ML20081D664
| ML20081D664 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fort Calhoun |
| Issue date: | 10/14/1983 |
| From: | William Jones OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT |
| To: | John Miller Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737 GL-82-33, LIC-83-274, PROC-831014, NUDOCS 8311010290 | |
| Download: ML20081D664 (73) | |
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PROGRAM PLAN FOR THE FORT CALHOUN CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW i
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PREPARED BY THE OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT l
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October 14, 1983 i
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O 8311010290 831014 PDR ADOCK 05000285
-F PDR
l TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Page
1.0 INTRODUCTION
1-1 2-1 2.0 OVERVIEW 2-1 2.1 Purpose 2-1 2.2 Objectives 2.3 Description of CRDR Activities 2-2 2.3.1 Execution Phase 2-2 1
2.3.2 Assessment Phase 2-4 I
2.3.3 Documentation Phase 2-4 2.3.4 Correction Phase 2-4 2.3.5 Effectiveness Phase 2-4 2.4 Program Milestones 2-5 2.5 Definition of Tenns 2-5 1
3.0 MANAGEE NT AND STAFFING 3-1 3.1 CRDR Organization and Management 3-1 3.2 Review Team Structure 3-1 3.3 Review Team Qualifications 3-3 3.4 Review Team Orientation 3-5 4.0 EXECUTION PHASE 4-1 4.1 Operating Experience Review 4-1 4.1.1 Historical Documentation Review 4-1 4.1.2 Document Screening 4-2 4.1.3 Operating Personnel Interviews 4-3 4.2 Control Room Survey 4-3 4.2.1 Checklists 4-4 4.3 Task Analysis 4-7 4.3.1 Methodology 4-8 4.3.2 Data Recording 4-9 4.3.3 Data Analysis 4-9 4.3.4 Reporting of Analytical and Observational 4-10 Results O
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5.0 ASSESSMENT
PHASE 5-1 5.1 HEDs and Problem Areas Screening 5-1 v
6.0 DOCUMENTATION PHASE 6-1 6.1 General Documentation Requirements 6-1 6.2 References 6-2 6.3 Review Documentation 6-3 6.4 CRDR DATABASE Description 6-4 6.5 Final Summary Report 6-4 7.0 CORRECTION PHASE 7-1 7-1 7.1 Scheduling 7.2 Implementation 7-1 8.0 EFFECTIVE PHASE 8-1 8.1 Validation of Changes 8-1 8.2 Future Control Room Changes 8-2 APPENDIX A - CRDR DATA COLLECTION FORMS APPENDIX B - MANAGEMENT RESUMES APPENDIX C - REVIEW TEAM RESUMES O
LIST OF FIGURES Figure Page 2.1 SCHEMATIC 0F CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW ACTIVITIES 2-3 3.1 PROJECT ORGANIZATION AND LEY PERSONNEL 3-2 4.1 CHECM.IST SURVEY FORMAT DEVELOPMENT 4-5 4.2 CONTROL ROOM LAYOUT 4-6
5.1 ASSESSMENT
PHASE ACTIVITY FLOW 5-2 5.2 PROBLEM AND HED SCREENING 5-4 5.3 NEAR-TERM DEFICIENCY CORRECTION 5-6 6.4 TASK ANALYSIS DATABASE SAMPLE 6-5 9.1 CRDR SCHEDULE 9-2 l
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SECTION
1.0 INTRODUCTION
O The purpose of this program plan is to describe the manner in which the Omaha Public Power District (OPPD) intends to conduct a design review of the Fort Calhoun Nuclear Power Plant control room and renote shutdown panel. OPPD intends to begin the review ef fort before the program plan has been approved by the NRC. However, OPPD expects that any major deficien-cies in the plan noted by the NRC staff will be brought to OPPD's attention in a timely manner. General P'ysics Corporation will provide human factors engineering and independent operations specialists to OPPD for the CRDR pro-ject.
A second function of this program plan is to provide a basis upon which to judge that an adequate CRDR has indeed been conducted.
It is intended that any audit of OPPD's CRDR by NRC personnel or contractors will use this pro-gram plan as its reference document and that the criteria for completeness and adequacy will be taken from this document.
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OPPD intends to construct a full scale photographic mock-up of the control room panels to be used during the survey and operations personnel inter-views as well as for determination of any necessary corrective modifica-tions to the control panels.
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SECTION 2.0 OVERVIEW
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2.1 Purpose The purpose of the OPPD CRDR is to ensure that the Fort Calhoun control room and remote shutdown panel will support operation during emergency and normal operating conditions. The operator tasks required during emergen-cies will be based on the new emergency procedure guidelines (EPGs) recent-ly developed by the Combustion Engineering (CE) owners group.
2.2 Objectives To ensure that the CRDR fulfills its stated purpose, the following objec-tives will be met during the review:
To perfonn a control room survey that compares the existing control room design with accepted human engineering criteria q.
V To identify human engineering discrepancies (HEDs)
To review relevant plant operational experience using appro-priate documentation and operator interviews To determine the input and output requirements of control room operator tasks during emergency conditions To determine the extent and importance of any identified dis-crepancies j
To formulate and implement resolutions for significant discrep-ancies (as judged above) 2-1 l
To ensure that the proposed resolutions do, in fact, eliminate or mitigate the discrepancies for which they are fomulated To identify training necessary to ensure that control room operators can function adequately with any control room changes 2.3 Description of CRDR Activities To achieve the stated objectives of the CRDR, several activities will be completed A flow chart of these activities is presented in Figure 2-1.
during the review.
This flow chart is not intended to show the start and stop times for each activ-ity, but rather, the inter-relationships of the information needed and obtained by each activity. Note that the CRDR has been split into six nominal phases:
pl an-The ning, execution, assessment, correction, effectiveness, and documentation.
planning phase of the CRDR is represented by this program plan.
The activities within each phase will be described in more detail later, but a brief synopsis of these activities will help give a general picture of the review process.
O 2.3.1 Execution Phase The execution phase will constitute the investigative, data gathering portion of the CRDR. During this phase, a control room survey will compare the characteris-tics of the existing control room with appropriate human engineering design guide-An examination of operating experience, both generic and plant-specific, lines.
will be conducted by a review of historical operational documents, such as plant trip reports and control room operator logs, and through questionnaires and inter-i views with control room operators. The task analysis, which consists of the task identification, verification of instrumentation, and validation of control roo:n functions, will be integrated with the development of the upgraded emergency oper-ating procedures (E0Ps) and will be based on the emergency procedures guidelines (EPGs) developed by the CE owners group. The EPGs will be analyzed to.detennine the tasks required of operators during emergencies. The instrumentation and con-trol requirements for those tasks will be established, and the adequacy and com-pleteness of existing instrumentation and controls will be detennined, p) u I
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d REVIEW TEAM SELTCTION PHASEI AND CROR PROCEDUP.ES DEVELOPMENT PLANNING I
I 1 r J k 9P 1r OPERATING EXPERIENCE CONTROL ROOM SURVEY REVIEW I
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TASK IDENTIFICATION PHAJE ll EXECUTION ir VERIFICATION OF TASK ANALYSIS INSTRUMEN IATION 1r VAllDATION OF CONTROL ROOM FUNCTIONS I f a
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ASSESSMENT
' f 1P J L PHA5E IV A
ORT DOCUMENTATION 1 r II J L IMPLEMENT ENHANCEMENTS AND MODIFICATIONS PHAJE V CORRECTION ir TRAIN OPERATORS ON CHANGES I f I
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PHASE VI A 10 ATE CHANGES WCORPORATE NTURE EFFECTIVENESS AND SOLICIT FEE 0BACK CONTROL ROOM CHANGES q
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SCHEMATIC OF CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW ACTIVITIES l
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2.3.2 Assessment Phase During the assessment phase, all discrepancies identified in the execution phase will be analyzed, and the potential impact of each discrepancy on emergency plant operation will be detemined. Discrepancies will be classified according to their potential impact on emergency plant operation. Significant discrepancies will be evaluated for resolution through enhancement, modification, or other means, such as changes to procedures and training. Any actions proposed to resolve signifi-cant discrepancies will be analyzed for their effect on operation.
2.3.3 Documentation Phase A report that will summarize the overall review process, summarize the identified human engineering discrepancies, describe the disposition of discrepancies for which no changes were made, describe control room design improvements implemented during the course of the review, identify existing design characteristics that are beneficial, and identify the proposed design improvements. The schedule for imple-mentation will be submitted to the NRC approximately four months after the comple-tion of the Assessment Phase.
2.3.4 Correction Phase A plant-soecific plan will be developed to ensure the integration of proposed con-trol room changes with other post-TMI programs, as well as plant operating status.
A schedule will be developed for the orderly introduction of proposed changes.
