ML20077S111
| ML20077S111 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | San Onofre  |
| Issue date: | 09/12/1983 |
| From: | Novak T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Eisenhut D, Mattson R, Speis T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20077S116 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8309210314 | |
| Download: ML20077S111 (1) | |
Text
. - _. - _ -
Distribution:
=Decument* Control:50-362 3 J
PRC System NRC PDR SEP 121983 LB#3 Reading TMNovak GWKnighton HRood JLee MEMORANDUM FOR:
D. G. Eisenhut Director Division of Licensing R. Mattson, Director, Division of Systems Integration T. Speis, Director, Division of Safety Technology H. Thompson, Director Division of H aan Factors Safety R. Vollmer. Director, Division of Engineering
.i FRON:
Thomas M. Novak, Assistant Director for Licensing. Division of Licensing
SUBJECT:
SAN ONOFRE 3 COM ISSION BRIEFING PACKAGE 4
i By memorandum dated August 24, 1983, I forwarded to you supporting information for the Comission briefing to be held on the full power authorization for San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 3.
Enclosed is supplemental information which has been provided to the Commission. This information should be incorporated in your " briefing book."
Also enclosed for your information is a slide which was not sent to the Comission. This slide (98) discusses the preliminary results of a study on the need for PORVs and will be available as a backup slide.
Odginen sWedW Thomas M. Novak, Assistant Director for Licensing Division of Licensing
Enclosure:
As stated cc:
H. R. Denton R. C. DeYoung J. B. Martin 8309210314 030912 PDR ADOCK 05000362 P
PDR k!,L ' #.3...........,.D...L..:..L. B.
D...L :., ')
DL.
.L. Y e,.................,,,,,
omer>
=~*nt R.h.,,,,,,,,,,,!$g9,,,,,,,,,,, %Kii? jton[
TM r
,,,a,,,,,,,,,,,,
,,,,,//ja,a.,,,,,
om> 9/..
..../ 8 3.....,R/..lk/.a.a,.., pj,3,,,j,s, a,.,,,,,,g/
OFFIClAL RECORD COPY osce im-us-Sa nRc FORM 318 00-80) NRCM ONO
-..~
,,8
'o UNITED STATES y y, eq ( gg NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION g-
,/ p.
WASHINGTO N, D. C. 20555
%, v...../
SEP 0 1983 MEMORANDUM FOR:
Chairman Palladino Commissioner Gilinsky Comissioner Roberts Commissioner Asselstine Comissioner Bernthal FROM:
William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations
SUBJECT:
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION RELATED TO SAN ON0FRE UNIT 3 FULL POWER LICENSE PACKAGE In ray August 19, 1983, memorandum to the Commission transmitting the San l
Onofre Unit 3 full power license package, I indicated that the safety evaluation supporting the proposed amendment would be provided later.
The proposed safety evaluation is enclosed.
Also enclosed for your inforreation is a revised proposed license amendment and an additional briefing slide. The proposed amendment has been revised to (1) incorporate changes to the Technical Specifications on fire protec-tion; (2) delete paragraph 2.C.(18)c (Medical Services) in accordance with ASLBP No. 78-365-010L and (3) make a minor editorial change. The briefing slide (9A) that has been added concerns the schedule for completion of the staff's PORY study.
l Is William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations
Enclosures:
As stated l
cc:
SECY OGC OPE
Contact:
l H. Rood, ONRR l
X28427 8309210316 830912 DR ADOCK 05000362 l
SAFETY EVALUATION AMENDMENT 8 TO NPF-15 SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT 3 DOCKET NO. 50-362 1.
Introduction Amendment 8 to the San Onofre Unit 3 Operating License makes several changes.
These are:
(a) Maximum Power Level is changed to 100 percent of full power.
The Facility Technical Specifications covering fire protection are modi-(b) fied in accordance with Condition 2.(c)12.b of the San Onofre 3 Operating License as issued on November 15, 1982.
A cooling system for the auxiliary feedwater pump motor bearing lubrica-(c) tion oil is required to be installed and operable by the first refueling outage.
A demonstration of adequate fuel element assembly shoulder gap clearance (d) is required at each refueling outage.
Isolation capability for the primary emergency operations facility is (e) required by January 1, 1984.
A software error in the core protection calculators is required to be cor-(f) rected at the first outage of sufficient duration after February 2, 1984.
The following sections evaluate each of the changes made in Amendment 8 to NPF-15.
2.
Maximum Power Level NPF-15 was issued on November 15, 1982, and contained a condition limiting the In addition, several other maximum power level to 5 percent of full power.
conditicns must be completed prior to exceeding 5 percent power.
Based on the results of the staff review given below, and on the Commission dated Memorandum there are no open items that require staff evaluation to resolve prior to On this basis, the maxi-allowing San Onofre Unit 3 to exceed 5 percent power.
mum power condition in the San Onofre Unit 3 license is enanged by this amend-l I
ment to allow full power operation.
j It should be noted, however, that there are several license conditions in the license as issued on November 15, 1982 that will require NRC staff inspection to verify completion prior to San Onofre Unit 3 exceeding 5 percent power.
