ML20085H181

Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants,Zimmer Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1 (Phase Ii), Draft Technical Evaluation Rept

ML20085H181
Person / Time
Site:	Zimmer
Issue date:	08/31/1983
From:	Shaber C, Stickley T EG&G, INC.
To:	NRC
Shared Package
ML20085H183	List: ML20085H181
References
CON-FIN-A-6457, REF-GTECI-A-36, REF-GTECI-SF, RTR-NUREG-0612, RTR-NUREG-612, TASK-A-36, TASK-OR NUDOCS 8309060440
Download: ML20085H181 (28)

Text

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ENCLOSURE

__ CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS

-- WM. H. ZIMMER NUCLEAR POWER STATION--UNIT I (PHASE II)

DocketNo.[50-358]

Author C. R. Shaber Principal Technical Investigator T. H. Stickley Published August 1983 EG&G Idr.ho, Inc.

Icaho Falls, Idaho 83415 Frepared for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Under DOE Contract No. DE-AC07-76ID01570 FIN No. A6457 XA Copy Has' Been Sent tom yA yA o

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ABSTRACT The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has requested that all nuclear plants, either operating or under construction, submit a response of compliancy with NUREG-0612, " Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants." EG&G Idaho, Inc., has contracted with the NRC to evaluate the

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responses of those plants presently under construction. This report contains EG&G's evaluation and recommendations for Wm. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station No. I for the requirements of Sections 5.1.4, 5.1.5, and 5.1.6 of NUREG-0612 (Phase II). Section 5.1.1 (Phase I) was covered in a separate report [1].

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EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

1 Wm. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station No. I does not totally comply with the guid.tlines of NUREG-0612. In general, compliance is insufficient in the following areas:

o Hoists without acceptable justification for exemption from NUREG 0612 require presentation of additional information to show that they meet the requirements of NUREG 0612 Article 5.1.4 guideline Appendix A. Included are Items 101 Auxiliary hoist, Items 108, 109, and 114.

o The justification for exemption of hoist Item 301 is based, in part, on unacceptable Administrative controls. Provision of information on physical / mechanical devices to accomplish this is needed.

o The Fuel Transfer Canal Shield device now under construction should have prompt attention to assure that the requirements of ANSI N14.6 d? sign, fabrication and tests are met.

o There is insufficient information on seven of the lifting '

devices, not specially designed, to show ccepliance with the ,

requirements of NUREG 0522 Article 5.1.6.

o Action should be taken, and reported. to show that new crane Items 117 and 120 meet NUREG 0554.

o Information, on interfacing lift points of critical loads, generally fail to show that they meet either of the options of NUREG 0612 Article 5.1.6.

The main report contains recommendations which will aid in bringing j the above items into compliance with the appropriate guidelines.

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CONTENTS ABSTRACT ............................................................. 11 EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

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1. INTRODUCTION .................................................... I 1.1 Purpose of Review ..................................'...... I 1.2 Generic Background ........................................ I 1.3 Plant-Specific Background ................................. 3

2. EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS .................................. 4 2.1 Overview .................................................. 4 2.2 Heavy Load Overhead Handling Systems ...................... 4 2.3 Guidelines ................................................ 4

3. CONCLUDING

SUMMARY

.............................................. 21 3.1 Guideline Recommendations ....... ......................... 21 3.2 Additignal Recommendations ................................ 23 3.3 Summary ................................................... 23

4. REFERENCES ......................... ............................ 24 TABLES 2.1 All Cranes or Overhead Load-Handling Systems .................... 5 2.2 Main Reactor Building Crane 110 Ton Hook ........................ 16 2.3 Li f ti n g Poi nt Sa fety Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 3.1 NUREG-0612 Objectives Compliance Matrix ......................... 22 iv

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CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS WM. H. ZIMMER NUCLEAR POWER STATION--UNIT 1 (PHASE II)

1. INTRODUCTION

, 1.1 Purpose of Review This technical evaluation report documents the EG&G Idaho, Inc.,

t review of general lead-handling policy and procedures at Wm. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station Unit 1. This evaluation was performed with the objective of assessing conformance to the general load handling guidelines of NUREG-0612, " Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants" [2], Sections 5.1.4, 5.1.5, and 5.1.6. This constitutes Phase II of a two phase evaluation. Phase I assesses conformance to Section 5.1.1 of NUREG-0612 and was documented in a separate report

[1].

