OPERABILITY upon LOSP signal by verifying deenergization of the emergency bus, load shedding of the operating loads from the emergency bus, and verifying the diesel starts and energizes the emergency bus with the available auto-connected shutdown loads.

V0GTLE UNITS - 1 & 2 3/4 8-10 Amendment No. 86 (Unit 1)

Amendment No. 64 (Unit 2)

3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION BASES 3/4.3.1 and 3/4.3.2 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM and ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the Reactor Trip System and the Engineered Safety features Actuation System instrumentation and interlocks ensures:

(1) the associated ACTION and/or Reactor trip will be initiated when the parameter monitored by each channel or combination thereof reaches its Setpoint (2) the specified coincidence logic (3) sufficient redundancy is maintained to permit a channel to be out-of-service for testing or maintenance consistent with main-taining an appropriate level of reliability of the Reactor Protection and Engi-neered Safety Features instrumentation, and (4) sufficient system functional capability is available from diverse parameters.

The OPERABILITY of these systems is required to provide the overall reli-ability, redundancy, and diversity assumed available in the facility design for the protection and mitigation of accident and transient conditions. The inte-grated operation of each of these systems is consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses. The Surveillance Requirements specified for these systems ensure that the overall system functional capability is maintained com-parable to the original design standards. The periodic surveillance tests per-formed at the minimum frequencies are sufficient to demonstrate this capability.

Specified surveillance intervals and surveillance and maintenance outage times have been determined in accordance with WCAP-10271, " Evaluation of Surveillance Frequencies and Out of Service Times for the Reactor Protection Instrumentation System," and supplements to that report.

Surveillance intervals and out of service times were determined based upon maintaining an appropriate level of reliability of the Reactor Protection System and Engineered Safety Features instrumentation.

The NRC Safety Evaluation Report for WCAP-10271 and its supplements were provided in letters dated February 21, 1985, from C. O. Thomas (NRC) to J. J. Sheppard (WOG-GP); February 22, 1989, from C. E. Rossi (NRC) to R. A. Newton (WOG0; and on April 30, 1990, from C. E.

Rossi to G. T. Goering.

The engineered safety features actuation system does not include an explicit functional unit for the automatic load sequencer.

An inoperable load sequencer would affect the ability to detect and respond to a loss of power ar undervoltage and thus is included with the instrumentation that must be available to meet the requirements of functional units 6.d.i. and i.i., as well as 8.a and b.

Since the hardware is the same for each of these functional units, a common action statement is used.

The mode of applicability for functional unit 6.d does not include mode 4 since the AFW is not required to be operable in mode 4; therefore, a footnote has been added that refers to functional unit 8.a and b. which requires the instrumentation to be operable in mode 4.

An inoperable automatic load sequencer does not impact the operability of the automatic actuation logic and actuation relays (functional unit 1.b).

The hardware referred to by this functional unit is not contained within the automatic load sequencer, but in the solid-state protection system.

The effects of an inoperable automatic load sequencer is that the associ;ted on site or offsite 4.16 kV emergency power sources may not correctly respond to an ESF or loss of power signal.

The appropriate action for an inoperable automatic load sequencer is closely related to the action for an inoperable diesel generator and an associated offsite source with an energized 4.16 kV V0GTLE UNITS - 1 & 2 B 3/4 3-1 Amendment No. 86 (Unit 1)

Amendment No. 64 (Unit 2)

INSTRUMENTATION BASES REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM and ENCINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION (Continued) bus. The appropriate actions for an inoperable automatic load sequencer are included in specification 3.8.1.1 and are discussed in the basis for Technical Specification 3/4.8.1. Action statement 29 for inoperable undervoltage channels is commensurate with that for an inoperable automatic load sequencer, and its basis is enveloped by the justification given for Technical Specification 3/4.8.1.

The Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Instrumentation Trip Set-points specified in Table 3.3-3 are the nominal values at which the bistables are set for each functional unit. A Setpoint is considered to be adjusted consistent with the nominal value when the "as measured" Setpoint is within the band allowed for calibration accuracy.