The schedule will take into account the required training of operators on pending changes. The plan and schedule will be a part of the summary report identified in the previous section. Administrative follow-up will be instituted to ensure the successful completion and integration of all control rom changes.
2.3.5 Ef fectiveness Phase A program will be set in place at Fort Calhoun to solicit, evaluate, and act on This operational feedback concerning plant system design and plant procedures.
process will be delineated to make certain that changes resulting from the CRDR O
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are evaluated for their effectiveness. Additionally, OPPD will establish a pro-I cedure to ensure that future control room modifications receive human factors con-Os sideration.
2.4 Program Milestones In planning the implementation of the CRDR, OPPD has established the following milestones and completion dates:
Milestone Completion Date Develop Draft Program Plan 30 May 83 Define Manpower Requirements 30 May 83 Select Contractor 15 Aug 83 Start Review 1 Sep 83 Submit Final Program Plan 15 Oct 83 Review Operation Experience 1 Feb 84 Conduct CR Survey 1 Apr 84 Verification of Task Capabilities 1 Aug 84 Validation of CR Functions 1 Oct 84 HED Assessment 1 Feb 85 Submit Summary Report 1 Apr 85 Validation, verification and implementation of Control Room improvements have not been scheduled since it is not possible to develcp a qualified implementation schedule until completion of the review and assessment activities. The summary report will contain validation, verification and implementation schedules for correction of HEDs.
2.5 Definition of Terms Control Room Design Review (CRDR) - A post-TMI task listed in NUREG-0660, " Task i
Action Plan Developed as a Result of the TMI-2 Accident," and HUREG-0737, the staff supplement to HUREG-0660, as Task I.D.1.
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Control Room Survey - One of the activities that constitute a CRDR.
The control room survey is a static verification of the control room performed by comparing pV the existing control room instrumentation and layout with selected human engineer-ing design criteria; i.e., checking the control room match to the human operator.
Critical Incident Technique - An interview technique in which control room oper-ators and supervisory personnel are asked to describe situations they have wit-nessed where either they or someone else committed an error that led or almost led to an abnormal or unsafe operational status.
Elements of a Utility CRDR Implemention Process - Necessary parts of a cohesive CRDR implementation process considered in developing and reviewing the implementa-tion plan and schedule.
Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) - Plant procedures directing the operator actions necessary to mitigate the consequences of transients and accidents that cause plant parameters to exceed reactor protection setpoints, engineered safety feature setpoint, or other appropriate technical limits.
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system analysis of transients and accidents, that provide sound technical bases for plant-specific E0Ps.
Human Engineering Discrepancy (HED) - A characteristic of the existing control room that does not comply with human engineering criteria.
Human Engineering Suitability - An attribute of a system, component, or procedure that determines compliance with the human engineering requirements of its users and the job in which it is used.
Nuclear Utility Task Action Committee (NUTAC) for CRDR - Representatives from var-ious nuclear utilities and INP0 organized to define areas of CRDR implementation for which an overall industry effort can provide assistance to individual util-ities in completing Task I.D.1, NUREG-0737, 2-6
The l1 Operating Experience Review - One of the activities that constitute a CRDR.
O operating experience review screens plant operating doc problems or near misses in the past.
Review Team - The group of individuals responsible for implementing the CRDR.
Safety Parameter Display Systems (SPDS) - An aid to the control room operating crew for use in monitoring the status of critical safety functions (CSFs) that f
constitute the basis for plant-specific, symptom-oriented E0Ps.
Task Analysis - A tool used to delineate system functions and the specific actions that must take place to accomplish those functions.
In the CRDR context, task analysis is used to determine the individual tasks that must be completed to allow j
successful emergency operation. This activity checks the control room match to the emergency operating procedures.
Validation - The process of determining whether the control room operating crew can perform their functions effectively given the control room instrumentation, n'-
procedures, and training.
In the CRDR context, validation implies a dynamic performance evaluation.
Verification - The process of determining whether instrumentation, controls, and other equipment exist to meet the specific requirements of the emergency tasks The control room survey is a verification activity, performed by operators.
In the CRDR context, checking the control room match to the human operator.
i verification implies a static check of instrumentation against human engineering criteria.
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SECTION 3.0 MANAGEMENT AND STAFFING O
3.1 CRDR Organization and Management Figure 3-1 illustrates the organization of the CRDR project and identifies key personnel and/or disciplines aesociated with project management, the project review team, and review task activities. As can be seen in Figure 3-1, the CRDR project is organized within the Operations Technical Support Services (TSS) of the Technical Services Section.
The project management team will consist of Dr. Richard L. Jaworski P.E., Section Manager - Technical Services; Mr. Timothy J. McIvor P.E., Manager - Operations Technical Support Services; and the Project Manager, Mr. V. Guy Morris P.E..
The duties and responsibilities of the management team include the review and approval of the program plan, data collection methods, conceptual design packages and project reports, and project personnel.
It also will be the responsibility of the management team to resolve differing positions among review team members on methodology, review findings, assessment, and HED corrective actions.
Additional requirements of the Project Manager include providing the administrative and technical direction for the project and the responsibility for day-to-day implementation of the plan. Access to infonnation, facilities, and individuals providing useful or necessary input to the team is coordinated by the Project Manager.
Resumes of the management team are contained in Appendix B.
3.2 Review Team Structure The review team is a multi-disciplinary team of individuals with the wide range of skills and plant experience necessary to implement all CRDR activities and pro-O 3-1
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Technical Services Dr. R. L. Jaworski P.E Section Manager I
Operations Technical Support Services T. J. Mc!vor P.E.
Manacer I
CRDR Project V r. Morris P.E.
Project Manager p
GCNERAL PHYSICS CORPORATION l
J. M. Christensen l
l Project Director l
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l OPPD Fort Calhoun D. C. Burgy Resources l
Project Manager l
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- Operations Special.
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- Plant Engineer l
Project Staff l
- I&C Engineer R. Liddle M. Jones l
g L. Schrceder D. Duquette l
Human Factors Operations l
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L__________________s 1 r 1 r 1 r Control Room Design Review Team FIGURE 3-1.
PROJECT ORGANIZATION
ducts. The core review team will consist of a mix of OPPD and General Physics Corporation personnel. At a minimum, the review team will consist of the follow-ing types of personnel:
IaC Engineer Operations Specialist (SR0/STA)
Hunan Factors Engineer (Lead)
Plant (Systems) Engineer The review team will be supplemented, as required, by other disciplines such as:
mechanical, electrical, and industrial engineering, training, computer operations, procedures, licensing, health physics, and emergency preparedness. During the course of the reviev, any additional expertise (e.g., lighting, acoustics) required will be made available to the review team, as needed. Resumes of review team members are contained in Appendix C.
3.3 Review Team Member Qualifications The Fort Calhoun CRDR team has not been selected at this time. The recommended qualifications set forth in the following paragraphs will be a major consideration in the selection of the review team members.
Qualifications of the Plant Engineer and I&C Engineer will meet or exceed ANSI N18.1.
3.3Property "ANSI code" (as page type) with input value "ANSI N18.1.</br></br>3.3" contains invalid characters or is incomplete and therefore can cause unexpected results during a query or annotation process..1 Operations Specialists Professional Experience: A licensed senior reactor operator or reactor operator with a minimum of two years of experience at Fort Calhoun shall be included on the CRDR review team. General Physics Corporation personnel who provide operations support will have a minimum of two years of experience in a PWR control room.
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3.3.2 Plant Engineer O
Formal Education:
A bachelor's degree in engineering or equivalent.
Professional Experience:
A minimum of five years of applied experience with a minimum of three years of experience at Fort Calhoun or a similar nuclear power The bachelor's degree requirement may be waived in lieu of two additional plant.
years of directly-related experience.
3.3.3 IaC Engineer Formal Education:
A bachelor's degree in engineering or equivalent.
Professional Experience:
A minimum of five years of applied ' experience with a minimum of three years of experience at Fort Calhoun or a similar nuclear power The bachelor's degree requirement may be waived in lieu of two additional plant.
years of directly-related experience.
i 3.3.5 Human Factors Engineer The General Physics Corporation project staff is described below; complete resumes for these personnel are provided in Appendix C.
Dr. Julien C. Christensen (Project Director)
He Dr. Christensen has over 35 years experience in the human factors field.
4 His duties is currently General Physics' Chief Human Factors Specialist.
include technical supervision of all phases of human factors application.
Dr. Christensen coordinated the control room reviews for Oyster Creek f
Nuclear Power Plant and Three Island Unit 1.
1 Donald C. Burgy (Project' Manager)-
Mr. Burgy directs all human factors engineering'and man-machine systems l
design and evaluation work for General Physics. He has managed or participated in nuclear power plant control room design reviews at eight I
1 nuclear power stations.
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Robert J. Liddle Mr. Liddle is a human factors engineer responsible for the development and O
implementation of control room design review methodologies. He has served as project manager for control room review projects and has had experience with utility / Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensing negotiations involving human factors issues.