Further, License Condition 2.C.(16) requires the completion of the planned San Onofre Unit 3 SSER 1
startup test program, which will result in power being raised in steps, with tests to verify plant operating characteristics at each power plateau.
3.
Technical Specifications Condition 2.C(12)b of NPF-15 states that prior to exceeding 5% power the licensee shall install certain fire protection equipment and shall propose appropriate modifications to the Technical Specifications.
By letter dated April 15, 1983 SCE proposed such modifications to the plant technical specifications.
Specifi-cally the proposed changes add fire detection in zones 11, 28, 45, 62, 72, and the technical support center to those listed in Technical Specification 3/4.3.3.7, FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION; and add additional sprinklers in the AFW pump room to those listed in Technical Specification 3/4.7.8.2, SPRAY AND/0R SPRINKLER SYSTEMS.
The staff has reviewed the proposed technical specification changes and has found that they appropriately reflect the changes in plant equipment required by the license condition, as discussed in the staff's Safety Evaluation issued with the Unit 3 Operating License, NPF-15, dated November 15, 1982.
Therefore, we find the proposed changes acceptable and are incorporating them into the Technical Specifications in this amendment to NPF-15.
As the licensee pointed out in its letters of April 15 and July 1, 1983, the incorporation of portable fire extinguishers into the technical specifications l
is not necessary, and not consistent with past licensing practice.
These extinguishers are provided to aid in extinguishing small fires that pose little threat to plant safety.
The licensee has committed to maintain them in accord-ance with the provisions of National Fire Protection Association Standard #10, which specifies monthly inspection of fire extinguishers.
The primary means of l
controlling fires is through hose stations, which are included in the plant I
technical specifications.
Based on our review, we conclude that the SCE submittal of April 15, 1983 completely satisfies license condition 2.C(12)b, and is acceptable.
4.
Qualification of Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) t ump Motor Bearings Condition 2.C(20) of NPF-15 requires the licensee to submit (prior to exceeding 5% power) a proposed hardware modification and a schedule for its implementation that will increase the reliability of the AFW motor-driven pumps in the event of a break in the high energy line feeding the steam-driven pump.
In response to this condition, SCE submitted, by letter dated January 11, 1983, a revised AFWS reliability study which indicated that the contribution to AFWS unreliabil-ity is low enough that a pipe break in the AFWS pump room need not be considered.
The licensee's analysis indicated that the contribution from the effects of a pipe break to unreliability when considering the loss of offsite power as the initiating event is only 10%.
We have reviewed the SCE submittal, and while we agree with the information provided, we conclude that the design as currently proposed does not meet GDC 4 and hence must be modified.
Based on the above conclusion, we informed the licensee that a plant modifica-tion is required in order to meet GDC 4 and the guidelines of BTP ASB 10-1.
By San Onofre Unit 3 SSER 2
letter dated March 7, 1983, SCE committed to install during the first refueling outage a forced lube oil cooling system to satisfy the environmental require-ment for the AFW pump motors Plant operation prior to that time is acceptable based on daily visual inspection of the steam lines in the AFW pump room.
This inspection will provide early indication of pipe cracks through observation of steam leaks.
5.
Fuel Assembly Shoulder Gap Clearance The issue of fuel rod axial growth was considered in the San Onofre 2 and 3 OL review.
In the FSAR, the approved CE topical report CENPD-198 and its supplements are used to predict the differences in axial growth between fuel rods and fuel assembly guide tubes.
The CENPD-198 methods had been develcped from CE 14 x 14 fuel performance data involving exposures to 22.5 GWd/MTU.
Since San Onofre 2 and 3 are using 16 x 16 fuel instead of 14 x 14 fuel, and since exposures will eventually exceed 22.5 GWd/MTU, there was uncertainty in the adequacy of the growth analysis.
Nevertheless, we accepted this analysis in the SER on the basis that any unanticipated growth in CE 16 x 16 fuel would be available from routine refueling outage examinations at San Onofre 2 and 3 or from surveillance of lead-burnup precharacterized assemblies in the joint CE/EPRI program being conducted at Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2 (ANO-2).
Recent measurements taken during the second ANO-2 refueling outage have revealed excessive growth.
Subsequently, mechanical modifications to the 30 most-affected ANO-2 assemblies were performed to provide additional shoulder gap clearance.
Because it now appears that excessive growth may occur in San Onofre 2 and 3, the issue has been discussed with the licensee.
By letter dated July 25, 1983, SCE committed to demonstrate, prior to entering MODE 2 after each refueling outage, that adequate shoulder gap exists for at least the next cycle of operation.
l SCE proposed that this commitment apply until the staff has made the finding that adequate shoulder gap clearance has been provided for the design life of the fuel.
The staff has reviewed this commitment and concludes that it is acceptable, because it provides continuing assurance that adequate shoulder gap exists.
The operating license will be conditioned to require that the licensee comply with this commitment.
6.