1.2 Generic Background Generic Technical Activity. Task A-36 was established by the U.S.

Nuclear Reg:ulatory Csmmissior. (NRC) staff to systemstitally examine  ;

staff licensing criteria and the adequacy of measures in effect at operating nuclear power plants to assure the safe handling of heavy loads and to recommend necessary changes to these rieasures. This ,

act1vity was initiated by a letter issued by the NRC staff on May 17, 1978 [3], to all power reactor applicants, requesting information concerning the control of heavy loads near spent fuel.

The results of Task A-36 were reported in NUREG-0612, " Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants." The staff's conclusion from this evaluation was that existing measures to control the handling of heavy loads at operating plants, although providing protection from certain potential problems, do not adequately cover the major causes  :

of load-handling accidents and should be upgraded.  ;

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In order to upgrade measures for the control of heavy loads, the staff developed a series of guidelines designed to achieve a two phase objective using an accepted approach or protection philosophy. The first phase of the objective, achieved through a set of general guidelines identified in NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.1, is to ensure that all load-handling systems at nuclear power plants are designed and operated such that their probability of failure is uniformly small and appropriate for the critical tasks in which they are employed. The second phase of the staff's objective, achieved through guidelines

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identified in NUREG-0612, Articles 5.1.2 through 5.1.5, is to ensure that, for load-handling systems in areas where their failure might result in significant consequences, either (a) features are provided, in addition to those required for all load-handling systems, to ensure that the potential for a load drop is extremely small (e.g., a single-failure proof system) or (b) conservative evaluations of load-handling accidents indicate that the potential consequences of t

any load drop are acceptably small. Acceptability of accident consequences 1,s quantified in NUREG-0612 into four accident analysis evaluation criteria as follows:

o " Releases of radioactive material that may result from damage to spent fuel based on ec1:ulations involving accidental dropping cf a postulated heavy load produce doses tht are well within 10 CFR Part 100 limits of 300 rem thyroid, 25 rem whole body (analyses should show that doses are equal to or less than 1/4 of Part 100 limita);

o " Damage to fuel and fuel storage racks based on calculations invorving accidental dropping of a postulated heavy load does not result in a configuration of the fuel such that k,ff is larger than 0.95; o " Damage to the reactor vessel or the spent fuel pool based on calculations of damage following accidental dropping of a

! postulated heavy load is limited so as not to result in water 2

leakage that could uncover the fuel, (makeup water provided to overcome leakage should be from a borated source of adequate concentration if the water being lost is borated); and o " Damage to. equipment in redundant or dual safe shutdown paths, based on calculations assuming the accidental dropping of a postulated heavy load, will be limited so as not'to result in

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loss of required safe shutdown functions."

T- The approach used to develop the staff guidelines for minimizing the potential for a load drop was based on defense in depth. This plan includes proper operator training, equipment design, and maintenance, coupled with safe load paths and crane interlock devices restricting movement over critical areas.

Staff guidelines resulting frcm the foregoing a're tabulated in Section 5 of NUREG-0612.

1.3 plant-Specific Background On December 22, 1980, the NRC issued a letter. [4]'to Cincinnati Gas and Electric Co., tne applicant f or Wm. H. Zir.cer Nuclear Power Station Unit I requesting that the applicant review provisions for.

handling and control of heavy loads at Ym. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power ,

Station Unit 1, evaluate these provisions with respect to thG guidalines of NUREG-C612, and provide certain additional ir. formation to be used for an independent determination of conformance to these guidelines. Cincinnati Gas and Electric Co. provided responses to this request on May 13,1981,[5], June 24,1981,[6], October 7, 1982

[7],andJune 2, 1983 [8]. ' ~

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2. EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

(_ 2.1 Overview

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The following sections summarize Cincinnati Gas and Electric Co.'s

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re' view of heavy load handling at Wm. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station Unit I accompanied by EG&G's evaluation, conclusio6s, and recommendations to the applicant for bringing the facilities more completely into compliance with the intent of NUREG-0612.

