ML20084P073
| ML20084P073 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 05/15/1984 |
| From: | Letsche K KIRKPATRICK & LOCKHART, SUFFOLK COUNTY, NY |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| OL-3, NUDOCS 8405170397 | |
| Download: ML20084P073 (32) | |
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- REl ATED CORRESPONDENCE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA UI' NUCLEAR RECULATORY COMMISSION Defore the Atomic Safety and Licensing Poard 40.30
- Tj GTFILE$5{jt%
)
In the Matter of )
) Docket No. 50-322-OL-2 LONC ISLAND LIGHTING C04PANY ) (Emergency Planni ng)
)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, )
Unit 1) )
)
SUFFOLK COUNTY MD40RANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO LILCO'S MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF SUFFOLK COUNTY'S TESTIMONY ON CONTENTIONS 11 AND 15 Suffolk County hereby responds to LILCO's Motion to Strike Portions of Suffolk County's Testimony on Contentions 11 a nd 15, dated May 3, 1984 (hereinafter " Motion") , a nd for the reasons set forth below, submits that the LILCO Motion should be denied .
I. Testimony of Arthur H. Purcell et al .
A. On pages 10-11: The answer beginning with "(Purcell Saegert) The Three Mile Island" en line 3 of page 10 and ending -
with "that TMI-II was lost" on line 16 of page 11, including foot notes 2 a nd 3 LILCO asserts that this portion of testimony is irrelevant "because the chain of reasoning is so tenuout' that the evidence (that GPU behaved inappropriately in 1979) simply does not lead ADO O .
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V to the conclusion that the County witnesses would have the Board draw . . . . Motion at 2-3. LILCO also asserte that in its view, " all thirgs consid ered" the testimony is " not proba-tive." Motion at 4. LILCO's objection goes merely to the weight of this testimony, and the motion to strike should therefore be denicd .
LILCO admits that the testimony in question contains the County witnesses' opinion that the behavior of utility officials during the Til accident evidenced a lack of objectiv-ity and conflict of interest. See Motion at 3. It is certain-ly proper for the County's witnesses to refer to the only rele-vant hictorical experience in order to illustrate the phencme-non they believe would also occur in the event of a Shoreham accident with LILCO officials in command and co ntrol . LILCO's Motion appears to constitute only a disagreement with the opinions of the County's witnesses; LILCO f ails to state any proper basis for striking the testimony. Because the objection goes to the weight of the evidence and can be pursued on cross examination, the LILCO motion should be denied.
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B. On pages 11-12: The answer beginning with "( All)
The terms ' mi nd s et ' " on line 37 of page 11 a nd ending with " unworkable emergency responses" in line 9 on page 12 LILCO mcves to strike this portion of the testimony as ir-rel ev a nt , by suggesting that lack of objectivity is not rele-ve nt to the lack of , independence and conflict of interest issue that is the subject of Contention 11. See Motion et 4-5.
LILCO is i ncorrect . The testimony at issue sets forth the Suffolk County wit nesses' opinion that utility employees are too close to the source of the problem to maintain the objec-tivity a nd ope n-mi nd ed ness necessary to manage and control a response to an emergency involving a nuclear power plant. The "mi nd set" discussed in this portion of the County's testimony directly relates both to the tendency of LILCO officials to minimize the public's perception of a potential or actual emer-gency, and to LILCO's f ailure to ensure the independence of LERO personnel who are in command and control under the LILCO Plan. Both of these matters are explicitly raised in Conten-tion II . LILCC's motion should be denied.
C. On page 3 4: The second paragraph on page 14, beginni ng with " Fourth" a nd e nding with " reg ardi ng trai ni ng . " _
LILCO asserts that this testimony " belongs in the testimo-ny on the ' trai ni ng ' issues," a nd , there fo re , LILCO asserts that-it is irrelevant. Motion at 5. LILCO's motion should be d e ni ed . Although it is true that th'e word "traini ng" does appear in the second line of the paragraph LILCO seeks to strike, the thrust of the paragraph is the " institutional in-ability" of the LILCO officials in command a nd control posi-tions under the LILCO Plan "to be involved in emergency j
prepared ness efforts on a full-time or near full-time basis."
The Suffolk County witnesses, af ter noting that fact, note that as a result those officials lack the perspective necessary for objective and independent decision-making in the event of a Ehoreham emergency. See Purcell, et al. at 14. The point of this paragraph is not to criticize the particulars of LILCO's training program Which is the subject of the training conten-tio ns . Instead, the testimony at issue reflects the opinion of these witnesses that because of their existing LILCO positione and prior experience, the particular individuals chosen to be in command and control positions under the LILCO Plan do not have the necessary independence to permit objective decision-i maki ng . The testimony is relevant to the lack of independence issue directly raised in Contention 11. Accordingly, the LILCO Motion should be denied .
