ML20069Q380

to 750807 License Amend Request to Change Tech Spec Re Containment Leakage Rate Testing

ML20069Q380
Person / Time
Site:	Prairie Island
Issue date:	12/03/1982
From:	Musolf D NORTHERN STATES POWER CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20069Q376	List: ML20069Q373 ML20069Q380
References
NUDOCS 8212090059
Download: ML20069Q380 (20)

Text

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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION NORTHERN STATES POWER COMPANY PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLAKr Docket No. 50-282 50-306 REQUEST FOR AMENDMENT TO OPERATING LICENSE NOS. DPR-42 & DPR-60 (Revision No. I to License Amendment Request Dated August 7,1975)

Northern States Power Company, a Minnesota corporation, request authorization for changes to the Technical Specifications as shown on the attachments labeled Exhibit A and Exhibit B. Exhibit A describes the proposed changes along with reasons for the change. Exhibit B is a set of Technical Specification pages incorporating the proposed changes.'

T1.is letter contains no restricted or other defense information.

NORTHERN STATES POWER COMPANY By we David Musolf Manager - Nuclear Support Servi On this Md day o f Ram /;p+ , ///fc2 before me a notary public in and for said County, personally appeared David Musolf, Manager - Nuclear Support Services, and being first duly sworn acknowledged that he is authorized to execute this document on behalf of Northern States Power Company, that he knows the contents thereof and that to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, the statements made in it are true and that it is not interposed for delay.

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8212090059 821203 PDR ADOCK 05000282 P PDR

m e T EXHIBIT A PRAIRIE ISIAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PIANT REVISION 1 TO LICENSE MENDMENT REQUEST DATED AUGUST 7,1975 PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS APPENDIX A 0F OPERATING LICENSES DPR-42 & DPR-60 Pursuant to 10 CPR Part 50, Sections 50.59 and 50.90, the holders of Operating Licenses DPR-42 and DPR-60 hereby propose the following changes to Appendix A, Technical Specifications:

1. Specification 4.4.A.1. Tvoe A Test Duration PROPOSED CHANGE Add a new specification 4.4.A.1.b as follows:

b. A Type A test may be terminated in less than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> if the procedures of Bechtel Topical Report M-TOP-1 are followed completely.

Renumber specifications 4.4.A.1.b and 4.4.A.1.c as 4.4.A.1.c and 4.4.A.1.d respectively.

REASON POR CHANGE In our letter dated November 2, 1977 and in followup discussions and correspondence, Northern States Power Costpany has sought to obtain approval from the Comunission for terminating containment integrated leak rate tests (Type A tests).in less than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. In discussions-with our Project Manager in the Division of Licensing we have been informed that Bechtel Topical Report W-TOP-1 has been approved for use by the Commission and provides for test durations of less than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. This change revises the Technical Specifications to show NRC Staff approval of M-TOP-1.

SAFETY EVALUATION l

Bechtel Topical Report BN-TOP-1 requires the use of rigorous test duration criteria. These criteria have been found acceptable by the NRC Staff when used in conjunction with the test procedure of BN-TOP-1. )

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EXHIBIT A

2. Specification 4.4.A.3. Shield Buildina and Auxiliary Buildina Imak Tests PROPOSED CHANGE Delete Specification 4.4.A.3 and renumber the remaining Specifications in Section 4.4.A. Combine pages TS.4.4-2 and TS.4.4-3 and renumber other pages.

REASON FOR CHANGE Specification 3.3.a is no longer required. Shield building leak tightness is verified by the quarterly shield building ventilation syetem operability test. Refer to Specification 4.4.3.1.

Specification 3.3.b is no longer required. Auxiliary building ventilation zone leak tightness is verified by the quarterly auxiliary building sp.ecial ventilation system operability test. Refer to Specification 4.4.B.2.

System performance with a 10-foot opening vos demonstrated during a special test program several years ago and reported in our April 9,1976 report entitled, " Containment Systems Special Analyses." It is not necessary to repeat testing with an additional opening on a periodic basis.

Specification 3.3.c is no longer required. Special testing was performed and reported in our April 9, 1976 report. This report establishes the instrument location for shield building tests required by Specification

• 4.4.B.1.

