Text

Proposed Tech Specs,Revising AOTs for Inoperable Ssws Pumps, for Inoperable Safety Acs Pumps,For Inoperable EDGs & Allowing Online Maint of EDGs
	ML20071M134
Person / Time
Site:	Hope Creek
Issue date:	07/27/1994
From:	; Public Service Enterprise Group
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20071M126	List: ML20071M122; ML20071M134;
References
	NUDOCS 9408040068
	Download: ML20071M134 (17)
	v • d • e

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ATTACKKENT 2 LICENSE AMENDMENT APPLICATION, LCR 94-08, 94-11 & 94-12 NLR-N94106 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NPF-57 HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION ,

DOCKET NO. 50-354 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGES WITH PEN AND INK CHANGES The following Technical Specifications for Facility Operating License No. NPF-57 are affected by this license amendment request:

Technical Specification Page 3.7.1.1 3/4 7-1 ,

3.7.1.2 3/4 7-3 3.8.1.1 3/4 8-1 -

4.8.1.1.2.h 3/4 8-6 ,

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9408040068 940727

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3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS l I

3/4.7.1 SERVICE WATER SYSTEMS SAFETY AUXILIARIES COOLING SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.1.1 At least the following independerlt safety auxiliaries codling system (SACS) subsystems, with each subsystem comprised of:

a. Two OPERABLE SACS pumps, and

b. An OPERABLE flow path consisting of a closed loop through the SACS heat exchangers and SACS pumps and to associated safety related equipment shall be OPERABLE:

a. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1, 2 and 3, two subsystems.

b. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 4, 5, and ** the subsystems associated with systems and components required OPERABLE by Specification 3.4.0.1, j 3.4.9.2, 3.5.2, 3.8.1.2, 3.9.11.1 and 3.9.11.2.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and **. l I

ACTION:

a. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1, 2, or 3: :

1.a. With one SACS pump cr heat exc inoperable, restore the inoperable pump cr h :t exchanger o OPERABLE status within 3o h -+ 72 hvui s*'or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 MfRT A 5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within theG.v following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .* @**

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2. With one SACS subsystem otherwise inoperable, realign +the affected diesel generators to the OPERABLE SACS subsystem within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months , 5 and restore the inoperable subsystem to OPERABLE status with at !

least one OPERABLE pump and heat exchanger within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be ;

in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in COLD .

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(* 9'"~ .* W S' ** SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .*-M h.pr.ble per4 -

9-"5 3. ** With one SACS pump cr heat exchangordn each subsystem inoperable, OQy(mf

"" " "

7 i =:dicitly initi t+-mes:;re; to pl:ce th: =itMn at least HOT l r

- SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within g the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .*W

" hithbothSACSsubsystemsotherwiseinoperable,immediately 14 . l initiate measures to place the unit in at least HOT SHUTDOWN <

within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN

in the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

t

- "Whenever both SACS subsystems are inoperable, if unable to attain COLD SHUTDOWN as required by this ACTION, maintain reactor coolant temperature as low as practical by use of alternate heat removal methods. '

- When handlin

% A, le.y w. g irradiated y,$.\ y w efuel

. o in Aw theeas;tcondary s.uc c containment.y e rs u. A *y

mm el HOPE CREEK O p "1 ofr/A&r 3 Ses / g/4 7-1 t,, o(ce A6t.L use

i INSERT FOR PAGE 3/4 7-1: !

l Insert A l l

b. With one SACS heat exchanger inoperable, restore the heat exchanger to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN with the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

Insert B

b. With one SACS heat exchanger in each subsystem inoperable, '

immediately initiate measures to place the unit in at least i HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN l within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

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l PLANT SYSTEMS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (Continued)

ACTION: (Continued)

b. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 3 or 4 with the SACS subsystem, which hoM wo is associated with an RHR loop required OPERABLE by Specification MG 6+ sr 3.4.9.1 or 3.4.9.2,,. inoperable, declare the associated RHR loop on kee inoperable and take the ACTION required by Specification 3.4.9.1

bar or 3.4.9.2, as applicable.

c. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 4 or 5 with the SACS subsystem, which is associated with safety related equipment required OPERABLE by Speci-fication 3.5.2,yinoperable, declare the associated safety related equipment inoperable and take the ACTION required by Specification 3.5.2.

d. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 5 with the SACS subsystem, which is associated with an RHR loop required OPERABLE by Specification 3.9.11.1 or 3.9.11.2,qinoperable, declare the associated RHR system inoperable and take the ACTION required by Specification 3.9.11.1 or 3.9.11.2, as applicable.

e. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 4, 5, or **, with one SACS subsystem, which is associated with safety related equipment required OPERABLE by Specification 3.8.1.2, inoperable, realign the associated diesel generators within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months to the OPERABLE SACS subsystem, or declare the associated diesel generators inoperable and take the ACTION re-quired by Specification 3.8.1.2. The provisions of Specifica-tion 3.0.3 are not applicable.

f. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 4, 5, or **, with only one SACS pump and heat exchanger and its associated flowpath OPERABLE, restore at least two pumps and two heat exchangers and associated flowpaths to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or, declare the associated safety related equipment inoperable and take the associated ACTION requirements.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.1.1 At least the above required safety auxiliaries cooling system subsystems shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve in the flow path that is not locked, sealed or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.

b. At least once per 18 months during shutdown by verifying that: 1) Each automatic valve servicing safety-related equipment actuates to its correct posit. ion on the appropriate test signal (s), and 2) Each pump starts automatically when its associated diesel generator automati-cally starts.

HOPE CREEK 3/4 7-2

I PLANT SYSTEMS STATION SERVICE WATER SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.1.2 At least the icllowing independent station service water system loops, with each loop comprised of: I

a. Two ')PERABLE station service water pumps, and i

b. An CPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the Delaware ,

River (ultimate heat sink) and transferring the water to the SACS heat -

exchangers, shall be OPERABLE:

a. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1, 2 and 3, two loops. ,

b. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 4, 5 and *, one loop.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and *.

ACTION: e

a. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1, 2, or 3: So

1. With one station service water pump inop ble, restore the in- !

operable pump to OPERABLE status within ays or be in at !

least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN .

within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .** l

2. With one station service water pump in each loop inoperable, restore r at least one inoperable pump to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or

q be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in COLD l'llj' SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . "

h/5 med *W 3. With one station service water system loop otherwise inoperable, l A% At try'ird restore the inoperable station service water system loop to f ofenote 5. ,,, t a. OPERABLE status with at least one OPERABLE pump within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months e rufs mt ,

or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in be' otross e . COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .*M :

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b. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 4 or 5:

With only one station service water pump and its associated flowpath !

OPERABLE, restore at least two pumps with at least one flow path to i OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or declare the associated SACS sub- '

system inoperable and take the ACTION required by Specification 3.7.1.1.

c. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION *:

With only one station service water pump and its associated flowpath OPERABLE, restore at least two pumps with at least one flow path to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or declare the associated SACS sub-system inoperable and take the ACTION required by Specification 3.7.1.1.

' The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

JWhenhandlingirradiatedfuelinthesecondarycontainment.

HOPE CREEK 3/4 7-3

/10 CH6t4(rES To TMW PA(cf IreFO O N d.

PLANT SYSTEMS _s r

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.1.2 At least the above required station service water system loops shall ,

be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power operated or automatic), servicing safety related equipment that is not locked, sealed or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position,

b. At least once per 18 months during shutdown, by verifying that:

1. Each automatic valve servicing non-safety related equipment actuates to its isolation position on an isolation. test signal.

