Text

Proposed Tech Specs Reflecting TS Changes 184 & 49
	ML20082E527
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley
Issue date:	03/31/1995
From:	; DUQUESNE LIGHT CO.
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ML20082E518	List: ML20082E516; ML20082E527;
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ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO.

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-66 DOCKET NO. 50-334 Replace the following pages of Appendix A, Technical Specifications,-

with the enclosed pages as . indicated. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of. change.

Remove Insert 3/4 1-11 3/4 1-11 3/4 3-50 3/4 3-50 3/4 3-52 3/4 3-52 3/4 4-27a- 3/4 4-27a 3/4 4-27b 3/4 4-27b 3/4 4-27c 3/4 4-29 3/4 4-29 3/4 4-29a 3/4 5-2 3/4 5-2 B 3/4 4-10 B 3/4 4-10 B 3/4 4-10b B 3/4 4-10c B 3/4 4-10d B 3/4 4-10e B 3/4 4-10f B 3/4 4-10g B 3/4-4-10h B 3/4 4-101 B 3/4 4-10j B 3/4 4-11 B 3/4 4-11 B 3/4 4-11a B 3/4 4-11b B 3/4 4-11c B 3/4 4-11d B 3/4 4-11e B 3/4 4-11f 9504110252 950331 PDR ADOCK 05000334 P PDR

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4 DPR-66~

0 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS !

CHARGING PUMP - SHITDOWN ,

4

. LIMITING' CONDITION: FOR OPERATION: !

3 '.1. 2 . 3 - J At :least one charging. pump

in the boron' injection Specification 3.1.2.1 or low.. head . safety flow path required : by. '

-'i'njection pump-(with an open' reactor coolant system. vent ~of greater than or equal to 3.14 square inches) shall be.. OPERABLE;and capable.

of-being powered from an OPERABLE bus. .;

APPLICABILITY:- MODES 5 and.6'.

.i ACTION:

With none of the above pumps OPERABLE, ' suspend all operations;l-involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes until one charging pump or low head safety injection ' pump is restored to!l OPERABLE status.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.2.'3.1 The above required charging pump shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying, on recirculation flow,' that!the pump develops

- a' discharge pressure greater than or equal to 2402 psig when tested-pursuant to Specification 4.0.5..

4.1.2.3.2 When the low head safety ' injection pump is used in -

lieu-of a charging pump, the low head safety injection pump shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by. .,

.a. . Verification of an operable RWST pursuant to14.1.2.7, Verification of an operable low head: safety Tinjection pump l

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b.

pursuant to-Specification 4.5.2.b.2,

c. Verification of an operable low head safety injection flow l path from the RWST to the Reactor Coolant System once per shift, and '

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d. Verification that the vent is open in accordance with 4.4.9.3.3.

(1) With two charging pumps OPERABLE, follow Specification 3.4.9.3.

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BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 1-11 Amendment No.

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.DPR-66' -i INSTRUMENTATION j ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

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LIMITING' CONDITION FOR OPERATION i

-3'.3.3.8 'The accident monitoring instrumentation channels shown '

~ in-Table 3.3.11.shall.be OPERABLE.- ~!

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1; 2 and 3. ,

ACTION:

a. With the number -of OPERABLE accident-- monitoring ;

instrumentation channels' less than . the' Total - Number 'of Channels shown in Table 3. 3.11, either ; restore the inoperable channel (s) to' OPERABLE status within.7. days or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months s- .

(follow Specification 3.4.11 when determining ACTIONS for ,

Items 4, 5, and 6)..

b. With the number' of OPERABLE- accident monitoring instrumentation channels less than the MINIMUM CHANNELS (

OPERABLE requirements of Table 3.3.11, either restore the

~ inoperable channel (s) to OPERABLE status.within~48 hours or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next .12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months ,

(follow Specification 3.4.11 when determining ACTIONS for Item 4).

c. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable. 'i SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.3.3.8 Each accident monitoring instrumentation channel.shall ,

be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of-the CHANNEL CHECK and' !

CHANNEL CALIBRATION operations at.the frequencies shown in Table -

4.3-7.

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BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 3-50 Amendment No.

c, TABLE 4.3-7 'DPR-66 ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION SURVEIT.TANCE REOUIREMENTS CHANNEL CHANNEL CHECK CALIBRATION

1. Pressurizer Water Level M R .-

2. Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Rate S/U"' R

3. Reactor Coolant System Subcooling Margin M R

4. PORV Acoustical Detector Position Indicator M R

5. PORV Limit Switch Position Indicator M- R

6. PORV Block Valve Limit Switch' Position Indicator M R

7. Safety Valve Acoustical Detector Position Indicator M R

8. Safety Valve Temperature Detector Position Indicator M R

9. Deleted l

10. Containment Sump Wide-Range Water Level M 'R

11. Containment Wide-Range-Pressure N/A R

12. In-Core Thermocouples (Core-Exit Thermocouples) M R

13. Reactor Vessel Level Indicating System M R (1) Channel check to be performed in conjunction with Surveillance Requirement 4.7.1.2.c following an extended plant outage.

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 3-52 Amendment No.

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.DPR-66

, REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION SYSTEMS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION i

3.4.9.3 An overpressure protection system shallibelOPERABLE !

m with a maximum of one charging pung3 capable ofLinjecting into the-RCS and the accumulators isolated and'aither a-or b below-

a. Two power operated relief valves (PORVs) with a . lift - l setting.less than or equal.to 432 psig,.or- 1i

b. The RCS depressurized and an RCS' vent.of greater.than'_or :

equal.to 3.14 square inches. l APPLICABILITY: Mode 4 when any RCS cold' leg temperature is less than or equal to an enable temperature of 329'F, ,

Mode 5, :

Mode 6 when the reactor vessel head is on. +

ACTION: i P

a. With two or more charging pumps capable of injecting into &

the RCS, immediately initiate action to verify a maximum.of.

one charging pump is capable of injecting into'the RCS'or ;

depressurize and vent the RCS through a-3.14' square inch or !

larger vent within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .. ,

b. With an accumulator not isolated when the accumulator- 1 pressure is greater than or equal- . to the maximum RCS- ;

pressure for the existing RCS cold leg. temperature allowed .

by the' heatup andi cooldown curves, isolate the affected !

accumulator within 1-hour'or increase-the-RCS cold l leg j temperature above the enable temperature within the next '

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months or depressurize the affected accumulator'to less

'than the max.* eum RCS pressure for the existing- cold leg . l

' temperature ellowed by the heatup and 'cooldown curves- ,

within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . -

c. With one PORV inoperable in MODE 4 (when any RCS cold leg !

temperature is less than or equal to the- enable ;

temperature), restore the inoperable PORV to OPERABLE status within 7 days or depressurize and vent' the RCS ,

through a 3.14 square inch or larger vent within the next !

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . 1 (1) Two charging pumps may be capable of injecting'into the RCS.for pump. swap' operation for less than.or equal to 15 minutes.

(2). Accumulator isolation with power removed from the discharge isolation valves is only required when the accumulator pressure -.

is greater than or equal to the maximum RCS pressure-for the '

existing ~ RCS cold leg temperature allowed by the heatup and' cooldown curves.

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 4-27a Amendment No. 1 i

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'DPR-66 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LIMITING' CONDITION'FOR' OPERATION'(Cont'inued)

ACTION: (Continued)

d. With - one PORV inoperable in MODES 5 'or _ 6, restore the inoperable PORV to OPERABLE status within 24 - - hours or' depressurize and vent the RCS through a_3.14 square inch.or.

-larger. vent within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . ,

e. With two PORVs inoperable, depressurize and vent the RCS.

through'a 3.14 square inch or. larger vent within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.4.9.3.1 Verify at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months that:

a. A maximum of one charging pump is capable of injecting into-

,. the RCS, and

b. Each accumulator'is isolated; however, with'the accumulator pressure less than the low temperature . overpressure.

protection setpoint, the accumulator discharge _ isolation valves may be opened to perform accumulator discharge check valve testing.

4.4.9.3.2 When PORVs are-being used for overpressure protection,.

demonstrate each PORV-is OPERABLE by:

a. Verifying each PORV block valve.is open for each required PORV at least once per 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months , and

b. ' Performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on the PORV actuation channel, but excluding valve operation, within

~

31 days prior to entering ' a condition in which the PORV 'is-required to be - OPERABLE and placed i n - o p e r a t i o n -' a f t e r decreasing the RCS cold leg- temperature to less than or:

p equal to the enable temperature and at least once per 31-l days, and

c. Performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION:on each required.PORV

actuation channel at least once per 18 months.-

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l BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 4-27b Amendment No.

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DPR-66

--REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) 4.4.9.3.3 When a vent is being used for overpressure protection,

.. verify the required' vent is open:

a. At least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months for an open vent or unlocked open vent valve (s), except

b. At least once per 31 days for a valve which is locked or provided with remote position indication, or sealed, or otherwise secured in the open position.

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BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 4-27c Amendment No. l

W t DPR-66 1 4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM 3/4.4'11'RELTEF VALVES LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

'3.4.11 Each power operated relief valve (PORV) and associated

( . block valve shall'be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3. '

ACTION:

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - GENERAL NOTE - - - - - - - - - -- - - Ji Separate ACTION statement entry is allowed for each PORV.and a block valve. ;

a. With one or more PORVs inoperable and capable -of being manually cycled, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months either restore the PORV(s) ~ '

to OPERABLE status or close the associated block valve (s) with power maintained to the block valve (s); otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

b. With one or two PORV(s) inoperable and not capable of being.

manually cycled, within l' hour either restore the PORV(s) to OPERABLE status or close the associated' block valves and remove power from the block valve (s) ; ~ a minimum of' two -

PORVs are to be OPERABLE within the following 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in HOT STANDBY within the next L 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in ' HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months . -- W i t h o n e PORVi inoperable and isolated, power operation'may. continue until~

the next refueling _ outage.

c. With three PORVs inoperable. and not capable of being l manually cycled,'within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months either restore at least one I PORV to OPERABLE status or close the associated block i valves and remove power from the block valves and be in HOT l STANDBY within the next 6' hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within i the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months . 'l

d. With one block valve inoperable and open, within 1' hour either restore the block valve to OPERABLE status or' place the associated PORV in manual control'. -Restore the block valve to OPERABLE status within the following 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or j be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT 'i BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 4-29 Amendment No.

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~.DPR REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION'FOR OPERATION (Continued)

ACTION: - . (Continued)

SHUTDOWN within 'the following / 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months . With one block valve inoperable, restore the block ' valve to OPERABLE

~

status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months or close it, power operation may

. continue until.the next refueling outage.

e. With more than one. block valve inoperable, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months . ,

either restore the block valves to OPERABLE' status or place; the associated PORVs in manual control. Restore at least

one block valve to OPERABLE status within the next hour'if three block valves are inoperable; restore a minimum of two block valves to OPERABLE status within 72' hours; otherwise,

be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months ' and ' in ' HOT ,

SHUTDOWN within tha.following.6. hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.4.11.1 Each PORV shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once-per 18 months by operating the PORV.through'one complete cycle.of full travel using:

a) The normal air supply system, and b) The backup nitrogen supply system.

4.4.11.2 Each-block valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLELat least once-per 92 days by operating the valve through one complete cycle of full travel unless the block valve 'is closed to meet required ACTIONS b or c.

V BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 4-29a Amendment No.

(next page is 3/4 4-32)

'o i DPR-66 ,

-EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

b. At~least.once'per 31 days and within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months after each solution . volume increase of greater than or equal to 1 . percent of~ tank volume by verifying the' ' boron-l concentration of the accumulator solution.

c.- At least once per 31 days when the.RCS pressure is above 2000 psig by verifying that power to the isolation valve operator control' circuit is disconnected by. removal of the plug in the lock out jack from the circuit.