SAFETY EVALUATION None required. This change removes redundant and obsolete surveillat:e requirements.

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EXHIHIT A 3-

3. Table TS.4.1-1, Penetration Leakane Tests PROPOSED CHANGE

a. Remove all references to " Hydrostatic" tests. Remove the column labeled

" Test Method."

b. Change " Penetration Designation" for 3A, 3B, 50 (Unit 2), and 49A to " Note (1)."

Change " Type of Test" to " " indicating that no testing is required.

c. Change " Penetration Designation" for steam lines (6A, 65), feedwater lines (7A - 7D), and steam generator blowdown (8A - 8D) to " Note (2)."

Change " Type of Test" to " " indicating that no testing is required.

d. Change " Penetration Designation" for RER loop out (9), RER loop in (10),

Safety Injection (28A, 288, 35), cooling Water (37A-D, 38A-D), and Closed Cooling (32A-B, 33A-B, 39, and 40), and . Low Head SI (48) to

" Note (5)." Change " Type of Tsse" to " " indicating that ne testing is required.

e. For Penetration 6A and 6B add the notation, "(6C, 6D in Unit 2)."

f. Redesignate the three penetrations (k2A) Post-LOCA Hydrogen Control Air Supply, Post-LOCA Hydrogen Control Vent, and Sample to Ge s Analyzer as penetrations (k2A-1), (42A-2), and (k2A-3) respectively.

g. Redesignate the two penetrations (42F) Heating Steam Condencate Return and Heating Steam Return Vent as (h2F-1) and (42F-2) respectively (k2E-1 and h2E-2 in Unit 2).

h. Redesignate the three penetration (50) Post-LOCA Hydmgen Contml Air Supply, Post-LOCA Hydroger. Control Vent, and Samele to Gas Analyzer as penetrations (50-1), (50-2), and (50-3) respectively.

1. Change the " Penetration Description" for the following penetrations:

No. Current Description Correct Description 21 RC Drain Tank Gas to Analyzer RC Drain Task to Gas Analyser 27-1,2 Pressure Instrument OILT Instru=ents 30-A,3 Contain=ent Sump Suction Low Head sI suction fran sump B i

37A-D CC to Fan Coil Units. Cooling Water to Fan Coil Units l 38A-D CC from Fan Coil Units Cocling Water from Fan Coil Units I

b

F EXHIBIT A

j. For electrical penetrations (34) and (47) delete " Nitrogen to Electrical Penetration" test. Change the penetration designation in each case from " sealed" to " Annulus" and Type of Test to "B."

k. Change the " Type of Test" from "H" to "C" for the following penetrations: 12, 13A, 13B, 14, 29A, 29B, 30A, and 305.

1. Change note (4) on page 5 of the table to read:

4. These penetrations have blank flanges. Penetrations 18, 25A, 25B, 27-1, 27-2, 27C-1, and 27C-2 have blind flanges on the inside only. Penetrations 42B, 43A, 52, and 53 have a blind flange in the annulus only.

m. Change note (5) on page 5 of the table to read:

5. Safety injection, RER, cooling water, and closed cooling water system velves not relied upon to prevent containment leakage.

n. add note (6) on page 5 of the table to read:

6. The leakage test for this penetration is only required prior to use of the inservice purge system.

o. Change the " Penetration Designation" for penetrations 42A and 50 (42A-1 and 50-1) from " Exterior" to " Annulus."

REASON FOR CHANGE

a. Hydrostatic testing is not permitted by Appendix J. All type B and C testing will be pneumatic.

b. These are instrument penetrations. Isolation valves are not relied upon in these lines to prevent containment leakage.

c. These are steem and feedwater system penetrations. Isolation valves are not relied upon in these lines to prevent containment leakage.

d. These are systems in which isolation valves are not relied upon to prevent containment leakage.

e. Correction of typographical error.

f. Correction of typographical error.

l l g. Correction of typographical error,

h. Correction of typographical error.

I l 1. Correction of typographical errors.

j. Nitrogen is not supplied to these penetrations on a continuous basis.

The nitrogen makeup line has been disconnected.

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EXHIBIT A

k. Hydrostacic testing will no longer be performed.