2. Each pump starts automatically when its associated diesel genera-tor automatically starts.

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HOPE CREEK 3/4 7-4 l

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3/4.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3/4.8.1 A.C. SOURCES A.C. SOURCES - OPERATING t I

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.8.1.1 As a minimum, the following A.C. electrical power sources shall be OPERABLE:

a. Two physically independent circuits between the offsite transmission l network and the onsite Class 1E distribution system, and

b. Four separate and independent diesel generat rs, each with:

1. A separate fuel oil day tank containing a minimum of 200 gallons of fuel, )

2. A separate fuel storage system consisting of two storage tanks J containing a minimum of 48,800 gallons of fuel, and {

3. A separate fuel transfer pump for each storage tank.

I APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION:

a. With one offsite circuit of the above required A.C. electrical power sources inoperable, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the remaining A.C.

sources by performing Surveil'ance Requirement 4.8.1.1.1.a within I 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months and at least once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months thereafter. If any diesel l generator has not been successfully tested within the past 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , l demonstrate its OPERABILITY by performing Surveillance Require- ;

f ment 4.8.1.1.2.a.4 and 4.8.1.1.2.a.5 for each such diesel generator l separately within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . Restore the inoperable offsite circuit l to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following '

24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

b. With one diesel generator of the above required A.C. electrical power sources inoperable, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the above required A.C. offsite sources by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.'1.a within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months and at least once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months thereafter. If the diesel

/ generator became inoperable due to any cause other than preplanned

! preventive maintenance or testing, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the remaining diesel generators by performing Surveillance Rectire-ment 4.8.1.1.2.a.4 and 4.8.1.1.2.a.5 separately for each .";el generator within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months

t the inoperable diese' generator W hs, _to OPERABLE status withi M; res orer be in at least HCf SHUTDOWN within the next 12 nours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

c. 'With one offsite circuit of the above required A.C. sources and one diesel generator of the above required A.C. electrical power sources inoperable, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the remaining A.C. sources by performing Survei'llance Requirement 4.8.1.1.1.a within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months and "This test is required to be completed regardless of when the inoperable diesel generator is restored to OPERABILITY.

f HOPE CREEK 3/4 8-1

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (Continued)

ACTION: (Continued) at least once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months thereafter. If a diesel generator became inoperable due to any causes other than preplanned preventive main-tenance or testing, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the remaining OPERABLE diesel generators separately for each diesel generator by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2.a.4 and 4.8.1.1.2.a.5 within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .* Restore at least two offsite circuits and all four of the above required diesel generators to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months from time of the initial loss or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . A successful test (s) of diesel generator OPERABILITY per Sur-veillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2.a.4 and 4.8.1.1.2.a.5 performed under this ACTION statement for the OPERABLE diesel generators satisfies the diesel generator test requirements of ACTION Statement b.

d. With both of the above required offsite circuits inoperable, demon-strate the OPERABILITY of all of the above required diesel generators by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2.a.4 and 4.8.1.1.2.a.5 separately for each diesel generator within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months unless the diesel generators are already operating; restore at least one of the above required offsite circuits to OPERABLE status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months or be in at least HOT SHUTOOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . With only one off-site circuit restored to OPERABLE status, restore at least two offsite circuits to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months from time of initial loss or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . A successful test (s) of diesel generator OPERABILITY per Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2.a.4 and 4.8.1.1.2.a.5 performed under this ACTION statement for the OPERABLE diesel generators satisfies the diesel generator test requirements of ACTION statement a.

e. With two diesel generators of the above required A.C. electrical power sources inoperable, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the above required A.C. offsite sources by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.1.a within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months and at least once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months thereafter and demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the remaining diesel generators by performing Sur-veillance Requirement 4.8.L1.2.a.4 and 4.8.1.1.2.a.5 separately for each diesel generator within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months .* Restore at seast one of the g inoperable diesel generators to OPERABLE status within ours or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN # l within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . -Restere both Of the ineperable diesel '

generators to OPER^BLE stet +s-witMn 72 hcurs 'rcr time of "iti:1 Q 4 css or be ir, at-4 cast MOT SHUTD0hH within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in 1

I "This test is required to be completed regardless of when the inoperable diesel generator is restored to OPERABILITY.