2.2 Heavy Load Overhead Handling Systems Table 2.1 presents the applicant's IIst of overhead handling systems

.which are subject to the criteria of NUREG-0612. The applicant has

.. indicated that the weight of a heavy load for the facilities as 1000 pounds per the NUREG-0612 definition.

2.3 . Guidelines The basic guide'ines of NUREG 0612 for phase II evaluations are qucted and discussed in the subsections below. Since the criteria of guideline 5.1.2 and 5.1.3 are specific for Pressurized Water Reacters they are not t.ddressed. Wm H, Zimmer NPS Unit I which is a Eoiling Wster Reactor needs to show consistency witn guideline 5.1.5, 5.1. 5 and 5.1.6. .

2.3.1 Reactor Building [NUREG-0612. Article 5.1.41 (1) "The reactor building crane,.and associated lifting devices used for handling the above heavy loads, should satisfy the single-failure proof guidelines of Section 5.1.6 of this report.

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J(2) "The effects of heavy i load crops in the reactor building should be analyzed to show that the evaluation criteria of s_. Section 5.1 are satisfied. The loads analyzed should i include: sh.ield plugs, drywell head, reactor vessel head;  !

steam dryers and sa'pa,rators; refueling canal plugs and l

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e lhBLE 2.1 (continued)

(No.) and .

Capacity of Excluded Excluded Cranes -

iten Beans or by Basis by Basis b

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no. purpose or Equipment to be Lif ted lloists (Tons { in Ali 2a in all 4 NONEG 0612 Coassent of EG&ts 302 Londenser Water Box Lay Down 13 /

303 Londenser Water Box (4) 13 /

304 furbine Driven Neactor feed Pumps (2) 10 /

JUS Neactor feed Pumps Turbines (4) 2 /

MI6 Uil Heservoir Cooler and Slabs (2) b /

Jul Condensate Pumps and Boosters b /

308 Emergency Heater Drain Pump 12 /

309 L.P. Hith IA and IB Drain Coolers IA and IB (2) 25 /

309 L.P. HIK5 1A and IB Drain Coolers IA and 18 (2) 25 /

401 Solid Nadwaste Bridge Crane 1-1/2 /

402 Solid Nadwaste Crane Holst and Irelley "A" 1-1/2 /

403 Solid Madwaste Crane Holst and Irelley "B" 1-1/2 /

404 Machine Shopp Bridge Crane 10 /

40$ Decontamination Noam b /

406 Traveling Screen and 5.W.P.S. Bridge Crane 30 /

401 Circ Water Pumps 21 /

408 Cir Water Stop Logs 1 /

409 Circ Water CL2 Storage Tanks 2 /

., 410 fire Water Pumps (2) 1 /

411 Cooling Iower Make-up Water Pumps (2) 5 /

412 Service Water Pumps (2) 8 / Single failure proof design 413 Service Water Stralr.ers 5 /

414 Service Water General Service 8 /

415 Slab Neuuval Nadweste NLDS S /

' 1-1/2 416 Madweste Nacility Vent fan Nemoval /

411 Service Water Pump Motors IA and IB Maintenance 3 /

4 18 Service Water Pump Motors IA and IB Maintenance 3 /

419 Cooling Tower Make-up Water Pump Motor Maintenance 3 /

a. Submittal indicates that load drop will not result in damage to any system required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal. Visual observations were made to verify the physical separallon requirements exist. Also, included are those holsts that are incapable of handling heavy loads.

b. Submittal indicates that while being used under the plant conditions specified the overhead handling system cannot degrade the sh6tdown or decay heat renoval capability of the plant. ,

gates; shielded spent-fuel shipping casks; vessel inspection platform; and any other heavy loads that may be brought over or near safe shutdown equipment as well as fuel in the reactor vessel or the spent-fuel pool. Credit may be taken in this analysis for operation of the Standby Gas Treatment System if facility technical specifications require its operation during periods when the load being analyzed would be handled. The analysis should also conform to the guidelines of Appendix A." .

