ML20079N538

Proposed Contentions Re Financial & Technical Qualifications,Environ Qualification,Induced Seismic Activity,Prematurity of Application,Liquid Pathway Study & Generic Safety Issues.Svc List Encl

ML20079N538
Person / Time
Site:	River Bend
Issue date:	12/15/1982
From:	Falkenheiner D, Watkins L LOUISIANA CONSUMER'S LEAGUE, INC., ROTHSCHILD, G.E.
To:	Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
References
82-468-01-OL, 82-468-1-OL, ISSUANCES-OL, NUDOCS 8303040312
Download: ML20079N538 (10)

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION [h~ k$

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Before the Atomic Safety and Licensine Board *

. u idle j 4 In the Matter of ego s e t5 FY GULF STATES UTILITIES COMPANY, ET AL Docket Numb r 82 468-01 OL RIVERBEND STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 CONTENTIONS BY JOINT INTERVENORS CONSUMERS' LEAGUE, INC.

LOUISIANANS FOR SAFE ENERGY GRETCHEN REINEKE ROTHCHILD

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Pursuant to the Board's Memorandum and Order dated July 30, 1982, and Order dated August 20, 1982, Intervenor (LCL) respectfully proposes the following contentions:

1. FINANCI AL AND TECHNICAL QUALIFICATIONS With the 1982 amendment of 10 CFR 50.40(b), a presumption was created by regulation that an electric utility will be able to finance activities authorized under the construction permit or operating license. 47 F.R. 13750, at 13752. Implicit in this statement is the requirement that the authorized activities, including cc,nstruction, will meet all regulatory standards, and thereby will protect the public health and safety.

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>r Special circumstances, as shown below, and as will be suppo'rted or proven in the proceedings herein, are such that application of 10 CFR 50.40(b), as amended on March 31, 1982, would not serve the purposes for which the regulation was adopted, and thus, an exception to 10 CFR 50.40(b) should-be allowed in this proceeding. 10 CFR 2.758(b).

Since GSU was granted the construction permit for River Bend Station, Units 1 and 2, its financial status has changed substantially for the worse, and there have been numerous inspection reports document-ing where construction activities were not conducted in full compliance with regulatory requirements under circumstances indicating that cost-cutting measures were involved. Examples are:

- (1) Failure to follow storage procedures for structural steel fasteners. I & E Report No. 50-458/82-04.

(2) Failure to provide timely notice of a construction deficiency, i.e. insuf ficient welds on pipe whip restraint mounting brack-ets. 1 & E Report No. 50 458/82-01.

(3) Substitution of grade 50 reinforcing steel for grade 40 rein-forcing steel. 1 & E Report No. 50-458/81-11.

(4) GSU has applied to the Office of Nuclear Regulatory Regulation for permission to limit or reduce ASME materials, welding, and documentation and examination requirements for one-half inch tubing and supports as a cost-cutting proposal. See, Memorandum, November 3, 1982, from John J. Stefano, Project Manager, Licensing Branch No. 2, DL. The limitation or reduction in the qualities of the n.aterials and welds could adversely affect the public health and safety. The reduction in the qualities of the examination of the welds, and the documentation of the examination also coulu adversely affect the public health and safety.

These special circumstances warrant complete scrutiny of the financial qualifications of the applicants to build and to operate a healthy and safe facility and a facility which will protect the environment.

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2. ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION they will be in compli-The Applicants have not demonstrated that cnce with NUREG-0588 (" Interim Staff Position on Environmental Q  ;

December, 1979) and cations of Safety-Related Electrical Equipment,"

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Generic Technical Activity A-24 for existing safety related eqtipment .

added as a result of post-TMI and for equipment and for equipment requirements.

3. INDUCED SEISMIC ACTIVITY .

The applicants have f ailed to adequately consider the effects i

of two types of seismic activity resulting from human activity, to-w t:

A. The seismic activity resulting from the loss of control and l

1. resulting explosion pre' aced by exploratory and/or production natura gas wells involved in Tuscaloosa Trend activity within the pertinent radius of the exclusion zone.

B. The seismic activity resulting from subsidience due to with-drawal c2 water, oil, or gas, or any combination thereof.

4. PREMATURITY OF APPLICATION The Applicants have failed to pro.ide the technical specifications d other and other information required by 10 CFR parts 50 and 51 an .

filed its application for an operating regulatory practices because it license too early into its construction and planning process. 10 CFR 50.55(d).

5. LIQUID PATHWAY STUDY The Applicants have failed to study and evaluate adequately the impacts of the various types of accidents on the two sources of drinking

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f water, The Baton Rouge Regional Aquifer and the Mississippi Riveri and it has not established acceptable criteria for judging the accepta-bility of the results of any studies.