1. Clarification of blank flarge installation.

m. Clarification of testing requirements for systema in which isolation valves are not relied upon to prevent containment leakage.

n. Clarification of when inservice purge valves must be tested (when blank flange is removed to use the system).

o. These penetrations have fail open solenoid valves venting the volume between the inner and outer isolation valves to the annulus. All leakage is therefore directed to the annulus where it is processed by the shield building ventilation system.

SAFETY EVALUATION These changes are required to conform to the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix J.

NOTE:

Items 1.c, 2, and 4 of our August 7,1975 License Amendment Request have been withdrawn. These items related to a change in the allowable leakage attributable to leakage to the ABSVZ and leakage to the exterior. The change was originally submitted in response to a letter dated March 27, 1975 from Mr Karl Kniel, Chief, LWR Branch 2-2, Directorate of Licensing, USAEC, to Mr L 0 Mayer, NSP.

The suggested change in leakage ratio was based on data from the initial Unit 1 Type B and Type C tests prior to start up. Experience since the preoperational testing has indicated that changes in the leakagc i ratio are unnecessary.

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EXHIBIT B Revision 1 to License Amendment Request Dated August 7,1975 Exhibt B, attached, consists of newly prepared pages of the Technical Specifications as listed below. These pages incorporate the proposed changes.

Pages TS.4.4-1 TS.4.4-2

• TS.4.4-3

• TS . 4. 4-4

• TS.4.4-5 TS.4.4-6

• TS . 4. 4-7 TS.4.4-8 TAB 2 TS.4.4-1 (page 1 of 5)

TAB 2 TS.4.4-1 (page 2 of 5)

TABE TS.4.4-1 (page 3 of 5)

TABM TS.4.4-1 (page 4 of 5)

TABM TS.4.4-1 (page 5 of 5)

• Page renumering only d

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TS.4.4-1 REV 4.4 CONTAINMENT SYSTEM TESTS Applicability Applies to integrity testing of the steel containments, shield buildings, auxiliary building special ventilation zone, and the associated systems including isolation valves and emergency ventilation systems, objective To assure that potential leakage from containment of either unit to the. environs following a hypothetical loss of coolant accident in that unit is held within values assumed in the accident analysis.

Specification .

A. Containment Leakace Tests Periodic and post-operational integrated leakage rate tests of each containment shall be performed in accordance with the requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix J, " Reactor Containment Leakage Testing for Water Cooled Power Reactors," as pub--

lished in the Federal Register, Volume 38, February 14, 1973.

1. Type A tests shall initially be performed in accordance with the reduced pressure test program as defined in paragraph III A4 (a) (1) l of Appendix J. Periodic tests shall be in accord with either the reduced or peak pres-sure test program defined in Paragraph III AS.

Tests shall include the'following conditions:

a. The absolute method of leakage rate testing will be used as the method for performing the test. The controlled leak-off method of leakage rate testing will be used for verification. Test will be conducted in accordance with the erovisions of ANSI N45.4-1972.

b. A Type A test may be terminated in less than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> if the procedures of Bechtel Topical Report EN-TOP-1 are followed completely.

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c. An initist leskr. e rate test vill be pe:-for=ct si a pressure of 23 ;sig (P )

and a second test at h6 psig (?,).

~d . The design basir accident leakage rate l-(I g) stall be 0.25 veight percent per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> as pressure Pa*

2. Initial and periodic type 3 (except airlocks) and type C tests of pt:ttrstions ( .nble I3.L.k-1) s*-" be perfor=ed c l a pressure of 46 psig (Pd in accord *Me with the pzwistons of Appendix J, Section Im3 and Section III.C, and Specifi.

fication k.k.A.5 "he airlocks shall ne tested initially and at six-sonth intervals at 46 psig by pressurizing the inner voltssa.

In addition, when containment system integrity is required, each airlock shall be tested every 3 days if it is in use by pressurizing this incargasket spade to 10 psig'.

3. Type A, tests will be considered to be satisfactory if the acceptance criteria delineated in Appendix J,Section III.A are met.

