ML20076B731

Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants,Wh Zimmer Nuclear Power Station (Phase I)

ML20076B731
Person / Time
Site:	Zimmer
Issue date:	07/31/1983
From:	Shaber C, Stickley T EG&G, INC.
To:	NRC
Shared Package
ML20076B729	List: ML20076B731
References
REF-GTECI-A-36, REF-GTECI-SF, RTR-NUREG-0612, RTR-NUREG-612, TASK-A-36, TASK-OR EGG-HS-6350, NUDOCS 8308220012
Download: ML20076B731 (27)

Text

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ENCLOSURE EGG-HS-6350 CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS WM. H. ZIMMER NUCLEAR POWER STATION (PHASE I)

Docket No.'[50-355]

C. R. Shaber Principal Technical Investigator ,

T. H. Stickley EG&G Idaho, Inc.

l Published July 1983 EG&G Idaho, Inc.

Idaho Fall:, Idaho 83d15 l

Prepared for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission l

Under DOE Contract No. DE-AC07-76ID01570

. FIN No. A6475 8306220012 830811 PDR ADOCK 05000358 A PDR

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ABSTRACT

, The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has requested that all nuclear plants, either operating or under construction, submit a response of ecmpliancy with NUREG-0612, " Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Diants." EG&G Idaho, Inc., has contracted with the NRC to evaluate the responses of those plants presently under construction. This report contains EGLG's evaluation and recommendations for Wm. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station Unit 1.

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SUMMARY

Wm. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station does not totally comply with the guidelines of NUREG-0612. In general, the actions taken and planned are consistent with NUREG 0612 requirements. Inconsistencies exist on:

e The justification for exemption of hoist Unit No. 103 e The adequacy of design.or exemption justification for hoist Unit No. 301.

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- The main report Section 2.3.7 contains discussions and recommendations which will aid in the development of information more consistent with the NUREG 0612 guidelines. - -

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CONTENTS AESTRACT ............................................................. 11 EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

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1. INTRPSUCTION .................................................... 1 l 1.1 Purpose of Review ......................................... 1 1.2 Generic Eackground ........................................ 1.

1.3- Plant-Specific Eackground ................................. 3 i

2. EVALUATION ANL RECOMMENDATIONS .................................. 4 2.1 Overview .................................................. 4 2.2 Heavy Lead Overhead Handling Systems ...................... 4 2.3 General Guidelines ........................................ 5 2.4 Interim Protection Measures ............................... 16

3. CONCLUDING

SUMMARY

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3.1 Applicable Load-Handling Systems ..............'............ 21 3.2 Guideline Recommendations ................................. 21 3.3 Interim Protection ........................................ 23

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CONTROL OF HEAVY LCADS AT NUCLEAR FOWER PLANTS WM. H. ZIMMER NUCLEAR POWER STATION (PHASE I)

1. ENTRODUCTION 1.1 Purcose of Review This technical evaluation report documents the EG&G Idaho Inc., review of general load-handling policy and procedures at the Cincinnati Gas and Electric Company's Wm. H. Zim er Nuclear Power Station. This

, evaluation was performed with the objective of assessing conformance to the general load-handling guidelines of NUREG-0612, " Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants" [1], Section 5.1.1.

1.2 Generic Eackcround Generic Technical Activity Task A-36 was established by the U.S.

. . . Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff to systematically examine staff licensing criteria and the adequacy of measures in effect at operating nuclear power plants to assure the safe handling of heavy loads and to recommend necessary changes to these measures. This activity was initiated by a letter issued by the NRC staff on May 17, 1978 [2], :o all power reactor applicants, requesting information l

concerning the control of heavy loads near spent fuel.

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The results of Task A-36 were reported in NUREG-0612, " Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants." The staff's conclusion from

_this evaluation was that existing measures to control the handling of l heavy _ loads'at operating plants, although providing protection from

!. certain potential. problems, do not adequately cover the major causes of load-handling accidents and should be upgraded.

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l In crder to upgrade measures for the control of heavy loads, the s aff l ceveloced a series of guidelines designec to acni. eve a two pnase cojective using an accepted approacn or protection pnilosophy. The i first portion of the objective, achieved through a set of general guidelines identified in NUREG-0612, Ar-icle 5.1.1, is to ensure that all load-handling systems at nuclear power plants are designed and operated such that their probability of failure is uniformly small and approcriate for the critical tasks in whien they are employed. The second portion of the staff's objective, achieved through guicelines icentified in NUREG-0612, Articles 5.1.2 througn 5.1.5, is ta ensure that, for load-handling systems in areas where their failure might result in significant consequences, either (a) features are provided, in addition to those required for all load-handling systems, to ensure that the potential for a load drop is extremely small,(e.g., a single-failure proof crane) or (b) conservative evaluations of load-handling accidents indicate that the potential consequences of any load drop are acceptably small. Acceptability of accident consequences is quantified in NUREG-0612 into four accident analysis evaluation criteria.