To accommodate the instrument drift assumed to occur between operational tests and the accuracy to which Setpoints can be measured and calibrated, Allowable Values for the Setpoints have been specified in Table 3.3-3.

Opera-tion with Setpoints less conservative than the Trip Setpoint but within the Allowable Value is acceptable since an allowance has been made in the safety analysis to accommodate this error. An optional provision has been included for determining the OPERABILITY of a channel when its Trip Setpoint is found to exceed the Allowable Value. The methodology of this option utilizes the "as measured" deviation from the specified calibration point for rack and sensor components in conjunction with a statistical combination of the other uncertainties of the instrumentation to measure the process variaSle and the uncertainties in calibrating the instrumentation.

In Equation 2.2-1, Z + R + S s TA, the interactive effects of the errors in the rack and the sensor, and the "as measured" values of the errors are considered.

Z, as specified in Table 3.3-3, in percent span, is the statistical summation of errors assumed in the analysis excluding those associated with the sensor and rack drift and the accuracy of their measurement.

TA or Total Allowance is the difference, in percent span, R or Rack Error is the "as measured" deviation, in the percent span, for the affected channel from the specified Trip Setpoint.

S or Sensor Error is either the "as measured" deviation of the sensor from its calibration point or the value specified in Table 3.3-3, 1

in percent span, from the analysis assumptions. Use of Equation 2.2-1 allows for a sensor drift factor, an increased rack drift factor, and provides a j

threshold value for REPORTABLE EVENTS.

The methodology t6 derive the Trip Setpoints is based upon combining all of the uncertainties in the channels.

Inherent to the determination of the Trip Setpoints are the magnitudes of these channel uncertainties.

Sensor and rack instrumentation utilized in these channels are expected to be capable of operating within the allowances of these uncertainty magnitudes.

Rack drift in ex:ess of the Allowable Value exhibits the behavior that the rack has not met its allowance.

Being that there is a small statistical chance that this will happen, an infrequent excessive drift is expected.

Rack or sensor drift, in excess of the allowance that is more than occasional, may be indicative of more serious problems and should warrant further investigation.

V0GTLE UNITS - 1 & 2 B 3/4 3-2 Amendment No. 86 (Unit 1) l Amendment No. 64 (Unit 2)

INSTRUMENTATION BASES REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM and ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION (Continued)

The measurement of response time at the specified frequencies provides assurance that the Reactor trip and the Engineered Safety Features actuation associated with each channel is completed within the time limit assumed in the i

safety analyses. Response time limits for the Reactor Trip System and Engi-neered Safety Features Actuation System are maintained in Table 16.3-1 and 16.3-2 of the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Final Safety Analysis Report (VEGP FSAR). No credit was taken in the analyses for those channels with response times indicated as not applicable.

Response time may be demonstrated by any series of sequential, overlapping, or total channel test measurements provided that such tests demonstrate the total channel response time as defined. Sensor response time verification may be demonstrated by either:

(1) in place, onsite, or offsite test measurements, or (2) utilizing replacement sensors with certified response time.

The Engineered Safety Features Actuation System senses selected plant parameters and determines whether or not predetermined limits are being i

exceeded.

If they are, the signals are combined into logic matrices sensitive to combinations indicative of various accidents events, and transients. Once the required logic combination is completed, the system sends actuation signals to those Engineered Safety Features components whose aggregate function best j

serves the requirements of the condition.

As an example, the following actions may be initiated by the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System to mitigate the consequences of a steam line break or loss-of-coolant accident:

(1) ECCS pumps start and automatic valves position, (2) Reactor trip, (3) feed water j

isolation, (4) startup of the emergency diesel generators, (5) containment spray pumps start and automatic valves position (6) containment isolation, (7) steam line isolation, (8) turbine trip, (9) auxiliary feedwater pumps start and automatic valves position, (10) containment fan coolers start and automatic valves position, (11) Nuclear Service Cooling and Component Cooling water pumps start and automatic valves position, and (12) Control Room Ventilation Emergency Actuation Systems start.