A. Summary of Applicant's Statements-Load handling devices listed by Item No.100 series are those located in the Reactor Building. Through item by item evaluation many hoisting items have been excluded from the requirements of NUREG 0612 . The evaluations justifying exclusions include:

o the load drop will not result in damage to any system required for plant shutdown, or decay heat removal o physical separation exists between the load impact point and safety related equipment o lifting devices being unable to handle a " heavy load" o load drop cannot degrade the shutdown or decay heat removal capacity o single failure proof design was used o the handling device is not used for lifting (pulling winch) o the item is not used except when plant is in cold shutdown o use of the hoist requires prior isolation of equipment to be handled 7

o Architect engineering analysis shows the load drop cannot penetrate intervening floors to effect safety related equipment o redundant flow paths prevent interruption of required services.

The Reactor Building hoist units which Cincinnati Gas and Electric Co. identifies that must meet NUREG 0612 criteria are Units; 101, 105, 109, 114, 116, 118, and 119.

Information presented on these units to show compliance with NUREG 0612 Guideline 5.1.4 is given individually.

o Item 101 Reactor Building crane 110 ton capacity hoist is single failure proof. Fifteen pages, including six of special drawings are excerpted from the Final Safety Analysis Report to present factual design data to show that the parameters given in NUREG 0554 for single failure proof cranes does exist.

o Item 101 Reactor Building crane 10 ton capacity hoist does not meet the single failure proof criteria. Its use is limited to a maximum load of one fuel assembly and handling tool when operating over the spent fuel pool. It is used for hoisting new fuel, replacement control rods, fuel channels and incore detector strings (from equipment access building to refueling floor),

transport of new fuel shipping crates, and to move loads from the west wall to a position for attachment to the main crane hook.

o Item 105, 2 ton electric hoist for relief and safety valve maintenance, VP cooler units. The two loads to be handled are two tons each and introduce risk, if dropped, to the RH line shutdown cooling. Amelioration of the risk is acceptable due to system redundancy and 8

l separation that precludes loss of capability of the  !

system to perform its safety related functions in the event of a load drop.

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! o Item 109 a 24.45 ton crane for handling pump motors.

The load, if dropped, introduces risk to the recirculation loop piping. No information is given on l~ control for the risk. More review is required.

o Item 114, a 2.5 ton, powered chain hoist for handling a one ton valve bonnet on the shutdown cooling system and

! a one half ton recirculation flow control valve

! actuator. These are reported as, "not a heavy load."

This is contrary to the description of a heavy load as l quoted in 2.2 above. More review is required.

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j o Item 116, a 6 ton chain HGT chain hoist for handling the Drywell Access Hatch. This load, if dropped, will not impact any safety related equipment.

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o Item 118, a 4 ton electric powered hoist for handling l floor slabs, pump motors and impe11ers in the low j.

pressure core spray area. Loads range from 3 to 3.5 tons. These loads if dropped introduce risk to the RHR pump area. The risk is considered acceptable due to l system redundancy and separation that precludes the l capability of the system from performing its safety related functions.

1 o Item 119, three 4 ton electric powered hoists for handling the floor slabs, pump motors and pump impe11ers of 2 to 2.5 ton over the LPCS pump or other RHR pump. Risk ameliorations is acceptable due to system redundancy and separation that precludes loss of capability of the system to perform its safety related functions.

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B. EG&G Evaluation -

The Item 101, 110 ton crane single failure proof design is consistent with the NUREG 0612, Sec. 5.1.4 option (1) requiring that single failure proof guidelines in NUREG 0612 Sec. 5.1.6 be followed:

The Auxiliary hoist of Item 101, and Items 109, and 114, provide information. in terms of, " Hazard Elimination Catego ry." Since these items are rot single failure proof they should meet the NUREG 0612 Section 5.1.4 option (2) which requires analysis as given in NUREG 0612 Appendix A.

Also, Item 108, a 20 ton electric hoist used for the main steam hatch slab and isolation valves was discussed in the EG&G Phase I submittal, it is believed to be excluded with insufficient justification, e.g., Administrative Controls, and should be covered herein.

f C. EG&G Conclusions and Recommendations The main hoist Item 101 reportedly meets the single failure proof criteria and is consistent with Guideline 5.1.4. The l other Reactor Building handling systems not excluded from applicability of NUREG 0612 require a more detailed i presentation of facts to show they are consistent with the 5.1.4 guidelines (Appendix A-1).