Isolation Capability for the EOF Ventilation System By letter dated March 31, 1982, SCE submitted for staff review a functional description of the San Onofre primary Emergency Operations Facility (EOF).
By l
letter dated May 20, 1983, SCE indicated that the primary EOF ventilation sys-tem cannot be isolated because of the positive pressure feature of the system in which outside air is provided through the HEPA filters to assure a positive In the SCE letter of pressure is maintained throughout the EOF envelope.
SCE stated that it intends to modify the primary EOF to ensure July 22, 1983 that the ventilation system can be isolated, and that this capability will be provided by January 1, 1984.
Based on this commitment, and the large radio-logical protection factor of the primary EOF (120), the staff finds that the The Unit 3 San Onofre primary EOF meets the NRC criteria for habitability.
operating license will be conditioned to require that isolation capability be provided on the schedule proposed by the licensee.
i l
San Onofre Unit 3 SSER 3
4 7.
Core Protection Calculators TCPCs)
(a)
Introduction Since the issuance of the San Onofre 2 and 3 SER, several issues have devel-oped concerning the Core Protection Calculators (CPCs).
These issues are (1) the discovery of a CPC software error, and (2) the staff audit finding of the CPC/ Core Operating Limits Supervisory System (COLSS) power discrep-ancy at 50% power, and (3) a deficiency in the SCE quality assurance proce-dure.
This Safety Evaluation addresses tnese issues and provides the staff evaluation of them.
(b) Staff Evaluation of the CPC Issues (1) CPC Software Error By letter dated August 4, 1982, Combustion Engineering informed NRC of the discovery of a discrepancy between the Core Protection Calculators (CPC) software of CE plants and its functional requirements.
The dis-crepancy involves penalty factors (PF) associated with Control Element Assembly Calculators (CEAC).
With failure of both CEACs (a CEAC under-going testing is also considered as " failed") the functional require-ments specify that the CPCs are to use DNBR (departure from nucleate
[
boiling ratio) and LPD (local power density) PFs stored in the CPC data base.
These PFs are the largest possible PFs that the CEACs could calculate during normal operation.
However, it has been found during the testing of the Waterford-3 CPC software that the CPC software does not provide for the application of the LPD PF to the LPD calculation in accordance wih the design specifications.
Despite this condition, CE has concluded that there is adequate protection l
provided by CPC reactor trip logic to permit plant operation with the CPC software error.
l By letter dated March 7, 1983, Southern California Edison cited the l
CE conclusion as justification for permitting plant operation with l
the CPC software error at San Onofre 2 and 3.
SCE also indicates its plan to correct the software error at the first refueling outage.
l The staff has evaluated the safety impact of the software error.
The i
CPC functional specifications require that the pre-determined large l
penalty factors be applied to the LPD and DNBR calculations when both i
CEACs fail.
While the present CPC software fails to apply the large LPD penalty factor, the DNBR penalty factor is applied as required.
During most plant operating conditions including full power operation, CE's evaluation has concluded that the plant will trip immediately due to the application of the large DNBR penalty factor as a result of failure of both CEACs.
For lower power operation, the application l
of the large DNBR penalty factor may not immediately trip the reactor; however, under this condition the peak linear heat rate will not be high enough to exceed the specified acceptable fuel design limit.
Therefore, CE concludes that the LPD trip function with or without the penalty factor is not required for plant protection under the condition of failure of both CEACs.
The staff review has not i
San Onofre Unit 3 SSER 4
I
identified any circumstances which would require an LPD trip to protect the core in the event that both CEACs fail.
Nevertheless, we believe the error degrades the protection provided by the CPCs at higher power levels by effectively eliminating a diverse software trip path to the protection circuit.
Therefore, we require that the CPC software be corrected to conform to its functional specifications at the earliest practical date without impacting plant operation.
By letter dated July 22, 1983, SCE indicated that the necesrary software changes for San Onofre 2 and 3 will be developed and approved for implementaticn in the CPCs on or before February 2, 1984.
Since the implementation of the change will require up to 7 days in Operating Mode 5, SCE will utilize the first available outage of sufficient duration after February 2, 1984 for the implementation of the software correction.
We find this commitment to be acceptable, based on the evaluation described above.
(2) CPC/COLSS Power Indication Discrepancy A staff audit during the San Onofre 2 startup test program in December 1982 discovered that with the plant at 50% power, the power level indicated by the COLSS was about 2.5% higher than the power level indicated by the CPC.
The latter value was in close agreement with the secondary calorimetric power.
Since the secondary calorimetric power is the most accurate method for determining steady state power, a higher COLSS indication of power level is conservative and of no safety concern.
However, SCE was requested to evaluate the discre-pancy.
By "05000362/LER-1983-045-03, /03L-0:on 830614,while Performing QC Insp of Fire Barrier Penetration Seals in Mode 5,five Seals in Diesel Generator Bldg Damaged.Cause Not Determined.[[Topic" contains a listed "[" character as part of the property label and has therefore been classified as invalid. in Effect Until Seals Repaired|letter dated July 14, 1983]], SCE provided an explanation for the discrepancy.
