ML20083E613
| ML20083E613 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 09/19/1991 |
| From: | Rood H Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20083E614 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9110030061 | |
| Download: ML20083E613 (19) | |
Text
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j p,_E Reissued Septernber 19, 1991
. ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NOS. 66 - AND 65 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NOS. DPR-80 AND DPR-82 DOCKET-NOS. 50'-275 AND 50-323 Revise Appendix A Technical Specifications by removing the pages identified below and inserting the enclosed pages.- The revised pages art identified by the captioned amendment nLanber and contain marginal-lines-indicating the area of change.. Overleaf pages are also included, as appropriate.
REMOVE PAGE INSERT PAGE x..
x xi-xi
'3/4 7-18 3/4 7-18 3/4 7-19 3/4 7-19 3/4 20 3/4 7-20 3/4 7-21 3/4 7-21 3/4j7-22 3/4 7-22 3/4 7-23a 3/4 7-23b 8 3/4 7-4 B 3/4 7 4 8 3/4 7-5 B 3/4 7-5 g.
+
9110030061 910919 PDR ADDCR O$000275 P
i.
INDEX
'i LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SECTION PAGE 3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS 3/4.5.1 ACCUMULATORS............................................
3/4 5-1 3/4.5.2 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - T,yg GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 350'F...3/4 5-3 3/4.5.3 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - T,yg LESS THAN 350'F..,...............
3/4 5-7 3/4.5.4-BORON INJECTION SYSTEM Boron Injection Tank....................................
3/4 5-9 Heat Tracing............................................
3/4 5-10 3/4.5.5 REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK............................
3/4 5-11 3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3/4.6.1 CONTAINMENT I
Coatainment Integrity...................................
3/4 6-1 Containment Leakage.....................................
3/4 6-2 Containeent Air Locks...................................
S/4 6-5 Internal Pressure.......................................
3/4 6-7 Air Temperature.........................................
3/4 6-8 Containment Structural Integrity........................
3/4 6-9 Containment Ventilation System..........................
3/4 6-10 3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS Containment Spray System................................
3/4 6-11
. Spray Additive System........................... n......
s/4 6-12 Containment Cooling Systes..............................
3/4 6-13 3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES............................
3/4 6-15
. TABLE 3.6-1 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES.........................
3/4 6-17 3/4.6.4 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL Hydrogen Analyzers / Monitors.............................
3/4 6-26 Electric Hydrogen Recombiners...........................
3/4 6-27 DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 ix
Reissued September 19, 1991 INDEX LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.1 TURBINE CYCLE Safety Va1ves...........................................
3/4 7 TABLE 3.7-1 MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE POWER RANGE NEUTRON FLUX HIGH SETPOINT WITH INOPERABLE STEAM LINE SAFETY VALVES.......
3/4 7-2
-TABLE 3.7-2 STEAM LINE SAFETY VALVES PER L00P....................
3/4 7-3 Auxi l ia ry Feedwate r Sys tem..............................
3/4 7-4 Condensate Storage Tank............................
3/4 7-6 Specific Activity.......................................
3/4 7-7 TABLE 4.7-1 SECONDARY COOLANT SYSTEM SPECIFIC ACTIVITY SAMPLE AND ANALYSIS PR0 GRAM.........................,...
3/4 7-8 Main Steam Line Isolation Va1ves........................
3/4 7-9 Steam Generator 10% Atmospheric Dump Valves.............
3/4 7-9a 3/4.7.2 STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITATION.........3/4 7-10 3/4.7.3 VITAL COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM....................
3/4 7-11 3/4.7.4 AUXILIARY SALTWATER SYSTEM..............................
3/4 7-12 3/4.7.5 CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION SYSTEM.........................
3/4 7-13 3/4.7.6 AUXILIARY BUILDING SAFEGUARDS AIR FILTRATIDH SYSTEM.....
3/4 7-16 3/4.7.7 SNUBBERS................................................
3/4 7-18 FIGURE 4.7-1 SAMPLEPLAN2)FORSNUBBERFUNCTIONALTEST..........