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Dr. Lothar R. Schroeder Dr. Schroeder is currently the project manager for a PWR control room design review. He has previously supported control room review projects for Public Service Electric and Gas Company's Salem plant and for DOE at the Handord N-Reac tor. Dr. Schroeder has also supported an NRC research project involving the application of control room crew task analysis data to human engineering design and staffing concerns.
H. Matt Jones Mr. Jones is a senior instructor for onsite power plant training programs including generic and plant-specific subjects. He has provided operations expertise as a CRDR team member for the Salem, Trojan and WNP-2 CRDR O
projects, and was the project manager for the Clinch River Breeder Reactor CRDR.
Donald R. Duquette Mr. Duquette is a Certified Nuclear Power Plant Senior Reactor Operator Instructor for Pressurized Water Reactors. He has managed and prepared systems manual projects for four nuclear utilities, and he was a member of the CRDR team for the Salem Nuclear Generating Station.
3.4 Review Team Orientation All non-0 PPD members of the review team will undergo an orientation program designed to provide certain basic knowledge requirements. This orientation will consist of observing nomal plant operation and the use of emergency procedures.
This orientation will take place at the plant and on the control room mock-up.
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SECTION 4.0 4
EXECUTION PHASE O
The objective of the OPPD CRDR is to detemine the extent to which the Fort Cal-houn control room provides the operators with sufficient information to complete their required functions and task responsibilities efficiently under emergency The review will also determine the human engineering suitability of conditions.
the designs of the instrumentation and equipment in the Fort Calhoun control roon.
This section of the implementation plan describes the procedures that will be applied to accomplish those overall objectives.
4.1 Operating Experience Review The review of operating experience will provide infomation on potential problem areas in the control room by studying actual occurrances (and near misses) in the The plant. Two separate steps are involved in reviewing operating experience.
first is to review available and applicable historical documentation pertaining to The second step is to interview operating plant-specific and generic occurrences.
O Operating personnel interviews should identify specific problem areas personnel.
v in the Fort Calhoun control room and, in particular, should point out problems that occur in nomal operation.
4.1.1 Historical Documentation Review Since OPPD is most concerned with events that have occurred at Fort Calhoun, the major portion of the documentation review will involve plant-specific documents.
The applicable plant documents that will be examined include the following:
Operations Incident Report (1978-Present)
Licensee Event Report (LERs)(1978-Presert)
Outage Reports (1978-present) n v
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l It is recognized that documentation originating elsewhere in the industry should be reviewed to ascertain whether or not generic problems have been found that O
might relate to Fort Calhoun.
Industry-wide documentation to be reviewed includes Significant Operating Experience Reports (SOERs), Significant Event Reports (SERs), and Licensee Event Reports (LERs) from plants of the same design vintage and vendor type as Fort Calhoun distributed by the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INP0).
Since INP0 maintains a complete LER data base, they will be requested to provide OPPD with a printout of LERs sorted using the following characteristics:
LERs from:
Combustion Engineering (CE) Power Designed from:
1965 through 1975 Listing errors by:
Licensed Operators Involving either:
Human error or procedural deficiency 4.1.2 Document Screening The reports obtained will be screened by an operations specialist with the assis-O tance of a human factors specialist to determine if the report describes and docu-ments a control room problem. A control room problem is defined as one that meets one or more of the following criteria:
I Equipment referenced (valve / pump controls, displays, indicators, etc.)
must be in the physical confines of the control room or remote shut-down panel.
Procedure steps referenced should be acccomplished within the physical confines of the control room or remote shutdown panel.
Personnel error referenced must have occurred in the control roon on equipment in.the control room or remote shutdown panel or entailed a deviation from procedures that were to be accomplished in the control room or remote shutdown panel.
Reports that pass the above selection criteria will be retained for further anal-ysis.
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4.1.3 Operating Personnel Interviews Probably the most valuable source of data on operational problems is the person who has operated the plant. The intent of the operating personnel interview is to gain as much firsthand infomation as possible on actual and potential operational errors.
Structured interviews will be developed to obtain detailed infomation in areas of control room design, training, procedures, and staffing. The interview outline will also allow detailed follow-up in areas of general interest to the review team. The interview questions will be given to the interviewees two to three weeks in advance of the interview in order to give each intervienee adequate time to think about his/her response.
This particular activity will be assigned to human factors personnel, under the task leadership of the human factors engineer, assisted by an operations special-ist not from OPPD. The interview team will have experience in a control roam environment. Unless such experience is present, the importance of certain res-ponses might be missed by the interviewer. Also, responses may lead an exper-ienced individual to probe deeper in specific areas, seemingly unrelated to the response.
Interviews will be conducted using a structured technique that helps ensure all important areas will be addressed. The structure will be flexible enough to allow added emphasis on certain topics if necessary. The personnel to be interviewed include 100% of the licensed operating staff plus other licensed operators, super-visory, and training personnel. Approximately 30 interviews will be conducted.
4.2 Control Room Survey I
A survey of the existing Fort Calhoun control room will be conducted during the CRDR. The purpose of the survey will be to compare the design features of the O
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To
, existing control room with applicable human engineering design guidelines.
facilitate the survey, checklists will }oe coepiled for which direct observation and measurement of control roen features can be undertaken.
s 4.2.1 Checklists and Surveys The checklists will represent Section 6,of NUREG-0700 and infonnation from some of the documents listed in Section 6.2 of this program plan. The review team will extract the necessary infonnation from the reference documents and refonnat that information for the Fort Calhoun specific survey using the format development process shown in Figure 4-1.
The checklists will organize guideline items under the following broad categories:
Control room layout (See Figure 4-2)
Conmunications Annunciator warning systems Controls Visual displays Labels and location aids Process computers Panel layout Control / display integration Environmental Some guidelines will be addresse( primarily on a control room-wide basis, such as those that fall in the categories of communications, process computer, control room layout, and environmental factors. Others will be approached on a control room-wide basis first, and then panel-by-panel, such as the annunciator system and layout.
Still other guidelines will be evaluated element-by-element, and then for general control room consistency, such as controls, displays, labels, and location aids. The checklists will incorporate guidelines contained in the "CRDR Survey Development Guideline," published by the NUTAC on CRDR (INP0-83-026).
Checklist items will be organized for easy reference and will provide space for an indication of compliance or non complianc'e.to each guideline. When lack of com-pliance is found, the specific reason or reasons will be clearly described.
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NUREG-0700 NUTAC GENERAL SECTION 6 SURVEY PIIYSICS CilECKLIST GUIDELINES CIIECKLIST If OPPD CONTROL ROOM SURVEY t
FORMAT O
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REVIEW
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i if APPROVED SURVEY FORMAT i
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Items that require further documentation of the human engineering discrepancy will be described in greater detail on a separate record cross-referenced to the check-list. Photographic evidence of at least one example of each type of HED will also be provided, if feasible, for review during the assessment phase of the CRDR.
When HEDs are mitigated by physical changes, the post-fix configuration will also be photographed.
In addition to completing the checklists, the surveys identified in the NUTAC guidelines will be completed. The individual surveys may include the following:
General Design Convention Survey Lighting Survey Noise Survey Anthropometric Survey Communication Survey Abbreviation and Acronym Survey Color-Coding Survey The control room survey will be conducted by human factors specialists who will be assisted by an operations specialist.
4.3 Task Analysis The operating experience review and the control room survey will identify as HEDs control room characteristics that have caused, or nearly caused, problems during nomal operation or HEDs that do not confonn to certain human engineering design criteria. The final activity in the CRDR execution phase, the task analysis will identify the tasks that operators must perfom during emergency conditions and determine whether the instrumentation, controls, and equipment is available to perform those tasks.
In addition to determining the availability of appropriate instrumentation, controls, and equipment, the task analysis will validate O
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I that the emergency tasks identified can be perfomed under simulated emergency conditions. The three major functions constituting the CRDR task analysis are:
Task Identification - The determination of the individual task and associated control room instrumentation that must be completed to allow successful emergency operation.
Verification of Instrumentation - Checking out the physical presence and capability of control room instrumentation and equipment versus the E0Ps and evaluating the human factors suitability of the instru-mentation.
Validation of Control Roan Functions - A dynamic perfomance evalu-ation of the operating crews implementing emergency operating proce-dures.
4.3.1 Methodology OPPD views task analysis as most importantly the basis for the upgraded E0Ps.
Transient and generic operating task analyses were performed in the development of the generic EPGs, and OPPD will further analyze task requirements in the develop-ment of the Fort Calhoun specific E0Ps. The specific task analysis procedures and the verification and validation of the resulting E0Ps generally are described in OPPD's response to Generic Letter 82-33. The specific procedures will be defined in the Procedures Generation Package. The specific procedures will be based on the NUTAC developed guidelines for task analysis and verification and validation.