The secondary calorimetric power is used for both CPC and COLSS power calibration.
Since the calibration is a gradual process requiring a long period of steady state operation to achieve a complete calibration, preliminary coefficients were installed i
in the correlation used for the COLSS turbine power calculation for i
use during the startup tests.
The preliminary coefficients resulted l
in the calculated turbine power exceeding the secondary calorimetric power.
Since the power indicated by the COLSS is the maximum of the calibrated turbine power and the calibrated delta T power, the higher turbine power calculation resulted in the higher COLSS-indicated power l
at the time of the staff audit.
More accurate coefficients of the turbine power correlation are determined after the 100% power startup tests are complete and are installed prior to the completion of the startup test program.
We conclude that this explanation of the discrepancy is acceptable, and that operation with the discrepancy does not adversely affect public health and safety.
(3) Q/A Program Deficiency l
During the staff audit of the CPC startup test in December 1982, the l
staff was informed that CE and SCE personnel, in preparing for the audit, had discovered a non-conservative error in the values of the power multiplier addressable constants used to define instrument uncertainties.
The error results in a non-conservative power cali-bration uncertainty value of 7.5 percent compared to a required value of 10 percent.
The latter value was submitted to SCE from CE by letter dated August 20, 1981, but the modification was not imple-l San Onofre Unit 3 SSER 5
_--,_u---
1.2r aws
+_
x x
~
r u. ~
~-
w a-.
f mented.
This incident and the software error discussed in Item (1),
above, indicate the need for improvement in the quality assurance l
program.
CE has stated that the software design personnel involved l
with the CPC design have received additional training in the Q/A l
procedures.
A check list which lists items to be verified during the generation and review of the software implementation documentation for the CPC System is being developed.
In its letter of February 23, 1983, CE indicates that CE is implementing a document control pro-l cedure (DCP) to govern the transmittal of CPC-related material.
A master DCP will be established for both Units 2 and 3 for each fuel cycle and changes during the cycle will be issued as revisions.
Each addressable constant DCP and revision will contain a complete listing of all addressable constants, with the ones being changed appropri-i l
ately marked out and the new values identified.
The DCP process both at SCE and at CE identify and document DCP completion.
The DCP pro-
[
cess will provide both CE and SCE the needed documentation regarding l
acceptability and use of addressable constants. We find this quality assurance program improvement acceptable.
l 8.
Environmental Consideration l
l We have determined that authorization of full power operation by this license amendment will not result in any environmental impacts other than those evaluated i
in the Final Environmental Statement (FES) and its Errata, since full power operation is encompassed by the overall action evaluated in the FES and its Errata.
We have determinea that the other changes made by this amendment do not authorize a change in effluent types or total amount nor an increase in power level and will not result in any significant environmental impact.
Having made this determination, we have further concluded that the other changes made by this amendment involve action which is insignificant from the standpoint of environ-rr. ental impact, and, pursuant to 10 CFR Section 51.5(d)(4), that an environmental impact statement or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal j
need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.
9.
Conclusion 1
Prior public notice of the overall action involving issuance of this operating license amendment authorizing full power operation, including emergency prepared-ness issues, was published in the FEDERAL REGISTER on April 7, 1977 (42 F.R.
18460).
Staff evaluation of the safety of the overall action is given in the i
SER and its supplements (NUREG-0712).
With regard to the other actions author-ized by this amendment including changes to the Technical Specifications, we have concluded that because they do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of accidents previously considered, do not create the possibility of an accident of a type different from any evaluat.ed previously, and do not involve a significant decrease in a safety margin, these actions do not involve a significant safety hazards consideration.
1 Further, there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public
.will not be endangered by operation in the manner authorized by this amendment, and the activities authorized by this amendment will be conducted in compliance San Onofre Unit 3 SSER 6
...-. -.a..-----..-
4 with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not I
be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
We, therefore, conclude that the proposed changes are acceptable.
J t
f f
f I
San Onofre Unit 3 SSER 7
e UNITED STATES
[
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
' E WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 0%
4 0
9... 9 Docket No.:
50-362 Mr. Kenneth E. Baskin Mr. James C. Holcombe Vice President Vice President - Power Supply Southern California Edison Company San Diego Gas & Electric Company 2244 Walnut Grove Avenue 101 Ash Street Post Office box 800 Post Office Box 1831 Rosemead, California 91770 San Diego, California 92112 Gentlemen:
Subject:
Issuance of Amendmc.7t ho. 8 to Facility Operating License NPF-15 San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 3 The Nuclear Regulatory Comission has issued Amendment No. 8 to Facility Operating License NPF-15 for the San Onofre Nuclear Station, Unit 3, located in San Diego County, California.
This amendment authorizes operation at power levels up to 100 percent of full rated power, 3390 thermal megawatts. This amendment also contains changes to the license which (1) change the Technical Specifications to reflect changes in fire protection equipment required by the Operating License, (2) require the installation of a cooling system for the auxiliary feedwater pump motor bearings, (3) require resolution of an issue relating to excessive axial fuel growth, (4) require that isolation' capability be provided for the primary E0F, (5) require the correction of a software error in the CPC, and (6) delete Paragraph 2.C(18)c (Medical Services) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-15 in accordance with ASLBP No. 78-365-010L, dated August 12, 1983.