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HOPE CREEK 3/4 8-2

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (Continued)

ACTION: (Continued) 4GLD-SHUT 90WN-w&tW-the fellowing 2d hcur . A successful test (s) of diesel generator OPERABILITY per Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2.a.4 and 4.8.1.1.2.a.5 performed under this ACTION statement for the OPERABLE diesel generators satisfies the diesel generator test re-quirements of ACTION Statements a and b.

f. With two diesel generators of the above required A.C. electrical power sources inoperable, in addition to ACTION e., above, verify within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months that all required systems, subsystems, trains, components, and devices that depend on the remaining diesel generators as a source of emergency power are also OPERABLE; otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUT-DOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

g. With one offsite circuit and two diesel generators of the above re-quired A.C. electrical power sources inoperable, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the remaining A.C. sources by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.1.a within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months and at least once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months thereafter and demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the remaining diesel generators by performing Surveillance Requirements 4.8.1.1.2.a.4 and 4.8.1.1.2.a.5 separately for each diesel generator within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months .*

Restore at least one of the above required inoperable A.C. sources to OPERABLE status within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

Restore the inoperable offsite circuit and both of the inoperable diesel generators to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months from time of initial loss or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

h. With the buried fuel oil transfer piping's cathodic protection system inoperable for more than 30 days, prepare and submit a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within the next 10 days outlining the cause of the malfunction and the plans for restoring the system to OPERABLE status, c

"This test is required to be completed regardless of when the inoperabla diesel generator is restored to OPERABILITY.

HOPE CREEK 3/4 8-3 Amendment No. 45

[do (com no m Ouc.

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ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.8.1.1.1 Each of the above required independent circuits between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class 1E distribution system shall be:

a. Determined OPERABLE at least once per 7 days by verifying correct breaker alignments and indicated power availability, and

b. Demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months during shutdown by transferring, manually and automatically, unit power supply from the normal circuit to the alternate circuit.

4.8.1.1.2 Each of the above required diesel generators shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. In accordance with the frequency specified in Table 4.8.1.1.2-1 on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS by:

1. Verifying the fuel level in the fuel oil day tank.

2. Verifying the fuel level in tae fuel oil storage tank.

3. Verifying the fuel transfer pump starts and transfers fuel from the storage system to the fuel oil day tank.

4. Verifying the diesel starts from ambient conditions and accel-erates to at least 514 rpm in less than or equal to 10 seconds after receipt of the start signal." The generator voltage and frequency shall be 4160 2 420 volts and 60 1 1.2 Hz within 10 seconds after receipt of the start signal. The diesel generator shall be started for this test by using one of the following signals:

a) Manual.

b) Simulated loss of offsite power by itself.

c) Simulated loss of offsite power in conjunction with an ESF actuation test signcl.

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d) An ESF actuation test signal by itself.

5. Verifying the diesel generator is synchronized, loaded to between 4300 and 4400** kw in less than or equal to 130 seconds,"

and operates with thin load for at least 60 minutes.

"The diesel generator start (10 sec) and subsequent loading (130 sec) from ambient conditions shall be performed at least once per 184 days in these surveillance tests. All other engine starts and loading for the purpose of this surveillance testing may be freceded by an eng?ne prelube period and/or other warmup procedures recommenr.ed by the manufacturer so that mechanical stress and wear on the diesel engine is minimized.

- This band is meant as guidance to avoid routine overloading of the engine.

Loads in excess of this band shall not invalidate the test; the loads, however, shall not be less than 4300 kw nor greater than 4430 kw.

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HOPE CREEK 3/4 8-4

t/c (p@JGM To 7*5

()(H,r. Ira F o W d.

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

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l SURVEILLANC2 RFQUIREMENTS (Continued) l 6.

Verifying the diesel generator is aligned to provide staney power to the associated emergency busses.

7. Verifying the pressure in all diesel generator air start I receivers to be greater than or equal to 325 psig.

8. Verifying the lube oil pressure, temperature and differential !

pressure across the lube oil filters to be within manufac- i turer's specifications.

b'. At least once per 31 days by visually examining a sample of lube oil from the diesel engine to verify absence of water.

c. At least once per 31 days and after each operation of the diesel where the period of operation was greater than or equal to I hour by checking for and removing accumulated water from the fuel oil day tank.

d. At I w t once per 92 days by removing accumulated water from the fuel oli storage tanks.

e. At least once per 31 days by performing a functional test on the emergency load sequencer to verify operability.