The CRDR task analysis requirements are similar to the E0P task analysis require-ments.
The task identification information (i.e., task and _ instrumentation re-quirements) is the same for both efforts. The criteria for verification and validation dif fer slightly.
OPPD will meet the task analysis requirements through the integrated approach.
The basic task analysis function will fall within the E0P upgrade ef fort. The human factors engineer and the project engineer will work with the procedures OV 4-8
generation team in developing the procedures generation packages in order to (1) confinn that the required tasks, systems, and instrumentation information was O
8e4a2 9e ereted (2) co r4 - taet '#streme tetie# nrese#ce is ver4ried: (3) to specify validation procedures in which CRDR personnel could participate.
I CRDR personnel will conduct that part of the verification that addresses human factors suitability of instrumentation. CRDR personnel will participate as observors in the validation walk-throughs on the nock-up in order to collect the CRDR required data.
4.3.2 Data Recording The human factors specialist accompanying the operating crew operator (s) during the event walk-through on the mock-up will be evaluating the operator actions ver-sus the control board / control roon design criteria for each step of the proce-dure (s) being validated. A Task Analysis Validation Worksheet will be used to re-cord the evaluation of each procedure step. The human factors specialists observ-ing the events for work station and work flow data will record the following infor-mation:
o Actions taken Communication requirements Uncertainties involved Annunciator cues Crew roles 4.3.3 Data Analysis A number of nethods will be used to analyze and process the infonnation obtained in the Task Analysis Validation. The review team will cross-check the comments recorded on the Task Analysis Validation Worksheet with HEDs documented in previous review processes of the CRDR.
If a comment has not been previously addressed by one or more existing HEDs, it represents a new discrepancy and will be reported as such.
4-9
Diagranmatical link analyses techniques will be employed on the observational data I
The t
collected by the human factors specialists on work station and work flow.
1 HEDs produced may require design modifications to improve and enhance work flow.
The results may also indicate the desirability of training and/or procedural modi-fications.
4.3.4 Reporting of Analytical and Observational Results Discrepancies discovered in the evaluation of the data obtained in the walk-through approach will be recorded on a HED fonn. Work flow enhancements, train-ing, and/or procedural recommendations generated will also be recorded and re-ported using the HED fom.
O O
4-10
SECTION
5.0 ASSESSMENT
PHASE This phase of the CRDR program constitutes a systematic evaluation of all pro-blem areas and HEDs identified during the execution phase with the objective of determining the level of significance and preparing and testing recommendations for corrective action. Basic guidelines for the conduct of HED assessment are contained in the NUTAC document, NUREG-0700 and NUREG-0801.
The decision factors which comprise the NUTAC and NUREG-0801 assessment methodology are imbedded in the methodology which OPPD proposes to use for this program. This methodology has several advantages:
1.
It simplifies the decision process as it affects significance determina-tion.
2.
It includes some valid decision criteria which are not addressed in the NUREG-0801 approach.
Ob 3.
It is more oriented to problem correction than problem definition.
Figure 5-1 illustrates the flow path for the recommended assessment program.
This flow path incorporates the NUTAC assessment approach.
Specific assessment procedures / guidelines will be developed during the planning phase and refined at the beginning of this phase. An important aspect of this approach is that OPPD proposes to screen problen areas identified during the execution phase to determine if a real HED exists.
5.1 HEDs and Problem Areas Screening Tnis represents the initial task of the actual assessment process.
The various tasks which make up the review phase will result in problem descriptions and HEDs from a variety of review sources. This part of the assessment phase will Ov 5-1
(1)
ESTABLISH ASSESSMENT TEAM I f (2)
PROBLEM AND HED SCREENING I f l f NON ASSESSMENT DOCUMENTATION HED COMPILATION I f (4) OBVIOUS SOLUTION ENHANCEMENT
~
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(5) RELATIVE SIGNIFICANCE EVALUATION I f (S) PROPOSE HED r
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I f (7) COMPARATIVE EVALUATION OF SOLUTIONS If I f (9) RECOMMEND (8) DEVELOP &
ENHANCEMENT TEST CONCEPTUAL SOLUTIONS g
DESIGNS I
I I
(10)
(11) PREPARE NO YES RECONSIDER IMPLEMENTATIO IMPLEMENTATION SOLUTIONS DECISIONS RECOMMENDATION I I pd CORRECTION PHASE I
FIGURE 5-1.
ASSESSMENT PHASE ACTIVITY FLOW l
5-2
accomplish a screening of problems and potential problems as illustrated in Fig-ure 5-2.
Problems and potential problems found during the interviews and LER re-O views will be evaluated to identify those which qualify as HEDs at Fort Calhoun.
These will be docunented on HED report forms (See Appendix A). The other HEDs will be evaluated by the review team to determine whether they are valid. The valid HEDs resulting from this screening process will be included in the last screening step to detennine whether the HED is a deficiency (for example, a component which violates a population stereotype, but follows a different, yet logical and acceptable plant convention).
All problem areas and liEDs which are screened out during this assessment task will be documented for the record, with justification provided for the dele-tions. The remaining valid HEDs will enter the next assessment task, which will consist of recording the HEDs on report foms, with relevant HED parameters noted on the forms. These parameters include:
NUTAC/NUREG-0700 guideline (s) violated 4
Physical location of the HED, including, as applicable:
i O
suste-equipment CR area panel or board component (by device nuiter, or other official designation)
Type of performance affected (if based on perfomance-based find-ings).
HEDs will be organized according to these parameters so that during assessment, l
the impact of a particular assessment decision can be applied to all HEDs with l
that parameter in common.
Organizing the liEDs by these parameters will allow them to be considered:
l by system and work station (e.g., by panel) by topic, for HEDs or conditions that may similarly affect any wort I
station or operational sequence, or that pertain to special situa-tions 5-3 l
OPERATING HISTORICAL VAll0ATION OF CONTROL ROOM VERIFICATION OF l
PERSONNEL DOCUMENT SURVEY INSTRUMENTATION INTERVIEW REVIEW FUNCTIONS l f l f 1 I I f 1 f 1 I PROBLEM REPORT PROBLEM REPORT HEOs V
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FIGURE 5 2.
PROBLEM AND HED SCREENING FOR ASSESSMENTS 5-4 i
by component item, to assure that all components with the same HED characteristics are considered in the assessment and corrective OQ action plan.
Another assessment task OPPD plans to implement early in the assessment phase is the identification of obvious enhancerent solutions. The rationale for inser-tion of this task here is that, if it can be determined that an enhancement is the obvious solution to an HED, then it becomes unnecessary to subject these HEDs to the more time-consuming process of detennining significance, cost-effect-iveness, etc. That time can be better utilized during assessment of HEDs for which a solution is not obvious.
Table 5-3 identifies three basic categories of enhancement, with exampics, which are suitable for near-term corrective action.
Although some of these enhance-ments could become costly if applied extensively throughout a control room, they can usually be accomplished with minimum time and expense.
For the remaining HEDs, priorities will be established and alternative resolu-tions will be identified and evaluated (including cost analysis). For the se-lected HED resolutions, conceptual design packages will be developed, as neces-sary, and tested for feasibility and effectiveness.
In completing the assess-ment phase, OPPD will perform the tasks identified in Figure 5-1.
The results and recommendations from those tasks will be reviewed by the CRDR review team.
Several criteria will be used by the review team when evaluating candidate pro-posals for HED correction. At least the following characteristics of each pro-posal will be considered:
safety system impact on operating ef fectiveness impact on plant availability cost consistency with existing features compliance with regulatory design requirements impact on control room staffing impact on operator training programs v
5-5
O O
0 TABLE 5-2 NEAR-TERM DEFICIENCY CORRECTION t
l VISUAL ENHANCEMENT PHYSICAL ENHANCEMENT TASK ENHANCEMENT 1
l 9 COLOR CODING S SHAPE CODING S SEQUENCE OF STEPS m
S DEMARCATION O CONTROL GUARDS S POLICY CHANGE l
O OVERLAYS S INTERLOCKS S PROCEDURE CHANGE S MIMICS S EXCHANGE LOCATIONS S JOB PERFORMANCE AID e DISPLAY ZONING S REPLACE COMPONENTS S RETRAINING S METER RESCALING G ENVIRONMENT ADJUSTMENT S NOMENCLATURE STANDARDlZATION S HIERARCHICAL LABELS S HABITABILITY IMPROVEMENT S COMMUNICATIONS O LABEL REDESIGN O FURNITURE REARRANGEMENT S ESTABLISH CONVENTIONS S SYMBOLOGY i
l i
i
SECTION 6.0 DOCUMENTATION PHASE i
The importance of data management before, during, and after the CRDR cannot be overemphasized.
Adequate documentation and document control creates a traceable and systematic translation of information from one phase of the CRDR to the next.