A copy of Amendment No. 8 to Facility Operating License NPF-15 is enclosed.
Also enclosed are copies of the safety evaluation supporting Amendment No. 8 and the related notice which has been forwarded to,the Office of the Federal Register for publication.
Sincerely, Darrell G. Eisenhut, Director Division of Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Enclosures:
1.
Amendment No. 8 2.
Safety Evaluation 3.
Federal Register Notice cc w/ enclosures:
See next page
p ucoq[o j
UNITED STATES
]
e[,y
[g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION g.
g/n;g,
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555
%.~..j...f SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDIS0N COMPANY SAN DIEGO GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY THE CITY OF RIVERSIDE, CALIFORNIA THE CITY OF ANAHEIM, CALIFORNIA DOCKET NO. 50-362 SAN ON0FRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT 3 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 8 License No. NPF-15 1
1.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
A.
The application for ifcense for the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 3 (the facility) filed by the Southern California Edison Company on behalf of itself and San Diego Gas and Electric Company, The City of Riverside and The City of Anaheim, California (licensees) complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Comission's regulations as set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; i
B.
The facility will operate in conformity with the application, as amended, the provisions of the Act, and the regulations of the Commission; C.
There is reasonable assurance:
(1) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; D.
The Southern California Edison Company
- is technically qualified to engage in the activities authorized by this operating license in accordance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; E.
The issuance of this license amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public;
- The Southern California Edison Company is authorized to act as agent for the i
other co-owners and has exclusive responsibility and control over the physical construction, operation, and maintenance of the facility.
l
F.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Connission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisffed.
2.
Paragraphs 2.C(1), 2.C.(2) and 2.C(20) of Facility Operating License No.
NPF-15, are hereby amended to read as follows:
(1) Maximum Power Level Southern California Edison Company (SCE) is authorized to operate the facility at reactor core power levels not in excess of full power (3390 megawatts thermal).
(2) Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, as revised through Amendment No. 8, are hereby incorporated in the license.
SCE shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.
(20) Qualification of Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Pump Motor Bearings Prior to startup following the first refueling outage, SCE shall install and make operational the lubrication oil cooling system for the auxiliary feedwater pump motor bearings described in SCE's letter of March 7,1983. Prior to installation of the lube oil cooling system, SCE shall perform daily visual inspection of the steam lines in the AFW pump room in accordance with SCE's letter of July 12, 1982.
3.
Paragraphs 2.C.(23) through 2.C(25) are hereby added to Facility Operating License NPF-15, as follows:
(23) Fuel Assembly Shoulder Gap Clearance (SCE letter of July 25, 1983)
Prior to entering Startup (Mode 2) after each refueling, SCE shall either provide a report that demonstrates that the existing fuel element assembly (FEA) has sufficient available shoulder gap clearance for at least the next cycle of operation, or identify to the NRC and implement a modified FEA design that has adequate shoulder' gap clearance for at least the next cycle of operation. This commitment will apply until the NRC concurs that the shoulder gap clearance provided is adequate for the design life of the fuel.
(24) Isolation Capability for Primary EOF By January 1,1984 the primary E0F ventilation system shall be modified to provide isolation capability as described in the SCE letter of July 22,1983.
3-(25) Correction of CPC Software Error At the first available outage of sufficient duration (7 days in Mode 5) after February 2,1984, SCE shall correct the software error in the Core Protection Calculators discussed in the SCE letters dated March 7, 1983 and July 22, 1983.
4.
In accordance with the flemorandum and Order (Ruling on Off-site Medical Services Issue), ASLBP 78-365,010L dated August 12, 1983, Paragraph 2.C(18)c of Amendment No. 4 is hereby deleted.
5.
This license amendment is effective as of the date of issuance.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Darrell G. Eisenhut, Director Division of Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Date of Issuance:
/
4
\\
e t '
J
T::. :
..... r
..in..e.1
....s so j
- ,.,y,e.....
^
.....---.-.".ap.:
-...s.
...*.....s...*.
.c-*....
..:n s t km. . ~
- n 6 t Ln. ".: SY.J ? :
c. :. :..
- e. -., a..s w,1...c ; e a.
2(Note I)
F.tiief vaives C... 1
=..:1 din,. e. lev.c0 Ca:1e Riser Gallery am 305
.3 42 Cable Riser Gallery Em 31E 3
40 C....-1
- .u:.1 din, r.iev 30
-.n E :.v. nvAC Unit Rm 309A 1
..... :..:1s1n- :.iev :.0 i
E:;y. -vAC Unic Rm 3055 1
.z:.aste ziev t.
2 r.
6: i Act: P.aceup Tank R: 204E N:ne E:ri:'A:ic.W.akeup Tank R: 204A Hane i
r......
1 :.1..se.n. elev.0e e
3_.:
E5f 5-1 :ngear F.m 305A 2
,i
=. c t S w '.. '.y-a. a.
r.-
'. C.:.