_ f. At least once per 92 days and from new fuel oil prior to addition to >

the storage tanks by obtaining a sample in accordance with ASTM-04057 and by verifying that the sample meets the following minimum requirements and is tested within the specified time l limits: i

1. As soon as sample is taken or from new fuel prior to addition '

to the storage tank, as aoplicable verify in accordance with thetestsspecifiedinASTM-0975-7Ythatthesamplehas:

a) A water and sediment content of less than or equal to 0.05 volume percent. !

b) A kinematic viscosity 0 40*C of greater than or equal to !

1.9 contistokes, but less than or equal to 4.1 contistakes-or a Saybolt Second Universal (55U) viscosity at 100*F of .

greater than or equal to 32 55U but less than or equal to 40.1 550.. t c) A specific gravity as specified by the manufacturer as API '

gravity 9 60'F of greater than or equal to 28 degrees but less than or equal to 42 degrees. 1

2. Within one week after obtaining the sample, verify an impurity l level of less than 2 og of insolubles per 100 al. when tasted in accordance with ASTM-D2274-70.

HOPE CREEK 3/4 8-5 Asendment No. 22 i i i 1 __ _ ____ _ _ . . _ . _ . -- - - - -" -

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ELECTRICAL POMER SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE RE001REMENTS (Continued)

3. Within 2 weeks after obtaining the sample, verify that the other properties specified in Table 1 of ASTM-0975-77 and Regulatory Guide 1.137, Position 2.a, are met when tested in accordance with ASTM-0975-77.

g. Deleted +

4 t% cg ch, b y*

h. At least once per M -menths f, during shutdown, by;

1. Subjecting the diesel to an inspection in accordance with procedures prepared in conjunction with its manufacturer's recommendations for this class of standby service.

2. Verifying the diesel generator capability to reject a load of greater than or equal to that of the RHR pump motor (1003 kW) for each diesel generator while maintaining voltage at 4160 1 420 volts and frequency at 60 1.2 Hz.

3. Verifying the diesel generator capability to reject a load of 4430 kW without tripping. The generator voltage shall not exceed 4785 volts during and following the load rejection.

4. Simulating a loss of offsite power by itself, and:

a) Verifying loss of power is detected and deenergization of the emergency busses and load shedding from the emergency busses.

b) Verifying the diesel generator starts

on the auto-start signal, energizes the emergency busses with permanently connected loads within 10 seconds after receipt of the start signal, energizes the autoconnected shutdown loads through the load sequencer and operates for greater than or equal to 5 minutes while its generator is loaded with the '

shutdown loads. After energization, the steady state I voltage and frequency of the emergency busses shall be maintained at 4160 i 420 volts and 60 i 1.2 Hz during this ,

l test.

This diesel generator start (10 sec) and subsequent loading (130 sec) from ambient conditions may be preceded by an engine prelube period and/or other warmup procedures recommended by the manufacturer so that mechanical stress and wear on the diesel engine is minimized.

For any start of a diesel generator, the diesel must be loaded in accordance with the mai.ufacturer's recommendations.

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Amendment No, 65 HOPE CREEK 3/4 8-6

ATTACHMENT 3 LICENSE AMENDMENT APPLICATION, LCR 94-08, 94-11 & 94-12 NLR-N94106 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NPF-57 HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION DOCKET NO. 50-354 i

PROBABILISTIC SAFETY ASSESSMENT ANALYSES a

t 4

3 d

a EEQBABILISTIC BAFETY ASSESSMENT (PSA) ANALYSES PSA analyses were performed to determine the increase in risk resulting from the Technical Specification changes discussed in this LCR. Risk is defined here as the frequency of core damage multiplied by the time interval over which the plant is exposed to a condition. For example, a Core Damage Frequency (CDF) of 1.29 E-5/ year corresponds to a CDF of 3.53 E-8/ day. The " risk" of maintaining this condition over a period of 30 days would therefore be:

3.53 E-8/ day

30 days = 1.06 E-6 The increased AOTs for the SSWS, SACS and EDG systems each represent an increase in plant risk, but as this analysis shows, the risk increase is acceptable. For this analysis, risk increases of 5 1E-6 were determined to be insignificant and were used as a criterion to determine if an AOT extension is acceptable.