4.5.1.2 Each accumulator water , level and pressure' alarm channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. 'At least once per 31 days by the performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.

b. At least once per 18 months by the performance of a-CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 5-2 Amendment No.

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4 f+) DPR-66 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

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: BASES 7? 3 / 4 . 4 '. 9 PDFASURE/ TEMPERATURE LTMITS'(Continued) vessel inside- radius' are' essentially 'identical,. the: measured' transition: shift for a: sample can be applied with confidence to the adjacent section_of.the reactor vessel.1 The heatup and cooldown '

curves . must be recalculated when . thei ARTwor determined from the surveillance capsule is different from the calculated' ARTuor for-'the-equivalent capsula radi~ation exposure. ,

'The pressure-temperature limit -lines shown J on - Figure ' 3.4-2 ' for -

4 reactor criticality and for inservice leak-and hydrostatic testing ,

have been provided to assure compliance with the minimum temperature requirements of Appendix G'to 10.CFR 50 for reactor criticality and for inservice leak and-hydrostatic testing.

The nu.nber of reactor vessel irradiation' surveillance specimens and the frequencies for removing and testing these . specimens are-provided in UFSAR Table 4.5-3 to assure compliance with the: l requirements of Appendix.H to 10 CFR 50.

The limitations imposed-on the pressurizer heatup and cooldown rates ,

and spray water temperature' differential are provided to assure that the pressurizer is operated within the design criteria assumed for the fatigue analysis performed in accordance with the. ASME Code ;

requirements.

l Pressure-temperature limit curves shown :in Figure -B 3/4 4-3 were i developed for the. limiting ferritic steel component within an i isolated reactor coolant loop. The limiting component is the steam .l' generator channel' head to-tubesheet region.. This figure provides the ASME III, Appendix G limiting curve which is.used to~ define-operational bounds,.such'that when operating with an isolated. loop the analyzed pressure-temperature limits are known. The' temperature

, range provided bounds the expected operating range for an isolated loop.

OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION SYSTEMS BACKGROUND j The overpressure protection system (OPPS) controls RCS pressure at-low temperatures so the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB) is not compromised by violating the pressure and' ,

temperature (P/T) ~ limits of 10 CFR 50, Appendix G. The reactor vessel is the limiting RCPB component for demonstrating 'such protection. The maximum setpoint for the power operated relief )

valves (PORVs) and the maximum RCS pressure for the existing RCS.- !

cold leg temperature'during cooldown, shutdown, and heatup meet the j 10 CFR 50, Appendix G requirements during the OPPS MODES.

I BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 4-10 Amendment No. !

DPR-66 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BASES (Continued) 3/4.4.9 PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITS (Continued)

BACKGROUND (Continued)

The reactor vessel material is less tough at low temperatures than at normal operating temperature. As the vessel. neutron exposure accumulates, the material toughness decreases and becomes less resistant to pressure. stress at low temperatures. RCS pressure, therefore, is maintained low at low temperatures and is increased only as temperature is increased.

The potential for vessel overpressurization is most acute when the RCS is water solid, occurring only during shutdown; a pressure fluctuation can occur more quickly than an operator can react to relieve the condition. Exceeding the RCS P/T limits by a significant amount could cause brittle cracking of the reactor vessel. LCO 3.4.9.1, " Pressure / Temperature Limits," requires administrative control of RCS pressure and temperature during heatup ,

and cooldown to prevent exceeding the limits.

This LCO provides RCS overpressure protection by having a minimum coolant input capability and having adequate pressure relief capacity. Limiting coolant input capability requires deactivating all but one charging pump and isolating the accumulators. The pressure relief capacity requires either two redundant RCS relief valves or a depressurized RCS and an RCS vent of sufficient size.

One RCS relief valve or the open RCS vent is the overpressure protection device that acts to terminate an increasing pressure event.

With minimum coolant input capability, the ability to provide core coolant addition is restricted. The LCO does not require the makeup control system deactivated or the-safety injection (SI) actuation circuits blocked. Due to the lower pressures in the OPPS MODES and the expected core decay heat levels, the makeup. system can provide adequate flow via the makeup control valve and, if needed, until the i charging pump is actuated by SI.

The OPPS for pressure relief consists of two PORVs with reduced lift settings or a depressurized RCS and an RCS vent of sufficient size.

Two RCS relief valves are required for redundancy. One RCS relief valve has adequate relieving capability- to keep from overpressurization for the required coolant input capability.

1 BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 4-10b Amendment No. l l

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$h c.~ DPR-66' REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM i

' BASES'(Continued) 3/4.4.9'PRMSURE/ TEMPERATURE LTMITS (Continued)'

PORV REOUIREMENTS -

As designed for the OPPS System, each PORV is signaled'to open if the RCS pressure approaches a' limit determined by the OPPS actuation circuit.. The.OPPS actuation circuit monitors RCS pressure and i determines when a condition not acceptable is approached. If-the-indicated pressure meets or exceeds the OPPS actuation setpoint, a PORV is signaled to open. Having. the setpoints ~ of - both valves . '

within the limits ensures that the Appendix G limits will not be exceeded in any analyzed event. When a PORV is opened ' in - an '

increasing pressure transient, the release of coolant will cause'the pressure increase to slow and reverse. As the PORV releases coolant, the RCS pressure decreases until a reset pressure is reached and the valve is signaled to close. The pressure continues to decrease below the reset pressure as the valve closes.

RCS VENT REOUIREMENTS Once the RCS is depressurized, a vent exposed to the containment ,

atmosphere will maintain the RCS at containment ambient pressure in !

an RCS overpressure transient, if the relieving requirements of the transient do not exceed the capabilities'of the vent. 'Thus, the~

vent path must be capable of relieving the flow resulting from the -

limiting OPPS mass or heat input transient, and maintaining pressure below the.P/T limits. The required vent capacity may be provided by one or more vent paths.

For an RCS vent to. meet the flow capacity requirement, it may be ,

satisfied by removing a pressurizar safety valve or establishing an !

opening between the RCS and the containment atmosphere of' the ,

~

required size through any positive means available which cannot be inadvertently defeated. The vent path (s) must be above the level of reactor coolant,'so as not to drain the RCS when open.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES Safety analyses demonstrate that'the reactor vessel is adequately ,

protected against exceeding the P/T limits when low RCS temperature conditions exist. At the enable temperature and below, overpressure prevention is provided by two OPERABLE RCS relief valves ~ or a s depressurized RCS and a sufficient sized RCS vent.

a BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 4-10c Amendment No. l l

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.DPR-66.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM J

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BASES (Continued). -l

, '3/4.4.9 PREMSURE/ TEMPERATURE T TMTTS (Continued) 1 APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (Continued)

'The actual temperature at which the pressure in the P/T' limit curve falls below. the OPPS setpoint increases as the- reactor vessel.

material toughness decreases due to neutron embrittlement. Each.

time the heatup.and cooldown curves are revised, the OPPS must be-re-evaluated to ensure-its functional requirements can still;be met. ;

The;heatup and cooldown curves. represent the Appendix-G limits'that define OPPS operation.- Setpoint- calculations correlated. to .RCS temperature. define ' acceptable OPPS setpoints for steady-state i pressure-temperature limits based on. Revision 2 of NRCLRegulatory Guide 1.99. Any change to the RCS that may affe~ct OPPS operation.

must be evaluated against the analyses to determine the impact.of :

the change on the OPPS. acceptance limits.

Transients that are capable of overpressurizing the RCS are categorized as either, mass or heat input transients, examples of ,

which follow:

MASS INPUT TYPE TRANSIENTS

a. Inadvertent safety injection; or l

b. Charging / letdown flow mismatch. '

l HEAT INPUT TYPE TRANSIENTS !

a. Inadvertent actuation of pressurizer heaters;

b. Loss of RHR cooling; or

c. Reactor coolant pump (RCP) startup with temperature. -i asymmetry within the RCS or between the RCS and steam generators. ;

The following are required during the OPPS MODES to ensure that' mass and heat input transients do not occur, which'either of the OPPS:

overpressure protection means cannot handle: -

a. Deactivating all but one charging pump OPERABLE;

b. Deactivating the accumulator discharge isolation valves ~in their closed positions; and I

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 4-10d Amendment No. l

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~ DPR-66'-

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM 'l I

BASES-(Continued) 3 /4 . 4.9 PRMSURE/ TEMPERATURE LTMITS (Continued)-

HEAT INPUT TYPE TRANSIENTS (Continued) >

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c. . -Disallowing start of'an RCP if-secondary' temperature is more ,

than' 25'F above primary temperature in any one loop.- LCO

-3.4.1.6,- " Reactor Coolant Pump Startup," provides this ,

protection.

The' analyses . ' demonstrate that either one RCS. relief valve .or the ~ '!

depressurized RCS and RCS' vent can maintain the RCS pressure below the' limits when'only one charging pump is actuated by SI. Thus, the. ,

~ LCO allows only'one charging' pump OPERABLE during the OPPS MODES. .

Since neither one RCS relief valve nor the RCS: vent can handle a full SI actuation, the LCO also requires the accumulators' isolated.

l The -isolated' accumulators must have their discharge valves closed with power removed. Fracture mechanics analyses established _the .

temperature'of OPPS Applicability at the enable ~ temperature.

PORV PERFORMANCE The fracture mechanics analyses show that the vessel-is protected ,

when the PORVs are set to open at or below the limit.. The setpoint. .- i is derived by analyses that model the performance of the OPPS-assuming the limiting OPPS transient of SI actuation of one. charging ,

pump. These analyses consider pressure overshoot and undershoot beyond the PORV opening and closing, resulting from signal processing ~

and valve stroke times. The PORV setpoints at or below the derived ,

limit ensures the P/T limits will be met.

The PORV setpoint will be updated- when the revised P/T limits' i conflict with the OPPS analysis " limits. The P/T limits are periodically modified as the reactor vessel material- toughness decreases due to neutron embrittlement caused by neutron irradiation.

Revised limits are determined using neutron ~ fluence projections and the results of examinations of. the reactor vessel. material irradiation surveillance specimens. The Bases for LCO 3.4.9.1, ~

j

" Pressure / Temperature Limits," discuss these examinations. .l l

The PORVs are considered. active components. Thus, the failure of one ;

PORV is assumed to represent the worst case, single active failure. l RCS VENT PERFORMANCE i

With the RCS depressurized, analyses show that a PORV or equivalent !

opening with a vent size of 3.14 square inches is capable of mitigating the allowed OPPS overpressure transient. The capacity of BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 4-10e Amendment No. l e -r

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DPR-66 y REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM i

BASES (Continued)

R ,

3/4iC 9 PDRESURE/ TEMPERATURE LIMITS (Continued) .,

RCS VENT PERFORMANCE (Continued) a vent this size;is greater.than the flow of the limiting transient

for the_OPPS configuration, SI actuation with one charging pump , ,

OPERABLE, maintaining RCS pressure less than the maximum pressureLon the P/T limit curve. ,

The RCS vent size is based on the PORV size, therefore, the vent is bounded by the PORV analysis.

The RCS vent is passive and is not subject to active failure.

LCQ This LCO requires that the OPPS-is OPERABLE. The OPPS is OPERABLE:

when the minimum coolant input and pressure relief capabilities are OPERABLE. Violation of this LCO could lead to the loss of low ,

temperature overpressure mitigation and violation of the limits as a result of an operational transient, l To limit the coolant input capability, the LCO requires one charging pump capable of injecting into the RCS and all accumulator discharge isolation valves closed and immobilized. The LCO is' qualified by a note that permits two pumps capable of RCS injection for less than or equal to 15 minutes to allow for pump swaps.