The Engineered Safety Features Actuation System interlocks perform the following functions:

P-4 Reactor tripped - Actuates Turbine trip, closes main feedwater

' below Setpoint, prevents the opening of the main valvesonT,TveswhichwereclosedbyaSafetyInjectionorHigh feedwater va Steam Generator Water Level signal, allows Safety Injection block so that components can be reset or tripped.

Reactor not tripped - prevents manual block of Safety Injection.

V0GTLE UNITS - 1 & 2 B 3/4 3-3 Amendment No. 86 (Unit 1)

Amendment No. 64 (Unit 2) l

INSTRUMENTATION BASES I

REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM AND ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION (Continued)

P-11 With pressurizer pressure below the P-ll setpoint, allows manual block of safety injection actuation on low pressurizer pressure signal. Allows manual block of safety injection actuation and steam line isolation on low compensated steam line pressure signal and allows steam line isolation on high steam line negative pressure rate. With pressurizer pressure above the P-ll setpoint, defeats manual block of safety injection actuation on low pressurizer pres-sure and safety injection and steam line isolation on low steam line pressure and defeats steam line isolation on high steam line negative pressure rate.

P-14 On increasing steam generator water level, P-14 automatically trips all feedwater isolation valves, initiates a turbine trip, and inhibits feedwater control valve modulation.

The Source Range High Flux at Shutdown Alarm Setpoint is an analysis assumption for mitigation of a Baron Dilution Event in MODES 3, 4, and 5.

3/4.3.3 MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.3.1 RADIATION MONITORING FOR PLANT OPERATIONS The OPERABILITY of the radiation monitoring instrumentation for plant operations ensures that:

(1) the associated action will be initiated when the radiation level monitored by each channel or combination thereof reaches its Setpoint, (2) the specified coincidence logic is maintained, and (3) sufficient redundancy is maintained to permit a channel to be out-of-service for testing or maintenance. The radiation monitors for plant operations senses radiation levels in selected plant systems and locations and determines whether or not predetermined limits are being exceeded.

If they are, the signals are combined into logic matrices sensitive to combinations indicative of various accidents and abnormal conditions. Once the required logic combination is completed, the system sends actuation signals to initiate alarms or automatic isolation action and actuation of Emergency Exhaust or Ventilation Systems.

3/4.3.3.2 MOVABLE INCORE DETECTORS The OPERABILITY of the movable incore detectors with the specified minimum complement of equipment ensures that the measurements obtained from use of this system accurately represent the spatial neutron flux distribution of the core. The OPERABILITY of this system is demonstrated by irradiating each detector used and determining the acceptability of its voltage curve.

" H a full incore flux map is used.

For the purpose of measuring F Z or Quarter-core flux maps, as defined l(n )WCAP-8k48, June 1976, may be used in recalibration of the Excore Neutron Flux Detection System, and full incore flux maps or symmetric,incore thimbles may be used for monitoring the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO when one Power Range channel is inoperable.

V0GTLE UNITS - 1 & 2 B 3/4 3-4 Amendment No. 86 (Unit 1)

Amendment No. 64 (Unit 2)

INSTRUMENTATION BASES 3/4.3.3.3 SEISMIC INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the seismic instrumentation ensures that sufficient capability is available to promptly determine the magnitude of a seismic event and evaluate the response of those features important to safety. This capa-bility is required to permit comparison of the measured response to that used in the design basis for the facility to determine if plant shutdown is required pursuant to Appendix A of 10 CFR Part 100.

The instrumentation on Unit 1 is shared with Unit 2 and the seismic instrumentation and corresponding Technical Specifications meet the recomendations of Regulatory Guide 1.12, Revision 1, April 1974.

3/4.3.3.4 METEOROLOGICAL INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the meteorological instrumentation ensures that sufficient meteorological data are available for estimating potential radiation doses to the public as a result of routine or accidental release of radioactive materials to the atmosphere. This capability is required ta evaluate the need for initiating protective measures to protect the health and safety of the public and is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatcry Guide 1.23, "Onsite Meteorological Programs," February 1972.

3/4.3.3.5 REMOTE SHUTDOWN SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the Remote Shutdown System ensures that sufficient capability is available to permit safe shutdown of the facility from locations outside of the control room.