6. GENERIC SAFETY ISSUES Contrary to the prindiples of the River Bend decision, 6 NRC 760 (November 23, 1977), the Applicants have failed to include in their FSAR an adequate action plan for River Bend, Units 1 and 2, with respect to the following unresolved safety issues which the NRC staff identified as a result of investigations of the Three Mile Island accident. See, NUREG-0705, " Identification of New Unresolved Safety Issues Relating to Nuclear Power Plants," March, 1981.

, A. Shutdown decay heat removal requirements, Task A-45.

B. Safety implications of control systems, Task A-47.

C. Hydrogen control measures and effects of hydrogen burns on safety equipment, Task A 48.

D. Others.

7. CRACKING OF MATERIALS The Applicants have not demonstrated that River Bend, Units 1 and 2, meet the requirements of 10 CFR part 50, Appendix A, GDC 4, 14, 30, and 31 with regard to the adequacy of material selection and control and systems design, as follows:

A. The use of appropriate materials and processes as specified by NUREG-0313, Revision 1, has not been fully followed in the design and construction of the River Bend, Units I and 2, piping systems impor-tant to safety.

B. Recommendations contained in NUREG-0619 (P. C-12) relating to the installation of a low flow controller to be used to control 1

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feedwater flow over a range of flow from 0.5% to 10% of rated flow has not been adequately implemented at River Bend, Units 1 and 2.

Analytical evidence shows that such a flow controller is necessary to limit crack growth in BWR feedwater nozzles over the life of the plant.

8. OLD RIVER CONTROL STRUCTURE The Applicants have not adequately considered the public health, safity and environmental effects of the failure of the Old River Control

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Structure located north of the plant site and the switch of the Missis-sippi River to the present course of the Atchafalaya River inasmuch as the volume of the Mississippi River will be greatly diminished and there will be an increase in salt content in the waters.

9. EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN The Applicants and NRC staff have failed to account properly for local emergency needs and capabilities in establishing boundaries for the plume exposure pathway and ingestion pathway Emergency Planning Zones (EPZs) for River Bend, Units 1 and 2, as required by 10 CFR part

'50, Appendix E. Specifically, the Applicants and NRC staff have failed to consider adequately or to account properly for the effects of the following factors specific to River Bend, Units 1 and 2, on local emer-gency response needs and capabilities, and hence, on the appropriate size and configuration of the EPZ's of River Bend, Units 1 and 2, to consider:

A. The proposed plant site is in close proximity to the Missis-sippi River which is the only source of drinking water for the residents

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l of New Orleans _and numerous other communities south-of Baton Rouge.

Also, the proposed plant is located above the Baton Rouge Regional Aquifer, an aquifer located in numerous counties of southwest Missisis-sippi and parishes in Southeast Louisiana, including West Feliciana

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and East Baton Rouge Parishes. The Capital Area Groundwater Conservation Commission has petitioned the U. S. Environmental Protection Agency to declars 'he Baton Rouge Aquifer a sole source aquifer under the Federal Safe Drinking Water Act.

The proximity of the proposed plant site to these important sources of drinking water, and the soil composition peculiar to the site, with the resulting implications for travel of radionuclides fr~ through a liquid pathway in the event of a reactor meltdown accident A.

at River Bend. See, NUREG-CG-1596, "The Consequences from Liquid Path-ways on a Reactor Meltdown Accident," June, 1981.

B. The number, location, and capacity of local sheltering facili-ties, and the degree of protection from radionuclides afforded thereby.

C. The heightened sensitivity to radiation of children and preg-nant women over that of the average healthy adult male.

D. Local meterological conditions, including the distribution of wind directions and speeds, the frequency of tornados and hurricane-force winds, and the frequency and duration of temperature inversions.

E. The consequences or effects of temperature inversions in the event of a reactor ineltdown accident.

F. Radionuclides which will be significant contributors to demi-nant exposures modes for prompt and latent effcets in the event of

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a BWR-1, BWR-2, and BWR-3 or equivalent accidental release as described

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in the U.S.N.R.C.'s' Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400) at River Bend.

In arriving at their generic guidance on the site of Emergency Planning Zones, NUREG-0396 and NUREG-0654 rely on the potential conse-quences of a spectrum of accidents, such as the BWR-1 through BWR-3 described in WASH-1400. However, the fission product inventory proposed for River Bend exceeds that of the 3,200-megawatt thermal reactor used as the model for WASH-1400 and its estimates of accident consequences.