The LCO is also ' qualified by a note stating that accumulator.

isolation with~ power removed from the discharge isolation valves is only required when the accumulator pressure is greater than or at the maximum RCS pressure for the existing temperature, as allowed by the i P/T limit curves. This note permits the accumulator . discharge )

isolation valve surveillance to ' be performed . only under these -l pressure and temperature conditions. ;

1 The elements of the LCO that provide low temperature overpressure i mitigation through pressure relief are: l,

a. Two OPERABLE PORVs; a PORV is OPERABLE for OPPS when-its block valve is open, its lift setpoint is set to the limit and testing proves its ability to open=at this setpoint, ',

and motive power is available to the two valves and_their i control circuits; or

b. A depressurized RCS and an RCS vent.

l j

i BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 4-10f Amendment No. l j

DPR-66 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM 1 BASES (Continued) 3/4.4.9 PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITS (Continued)

LCQ (Continued)

An RCS vent is OPERABLE when open with an area of 3.14 square inches.

Each of these methods of overpressure prevention is capable of mitigating the limiting OPPS transient.

APPLICABILITY This LCO is applicable in MODE 4 when any RCS cold leg temperature is less than or equal to the enable temperature, in MODE 5, and in MODE 6 when the reactor vessel head is on. When the reactor vessel head is off, overpressurization cannot occur.

Low temperature overpressure prevention is most critical during shutdown when the RCS is water solid, and a mass or heat input transient can cause a very rapid increase in RCS pressure when little or no time allows operator action to mitigate the event.

ACTION a.

With two or more charging pumps capable of injecting into the RCS, RCS overpressurization is possible.

To immediately initiate action to restore restricted coolant input capability to the RCS reflects the urgency of removing the RCS from this condition.

b. An unisolated accumulator requires isolation within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months .

This is only required when the accumulator pressure is at or more than the maximum RCS pressure for the existing temperature allowed by the P/T limit curves.

If isolation is needed and cannot be accomplished in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months , the ACTION provides two options, either of which must be performed in the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . By increasing the RCS temperature to more than the enable temperature, the accumulator pressure cannot exceed the OPPS limits if the accumulators are fully injected. Depressurizing the accumulators below the OPPS limit also gives this protection.

The completion times are based on operating experience that these activities can be accomplished in these time periods indicating that an event requiring OPPS is not likely in the allowed times.

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 4-10g Amendment No. l

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h 9' y iDPR-66:

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM '

BASES l(Continued)-

3/4.4.9'PRRRSURE/ TEMPERATURE LTMITS (Continuedi ACTION (Continued)

c. In MODE 4 when any RCS_ cold leg. temperature is less than'or equal to the enable- temperature, with one required RCS ,

relief valve inoperable, the RCS relief valve must ' be .

restored to OPERABLE status within a_ completion time'of 7. a~

days. Two RCS._ relief valves are required to-provide low-temperature overpressure mitigation while-withstanding' a single failure of an active component. ;

The completion time considers the facts that only~one of' i the RCS relief- valves is required to mitigate an overpressure transient and~that the likelihood of an active 3 failure of the remaining valve path during this time period-is very low. If plant operation results in transitioning ;

to MODE 5, the completion time to restore an inoperable PORV may not exceed 7 days as required by this ACTION.

d. The consequences of operational- events that will l overpressurize the RCS are more severe at' lower- :

temperature. Thus, with one of the two RCS relief valves inoperable in MODE 5 or in' MODE 6 with the head on, the completion time to restore two valves to OPERABLE status-is- ;

24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

l The completion time represents . a reasonable time to investigate and repair several types of relief valve failures without exposure to a lengthy period with only one OPERABLE RCS relief valve to protect against overpressure ,

events. If a PORV is inoperable when the plant enters i MODE 5 from MODE 4, - the completion . time to restore an inoperable PORV . changes to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months but the _ cumulative -

inoperable. time may not exceed 7 days before taking action -

to depressurize and vent.

e. The RCS must be depressurized and a vent- must be established within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months when both required'RCS relief j valves are inoperable. The vent must be' sized greater than :

or equal to 3.14 square' inches to ensure that - the flow ;

capacity is greater than that required for the worst case mass input transient reasonable during the applicable MODES. This action is needed to protect the RCPB from a low temperature.' overpressure event:and a possible brittle :

failure of the reactor vessel.

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 4-10h Amendment No. 'l 4

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DPR ~

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BASES 1(Continued) .

e 3/4.4.9 PRRMSURE/ TEMPERATURE LTMITS'(Continuadi j ACTIQH (Continued). .

?. The completion time considers-the time required to place :

the plant- in this; condition and the relatively low i

. probability. of an' overpressure event during this- time :

period .due to .. increased- operator. awareness- of '

~a dministrative control requirements.- -

SURVEIT.TANCE REOUIREMENTS (SR) l SR'4.4;9.3.1 To minimize the potential _for.a low temperature overpressure event:by ,

limiting the mass input-capability, a maximum of one charging pump is OPERABLE with the others verified deactivated with. power removed,and the accumulator discharge isolation valves are verified closed and' ;

locked out.

i The . frequency of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months is sufficient, .considering L '~other indications and alarms available to the operator in the control room,.

to verify the required status of the equipment.

SR 4.4.9.3.1.b allows opening the accumulator discharge isolation .i valves to perform accumulator discharge check valve-testing.

SR 4.4.9.3.2 The PORV block valve must be, verified open every 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months to provide the flow path for each required PORV'to perform its function when actuated. The va.1ve must be remotely ~ verified open in the main-control room. This surveillance is performed if the PORV satisfies the LCO.

The block valve is a remotely controlled, motor operated valve' . The power to the valve operator is not.requirediremoved, and-the manual. '

operator is not required locked in the inactive position. Thus, the block. valve can be closed in the event'the'PORV develops excessive- -j leakage or does not close (sticks open) after relieving an '

overpressure situation. _;

The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months frequency is considered adequate in view of other- l administrative controls available to the operator in the control ;

room, such as valve position indication, that verify that the PORV block valve remains open.

e BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 4-101 Amendment No. l

-j isL

'DPR-66 i REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM l

BASES (Continued) ;

e 3/4.4.9 PDR.4SURE/ TEMPERATURE T>TMITS (continued) ,

SURVEIT.TANCE REOUIREMENTS (SRI (Continued) i The SR is. required to be performed prior to' entering the condition '

for the OPPS to be OPERABLE. . This assures low temperature- i overpressure. protection is available when. the' RCS- cold'. leg temperature is ;less than or equal' to the enable temperature. !

Performing the surveillance every 31. days on each required ' PORV

j. permits verification and adjustment, if necessary, of.its lift. ,

setpoint, and considers instrumentation reliability which has been '

shown through operating experience to be acceptable. The CHANNEL' :

FUNCTIONAL TEST will verify the setpoint is within the allowed '

maximum limits. PORV actuation could depressurize the RCS and is not' required.

Performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION on each required'PORV actuation i channel is required every 18 months to adjust the whole channel so that it responds and the valve opens within the required range and ,

accuracy to known input. !

SR 4.4.9.3.3 i

The RCS vent of greater than or equal to 3.14 square inches is proven OPERABLE by verifying its open condition either:

a. Once every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months for an open vent or valve that cannot be locked,.except

b. Once every 31 days for a valve that is locked, or provided with remote position indication, or' sealed, or secured,in position. A removed pressurizer safety valve fits this category.

The passive vent arrangement must only be open to be OPERABLE. This i surveillance is required to be performed if the vent is being used to l satisfy the pressure relief requirements of the LCO.

l i

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l BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 4-10j Amendment No. l

o

DPR-66 F REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BASES 3/4.4.10 STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY 1

, The inservice inspection and testing programs for ASME Code Class.1,

.2,. and 3 -components- ensure that the structural integrity and operational-readiness of these components will be maintained at an acceptable level-throughout the life of the plant. These programs are in accordance with Section XI of the ASME Boil'er and Pressure vessel Code and . applicable Addenda as required by 10 CFR Part J 50.55a(g) except where specific written relief has been granted by.

the Commission pursuant to 10 CFR Part 50.55a(g) (6) (i) .

3/4.4.11 RELIEF VALVES BACKGROUND The Pressurizer is equipped with two types of devices for pressure relief: pressurizer safety valves and PORVs. The PORVs-are air.

operated valves that are controlled to open at ~ a specific set pressure when the pressurizer pressure increases and close when the pressurizer pressure decreases. The PORVs may also be manually operated from the control room.

Block valves, which are normally open, are located between the ;

pressurizer and the PORVs. The block valves are used to isolate the I PORVs in case of excessive leakage or a stuck open PORV. Block valve ]

closure is accomplished manually using controls in the control room. 1 A stuck open PORV is, in effect, a small break loss of coolant {

accident (LOCA). As such, block valve closure terminates-the RCS {

depressurization and coolant inventory loss.

The PORVs and their associated block valves may be used by plant operators to depressurize the RCS to recover from certain transients if normal pressurizer spray 'is not available. Additionally, the series arrangement of the PORVs - and their block valves permit performance of certain surveillances on the valves during power operation.

The PORVs may also be used for feed and bleed core cooling in the case of multiple equipment failure events that are not within-the design basis, such as a total loss of feedwater.

The PORVs, their block valves, and their controls are powered from emergency power sources in the event of a loss of offsite power. Two PORVs and their associated block valves are powered from two separate safety trains.

I BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 4-11 Amendment No.

IS - ,

'DPR-66' REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM i

BASES-(Continued)

'3/4.4.?1 RRT.TEF VALVES (Continued)

BACKGROUND (Continued) t The plant has three.PORVs, each having-a relief capacity.of. 210,000 lb/hr at 2350 psig. The functional design of the'PORVs is based on- ;

maintaining' pressure.below the high pressure reactor-trip setpoint. +

In addition, the PORVs minimize challenges to the pressurizer safety valves and- also ' may be used for low temperature overpressure. i protection (OPPS). See LCO 3.4.9.3,. " Overpressure Protection ;~

System."

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES Plant operators employ the PORVs to depressurize the RCS in response i to certain plant transients if normal pressurizer spray is not-available. For the Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR) event, the safety analysis assumes that manual operator actions are required.to mitigate;the event. A loss of offsite power is assumed to' accompany-the event, and thus, normal pressurizer spray is unavailable to reduce RCS pressure. The PORVs are assumed to be used for RCS t depressurization, which is one of the' steps performed to equalize the primary and secondary pressures in order to terminate the primary to .

secondary break flow and the radioactive releases from the affected 't steam generator. i The PORVs are used in safety analyses for events that result -in increasing RCS pressure for which departure from nucleate boiling ratio (DNBR) criteria are critical. Certain analyses have been performed to study the effects on . primary pressure assuming PORV actuation. The results of the loss of external load and/or a turbine trip. event indicate the primary pressure remains within the design. -!

limits and the DNBR is maintained within the acceptance criteria.

LCQ i

The LCO requires the PORVs and their associated block valves to be l

~!

OPERABLE for manual operation to mitigate the effects associated with an SGTR. I By maintaining at least two PORVs and their associated block valves OPERABLE, redundancy. has been provided. The block valves are i available to isolate the flow path through either a failed open PORV !

or a PORV with excessive leakage. Satisfying the LCO helps minimize +

challenges to fission product barriers.

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4 BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 4-11a Amendment No. l [

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DPR-667 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM j BASES (Continued)

L 3/4.4.11 RFLTEF VALVES (Continued) >

APPLICABILITY ,

A.

In MODES 1,-2, and 3, the PORV and its. block valve are required to be..

OPERABLE to limit the potential for a small break LOCA through the !

flow path. The most likely cause for a PORV small break LOCA is.a ;

result-of a pressure increase transient that causes the PORV.to open.:

Imbalances in the energy output of the core and heat removal by the secondary system can cause the RCS pressure to increase to the PORV ;

opening setpoint. The most rapid increases will occur'at the higher operating power and. pressure conditions of MODES 1 and 2. The.PORVs. ;

are also required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 to minimize .