The CRDR team will have immediate acccess to a complete, up-to-date library of documents to:
Provide a support base to manage and execute the various steps and phases of the control room reviews Provide a design base from which future control room modifications may draw.
Therefore, a data document library will be established to ensure the success of the CRDR process.
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procedures that OPPD will use to support the control room design review.
6.1 General Documentation Requirements Many documents will be referenced and produced during the CRDR project.
The documentation system will meet the following requirements:
Provide a record of all documents used by the Review Team as refer-ences during various phases of the CRDR Provide a record of all correspondence generated or received by the review team during the review O
6-1
Provide a record of all documents produced by the review team as project output Allow an audit path to be generated through the project documenta-tion Retain project files in a manner that allows future access to help determine the effects of control room changes proposed in the future.
6.2 References The following documents have been identified as possible reference material that may be used during the review project. As the review progresses, it is antici-pated that additional material and references will be identified.
Fort Calhoun Updated Safety Analysis Report CE Emergency Procedure Guidelines (EPGs)
Regulatory Guides (e.g., R.G.1.97 and R.G.1.47)
NRC guidance documents (e.g., NUREG-0700)
Control room drawings (floor plan, panel layout, etc.)
Control room photographs (panel. photographs, etc.)
Human factors design infomation Van Cott & Kinkade McComick MIL STD 1472C Existing system descriptions Piping and instrumentation diagrams (P& ids)
Operating training materials Computer sof tware descriptions Instrument tabulations Annunciator and label engraving lists INP0/TVA Pilot Systems Review Report (INP0 82-014)
CROR NUTAC documents IlO I
6 6.3 Review Documentdtion Throughout the review process, documents will be processed to record data, anal-yses, and findings. Whenever practical and appropriate, standard foms will be developed and used. The bulk of the documentation generated by the review pro-cess will be necessary to do the following:
Document the criteria used for each review activity Record the results of the survey, operating experience review, and task analysis Compile HEDs and associdted data for review and assessment In order to facilitate systematizing and recording control room design review, OPPD is using a series of standard foms developed for the CRDR. These foms appear, as samples, in Appendix A:
Historical Report Documentation Fom Task Analysis Data Collection Fom Human Engineering Discrepancy Record i
Interview Questions Air Velocity Survey Record Humidity / Temperature Record Lighting Survey - Luminance and Reflectance Record Lighting Survey - Illuminance Record Sound Survey Record i
Any or all of these foms may be revised based on the experience gained during the CRDR.
6-3
6.4 CRDR Database Description OPPD has contracted General Physics Corporation to develop and utilize a docu-mentation system using an IBM Personal Computer with dBASE II data base manager.
The system will be used to input, store, retrieve and analyze significant data from the CRDR project. OPPD believes the majority of data will be generated from the Control Room Survey, Task Analysis and Operating Personnel Intervieds and the major sources of data input will be the following:
The Control Room Human Engineering Discrepancy Record The control Room Review Task Analysis Record and validation Worksheet Res'alts The Operating Personnel Interview Data The System Nomenclature List General Physics will create dBASE II files which accept data from these fonns and store it in the following files:
Discrepancy record file m
Task description file Interview data summary file Plant systems file Some of the fields in each of these files will be indexed thereby allowing rapid search and retrieval of information with the files.
t As the project progresses, additional sources of data input may be detennined.
dBASE II allows for the creation of additional files and the easy integration of these into existing application programs.
6.5 Final Summary Report Upon completion of the CRDR, a detailed summary of the results will be prepared and submitted to the NRC for review. The final report will describe the results of the CRDR and will be submitted within four months af ter completion of the 0V 6 -4
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Assessment Phase. This report will summarize the review process, provide descriptions of the identified human engineering discrepancies (HEDs), detail proposed corrective actions and present implementation schedules for each ac-tion. Details of the CRDR, along with complete documentation, will be available for NRC evaluation and review.
The final report will specify the personnel who participated in the Control Room Design Review and delineate their qualifications.
It will also indicate any modifications or revisions made to the implementation plan submitted to the NRC.
These may become necessary periodically throughout the CRDR and will be in the report.
Findings of the CRDR will be organized according to the execution phase areas in this plan.
Each chapter or section will describe identified discrepancies and potential safety consequences and will identify the proposed corrective action.
Details of the assessment procedure used in this process will be summarized and supporting documentation provided. Changes that do not provide a full and complete correction of an identified HED, or decisions to allow a discrepancy (which was assessed to be corrected) to remain, will be justified, and information pertinent to such decisions will be provided.
Identified design improvements, whether safety-related or not, will be described.
The summary report will address findings at the individual control room system level, based on the control room survey or task analyses. Further discussion will be directed to review findings and solutions identified during the opera-ting experience review, task perfomance capability verification, and operating crew function validation.
Implemented or proposed design solutions and implementation schedules will be described.
Such scheduling will be governed by priorities, and any departure from this prioritization will be explained. This tentative implementation schedule will include a plan to ensure adequate review of planned improvement.
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6-6 l
i i
SECTION 7.0 i
CORRECTION PHASE
! O i
j 7.1 Scheduling I
l The actions required to resolve significant HEDs will vary, as will the time required to completr roposed changes.
It is essential, however, to set some end point for complet.ing the proposed changes for each HED category.
Therefo re, I
a correction schedule will be established as part of the final summary report.
In developing the schedule, the following guidelines will apply for OPPD when I
planning the activities appropriate to resolve significant HEDs.
t l
j Developing a schedule for HED corrections is a separate and distinct task from HED prioritization. Many corrections can be implemented quickly regardless of I
their assigned priority. Corrections for some of the highest priority HEDs may require a good deal of time for engineering design, purchasing, and installa-tion.
If the safety significance of such an HED is detennined to be high, an interim temporary correction may reduce the priority of the ultimate change.
1 When scheduling corrections, the following major items should be considered:
plant outage schedule (e.g., refueling) manpower requirements integration of corrections with other planned station design changes deve op nt proce al c ange l
requirements for engineering, purchasing, installation, and testing 7.2 Implementation l
Modifications required to resolve significant HEDs will be implemented through the existing 0 PPD engineering change process. Since the engineering change pro-cess for selected HEDs may take a considerable amount of time for implementa-tion, the implementation and follow-up activities will rely upon normal line organizations.
7-1
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l SECTION 8.0 EFFECTIVENESS PHASE O
8.1 Validation of Changes During the resolution of HEDs, proposed modifications and enhancements will be evaluated for their effectiveness in solving the deficiencies that prompted them. However, no feasible evaluation method can account beforehand for all the circumstances encountered during actual operation. Recognizing the need for operational feedback on the usability of control room changes resulting from the CRDR, OPPD will obtain operator feedback regarding control room improvements.
8.2 Future Control Room Changes In order to ensure adequate human factors considerations for control room changes that are considered after the CRDR is completed, a procedure will be established as a part of the OPPD engineerng procedures, that provides a general human factors review. The procedure will include completing a broad human O
engineering checklist.
If any problems emerge, then a more detailed human factors investigation may be initiated.
l O 8-1 L
SECTION 9.0 1
CRDR SCHEDULE Figure 9-1 presents the schedule for implementing the CRDR at Fort Calhoun.
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J PROPOSED PROJECT SCHEDULE FORT CALHOUN CRDR AuC 'EJ SEPT CCT NOV DEC JAN 34 Fit MAR AFR MAY JuN JUL AuG SE PT OCT how CEC JA4 15 Fit tr A R APR FMASE t. PLANN174G C.smWte Pro. yam Plan PH ASE II: E <ECUTION Oc+r. E =per.ence nev.en Rev,e.r, H.stor cal Data De6esco S.,mtrary Aepoet Rev.cw Sammars Report Cr.irc.1 Room Sstsey Dev.ca Sareev Format F.e..<., 'Aporo.e Format Conoxt Leicy Lewsicy brsey bmmary Be<e Lt.4y Lmn.,ry Op< r. Persorms inters,e As Devo p interswve Format Resw.h 4 pro.e Format Cabet int:r.ews (Aven interwie 4 $Jer.tn.sry he=ne.v int:f v,e4 kmmJry
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APPENDIX A 6
SAMPLE FORMS O
U HISTORICAL DOct2'ZHTATICH REVIEW IED Candidate Sumanary 1.ER x
Other (Specify)
Report Number 81-05 Report Date 4/3/81 Occurrence Date: 3/5/81 Error Categorization:
Work Stations Error of comission using controls C-19 2nstruments Involved:
Procedures Involved:
MO-2052A MO-2069A Major Systema Involved meactor Containment System Containment Spray System Identification of occurrence:
19o valves were incorrectly positioned.
Surnarize Events Preceding occurrence: Plant was operating in Mode 1 at 100% power.
Upon coripletion of surveillance testing the system was returned to operation with an incorrect valve lineup. These valves serve as the boundary between the recirculation sump in Containment and Contairunent Spray System.