This capability is required in the event control room habitability is lost and is consistent with General Design Criterion 19 of 10 CFR Part 50.

The OPERABILITY of the Remote Shutdown System ensures that a fire will not preclude achieving safe shutdown.

The Remote Shutdown System instrumenta-tion, control, and transfer switches necessary to eliminate effects of the fire and allow operation of instrumentation, and control circuits required to achieve and maintain a safe shutdown condition are independent of areas where a fire could damage systems normally used to shut down the reactor. This capability is consistent with General Design Criterion 3 and CMEB 9.5.1.

3/4.3.3.6 ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the accident monitoring instrumentation ensures that sufficient information is available on selected plant parameters to monitor and assess these variables following an accident.

This capability is consis-tent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.97, " Instrumentation for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant Conditions During and Following an Accident," Revision 2, December 1980 and NUREG-0737,

" Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements," November 1980.

The instru-mentation listed in Table 3.3-8 corresponds to the Category 1 instrumentation for which selection, design, qualification and display criteria are described in Regulatory Guide 1.97, Rev. 2.

V0GTLE UNITS - 1 & 2 B 3/4 3-5 Amendment No. 86 (Unit 1)

Amendment No. 64 (Unit 2)

INSTRUMENTATION BASES I

3/4.3.3.7 CHLORINE DETECTION SYSTEMS The OPERABILITY of the Chlorine Detection Systems ensures that sufficient j

capability is available to promptly detect and initiate protective action in i

the event of an accidental chlorine release.

This capability is required to protect control room personnel and is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.95, Revision 1, " Protection of Nuclear Power Plant Control Room Operators Against an Accidental Chlorine Release," January 1977.

This capabiljty will not be required if the quantity of chlorine gas stored on site is small (s 20 lbs.) and utilized for laboratory and calibration purposes. This applicability is consistent with the exclusions and recommenda-tions of Regulatory Guide 1.95, Revision 1, " Protection of Nuclear Power Plant Control Room Operators Against an Accidental Chlorine Release," January 1977.

3/4.3.3.8 LOOSE PARTS DETECTION SYSTEM Not used.

3/4.3.3.9 RADI0 ACTIVE LIOUID EFFLUENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION Not used.

3/4.3.3.10 EXPLOSIVE GAS MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION This instrumentation includes provisions for monitoring (and controlling) the concentrations of potentially explosive gas mixtures in the GASE0US WASTE PROCESSING SYSTEM.

The OPERABILITY and use of this instrumentation is consis-tent with the requirements of General Design Criteria 60 and 63 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50.

3/4.3.3.11 HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAK ISOLATION SENSORS The operability of the high energy line break isolation sensors ensures that the capability is available to promptly detect and initiate protective action in the event of a line break.

This capability is required to prevent damage to safety-related systems and structures in the auxiliary building.

3/4.3.4 TURBINE OVERSPEED PROTECTION This specification is provided to ensure that the turbine overspeed protection instrumentation and the turbine speed control valves are OPERABLE and will protect the turbine from excessive overspeed.

Protection from turbine excessive overspeed is required since excessive overspeed of the turbine could generate potentially damaging missiles which could impact and damage safety-i related components, equipment or structures.

l V0GTLE UNITS - 1 & 2 B 3/4 3-6 Amendment No. 86 (Unit 1)

Amendment No. 64 (Unit 2)

I 3/4.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.8.1. 3/4.8.2. and 3/4.8.3 A.C. SOURCES. D.C. SOURCES. and ONSITE POWER r'

DISTRIBUTIOR The OPERABILITY of the A.C. and D.C power sources and associated distribu-tion systems during operation ensures that sufficient power will be available to supply the safety-related equipment required for:

(1) the safe shutdown of I

the facility, and (2) the mitigation and control of accident conditions within the facility. The minimum specified independent and redundant A.C. and D.C.

l power sources and distribution systems satisfy the requirements of General Design Criterion 17 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50.

l The ACTION requirements specified for the levels of degradation of the power sources provide restriction upon continued facility operation commensurate with the level of degradation. The OPERABILITY of the power sources are consistent with the initial condition assumptions of the safety analyses and are based upon maintaining at least one redundant set of onsite A.C. and D.C. power sources and associated distribution systems OPERABLE during accident conditions coincident with an assumed loss-of-offsite power and single failure of the other onsite A.C. source.