E challenges to the pressurizer safety valves.-

l Pressure increases are less prominent in MODE 3 because the core input energy is reduced, but the RCS pressure is high. Therefore, E

the LCO is applicable in MODES 1, 2, and 3. The . LCO is not. ;

applicable in MODE 4 when both pressure and core energy are decreased and the pressure surges become . much less significant. The PORV setpoint is' reduced for OPPS in MODES 4 (below the enable-

, temperature), 5, and 6 with the reactor vessel head in place. LCO ,

3.4.9.3 addresses the PORV requirements in these MODES. !

ACTION A General Note provides clarification that all pressurizer PORVs and !

block valves are treated as separate entities, each with separate completion times (i.e., the completion time is on a component basis). ,

a. With the PORVs inoperable and capable of being manually a cycled, either the PORVs must be restored or the flow path isolated within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months . The block valves.should.be closed -

but power must be maintained to the associated block valves, since removal of power would render the block valve inoperable. Although a PORV may be designated inoperable, it may be able to be manually opened and closed, and therefore, able to perform its function. PORV inoperability may be due to seat leakage, instrumentation problems related l l to PORV accident monitoring instruments identified in LCO i 3.3.3.8, or other causes that do not prevent manual use and :

do not create a possibility for a small break LOCA. If the ;

position indication is inoperable, then the PORVs are inoperable. For these reasons, the block valve shall.be closed but the ACTION requires power be maintained to the valve. Automatic control problems and related instrumentation problems would .not render the PORVs inoperable. Accident analyses assume manual operation of BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 4-11b Amendment No. l l

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m

~

EDPR-66J REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM :

i

' BASES (Continued) 1 i

-3/4.4.11 RRTJEF VALVES (Continued)

ACTION'(Continued)

?

the PORVs and does not take credit for automatic actuation.-

This condition is only intended to permit. operation of the:

plant for a. limited period of time not to' exceed the next

. refueling outage (MODE 6)- so - that. maintenance-'can be -

performed on the PORVs to eliminate the . seat . leakage condition. Normally, the PORVs should' be available for automatic mitigation of overpressure events and should be'-

returned to OPERABLE status prior to entering startup -(MODE 2). ;

1 Quick access to the'PORV for pressure control can be made when power remains on- the closed block valve. The completion . time of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months is based _ on plant operating experience that .has shown that minor . problems _ can be corrected or closure accomplished in this time period.

b. With one or two PORV(s) inoperable and not capable of being manually cycled, the PORV(s) must be either- restored or isolated by closing the associated block valve.and removing the power to the associated block valve. The completion time of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months is reasonable, based.on challenges to the PORVs during this time period, and provides.the operator adequate time to correct the situation. If the inoperable valve (s) cannot be restored to OPERABLE status, the PORV(s) must be isolated within the specified time. Because there is at least one PORV that remains OPERABLE,-an additional 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months is provided to restore a minimum .of two PORVs to OPERABLE status. If a minimum of two PORVs cannot be restored within this additional time, the plant ' must be-brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. Two OPERABLE PORVs provide redundancy to allow continued operation until .the next refueling outage '.to- perform maintenance on the inoperable valve and return it to '

OPERABLE status.

c. If three - PORVs are inoperable and not capable of being. ,

manually cycled, it is necessary to either restore at least one valve within the completion time of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months or isolate ,

the flow path by closing and removing the power to.the i associated block valves. The completion time of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months is ;

reasonable, based on the small potential for challenges to the system during this time and provides the. operator time to correct the situation. If one PORV is restored, then the l

I BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 4-11c Amendment No. l ;

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m. . . . . - . . . - . - - . - . .

g,

. ' i r .

DPR-66 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM i

iBASES1(Continued)

~3/4.4.11 DFLTEF VALVES (Continuadi- l ACTION (Continued).

plant will be in a less' limiting ACTION statement with'the

. time clock started at the original declaration.of having 1

three PORVs' inoperable. If.no PORVs are restored within~the completion time,:then the plant must be brought to a MODE in- ,

which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this' status, the

. plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months 'andl to MODE 4 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . The allowed completion. times are reasonable, based on operating -. experience', to reach the' required plant conditions from full. power conditions in an ,

orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. . In MODES 4 and 5, maintaining PORV OPERABILITY may be' required.. '~ '

See LCO'3.4.9.3.

d. If one block . valve is inoperable and open, then it is necessary to either restore the block valve to OPERABLE- <

status within the completion time of l'~ hour or. place.the- ;

associated PORV in manual control. . The prime importance for; the capability to close the block . valve is to isolate a stuck open PORV. Therefore, if the block' valve cannot be ,

t restored to OPERABLE status within 1. hour, the required-action is to place the PORV in manual control to preclude- i its automatic opening for an overpressure event and to avoid .

the potential for a stuck open PORV_at a time that the block '

valve is inoperable. If the block valve in inoperable, it is necessary to restore the block valve to OPERABLE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months or close it. _If block valve instrumentation

related to accident monitoring instrumentation identified in LCO 3.3.3.8 is determined to be inoperable, then the block-valve shall be declared inoperable. Closing the block valve precludes the need to place the PORV in~ manual control since. ,

it is isolated from the system. The completion time of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months is reasonable, based on the small potential for ,

challenges to the system during this time period, and S provides the operator time to correct the situation. 1 Because at least one PORV remains. OPERABLE,-the operator is permitted a completion . time of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months to restore. the inoperable open block valve to OPERABLE status. If it cannot be restored within this additional time, the plant :

must be brought'to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply in order- to avoid continuous operation without a redundant ,

ability to isolate this PORV flow path. If the block valve '

is restored within the completion time of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months , the ,

power will be restored and the PORV restored to OPERABLE status. With one block valve inoperable and closed, there l

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 4-11d Amendment No. l

_ _ .- _ _ ._. _ - _ . . _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ . .~-. ._ , __

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> -DPR REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BASES .' (' Continued') ?

'3/4.4;11 RET.TEF VALVES (Continued) i ACTION (Continued)-

still.. remains two PORV flow paths. This redundancy will ?

allow continued operation until the next refueling outage _to-perform maintenance on the inoperable valve and return it'to OPERABLE status. -j

e. If more than one block valve'is inop'erable,'it is necessary to either restore the block valves within the completion i time _of-1 hour, or place the associated PORVs in manual control and restore at least one block valve within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months

]

q

[and restore a minimum of_two block valves within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months ). )

Two OPERABLE PORVs provide redundancy to allow continued- _

operation - until the next. refueling outage to' perform maintenance on the inoperable _: valve and return. it to OPERABLE status. The completion times are reasonable, based:

on the small potential for challenges to the system during this time and ' provide the operator time to correct the situation. If the required actions are not-met, then the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. .To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 - within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and to MODE 4 within'12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . The allowed completion times are reasonable, based o r, operating experience, to ' reach the required plant j conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. In MODES 4 and 5, maintaining- PORV OPERABILITY may be required. See LCO 3.4.9.3.

SURVEIT.TANCE REOUIREMENTS (SR)

SR 4.4.11.1 This surveillance requires a complete cycle of each PORV. Operating a PORV through one complete cycle . ensures that the PORV can J be manually actuated for mitigation of an SGTR. The frequency of 18 months is based on a typical refueling; cycle and industry. accepted: >

practice. Cycling the PORVs using both the normal air supply system j and the backup nitrogen supply system actuates the solenoid control valves and check valves to ensure the PORV control system will actuate properly when called upon. Testing in this manner assures each component within the PORV control system necessary to support PORV operation has been determined to function satisfactorily.

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 4-11e Amendment No. l.

k T,- 'DPR REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BASES.(Continued)

, 3/4.4.11 DRT.TEF VALVES (Contlnued) ;

SURVEIT.T.ANCE REOUTREMENTS (SR) (Continued) }

SR 4.4.11.2 -

Block valve cycling verifies that the valve (s)~ can be closed if '

needed. The basis for the frequency of 92 days is the ASME Code, '

Section XI. If the block valve is closed to isolate'a PORV-that is capable of being manually cycled, the OPERABILITY.of the block valve 4 is of importance, because: opening the block _' valve is necessary-to permit the PORV to be used for manual control of reactor pressure.

If the block valves are closed to isolate'otherwise inoperable'PORVs,.

the maximum completion time to restore one PORV and open the block valve is-72 hours, which is well within the allowable limits (25%) to extend the block valve frequency of 92 days. Furthermore,.these test.

requirements would be completed by.the reopening of a recently closed, block valve upon restoration of the PORV.to OPERABLE status-(i.e.,

completion of the required actions fulfills the SR).

This SR is not required to be met with the block valve closed, in accordance with required ACTION b or c of this LCO.

3/4.4.12 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM VENTS 2

Reactor Coolant System Vents are provided to exhaust noncondensible-gases and/or steam from the primary system that could inhibit natural circulation core cooling. The OPERABILITY of at least one reactor coolant system vent path from the -reactor vessel head and the pressurizer steam space, ensures the capability exists to perform-this function. i l

The valve. redundancy of the reactor coolant system vent paths serves ,

to minimize the probability of inadvertent or irreversible actuation- !

while ensuring that a single failure of a vent valve, power' supply or j control system does not prevent isolation of the vent path. 1 The function, capabilities, and testing' requirements of the reactor coolant system vant systems are consistent with the requirements of Item II.B.1 of NUREG-0737, " Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements," November 1980.

l BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 4-11f Amendment No. l

a

'ATTACMMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO.

FACILITY OPERATING ~ LICENSE NO. NPF-73 2 .

DOCKET NO. 50-412 Replace the following pages of Appendix JL,. Technical l Specifications, with the . enclosed . pages as indicated. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical' lines indicating ,

the areas of change.

Remove Insert 3/4 1-10 3/4 1-10 3/4 1-11 3/4 1-11 3/4 3-57 3/4 3-57 3/4 4-35 3/4 4-35 3/4 4-36 3/4 4-36 ,

3/4 4-36a 3/4.4-39 3/4 4-39 i 3/4 4-39a 3/4 5-2 3/4 5-2 B 3/4 4-14 B 3/4 4-14 B 3/4 4-15 B 3/4 4-15 B 3/4 4-15a B 3/4 4-15b B 3/4 4-15c B 3/4 4-15d B 3/4-4-15e B 3/4 4-15f

B 3/4 4-15g B 3/4 4-15h B 3/4_4-151 ,

B 3/4 4-16 B 3/4 4-16 B 3/4 4-16a B 3/4 4-16b B 3/4 4-16c B 3/4 4-16d B 3/4 4-16e B 3/4 4-16f 6-19 6-19 i

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- NPF-73 i

~ REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS O CHARGING PUMP-SHUTDOWN LIMITING CONDITION-FOR OPERATION

. 3'.1.2.3 ~ At least one charging pump m in the boron injection flow.

path' required by specification.3.1.2.1 or.' low head safety injection pump (with an open Reactor Coolant System vent l of . greater than or' equal-to 3.14 square inches):shall be OPERABLE and capable'of being; powered from an. OPERABLE' emergency bus.

~

i APPLICABILITY: MODES 4, 5 and 6.

ACTION: .;

With none of the above pumps OPERABLE, ' suspend - all operations involving-CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes until one aharging pump or low - head safety injection pump is ' restored -to .l OPERABLE status.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

~

4.1.2.3.1 The above required charging pump shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying, that on recirculation flow,.the pump develops a differential. pressure of greater'than or' equal to 2437-paid when' ;

tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.

4.1.2.3.2 When the low head safety injection pump is used in' lieu of a charging pump, the low head safety injection pump shall- be demonstrated OPERABLE by: ,

a. Verification of - an' OPERABLE ' RWST pursuant .to - 4.1.2.7 ' and 4.1.2.8,

b. Verification of an OPERABLE' low head safety injection pump l pursuant to Specification 4.5.2.b.2,

c. Verification of an OPERABLE _ low head safety injection flow l path from the RWST to the Reactor Coolant System once per shift, and ,

d. Verification that the vent is 'open in accordance with ,

4.4.9.3.3.

(1) With two charging pumps OPERABLE, follow Specification'3.4.9.3.