D. On page 2 a nd in the Attachments : Foot note 5 on page 21, beginning with "This desire" a nd ending with " command a nd control posi-tions , " a nd Attachment 4.
LILCO's mction to strike footnote 5 and Attachment 4 again
, amounts to an argument which goes to the weight of this testi-me ny . LILCO asserts that the " probative value of the testimony is so slight that it should be struck as irrelevant." Motion at 6. In this portion of their testimony the County's witnesses state their opinion that the tendency of LILCO em-t ployees in commend and control positione either to take the ad-vice of other LILCO executives or to make statements presenting i
management in the mest favorable light, could be increased as a result of LILCO's recent personnel actions. The discussion is relevant to the allegations in Contention 11 that LILCO employ-ces will have o strong incentive to minimize the public's per-ception of the potential or actual danger involved in a radio-logical emergency, and that LILCO has failed to institute appropriate measures to ensure the independence of LERO person-nel. Because the discussion is relevant to Contention 11 there is no basis for striki ng 'it, and LILCO has failed to state one.
If LILCO wishes to challenge the weight of this evidence, it can do so on cross examination.
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E. On pagcc 26-27: The paragraph beginning i in li ne 10 of page 26 with " Third" a nd e ndi ng l in line 17 of page 27 with "short-term dis-ruption" l LILCO asserts that this paragraph on pagcz 26-27 is irrel- l l
cvant because "any decision-maker would prefer a less die-i ruptive alternative," and , according to LILCO, the discussion ,
l pages 2C-27 "has nothing to do with LILCO's financial a nd i n- .
stitutional i nte re s t s . " Motion at 7. LILCO's motion should be denied because it fails to state a proper basis for striking l the testimony, and it ig nores the f act that Contention 11 plainly raises the issue of the result of conflicts of interest upon protective action recommendetions. The testimeny is reic- l vo nt end should not be stricken. ,
contention 11 explicitly states that the LILCO employees in command and control "may not recommend an appropriate pro- ;
tective cetion in a prompt manner because to do so would be !
contrary to LILCO's financial interests in maintaining a public perception that Choreham is not e source of danger." The para- I graph at issue provides a specific exemple of one likely effect !
of conflicts of interest upon recommendations of protective i
ac tio ns . The testimony is clearly relevant to the contention and there is no basis for striking it.
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F. On page 08: Footncte 6 beginning with l "For instanec" a nd e nd i ng with " LE RO" LILCO asserts that this footnote is irrelevant, presumec a fact not in evidence, a nd " attempts to reopen the question of the onsite emergency plan." Motion at '. Each of these LILCO assumptions is incorrect, First, the footnote is cicarly role-va nt to Contention 11, since it discusses part of the decision-makirs process in which the LILCO officials in command and control will engage during a radiological emergency. It also discusses how the relationship between the LERO directors and persons at the plant -- that is, a non-indepe ndent relationship
, -- can result in e non-cbjective use of information provided by 1
the LILCO employees to the LERO directors. Thus, the footnote discusses a direct contreet betwcon the situation at Shorchem where utility officials are in chorge of the offsite response and the traditional situation where non-utility officials are l
l i n comma nd a nd co ntrol of that response. The footnote clearly addresses an issue that is reicvant to Contention 11.
LILCO'c assertion that foot note 6 presumes a f act not in evidence is without basis, and in fact goes to the weight of the testimony. First, it is not true that the testimony " pre-sumes" that onsite recommendations need to be " critically chal-lenged:" it merely states that if LILCO officials perform
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! of fr.i te commend a nd control functionc , it is unlikely that the onsite recommcndotions would be critically challenged. Thus, there is ne presumption that such challenges are always neces-sery, the witnesses merely discuss what they believe is likely to hoppen during the process of meking offsite protective ,
1 ection recommendetions under the LILCO Plan.
i Finally, LILCO's suggestion that this footnote " attempts j to reopen" onsite emergency planning is also without besis.
The footnote contains no criticism or discussion of anything perteining to the onsite plant it merely discusses how the LILCO officiels in command and control of the offsite response are going to perform their decision-making responsibilities.
LILCO has stated no besis for striking this footnote, and the 1
motion should , therefore , be denied .