The A.C. and D.C. source allowable out-of-service times are based on Regulatory Guide 1.93, " Availability of Electrical Power Sources," December 1974 and Appendix A to Generic Letter 84-15, " Proposed Staff Position to Improve and Maintain Diesel Generator Reliability." When one diesel generator is inoperable, there is an additional ACTION requirement to verify that all required systems, subsystems, trains, components and devices, that depend on the remaining OPERABLE diesel generator as a source of emergency power, are also OPERABLE, and that the steam-driven auxiliary feedwater pump is OPERABLE. This requirement is intended to provide assurance that a loss-of-offsite power event will not result in a complete loss of safety function of critical systems during the period one of the diesel generators is inoperable. The term, verify, as used in this context means to administratively check by examining logs or other information to determine if certain components are out-of-service for maintenance or other reasons.

It does not mean to perform the Surveillance Requirements needed to demonstrate i

the OPERABILITY of the component.

The OPERABILITY of the minimum specified A.C. and D.C. power sources and associated distribution systems during shutdown and refueling ensures that:

(1) the facility can be maintained in the shutdown or refueling condition for extended time periods, and (2? sufficient instrumentation and control capa-bility is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit status.

The ACTION times specified for an inoperable automatic load sequencer are based on the times allowed when a combination of one diesel generator and one offsite circuit is inoperable. Under this condition the 4.16 kV Class 1E bus would remain energized. The ACTION conservatively addresses any consequential effects of an inoperable load sequencer on other engineered safety features.

V0GTLE UNITS - 1 & 2 B 3/4 8-1 Amendment No. 86 (Unit 1)

Amendment No. 64 (Unit 2)

)

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS BASES A.C. SOURCES. 0.C. SOURCES. and ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION (Continued)

In Modes 5 and 6 the automatic load sequencer is necessary to automatically strip the loads from the IE bus and start the operable diesel generator in the event of a loss of off site power (LOSP).

Since the design basis LOCA is not applicable in Modes 5 and 6 the automatic LOCA load sequencer l

function of the load sequencer is not required to be demonstrated as operable.

i Therefore, those surveillances that require sequencing of loads because of an SI signal are not required in Modes 5 and 6.

The loss of power:and undervoltage functions are the aspects of sequencer operation that:

1) function to trip all closed breakers on the 4.16 kV Class i

lE bus on a loss of or degraded voltage; 2) start the associated diesel

)

generator; 3) close the breaker to supply power to the 4.16 kV Class 1 E bus from the associated diesel generator; and 4) close the breakers to supply power from the 4.16 kV Class IE bus to the LOSP required loads in the appropriate sequence.

During shutdown, the operability of the loss of power and undervoltage function for modes 5 and 6 of the automatic load sequencer is not affected by the inability to sequence and load equipment that is not required to be operable in Modes 5 and 6.

Surveillances to show the operability of the loss of power and undervoltage function of the automatic load sequencer will only include that equipment that is required to be OPERABLE in Modes 5 and 6.

The Surveillance Requirements for demonstrating the OPERABILITY of the i

diesel generators are based on the recommendations of Regulatory Guides 1.9, Revision 3 " Selection, Design, Qualification, and Testing of Emergency Diesel Generator Units Used as Class lE Onsite Electric Power Systems of Nuclear Power Plants," July 1993; and 1.137, " Fuel-Oil Systems for Standby Diesel Generators," Revision 1, October 1979, Appendix A to Generic Letter 84-15; Generic Letter 83-26, " Clarification of Surveillance Requirements for Diesel l

fuel Impurity Level Tests;" and Generic Letter 93-05, "Line-Item Technical Specifications Improvements to Reduce Surveillance Requirements for Testing During Power Operation."

i The Surveillance Requirement for demonstrating the OPERABILITY of the I

station batteries are based on the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.129,

" Maintenance Testing and Replacement of Large Lead Storage Batteries for Nuclear Power Plants," February 1978, and IEEE Std 450-1975, "IEEE Recommended Practice for Maintenance, Testing, and Replacement of Large Lead Storage j

Batteries for Generating Stations and Substations," and 484-1975 " Recommended Practice for Installation Design and Installation of Lead Storage Batteries for Generating Stations and Substations."