Sunnarize Events During occurrence:
Tech Specs for containment isolation valves require that when a single valve is used for Containment isolation.
(
its power source must be deactivated. With the valves in the incorrect lineup, this Tech Spec was not satisfied this condition existed for about 5% hours.
Sunnarize Consequences of occurrences nis had no adverse ef fect on plant or public safety. Containment integrity was maintained with the shut isolation valve.
Identification of Probable Cause The control switches were adjacent to each other on the control board. When intending to close MO-2052A, the operator inadvertently positioned the switch for valve MO-2069A.
Corrective Action Taken/ Proposed:
Plant procedures will be changed to require an independent verivication of the position of valves whose power supplies are deenergized following valve operation.
l Additional pecomendations:
Examine whether the placement, labeling and coding of these controls meets acceptable human factors standards.
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REVIEWER:
DATE: 03/02/82 NO.
252
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NO CHANGES RECONMENDED.
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i LOG SCALES ARE USED HERE.
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Is there some aspect of the panel layout that helps you operate particular systems or the plant in general? If so, please describe.
Which, if any, areas of the control room have e
particularly high noise levels? Is communication made difficult as a result of high noise levels?
e Are there any annunciator legends that are vague in their meaning or do not help you in diagnosing a problem?
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e Has the training you received been applicable to the operating situations you have encountered? If not, please describe the deficiencies, e
Has the temperature or the humidity in the control room ever reached a level at which you were very uncomfortable? Please describe.
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APPENDIX B MANAGEMENT RESUlES l
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R. L. Jaworski, P.E.
Section Manager-Technical Services O
EDUCATION Ph.D., Nuclear Engineering, Iowa State University M.S.,
Nuclear Engineering, Iowa State University B.S.,
Engineering Science, Iowa State University LICENSES Registered Professional Engineer:
Nebraska SR0:
Fort Calhoun Station, 1975 (expired)
R0:
University Training Reactor-10,1965 (expired)
EXPERIENCE Omaha Public Power District 1979-Present Section Manager-Technical Services Dr. Jaworski is responsible for overall management of technical support activities related to conceptual engineering of plant modifications, operational problems, licensing considerations, environmental monitoring, chemical laboratories, fuel procurement and utilization, and plant performance assessment.
1975-1979 Omaha Public Power District Manager-Reactor & Computer Technical Services Responsibilities included management of technical areas related to nuclear fuel; that is, procurement, design, licensing, and operation, as well as management of programs in process computer systems.
1971-1975 Omaha Public Power District-Reactor Engineer-Fort Calhoun Station Provided nuclear engineering support to on-site and off-site personnel for all technical and nuclear safety aspects related to fuel receipt, handling, testing, and operation. Coordinated all development, execution, and evaluation of plant testing, including pre-and post-core hot functionals, physics testing, power ascension, and refueling.
1969-1971 Omaha Public Power District Test Engineer-Fort Calhoun Station Responsibilities included inhouse expertise in technical and nuclear safety during development of the Fort Caloun FSAR and Technical Specifications, as well as increasing technical capabilities in the area of nuclear engineering pertaining to plant I
licensing and operation.
l 1965-1969 Iowa State University Research Ass 1stant-Department of Nuclear Engineering Assisted university staff in development and research projects related to nuclear phenomena and development of laboratory techniques.
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h T. 3. McIvor P.E.
Manager - Operations Technical Support Services 1
O EDUCATION M.SI, Electrical Engineering, University of Nebraska B.S., Electrical Engineering, University of Hebraska Add 5tional Graduate Study in Electrical, Mechanical and Hudlear Engineering, University of Hebraska and Iowa State University PreNntly pursuing a Ph.D. in Industrial and Management Systems Engineering, University of Nebraska LICENSES Registered Professional Engineer: Nebraska y
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l EXPERIENCE Omaha Public Power District 1979-Present Manager Operations Technical Support Services ict i.
InCthis position, Mr. McIvor is responsible for the co-ordination of.a broad range of engineering support func-tions for the operation and maintenance of OPPD's nu-clear and fossil generating stations. Examp1es of the types of work perfomed by this department are problem solving, testing, analysis, conceptual design of modifi-cations, licensing support, outage planning and engin-j eering coordination.
l 1978-1979 Supervisor - Technical, Nebraska City Station Mr. McIvor was responsible for directing the startup activities for a 575 MW coal-fired unit which went into operation in May 1979. Responsibilities included admin--
istration of the startup test program and operational coordination.with the Architect-Engineer and the con-tractors on the project. The plant chemists also re-ported to this position.
i 1977 Plint Engineer, Nebraska City; Station Th.js position was similar to that described above, but without <the added responsibil.ity of the chemical group.
1975-1977 Sdnior $ngineer, Production Operations Division During this period Mr. McIvor perfomed engineering-wort
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in support of the operation, maintenance and nodifica-
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tion of OPPD generating facilities; primarily the Fort Calhoun Nuclear Station.
l 1974-1975 Engineer, Production Operations Division This position was similar to that described above.
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1 EXPERIENCE (Continued) 1 O
Omaha Public Power District (Continued) 1973-1974 Engineer, Engineering Division During this period Mr. McIvor worked in the areas of substation and distribution system design.
University of Nebraska 1972-1973 Graduate Assistant - Department of Elec. Engineering Mr. McIvor taught laboratory courses and worked on consulting projects for the Lincoln Electric System, the City of Grand Island, and the Utilities Department of the University.
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V. G. Morris, P.E.
Project Manager - Technical Services O
EDUCATION MBA, Organizational Development, University of Nebraska B.S., Industrial Engineering, University of Nebraska LICENSES Registered Professional Engineer:
Nebraska Registered Professional Engineer:
South Dakota EXPERIENCE Omaha Public Power District 1982-Present Production Operations Technical Support Services.
Mr. Morris is the Project Manager responsible for imple-mentation of NRC Post-TMI review activities for the Fort Calhoun Nuclear Power Station. He was also Site Coordin-ator for all Technical Services during the 1983 Fort Cal-houn 10-year refueling and inspection outage. Coordin-ated all activities for the in-service inspections and numerous hydrostatic pressure tests. Member of the over-view team for planning future outages.
1979-1982 Gibbs & Hill, Inc. A consultant to the Electric Utility Industry Project Manager responsible for the administration, interpretation and guidance of energy related consulting contracts.
1978-1979 General Electric Company Steam Turbine Installation and Service Engineering - Mechanical and Huclear Division Project Manager responsible for planning and controlling the installation of G.E. turbine-generator equipment.
1974-1978 Gibbs & Hill, Inc.
Electrical Engineer, performed technical assignments on design / construction contracts for nuclear, coal fired, combined cycle and refuse derived electrical generating stations.
Responsible engineer for the design and construction of all control panels for a 600 MW coal fired station.
1973-1974 Gibbs & Hill, Inc.
Electrical Design Draftsman assigned to engineering construction contracts for nuclear and combined cycle electrical generating stations.
1973 Henningson, Durham and Richardson, Inc. An architectur-al/ engineering consulting finn Performed design /draf ting of natural gas piping for a gas treatment plant and electrical design /draf ting of Ob lighting systems for major architectural projects.
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APPENDIX C REVIEW TEAM RESUtES O
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JULIEN M. CHRISTENSEN Chief Scientist EDUCATION Ph.D., Experimental Psychology, Ohio State University M.A., Experimental Psychology, Ohio State Univelsity B.S., Accounting, University of Illinois LICENSES AND Registered Professional Psychologist: Ohio CERTIFICATIONS Private Pilot's License Rated Navigator and Radar Observer (Air Force)
EXPERIENCE General Physics Corporation 1930 - Present Dr. Christensen provides direction and guidance to all corporate research programs and services that
.have human factors requirements. Areas of
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responsibility have included product liability and safety, man-machine integration for aerospace systems, and nuclear / fossil power plant operation.
Representative projects include Human Reliability Data Bank, Sandia National e
Laboratories Directed program that identified sources of human reliability data and structured a data base management system for probabilistic risk assessment in nuclear power plant operations.
Human Factors Engineering Control Room Reviews, e
General Public Utilities, Oyster Creek Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 Analyzed panel design and layout, control and display configuration, communication, environmental conditions, operating procedures, and maintenance procedures within the control room.
1478 - [080 Stevens, Scheidler, Stevens, vossler, Inc.
Dr. Christensen directed the human factors research and development program.
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v 1974 - 1978 Wayne State University Dr. Christensen was Professor and Chairman, Department of Industrial Engineering and Operations Research.
1946 - 1974 U.S. Air Pbrce Aerospace Medical Research Laboratory, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio PROFESSIONAL Member, American Association for the Advancement of AFFILIATIONS Science Diplomate, American Board of Forensic Psychology Fellow, American Psychological Association Member, American Society of Safety Engineers Member, Human Factors Association of Canada Fellow, Human Factors Society Member, International Ergonomics Research Society
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Member, Systems Safety Society PUBLICATIONS
" Human Factors Considerations in Lawsuits," in D. B.