- c. On pages 32-33: The three sentences beginning with with "That is" in line 0 of page 32 and footnotes 8 a nd 9, e ndi rs on pag e 2 2 LILCO fails to state any basis for striking this testimo-ny, see Motion at 8, and for that reason alone, the motion should be denied. LILCO does assert, however, that this testi-meny "goes to the quality of the paper plan," and "has nothing to do with how the public perceives the author of the
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plan . . . . This LILCC motion appears to be a disagreement i
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. l with the opinions stated by the County's witnesses, a nd thus i s not a proper motion to etrike. Motion at 8. First, LILCO is i ncorrect that this testimony goes only to "the quality" of a
" paper pla n." The testimony discusses certein characteristics a picn'must have in order to be credible, includ3 ng methods of prese nting informatien, and recommendirg coursos of action.
Clearly, such things take piece during the impicmentation of an emergency plan and are directly relevant to the credibility of that plan as Professor Saegert explains in the first sentence i on pbge 3 2, which LILCO does not seek to strike. The fact that i the LILCO Plan's " contents" mey be written on paper before LILCO attempte to implement then during an emergency does not render irrelevant a discussion of whether LILCO's statements 1
I mede during that implementction will be believed by the public.
i j The testimony at issue is relevant to contention 15, and LILCO l
has stated no basis for striking it.
1 H. On pages 25-36 and in the attachments: From i
"In eddition" in line 9 on page 05, through l "more negative" in line 7 on page 36, a nd Attachment 5 I,
i j LILCO asserts that this testimony is inadmissible because J
it violates the "best evidence" rule, in LILCO's view it has
- "so littic probative value" that it is irrelevant, and the tes-
. timony constitutes hearsay. All LILCO's arguments go to the l
T I weight of this testimony and LILCO has failed to state a proper basis for strikirs it.
First, it is importent to view this portion of testimony in its , entirety in order to understand the reason that the County's witnesses cite one of the findings of the Marburger Commission. As stated in the testimony, there are two reasons that the witnesses believe the quoted Marburger Commission findings are sig nificant : (1) the Commission's conclusion supports the survey results cited in contention 15; a nd (2 ) the wide publicity received by the findings -- evidenced in the newspaper articles' Which constitute Attachment 5 -- is likely to cause public perception of LILCO and its credibility to be-come even mere negative. These reasons also demonstrate Why the testimony is relevant to Contention 15. Clearly, the fi nd-inge of the Marburger Commission cited by the County witnesses, and the publicity given those findings even assuming the find-ings Where untrue, are relevant to the credibility issue raised i vontention 15.
Thus, the use which the County's witnesses make of the-Marburger Commission Peport is clear on the face of the testi-mony; should LILCO believe that it is necessary to place the entire Marburger Commission Report into evidence, it can do so
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i in connection with its cross-examinetion of the County wi t nes ses . The County witnesses quoted the portions of thet Report they believe are sig nificant . There is no basis for striking that testimony simply because LILCO believes the entire' Deport should be put into evidence.
LILCC 's secc nd argument -- that the Marburger Commission Report was " not a consensus document" -- again goes to the weight of this testimony and the County's witnesses' reference to the quoted portion of the Marburger Commission Peport.
Should LILCO wish to challenge the sig nificance assig ned to that portion of the Commission's findings by the County's witnesses, it can do so upon cross-examination of those wit ne s s e s .
Finally, LILCO's hearsay objection should be denied for the same reasons this Board has consistently denied every other motion to strike hearsay testimony in this proceeding. In addition, the Suffolk County witnesses do not discuss the "de-liberations" of the Marburger Commission, as suggested by LILCO in its Motion. Instead, the County witnesses quote one finding contained in the Commission's Report, and discuss the effect, upon the public's perception of LILCO's credibility, of the numerous press reports which contained the credibility fi ndi ng of the Commission.1/ In sum, LILCO has stated no basis for l
1/ Morever, LILCO's implication that it would be prejudiced by the admission of this testimony containing a brief quo-1 (Footnote cont' d next page) l striking this testimony. ;
I. On pages 37-2E and in the attachments : The words "St. Andrews School Board" in the third line from the bottom on page 37; the words "and the Eoard of Trustees of the 17ew Inter-disciplinary School" in line 5 on page 38; a nd the letter and resolution from St. And rews a nd two letters from the New Interdisciplinary School in Attachment 6 The only basis for LILCO's motion to strike this testimony is that the two schools menticned "are not in the Shoreham te n-mil e EPZ . " LILCO therefore concludes that "how" these schools " view LILCO is irrelevent to the adequacy of the emer-gency plan." Motion at 10. LILCO is incorrect. First, Co n-tention 15 is nowhere limited to " schools in the Choreham EPZ ."