Verifying average electrolyte temperature above the minimum for which the battery was sized, total battery terminal voltage on float charge, connection resistance values, and the performance of battery service and discharge tests ensures the effectiveness of the charging system, the ability to handle high discharge rates, and compares the battery capacity at that time with the rated capacity.

V0GTLE UNITS - 1 & 2 B 3/4 8-2 Amendment No. 86 (Unit 1)

Amendment No. 64 (Unit 2)

ELECTRICAL POWER SVSTEMS BASES I

A.C. SOURCES. D.C. SOURCES. and ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION (Continued)

Table 4.8-2 specifies the normal limits for each designated pilot cell and each connected cell for electrolyte level, float voltage, and specific gravity. The limits for the designated pilot cells float voltage and specific gravity, greater than 2.13 volts and 0.015 below the manufacturer's full charge specific gravity or a battery charger current that had stabilized at a low value, is characteristic of a charged cell with adequate capacity.

The normal limits for each connected cell for float voltage and specific gravity, greater than 2.13 volts and not more than 0.020 below the manufacturer's full charge specific gravity with an average specific gravity of all the connected cells not more than 0.010 below the manufacturer's full charge specific gravity, ensures the OPERABILITY and capability of the battery.

Operation with a battery cell's parameter outside the normal limit but within the allowable value specified in Table 4.8-2 is permitted for up to 7 days.

During this 7-day period:

(1) the allowable values for electrolyte level ensures no physical damage to the plates with an adequate electron transfer capability; (2) the allowable value for the average specific gravity of all the cells, not more than 0.020 below the manufacturer's recommended full charge specific gravity, ensures that the decrease in rating will be less than the safety margin provided in sizing; (3) the allowable value for an individual cell's specific gravity, ensures that an individual cell's specific gravity will not be more than 0.040 below the manufacturer's full charge specific gravity and that the overall capability of the battery will be maintained within an acceptable limit; and (4) the allowable value for an individual cell's float voltage, greater than 2.07 volts, ensures the battery's capability to perform its design function.

3/4.8.4 ELECTRICAL E0VIPMENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES Containment electrical penetrations and penetration conductors are pro-tected by either deenergizing circuits not required during reactor operation or by demonstrating the OPERABILITY of primary and backup overcurrent protec-tion circuit breakers during periodic surveillance. A list of containment 1

penetration conductor overcurrent protective devices and feeder breakers to isolation transformers between 480 V class IE busses and non-class IE equipment is provided in Table 16.3-5 of the VEGP FSAR.

The Surveillance Requirements applicable to lower voltage circuit breakers j

provide assurance of breaker reliability by testing at least one representative sample of each manufacturer's brand of circuit breaker.

Each manufacturer's 1

molded case and metal case circuit breakers are grouped into representative samples which are then tested on a rotating basis to ensure that all breakers are tested.

If a wide variety exists within any manufacturer's brand of circuit breakers, it is necessary to divide that manufacturer's breakers into groups and treat each group as a separate type of breaker for surveillance purposes.

V0GTLE UNITS - 1 & 2 B 3/4 8-3 Amendment No. 86 (Unit 1)

Amendment No. 64 (Unit 2)

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS BASES ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES (Continued)

The bypassing of the motor-operated valves thermal overload protection except during periodic testing ensures that the thermal overload protection will not prevent safety-related valves from performing their function. The Surveillance Requirements for demonstrating the bypassing of the thermal overload protection continuously are in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.106,

" Thermal Overload Protection for Electric Motors on Motor Operated Valves,"

Revision 1, March 1977.

I

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I i

V0GTLE UNITS - 1 & 2 B 3/4 8-4 Amendment No. 86 (Unit 1)

Amendment No. 64 (Unit 2)

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