Thus, the generic model is based on estimates of accident consequences which fail to account for radionuclides which will be significant con-tributors to dominant exposure modes for both prompt and delayed effects in the event of releases from accidents classed as BWR-1, r~ BWR-2, and BWR-3 at River Bend.

G. The locations of prisons, hospitals and geriatric facilities in the event of a BWR-1, BWR-2, and BWR-3 release or equivalent.

(1) How would these facilities be evacuated? There are non-ambula-tory people at the hospital at Jackson, Louisiana. School buses from East Baton Rouge Parish have been proposed to transport these institutionalized individuals.

(2) No agreements with the owners of these buses has been out-lined.

(3) No agreement with the operators of these buses has been presented.

(4) No provision is shown for the consequences to the East Baton Rouge Parish School system to resulting disruption of serv-ices.

(5) The time of days of the incident should have been presented in the plan. No provision or consideration is presented to cope with an incident at 2:30 P.M. when the school buses are en route to and from various schools.

10. CONSTRUCTION STATE

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Plant is so incomplete at this time that intervenor asks that

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the record as to contentions be kept open until fif teen days befbre a the regulations found at 10 CFR 2.714(b).

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11. POTASSIUM IODIDE TABLETS Applicant has not presently provided in its emergency planning i for the following:

s For distribution and/or. storage of potassium iodide in accordance I with accepted public health practice in locations which are readily accessible to affected individuals as protection against thyroid irradi-ation. (See FSAR for this provision).

11. FUNDS FOR PREMATURE OR EARLY DECOMMISSIONING Applicant has not demonstrated that it possesses or has a reason-able assurance of obtaining funds necessary to cover costs of early operation coupled with a possibility of early shutdown and decommission-storage of spent fuel.

ing along with the funds for eventur.1 permanent This is not to be construed as a mere financial question because refer-ence is here made to a memorandum suggesting that certain weldings on tubing would not be x-rayed because of the expense involved and these assertions by applicant would certainly show that the financial picture for applicant immediately after fuel loading will not be such that it could cope either with long term storage away from reactor or an early decommissioning.

Furthermore, that during an emergency, monitoring should be expanded to include the human population residing within the ingestion pathway of Iodine 131, and similarly, offsite monitoring radiologically should include samples from the human population.

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f Intervenor here contends that K1 tablets should be stockpiled at receiving hospitals, and/or preliminarily distributed to all citizens within the EPZ (see 10 CFR 50.47).

12. CONSTRUCTION OF RIVERBEND UNIT 2 It-was not possible to find where the construction activities with River Bend 2 were considered or accounted for the FSAR. These act1vities must be delineated for their seismic effect on River Bend 1 and moreover, construction crews will be present in addition to oper-ating crews, all of whom must be considered in the evacuation plans.

&f) < 22-<n By: Doris Fdlkenheiner For Louisiana Consumers League 1 By: James Pierce For Louisianans for Safe Energy As B. WMg By: Linda B. k'atkins For Gretchen Reineke Rothchild l

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UNITED STATES OF L M ICA NUCT T AR REGULATORY C01MSSION

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In the Matter of )

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GULF SIATES UTILITIES COMPAhT, ET AL. ) Docket No. (a) 50-4580L

) 50-4590L (River Send Station Units 1 and 2) )

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SERVICE LIST B. Paul Cotter, Jr.,Esq., Chair =an Ata=1c Safety and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Co= mission Washington, D.C. 20555

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' J Mr. Forrest J . Remick 305 East Ennfiton Avenue . - Doris'Falkenheiner, Esq. '

State College, Pennsylvania 16801 Stephen M. Irving, Esq.

535 North Sixth' Street }

Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70802

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Dr. Richard F. Cole William J. Guste, Jr., Esq. **

d Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Attorney General

\ U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Co= mission State of Louisiana Wathington, D.C. 20555 234 Loyola Avenue, 7th Floor New Orleans, Louisiana 70112 Counsel for NRC Staff a Of fice of the Executive Legal Director U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Co= mission N -,. ~f.a.c. [ *./gh Ecq ,

Department of Justice l Washington, D.C. 20555 7434 Perkins Road, Suite C Baton Rouge Louisiana 70808 Iroy 3.-Conner, Jr., Esq.

Conner & Wetterhahn James W. Pierce, Jr. .

1747 Pennsylvcnia Avenue, N.W. P.O Box 23571 Washington, D.C. 20006 Baton Rouge, La. 70893 Gulf States Utilities Cc=pany ATTN: Mr. L.L. Eu=phreys Senior Vice President

• P.O. Box 2951 Beau =ent, Texas 77704 Ms. Gretchen Reinike Rothschild 1659 Glen = ore Avenue Eaton Rouge, Louisiana 70808

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