2.3.2 Other Areas [NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.51 l (1) "If safe shutdown equipment are beneath or directly adjacent to a potential travel load path of overhead handling systems, (i.e., a path not restricted by limits of crane l travel or by mechanical stops or electrical interlocks) one of the following should be satisfied in addition to

satisfying the general guidelines of Section 5.1.1

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(a) The crane and associated lifting devices should conform to the single-failure proof guidelines of Section 5.1.6 of this report;

_O_R (b) If the load drop could impair the operation of l equipment or cabling associated with retvndant or dual l safe shutdown paths, mechanical stops or eiectrical interlocks should be provided to prevent movement of loads in proximity to these redundant or dual safe shutdown equipment. (In this case, credit should not be taken for intervening floors unless justified by analysis.)

9R (c) The effects of load drops have been analyzed and the results indicate that damage to safe shutdown equipment would not preclude operation of sufficient equipment to achieve safe shutdown. Analyses should conform to the guidelines of Appendix A, as applicable.

(2) "Where the safe shutdown equipment has a ceiling separating it from an overhead handling system, an alternative to Section 5.1.5(1) above would be to show by analysis that the largest postulated load handled by the handling system would not penetrate the ceiling or cause spalling that could cause failure of the safe shutdown equipment."

A. Summary of Applicant's Statements 4

The comprehensive tabulation of all overhead handling systems at Wm. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station lists by Item Number 37 systems "in other areas." This list includes 61 hoists. Justifications for exclusion from the requirements of NUREG 0612 are providad to delete all of these Items.

B. EG&G Evaluation The justifications for exclusion are given on each separate item. These indicate that the evaluations are consistent with the exclusion requirements with one exception, Item No. 301. The submittal data relative to Item 301 11

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indicates that it consists of two overhead traveling bridge cranes in the Main Turbine Building. The large hook is 110 ton capacity and the smaller hook is 25 ton capacity.

The justification for exclusion is dependent upon administrative restrictions, but even then, handles loads of 24 tons. The guidelines allowed in NUREG 0612 Article 5.1.5 for a crane that is not single failure proof are'not sufficiently addressed to show that the guideline is met.

C. EG&G Conclusions and Recommendations The requirement options concerning Item 301 as given in 2.3.2 (1) b or c and 2.3.2 (2) above are not addressed.

Provide information that shows compliance with the guideline. For example, are electrical interlocks used to prevent crane use when the main steam line valves are open?

Are there mechanical stops to control load travel to the area defined by rows L and R and Columns 16 and 24?

2.3.3 Single-Failure-Proof Handling Systems [NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.6]

(1) " Lifting Devices:

(a) Special lifting devices that are used for heavy loads in the area where the crane is to be upgraded should meet ANSI N14.6-1978, " Standard For Special Lifting Devices for Shipping Containers Weighing 10,000 Pounds (4500 kg) or More For Nuclear Materials," as specified in Section 5.1.1(4) of this report except that the handling device should also comply with Section 6 of ANSI N14.6-1978. If only a single lifting device is provided instead of dual devices, the special lifting device should have twice the design safety factor as required to satisfy the guidelines of Section 5.1.1(4). However, loads that have been evaluated and shown to satisfy the evaluation criteria of Section 5.1 need not have lifting devices that also comply with Section 6 of ANSI N14.6.

(b) Lifting devices that are not specially designed and that are used for handling heavy loads in the area where the crane is to be upgraded should meet l

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ANSI B30.9-1971, " Slings" as specified in Section 5.1.1(5) of this report, except that one of the following should also be satisfied unless the effects of a drop of the particular load have been analyzed and shown to satisfy the evaluation criteria of Section 5.1:

(1) Provide dual or redundant slings or lifting devices such that a single component failure or malfunction in the sling will not result in uncontrolled lowering of the load;

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_ (ii) In selecting the proper sling, the load used should be twice what is called for in meeting Section 5.1.1(5) of this report.

(2) "New cranes should be designed to meet NUREG-0554,

" Single-Failure-Proof Cranes for Nuclear Power Plants." For operating plants or plants under construction, the crane should be upgraded in accordance with the implementation guidelines of Appendix C of this report.

(3) " Interfacing lift points such as lifting lugs or cask trunions should also meet one of the following for heavy loads handled in the area where the crane is to be upgraded unless the effects of a drop of the particular load have been evaluated and shown to satisfy the evaluation criteria of Section 5.1:

(a) Provide redundancy or duality such that a single lift point failure will not result in uncontrolled lowering of the load; lift points should have a design safety factor with respect to ultimate strength of five (5) times the maximum combined concurrent static and dynamic load after taking the single lift point failure.