The approach used to develop the staff guidelines for minimizing the potential for a load drop was based on defense in depth and is summarized as-follows:

o Provide sufficient operator training, handling system design, load-handling instructions, and equipment inspection to assure reliable operation of the handling system o Define safe load travel paths through procedures and operator training so'that, to the extent practical, heavy loads are not carried over or near irradiated fuel or safe shutdown equipment o Provide mechanical stops or elec-trical interlocks to prevent movement of heavy loads over irradiated fuel or in proximity to equipment associated with redundant shutdown paths.

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Staff guidelines resulting from the foregoing are tabuiated in Section 5 of NUREG-0612.

1.3 plant-Scecific Backcround On December 22, 1950, the NRC issued a letter [3] to Cincinnati Gas and Electric Company, the applicant for Wm. H. Zimmer Nuclear power Station, requesting that the applicant review provisions for handling and control of heavy loacs at Wm. H. Zimmer Nuclear power Station, evaluate these provisions with respect to the guidelines of NUREG-0612, and provide certain additional -information to be used for an indepencent determination of conformance to these guidelines. On May 13, 1981, Cincinnati Gas and Electric Company provided a response [4] to this request.

On June 24, 1981, a second response [5]

was submitted with supplemental information. .

rom these, a Technical Evaluation Report was drafted.

The draft was discussed in a conference call and additional responses [6] subm.itted October 7, 1982, and

[6a] on June 2, 1983.

The present evaluation and recommendations

.herein considered information from all of the responses.

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2. EVALUATION AND REC 0KvENDATIONS 2.1 Overview The following sections summari:e Cincinnati Gas anc Electric Company's review of heavy load handling at the Wm. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station accompanied by EG1G's evaluation, conclusions, and recommandations to the applicant for bringing the facilities more completely into compliance with the intent of N'JREG-0612. The applicant indicated the weight of the power station's single spent-fuel assembly and its handling tool as 1000 pounds. This is the criteria listed in NUREG-0612 for classification as a heavy load and is .

considered to be a Wm. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station heavy load.

2.2 Heavy Load Overhead Handlino Systems This section reviews the applicant's list of overhead handling systems which arE subject to the criteria of NUREG-0612 and a review of the justification for excluding overhead handling systems frcm the above

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mentioned list.

2.2.1 Scoce

" Report the results of your review of olant arrangements 'to identify all overhead handling systems from whict. a load crop may result in damage to any system recuired for plant shutdown or decay heat removal (taking no credit for any interlocks, I technical specifications, operating procedures, or detailed l

structural analysis) and justify the exclusion of any overhead

handling system from your list by verifying that there is sufficient physical separation from any load-impact point and any

safety-related component to permit a determination by inspection i that no heavy load drop can result in damage to any system or i

component recuired for plant shutdcwn or decay heat removal." .

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A. Sum a y cf Acolicant's Statements Theaopitcant'sJune2,1953,submittalatt$cnedataolelis-ing the item numbers of all overhead handling devices in, or planned for, the reactor. It listed 68 numbered items which was expanded to identify 95 hoists. Subsequent attachments presented justification for removal of many listed items ar.d hoists which do not meet the criteria which NUREG 0612 specifics.

5. EG&G Evaluation

. The original submittals and the updated one of June 2,1983 indicate that a thorough evaluation and listing of overhead handling items has been made. Justification to remove hoists frem the complete list was made with reason given for each.

C. EG&G Conclusions and Recommendations Since there is no information to the contrary, EG&G concludes that the applicant has included all applicable hoists and cranes in their list of handling systems which must be consistent with the requirements of the general guidelines of NUREG-0612.

2.3 General Guidelines This section addresses the extent to which the app'icable handling sys-tems comply with the general guidelines of NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.1.

I EG&G's conclusions and recommendations are provided in summaries for each cuideline.

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The NRC has established seven general guidelines which must be met in order to provide the defense-in-depth approach for the handling of heavy leads. These guidelines consist of the following criteria from Section 5.1.1 of NUREG-0612: ,

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e Guiceline 1--Safe Load Paths e Guideline 2--Lead Handling Procedures ,

o Guideline 3--Crane Operator Training e Guideline 4--Special Lifting Devices e Guideline 5--Lifting Devices (not specially designed) e Guideline 6--Cranes (Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance) e Guideline 7--Crane Design.

These seven guidelines should be satisfied for all overhead handling systems and programs in orcer to handle heavy leads in the vicinity of ,

the reactor vessel, near spent fuel in the spent-fuel pool, or in other areas where a load drop may damage safe shutdown systems. The succeeding paragraphs address the guidelines individually.