3/4 7-23 i
TABLE 4.7-2 SNUBBER VISUAL INSPECTION INTERVAL....................
3/4 7-23=
1 3/4.7.8 SEALED SOURCE CONTAMINATION.............................
3/4 7-24 3/4.7.9 FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS F i re Suppres si on Water System...........................
3/4 7-26 Spray and/or Sprinkler Systems..........................
3/4 7-28 CO S
2 ystem..............................................
3/4 7-30 TABLE 3.7-3 CO SYSTEM............................................
3/4 7-31 p
Halon System............................................
3/4 7-32 Fire Hose Stations......................................
3/4 7-33 DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 x
Amendment Nos. 6E and 65
INDEX LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS PAGE SECTION 3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS (continued)
TABLE 3.7-4 FIRE HOSE STAT 10HS...................................
3/4 7-34 3/4.7.10 FIRE BARRIER PENETRATIONS...............................
3/4 7-36 3/4.7.11 AREA TEMPERATURE MONITORING.............................
3/4 7-37 TABLE 3.7-5 AREA TEMPERATURE M0HITORING..........................
3/4 7-38 3/4.7.12 ULTIMATE HEAT SINK......................................
3/4 7-39 3/4.7.13 FLOOD PROTECTION........................................
3/4 7-40 3/4.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3/4.8.1 A.C. SOURCES 0perating...............................................
3/4 8-1 TABLE 4.8-1 DIESEL GENERATOR TEST SCHEDULE.......................
3/4 8-8 TABLE 4.8-2a LOAD SEQUENCING TIMERS - ESF TIMERS.................
3/4 8-9 TABLE 4.8-2b LOAD SEQUENCING TIMERS - AUTO TRANSFER TIMERS....... 3/4 8-10 3/4 8-11 Shutdown................................................
3/4.8.2 ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION 3/4 8-12 0perating...............................................
3/4 8-14 Shutdown................................................
3/4.8.3 D.C. SOURCES 3/4 8-15 0perating.......................................
TABLE 4.8-3 BATTERY SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS....................
3/4 P-17 3/4 8-18 Shutdown................................................
3/4.8.4 ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES Motor-Operated Valves Thermal Overload Protection 3/4 8-19 and Bypass 0evices......................................
TABLE 3.8-1 MOTOR-OPERATED VALVES THERMAL OVERLOAD PROTECTION AND BYPASS DEVICES......................................
3/4 8-20 Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protective Devices......................................
3/4 8-23 DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 xi Amendment Nos. 66 and 6!
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-INDEX LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SECTION PAGE 3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3/4.9.1-BORON CONCENTRATION.....................................
3/4 9-1 3/s.9.2 INSTRUMENTATION..........................................-
3/4 9-2 3/4.9.3 DECAY TIME..............................................
3/4 9-3 3/4.9.4 CONTAINMENT-PENETRATIONS................................
3/4 9-4 3/4.9.5 COMMUNICATIONS..........................................
3/4 9-5 3/4.9.6 MANIPULATOR CRAN.......................................
3/4 9-6 3/4.9.7
- CRANE TRAVE L - FUEL-HANDLING BUILDING...................
3/4 9-7 3/4.9.8 : RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL AND COOLANT CIRCULATION High' Water Leve1........................................
3/4 9-8 Low Water Leve1.........................................
3/4 9-9 3/4.9.9-CONTAINMENT VENTI LATION ISOLATION SYSTEM................
3/4 9-10 3/4.9.10 WAT ER LEVEL - REACTOR VESSEL............................
3/4 9-11 Fuel Assemblies.........................................-
3/4 9-11 Control Rods....................................'........
3/4.9-11a 3/4. 9.11 _ WATER - LEVEL - SPENT FUEL P00L...........................
3/4 9-12 t
3/4.9.12 l FUEL HANDLING BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM...............
3/4 9-13 3/4.9.13 -SPENT FUEL SHIPPING CASK MOVEMENT.......................
3/4 9-15 3/4.10 SPE_CIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS 3/4.10.1 SE 90WN MARGIN.........................................