4

- BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 3/4 1-10 Amendment No.

i

NPF-73.

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS CHARGING PUMPS-OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1;2.4 At.least two charging' pumps shall be OPERABLE. !

APPLICABILITY:= MODES 1, - 2 and 3 m , l ACTION: I With pumpsonly to one' charging OPERABLE pump'within

. status OPERABLE, restore 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months at least'two or be in at' least charging! HOT STANDBY and borated to a - SHUTDOWN ' MARGIN equivalent to at .least '

1 percent ok/k at 200*F within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months ; restore at least two .l charging pumps to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in' HOT ,

SHUTDOWN within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.2.4.1 At- least two charging pumps shall . be _ demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying, that on recirculation flow, each pump develops ..

a dif ferential- pressure of greater than or equal to 2437 psid _ when -l tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5. ;

e t

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(1) The provisions lof Specifications _3.0.4 and 4.0.4 are not l_ '

applicable'for. entry.into MODE 3 for the centrifugal charging-pump declared inoperable pursuant to Specification ~ 3.4.9.3 l provided that the _ centrifugal charging ; pump . is restored to ;

OPERABLE status within 4' hours'or prior to.the temperature of one or more of the RCS cold legs exceeding 375'F, whichever comes :

first.

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 3/4 1-11 Amendment No.

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,-l

'- NPF INSTRUMENTATION ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3.3.8 in Table 3.3-11 The accident shall monitoring be OPERABLE. instrumentation channels shown . l t APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.

ACTION:

a. With the number of OPERABLE accident .. monitoring instrumentation channels less than the Total Number of Channels shown in Table 3.3-11, either restore the inoperable l channel (s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months (follow Specification 3.4.11 when determining ACTIONS for Items 4 and 5).

b. With the number of- OPERABLE accident monitoring instrumentation channels less .than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirements of Table 3.3-11, either restore the j .

inoperable channel (s) to OPERABLE status'within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or ,

be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

c. With the number of OPERABLE Reactor Coolant System Subcooling Margin Monitor instrumentation ^ channels less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirements of Table 3.3-11, either l restore the inoperable channel (s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

d. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS t

4.3.3.8 Each accident monitoring. instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of the CHANNEL CHECK and CHANNEL CALIBRATION operations at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-7.

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l BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 3/4 3-57 Amendment No.

. . - . . . ~ . . __ _ __ ..

5

+ .NPF-73~ I REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM i

-OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION SYSTEMS

' LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION- .

3.4.9.3 An overpressure grotection. system shall be OPERABLE'with- ,

a maximum- of one charging gump " capable of . injecting into the RCS and i the accumulators isolated and either a or b below:

a. Two: power-operated relief valves-(PORVs).with nominal maximum l lift settings'which vary with the RCS temperature and which~ !

do not exceed'the limits established in' Figure 3.'4-4,' or: l b.. The RCS .depressurized and 'an RCS . vent of ' greater than or equal to 3.14 square inches. .

APPLICABILITY: ' MODE 4 when any'RCS cold leg temperature is less~. [

than or equal to an enable temperature'of 350*F, .

MODE 5,. .

MODE 6 when the reactor vessel head is'on.

ACTION:

a. With two or more charging pumps. capable of-injecting <into the RCS, immediately initiate action to verify a maximum of one. '

charging pump is capable of . injecting into the . RCS or depressurize and vent the RCS through a 3.14 square inch or .

larger. vent within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

b. With an accumulator not isolated when the accumulator- >

pressure is greater than or equal.to'the maximum RCS pressure '

for the existing RCS cold leg temperature. allowed by .the heatup and'cooldown curves, isolate theiaffected accumulator- 3 within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months or increase the RCS. cold leg temperature;above ;

the enable temperature .within the next 12- hours or- 1 depressurize the affected accumulator to less than- the; i maximum RCS pressure for the existing cold-leg. temperature allowed by the heatup and cooldown curves within the next'12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

(1) Two charging pumps may be capable of injecting into the RCS-

l.!

for pump swap operation for less than or equal to 15 minutes.-

~

All charging pumps may be capable of injecting into the RCS1 ;

for less than or equal to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months ' immediately- following .at '

change from MODE 3 to MODE 4 or prior.to the temperature of..

one or more of the RCS cold legs decreasing below 325'F, j

-whichever comes first. -

(2) Accumulator isolation with' power' removed from.the discharge isolation valves is only required when the~ accumulator -

pressure is greater than or equal to the maximum RCS pressure for the existing RCS cold leg temperature allowed by the ,

heatup and cooldown curves. .

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 3/4 4-35 Amendment No. ;

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M :NPF REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM j I

L'IMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION-(Continued)

ACTION: -(Continued)-

v

c. With one PORV inoperable in MODE 4 (when any RCS cold leg temperature is less than or equal to the enable temperature), .,l restore the inoperable _PORV to OPERABLE status within 7 days or depressurize;and vent the RCS through a 3.'14 square inch

'or larger vent within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . The provisions'of. 1 4 . Specification 3.0.4 are not' applicable when-in this action.

d. With 7one PORV inoperable in. MODES 5 or - 6, restore the inoperable PORV~'to OPERABLE status within ' 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months or depressurize'and vent the RCS through a 3.14 square-inch or.- a larger vent within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

e. With two PORVs inoperable, depressurize andi vent the . RCS- ;

through a 3.14 square inch or larger vent within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

l SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.4.9.3.1 Verify at least once per.12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months that:

a. A maximum of one charging pump is capable of injecting into ,

the RCS, and

b. Each accumulator is isolated; however, with'the accumulator pressure less .than the -low' temperature; overpressure ,

protection setpoint, the . accumulator discharge. isolation j valves may be opened to perform accumulator discharge' check valve testing.

4.4.9.3.2 When PORVs are being used for overpressure protection, l demonstrate each PORV is OPERABLE by:

a. Verifying each PORV block valve is open for each required PORV at least once per 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months , and j

b. Performance of a CHANNEL' FUNCTIONAL. TEST on' the PORV ,

actuation channel, but excluding valve operation, within'31 :

days prior to entering a condition in which- .the 1 PORV - is :

required to be OPERABLE and placed in operation after i decreasing the RCS cold leg temperature to less than or equal j to the enable temperature and at'least once per 31' days,'and q

c. Performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION on each required PORV :l I

actuation channel at least once per 18 months.

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 3/4 4-36 Amendment No.

i

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r. /*S 5NPF-73 !

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM I SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) 4.4.9.3.3 When a vent is being used'for' overpressure protection,- -

verify the required vent-is.open:-

.a. At least1once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months for an open vent or unlocked open-vent valve (s), except.

b.- .At least once per 31 days for a: valve which'is locked, or provided' with remote position indication, ' or sealed, or'

- otherwise: secured in the open position.

-(

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 3/4 4-36a Amendment No. .l

.E NPF-73 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

- 3 / 4. 4.11 DFT.TEF VALVES LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION I 3.4.11 Each power-operated relief valve (PORV).and associated block valve shall be' OPERABLE.

I APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION: ;

- - - - - - - - - - - --- - - GENERAL NOTE.- - - - - - - - - - - -

Separate ACTION statement entry is allowe'd for each PORV and block valve.

a. With one PORV inoperable, withinl1 hour,either restore the-PORV to OPERABLE status or close the associated block valve and remove power from the block valve;'otherwise, be in at.

least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months . Power-operation may continue until the next refueling outage,

b. With two PORVs inoperable, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months either restore the PORVs to OPERABLE status or close the associated block' valves and remove power from the block valves; restore at least one PORV to OPERABLE status within.the'following 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be 1 in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT SHUTDOWN- i within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

c. With three PORVs inoperable, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months either restore at least one PORV to OPERABLE status'or close the' associated block valves and remove power from the block valves and.be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT SHUTDOWN-within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

d. With one block valve inoperable and open, within i hour ,

either restore the block valve to OPERABLE status or place I the associated PORV in manual control.- ' Restore the block valve to OPERABLE status within the following 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or bet in HOT STANDBY within the neyt 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months . With one block valve <

inoperable, restore the block valve to OPERABLE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months or close it, power operation may continue until the next refueling outage.

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 3/4 4-39 Amendment No.

NPF-73c REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR' OPERATION (Continued)

ACTION: (Continued)

e. 'With more than one blockL valve . inoperable, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months either restore the block valves to OPERABLE status or place.

the' associated PORVs in manual control. . Restore at least one.

block valve to OPERABLE status within the next hour if.three -

block valves are inoperable; restore a minimum of two block valves to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months ; otherwise, be in-HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT SHUTDOWN ,

within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.4.11.1 Each PORV shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months by operating the PORV through one' complete cycle of full travel. -

4.4.11.2 Each block valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 92 days by operating the valve through one complete cycle of full travel unless the block valve is closed to meet required ACTIONS ~

a, b, or c.

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i BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 3/4 4-39a Amendment No. l

NPF-73' EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS I

i SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS-(Continued)

c. At least once'per 31 days!when the RCS pressure 'is - above ~ l 1000 psig by verifying that power to - the . isolation valve !

operator control circuit is disconnected ~by removal of the- _

plug in the lock out jack from the circuit.

4 . 5.1. 2 . Each accumulator water level and pressure alarm channel-shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 31 days by the performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL. TEST.

b. At least once per 18 months by the performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

4 4

i BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 3/4 5-2 Amendment No.

. . ~ .. . .

N- .ypp-73

-REACTOR' COOLANT SYSTEM BASES-7 3/4.4.9 PREESURE/ TEMPERATURE LIMITS (Continued) l I

The. pressure-temperature limit lines shown on Figure 3.4-2 for j reactor. criticality and for inservice leak and hydrostatic testing have been_provided to assure compliance with the minimum temperature requirements of Appendix G to 10 CFR 50 for reactor criticality and for inservice leak and hydrostatic testing.

The number of reactor vessel irradiation surveillance specimens and the frequencies for removing and testing these . specimens are provided in UFSAR Table 5.3-6 to assure -compliance with the requirements of Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50.

The limitations-imposed on the pressurizer heatup and cooldown rates and auxiliary spray water temperature differential are provided ,

to assure that the pressurizer is operated within the design criteria assumed for the fatigue analysis performed in accordance with.the ,

, ASME Code requirements. .

Pressure-temperature limit curves shown in figure B 3/4'4-3.were developed for the limiting ferritic steel component within an "

isolated reactor coolant loop. The limiting component is the steam generator channel head to tubesheet region. This figure provides the ASME III, Appendix G limiting curve which- is used to define operational bounds, such that when operating with an isolated loop .

the analyzed pressure-temperature limits are known. The temperature range provided bounds the expected operating range for an isolated loop.

OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION SYSTEMS BACKGROUND The overpressure protection system (OPPS) controls RCS pressure at low temperatures so the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB) is not compromised by violating . the '. pressure 'and temperature (P/T) limits _ of 10 CFR 50, Appendix G. The reactor i vessel is the limiting RCPB component .for.~ demonstrating such~

i protection. The maximum setpoint for the power operated relief valves (PORVs) and the maximum RCS pressure for the existing'RCS cold leg temperature during cooldown, shutdown, and-heatup meat the 10'CFR 50, _ Appendix G requirements during the OPPS MODES.

The reactor vessel material is less. tough at low temperatures- .'

than at normal operating temperature. As the vessel neutron exposure accumulates, the material toughness decreases and becomes less-resistant to pressure stress at low temperatures. RCS pressure, therefore, is maintained low at low temperatures and is increased only as temperature is increased. ,

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 B 3/4 4-14 Amendment No.

, ,,. m . . .. . , . . _ ._-_ _ - _. -.