2.3.1 Safe Lead Paths [ Guideline 1. NUREG-0612. Article 5.1.1(1)]

" Safe load paths should be defined for the movement o'f heavy loads to minimize the potential for heavy loads, if dropped, to impact irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel and in the spent-fuel pool, or to impact safe shutdown equipment. The path should follow, to the extent practical, structural floor members, beams, etc., such that if the load is dropped, the structure is more likely to withstand the impact. These load paths should be defined in procedures, shown on equipment laycut drawings, and clearly marked on the floor in the area where the load is to be handled. Deviations from defined Icad paths should require written alternative procedures approved by the plant Safety review committee."

A. Summary of Aoplicant's Statements Safe load paths will be defined for each crane designed to carry heavy loads with the potential for impacting equipment required and/or for safe shutdown or decay heat removal.

The safe load path will, " follow to the extent practicable structural floor members, beams, etc. . . " These safe load paths will be included in procedures, and on equipment layout drawings. On the plant refueling floor, safe load paths will be clearly marked (via paint or safety roping) where the load shall be handled.

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B. EGLG Evaluation The safe load paths have been shown on arawings providec for the equipmen: removal plans. The proposed actions to meet the other details for " Safe Load Paths" are consistent with Guideline No. 1.

C. EG&G Conclusions and Recommendations Completion of the acticns describec by the applicant will be consistent with the requirements of Guideline No. 1.

2.3.2 Leac-Mandlino Procedures [ Guideline 2, NUREG-0612. Article 5.1.1(2)]

"Prececures should be develcped to cover load-handling operations for heavy loads that are or could be handled over or in proximity to irradiated fuel or safe shutdown equipment. At a minimum,

- procedures should cover handling of these loads listed in -

Table 3.1-1 of NUREG-0612. These procecures should include:

identification of required equipment; inspections and acceptance criteria required before movement of 1 cad; the-steps and proper sequence to be followed in handling the load; defining the safe path; and other special precautions."

A. Summary of-Aeolicant's Statements Per the requirements of Section 5.1.1(2) of NUREG-0612, pro-cedures shall be developed to detail load-handling operations for hoists determined to be operating over or in proximity to irradiated fuel or safety equipment. Such procedures shall be written and approved prior to performing applicable load-ha~ndling operations following initial fuel loading. Proce-dures shall contain detailed rigging instructions including sling lengths, rope diameters, shackle diameters, and minimum ratings. The procedure shall contain an isometric pictorial diagram of the required rigging: Multi-use rope slings used at ZPS-1 are labeled with tags to indicate their rated 7

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capacity. Some heavy loacs located on tne plant refueling floor are handlec with cecicatec sling arrangements. These slings will be labeled for their particular use(s). Eefore

, use, rigging inspections covering nine inspection parameters will be made. The procedures shall contain step-by-step loac.

movement inspections and shall define the equipment removal path as previously ciscussed.

B. EG&G Evaluation The commitment for procedure development, as stated, is consistent with the recuirements for this guideline.

C. EG&G Conclusions and Recommendations The procedure completion and implementation plans at the Wm. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station Unit 1 are consistent with Guideline 2.

2.3.3 Crane Ocerator Trainin; [ Guideline 3. NUREG-0612.

Article 5.1.1(3)]

" Crane operators should be trained, qualified and conduct themselves in accordance with Cnacter 2-3 of ANSI.830.2-1976, .

'Overnead and Gantry Cranes' [7]."

A. Summary of Acolicant's Statements All personnel who operate cranes or hoists at the Wm. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station shall be trained, qualified, and conduct themselves per the guidelines of Chapter 2-3 of ANSI B30.2-1976. They have received documented classroom training in the areas of rigging, lifting, hand signals, and rigging inspection. In addition, personnel who operate cab-operated cranes have received hands-on training on such equipment during the preoperational testing programs at the plant.

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2. EG&G Evaluation The commitments and actions taken vill, upon completion, satisfy the requirements of Guideline 3.

C. EG&G Conclusion and Recommendations The implementation of planned actions will be consistent with Guideline 3.

2.3.4 Soecial Liftino Devices [ Guideline 4. NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.1(4)]

"Special lifting devices should satisfy the guidelines of ANSI N14.6-1978, ' Standard for Special Lifting Devices for Shipping Containers Weighing 10,000 Pounds (4500 kg) or More for Nuclear Materials' [8]. This standard should apply to all special lifting devices which carry heavy loads in areas as defined above. For operating plants, certain inspections and load tests may be accepted in lieu of certain material requirements in the standard. In addition, the stress design factor stated in Section 3.2.1.1 of ANSI N14.6 should be based on the combined maximum static and dynamic loads that could be imparted on the handling device based on characteristics of the crane which will be used. This is in lieu of the guideline in Section 3.2.1.1 of ANSI N14.6 which bases the stress design factor on only the weight (stati_c load) or the load and of the intervening components of the special handling device."