3/4 10 1 3/4.10.2 GROUP. HEIGHT, INSERTION AND POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS...
3/4 10-2 l
3/4.10.3 PHYSICS TE5TS...........................................
3/4 10-3 3/4.10.4 POSITION INDICATION SYSTEM - SHUTDOWN...................
3/4 10-4 DIALLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 xii Amendment Nos.39 and 38 JUN 7 589
m.
PLANT SYSTFMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) 2)
Verifying that the cleanup system satisfies the in place penetration and bypass leakage testing acceptance criteria of less than 1% and uses the test procedure guidance in Regulatory Positions C.S.a. C.S.c and C.S.d of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revi-sion 2. March 1978, and the system flow rate is 73,500 cfm 1 10%;
3)
Verifying,-within 31 days after removal, that a laboratory analysis of a representative carbon sample obtained in accor-dance with Regulatory Position C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2. March 1978, meets the laboratory testing criteria of Regulatory Position C.6.a of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revi-sion 2, March 1978, for a methyl iodide penetration of less than 6%; and 4)
Verifying a system flow rate of 73,500 cfm + 10% during system operation when tested in accordance with AN3I N510-1980, After every 720 hours0.00833 days <br />0.2 hours <br />0.00119 weeks <br />2.7396e-4 months <br /> of charcoal adsorber operation, by verifying, c.
within 31 days after removal, that a laboratory analysis of a repre-sentative carbon sample obtained in accordance with Regulatory Position C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, meets the laboratory testing criteria of Regulatory Position C.6.a of Regulatory Guide 1.52 Revision 2, March 1978, for a methyl iodide penetration of less than 6%;
d.
At least once per 18 months by:
1)
Verifying.that the pressure drop across the combined HEFA filters and charcoal adsorber banks is less than 3.7 fnehes Water Gauge while operating the system at a flow rate of 73,500 cfm i 10%,
2)
Verifying that flow is established through the HEPA filter and charcoal adsorber bank on a Safety Injection test sign 41, and 3)
Verifying that the heaters dissipate 50 1 5 kW when tested in accordance with ANSI N510-1980.
After each complete or pac. ial replacement of a HEPA filter bank, by e.
i verifying that the cleanup system satisfics the in place penetration i
and bypass leakage testing acceptance criteria of less than 1% in accordance with ANSI N510-1980 for a DOP test aerosol while operating the system at a flow rate of 73,500 cfm 1 10%; and f.
After each complete or partial replacement of a charcoal adsorber bank, by verifying that the cleanup system satisfies the in place penetration and bypass leakage testing acceptance criteria of less than 1% in accordance with ANSI N510-1980 for a halogenated hydro-carbon test gas while operating the system at a flow rate of 7,1,500 cfm 1 10%.
DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 7-17 i
Reissued September 19, 1991 PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.7 SNUBBERS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.7.1 All snubbers shall be OPERABLE.
The only snubbers excluded from this requirement are those installed on nonsafety-related systems and then only if their failure or failure of the system on which they are installed would have no adverse effect on any safety-related system.
APPLICABILITY:
MODES 1, 2 3, and 4 R) DES 5 and 6 for snubbers located on systemsrequiredOPERABLEInthoseMODES.
ACTION:
With one or more snubbers inoperable on any system, within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> replace or restore the inoperable snubber (s) to OPERABLE status and perform an engineering evaluation per Specification 4.7.7.lf. on the attached component or declare the attached system inoperable and follow the appropriate ACTION statement for that system.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.7.1 Each snubber snall be demanstrated OPERABLE by performance of the fol-lowing augmented inservice inspection program and the requirements of Specification 4.0.5.
t a.
Visual Inspections Snubbers ma operation. y be categorized as inaccessible or accessible during reactor Each of these categories (inaccessible and accessible) may be inspected independently or jointly according to the schedule determined by Table 4.7-2.
The visual inspection interval for each category of snubber shall be detemined based upon the criteria provided in Table 4.7-2 and the first inspection interval deterinined using this criteria shall be based upon the previous inspection interval as established by the requirements in effect before Amendment Nos. 66 and 65.
DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 7-18 Amendment Nos. 66 and 65
__, _ _ _ _ ~ - - - - - - - - ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ' ' ' ' '
Reissued September 19, 1991 PLANT SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) b.
Visual Inspection Acceptance Criteria Visual inspections shall verify (1) that there are no visible indica-tions of damage or impaired OPERABILITY, (2) attachments to the founda-tion or supporting structure are functional, and (3) fasteners for attachment of the snubber to the component and to the snubber anchor-age are functional.
Snubbers which appear inoperable as a result of visual inspections shall be classified unacceptable and may be reclassified acceptable for the purpose of establishirg the next visual inspection interval, provided that:
(1) the cause of the rejection is clearly established and remedied for that particular snubber and for other snubbers irrespective of ty)e that may be genericallysusceptible;and(2)theaffectedsnu)berisfunctionally tested in the as-found condition and determined OPERABLE per S>eci-fication 4.7.7.le.
All snubbers found connected to an inopera He common hydraulic fluid reservoir shall be counted as unacceptable for determining the next inspection interval.
A review and evaluation shall be performed and documented to justify continued operation with an unacceptable snubber.
Ifcontinuedoperationcannotbejustified, the snubber shall be declared inoperable and the ACTION requirements shall be met, c.
Transient Event Inspection A visual inspection shall be performed of all hydraulic and mechanical snubbers attached to sections of systems that have experienced unexpected, potentially damaging transients as detennined from a review of operational data.
This inspection shall be performed within 6 months following such an event.
In addition to satisfying the visual ins)ection acceptance criteria freedom-of-motion of mechanical snu)bers shall be verified usin,g at least one of the following:
(1 of in place snu)bber piston setting; or (3) stroking the mechanicalmanuall snubber through its full range of travel, a
i DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 7-19 Amendment Nos. 66 and 65 l
Reissued September 19, 1991 j
PLANT SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) d.
Functional Tests l
During the first refueling shutdown and at least once per 18 months thereafter during shutdown, a representative sample of snubbers of each 1.ype shall be tested usin As uskd in this specification,g one of the following sample plans.
type of snubber shall meen snubbers of the same design ard manufacturer, irrespective of cepacity.
The sam)le plan shall be selected prior to the test period and cannot.)e changed during th3 test period.
The NRC Regional Acaini-strator shall be notified in writing of the samale plan selected for each snubber type prior tc the tut period or tie sample plan used in the prior test period shall be implemented:
1)
At least 10% of the total of each type of snubber shall be functionally tested either in place or in :. bench test.
For each snubber of a tyoe that does not meet the functional test acce)tance criteria of Specification 4.7.i.le., an additional 10%
l of t1at type of snubber shall be fur.ctionally tested until no more failur,ts are fv]nd or until all snubbers of that type have been functionally tested; or 2)
A representative sample of each type of snubber shall be func-tionally tested in ectordance with Figure 4.7-1.
"C" is the total number of snubbers of a type found not meeting the accep-tance requirements of Specification 4.7.7.le.
The cumulative I
number of snubbers of a type tested is denoted by "N".
At the I
end of each day's testing, the new values of "N" and "C" (pre-vious day's total plus current day's increments) shall be plotted on fi Jte 4.7-1.
If at any time the point plotted f
falls in the ' Reject" region, all snubbers of that type shall be functionally tested.
If at any time the point plotted falls in the " Accept region, testing of snubbers of that type may be terminated.
When the point plotted lies in the " Continue Testing" region, additional snubbers of that type shall be teste:1 until the "Re,i ct" region, point falls in the "Acce)t" region or theor all the snubbers tested; or 3)
An initial representative sample of 55 snubbers shall be func-tionally tested.
For each snubber t functional test acceptance criteria,ype which does not meet the another sample of at least one-half the size of the initial sample shall be tested until the total number tested is equal to the initial sample size multiplied by the factor,1 + C/2, where "C" is the number of snubbers found which do not meet the functional test acceptahce criteria.
The results from this sample plan shall be plotted using an " Accept" line which follows the equation N = 55(1 + C/2).