Contention 15 states that "LILCO is not considered by the public to be a credible source of information," a nd it refers (Foctnote cont'd from previous page) tation from the Marburger Commission Report and newspaper articles discussing that Report because LILCO would not have the opportunity "to crors-examine" the Marburger Commissior "results" is disingenuous. LILCO a nd , i nd eed ,
many of its own witnesses on Contention 15, participated fully in the months of hearings before the Marburger Commission, a nd put into that hearing record volumes of written material and oral testimony. If LILCO wishes to bring to the Eoard's attention any aspect of that Commission's findings which it believes are relevant to the finding cited for a limited purpose by the County, it is certainly in a position to do no provided it can make the proper and necessary showing of good cause.
to more than GC percent of the people in Euffolk County Who Who would not trust LILCO officials to tell the truth about en accid ent . As the Euf folk County witnessos state in the para-l graph from which LILCO seeks to strike references to these two l
schools, all the resolutions in Attachment 6 "further corrobo-rate" their opinion that , as stated in Contention 15, "LILCO is not considered a credible source of informetion in the event of a Shorchem emergency. The testimony is relevant and should not be stricken.
J. On pages 37-38: The sentence at the bottom of page 37 beginning with "Each" through the end of the paragraph at the top of page 30, e ndi ng wi th " Shoreham emerg ency. "
LILCO seeks to strike this testimony, but states no basis other than its assertion that it "has so little probative value that it should be struck as irrelevant." Motion at 10. This i
motion should be summerily denied since it is totally lecking in basis. In addition, this objection goes merely to the weight of the testimony. LILCO makes no argument or showing that the testimony does not relate to Contention 15 or the al-legation in the contention that the public does not view LILCO as a credible source of information in the event of a Ehoreham emergency. There is no basis for striking this testimony.
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m K. On pages 40-44 ard in the attachments: All of pages 40, 41, 4 2 a nd 4 2, a nd pag e 44 from the top through the words " menage an emergency" in line 6; Attachments 7-11 Once agai n, LILCO ccmpletely fails to provide any basis for striking this testimony, other than its statement that "cn balence the relevance of [this testimony? is so slight that the testimony should be ruled incomissibic." Motion at 11. This Motion should be summarily rejected. As LILCO itself notes, the relationship between the press reports which constitute At-techments 7-11 concerning LILCO's mismanagement and dicsc1 gen-crator an3 other probleme, and LILCO's credibility as e source of information during en accident is described on pages 42-44 of the testimony which LILCO seeks to strike (i.e., where the witncesca respond to the question "Ifow does publicity about LILCC's mismenagement relate to LILCO's credibility as a source of information during a radiological emergency?") . Even if LILCC does not agree with the conclusione drawn by the County's witnceses in this portion of their testimony, that provides no benis for striking the testimony. It is cicarly relevant a nd probative to the issues raised in contention 15, a nd , there-fore, the LILCO motion should be denied.
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! L. On page 44: The sentence beginning in line l
1 o f pag e 44 wi th " Thi rd " a nd e nd i ng wi th "sta nd ard s of competence" in line 3 l
This sertence is a portion of the testimony which LILCO i socks to strike in the immediately preceding portion of its Motion. Gee pcrt I.K above. LILCO prcvides no new basis for j striking this sentence, it merely stetes that the "chein of ceuse and effect the testimony postulates is so tenuous that the testimeny is not probative." Motion at 11. Once agai n, this LILCO objection goes to the weight of the testimony. If LILCO believes that the " chain of cause and effect" is tenuous, it can pursue that belief upon cross-examination of the l
l County's witnceses . In addition, contrary to LILCO'r sugges-i tion, the testimony does not go to the adequacy or inadequacy o f LILCO ' c t rai ni ng prog ramt it discusses the effect, upon the public's perception of LILCO's performance during an emergency, of the public's pre-existing perceptions about LILCO's incompe-tence. The testimony is relevent to Contention 15 and should not be stricken.
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l M. On page 44: The sentence starting on line 3 with "Thus any" a nd e nding with " emerg e ncy" i n li ne 6 This motion to strike is also encompassed within the Motion discussed in Part I.K above. LILCO asserts that this sentence is outside the scope of Contention 15 because it deals with somethi ng that would happen "during an emergency." Motion et 12. This issue ic directly raised in Contention 15; i nd eed ,
LILCO's lack of credibility and the public's perception of LILCO's credibility are important primarily because of the effect of such perceptions during an emergency. Here the County's witnesses discuss the f act that the public's preexisting perceptions will be confirmed given certain LILCO behavior during an emergency, resulting in disobedience of LILCC orders. The testimony is relevant to the issues raised in Contention 15 and should not be stricken.