2 1
l
-.af.aste glev s-e,
- u r
.....ers
.y. e
.,.....3 1
=.. 1 1 s. e.
.i r e...., n. o.......
t 6..a..
m.
Train E 3
4 15 Ciesei ~uel Oil St: race Tank
............ - y a o. i. s
- h. ne
.n.
e.
...,..s,..
c.
.a-,.
sant i. ~.,,.
h...e i
l 21 Nuclea-Sterace Tank T-104 N:ne t
22 Auxiliary Fee: vater Sur: Rm 2
9 6
(Note 2) s 1d-1.v 'O' 3:
- . 1 H n r.d '. i..-
u.
Spent fuel,?:ols neat Excnange i. e.
N
..e
-n l
- r....- -..
l 25 Penetratien Elev. 30' 2
8(Note 1) 4
]
i i
i I
i i
e.c..._,... -...... I
/:
c ~... n.
.... v..... h.
3 o.
i 1
l T-~
&-r e +,,
~ ' ' - -
- 7.W?
Ws-e.
.gWg,n
.,,...,.,y g,,
t a
r..
- 4......s
..2.,-
g..
..j
- r. v '.a
.c '....
z-..z,.c'.
i 9..f 1 s.....e..
s
.,.t...
...s... %,.
.g
(.
.....:...s.
.. rs.
...e, r.;.-w.,
i C....
1
=.ui.
4.n. e. ev.ic se m 1.3s 2
- .:gy. cntlier n.
E:;y. Chiller R: 117 2
1 La
~.. ake Structure,
' ?c : Rc T2-105 4
- ..., r.
...., n :.
- ......i... n..e 1.v.. g,..=.
e p....
e
...a.1c n...a
.3.:.
6 's *iv *s =. 1) e e
.a.
.v
...4..
......-....=..4.3..e...
- e..
s.
a
.),
a r....r..
n.. C...., c.,
.c. e s...
i 5-Ra:-aste Elev 9' C..ar; ng Pump R s 1C5A.:
5 r.ac aste lev c, t
i
- .... n..ic
.g k....
sank 1
u
..r
.s
,.0.= n.0 N...
- ...<,i si.
1 :.1.v c. e : a j
2.
(-) e. e..
ce 1
s.
2,. <....... 2i.. sev.:::n 1 E' l
- ...... u.X.:., s C C,.,, 0 0.r,
e.:,
v. _-
N.a i
s.
I
.e <.... :.... -. r3ev e..
Che:1 al 5: rage Tank R: 015 1
.Ca'e.v.... :'ida. :la.v S'
-L.
...e
. c c3;... ug.e. <....,,
Ta..k Res 020, 021 Ncne
.i
.ea<...v e... 21d :)ev
,.c.
5a e.
rum: r.m Ou.S at.as a. lev 37, n
c React:r irt; System R s 30SA-0, 309-A-C S
e.,<,....
- .... :.. :. 2..
f...,
..wG.
.c a,.... : : :.. ig... 3
- r t,. :.,
l m_.__
,,, _, _ _ _ _, _,.,.~_, - _ _,
~....... s......w.,
,,3.....
...a.
e
..:. r. s*. :. S P. ;.*. :
n :. A.
r :.*.i 5..;.. i 6
c.,
5.,,. e. v.....
.es.
3..:
e-u
- r.....
.c...,.. s.
,....t....
- ..s.. t1.s.,: 6a C::::ne.. Co ling Water Pump Res 005, 007,- 008 3
52 Raf.aste Elev 50' v:iume Con.r:i valve Re :s 2(Note 1) s
- e..-
C...
,1
- ..1i :.. :-
=. 0 C......
,4.
c,.
c..... 1 :... i
- e.. r. es. :..i s
.N..., s.
- n.. s.....
1.
r... -.e..w
- c..:
C.....)
- ..:1 d:.n. :s,.v
- .n.i X:s JU:: w c a - *. e r.v.
3
- e..... 1 :... : 1 d :.
- i e s,.=. tv
- .,a....... X.....
c....
1 f
..3....s. * *. rev
.,Cu L a: i e r.'. s e r a a e..seTV r.: O s r.
2 C s.... e
.sc.
L. c...I i e.),
N,.... c..
t i
a r....e..a.
.. e.i g., e e n C c.
i e
- e.. s e.
- c..'.e. e..
4,.
.e.,,..,
- ... :s
- i,y.ci,u c.............
w. I...
r.
- n. - e.J h.C.e
.c..c... =.,..
e.
.y...
l l
0 r.a:.as e ziev 2,
1 Du:.cna ; r. s 444.w, N ne i
I u..1
- .. < 1.s e.
c. i, y 70s
~~
~
4'MteI) c.
r
..is C.-...--.
,' v '.
t
~
75 Refueline Vater Sterace Tank i-005 None 7:
Refueline Vater St: race Tank N..
...n:
i 9
I.
.c..............
/
- 3..,
.v...-.,-u....
(...... a.
g n.
,m
___o..__-.
2_
e f
f i
r.