Each snubber ooint should be plotted as soon as the snubber is tested.
If tie point plotted falls on or below the " Accept" line, testing of that type of snubber may be terminated.
If the point plotted falls above the " Accept" line, testing must continue until the point falls in the " Accept" region or all the snubbers of that type have been tested.
DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 7-20 Amendment Nos. 66 and 65
Reissued September 19, 1991 PLANT SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) d.
Functional Tests (Continued) l Testing equipment failure during fuactional testing may invalidate that day s testing and allow that day's testing to resume anew at a later time provided all snubbers tested with the failed equipment during the day of equipment failure are retested.
The representative sample selected for the functional test sample plans shall be randomly selected from the snubbers of each type and reviewed before beginning the testing. The review shall ensure, as far as are representative of the various configurations, practicable, that they operating environments, range of size, and capacity of snubbers of each type.
Snubbers placed in the same location aF snubbers which failed the previous functional test shall be retested at the time of the next functional test but shall not be included in the sample plan.
If during the functional testing, additional sampling is required due to failure of only one type of snubber, the functional test results shall be reviewed at that time to determine if additional samples should be limited to the type of snubber which has failed the functional testing, e.
Functional Test Acceptance Criteria l
The snubber functional test shall verify that:
1)
Activation (restraining action) is achieved within the specified range in both tension and compression; 2)
Snubber bleed, or release rate where required is present in bothtensionandcompression,withinthespeelfiedrange; 3)
For mechanical snubbers, the force required to initiate or main-tain motion of the snubber is within the specified range in both directions of travel; and 4)
For snubbers specifically required not to displace under continuous load, the ability of the snubber to withstand load without displacement.
Testing methods ay be used to seasure parameters indirectly or parameters other than those specified if those results can be correltted to the specified parameters through established methods, f.
Functional Test Failure Analysis An engineering evaluation shall be made of each failure to meet the functional test acceptance criteria to determine the cause of the failure. The results of this evaluation shall be used, if applicable, in : electing snubbers to be tested in an effort to determine the OPERABILITY of other snubbers irrespective of type which may be subject to the same failure mode.
DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 7-21 Amendment Nos. 66 and 65
PLANT SYSTEMS Reissued September 19, 1991 SURVEltLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) f.-
Functional Test Failure An3 ysis (Continued) 1 For the snubbers found inoperable, an engineering evaluation shall be performed on the components to which the inoperable snubbers are attached.
The purpose of this engineering evaluation shall be to determine if the components to which the inoperable snubbers are attached were adversely affected by the inoperability of the snubbers in ordter to ensure that the component remains capable of meeting the design service.
If any snubber selected for functional testing either fails to lockup or fails to move, i.e., frozen-in place, the cause will be evaluated and, if caused by manufacturer or design deficiency, all snubbers of the same type subject te the same defect shall be functionally tested.
This testing requi rement shall be_ independerit of the requirements stated in Specification 4.7.7.1d. for snubbers not meeting the func-l ticaal test acceptance criteria.
g.
_ Functional-Testing of Repaired and Replaced Snubbers Snubbers that fail the visual inspection or the functional test acceptance criteria shall be repaired or replaced.
Replacement snubbers and snubbers that have repairs which might affect the functional test results shall be tested to meet the functional test criteria before installation in the unit.
Mechanical snubbers shall have met the acceptance criteria subsequent to their most recent service, and the freedom-of-motion test must have been performed within 12 months before being installed in the unit.
h.
Snubber Service Life Program The service life of hydraulic and mechanical snubbers shall be monitored to ensure-that the service life is not exceeded between surveillance inspections.
The maximum expected service life for various seals, springs, and other critical parts shall be deter-mined and established based on engineering information and shall be extended or shortened based on monitored test results and failure history.
Critical parts shall be replaced so that the maximum
-service life will not be exceeded during a period when the snubber is required to be OPERABLE.
The parts replacements shall be docu-mented and the documentation shall be retained in accordance with.
Specification 6.10.2.
DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 7-22 Amendment Nos. 66 and 65
10 g 8
/
F.EJ ECT j
f,fY c
02 CONTINUE TESTING f
2 ACCEPT 1
r 2
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 N
FIGURE 4.7-1 SAMPLE PLAN 2) FOR SHUBBER FUNCTIONAL TEST DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 7-23 L-_
n.,.
Reissued September 19, 1991 Table 4.7-2 SNUBBER VISUAL INSPECTION INTERVAL NUMBER OF UNACCEPTABLE SNUBBERS Column A Column B Colin T Category Size Extend Interval Repeat Interval Reduce D.terval (Notes 1 and 2)
(Notes 3 and 6)
(Notes 4 and 6)
(Notes 5 and 6) 1 0
0 1
80 0
0 2
100 0
1 4
150 0
3 8
200 2
5 13 300 5
12 25 400 8
18 36 500 12 24 48 750 20 40 78 1000 or greater 29 56 109 Note 1:
The-next visual inspection interval for a snubber category size shall be determined based upon the previous inspection interval and the number of unacceptable snubbers found during that interval.
Snubbers may be categorized, based upon their accessibility during power operation, as accessible or inaccessible.
These categories may be examined separately or jointly.
However, the decision must be made and documented before any inspection and this decision shall be used as the basis upon which to determine the next inspection interval for that category.
Note 2:
Interpolation between category sizes and the number of unacceptable snubbers is permissible.
Use next lower integer for the value of the limit for Columns A, B, or C if that integer includes a fractional value of unacceptable snubbers as determined by interpolation.
Note 3:
If the number of unacceptable snubbers is equal to or less than the number in Column A, the next inspection interval may be twice the previous interval but not greater than 48 months.
DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 7-23a Amendment Nos. 66 and 6r
Reissued September 19, 1991 1
Table 4.7-2 (continued)
SNUBBER VISUAL INSPECTION INTERVAL Note 4:
If the number of unacceptable snubbers is equal to or less than the number in Columa B but greater than the number in Column A, the next inspection interval shall be the same as the previous interval.
Note 5:
If the number o' unacceptable snubbers is equal to or greater than the number in Cslumn C, the next inspection interval shall be two-thirds of the previous intervai.
However, if the number of unaccep-table snubbers is less than the number in Column C but greater than the number in Column B th tionally by interpolation,e next interval shall be reduced aropor-that is the previous interval siall be reducedbyafactorthatisone-thIrdoftheratioofthedifference between the number of unacceptable snubbers found during the previous interval and the number in Column B to the difference in the numbers in Column B and C.
Note 6:
The provisions of Specification 4.0.2 are applicable for all inspection intervals up to and including 48 months.
DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 7-23b Amendment Nos. 66 and 65
PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.8-SEALED SOURCE CONTAMINATION
. LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION-3.7.8.1-Each sealed source containing radioactive material in excess of 100 microcuries of beta,and/or gamma esittira material or 10 microcuries of alpha-emitting raterial shall be free of greater than or equal to 0.00$ micro-curie of~ removable contamination.
APPLICABILITY: At all times.
ACTION:
With a sealed source having removable contamination in excess of the a.
above limits, immediately withdraw the sealed source from use, and either:
1.
Decontaminate and repair the sealed source, or 2.
Dispose of the_ sealed source in accordance with Commission Regulations.
b.
The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.
l
'5URVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.8.1.1 Test Requirements - Each sealed source shall be tested for leakage and/or contamination by:
a.
The licensee, or b.
Other persons specifically authorized by the Commission or an
-Agreement State.
The test method shall have a detection sensitivity of at least 0.005 micro-
- curie per test sample.
4.7.8.1.2 Test Free" neles - Each category of sealed sources (excluding startup seurces and fission detectors previously subjected to core flux) shall be tested at the frequency described below.'
Sources in use - At least once per_6 months for all sealed sources a.-
containing radioactive materials:
1)
With a half-life greater than 30 days (excluding Hydrogen 3),
and 2)
In any form other than gas.
DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 7-24 Amendment Nos. 55 and 54 JUN 111990 e
. -. - ~ ~ - -
PLANT SYSTEMS BASES
-3/4.7.2 STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE /fEMPERATURE LIMITATION The limitation on steam generator pressure and temperature ensures that the pressure induced stresses in the steam generators do not exceed the maximum allowable fracture toughness stress limits.
The limitations of 70*F and 200 psig are based on average steam generator impact values taken at 10*F and are sufficient to prevent brittle fracture.
3/4.7.3 VITAL COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the Vital Component Cooling Water System ensures that sufficient cooling capacity is available for continued operation of safety-related equipment during normal and accident conditions.
The redundant cooling capacity of this system, assuming a single failure, is consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.
3/4.7.4 AUXILIARY SALTVATER SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the Auxiliary Saltwater System ensures that sufficient cooling capacity is available for continued operation of safety-related equipment during normal and accident conditions.
The redundant cooling capacity of this system, assuming a single failure, is consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.
l 3/4.7.S CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION SYSTFJ The OPERABILITY of_ the Control Room Ventilation System ensures that:
(1) the ambient air temperature does not exceed the allowable temperature for-l continuous duty racing for the equipment.and instrumentation cooled by th!
system, and (2) the control room will remain habitable for operations personnel l-l during and following all credible-accident conditions.
The OPERABILITY of.
l this system in conjunction with control room design provisions -is -based O'1 l
limiting the radiation exposure to personnal occupying the control room to L
5 rem or=less whole body, or its equivalent.
This limitation is consistent with-the requiren ts of General Design Criterion 19 of A; sendix A,10 CFR l-Part 50.
Operation-of the system with the heaters operating to maintain low humidity using automatic control for at.least 10 continuous hours in a 31-day period is sufficient to rectuce the buildup _of moisture on-the adsorbers and HEPA filters.
ANSI N510-1980 will be used as-a procedural guide for surveil-lance testing.
DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 8 3/4 7-3
Reissued September 19, 1991 PLANT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.7.6 AUXILIARY BUILDING SAFEGUARDS AIR FILTRATION SYST_EM The OPERABILITY of the Auxiliary Building Safeguards Air Filtration System ensures that radioactive materials leaking from the ECCS equipment within the auxiliary building following a LOCA are filtered prior to reaching the environ-ment.
Operation of the system with the heaters operating to maintain low humidity for at least 10 continuous hours in a 31-day period is sufficient to reduce the buildup of moisture on the adsorbers and HEPA filters.
The oper6-tion of this system and the resultant effect on offsite dosage calculations were assumed in the safety analyses.
ANSI N510-1980 will be used as a proce-dural guide for surveillance testing.
i 3/4.7.7 SNUBBERS All snubbers are required OPERABLE to ensure that the structural integrity of the Reactor Coolant System and all other safety-related systems is maintained during and following a seismic or other event initiating dynamic loads.
Snubbers are c ~ vssified and grouped by design and manufacturer but not by size.
For example, aechanical snubbers utilizing the same design features of the 2-kip,10-kip, and 100-kip capacity manufactured by Company "A" are of the same type.
The same design mechanical snubbers manufactured by Company "B" for the purposes of this Technical Specification would be of a different type, as would hydraulic snubbers from either manufacturer.
A list of individual snubbers with detailed information of snubber location and size and of system affected shall be available at the plant in accordance with Section 50.71(c) of 10 CFR Part 50.
The accessibility of each snubber shall be determined and approved by the Plant Staff Review Committee.
The determination shall be based upon the existing radiation levels and the expected time to perform a visual inspection ~in each snubber location as well as other
(
factors associated with accessibility during plant operations (e.g., tempera-ture, atmosphere, location, etc.), and the recommendations of Regulatory Guides 8.8 and 8.10.
The iddition or deletion of any hydraulic or mechanical snubber shall be made in acco. dance with Section 50.59 of 10 CFR Part 50.
The visual inspection frequency is based upon maintaining a constant level of snubber protection during an earthquake or severe transient.