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7 NPF-73 '

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM 1

BASES (Continued)L 3/4.4.9'PDRESURE/ TEMPERATURE LTMITS (Continued)

BACKGROUND (Continued)

The potential for vessel overpressurization is most acute _when.

the RCS.is water solid, occurring only during shutdown; a pressure fluctuation can occur _ more quickly" than an' operator can react . to . >

relieve the condition. ' Exceeding the'RCS P/T limits by a significant_ ,

' amount could cause brittle cracking of the~ reactor vessel. LCOL 3.4.9.1, " Pressure / Temperature LLimits," requires _ administrative- '

control of RCS pressure and temperature'during heatup and cooldown to prevent exceeding the limits.

This LCO provides RCS overpressure protection by having a minimum coolant input capability and having adequate pressure -relief ,

capacity. Limiting coolant input capability requfres deactivating' all but one ' charging pump and' isolating- the accumulators.- The .

pressure relief capacity requires either two-redundant RCS relief. I valves or a depressurized'RCS and an RCS vent of sufficient size.

One RCS relief. valve or the open- RCS vent is the overpressure j protection device that acts to terminate an _ increasing pressure -

event, i

With minimum coolant input capability, the ability to provide-core coolant addition is restricted. The LCO does not require,the- .

~!

makeup' _ control' system - deactivated or the safety , injection - (SI)

-actuation circuits blocked. Due'to the lower pressures in-the OPPS i MODES and the' expected core decay heat levels, the makeup system can provide adequate flow via the makeup control' valve and, if needed,. 'i until the charging pump-is actuated by SI..- ,

The OPPS for pressure-relief consists of two PORVs'with~ reduced. !

lift settings or a depressurized RCS'and an RCS vent of sufficient' '

size. Two RCS relief valves are required for redundancy. One RCS relief valve has adequate relieving capability to keep from' 1 overpressurization for the required coolant input capability.

PORV REQUIRTMENTS As-designed for the OPPS System, each PORV is signaled to open if the RCS pressure approaches a limit determined by the OPPS actuation '!

logic. The OPPS actuation logic monitors'both RCS temperature and RCS pressure and determines when a condition not acceptable in-the-limits'is approached. The wide range RCS temperature indications are auctioneered to select the lowest temperature signal. The' lowest temperature signal.is processed through a-function' generator'that calculates a: pressure limit for that temperature. The calculated pressure limit is then compared with the indicated RCS pressure from I

i BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 B 3/4 4-15 Amendment No. 1

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pg v f;i" ' -

. c.- NPF-73 -

r REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

BASES (Continue }l l l 1

- 3/4.4.'9 PRRMSURE/ TEMPERATURE LTMITS (ContinugQ ,

PORV REQUIREMENTS '(Continued)' i i

a wide range. pressure channel.- If the indicated pressure meets or exceeds the calculated value, a PORV is signaled to open. Having the .!

- setpoints'of.both1 valves within the limits ensures that the Appendix. '

G limits.will not be exceeded in any analyzed event.--When a PORVJis; f opened'in an increasing. pressure' transient,~the release of coolant.

will cause the pressure increase to slow and reverse. As the:PORV. $

releases coolant, the RCS pressure decreases until a' reset pressure is. reached and the valve is signaled to; close. The pressure

- continues to decrease below the reset. pressure as the-valve closes.

l RCS VENT REOUIREMENTS

.i' once the RCS is depressurized, a vent exposed to the containment atmosphere will maintain the RCS at containment ambient pressure in :

an RCS overpressure transient, if the relieving-requirements of.the !

transient doinot exceed the capabilities of the vent. 13n21s, the 'vant l path must be capable of relieving the . flow resulting from -the .i limiting OPPS mass or heat input transient, and maintaining pressure i below the P/T limits. The required vent capacity may be provided'by-one or more vent paths. ;

For an RCS vent to meet the flow capacity requirement,'it may.be $

satisfied by removing a pressurizar safety valve or establishing an opening . between the . RCS and the containment atmosphere ' of .the ;

required size through any positive'means available'which cannot be j inadvertently defeated. The vent path (s).must be above the level of .;

reactor coolant, so as not to drain the RCS-when open.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES ,

Safety analyses demonstrate that the reactor vessel is adequately protected against exceeding the P/T limits when low RCS temperature conditions exist. At the enable temperature and below, overpressure

prevention is provided ' by two OPERABLE ' ' RCS relief valves. or a -

depressurized RCS and a sufficient sized RCS vent. l The actual temperature at which the pressure in the P/T-limitL !

curve falls below the OPPS setpoint increases as the reactor vessel material toughness decreases due to neutron embrittlement. Each. time the heatup and cooldown curves are revised, the. OPPS 'must be re-evaluated to ensure its functional requirements can still be met.

L BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 B 3/4 4-15a Amendment No. l l

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4-. . . . . .1 v.

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REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

_ a

- BASES.(Continued) ~

l i

~3 / 4'. 4. 9 ' PRMSURE / TEMPERATURE T TMITS ' (Continued)

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (Continued) ,

- The.heatup and cooldown curves represent the-Appendix'G' limits that define OPPS operation. -Any change to the RCS that may affect' ,

t OPPS operation must be evaluated against the analyses to determine ,

the impact of-the change'.on the OPPS-acceptance limits.

Transients -that- are Jcapable of .overpressurizing the ' RCS . are -!

categorized' as either , mass . or heat input transients, examples ~' of- .

which follow: ;

MASS INPUT TYPE TRANSIENTS h

a. Inadvertent safety injection; or

b. Charging / letdown flow mismatch.

HEAT INPUT TYPE TRANSIENTS

a. Inadvertent actuation of pressurizer heaters; .

b.- Loss of'RHR cooling; or LI

c. Reactor coolant pump (RCP) startup with temperature. ;

asymmetry within the' RCS or between the RCS and steam ,

generators.

The following are required during the OPPS MODES to ensure that' .

mass and heat input transients do not occur,-which either of the OPPS !

> overpressure protection means cannot handle:

a. Deactivating all but one charging pump OPERABLE;

b. Deactivating the accumulator discharge isolation valves in (

their closed positions; and ;

c. Disallowing start-of an RCP if secondary temperature is.more j than 50*F above primary temperature in any one -loop. ' LCO '

3.4.1.6, " Reactor Coolant Pump Startup," provides this .

protection.

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i BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 B 3/4 4-15b Amendment No. l I

"r- r ti ,

7. :NPF REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM l "c- ,

i BASES.'(Continued) 3/4.4.9'PDR.CSURE/ TEMPERATURE LTMITS (Continued)' ;

1 HEAT INPUT TYPE TRANSIENTS (Continued) .

[ The analyses demonstrate that either one'RCS relief valve or the_-

depressurized RCS and RCS vent can maintain the RCS pressure below ,.,

.the limits when'only one charging pump'is actuated by SI. 'Thus,;the ;

LCO allows'only one charging-pump OPERABLE during the OPPS MODES. .!

Since neither one RCS relief valve nor the RCS vant can handle a full-SI actuation, the LCO also requires the accumulators isolated.- {

The isolated accumulators must have their' discharge valves closed !

with power removed. Fracture mechanics analyses established the ,

temperature of OPPS Applicability at the enable temperature. ,

PORV PERFORMANCE The fracture mechanics analyses show that the vessel is protected- '

when the PORVs are set to open at or below the limit. The setpoint, i is derived by analyses t h a t '. m o d e l the performance of the OPPS assuming the limiting transient of SI actuation of one charging pump. -

These analyses consider pressure overshoot and undershoot beyond the "

PORV opening and closing, resulting from signal processing _and valve stroke times. The PORV setpoints at - or below the' derived limit ;

, ensures the P/T limits will be met. *

~

The Maximum. Allowed PORV Setpoint for the OPPS.is derived by analysis which models the performance of the OPPS assuming various i mass input'and heat input' transients. Operation with a PORV'setpoint less than or equal to.the maximum setpoint ensures that Appendix.G limits will not be violated with consideration for: (1) a maximum ,

pressure overshoot beyond the PORV setpoint ~ which can occur as a .

. result of time delays in signal processing and. valve opening; (2) a' 50*F heat transport effect made possible by the geometrical ;

relationship of the RHR suction line and the RCS wide range

temperature . indicator used for OPPS; (3) -instrument uncertainties; and (4) single failure.

The PORV setpoint will be updated when the revised P/T limits conflict with the OPPS analysis limits. The 'P/T limits 'are periodically modified as the reactor vessel; material ' toughness decreases due to neutron embrittlement caused by neutron-irradiation.- '

, Revised limits are determined using neutron fluence projections _and ~i

.the results of examinations of the reactor vessel material irradiation surveillance specimens. The Bases for LCO - 3 . 4 . 9.1, l

" Pressure / Temperature Limits," discuss these examinations. .

e \

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 B 3/4 4-15c Amendment No. l

. - ._ . _ _ _ _ _ ._ u

n; M 'NPF-73 'j REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM ;

BASES (Continued)'

3/4.4.'9'PRRESURE/ TEMPERATURE LIMITS (Continuadi-PORV PERFORMANCE (Continued) q The'PORVs are considered active components.

Thus, the' failure'of ;

one PORV is . assumed to represent .the worst case, single active ~ ;

failure. l RCS VENT PERFORMANCE >

With the RCS depre'ssurized, analyses' show that. a - PORV . or +

equivalent opening with a vent size of 3.14: square inches is capable of mitigating the allowed OPPS overpressure transient. The capacity- '!

of a vent this size is greater than the flow of the limiting transient for the OPPS configuration,~SI actuation with one charging i pump OPERABLE, maintaining RCS -pressure less than the maximum pressure on the P/T limit curve.

The RCS vent size is based on the PORV size, therefore, the vent.

is bounded.by the PORV analyses. i The RCS vent is passive and is not subject to active failure.- !

LCQ !

This LCO requires that the OPPS is OPERABLE. The OPPS is OPERABLE when the minimum ' coolant input and pressure' relief..

capabilities are OPERABLE. Violation of this LCO could lead to the

. loss of' low temperature overpressure mitigation and violation of the ,

limits as a result of an operational transient.

To limit the coolant input capability, the LCO requires one' charging pump capable of injecting into the RCS and all accumulator :

discharge isolation valves closed and immobilized. The ' LCO is-qualified by a note that permits two pumps. capable of RCS injection ;

for less than or equal to 15 minutes to allow for: pun? swaps. This note also allows all charging pumps capable of injecting into the RCS ,

during a change from MODE 3 to MODE'4 to be; OPERABLE for a' limited i period of time.

The LCO is also qualified by a note stating that accumulator l isolation with power removed from the discharge isolation valves is !

only required when the accumulator pressure is greater than or at the- )

maximum RCS pressure for the existing temperature, as allowed by the !

,.P/T limit curves. This ' note permits the accumulator discharge- i isolation valve surveillance to be performed- only under these l pressure and temperature conditions.

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 B 3/4 4-15d Amendment No. l

1

3. 1

' F .NPF-73 -

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM g i

I BASES (Continued)

'I

-3/4.4.9 PRR.CSURE/ TEMPERATURE LTMITS (Continued)

LCQ (Continued) .

Operation above. 350*F but less than 375*F with only. one- ,

. centrifugal charging pump OPERABLE is allowed for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months . As l shown by analysis, LOCAs occurring at-low temperature, low pressure conditions can be successfully mitigated by the operation of a single ,1

' centrifugal charging pump and a single LHSI pump with no credit for 1 '

-accumulator injection. Given the short time duration that th e' ,

condition of having only one centrifugal charging pump OPERABLE is allowed and the probability of a LOCA occurring during this time, the !

failure of the single centrifugal charging pump is not assumed. ,

Operation below 350*F but greater than 325*F with all centrifugal !

charging pumps OPERABLE is allowed for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months immediately j following a change from MODE 3 to MODE 4. This provides a reasonable !

period of time for the operators to secure an OPERABLE pump following-entry into MODE 4. Since. the charging pump is required .to - be ;

i OPERABLE in L MODE ~ 3, but is not required in MODE . 4 - due ' to OPPS' limitations, some time constraints for making'the transition must be .}

identified. During low pressure, low . temperature ' operation, all

~

i automatic Safety Injection actuation signals are blocked. In normal. '

conditions, a single failure lof the ESF actuation circuitry will l result in the starting of at most one. train of Safety Injection (one l centrifugal charging pump, and one .LHSI pump). For temperatures -

above 325*F, an overpressure event occurring as a result of: starting these two pumps can be successfully mitigated by operationLof'both .

