ML20070M295
| ML20070M295 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hope Creek  |
| Issue date: | 04/18/1994 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20070M292 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9404250293 | |
| Download: ML20070M295 (3) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES i'
ij NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION g.....,p WASHINGTON, D.C. 205$54001 '
SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 69 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE N0. NPF-57 PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY ATLANTIC CITY ELECTRIC COMPANY HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION DOCKET N0. 50-354
1.0 INTRODUCTION
By letter dated March 4,1994, the Public Service Electric & Gas Company (the licensee) submitted n request for changes to the Hope Creek Generating Station, Technical Specification (TS). The requested changes would add a new TS 3/4.10.8, " Inservice Leak and Hydrostatic Testing." The proposed changes would also include corresponding changes to the TS Index, Table 1.2, "0PERATIONAL CONDITIONS," and provides Bases for TS 3/4.10.8. The proposed i
changes would permit Hope Creek to remain in OPERATIONAL CONDITION 4 with average reactor coolant temperature being increased above 200*F, but not to exceed 212*F, and OPERATIONAL CONDITION 3 Limiting Conditions for Operation i
(LCO) for secondary containment isolation, secondary containment integrity and filtration, recirculation and ventilation system (FRVS) operability being met.
2.0 EVALUATION The Hope Creek TS define five OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS. OPERATIONAL CONDITION 4 requires the reactor mode switch to be in the shutdown position and the average reactor coolant temperature to be less than or equal to 200*F.
OPERATIONAL CONDITION 3 also requires the reactor mode switch to be in the shutdown position but with the average reactor coolant temperature greater than 200*F.
The Hope Creek TS require that various TSs be applicable in one or more of the five OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS. Additional TSs become applicable when the plant enters OPERATIONAL CONDITION 3 from OPERATIONAL CONDITION 4.
This change in OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS occurs when the average reactor coolant temperature is increased above 200'F.
TSs of particular concern for entry into OPERATIONAL CONDITION 3 are TS 3.3.2, " Isolation Actuation Instrumentation," TS 3.6.5.1,
" Secondary Containment Integrity," TS 3.6.5.2, " Secondary Containment Automatic Isolation," and TS 3.6.5.3, " Filtration, Recirculation, and Ventilation System." TS 3.3.2, " Emergency Core Coolant System (ECCS) -
Operating," requires two core spray (CS) system loops, four low pressure coolant injection (LPCI) modes of the residual heat removal (RHR) system, the high pressure coolant injection system, and the automatic depressurization system to be OPERABLE in OPERATIONAL CONDITION 3.
Shutdown," requires one CS loop and one LPCI mode of RHR to be OPERABLE in 9404250293 940418 PDR ADOCK 05000354 P
- -. OPERATIONAL CONDITION 4 and 5, thereby permitting outage-related maintenance to be performed on the ECCS systems not required to be OPERABLE.
TS 3.6.1.1 requires PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY to be maintained in OPERATIONAL CONDITION 3 but PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is not required in OPERATION CONDITION 4.
The requirements of TS 3.6.1.1 significantly restrict I
l unobstructed access within the primary containment during operations in OPERATIONAL CONDITION 3.
The licensee desires to be able to perform certain outage activities on various systems.while remaining consistent with OPERATIONAL CONDITION 4 applicable requirements that are in effect immediately prior to and immediately following inservice leak and hydrostatic testing.
The reactor coolant system (RCS) is isolated during leak or hydrostatic tests.
This isolation makes RCS temperature control difficult since the RCS is isolated from its heat sinks and heat input to the RCS is caused by both decay heat and mechanical heat from the recirculation pumps.
TS 3.4.6, " Reactor Coolant System Pressure / Temperature Limits," currently requires reactor pressure vessel temperatures approaching 200 *F when the RCS is pressurized for leak or hydrostatic testing. This minimum temperature for performing leak or hydrostatic tests will increase over time as fast neutron fluence to the reactor vessel increases with operating time. The leak or hydrostatic tests require several hours of completion; operating experience has shown that the RCS temperature slowly increases during these tests and dependent upon the l
amount of decay heat present, the RCS may approach the 200*F limit of OPERATIONAL CONDITION 4.
Therefore, the licensee has proposed to increase the OPERATIONAL CONDITION 4 temperature limit to provide some additional margin L
l within which to complete the leak or hydrostatic tests.
Permitting the average reactor coolant temperature to be increased above 200*F i.
l and limiting the maximum reactor coolant temperature to 212*F while performing leak or hydrostatic tests will not substantially affect the results of potential accidents which might occur with the increased average reactor coolant temperature since the leak and hydrostatic tests are performed with the RCS near water solid and with all control rods fully inserted. Therefore, the stored energy in the reactor core would be very low and the potential for causing fuel failures with a subsequent increase in coolant activity is l
minimal. The restrictions provided in the proposed new TS 10.8 would require-secondary containment integrity as well as OPERABLE automatic isolation dampers, OPERABLE FRVS, and OPERABLE isolation actuation instrumentation for this equipment. Therefore, any leakage of radioactive materials from the RCS would be filtered by the FRVS prior to release to the atmosphere.
L Furthermore, since the reactor coolant temperature would be limited to a L
maximum of 212*F, there would be no flashing of coolant to steam and therefore, any releases of radioactive materials from the coolant would be minimized.
In the event of a large loss-of-coolant accident during a leak or hydrostatic test, the RCS would rapidly depressurize thereby permitting the low pressure j
j 1 ~!
ECCS_ equipment, required by TS 3.5.2, to actuate and thereby keep the core flooded.
This action would prevent the fuel from overheating and releasing radioactive materials.
The RCS inspections required to be performed as part of the leak or hydrostatic tests would be expected to detect small leaks before a significant inventory coolant was lost.
Based on the foregoing analyses, the staff concludes that the proposed TS i
changes will ensure acceptable consequences of any postulated accidents, are enveloped by the previously accepted analyses, and are, therefore, acceptable.
3.0 ETATE CONSULTATION In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the New Jers'ey State Official u
was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment.
The State official had no comments.
4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
The amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR
{
Part 20 and changes a surveillance requirement. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released.
offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative-occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards
.i consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (59 FR 12384).
Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9).
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the-issuance of the amendment.
5.0 CONCLUSION
The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
(1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Principal Contributor:
J. Zimmerman Date:
April 18, 1994 i
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