This attachment is divided into three sections. The first is a summary of the changes to the PSA models that have occurred since the HCGS Individual Plant Examination (IPE) was submitted to the NRC. The second section is a description of the methodology used to calculate the risk increases for this LCR, along with one example of a risk increase calculation. The third section presents the tesults of all of the PSA analyses for this LCR.

Changes To PBA Models Since The HCGS IPE Bubmittal:

The HCGS IPE, the PSE&G response to GL 88-20, was submitted to the NRC in May 1994. The baseline CDP reported in the HCGS IPE was 4.58 E-5/ year. However, as stated in the Suggestions for Plant Improvement (Section 6.4) of that report, PSE&G had committed to review and finalize Safety Auxiliaries Cooling System (SACS) and Station Service Water System (SSWS) analyses to remove modeling conservatism. This work was completed, and the following changes were made to the SACS and SSWS fault tree success criteria:

A SSWS loop is successful if at least one pump (and associated flowpath) is successful in providing its design flow. The HCGS IPE success criterion for a SSWS loop was that both pumps (and associated flowpaths) needed to provide their design flow.

A SACS subsystem is successful if both pumps and both SACS /SSWS heat exchangers (and associated flowpaths) in that subsystem are successful, or if one pump in each SACS subsystem (with both heat exchangers per loop) are successful, provided that operators are successful in manipulating SACS loads to allow such a configuration. The HCGS IPE success 1 of 4 I

criterion for a SACS subsystem was that both pumps and both heat exchangers (and associated flowpaths) in one subsystem needed to perform their design function.

A few other minor changes were made to the PSA fault tree and event tree models used in the HCGS IPE. However, these changes are at a very low level of detail, and are not relevant to the analyses presented here.

The effect of the changes to the PSA models is that the HCGS CDF is calculated to be 1.29 E-5/ year, a factor 3.5 times lower than the CDP reported in the HCGS IPE. This change is attributed to the improvement that the revised SACS and SSWS success criteria have on the frequency of Station Blackout (SBO) events. In the !

HCGS IPE, the CDF attributable to SBO was calculated to be 3.38 E-5/ year, or 73.7% of the total CDF. With the revised PSA calculetion, the CDF attributable to SBO is calculated to be 2.33 ,

E-6/ year, or 18.1% of the total CDF.

Methodology For Risk Increase Calculations:

Risk is defined as the frequency of core damage multiplied by the time interval over which the plant is exposed to a condition.

For example, the HCGS CDF of 1.29 E-5/ year corresponds to a CDP of 3.53 E-8/ day. The " risk" of operating the HCGS over a period of 30 days would therefore be:

3.53 E-8/ day

30 days = 1.06 E-6.

This risk is considered the baseline risk of plant operation.

When a piece of equipment credited in the PSA is inoperable for a time period, there is an increase in risk over the baseline risk.

This PSA analysis calculates the Risk Increase (RI) associated with the AOT extensions described in this LCR.

The PSA software used by PSE&G calculates CDF as a yearly frequency. With this software, it is possible to select a piece of equipment (e.g., a SSWS pump) and assign it a failure rate of 1.0. The PSA software then calculates a conditional CDF, given that the specified equipment is unavailable for one year.

To calculate the RI of extending the AOT for equipment, it is appropriate to calculate a yearly conditional CDF (given that the equipment is unavailable), convert this to a daily CDP, and multiply this frequency by the exposure time (the duration of the AOT). The calculation of RI for SSWS pump AP502 is shown below:

CDF when SSWS pump AP502 is unavailable for one year =

1.32 E-5/ year; A CDF (yearly) = 1.32 E-5/ year - 1.29 E-5/ year = 3.0 E-7/ year 2 of 4 1

l l

A CDF (daily) = 3.0 E-7/ year

1 yr / 365 days = 8.22 E-10/ day RI (30 days) = 8.22 E-lO/ day

30 days = 2.47 E-8 An RI is then calculated for SSWS pumps BP502, CP502 and DP502 For this analysis, an RI of 5 1E-6 was used as a criterion to determine if the AOT extension is acceptable. If the RI for a 30 day AOT for each of the SSWS pumps is $ lE-6, then the 30 day AOT is acceptable.