PORVs without exceeding Appendix G limits. Given the.- short time !

duration that this condition is allowed and the low probability of a single failure causing-an overpressure' event during this time,'the ,

single failure of a PORV is not assumed. Initiation of both trains t of Safety Injection during this 4-hour time frame due to operator '

error or a single failure occurring:during testing of a redundant [

channel are not considered to be credible accidents.

The elements of the LCO that provide low. temperature overpressure

~

l mitigation through pressure relief are:

.i

a. Two OPERABLE PORVs; a PORV is OPERABLE'for OPPS when its.

block valve is open, its lift setpoint is set to the. limit- l and' testing proves its ability to open at this setpoint, and ;

motive power is available to the two valves and their '

1 control circuits;.or

b. A depressurized RCS and an RCS vent. l BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 B 3/4 4-15e Amendment No. l j

. s

- -, . . . - ~.. . . - .. - .. . .

l

.L yyy.73 )

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

]

BASES (Continued)

'3/4.4.9 PDRASURE/ TEMPERATURE LTMTTS (Continuadi -i LCC! (Continued)

An.RCS vent isLOPERABLE'when'open with'an area of 3'14-square .

inches ..

Each of these methods of overpressure prevention is capable of mitigating the limiting OPPS transient. ,

APPLICABILITY l ThisJ LCO is applicable in MODE 4 when any. RCS . cold leg :

temperature is less than or equal to the -enable temperature, int i MODE 5, and in MODE 6 when the reactor vessel head'is on. When the-reactor vessel head is off,'overpressurization cannot occur.

Low temperature overpressure prevention is most~cr'itical during.

shutdown when the RCS is water solid, and 'a mass' or heat input-transient can cause a very rapid increase in RCS pressure.when-little or no time. allows operator action to mitigate the event.

'i ACTION

a. With two or more charging pumps capable of injecting into- I the RCS,'RCS overpressurization.is possible.

To immediately initiate action to restore restricted coolant input capability to the RCS. reflects the urgency of removing the RCS from this condition. '

b. An unisolated accumulator requires isolation within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months .- !

This is only required when the accumulator pressure is'at or $

more than the maximum RCS pressure for the existing 1 temperature allowed by the P/T limit curves.

If isolation is needed and cannot be accomplished in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months , l l' the ACTION provides two options, either of which.must-be performed in the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . By .' increasing the RCS temperature ~to more than the enable temperature, the accumulator pressure cannot exceed the OPPS limits if the accumulators are fully injected. . Depressurizing the i accumulators below the OPPS limit. also gives this.

. protection.

The completion times are based on. operating experience that ;

these activities can be accomplished in these time periods L indicating that an event requiring OPPS is not likely in the allowed times.

i BEAVER VALLEY -. UNIT 2 B 3/4 4-15f Amendment No. l I

, , , , ,. - . .. - . - ~ . . - - - - - . . - - . . - , . ..-

e

NPF-73 l F. )

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM .l BASES l(Continued) I R

3/4.4.9 PDRMSURE/ TEMPERATURE LTMITS'(Continued) '

ACTION'(Continued) l

c. In MODE 4-when any'RCS cold leg temperature'is less.than or. -l equal to - the . enable temperature, with : one ; required RCS reli'ef - valve inoperable, ' the RCS relief valve must be ,

restored.to OPERABLE status within a-completion time of 7 i days. Two RCS relief valves are. required to provide' low . .

temperature overpressure mitigation;while. withstanding, a- !

single failure of an active' component. The exception to :

Specification -3.0.4 will permit. plant ' heatup with o n e .- l inoperable PORV.: Continued operation is permitted with one

, PORV inoperable. ;

1 The completion time considers the facts that only one of the ,

RCS relief valves is required to mitigate an. overpressure. i transient and that the likelihood of an active. failure of -i the remaining valve' path during this time.. period is veryL low. If plant operation results in transitioning to MODEf5, the completion time to restore an inoperable PORV.may not-exceed 7 days as-required by this ACTION.

d. The consequences of operational events .that will overpressurize the RCS are more severe at lower temperature. ,

Thus, with one of the two RCS relief valves inoperable in MODE 5 or in MODE 6 with the head.on,.the completion time'to ,

restore two valves to OPERABLE status is 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

The completion tiine represents a. reasonable' time to investigate and repair several types of relief valve failures without exposure to a lengthy period with only one OPERABLE RCS relief valve to protect against1 overpressure ;

events. If a PORV is inoperable when - the plant enters MODE 5 from MODE 4, the completion time to restore an !

inoperable PORV ' changes to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . but the : cumulative inoperable time may not exceed 7 days before taking action to depressurize and vent. j

, e. The RCS must be depressurized and'a vent must be established within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months when both required RCS relief valves'aro ;

inoperable. The vent must be sized greater than or equal to '

3.14 square inches to ensure that the flow capacity ja i

! greater than that required for the worst case mass-input- '

transient reasonable during the applicable MODES. This action is needed to protect the RCPB from a low temperature overpressure event and a possible brittle failure of the reactor vessel. -

1 BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT'2 B 3/4 4-15g Amendment No. l

c.

9- NPF-73 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BASES-(Continued) 3/4.4.9 PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITS (Continuedi ACTION (Continued)

The completion time considers the time required to place the plant in this condition and the relatively low probability-of an overpressure event during this time period-due to increased operator awareness of administrative control requirements.

SURVEIT.T1ANCE REOUIREMENTS (SR)

SR 4.4.9.3.1 To minimize the potential for a low temperature overpressure event by limiting the mass input capability, a maximum of one charging pump is OPERABLE with the others verified deactivated with power removed and the accumulator discharge isolation valves are verified closed and locked out.

The frequency of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months is sufficient, considering other indications and alarms available to the operator in the control room, to verify the required. status of the equipment.

SR 4.4.9.3.1.b allows opening the accumulator discharge isolation valves to perform accumulator discharge check valve testing.

SR 4.4.9.3.2 )

The PORV block valve must be verified open every 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months to provide the flow path for each required PORV to perform its function when actuated. The valve must be remotely verified open in the main control room. This surveillance is performed if the PORV satisfies -i the LCO. ;

The block valve is a remotely controlled, motor operated valve.

The power to the valve operator is not required removed, and the manual operator is not required locked in the inactive position.

Thus, the block valve can be closed in the event the PORV develops excessive leakage or does not close (sticks open) after relieving an overpressure situation.

The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months frequency is considered adequate in view of other administrative controls available to the operator in the control r

room, such as valve position indication, that verify that the PORV block valve remains open.

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 B 3/4 4-15h Amendment No. l

U_

NPF-73 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM i- BASES (Continued)-

3/4.4.9 PREMSURE/ TEMPERATURE LTMITS (Continued)

SURVETT.T.ANCE REOUTREMENTS (SR) (Continued) -1 The SR' is required to be performed prior to entering the !

condition for:the OPPS to be OPERABLE. This assures low temperature i overpressure protection is. available when the RCS cold -leg temperature is less than or equal to the enable temperature' .

Performing the ' surveillance every 31 days .on each . required PORV permits' verification and adjustment, .if necessary, of its' lift- J

, setpoint, and considers instrumentation reliability which has been !

shown through operating. experience to be acceptable. The CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST will verify the setpoint is within the allowed -

maximum limits. PORV actuation could depressurize the RCS and'is not required.

Performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION on each required ' PORV actuation channel is. required every 18 months to adjust the'whole channel so that it responds and the valve opens within the required-

range and accuracy to known input.

SR 4.4.9.3.3 -

The RCS vent of greater than or equal to 3.14_ square inches is proven OPERABLE by verifying its open condition either:

a. Once every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months for an open vent or. valve that cannot be locked, except

b. Once every 31 days for a valve that is locked,-or provided with remote position indication, or sealed, or secured.in position. A removed pressurizar safety valve fits this category.

1" The passive vent arrangement must only be open to be OPERABLE.

This surveillance is required to be performed if the~ vent is being used to satisfy the pressure relief requirements of the LCo.

3/4.4.10 STRUCTURAL INTEGRTTY The inservice inspection and testing programs for ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components ensure that the structural integrity and operational readiness of these components will be maintained at an-acceptable level throughout the life of the plant. These programs are in accordance with Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and applicable . Addenda as required by 10 CFR Part 50.55a(g) except where specific written relief has been granted by the Commission pursuant to 10 CFR Part 50.55a (g) (6) (i) .

1

'I BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 B 3/4 4-15i Apendment No. l )

1

I' g

. ENPF-731 !

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

' BASES i3/4.4.11 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM RET.TEF' VALVES l BACKGROUND 1 l

The Pressurizer is equipped with two types' of devices for i pressure relief: pressurizer safety valves and.PORVs. The PORVs are ]

. electro-solenoid actuated . valves that are controlled to open in 1

. response to a signal from a pressure sensing system when the pressurizer pressure increases 'and close when the pressurizer = .

pressure decreases. The PORVs may also be manually operated from the-control room. ;

p.

e Block valves, which are normally open, are located between the pressurizer and the PORVs. The block valves are used to. isolate the PORVs in case of excessive leakage or a stuck open PORV. Block valve closure is accomplished manually using controls in the control room.

A stuck open PORV is, in ' effect, a small break loss of coolant accident (LOCA). As such, block valve closure terminates-the RCS depressurization and coolant inventory loss.

The PORVs and their associated block valves may be used by plant operators to depressurize the RCS to recover'from certain transients !

if normal pressurizar spray is not available. Additionally, the series arrangement of the PORVs and their block' valves permit performance of certain surveillances -on the valves during power L operation.

l The PORVs may also be used for feed and bleed core cooling in the case of multiple equipment failure events that are not1within.the design basis, such as a total loss of feedwater.

The PORVs, their block valves, and their. controls are powered from emergency power sources in the event of a loss of offsite power.

Two PORVs and their associated block valves are powered from'two.

separate safety trains.

])

]

1 The plant has three PORVs, each having a relief capacity of. j 210,000 lb/hr at 2350 psig. The functional design of.the PORVs is based on maintaining pressure below the high pressure reactor trip setpoint. In addition, the PORVs minimize challenges to the pressurizer safety valves and also may be used for low temperature.

overpressure protection (OPPS). See LCO 3.4.9.3, " Overpressure Protection System."

o 1

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 B 3/4 4-16 Amendment No.

- . .. - . ... - = , . .

.. .n ..

.,- INPF-73 J; REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM i

BASES (Continued)-

3/4.4.11 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM DRT.TEF VALVES (Continued)-

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES Plant l operators employ the PORVs to-depressurize the RCS in.. -

+

response to certain plant transientsLif normal pressurizer sprayL is- 3 not available. ~ For the Steam Generator. Tube Rupture- (SGTR) ; event, the safety analysis assumes-that manual operator actions are required-to mitigate the event. A loss of offsite power .is . assumed to accompany the event, and thus, normal' pressurizer.Lspray. is unavailable ~to reduce'RCS' pressure. The PORVs are assumed to be used ,

' for RCS depressurization, ; which is one of-the steps performed to- ,

-equalize the primary:and-secondary pressures.in order to! terminate the primary to secondary break flow and the radioactive releases'from-the affected steam generator. ,

The PORVs are used in safety analyses for events that result in l increasing RCS pressure for which--departure from-nucleate boiling

' ratio (DNBR) criteria are critical. Certain - analyses - have been performed to . study the. effects on primary pressure assuming PORV '

actuation'. The results of the turbine trip : event ' indicate the primary pressure remains within the design. limits'and the DNBR.is maintained within the acceptance criteria.