.*.*.**...(....;...,s%
.........j 1
- s=iy_ '., _ -. -
.a..-..-
.e.....
...a
.s....a.. L..e..z.
n
.h:_.n.. r, n,,.
sF.s.. _A:
h :... _., P.. SM..;s:
a ni r u.-
73 Cer. -el Evileine
- El ev 9' i
C.-.ic.
n...
' n..:.
4
~
l
/c.
C.....e
=.,<id4.
. ;iev.e0i i
- c.:
.c...... e..
r....
.i n n.
2 ec
.c <.
.5. s. a -
F..
.~ v^ 2 :.
2
- r..e.:
1 50 Ka"-as.e Elev 37'.&'50' e.
.. 5 Ea..
... s N..,
....s.e.
- s. ; *4 a. y.. C.n C*
s.
.....s :s n,=
h,. n e
...... c...
sa.:,E e-Coeline.tunne.i
==
i -
ce 1
i 5'
safe:v E:::: Eid: Eiev s' i
. yn.e n= o.-
a n.
u
- 5 I (i;ote 1) 3 Technical Support Center (TSC)
.1. L,S..
2,
<n Le..-.
a-I i
i;ctes i
4 en c-..-12..icn of DCP 2-403E n
2.
On ccmpis-icn cf DCP 2-122M t
i
?
I l
1 l
I
..i.
.c ; n... :.........
~
.C, a. c...
s
....2.....
c.
3..
2../.....:....(ie c.....
s
(
2..-
D.
.s.
u
- u..s. g. s
[.c..:..
.C v e.... $
.c v_ 5 *. = =.. ~i v. E Rea:::r C::ia. Pumps C :.. a i -.e r.
4 Deiu;e-Water 5:ra..-
, r.. r.. iunnel r uel..nant.
.. c.g,
.1 Wet Ftpe
- i Truck Ra ;
Rat aste Eid;.
1
. et Pipe W
Cable Tunnel Section 1 1
Deluge-Water 5; ay
~
Ca:ie Tunnel Section 2 1
Deluge-Water Spray Cable Tunnel Section 3 1
Deluge-Water 5; ray Cable Tennel Secti:n 4 1
Deluge-Water Spray Cable Tunnel Section 5 1
Deluge-Water Spray Cable Tunnel Se:tien 6 1
Deluge-Water I; ray Cable Tunnel Se:ti:n 7 1
Deluge-Water 5; ray Cable Tunnel Section 8 1
Deluge-Wa.er 5 ray Cable Tunnei Secti:n 9 i
Delege-Water 5: ray Ca:ie Tunnel Secti:n ID 1
Deluge-Wate.- 5:rav
.a:. e innne. x ser rue
..a nd. s4de.
1 3
De,suc.e.. ter 5 era.v.
=a Catie Gallery Ra: aste Eic.:..
2" Deiut.e-Water 5:ra.v Cabie Risers Ei. S ft.
Centr:1 Sidg.
2" Deluge-Water Spray Cable Risers E1. 30 ft.
Cen rel Eldg.
2" Deluge-Water Spray Ca:1e Risers E1. 50 ft.
Centr:i 51:g.
2" Deluge-Water 5;: ay Cabie Risers Ei. 70 ft.
Cc.tr:1 51c;.
2*
Delu e-Water 5:ra.v 3
C c.' ': a.
<.. e c.d 4. n, n -....
C..*.--1 :'::
D e-1 t. - a.
"n a.
.c.. y 3
1 D e '. u - = - W. =.
.e... ".
- .. =.., =..... v n'. C. U.n #. *.
..=.1'..=..."'.#...-
- ic,.
t, 3
i.c.....:.
n.
i,.
Emer:en:v A.C. Unit -
Fuel Handline 51de..
1**
Deluc.e-Water 5;ra.v irain :
.ne..,e3 n
...a...
- n. n.=.. 41.s i..,
2 r. a. - a
.#. c.a.
C -. #... k i e.
^
.v... r...... r e. n.
C.....- '. : u..,. : n. '
W =.. r". r =.
r....:
n..-
A.:xiliary Fee: ater Tank Eidg. 30' 1
Pre-actica Sprinkie-
.re ; no::
1#
Deluce-Water Spra~v
! Fan Ree: 233 and C:.tr:1 Eld;. 30' 1
Wet Fipe C:rri: r 234 Salt Water C: ling Intake Structure 1
Wet Pipe Pumps and Salt Water C
ling Tunnel CCW Heat Exchangers Safety Equipment Sidg.
1
~ Wet Pipe and Piping Re:m; A/C R :: 017 l
Corrider 401 Centr:1 51dg. 70' 1
Wet Pipe l
Cerrider 105 Centrei Ei g. 9' 1
Wet Pipe "Cne half of these systems are desigr.ated Ur.i. 3, but are re:uired i: te C;ERAE' E for Unit 2 opera-icn.
- Cr. art:ai filter deluge systers are manually a:.uatet.
l l
I 1
- On c;:pletion of CCP 2-122M.