A. Summary of Acolicant's Statements The applicant's responses discuss two strongbacks that need to conform to ANSI N14.6 as special lifting devices.

! Separate evaluations of these two lifting devices are made.

First, the Reactor Head Strongback, according to information in the response, has been proof tested to 100 tons. It has a nameplate rating of 80 tons. The two major loads it handles are the Drywell Head and the Reactor Head, each listed at a load weight of 65 tons.

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Seconcly, tne D yer/ Separator Strongback has been prcof testec to 104 tons. It has a nameplate,lis-ing of 52 tons ,

at 194.25 inches and 35 tons at 205.5 incnes; also. a hook-bicek rating for 60 ton capacity. The listed loads to be hancied are the Steam Dryer at 38 tens and the Steam Separator at 51 tons.

Detail design, fabrication, and acceptance testing recuire-ment have been obtained frem the cesigner, General Electric s.

Company along with many related scecificatiens, such as '

materials, heat treatment requirement, welding prpcedures, welder qualification,-quality assurance documentation and controls. The N14.6 requirements have ber.n addressed and statements relative to compliance wi R Section 3 on design ,

and Section 4 on fabrication and acceptance testing are provided.

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Information provided shows that the special' lifting devices ,

at Wm. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station Un$t 3 are consistent -

with NUREG 0612 Guideline 4.

C. EG&G Conclusions and Recommer.dations. -

s The special lifting device: . satisfy the requirements and are consistent with the Cuideline s,

4 2.3.5 Liftino Devices (Not Soecially DesicnegiGuideline 5, NUREG-0612. Article S.'?.1(5M o' .

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"Lif' ting devices that are not specially, designed"should be installed and used in accercance with4the guidelines of ANSI B30.9-1971, 'Slinjs' [9]?,However, in selecting the proper sling, the load used should be the sum of the static and maximum dynamic load. The rating identified on the sling should be.in terms of the ' static load' which produces the maximum static and dynamic load. Where this restricts slings to use on only certain cranes, the slings should be claarly marked as to the cranes with which they may be used."

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The rigging used with all plant load-nandling systems meets the requirements of ANSI S30.9. The following handling systemhoists,inaddit[on.tomeetingANSI330.9,providean allowance for dynamic loa' ding. (It is established as the static load plus 1/2*4 of the static load for each foot per s,

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minute of hoist hook speed.):

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s e Main Reactor Building Crane--Aux. Hook.

s Relief and Safety Valve Mcintenance V. P. Cooler Units

'es Recirculating Pump Motors V. P. Cooler Units I; ,

e Valve Maintenance .

V e Drywell Access Hatch Cover e Low Pressure Core Spray e R. H. R. Pumps

+;n y ha The combination of rigging devices,.not covered above, and used on the Plant Refueling Floor are rated by the Manufacturer at 200*; of the static load. This includes sling construction, sling leg angles, and other considerations. All other handling' system items have been discussed in one of two attachments providing individual justification for exclusion from tne requirements of NUREG -

0612. Early submittals reported that a method is used, and is covered in procedures, by which certain slings for dedicated service will be labelad for that service.

B. EG!G Evaluation .

g Theinformationprovidedshowsthatliftingdevicesnot specially designed are consistent with Guideline 5 requirements.

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C. EG&G Conclusions and Recc mencations Wm. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station Unit I has presented informa-ion on the requirements that show their actions are consistent with Guiceline 5.

2.3.6- ' Cranes (Insoection, Testino, and Maintenance) [ Guideline 6, NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.1(6)]

"The crane should be inspected, tested, and maintained in accordance with Chapter 2-2 of ANSI B30.2-1976, ' Overhead and Gantry Cranes,' with the exception that tests and inspections should be performed prior to use where it is not practical to meet the frequencies of ANSI B30.2 for periedic in~spection and

, test, or where frequency of crane use is less than the specified inspection and test frequency (e.g., the polar crane inside a PWR containment may only be used every 12 to 18 months .during refueling operations, and is generally not accessible during power operation. ANSI B30.2, however, calls for certain inspections to be performed daily or monthly. For such cranes having limited usage, the inspections, test, and maintenance

- should be performed prior to their use)." .

A. Summary of Acolicant's Statements -

All cranes and hoists at ZPS-1 shall be subjected to frequent and periodic inspections as describcd in Chapter 2-2 of ANSI B30.2-1976. Ali piant cranes are cesignated as either regular or standby service, based upon a twice/ week-usage criterion.