O .

9 The LCO requires the PORVs and their associated block valves;to be' OPERABLE for manual operation-to mitigate the effects. associated with an SGTR.

By maintaining at least two PORVs and their associated block valves OPERABLE, redundancy.has been provided.- The block valves:are available to isolate the flow path through either.a failed open PORV !

or a PORV with excessive leakage. Satisfying the LCO helps minimize challenges to fission product barriers.

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, the PORV and its block valve are required ,

to be OPERABLE to limit the potential'for'a small break LOCA through. .

the flow path. The most likely cause for a PORV.small break LOCA is #

a result of a pressure increase transient that causes the PORV to open. Imbalances in:the energy output.of the core'and heat removal +

by,the secondary system can cause the RCS pressure to increase.to the- ;

i I

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 B 3/4 4-16a Amendment No.. l l l

, . .v.. . . .. - -. .. . - _v. . ~ _ ~ . . . . ,

p FNPF-735 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM IBASES ' (Cont!inued) . 1 I

i3/4.4.'11 REACTOR' COOLANT' SYSTEM RRLTEF VALVES (Continued) .

APPLICABILITY (Continued)

]

~

PORV' opening setpoint. The most' rapid increases will occur at.the higher operating power and pressure conditions of MODES 1 and 2. The "

PORVs ' are also ~ required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1,- 2, and 3 to minimize' challenges to.the pressurizer safety valves.

Pressure increases are less prominent in MODE 3-because'the core. ,

input energy is reduced, but.the RCS pressure is high. Therefore, !

the LCO is applicable in MODES 1, 2, 'and 3. The .LCO is not -3 applicable in MODE 4.when.both pressure and core energy are decreased'

and the pressure surges become much less significant. The PORV setpoint is. reduced for OPPS in MODES 4 (below the enable temperature), 5, and 6 with the reactor vessel head.in' place. LCO 3.4.9.3 addresses the PORV requirements in these MODES.~ 1 ACTION A General Note provides clarification that all pressurizer PORVs ~

l and block valves are treated as separate entities, each with separate ;

completion times'(i.e., the completion time is on a component basis). j

a. With'one PORV inoperable, either the PORV'must.be restored or the' flow' path. isolated within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months . The block valve l l should be closed with power removed 1 from the ' associated I l block valve because of. downstream piping. concerns..-:With the ,

block valve closed, the potential exists to. condense steam ;

in the piping. between ' the block valve - and the downstream PORV. If the block valve were opened and the PORV actuated, the piping downstream of the PORV may be overstressed due to j the slug of water'being forced down the piping. Based on '

the downstream piping concern, it is prudent to remove power .i from the closed block valve.. Removing power from the' block l valve renders the block valve inoperable, however, two PORVs and their associated block valves remain OPERABLE and redundancy exists for PORV operation.- .Therefore, plant operation may continue with one block valve closed and power removed. PORV inoperability may be due to seat leakage,

, instrumentation problems (including PORV accident monitoring instruments identified in LCO 3.3.3.8), or other causes.

Automatic control problems and related ' instrumentation-problems would not render the PORVs inoperable. Accident

) analyses assume manual operation of the PORVs and do not take credit for automatic actuation.- This condition is only j intended to permit operation of the plant for a limited t

i i

I BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 B 3/4 4-16b Amendment No. l

.~

g :NPF-73. l REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM I

a BASES.1 (Continued) .

l l

11 ^3/4.4.11 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM DELTEF VALVES (Continued)'

ACTION (Continued) period of time not to exceed the next refueling outage so that. maintenance can be performed on the PORV to return the !

1

~

valve:to an OPERABLE condition. . Normally, the PORV should

+

be available for automatic mitigation of overpressure events.

-and should be returned to OPERABLE status' prior toLentering startup (MODE 2).

The completion time-of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months is based on plant operating; experience that has shown that minor problems can be '

corrected or closure accomplished in this time' period. ,

b. With two PORVs inoperable, they must be either restored or isolated by closing the associated block valves and removing:

the power to the associated block valves. The completion-time of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months is reasonable, based on challenges to-the

. PORVs during this time period, and provides the operator .

adequate time to correct the situation. If the inoperable valves'cannot be restored to OPERABLE status, the inoperable

, valves must be isolated within the specified time.- Because there is one PORV that remains OPERABLE, an additional'72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months is provided to restore at least one inoperable PORV to. 't

' OPERABLE status. If a PORV cannot be' restored within this additional time, the plant must be brought to a MODE'in which the LCO does not apply.

c. If three PORVs are inoperable, it'is.necessary.to either

~

i restore at least'one valve within the~ completion timejof:1-hour or isolate the flow path'by closing.and removing.the-power to the associated block valves. The completion time. .

of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months is reasonable, based on the small potential for :

challenges to the system during this time and provides the t operator time to, correct the situation. If one PORV'is l restored, then the plant-will'be in a less limiting-ACTION statement with the time . clock started at the original ;

declaration of having three PORVs' inoperable. If no PORVs-are restored within the completion time, then.the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO-does not apply.- To' .

achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and to MODE 4 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . .The-allowed completion times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly. manner and . without challenging plant systems. In MODES 4 and 5, maintaining PORV OPERABILITY may be required. See LCO 3.4.9.3. ,

6 BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 B 3/4 4-16c Amendment No. l

s J A S .

1

'l

^

m NPF-73~

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

i

[

tBASES"(Continued)

]

'1 3/4.4.11-M ACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM RRLTEF VALVES (Continuad) . ~j ACTION (Continued) .

.j d.- If _one block valve is . inoperable . and open,. then J it is y necessary to either restore the ' block - valve to OPERABLE '

status within' the. completion . time of: 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months or- place ;the associated'PORV-in manual control.. The prime importancelfor--

the capability to close the - block valve is _ to isolat'e a stuck open PORV.- Therefore, .if the block valve _cannot be' restored to OPERABLE status within' ~ _ l' hour, the ' required .

action is to place the PORV in. manual control to. preclude a its automatic opening for an overpressure' event and.to avoid the potential for a stuck'open PORV at a time that;the block E valve is' inoperable. If the block valve is inoperable, it' is necessary to restore the block valve to OPERABLE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months or close it. If block valve' instrumentation. ,,

related to accident monitoring instrumentation. identified in '

LCO 3.3.3.8 is determined to beJinoperable, then.the' block valve shall be declared inoperable. Closing the block valve.

precludes the need to place the PORV in manual control since.

it'is isolated from.the system. The completion time of_1 hour is' reasonable,_ based on the small potential -for.

challenges to the system- during this time period,. and provides the operator time _ to correct the situation. ,

Because at least one PORV remains OPERABLE,.the operator is t permitted a ~ completion . time - of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months to restore the- .

inoperable open block valve to OPERABLE status. If it cannot be restored within this additional time,'thecplant '

must be brought to a MODE'in which the'LCO does'not apply in ;

order to avoid continuous operation without ' a redundantL ,

ability to isolate this PORV flow path. If the block. valve is restored within the completion .. time of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months ,-the-power will'be restored and the PORV restored to OPERABLE-status. With one block valve inoperable and closed, there .

i still remains two PORV flow paths. This redundancy;will-

~

allow continued operation until the-next refueling' outage to perform maintenance on the inoperable valve and return it to OPERABLE status.

e. If more than one block valve is' inoperable, it is necessary 1 to either restore the block valves within the completion . l time of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months , or place the associated PORVs in manual i control and restore at least one. block valve within 2' hours l

[and restore a minimum of two block valves within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months ). '

Two OPERABLE PORVs provide redundancy to allow continued operation until the next refueling outage to perform I maintenance on the inoperable valve and return it to !

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 B 3/4 4-16d Amendment No. l

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y' : .NPF-73 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

'k i BASES (Continued)-

K ' 3'/4.' 4. l'1 - REACTOR COOLANT ' SYSTEM RET.TEF ' VALVES ~ (Continued) b ACTION (Continued)'.

OPERABLE status.- The completion times are reasonable,-based !

on the small potential for challenges-to the system during. ~

this time and provide ~ the operator timeto correct - the 4 situation. If the. required actions are not met,;then the plant must be brought to a MODE in which:the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE.3 within 6 - hours and to - MODE 4. within 12 i hours. The allowed completion times are reasonable,' based. 1 on operating experience, to reach the required' plant )

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conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner- i and without. challenging plant systems. In MODES 4 and 5, maintaining PORV OPERABILITY may be required.- See LCO.

3.4.9.3. ,

1 i

SURVEILT.ANCE REOUIREMENTS (SR)

SR 4.4.11.1 This surveillance requires a complete cycle .of: each' PORV.-

-Operating a PORV through one complete cycle ensures that the-PORV can-be manually actuated for mitigation of an SGTR. The. frequency of 18' months is based on a' typical' refueling cycle and industry accepted.

practice. ,

1 SR 4.4.11.2 'l Block valve cycling verifies that the valve (s) can be closed if needed. The basis'for the frequency of 92 days is the ASME Code,: '

Section XI. If the block valves are closed.to isolate inoperable ~

PORVs,.the maximum completion' time to restore one PORV and open'the: ;

block valve.is 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months , which is well within the allowable limits (25%) to extend the block valve frequency of 92 days. Furthermore, these test requirements would be . completed by. the reopening. of a recently closed block valve upors restoration of the PORV to OPERABLE status (i.e., completion of the required. actions fulfills the SR).

This SR is not required to be met with the block valve closed,;in accordance with required ACTIONS a, b, or c of this LCO.

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 B 3/4 4-16e Amendment No. l

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4. ' ypy_73 - !

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM l J

BASES (Continued) .

l 3/4.4.12' REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM HEAD VENTS l I

Reactor Coolant System Vents. are provided to exhaust l noncondensible gases and/or steam from.the primary system that could I inhibit natural circulation core cooling. The OPERABILITY of at least one reactor coolant. system vent path from the reactor vessel head or ;

the pressurizer steam space via the PORV's ensures the capability exists to perform this function.

The valve redundancy of the Reactor Coolant System Head vent paths serves to minimize the probability _of inadvertent or -l irreversible actuation while ensuring that a single failure of a vent l valve, power supply or control system does not prevent isolation of- !

the vent path. J 8 .I The function, capabilities, and testing requirements of the 4

Reactor Coolant System vent systems are consistent with the -)

requirements of Item II.B.1 of NUREG-0737, " Clarification of TMI '

Action Plan Requirements," November 1980. ;

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BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 B 3/4 4-16f Amendment No. l {

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,' .. C NPF-73:

g st ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS ,

SPECIAL REPORTS (Continued)

d. . Seismic event analysis, Specification 4.3.3.3.2.

e. Sealed source leakage in excess of limits, Specification 4.7.9.1.3.

f. Miscellaneous reporting requirements specified in the ACTION l Statements for Radiological Effluent Technical- '

Specifications.

g. Containment Inspection Report, Specification 4.6.1.6.2.

h. Steam generator tube inservice inspection, Specification

-4.4.5.5.

1. Inoperable accident monitoring, Specification 3.3.3.8.

l 6.10 RECORD RETENTION 6.10.1 The following records shall be retained for at least five (5) years;

a. Records and logs of facility. operation covering time interval at each power level.

b. Records and logs of principal maintenance activities, inspections, repair and replacement of principal items of equipment related to nuclear safety.

c. All REPORTABLE EVENTS. l

d. Records of surveillance activities, inspections and

-calibrations required by these Technical Specifications.

e. Records of reactor tests and experiments.

f. Records of changes made to Operating Procedures.

g. Records of radioactive shipments.

h. Records of sealed source leak tests and results.

1. Records of annual physical inventory of all sealed source material of record.

6.10.2 The following records shall be retained for the duration of the Facility Operating License:

a. Records and drawing changes reflecting facility design modifications made to systems and equipment described in the ,

Final Safety Analysis Report.

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 6-19 Amendment No. l

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ML20082E527

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