4. Type B and C tests will be considered to be satisfactory, l if the combined leakage rate of all components subjected to Type B and C tests does not exceed 60% of the *L and if the following cotiditions are met:

t. Type B and C tests will be considered to be satisfactory, if the combined leakage rate of all components subjected to type B and C tests does not exceed 60% of the *L and if the following conditions are met.

a. For pipes connected to systems that are in the ABSVZ

b. (Designated ABSVZ in Table TS.4.4-1) the total leakage past isolation valves shall be less than 0.1 weight percent per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> at pressure P,.

b. For pipes connected to systems that are exterior to both the shield building and the ABSVZ (designated EXTERIOR in Table TS.4.4-1) the total leakage past isolation valves shall be less than 0.01 weight per-cent per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> at pressure P,.

, c. For airlocks, the leakage shall be less chan 256 seen l st 10 psig for door intergasket tests and 1500 seem at 46 psig for overall airlock tests.

5. The retest schedules for Type A, B, and C costs will be in I accordance with Section III-D of Appendix J. Each shield building shall be retested in accordance with the Type A test schedule for its containment. The auxiliary building special ventilat' ion zone shall be recested in accordance with the Type A test schedule for Unit I containment.

6 Type A, B and C tests will be in accordance with Section V of Appendix J. Inspection and reporting requirements of each shield building test shall be the same as for Type A tests.

The auxiliary building special ventilation zone shall have the same inspection and reporting requirements as for the Type A tests of Unit 1.

f TS.4.4-3 REV B. ge'egenev Charcoal Filter Systenc

1. Periodic tests of the shield building ventilation system shall be performed at quarterly intervals to demonstrate operability.

Each radundant train shall be initiated from the control room and determined to be operable at the time of its periodic test if it meets draudown performance computed for the test conditions with 75% of the shield building inlaakage specified in Figure TS 4.4-1 af ter initiation.

2. Periodic tests of the auxiliar7 building special ventilation -

system shall be performed at approximately quarterly intervals to demonstrate its operability. Each redundant train shall be initiated from the control room and determined to be operable at the time of periodic test if it isolates the normal ventilation system and procedures a measureable negative pressure in the ABSVZ within 6 minutes after initiation.

3. At least once per operating cycle, or once each 18 months, which-ever comes first, tests of the. filter units in the Shield Building Ventilation System and the Auxiliary Building Special Ventilation System shall be performed as indicated below:

a. The pressure drop across the combined HEPA filters and the charcoal adsorbers shall be demonstrated to be less than 6 inches of water at system design flow rate (+10%) .

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! b. The inlet heaters aud associated controls for each train

! shall be determined to be operable.

c. Verify that each train of each ventilation system automatically starts on a simulated signal of safety injection and high radiation (Auxiliary Building Special ventilation only).

4 a. The tests of Specification 3.6.E.2 shall be performed at least once per operating cycle, or once every 18 months whichever occurs first, or af ter every 720 hours0.00833 days <br />0.2 hours <br />0.00119 weeks <br />2.7396e-4 months <br /> of system operation or following painting, fire or chemical release in any ventilation zone communicating with the system that could contaminate the HEPA filters or charcoal adsorbers.

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TS.4.444 REV

b. Cold DCP tacting shall te performed after each completa or partial replacement of a HEPA filter b&sh or af ter 03:' structural maintenance on the system housing that could affect the HE?A bank bypass leakage.

c. Halogenated hydrecaroon testing shall be performed after each complete or partial

. replacement of a charcoal adsorber bank or after any structural maintenance on the system housing that could affect the charcoal adsorber bank bypass leakage,

d. Each circuit shall be operated with the heaters on at least 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> every month.

5. Perform an air distEibution test on the HEPA filter bank af ter any maintenance or testing that could affect the air distribution within the systems.

The test shall be performed at rated flow rate -

(110%). The results of the test shall show the air distribution is uniform within 120%.

C. Containment vacuum Breakers . .

The air-operated valve in each vent line shall be tested at quarterly intervals to demonstrate that a simulated containment vacuum of 0.5 psi will open the valve and a simulated accident signal will close the valve. The check valves as well as the butterfly valves will be leak-tested during each refueling shutdown in accordance with the requirements of Specifi-cation 4.4 A.2.