N. On page 51 - 52: The paragraph beginning with "Pesponding" at the bottom of Page 51 a nd e nd i ng with " fo r LI LCO" o n li ne 12 o f page 5 2 LILCO asserts that this paragraph " addresses the alleged ,
r lack of legal authority raised by contentions 1 - 10," and therefore is outside the scope of contention 15. Motion at 12.
LILCO is incorrect. The testimony at issue does not discuss LILCO's ectual legal authority to perform any specific acts, i
v7-t which are the issues raised in Contentions 1 - 10. Instead, the testimony et pages 51 - 52 addresses the public perception issue which is the heart of contention 15. That Contention states, among other thi ngs , "because the public does not per-ceive LILCO as a credible source of information, protective action recommendations and other information disseminated by LILCO in an emergency will not be followed or believed by the public." In this portion of the County's testimony the witnesses discuss that issue. They note that the exercise of command and control during an emergency means, among other things, having confidence that orders will be accepted, and they state that orders will not be accepted unless the entity which issues them is perceived as legitimate and credible by the pub 31c and members of organizations which are expected to follow the orders. There is no basis for striking this testi-wony.
O. On pages 52 - 60: The question on page 52 begi nni ng with "Q . Are there any other reasons" through the answer on pages 58-60 ending with "there areas of concern and expertise" i n line 2 of page 60. "
In its Motion LILCO asserts that this testimony. is beyond the scope of Contention 15. Motion at 13. LILCO provides no explanation or reason for this belief, other than its assertion l
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h that it believen this testimony is porti$ch.ti to Cont'entions 12 g' ,/,
and 13 which were denied comission by the, Pdart' . ' schb a state-
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ment does not constitute a tiesis s for striking5 this testjmony
, < ., /: , . 1, which is relevant to issues reised in. Cantention 15. ' '
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Contention 15.t. asserts tk'es individuals in support orga- '
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nizatione relied upon in the Plan:
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will share the publik perception that LILCO ;
is not a credibic soerce of informatio.r. ,
Therefore, it is l'kely that esocra frdm i
l l the LILC0 employees in commard and control i j ,
will not be o~r eyed by the non-LILCO emer- i gency wdykers relied upon in the Plan. Tc- ', t !
cordingl'y. there is no assurance that the j;, ,
portiono ~of the LILCC Plan involving par- i .
ticipation of nor-L3LCO personnel can or -
will be implenentyd Y, I The testimeny which L7LCO sacks to strike adcs forth the i l .n',
reasons for the witnesses' ag reeme with Cubpart A of Conten-i,I N tion 15 -- that is, they explain i this "cestimony why they# !
believe that LILCO's leck of crtd .1 ty will lead non-LIIbc
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organization mcmbers not to mbey LIICO command and control ,
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, , ; i directives. The testimony is .directly relevat:t to the icaue ex-i s s
, g plicitly raised in Corn.ention 1N Al.
There is no basis for c'
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In addidon, LILCC's description of this testimotiy as i '
/ 1 being limited to a statement nh. iat LILCO personne2 "will lack Y
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i ntim at e , every dey Acrking relationships with support ' j' org a niza t ib rig" (Motion at 15), is a mischaracterication tich
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merely indic'ates" t7.dc, LILCO's objection to this testimeny 'is ,
i n reelity, a disd.f ree ent with the testimcny. TheCounty'c\
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l witoceses are entitled to explain the beses for their agreemeitt
.I with the Contention and they do so in this testimony. The fact thet their beses include opinions about the relationships' hetween LILCo and non-LILCC entities does not justify striking their testimony. Should cLILCC wish to challenge the County.
wit nes s es ' cpinions on thi.1' inctter, it can do so upon~ cross ex-
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. cmination.
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rinally, LILCO's assertion that the testimony on pages 53 - 57 concerning the qualificatione of certain individual LERO workers is inadmissibic because it is " minutia" or because
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in LILCO'c view its " probative value is so slight as to be out-weighed by 'the burden of admitting and hearing it," is no basis for striking the testimony. The testimony is relevant,\ proba-
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tive and material to contention 15. The fact that it is'de-tailed doer not constitute a basis for striking it, nor occa LILCO's self-servirs and arrogant assertion that it would be i
mere burdensome to admit this testimony than to strike it. The County's witnesses are entitled to discuss specifdes and
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provide examples in stating the bases for their opinions and W
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c i - r their agreement with particular Contentions. They do so in the testimony which LILCO seeks to strike. Because that testimony is relevant 'to the admitted Contention 15 and its Eubpart A, LILCC 's mction should be denied.