All cranes undergo an undocumented before-use inspection encompassing those items listed under Section 2-2.1.2 of ANSI B30.2. All regular-use cranes, or standby-use cranes being operated regularly for more than a month, undergo a documented monthly inspection of these same characteristics.

All cranes undergo a documented yearly inspection encompassing those items listed.under Section 2-2.1.3 of ANSI B30.2.

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Preventive maintenance, equipment safety tagging, adjustments, and lubrication will be pe,rfcrmed as described in Section 2-2.3 of ANSI B30.3.0. Wire rope inspection, replacement, and maintenance will be conducted as described in Section 2-2.4 of ANSI B30.2.

All new, altered, extensively repaired, or modified cranes will be tested as required by Section 2-2.2.1 and rated 1 cad tests will be performed per Section 2-2.2.2 of ANSI E30.2 with an exception. The risk of an inadvertant drop of a test load could impact safe shutdown or decay heat removal equipment. Therefore, the requirements of Section 2-2.2.2.b. 2 and 3, requiring full length travel of the crane trolly and bridge while handling a 12$% test load is believed inappropriate and places the plant in an unsafe situation.

5. EG&G Evaluation The applicant has indicated that their actions are consistent with Guideline 6 for Inspection, Test, and Maintenance with one exception. Since the scope of the Heavy Load Program is aimed at preventing heavy load handling over vital equipment unnecessarily, and ANSI E30.2 Section 2-2.2.2b uses the qualifying phrase, "The rated lead test, if made . . ." it seems that the exception is justified.

C. EG&G Conclusions and' Recommendations

. With the one exception discussed, the Wm H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station Unit 1 actions are consistent with Guideline 6.

The basis for the exception, in light of the code wording, is believed to be consistent also,.because impracticalities are recognized.

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2.3.7 Crane Desien TGaiceline 7. NUREG-0612. Article 5.1.1(7)1 "The crane should be designed to meet the aoplicable cri eria and guidelines of Chapter 2-1 of ANSI B30.2-1976, ' Overhead and Gantry Cranes,' and of CMAA-70, ' Specifications for Electric Overhead Traveling Cranes' [10]. An alternative to a specification in ANSI B30.2 or CMAA-70 may be accected in lieu of specific compliance if the intent of the specification is satisfied."

A. Summary of Acolicant's Statements -

As described in the Wm. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station Final Safety Analysis Report, the Reactor Building crane is designed per the requirements of ANSI B30.2.0 and CMAA-70.

The miscellaneous hoists and trolleys located in the general areas of the plant are designed and constructed in accordance with ANSI B30.16-1973. They'are described by the architect engineer and manufacturer as " electric. overhead hoists." The refueling floor cranes include three jib cranes and the Reactor Building Crane. The three jib cranes on the refueling floor were designed and constructed in accordance with ANSI B30.11. The Turbine Building crane meets EOCI specifications. The Service Water Maintenance Bridge Crane complies with ANSI B30.2.

B. EG&G Evaluation The submittals present data showing that the Reactor Building main crane is consistent with the guideline. Also, the various non-bridge crane hoists and jibs that are designed to the appropriate ANSI code such as B30.11 and B30.16 are consistent with the guideline. Details on a few cranes prcmpt questions thas tne submittals fail to answer the concerns of Guideline 7. These are discussed below.

1. The information given on th6 Turbine Building Crane,

" meets EOCI specifications." It is listed as Item No. 301 and identified as two bridge cranes, each 14

I with 110-ton and 25-ton hooks. Therefore, both ANSI E30.2 and CMAA 70 design requireme,nts apply. Since ECCI 61 was superceded by CMAA 70, most of the requirements called for by CMAA 70 may be met. No Information is given to determine if ANSI B30.2 was used in the design.

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The information given on the Service Water Maintenance Building cranes, Item No. 406, indicates that it was designed to ANSI E30.2, but does not indicate that the added requirements of CMAA 70 criteria were used.

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Items 113, 401, and a04 are listed as " Bridge Cranes",

so the general statement relative to ANSI B30.11 or B30.16 do not apply. Reference to the design criteria of ANSI B30.2 and CMAA 70 are not given.

Each of the five item cranes above are listed among those in the submittal attachments used to justify exclusion from the requirements of NUREG 0612. The justifications for the latter four Item No. hoists are consistent with the general exclusion criteria of NUREG 0612. However, the Item 301 (2 cranes) justification is cependent partially on, isolation of' the main steam lines, administrative control limits to 24 tons for specific travel areas, and single-failure-proof design for Reactor Protection Instrumentation.

Guideline 7 requirements for design of cranes for Item 301 are not presented.

Justification for esclusion of Item 301 from consideration is not consistent with the recuirements of 2.2 above. Further evaluation and acceptable information is needed.