D. Residual Heat Removal System

1. Those portions of the residual heat removal systems external to the isolation valves at l the containment, shall be hydrostatically tested for leakage at 12-month intervals.

2. Visual inspection shall be made for excessive leakage from components of the system. Any visual leakage that cannot be stopped at test conditions shall be measured by collection and weighing or by another equivalent method.

3. The acceptance c.riterion is that maximum allowable leakage from eithei train of the recirculation heat removal system components (which includes valve stems, flanges and pump seals) shall not exceed two gallons per hour when the system is at

( 350 psig.

4. Repairs thn11 be made as required to maintain leakage withir. che acceptance criterion in Speci-fication 4.4 D.3.

S. If repairs are not completed within 7 days, j

the reacter shall be shut down and depressurized until repairs arc effected and the acceptance

' criterion in 3. above is satisfied.

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r TS04.4-5 REV E. Containment Isolation valves During each refueling shutdown, the containment isolation va'1ves, shield building ventilation valves, and the auxiliary building normal ventila-tion system isolation valves shall be tested for operability by applying a simulated accident signal to them.

F. Post Accident Containment Ventilation System During each refueling shutdown, the operability of system recirculating fans and valves, including actuation and indication, shall be demonstrated.

G. Containment and Shield Building Air Temperature Prior to establishing reactor conditions requiring containment integrity, the average air temperature difference between the containment and its associated Shield Building shall be verified to be within acceptable limits.

H. Containment Shell Temperature Prior to establishing reactor conditions requiring containment integrity, the temperature of the containment vessel wall shall be verified to be

• within acceptable limits.

Basis The containment system consists of a steel contaimment vessel, a concrete shield building, the auxiliary building special ventilation sone (ABSVZ), a shield building ventilation system, and an auxiliary building special ventilation system. In the event of s loss-of-coolant ac cident , a vacuum in the shield building annulus will cause acu leakage from the containment vessel to be mixed in the annulus volume and recirculated through a filter system before its deferred release to the environment through the exhaust fan that maintains vacuum. Some of the leakage goes to the ABSVZ from which it is exhausted through a filter. A small fraction bypasses both filter systems.

The freestanding containment vessel is designed to accommodate the g inum internal pressure that would result from the Design Basis Accident. For initial conditions typical of normal operation, 120*F and 15 psia,'an instan-taneous double-ended break with minimum safeguards results in a peak pressure of less than 46 psig at 268'F.

The containment will be strength-tested at 51.8 psig and leak-tested at 46.0 psig to meet acceptance specifications.

The safety analysis (2) W is based on a conservatively chosen reference set of assumptions regarding the sequence of events relating to activity release and attainment and maintenance of vacuum in the shield building annulus and the auxiliary building special ventilation zone, the ef fectiveness of filtering, and the leak rate of the containment vessel as a function of time. The effects of variation in these assumptions, including that for leak rate, has been investigated thoroughly; A summary of the items of conservatism ir.volved in I

the reference calculation and the magnitude of their effect upon off-site dose demonstrates the collective effectiveness of conservatism in these assumptions.

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TS.4.4-6 REV l

Several penetrations of the containment ver,sel and the shield building could, in the event of leakage past their isolation valves, result in leakage being con- I veyed across the annulus by the penetrations themselves, thus by system.

sing the function of the shield building vent  !

Such leakage is estimated not to exceed

.025% per day. A special zone of the auxiliary building .

has minimum-leakage construction and controlled access, and is designated as a special ventilation zone where  ;

such leakage would be collected by either.of two re-dundant trains of the auxiliary building special vent system. This system, when activated, will supplant the normal ventilation and draw a vacuum throughout the zone such that all outleakage will be through particulate and charcoal filters which' exhaust to the shield building exhaust stack.

The design basis loss-of-coolant accident was initially evaluated by the AEC staff (3) assuming primary containment leak rate of 0.5% per day at the peak accident pressure.

Another conservative assumption in the calculation is that primary containment leakage directly to the ABSVZ is 0.1% per day and leakage directly to the anvirons is 0.01% per day. The resulting two-hour doses at the nearest site boundary and 30-day dores at the low popu-lation zone radius of 1 miles are less than guidelines i presented in 10CFR100.