When determining if an RI is acceptable for an AOT, the worst case component is always considered. In the PSA fault tree models for a normally operating system (e.g., SACS and SSWS), it is necessary to assume that certain portions of the system are normally operating and others are in standby. For example, in the !! CGS SSWS fault tree model, it is assumed that SSWS pumps A and B are normally operating, and pumps C and D are in standby.

Therefore, SSWS pumps C and D have some failure modes that differ from the failure modes of the other pumps. This sometimes has the effect of overstating the importance of some components and understating the importance of others. For this reason, and also since differences in component importance are often in fact true, the worst caso component in terms of RI is always conservatively considered when comparing the RI with the 1E-6 criterion.

It should be noted that the values presented in the following results section represent the increase in risk attributable to establishment of the new AOT. It does not represent the increase in risk attributable to the difference between the old AOT and the new AOT. That risk increase would be less. It should also be noted that risk increase values were derived assuming that the particular component was out of service for the full AOT. During plant operation, however, it is expected that a component would be out-of-service (i.e., to perform preventative maintenance) for only a fraction of what the proposed AOTs permit. Thus, the actual risk increase would again be less than following results indicate.

Results of PSA Analyses:

A. Station Service Water System:

1. Increase AOT for one pump inoperable to 30 days RI (30 days) for SSWS pump AP502 = 2.47 E-8 RI (30 days) for SSWS pump BP502 = 1.64 E-8 RI (30 days) for SSWS pump CP502 = 4.40 E-8 RI (30 days) for SSWS pump DP502 = 3.36 E-9 The limiting SSWS pump is CP502, with a RI (30 days) = 4.40 E-8.

Since this is less than 1E-6, this RI is considered acceptable.

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o .

B. Safety Auxiliaries Cooling Systems

1. Increase AOT for one pump inoperable to 30 days RI (30 days) for SACS pump AP210 = 2.47 E-8 RI (30 days) for SACS pump BP210 = 2.47 E-8 RI (30 days) for SACS pump CP210 = 2.47 E-8 RI (30 days) for SACS pump DP210 = 2.47 E-8 The RI (30 days) for each SACS pump = 2.47 E-8. Since this is less than 1E-6, this RI is considered acceptable.

2. Increase AOT for one SACS pump in each loop inoperable to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months RI (72 hours) for SACS pump A/BP210 = 6.64 E-7 ,

RI (72 hours) for SACS pump A/DP210 = 6.64 E-7 RI (72 hours) for SACS pump B/CP210 = 6.64 E-7 RI (72 hours) for SACS pump C/DP210 = 6.64 E-7 The RI (72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months ) for each combination of inoperable SACS pumps is 6.64 E-7. Since this is less than 1E-6, this RI is considered acceptable.

C. Emergency Diesel Generators:

1. Increase the AOT for one EDG inoperable to 30 days RI (30 days) for EDG A/G400 = 7.23 E-7 RI (30 days) for EDG B/G400 = 6.58 E-7 RI (30 days) for EDG C/G400 = 4.45 E-7 RI (30 days) for EDG D/G400 = 2.15 E-7 The limiting EDG is AG400, with a RI (30 days) = 7.23 E-7. Since this is less than 1E-6, this RI is considered acceptable.

2. Increase the AOT for two EDGs inoperable to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months RI (72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months ) for EDG A/BG400 = 4.32 E-7 '

RI (72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months ) for EDG A/CG400 = 3.08 E-7 l RI (72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months ) for EDG A/DG400 = 3.98 E-7 RI (72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months ) for EDG B/CG400 = 3.95 E-7 RI (72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months ) for EDG B/DG400 = 3.07 E-7 RI (72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months ) for EDG C/DG400 = 3.85 E-7 The limiting combination of inoperable EDGs is the A/BG400 combination. This combination has an RI (72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months ) of 4.32 E-7.

Since this is less than 1E-6, this RI is considered acceptable.

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ML20071M134

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