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Hoist Item 108 apparently m.eets the ANSI code design requirements, However, the information concerning this hoist needs additional evaluation:

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e General listings for Item IOS rate tne hoist at t

'18 tons and at 20 tons. The pata shculd be consistent.

e The submittals justify exclusion from the requirement of NUREG 0612 on assurances from

" Application of Administrative controls" This is less than the " defense-in-depth" approach called for in NUREG 0612-5.1.

C. EG&G Conclusions and Recommendations In general, the information submitted shows that cranes have been designed to criteria consistent with the intent of Guideline 7, or a justification was. presentec to show that they are excluded from the requirements of NUREG 0612.

The two hoists included in Item 301, "The Turbine Building Cranes," are not shown to be consistent with Guideline 7.

Acministrative controls are not acceptable; alternatives to design specifications and sufficient information to exclude -

the cranes from NUREG 0612 are n.ot presented. More comprehensive alternative specification information is needed to show tha: the intent of Guideline Spe:ifications' is met.

Ho'ist Item 108. Provide better justification for removal from consideration frem the requirement of NUREG 0612.

2.4 Interim Protection Measures The NRC staff has established (NUREG-0612, Article 5.3) that six measures should be initiated to provide reasonable assurance that handling of heavy loads will be performed in a safe manner until final implementation of the general guidelines of NUREG-0612, Article 5.1 is complete. Four of these six interim measures consist of general i

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Guiceline 1, Safe Loao Patns; Guiceline 2, Lead-Handling Procecures; Guideline 3, Crane Operator Training; and Guideline 6, Cranes (Inspection, Tes.ing, and Maintenance). The two remaining interim measures cover the following criteria:

e Heavy load technical specifications e Special review for heavy loads handled over the core.

In the October 7, 1982, transmittal [6], specific implementation of interim actions were addressed by Cincinnati Gas and Electric Ccmpany. The interim protection measures were intended primarily for operational, licensed plants; however, the interim implementation actions reported are evaluated in the succeeding paragraphs of this section.

2.4.1 Interim Protection Measure 1 - Technical Scecificat' ions

" Licenses for all operating reactors not having a single-failure-proof overhead crane in the fuel storage pool area should be revised to include a specification comparable to Standard Techni-cal Specification 3.9.7, ' Crane Travel - Spent Fuel Storage Pool Building,' for PWRs and Standard Technical Specification 3.9.6.2,

' Crane Travel,' for BWRs, to prohibit handling of heavy loads over fuel in the storage pool until implementation of measures which satisfy the guidelines of Section 5.1."

A. Summary of Acolicant's Statements The Main Reactor Building crane is used for handling heavy loads in the fuel storage pool area. The 110-ton hook of this crane is designed with four single-failure proof features:

.. e A redundant idler gear train, which is a duplicate of the driving side gear reduction system (without drive motor). Each ge'ar reduction train has a 150*; of motor torque braking system.

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e Structural steel support upon which the crum barrel will rest following gross fai, lure of drum bearings, shaft, or bearing support.

e Redundant full capacity wire roce system.

e Redundant designed hook within a hock load-handling system.

In acdition Technical Specifications contain:

e A limiting condition for operation for movement of equipment over fuel assemblies in the spent-fuel pool, e Surveillance recuirements to assure operability of crane interlocks which prevent travel over the spent-fuel pool.

B. EG&G Evaluation The single-failure pro,of components, ccmbined with the crane interlocks, to prevent heavy load movements over the spent-fuel pool is censistent with the intent of Interim Protective Measure 1.

C. EG&G Conclusions and Recommendations The conditions satisfy Interim Protection Measure 1--no recommendations are given.

2.4.2 Interim Protection Measures 2, 3. 4, and 5--Administrative Controls 18

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"Procecural or acministrative measures [ including safe load paths, load-handling procecures, crane ccerator training, and crane inscection]... can be accomplishec in a short time pericd and need not be celayed for completion of evaluations and modifications to satisfy the guidelines of Section 5.1 of

[NUREG-0612]."

A. Summary of Acolicant's Statements Summaries of the applicant's statements are contained in discussions of the respective general guidelines in Sections- 2.3.1, 2.3.2, 2.3.3, and 2.3.6, respectively.

B. EG&G Evaluations. Conclusions. and Recommendations EG&G evaluations, conclusions, and reccmmendations are contained in discussions of the respective general guidelines in Sections 2.3.1, 2.3.2, 2.3.3, and 2.3.6.