Initial leakage testing of the shield building and the ABSVZ resulted in a greater inleakage than the design b asis. The staff has reevaluated doses for these higher inleakage rates and found that for a primary containment leak rate of 0.25% per day at peak accident pressure, the offsite doses are about the same as those initially calculated for higher prima 6facainment edage and lower secondary containment inlaakage The residual heat removal systems functionally become a part of the containment volume during the post-accident period when their operation is changed over from the injection phase to the recirculation phase. Redundancy and independence of the systems permit a leaking system to be isolated from the containment during this period, and the possible consequences of leakage are minor rela-tive to those of the Design Basis Accident (4); however, their partial role in containment warrants surveillance of their leak-tightness.

3

r TS.4.4-7 REV The limiting leakt.ge rates from the recirculation heat removal system are judgment values based primarily on assuring that the components could operate without mechanical failure for a period on the order of 200 days after a design basis accident. The test pressure, 350 psig, achieved either by normal system operation or hydrostatically testing, gives an adequate margin over the highest pressure within the system after a design basis accident. A recirculation heat removal system leakage of 2 gal /hr will limit off-site exposure due to leakage to insignificant levels relative to those calculated for leakage directly from the con-tainment in the design basis accident.

The shield building ventilation system consists of two inde-pendent systems that have only.a discharge point in common, the shield building vent. Both cystems are normally acti-vated and one alone must be capable of accomplishing the design function of the system. During the first operating cycle, tests will be performed to demonstrate the cap-ability of both the separate and combined systems under different wind conditions up to 45 mph if possible.

Pressure drop across the combined .5! EPA filters and charcoal sdr.orbers of less than 6 inches or water at the s rstem design flev rate vill indicate that the filters and adsorbers are not ciegged by excessive amounts of foreign matter. Pressure dmp should be detemined at least once per operating cycle 'o verify opersbility.

The frequency,of tests and sample analysis are necessary to show that the HEPA filters and chsrecal adsorbet s can perform as evaluated. A charcoal adsorber tray which aan accommodate a suf ficient number of representative adsorbe r sample modules for estimating the amount of penetration of the system adsorbent through its lif e is currently under development, trnen this tray is available, sample modules will be installed exth the same batch characteristics as the system adsorbent and will be withdrawn for the methyl iodide removal ef ficiency tests. Each module withdrawn vill be replaced or 1

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TS.4.4-8 P2V blocked off. Until these trays can be installed, to guarantee a representa-tive adsorbent sample, procedures should allow for the removal of a tray containing the oldest batch of adsorbent in each train, emptying of one bed from the tray, mixing the adsorbent thoroughly, and obtaining at least two samples. One sample will be submitted for Laboratory analysis and the other held as a backup. If test results are unacceptable, all adsorbent in the train will be replaced. Adsorbent in the tray removed for sampling will be renewed.

Any HEPA filtera found defective will be replaced. Replacement charcoal adsorber and HEPA filters will be qualified in accordance with the intent of Regulatory cuide 1.52 - Rev. 1 June 1976.

If significant painting, fire, or chemical release occurs such that the HEPA filters or charcoal adsorbers could become contaminated from the fumes, chemicals, or foreign material, the same tests and sample analysis will be performed as required- for operational use.

Operation of each train of the' system for 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> every month will demonstrate operability of. the system and remove excessive moisture which may build up on the adsorber.

Periodic checking of the inlet heaters and associated controls for each train will provide assurance that the system has the capability of reducing inlet air humidity so that charcoal adsorber efficiency is enhanced.

In place testing procedures wi1'1 be established utilizing applicable sections of ANSI N510 - 1975 standard as a procedural guideline only.

A minimum containment shell temperature of 30*F has been specified to provide assurance that an adequate margin above NDTT exists. Evaluation of data collected during the first- fuel cyc1's of Unit No. I shows that this limit can be approached only when the plant is in cold shutdosa. Requiring containment

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shell temperature to be verified to be above 30*F prior to plant heatup from cold shutdown provides assurance that this temperature i ove NDTT prior to establishing conditions requiring containment' integrity A maximum temperature differential between the ' average containment and annulus air temperatures of 44*F has been specified to provide assurance that offsite doses in the event of an accident remain below those calculated in the FSAR.