Esau (Ed.), Legal Reference for the Safety Professional, Park Ridge, Illinois, American Society of Safety Engineers (in press).
"The Human Element in Safety Man-Machine Systems,"
Professional Safety, March 1981.
The Dictionary of Terms Used in the Safety Profession, Park Ridge, Illinois, American Society of Safety Engineers, 1981 (one of several contributors).
" Human Factors in Hazard / Risk Evaluation" Proceedings of the Symposium on Human Factors and Industrial Design in Consumer Products, Medford, Massachusetts, Tufts University, May 1981.
"A Review of the Three Mile Island Unit 1 Control Room from a Human Factors Viewpoint." Report by MPR Associates, Washington, D.C., for General Public Utilities, Parsippany, New Jersey, December 1980 (one of several contributors).
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g DONALD C. BURGY Director, Human Factors Engineering I
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EDUCATION Ph.D. Candidate, Applied-Experimental Psychology, The Catholic University of America M.A., Applied-Experimental Psychology, The Catholic University of America B.A., Psychology, Swarthmore College L
EXPERIENCE General Physics Corporation 1979 - Present Mr. Burgy directs all human factors engineering and man-machine systems design and evaluation work in the l
Company. His human factors expertise includes system
'j analysis, information processing, man-computer interactions, performance evaluation, training i
systems, and speech /nonspeech communications.
Representative projects include:
o Control Room Design Reviews Directed or participated in nuclear power plant control room design reviews at ten nuclear power plants: Virginia Electric and Power Company's North Anna and Surry Power Stations, Commonwealth Edison Company's Zion, LaSalle, and Dresden Stations, Cincinnati Gas and Electric Company's
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William H.Zimmer Nuclear Power Station,
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Pennsylvania Power and Light Company's Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Illinois Power Company's g
Clinton Nuclear Power Plant, Public Service Electric and Gas Company's Salem Nuclear Generating Station, and Portland General Electric Company's Trojan Nuclear Plant.
Task Analysis of Nuclear Power Plant Control Room e
4 Crews, U.S. Nuclear Reaulatory Commission (NRC)
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Managed this major 18-month NRC research program in I
which a data collection approach and methodology i
was compared to traditional task analysis and job analysis methods in a Program Plan report and was used to collect data at eight power plants by teams of human factors and operations personnel.
l Directed :ne compilation of the results of the data g
collection effort in a computerized task data base.
/~'N e Guidelines for Internal Plant Communications, ks Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) m Participated in a study of communications problems in nuclear power plants and then managed project to develop Guidelines for Internal Plant Communications based on these problems. Developed methodology for collection and analysis of real-time communications data in operating power plants.
e Prototype Large Breeder Reactor (PLBR) Operability Study, EPRI Participated in an operability study of the two major PLBR designs--pool and loop types; coauthored a PLBR design familiarization course text; and conducted task analysis for initial design evaluations of PLBR control console layout, and instrumentation and control needs.
e Submarine Design Human Factors, U.S. Navy Developed task analysis format and collection methodology to promote team performance improvement and training enhancement in the Navy Submarine Advanced Combat Systems (SUBACS) program.
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1976 - 1978 The Catholic University of America Human Performance 7-~
Laboratory
( j Mr. Burgy conducted applied and basic research experiments on auditory signal classification of complex underwater sounds in research sponsored by the Human Factors Engineering branch of the Office of Naval Research.
PROFESSIONAL Member, Acoustical Society of America AFFILIATIONS Member, American Psychological Association Member, Human Factors Society SELECTED Applied Human Factors in Power Plant Design and PUBLICATIONS Operation, General Physics Corporation, 1980.
Coauthor with P. A. Doyle, H. F. Barsam, and R. J.
Liddle.
" Survey and Analysis of Communications Problems in Nuclear Power Plants," EPRI l'eport NP-2035, September 1981. Coauthor with D. A. Topmiller, D. R. Roth, P.
A. Doyle, and J. Espey.
" Task Analysis of Nuclear Power Plant Control Room Crews," NUPEG/CR-3309, 1983.
Coauthor with C.
Lempges, A. Miller, L. Schroeder, H. VanCott, and B.
Paramore.
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O ROBERT J. LIDDLE b
Manager, Human Factors Power Services EDUCATION M.S., Industrial Engineering and Operations research, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University B.S., Psychology, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University EXPERIENCE General Physics Corporation 1980 - Present Mr. Liddle is a human factors engineer responsible for managing power plant control room design reviews with regard to methodology, staffing, and training programs. He provides in-house staff instruction in technical and administrative aspects of control room reviews.
Mr. Liddle serves as project manager for several human factors projects and has had experience with utility / Nuclear Regulatory Commission negotiations involving human factors issues, g)s Control Room Design Review e
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Managed detailed control room design review projects at the Pennsylvania Power and Light Company Susquehanna Steam Electric Station and Washington Public Power Supply System No. 2; acted as lead human factors engineer in control room design review for Georgis Power Company's Plant Vogtle, Unit 1, and managed human factors review at Long Island Lighting Company's Shoreham Nuclear Power Station.
e Selection Testing Administers General Physics Basic Mathematics and Science Test (BMST) for operator training and selection; assists in human reliability analysis with emphasis on nuclear plant applications and the accompanying task analytic procedures.
Develocment of Human Engineering Standards e
Compiled and developed standards, in control coding, legend plate design, mimic and demarcation lines, and colo: coding practices.
e Human Factors Trainino Instruct: utility and industrial personnel in topics of performance evaluation techniques, experimental methodology and control room design review procedures.
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l e Emergency Response Facilities Develcoment Provided human factors input for the development and design of emergency response facilities including containment isolation mimic design.
1977 - 1978 Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University In his research project, Mr. Liddle investigated the use of videotape recording apparatus in an assessment center process. He assisted in scheduling and debriefing participants, data collection and interpretation, and report writing.
For his masters' thesis project, Mr. Liddle analyzed the effects of alcohol ingestion on the performance of an industrial welding task. This research involved an analysis of the welding task in terms of proper welding performance parameters.
PROFESSIONAL Member, Human Factors Society l
AFFILIATIONS
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PUBLICATIONS Applied Human Factors in Power Plant Design and Operation, General Physics Corporation, 1980, Coauthor with D. C., Burgy, P. A. Doyle, H. F. Barsam.
Preliminary Human Factors Encineerino Recommendations for the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Advanced Control Room, General Physics Corporation, 1980, Coauthor with M. B. Detamore, R. T. Jensen, D. C.
Burgy, C. D. Gaddy.
Shoreham Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Design Review Program Plan, General Physics Corporation,1983, Coauthor with C. D. Burgy.
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LOrHAR R. SCHROEDER bd Senior Scientist EDUCATIDN Ph.D., Experimental / Applied Psychology, Lehigh University M.S., Engineering Psychology, Lehigh University i.
B.S., General Engineering, University of Illinois a:
B.A., Psychology, University of Illinois EXPERIENCE General Physics Corporation 1982 - Present Dr. Schroeder's areas of expertise include task and error analysis, equipment design studies, operations research, and organizational design and management.
He is currently managing the control room design review at the Trojan Nuclear Power Plant and has assisted in the Salem control room design review.
Other representative projects include:
supporting NRC research in the application of control room crew task O
analysis data for human engineering design and staffing areas, evaluating SPDS placement, reviewing tagging procedures, and assessing the human factors aspects of Emergency Instruction Flowcharts.
1980 - 1982 U.N.C. Nuclear Industries Dr. Schroeder worked as a human factors specialist, interfacing with engineers and other staff in identifying and solving problems relating to equipment design, the use of procedures, and training efforts at ai 3
er Hanford's N-Reactor.
He also performed a human factors review of the 105-N control room in support of r
an ongoing control room upgrade program.
1974 - 1980 Department of Psvchology, Moravian College Dr. Schroeder's responsibilities as Assistant Professor and Department Chairperson included planning and coordinating a day and evening program in psychology involving over 100 majors. His primary teaching and research supported areas of Applied Psychology and Human Factors Engineering.
Dr.
Schroeder a Jo developed and directed a newly established certificate program in Personnel Administrat;on.
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1973 - 1974 Wigdchl FJectric Company Dr. Schroeder worked as a consultant, identifying potential organization problems and conducting problem solving sessions.
1972-Jewish Employment and V6cational Services As an industrial psychologist, Dr. Schroeder consulted with several industries and governmental agencies in order to develop, validate and administer " job-related" personnel selection tests under a Department of Labor contract.
PROFESSIONAL Member, Human Factors Society AFFILIATIONS Member, American Nuclear Society PUBLICATIONS
" Human Factors Review of N-Reactor Control Room,"
U.N.C. Nuclear Industries Report UN1-2097, June 1982.