2.4.3 Interim Protection Measure 6--Scecial Review for Heavy Loads Over the Core "Special attention should be given to procedures, couipment, and personnel for the handling of heavy loads over the core,. such as vessel internals or vessel inspection' tools. This special review should include the following for these loads: (a) review of procedures for installation of rigging cr lifting devices and

• movement of the load to assure that sufficient detail is provided and that instructions are clear and concise; (b) visual inspections of load-bearing components of cranes, slings, and special. lifting devices to identify flaws or deficiencies that could lead to failure of the component; (c) appropriate repair and replacement of defective components; and (d) verify that the crane operators have been properly trained and are familiar with specific procedures used in handling these loads, e.g., hand signals, conduct of operations, and content of procedures."

A. Summary of Acplicant's Statements The special reviews called for in Interim Protection Measure 6 will be performed. .

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' 3-. EG&3 Evaluation Performance of the reviews, as stated, meets the interim

. action . requirements. In addition, many of the details provided in response to NUREG 0512, Section 5.1.1 guidelines indicate that the plant systems are established to accomplish the interim special reviews.

C. EG&G Conclusion The reported _ action plans are consistent with the requirements for Interim Protection Measure 6.

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3. CCNCLUDING SuvgARY 3.1 Acolicable Load-Handling Systems The list of cranes and hoists supplied by the applicant as being subject to'the provisions of NUREG-0612 is accepted as complete (see Section 2.2.1).

3.2 Guideline Recommendations Compliance with the seven NRC guidelines for heavy load handling (Section 2.3) are partially satisfied at the Wm. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station. This conclusion is represented in tabular form as Table 3.1. Specific recommendations to aid in compliance with the intent of these guidelines are provided as folicws:

Guideline Recommendation

,. 1. (Secticn 2.3.1) a. Completion of the actions described Safe Lead Paths by the applicant are consistent with the requirements of Guideline 1.

2. (Section 2.3.2) a.' Completion of the load-handling Load-Handling procedures, and their implementation Procedures will show that Wm. H. Zimmer

! Nuclear Power Station Unit 1 is consistent with Guideline 2.

3. (Section 2.3.3) a. Completion of the actions committed Crane Operator to is consistent with the Training requirecents of Guideline 3.

21

Guiceline Recommendation

4. (Section 2.3.?) a. The special lifting cevices satisfy Special Lifting the requirements and are consistent Devices witn Guiceline 4

5. (Section 2.3.5) a. Wm. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station has presented information to sh'ow.

Lifting Devices Not that their actions are consistent Specially Designed witn Guideline 5.

6. (Section 2.3.6) a. Generally the actions taken are Cranes (Inspection, consistent with Guideline 6. One Testing, and Main- exception listed is believed tenance) consistent with the intent of Guideline 6.

7. (Section 2.3.7) a. Information provided shows that

.. Crane Design Wm. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station Unit 1 is consistent with Guideline 7, with exceptions concerning the hoists in Item Nos. 108 and 301.

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3.3 Ir.:erim Protection EG&G's evaluation of information provided by the applicant indicates that ths 'nllowing actions are necessary to ensure tnat the six NRC staff measures for interim protection at Wm. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station Ur.it I are met:

Interim Measure Recommendation

1. (Section 2.4.1) a. The indicated conditic.s and actions satisfy the Technical Specifications requirements for Interim Protection Measure 1.

2, 3, 4, and 5. a. The actions taken and under way for Measures 2, (Sections 2.3.1, 3, and 4, as indicated in the sections shown 2,3.2, 2.3.3, and respectively, are consistent with the protection 2.3.6) recommendation.

Adminis rative b. The required crane inspections program is Controls adequate. The required programs for testing and maintenance have one exception taken, e.g.,

carrying test loads over vital equipment. The plant is consistent with the intent of the guideline.

6. (Section 2.4.3) a. The reported action plans are consistent with Special Reviews the requirements for Interim Protection for Heavy Leads Measure 6.

Over the Core 4

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4 REFERENCES

1. NUREG-0512, Control of Heavy Loacs at Nuclear Po er Plants, NRC.

2. V. Stello, Jr. (NRC), Letter to all applicants.

Subject:

Request for Additional Information on Control of Heavy Loads Near Spent Fuel, NRC, 17 May 1978.

3. USNRC, Letter to [ Company].

Subject:

NRCRecuestforAdditionai Information on Control of Heavy Loads Near Spent Fuel, NRC, 22 December 1980.

4. E. A. Borgman, Letter to Mr. Harold Denton, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, dated May 13, 1981, Referencing Wm. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station Unit 1 - Control of Heavy Loads.

5. E. A. Borgman, Letter to Mr. Harold Denton, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, dated June 24, 1981, referencing Wm. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station Unit 1--Supplemental Information in response to NRC Letter of December 22, 1980 regarding Control cf Heavy Loads.

6. B. Ralph Sylvia, Letter to Mr. Harold Denton, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555, dated Octocer 7,1982, referencing Wm. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station Unit 1--Control of Heavy Loads.