Evaluat ion of data collected during the. first. fuel cycle of Unit No.1 showir that this limit can be approactied only when the plant is in cold shutdown.

Requiring this temperature differential to be verified to be less than 44*F prior to plant heatup from cold shutdown provides assurance that this para-meter is within accept limits prior to establishing conditions requiring '

containment integrity References -

c.

(1) FSAR, Section 5, and Appendix 14-C -

(2) FSAR, Section 14, and Appendix G (3) Safety Evaluation Report /Section 6.2 and 15.0 (4) FSAR, Section 14 (5) FSAR, Section 14.3.6 -

(6) Letter to NSP from AEC dated November 29, 1973 (7) NSF Report, " Prairie Island Containment Systems Special Analyses,"

dated April 9, 1976.

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TA3LE TS.h.h-1 fpg 1 of 5 BIV t 3 s

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'( ; j UNIT 1 AN1) UNIT 2 PKNICIMTION lHGIGNATION FOR IIAKAGE TETU

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Penet mtion Type *

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Penetation Penet ation Designation ' or \ l,. . <

Number Description (Note 3) < --Test

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1 Pressure Belief Tank ABSVZ C i i '

to Gas Analyzer I #

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2 ' Pressure Relief Tank Exterior C 4

Nit m gen Supply

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dr 3A Dead Weight Tester Note.(D -

x' .l c

s 3B Pressure Instrument Note (1) -

4 Primary. Vent Header 4.BSVZ C ','.

5 RC Drain Tank Pump ABSVZ C j i ' \' g '

• Discharge / i

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6A,6B 'l\ ~  ;

Steam lines Note (2)  ;; <

,, j (6C' 6D Ben vs 'D in Unit 2) Annulus B i-l\

7A,7B (TC,7D Feedvater lines Note (2) -

)

in Unit 2) Bellove Annulus B.

8A,8B Steam Gen Blowdown Note (2) -

(8C,8D t t x

in Unit 2) Benova Annulus B i ,' j s i

9 RER Ioop Out Note (5) -

9 Bellows Annulus B 10 RER Icop In Note (5) - I i ~

10 Benovs Annulus B "

n letdown line ABSVZ C 11 Bellows Annulus B f .i 12 Oarging line ABSVZ C .

13A,13B RC Pu=p Seal Supply ABSVZ C

, {

lh RC Pu=p Seal Paturn ABSVZ 'C 1 t

15 Pressurizer Stes= ABS'Fu <

C Sa=ple 16 Pressurizer Liquid ABS'ru C .

Sa=ple s s . .

6 4

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.. a TABLE TS.4.4-1 (Pg 2 of 5) azy UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2' PENETRATION DESIGNATION FOR LEAKAGE TESTS Penetration Type Penetration Penetration Designation of D mber Description (Note 3) Test 17 Loop B Hot Lag Sample ABSVZ C 18 Fuel Transfer Tube (4) ABSVZ B 18 Bellows Annvius B 1

y 19 Service Air (4) ABSVZ B c p. 20 ' Instrumont Air Exterior C 21 RC Drain Tank ABSVZ C

'R to Cas Analyzer 22 Containmant Air ABSVZ C Sample In -

s 23 Containment Air ABSVZ C

j.

• Sampla Out 24 Spare .

, 25A Containment Purge ABSVZ B Exhaust (4) l 25B Containment Purge ABSVZ B Supply (4) 26' Containment Sump "A" ABSVZ C Discharge 27A-1, Steam Generator Note (2)

t l 27A-2 Blowdown Sample s 27B Fire Protection (4) ABSVZ B (51 in Unit 2) s l', 27-1, 27-2 OILT Instruments '

ABSVZ B (27C-l'and

, 27C-2 in

< Unit 2) j '27D Spare -

2SM28t Safety Injection Note (5) -

29A,29B Containment Spray ABSVZ C 30A,308 Low Head SI Suction ABSVZ C

\ from Sump B 1

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r TABLE TS.k.k-1 (pg 3 of 5)