P. On page 58: Th e word s " a nd fire departments" in lines 10 - 11 on page 58 LILCO arserts that this testimony is irrelevant because "the LTLCO Plan does not rely on fire departments ." Motion at
- 15. In making this Motion LILCO appears to ig nore the state-ments contained in its own Plan. On pag e 2. 2-4, 'he LILCO Plan states the following:
Local Law Enforcement Agencies and Fire Departments It is anticipated that all local law en-forcement agencies a nd fire departments within the 10 mile EPZ will continue to carry out their normal response functions during in emergency. Should the incident escalate to the point of requiring these agencies to evacuate from the local area, it is further anticipated that these agencies will take their own compensating measures, based upon the situation at hand ,
and continue to render the necessary services in response to the situation.
The LERO provides a liaison within its or-genization to act as a full time point of contact through which LERO response effort information and interaction can be effected by the agencies involved.
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, e Thus, the reference in Contention 3 5. A to fire departments is a result of LILCO's essumption, contained in its Plan, that such departments will carry out functions duri ng an emergency, will render necessary services in response to the situation, a nd will bs in contact and interact with LERO. LILCO 's Motion to Striks has no basis.
O. On page 59: The word s " and the Su f folk County Police Department" in the last two lines of page 59 LILCO makes the same argument here as it does with respect to the reference to fire departm.ent,s on page 58. For the reasons stated in Section I.P above, a nd evidenced i n the por-tion of the LILCO Plan quoted therein, this portion of the LILCO Motion should be denied .
R. On pages 65 - 66: The entire paragraph beginning with "Second" on _ page 65 and ending with " workers will be met" in the middle of page 66 LILCO asserts that this testimony is outside the scope of Contention 15. Motion at 16. LILCO is incorrect. This por-tion of testimony addresses Subpart D of Contention -15, which alleges that LILCO's field personnel will not be. trusted or obeyed by the public. This testimony states the basis for the County's wi t nes s es ' agreement with that portion of the
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Contention, by stating vihy it is that the public's perception of LILCO and its workers will result in disobedience during an emergency. Clearly, Intervenors are not required to, nor could they, state in a Contention every reason which supports every allegation contained in the contention. The fact that the particular reason disc'ssed u on pages 65-66 is not explicitly set forth in the Contention does not mean that the testimony should be striken. The testimony states the reason for, a nd 4
expl ai ns , an allegation contained i n Co nte ntion 15. D a nd is therefore relevant a nd admissible evidence.
S. On page 66: The sentence beginning "The inability of LILCO's field workers" in line 10 on page 66 and e ndi ng with "will be met" on line 13 on page 66 This sentence is part of the paragraph discussed in part I.P above. This motion should be denied for the reasons set forth in part I.P.
T. On pages 68 - 68: The two paragraphs, begi nni ng with " Seco nd , a critical fact" i n line 4 on pag e 68 a nd e ndi ng with "by the public" in line 7 on page 69 LILCO asserts that this testimony is about the LILCO training program and is therefore outside the scope of Conten-tion 15. Motion at 16. LILCO is incorrect. This testimony
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does not discuss the substantive inadequacies in the LILCC training prcgram as those inadequacies are discussed in the County's training testimony. Instead, this testimony focuses en the perception cf the public, which is the subject of Con-tention 15. The testimony states that contrary to the normal situation in which the public traditionally has confidence in public service workers, such confidence will be lacking with respect to LILCO workers as a result of the public's perception of the training provided to LILCO's workers concerning the jobs they are expected to perform during an emergency. As the tes-timony states: ,
The confidence and resulting grant of cred-ibility which can come from the public's knowledge about ex t e nsiv e o n-the- j ob training, will thus be missing with respect to those LILCO workers and will contribute to the likelihood that their directives will not be followed by the public.
The point of the testimony is not the actual training that may in fact be received by LILCO workers -- it is the public's per-ception and its effect upon the public's willing ness to obey the LILCO workers. The testimony is thus relevant to Subpart D l
.1 of Contention 15. LILCO has stated no bases for striking it.
U. On pages C9 - 70: The paragraph beginning with " Third" in line C on pgae 69 e nd e ndi ng with "is most e s s e ntial" in line 6 on page 70 LILCO asserts that this testimony is beyond the scope of Contention 15, but does not explain in any way the basis for its assertion. See Motion at 17. Contrary to LILCC 's ' bald as-sertion, this testimony is relevant to the Contention. It states the witnesses' opinion that "LILCO traffic and public safety personnel will not be credible sources of information and directives, particularly where complex split-second judg-ments may be required ," and the reasons that they believe this to be the case. LILCO has failed to state any basis for strik-ing the testimony, and its motion should be denied.