The method i
for determining the next interval for the visual inspection of snubbers is provided based upon the number of unacceptable snubbers found during the previous inspection, the category size, and the previous inspection interval per NRC Generic Letter 90-09.
A snubber is considered unacceptable if it fails to satisfy the acceptance criteria of the visual inspection.
DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3/4 7-4 Amendment Nos. 66 and 65
i Reissued September 19, 1991 PLANT SYSTEMS BASES SNUBBERS (Continued)
I Any inspection whose results require a shorter insper. tion intercal will override the previous schedule.
The acceptance criteria are to be used in the visual inspection to deter-mine OPERABILITY of the snubbers.
For example, if a fluid port of a hydraulic snubber is found to be uncovered, tLe snubber shall be declared inoperable and shall not be determined OPERABLE via functional testing.
To provide assurance of snubber functional reliability, one of three functional testing methods is used with the stated acceptance criteria:
1.
Functionally test 10% of a type of snubber with an additional 10%
tested for each functional testing failure, or 2.
Functionally test a sample size and determine sample acceptance or rejection using Figure 4.7-1, or 3.
Functionally test a representative sample size and determine sample acceptance or rejection using the stated equation.
Figure 4.7-1 was developed using "Wald's Sequential Probability Ratio Plan" as described-in " Quality Control and Industrial Statistics" by Acheson J.
Duncan.
Permanent or other exemptions from the surveillance program for individual snubbers may be granted by the Commission if a justifiable basis for exemption is presented and, if applicable, snubber life destructive testing was performed to qualify the snubber for the applicable design conditions at either the completion of its fabrication or at a subsequent date.
Snubbers so exempted shall be listed in the list of individual snubbers indicating the extent of the exemptions.
The service life of a.*mubber is established via manufacturer 'iput and information through consideration of the snubber service conditions and asso-ciated installation and maintenance records (newly installed snubber, seal replaced, spring replaced, in high radiation area, in high temperature area, etc.).
The requirement to monitor the snubber service life is included to ensure that the snubbers periodically undergo a performance evaluation in view of their age and operating conditions.
These records will provide statistical bases for future consideration of enubber service life.
l DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3/4 7-5 Amendment Nos. 66 and 65 l
PLANT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.7.8 SEALED SOURCE CONTAMINATION The limitation on removable contamination for sources requiring leak testing, including alpha emitters, is based on 10 CFR 70.39(a)(3) limits for plutonium.
This limitation will ensure that leakage from byproduct, source, and special nuclear material sources will not exceed allowable intake values.
Sealed sources are classified into three groups according to their use, with surveillance requirements commensurate with the probability of damage to a source in that group.
Those sources which are frequently handled are required to be tested more often than those which are not.
Sealed sources which are continuously enclosed within a shielded mechanism (i.e., sealed sources within radiation monitoring or boron measuring devices) are considered to be stored and need not be tested unless they are removed from the shielded mechanism.
3/4.7.9 FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS The OPERABILITY of the Fire Suppression Systems ensures that adequate fire suppression capability is available to confine and extinguish fires occurring in any portion of the facility where safety-related equipment is located.
The Fire Suppression System consists of the water system, spray and/or sprinklers, CO, Halon, and fire water hose stations.
The collective 2
capability of the Fire Suppression Systems is adequate to minimize potential damage to safety-related equipment and is a major element in the facility Fire Protection Program.
In the event that portions of the Fire Suppression Systems are inoperat'e, alternate backup fire fighting equipment is required to be made available in the affected areas until the inoperable equipment it restored to service.
Whsn the inoperable fire fighting equipment is intended for use as a backup meals of fire suppression, a longtr period of time is allowed to provide an alttrnate means of fire fighting than if the inoperable equipment is-the prim try means of fire suppression, The Surveillance Requirements provide assurance that the minimun. OPERABILITY requirements of the Fire Suppression Systems arr. met.
An allowance is made for ensuring a sufficient volume of Halon in the Halon storage tanks by verifying the weight of the tanks.
In the event the Fire Suppression Water System becomes inoperable, prompt corrective measures must be taken since this system provides the major fire suppression capability of the plant, i
i DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3/4 7-6 l
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