6a. J. Williams,' Jr. , Letter to Mr. Harold Denton, U.S. Nuclear . Regulatory Commission, Washington, D. C'. 20555, dated June 2, 1983, referencing Wm. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station Unit 1--Supplimentary Information, Heavy Loads.

7. ANSI B30.2-1976, " Overhead and Gantry Cranes."

8. ANSI N14.6-1978, " Standard for Lifting Dev. ices for Shipping Containers Weighing 10,000 Pounds (4500 kg) or more for Nuclear Materials."

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9. ANSI 530.9-1971, "Siings."

10. CMAA-70, "Specifica:icns for Electric Overneaci Traveling Cranes."

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l I A8LE 3.1, WH.11. filNER HUCLE AR POWER SI Alloft NiMt[G-0612 COMPLlANCC MATRIX

_ . . ~ ___.. . . . . .

Weight Guldeline I Guideline 2 Guideline 3 Guideline 4 Guideline 5 Guideline 6 Guideline 1 Crane or Crane special Inspec L lon.

Equipment Capacity Safe Load Operator Llfting lost, and Deslanation licavy Loads (tons) Paths Procedures _l raining Devices Slings Maintenance Crane Dest,gn 101 main 14 Loa is to 90 ton Max. 110 C C C C C C C 101 aus 2 Loads to 4 Ton Ham. 10 C C C C C' C 105 2900 lbs 2 C C C C C 100 10.5 fon 10-208 C C C C C C 109 23.0 Ton 24.45 C C C C C C 114 I lon 2.5 C C C C C t.

115 5 Ton 6. ,

C C C C C 0

-110 3.'a Ton 4 C C C C C C 119 3 Ton 4 C C C C C C 301 24 Ton 110 and C C C- C C tic 25 204 5 Future 412 0 C C C C C C 411 3 Jon 3 C C C C C C y 410 2 Ton 3 C C C C C C 102, 103, 104, 106, 101, 110, Ill, 112, 113, 115, Are recognized in the sulunittals lit, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 121, 128, or drawings, but have justlIIcations l

129, 201, 2G2, 203, 204, 205, 201, 200. 302, 303, . provided for exclusion that are l J04, 305, 306, 301, 300, 309, 401, 402, 403, 404, consistent with NUREG 0612. .

l 406,401,411,417,413,414,415,416,411,410, '

j anil 419.

C = Appilcant action compiles with MthtEG-0612 Guideline.

NC = Applicent action does nnt coenply with NtiltEG-0612 Guldeline .

R = Applicant has proposed revisions /nodifIcations designed to cannply with NUlt[G-0612 Guideline.

I = Insuf ficient information provided by the applicant.

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a. Information sulmoitted shows capactly of Iloist 100 at 18 tons one place and at 20 tons in another.

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+ .N6c ,cau235 v.s. NUCLE An r.EcutATOav COuuissiON -

BIBLIOGRAPHIC D ATA SHEET EGG-HS-6350 4 T:7.. Auc s.sT.TLE  :. ice ,o, ,,,

Contrcl cf Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants Wm. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station (Phase I) s aECseiENrs ACCEssicN NO. )

5. D ATE REPORT COYPLETED

. l 7. AUTHORi$1

? C. R. Shaber, T. H. Stickley "o~T- ivt^a

, July 1983

i PE RFC AvtNG ORG ANIZATION h AME ANO MAILING ACORESS Itactuce I.0 Cocel DATE REPORT ISSUED MONTM lvEAR September 1983 EG&G Idaho, Inc. s . ,c ,,,, ,,,, , ,

Idaho Falls, 10 83415 8 iLeave mona b ,

12 SPCNSORiNG CnG AN Z ATICN N AME ANC M AILING ACD AESS uncruce I,o coors

'""C"*""""'"

Systems Integration

~

Division of

!.Officeof i

I.uciear neactor neguiation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

, , ,,3 yo,

-Washington, DC 20555 A6457

13. TYPE OF AEPORT *E atoo cov E ME O ' tactus.ne astest

5. SUFPLEVENTA av NOTES 14 tre,,e oices

16. AESTR ACT (100. oras or seus The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has recuested that all nuclear plants either operating or under construction submit a response of compliancy with r .NUREG-0612, " Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plante." EG&G Idaho, Inc.,

has contracted with the NRC to evaluate the responses of those plants presently' under construction. This report contains EG&G's evaluation and recommendations for Wm. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1. ~

i 17. <E Y WOR DS AND DOCUMENT AN ALYSIS 17e OESC AiPTOR$

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i 17e s0ENTIFIE AS OPEN ENCE o TER'.'S i

18 AV AILABILITY ST ATEMENT '9 SEcumTV CLASS tre.s recorrt 21 NO CF PAGES Make available'only as specifically approved Unclassified ra.s .,y, 22 eniCE

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