W. On pages 75 - 76: All of page 75 (except the end of foot note 25 at the bottom) and the first 5 lines of page 76 LILCO asserts that this testimony "has to do with training or personnel selection, not with LILCO's credibility." Motion at 17. Regardless of how LILCO chooses to characterize this testimony, it is relevant to Subpart F of Contention 15 and therefore there is no basis for striking it. Subpart F of Con-tention 15 states in pertinent part:
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- LILCO's proposed rumor control point is to be manned by LILCO employees . (Plan at 3.0-5). This rumor control effort will be ineffective and will fail to comply with NUREG 0654,Section II.C.4.c , because it relies on LILCO -- a non-credible source of information -- has the authoritative source for squelching, explaining or otherwise controlli ng rumors. Rumore cannot be ef-fectively controlled if the source of control is itself not credible.
The testimony at issue set forth specific reasons for the County's witnesses' ag reen ent with Co nte ntio n 15. F . It discusses the specifics of LILCO's proposed rumor control s ys t en , and expleins why that system will not and cannot result in effective rumcr control. There is no basis for LILCO's im-plicit suggestion that a discussion of the specifics of LILCC's proposed rumor control system is outside the scope of the Con-tention which asserts that that system will not be effective.
Using LILCO 's logic , any sentence in the testimony that does not contain the word " credibility" would be irrelevant. Clear-ly, the testimony at issue provides the factual context in which the effectiveness of, and the impact of LILCO's lack of credibility upon, LILCO's proposed rumor control system must be evaluated. Such an evaluation cannot be conducted in a factual vacuum. The LILCO motion should be denied.
X. On page 79: The paragraph beginning with
"(Saegert) The public" in line 4 on page 79 a nd ending with " read such material" near the bottom of page 79 LILCO asserts that this testimcny is outside the scope of Contention 15 and has "so little bearing" on the issue raised i n the Contention that it should be stricken as irrelevant.
Motion at 16. LILCC' e Motion simply ig nores the content of this portion of the County's testimony which is clearly rele-vant to Eubpart G of Contention 15. That Contention states :
LILCO proposes to conduct all public education activities desig ned to inform the public about Ehoreham and about actions to be taken in the event of a Choreham emer-gency. (See Plan at 2. 8-1 through 3. 8-4 )
LILCO 's leck cf credibility renders LILCO incapabic of effectively educating the pub-lic on these matters. The public will likely disbelieve, disregard or discount purported educational material s regarding such preparation for the radiological emer-gency at Ehoreham, if such materials are received from and/or prepared by LILCO.
Thus, the LILCO Plan cannot and does not comply with 10 CFP { 50.47(b)(7) or NUREG 0654, Sections II . G.1 a nd 2.
( emphasis added) . The Contention clearly includes the allege-tion that the public will disregard educational materials they receive from LILCO. The testimony at issue addresses precisely th at poi nt . Not only does it state Professor Saegert's opinion concerning the public's likely reaction to materials sent by
W LILCO, it also inclu6es additional evidence which she believes further substantiates that opinion. The testimony is relevant to Co nt e ntion 15. G a nd should not be stricken.
II. Testimony of Steven Cole on Contention 15 A. On page Id: The first paragraph beginning with "Pecent research" a nd e rding with " th e Shoreham plant" LILCO states no basis for striking this testimony, other than its bald and unexplained assertion that in its view it "has so little probative value" that it should be stricken as irrelevant. Motion at 18. The testimony- clearly is relevant to Contention 15, a fact not even contested by LILCC in its Motion. The LILCO objection gces only to the weight of the testimony and that objection can be pursued upon cross examina-tion of Professor Cole. The restimony merely states the bases for his opinion that LILCO's credibility is lower than that of many other utilities. The testimony should not be stricken.
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o III. Testimeny of Pobert W. Petrilak on Contention 15.C A. On page 2: The sentence "LILCC does not have the authority to direct the actions that would be expected of school districts" on page 2, lines 9 - 10 L LCO asserts that this sentence "goes to an issue of
' legal authority'" and is relevant to Contentions 1 - 10, a nd that it should be stricken as irrelevant to Contention 15.
Motion at 19. Although the sentence does have the word "au-thority" in it , the sentence clearly is a part of Mr. Pe-trilak's explanation of the reasons he agrees with Contention 15.C. The sentence must be read in context. The Contention asserts that school authorities may not believe or follow the information or recommenaction provided to them by LILCO. Mr.