O_R (b) A non-redundant or non-dual lift point system should have a design safety factor of ten (10) times the maximum combined concurrent static and dynamic load."

NOTE: Since the guideline of 2.3.3 requests information on several things, the Summary of Applicants Statement, the EG&G Evaluation and the Conclusions--Recommendations concerning each of the things will be addressed for each in A, B, and C below, i

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A. Summa ~ry of Applicant's Statements For (1)(a) Special lifting devices the Applicant identifies  !

the reactor vessel head strongback and the steam / dryer moisture separator strongback. Both devices are used as part of the Reactor Building Crane Item 101, which is single failure proof. The reactor vessel head strongba'ck is used to handle two loads, the drywell head of 65 tons and the reactor head of 65 tons. For these loads four 2.75 inch turnbuckles and four 2.5 inch shackles are used. The load bearing pins, turnbuckles, cables ahd all intervening hardware used in these lift devices are designed as part of the special lifting devices. Locking devices are provided on components that could otherwise inadvertently be disengaged. This strongback has no non load bearing functional parts. The safety factor with respect to yield is 4.1. The safety factor with respect to ultimate material strength is greater than 5.0. Inspection and testing meeting the requirements of ANSI B30.2 and N14.6 is being followed.

The steam dryer moisture separator strongback is used to handle two different loads. The 38 ton steam cryer and the 51 ton steam separator. For these loads a four leg bridle sling of 1-1/2 inch IWRC wire rope and four 2.5 inch turnbuckles are used, the working load rating for each leg is 40,000 pounds, the maximum angle of the sling leg is 25*

from the vertical plane. This strongback and attachments has an estimated weight of 20 tons. It is designed for the environment of its service including immersion in water with temperatures expected when the RPV head is removed. Design safety factor is greater than 3.3 with respect to yield and l greater than 5.0 with respect to ultimate material l l

. strength. The design provides allowance for simple motions required to facilitate remote engagement. '

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l . 1 A " Fuel Transfer Canal Shield" is under fabrication and will i

use a special lifting device it will be evaluated to see that N14.6 requirements are met.

For (1)(b), lifting devices, that are not specially designed and not shown to be exempt by justifying exclusion from

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NUREG 0612, Section 5.1, the option of using twice what is called for in Section 5.1.1 (5) of NUREG 0612 is used.

e.g., twice the safety factor of 5 based on static and dynamic load. The loads requiring devices to meet this criteria is given in Table 2.2 (CG&E Table 1).

For (2) concerning new cranes only Item 117 an overhead handling system for an undervessel service crane, and Item 201 an overhead handling system for removing the high pressure feedwater heaters from their cubicle, have not been purchased. Item 306, two 5 ton overhead cranes for use in servicing the main turbine oil cooler, is not yet installed, but the load impact area for Item 306 contains no safe shutdown or decay heat removal system.

For (3) concerning interfacing lift points, the information submitted is given in Table 2.3 below.

l B. EG&G Evaluation 1

For (1)(a) special lifting devices, the information indicates that the material and design requirements meet the engineering specifications and fabrication requirements, and tests were followed. Twice the design safety factors

. required to meet NUREG 0612 Section 5.1.1 (4) are indicated by the information given. These comments apply to both of the specially designed strongbacks. l l

For (1)(b) lifting devices that are not specially designed, the option 11 is used. The evaluation of the details to 15

TABLE 2.2 (CG&E Table 1) MAIN REACTOR BUILDING CRANE--110 TON HOOK Load Weight Load Identification (Tons) Designated Lifting Device Reactor Cavity Shield (3) legged bridle sling rated at Plugs (6) 90.0 180 tons Max angle from vert,1 cal plane 44' Dryer Separator Pit (3) 40.0 (2) 2-1/2" shackles Plugs (6) (1) 44.0 2 legged bridle sling, 88 ton rating Max angle from vertical plane 25*

Fuel Pool Shield Plugs (4) 12.0 (1) 1-3/8" shackle, (1) 24 ton rated sling Vertical lift RPV Head Insulation 7.5 Required rigging rated for 15 tons Max angle from vertical plane 35*

RX head Stud Tensioner 4.0 Stud Tensioner Strongback Fuel Pool Gates (1) 5.5 (2) 1-1.2" shackles,11 ton rated 2 legged bridle sling Max angle from vertical plane 10*

Dryer / Separator Pool Gate 23.5 (2) 2" shackle 47 ton rated 2 legged bridle sling Max angle from vertical

$ lane 10*

Shipping Cask Storage 4.0 (2) 1.5" shackles 8 ton rated 2 legged bridle sling.