53 CNC.:RE-UNIT 3 3/" 7-31 A.er.: c
..N:
8 t
I I
7590-01 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION DOCKET N0. 50-362 SAN ON0FRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT 3 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY, ET AL NOTICE OF ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NPF-15 l
Pursuant to the Comission's authorization granted at a meeting held on
,1983, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the l
Comission), has issued Amendment No. 8 to Facility Operating License No.
NPF-15, issued to Southern California Edison Company, San Diego Gas and Electric Company, the City of Riverside, California and the City of Anaheim, California (licensees) for the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 3 (facility) located at the licensees' site in San Diego County, California.
This amendment is effective as of the date of issuance.
l This amendment authorizes operation at power levels up to 100% of full
/
rated power, 3390 megawatts thermal, in accordance with the provisions of the License as amended, the Technical Specifications as amended, and the Environmental Protection Plan.
In addition, this amendment contains changes l
l to the license which (1) change the Technical Specif;ications to reflect changes in fire protection equipment required by th'e Operating License, (2) require the installation of a cooling system for the auxiliary feedwater l
pump motor bearings, (3) require resolution of an issue relating to excessive axial fuel growth, (4) require that isolation capability.be provided for the l
primary E0F, (5) require the correction of a sof tware error in the CPC, and
~
i (6) delete Paragraph 2.C(18)c (Medical Services) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-15 in accordance with ASLBP No. 78-365-010L, dated August 12, 1983.
~,.
7590-01
. Issuance of the amendment complies witn the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's regulations. The Comission has made appropriate findings as required by the Act and the Commission regulations in 10 CFR Chapter I, which are set forth in the license amendment. Prior public notice of the overall action involving the proposed issuance of an operating license authorizing full power operation was published in the FEDERAL REGISTER on April 7, 1977 (42 F. R. 18460).
The Commission has determined that the issuance of this amendment will not result in any environmental impacts other than those evaluated in the Final Environmental Statement and its Errata, since the activity authorized by this amendment is encompassed by the overall action evaluated in the Final Environmental Statement and its Errata.
For further details with respect to this action, see (1) Amendment No. 8 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-15 and (2) the Commission's related Safety Evaluation. These items are available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room,1717 H. Street, N. W., Washington, D.C.,
and the San Clemente Library, 242 Avenida Del Mar, San Clemente, California 92672. A copy of the above items may be obtained upon request addressed to i
the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission, Washington, D. C.
20555, Attention:
1 l
Director, Division of Licensing.
l Dated at Bethesda, Maryland, the day of FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (l/~O
~
f' George Wt Knighton, C fef Licensing Branch No. 3 Division of Licensing
I SCHEDULE OF-REPORT ON 1
NFFD FOR PORVs l
l l
l SEPTEMBER 20 STAFF REPORT TO ACRS l
l OCTOBER 4 ACRS SUBCOMMITTEE BRIEFING l
OCTOBER 13-15 ACRS FULL COMMITTEE BRIEFING l
OCTOBER 31 STAFF REPORT TO CRGR
\\
l NOVEMBER 16 CRGR PRESENTATION l
NOVEMBER 23 CRGR REVIEW COMPLETE
/
l DECEMBER 15 COMMISSION PAPER TO ED0 l
1 I
l SLIDE 9A i
~
PRELIMINARY RESULTS OF STUDY ON NEED FOR PORVs o
CE PLANTS WITHOUT PORVs, INCLUDING SONGS 2, 3 MEET ALL CURRENT REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS WITH EXISTING SYSTEMS.
A SINGLE FAILURE VULNERABILITY IDENTIFIED IN AUXILIARY PRESSURIZER SPRAY SYSTEM WILL NEED TO BE CORRECTED.
o PORVs PROVIDE IMPORTANT DEFENSE-IN-DEPTH CAPABILITY FOR PREVENTING MORE SEVERE ACCIDENTS AND MITIGATING OTHER MULTIPLE FAILURE ACCIDENTS PREVENT SAFETY VALVE LIFTS MULTIPLE STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURES TOTAL LOSS OF ALL FEEDWATER ATWS MITIGATION SMALL LOCA WITHOUT HPI
-~-
- - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ - - - -
o PORVs ARE ESTIMATED TO LOWER CORE MELT PROBABILITY FROM 6 x 10 5/RY TO 3.0 x 10_5/RY DUE TO LOSS OF FEEDWATER AND ATWS ACCIDENTS o
VALVE / IMPACT ASSESSMENT INDICATED A SMALL POSITIVE NET VALUE o
NRR STAFFS TENTATIVE VIEW IS THAT PORVs BE REQUIRED FOR ALL CE PLANTS,' INCLUDING SONGS 2 AND 3.
IMPLEMENTATION SHOULD BE DELAYED UNTIL USI A-45 RESOLUTION FINALIZED.
USI A-45 RESOLUTION COULD IMPOSE REQUIREMENTS WHICH CHANGE CURRENT ASSESSMENT.
o POSITION WILL BE EVALUATED BY CRGR IN NEAR FUTURE, SLIDE 9B
..