Petrilak simply explains on page 2 of his testimony why the Mount Sinai School District would not implement protective actions solely based upon LILCO recommendations. Although the sentence at issue may also be relevant to Contentions 1 (although it does not address the statutes or other legal mat-ters raised in those contentions) , in the context of this tes-tLmony, it clearly is relevant to Mr. Petrilak's opinion on Contention 15.C.
IV. Co nclusio n For the foregoing reasons LILCO's Motion to Etrike Por-tions of Euffolk County's Testimony on Contentions 11 and 15 should ,be denied .
Respectfully submitted, Martin Eradley Ashare Suffolk County Department of Law Veterans Memorial Highway Hauppauge, N,ew York 11788
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fk & Yb(f , { O Herbert' H. Brown Lawrence Coe Lanph r Karla J. Letsche l
KIRKPATRICK, LOC KHART , HILL,
, CHRISTOPHER & PHILLIPS 1900 M Street, N.W.
Washingto n, D.C. 20036 Attorneys for Suffolk County l
Dated: May 15, 1984 29 -
F
as . s UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before The Atomic Safety And Licensing Board
)
In the Matter of )
)
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322 (0.L.)
) (Emergency Planning)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, )
Unit 1) ) .
)
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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I hereby certify that copies of Suffolk County Memorandum in Opposition to LILCO's Motion to Strike Portions of Suffolk County's Testimony on Contentions 11 and 15 have been served on the following this 15th day of May 1984, by U.S. mail, first class, except as otherwise noted.
James A. Laurenson, Chairman Ralph Shapiro, Esq.
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Cammer and Shapiro U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 9 East 40th Street Washington, D.C. 20555 New York, New York 10016 Dr. Jerry R. Kline .
- W. Taylor Reveley III, Esq.
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Hunton & Willaims U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P.O. Box 1535 Washington, D.C. 20555 707 East Main Street Richmc..d, Virginia 23212 Mr. Frederick J. Shon Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Mr. Jay Dunkleberger U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission New York State Energy Office Washington, D.C. 20555 Agency Building 2 Empire State Plaza Edward M. Barrett, Esq. Albany, New York 12223 General Counsel Long Island Lighting Company ,
250 Old Country Road l Mineola, New York 11501 j
- By Hand
- By Federal Express -
I I
Mr. Brian McCaffrey Stephen B. Latham, Esq.
Long Island Lighting Company Twomey, Latham & Shea Shoreham Nuclear P.ower Station P.O. Box 398 P.O. Box 618 33 West Second Street North Country Road Riverhead, New York 11901 Wading River, New York 11792 Nora Bredes Docketing and Service Section Executive Director Office of the Secretary Shoreham Opponents Coalition 1717 H Street, N.W.
195 East Main Street U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm.
Smithtown, New York 11787 Washington, D.C. 20555 Marc W. Goldsmith Hon. Peter F. Cohalan Energy Research Group, Inc. Suffolk County Executive 400-1 Totten Pond Road H. Lee Dennison Building Waltham, Massachusetts 02154 Veterans Memorial Highway.
Hauppauge, New York 11788 4
MHB Technical Associates
- Eleanor L. Frucci, Esq.
1723 Hamilton Avenue Atomic Safety and Licensing Suite K Board Panel San Jose, California 95125 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm.
Washington, D.C. 20555 Joel Blau, Esq. Martin Bradley Ashare, Esq.
New York Public Service Commission Suffolk County Attorney The Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller H. Lee Dennison Building Building Veterans Memorial Highway Empire State Plaza Hauppauge, New York 11788 Albany, New York 12223 Atomic Safety and Licensing Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel Appeal Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm.
Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 i Edwin J. Reis, Esq. Jonathan D. Feinberg,'Esq.
Bernard M. Bordenick, Esq. Staff Counsel, New York State U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Public Service Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 3 Rockefeller Plaza.
Albany, New York 12223 Stuart Diamond Stewart M. Glass, Esq.
Business / Financial Regional Counsel NEW YORK TIMES Federal Emergency Management 229 W. 43rd Street Agency New York, New York 10036 26 Federal Plaza New York, New York 10278
- ' . - s. ,
Spence Perry, Esq. James B. Dougherty, Esq.
Associate General Counsel 3045 Porter Street, N.W.
Federal Emergency Management Agency Washington, D.C. 20008 Washington, D.C. 20471
- Fabian Palomino, Esq.
Special Counsel to the Governor Executive Chamber Room 229 State Capitol Albany, New York 12224 .
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Ka[rld J. LetschE' l
KIRKPATRICK, LOCKHART, HILL, CHRISTOPHER & PHILLIPS 1900 M Street, N.W., Suite 800 Washington, D.C. 20036 DATE: May 15, 1984 I
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