"A Human Factos Guided Survey for Systems Development," American Nuclear Society Winter Meeting, December 1981, coauthor with D. R. Fowler.
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" Control Room Human Factors in Context," American 5-/
Nuclear Society Winter Meeting, November 1982, coauthor with D. R. Fowler and D. E. Friar.
" Learning Style Data Applied to Nuclear Power Plant Training Programs," American Nuclear Society Annual Meeting, June 1983.
" Task Analysis of Nuclear Power Plant Control Room Crews," NUREG/CR-3371, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C., June 1983, coauthor with D. Burgy, C. Lempges, A. Miller, H. Van Cott, and B.
Paramore.
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On H. MATT JONES gj Manager, Richland Office EDUCATICN U.S. Navy Nuclear Power Training Program LICENSES AND Certified Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor Systems CERTIFICATIONS Instructor, Fast Flux Test Facility Certified Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor Simulator Instructor, Fast Flux Test Facility 1:XPERIENCE General Physics Corporation 1979 - Present Mr. Jones is responsible for coordination and marketing of training, operations, and engineering services in the Pacific Northwest. Representative projects include:
o Control Room Design Reviews Acted as Project Manager for the conduct of the Clinch River Breeder Reactor control room design S
review. Participated in design review projects for
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two light water cooled reactor plants.
e Training Services Acts as a senior instructor in on-site power plant training programs including generic and plant-specific subjects. Has prepared several textbooks on power plant fundamentals for utility clients.
e Operability Design Reviews Served as project manager for the operability design review of the Prototype Large Breeder Reactor. Participated in the operability study of several conceptual designs for liquid metal fast breeder reactor (LMFBR) plants.
1976 - 1979 Westinghouse Hanford Company Mr. Jones was Training Engineer in the Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF) Training Division at Richland, Washington. He conducted simulator training for FFTF, performed plant operator certification, and developed and implement ?d various qualification programs.
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Mr. Jones taught various classroom sessions in plant-specific areas and such academic subjects as reactor physics. He developed various training documents including training manuals, training plans, and training lesson plans.
1968 - 1976 United States Navy Mr. Jones was the electrical instructor at the S5G nuclear power prototype. His responsibilities included certification of all staff instructors to perform the Mr. Jones duties required of a prototype instructor.
undertook qualification as Engineering Of ficer of the Watch and Engineering Watch Supervisor at the SSG.
He also served as an Electrical Operator onboard a nuclear powered submarine. There he supervised the repair and overhaul of various types of shipboard equipment, and participated in post-refueling testing.
PROFESSIONAL Member, American Nuclear Society AFFILIATIONS PUBLICATIONS
" Operability Design Review of Prototype Large Breeder Reactor (PLBR) Designs," EPRI NP-2030, Septenber 1981.
Coauthor with J. H. Beakes and others.
" Operability Design Review of Prototype Large Breeder g
g Reactor," ANS 1980 Winter Meeting, November 1980.
Coauthor with J. H. Beakes.
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DONALD R. DUQUI"ITE g
Manager, Columbia PWR Training Programs Gj B.S. Candidate, Mechanical Engineering, The University EDUCATION of the State of New York U.S. Navy Nuclear Power Training Program LICENSES AND Certified Nuclear Power Plant Senior Reactor Operator CERTIFICATICNS Instructor, Pressurized Water Reactor EXPERIENCE General Physics Corporation 1979 - Present Mr. Duquette is responsible for managing operator training programs and specialized training projects for pressurized water reactor power generating plants.
Representative projects include:
Hot License Training Courses, Public Service o
Electric and Gas Comoany Designed and implemented complete hot license k
I training courses for Salem Nuclear Generating Station.
Pre-license Audit Examinations, Public Service e
Electric and Gas Comoany_
Conducted oral and written Nuclear Regulatory Commission-type audit examinations for license candidates prior to their licensing at the Salem Nuclear Generating Station.
Systems Manual Preoaration o
Managed and prepared systems manual projects of site-specific training materials for four nuclear utilities, including Commonwealth Edison Company's Zion Nuclear Generating Station and Byron and Braidwood stations and Public Service Company of Indiana's Marble Hill' Nuclear Power Station.
Mitigating Core Damage Course, Northeast Nuclear Energy Comoany Conducted a mitigating core damage course for Millstone Nuclear Power Station.
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1971 - 1979 United States Navy As an instructor at the S3G prototype plant, Mr.
Duquette qualified Engineering Watch Supervisor and Engineering Officer of the Watch. As Training Coordinator, he scheduled and supervised training for all of ficer and enlisted personnel. He also served aboard several naval vessels, both conventional ships and nuclear powered submarines.
PROFESSIONAL Member, American Nuclear Society AFFILIATIONS l
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RICHARD S. GROGECLOSE j
g g{3,f Chief Quality Engineer EDUCATION B.S., Liberal Studies (Concentration in Industrial Engineering), The University of the State of New York EXPERIENCE General Physica Corporation 1977 - Present Mr. Groseclose is responsible for all quality essurance activities. He provides technical assistance to power utilities and government clients in the areas of quality assurance, training, maintenance programs, inservice inspection programs, and engineering services. Representative projects include:
e Quality Assurance Manaaer, Inservice Inspection Programs Developed and implemented quality assurance programs during the inservice inspection projects for Oyster Creek Nuclear Power Plant, Jersey Central Power and Light Company, and Midland Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2, Consumers Power Company.
Quality Assurance Records Validation, Mississippi e
O Power and Light Comoany Managed quality assurar.ce program for records validation at Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Unit ?
e Pressure Vessel and System Recertification, National Aeronautics and Space Adminstration Assisted in the conducting of an integrated recertification program of all pressure vessels and piping systems at the Goddard Space Flight Center and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory.
e Nondestructive Examination, Inservice Inspection Seminars Teaches inservice inspection-related nondestructive examination methods at seminars conducted by General Physics.
o Nondestructive Examination Qualification Program Development and Revision, Tennessee Valley Authority Revised personnel qualification program and prepared general, specific, and practical examinations for inspection Levels I, II, and III for all methods.
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O 1975 - 1977 Nuclear Installation Services Comoany Mr. Groseclose was a Field Quality Assurance / Quality Control (QA/QC1 Manager. He developed construction plans and quality assurance procedures for Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company and managed the QA/QC programs at Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1, Public Service Electric and Gas Company, and during steam generator modification work at Donald C. Cook Plant, Indiana and Michigan Electric Company.
1974 - 1975 Control Flow Systems, Incorporated Mr. Groseclose was the Manager of Manufacturing.
He supervised fabrication, material planning and control, purchasing, scheduling, and quality assurance for this engineering / manufacturing company.
1973 - 1974 Florida Power and Licht comoany Mr. Groseclose was a Quality Supervisor in the Plant Construction Department. He implemented on-site qual-ity control for fossil plant construction and provided quality control liaison on all nuclear projects.
1970 - 1973 Burns and Roe, Incoroorated Mr. Groseclose was Lead Quality Assurance Engineer.
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He managed the Burns and Roe Quality Assurance Program at the Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2, I
General Public Utilities, during construction.
1968 - 1970 United Nuclear Corporation Mr. Groseclose was a Senior Industrial Engineer.
He developed methods, standards, and procedures for nuclear fuel fabrication and nondestructive testing.
1966 - 1968 Maryland Shinbuildina and Drydock comoany Mr. Groseclose was the Quality Control Superintendent responsible for directing nondestructive testing, mechanical and optical inspections, and certification of welders, welding procedures, and lif ting equipment.
1962 - 1966 T.D. Associates, Incorporated Mr. Groseclose was responsible
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for product design and engineering, and management of quality assurance, including the training and supervision of inspection personnel ar.d performance of nondestructive testing.
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Omaha Public Power District 1623 Harney Omaha, Nebraska 68102 402/536-4000 October 25, 1983 LIC-83-274 Mr. James R.
Miller, Chief U.
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Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Division of Licensing Operating Reactors Branch No. 3 Washington, D.C.
20555
Reference:
Docke t No. 50-285
Dear Mr. Miller:
Omaha Public Power District Fort Calhoun Station Control Room Design Review Pursuant to the requirements contained in Part 5 of Generic Letter 82-33 (Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737) and as committed to in the District's April 15, 1983 letter, please find enclosed three (3) copies of the program plan for the con-trol room design review of the Port Calhoun Station.
Sinc rely, l
W. C./ Jones DivisihnManager Production Operations WCJ/JCB:jmm l
Enclosures 1
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LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae 1333 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
l Washington, D.C.
20036 Mr.
E.
G.
Tourigny, Project Manager Mr.
L.
A.
Yandell, Senior Resident Inspector 06 b
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45 5124 Employment with Equal Opportunity Male / Female
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