Max angle from vertical 10*

Reactor Service Platform 6.0 1" 3 legged bridle sling.

Max angle from vertical 35*

Removable 1/2 Ton Jib Crane 4.0 13/8" shackle,13/8" sling Vertical lift i Channel handling Boom 2.0 1 3/8" shackle, 1 3/8" sling Vertical lift 16 l

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TABLE 2.2 (CG&E Table 1) MAIN REACTOR BUILDING CRANE--110 TON HOOK Load Weight Load Identification (Tons) Designated Lifting Device Equipment Hatch Cover ( ) Rigging rated greater. than double static load Refueling Canal Shield 30.0 Strongback, 60 ton rated rigging NOTE: Shackles were selected assuming a minimum breaking strength of six times safe working loads to yield a safety factor of ten between minimum breaking strength and the selected usage. (Does not apply to fuel pool shield plugs as previously described.)

TABLE 2.3 (CG&E Table 2) LIFTING POINT SAFETY FACTORS Weight Location Quantity (tons) Safety Factor Reactor Shield Plug 18 90.0 2.1 Pool Plug 8 44.0 1.7 Refueling Slot Plug 4 8.1 10.0 Equipment Hatch (el. 627'-9" East) 16 9.0 3.7 Equipment Hatch (el. 627'-9" West) 8 14.4 2.3 New Fuel Storage Vault Plug 8 4.4 2.0 Pool Gate No. 1 2 5.5 2.2 Pool Gate No. 2A -

2 5.0 2.5 Pool Gate No. 2B 2 7.5 2.2 Pool Gate No. 3 2 26.0 2.3 Skimmer Surge Tank Cover 3 2.2 10.1 NOTE: Actual weights may differ from the rated weights used for laydown area purposes.

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. . 1 support the information given in Table 2.2 reveals both acceptable components and unanswered questions. General information on shackles of the size specified indicate they are sized to meet the Safety Factor of 10 requirement. Also the lifts made with vertical slings indicate suitability ,

when accepting the 5.5 fpm crane speed for dynamic loading, l which is not otherwise addressed.

The unanswered questions are; what is the basis for the bridle sling rating?; how are the extra stresses due to sling angles included and; is any dynamic load considerations included?

For (2) concerning new cranes, Item 117 and Item 201 have not been purchased. The implementation guidelines of NUREG 0612 Appendix C need to be incorporated in purchase specifications. e.g., NUREG 0554. Item 306 is two 5 ton overhead cranes used for servicing the main turbine oil cooler. These cranes are not yet installed, but the load impact area reportedly contains no safe shutdown or decay heat removal system.

For (3) concerning Interfacing lift points there is no indication that redundancy or duality is designed into the systems. Therefore the design safety factor of 10 is the criteria that must be met. Only the Refueling Slot Plug and Skimmer Surge Tank Cover approach the requirement and dynamic loads are not addressed. The loads listed in Table 2.2 and Table 2.3 do not match very well. The number l

I of items, the weights and identifying names are not ,

consistent to each other or to the guideline specifications.

C. EG&G Conclusions and Recommendations For (1)(c.), since the Reactor Building crane travel speed is only 5.5 fpm the dynamic load risk is acceptably low. All 18

other factors are consistent with requirement options allowed in 2.3.3(1)(a). EG&G has no recommendations concerning the two special lifting devices now ready for service.

The Fuel Transfer Canal Shie.d device, under fabrication, which is "to be evaluated to see that ANSI N14.6' requirements are met" prompts concern. The design, fabrication and test requirements of ANSI N14.6 require action before and during construction. Subsequent evaluation will be too late to accomplish the requirements.

Immediate action is recommended to assure that design and fabrication of this device meets the ANSI N14.6 requirements.