BEV UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 PEN?rRATION DESIGNATION FOR LEAKAGE TESTS Penetration 'DPc Penetration Penetration Designation of Number Description Teet (Note 3) 31 Accumulator Nicrogen Exterior C 32A,323 CJ to RC Pumps Note (5) -

33A,33B CC from RC Pumps Note (5) -

34 Electrical Annulus a Penet mtion m

35 SI and Accumulator ~ Note (5) -

Test Line 36A, B, C, E Spares -

36D (50 Instrumentation Note (1) -

in Unit 2) 37A,3, C,D Cooling Water to Note (5) -

Fan Coil Units 38A,3, C,D Cooling Water from Note (5) -

l Fan Coil Units 1 39 CC to Excess I4tdown Note (5) -

Heat Exchanger 40 CC from Excess I4t- Note (5) -

down Heat Exchanger klA,hl3 Containment Vacuum Annulus C

Breakers l 41C Spare -

1 42A-1 Post-IDCA Hydrogen Annulus C Control Air Supply l.

42A-2 Post-IDCA Hydrogen Annulus C Control Vent 42A-3 Sample to Gas Exterior C Analyter i

i i

{

m

- e TABLE TS.4.4-1 (Pg 4 of 5)

REV UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 PENETRATION DESIGNATION FOR LEAKAGE TESTS Penetration' Type Penetration Penetration Designation of -

Number Description (Note 3) Test 42B (53 in Inservice Purge ABSVZ C Unit 2) Supply Valves (6) 42B (53 in

• Inservice Purge Annulus B Unit 2) Supply Blind Flange (4) 42C (54 in Containment Heating ABSVZ B Unit 2) Steam (4) 42D, 42E Spare -

42F-1 (42E-1 Heating Steam ABSVZ B in Unit 2) Condensate Return (4) 42F-2 (42E-2 Heating Steam ABSVZ B in Unit 2) Return Vent (4) 42G Spare _

43A (52 in Inservice Purge ABSVZ C Unit 2) Exhaust Valves (6) ,

43A (52 in

• Inservice Purge Annulus B Unit 2) Exhaust Blind Flange (4) 43B,C,D Spares -

44 Containment Vessel ABSVZ B .

Pressurization (4) 45 Reactor Makeup to ABSVZ C Pressurizar Relief Tank 46A,46B Auxiliary Feedwater Note (2) -

(46C,46D in Unit 2) i 47 Electrical Annulus B Penetration 48 Low Head SI Note (5) -

49A Instrumentation Note (1) -

49B (55 in Demineralized ABSVZ B Unit 2) Water (4) i

• Testing required following modification to inservice purge system of each unit during 1983 refueling outages.

TABLE TS.4.4-1 (Pg 5 of 5)

REY UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 PENETRATION DESIGNATION FOR LEAKAGE TESTS Penetration Type Penetration Penetration Gesignation of Numbsr Description (Note 3) Test 50-1 Post-LOCA Hydro- Annulus C gen Control Air Supply 50-2 Post-LOCA Hydro- Annulus C gen Control Vent 50-3 Sample to Gas Exterior C Analyzer ,

Equipment Door Annulus 3 Personnel Airlock Annulus B Maintenance Air- Annulus B lock Notes:

1. Instrumentation lines. No Type B or C testing required.

I

2. Steam and feedwater lines. Type C testing not required since valves are not relied upon to prevent containment leakage.

3. Penetration Designations ABSVZ pipes connected to systems that are located in the Auxiliary Building Special Ventilation Zone Exterior pipes connected to systems that are exterior to the Shield Building and ABSVZ Sealed pipes that will be sealed by water in space between isolation barriers following LOCA Annulus penetration that would leak to the Shield Building annulus following LOCA

4. These oenetrations have blank flanges. Penetrations 18, 25A, 25B, 27-1, 27-2, 27C-1, and 27C-2 have blind flanges on the inside only. Penetrations 42B, 43A, 52, and 53 have a blind flange in the annulus only.

5. Safety injection, RHR, cooling water, and closed cooling water system valves not relied upon to prevent containment leakage.

6. The leakage test for this penetration is only required prior to use sf the inservice purge system.

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