For (1)(b), as stated in the evaluation above for these lifting devices, there are questions that must be answered to permit a valid evaluation. The questions raised in the evaluation should be answered for the following load lifting devices:

Reactor cavity shield plugs Dryer--Separator pit plugs RPV head insulation Fuel pool gates Dryer / Separator pool gates Shipping cask storage Reactor service platform For (2), to be consistent with the guideline new crane Items 117 and 201 specifications should meet design requirements of NUREG 0554 or, if construction has been started upgrade specifications of NUREG 0612 Appendix C should be followed.

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The two cranes of Item 306 are reported to involve no load impact risk and would therefore be excluded from the NUREG 0612 requirement. If this is not true, the upgrade of the cranes to NUREG 0612 Appendix C should be followed.

For (3) to be consistent with the guideline either redundancy or duality of the lifting lugs and safety factors of 5 must be shown. Otherwise, it must be shown that a single set of lifting lugs have a safety factor of 10.

Also, the load information of Table 2.2 and Table 2.3 should be consistent with each other to assure correct load identification. Submit information to show compliance with one or the other of these options. It is needed for the loads of Table 2.2 except the two presently listed in Table 2.3 with safety factors of 10 or more.

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3. CONCLUDING

SUMMARY

3.1 Guideline Recommendations o In 2.3.1, Reactor Building Crane and Associated lifting devices used for handling heavy loads, the Item 101, 110 ton crane main hoist is consistent with requirements. The Item 101 Auxiliary hoist, Items 108, 109, and 114, require additional analysis and data submitted to show that they are consistent with the requirements of NUREG 0612 Article 5.1.4 guidelines Appendix A.

o In 2.3.2 other area hoists generally are excluded using justifications consistent with guideline requirements, except for hoist Item 301. More factual information on the l physical / mechanical controls rather than Administrative control is needed for it, i

o In 2.3.3 Single Failure Proof Handling Systems are discussed.

First, on Lifting Devices:

(a) Special lifting devices; the Reactor Vessel Head Strongback and Steam / Dryer Seperator Strongback are consistent with the guideline. The Fuel Transfer Canal Shield device under construction needs prompt attention to assure that the NUREG N14.6 design, fabrication and Test requirements are met (b) Insufficient information and unanswered questions exist on seven lifting devices that are not specially designed.

Second, The new cranes Item 117 and 120 specifications should be shown to meet NUREG 0554.

Third, adequate information, to show compliance with one or the ,

other of the options, is needed for all of the interfacing lift points, except the two presently consistent with the minimum  !

safety factor of 10.

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Table 3.1 22

3.2 Additional Recommendations None 3.3 Summary Significant progress on heavy Load Case Review has been made. The infermation presented justifying exclusion of many hoisting items from the requirements of NUREG 0612 is presented well. Timely presentation of the needed additional information recommended from the EG&G review can materially aid in completing the Heavy Load Case Review task.

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4. REFERENCES

1. EG&G-HS-6350 July 1983, Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants, Wm. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station (Phase I) C. R. Shaber, T. H. Stickley.

2. NUREG-0612, Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants, NRC.

3. V. Stello, Jr. (NRC), Letter to all applicants.

Subject:

. Request for Additional Information on Control of Heavy Loads Near Spent Fuel, NRC, l 17 May 1978.

4. USNRC, Letter to Cincinnati Gas and Electric Co. Subject NRC Request for Additional Information on Control of Heavy Loads Near Spent fuel, NRC, 22 December 1980.

5. E. A. Borgman, Letter to Mr. Harold Denton, US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, dated May 13, 1981, referencing Wm. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station Unit 1--Control of Heavy Loads.

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6. E. A. Borgman, Letter to Mr. Harold Denton, US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, dated May 13, 1981, referencing Wm. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station Unit 1--Supplemental Information in response to NRC letter of December 22, 1980 regaroing Control of Heavy Loads.

7. B. Ralph Sylvia, Letter to Mr. Harold Denton, US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, dated October 7, 1982, referencing Wm. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station Unit 1 Control of Heavy Loads.

8. J. Williams, Jr., Letter to Mr. Harold Denton, US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, dated June 2, 1983, referencing Wm.

H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station Unit 1--Supplementary Information--Heavy Loads.

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