ML20069H218
| ML20069H218 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05200001 |
| Issue date: | 05/25/1994 |
| From: | GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19304C231 | List: |
| References | |
| 25A5447, 25A5447-R04, 25A5447-R4, NUDOCS 9406130024 | |
| Download: ML20069H218 (50) | |
Text
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25AS447 Rev. 4 ABWR cerrisedaesign meerisi t
3.0 Additional Certified Design Material 3.1 Human Factors Engineering 3.2 Radiation Protection 3.3 Piping Design 3.4 Instrumentation and Control 3.5 Initial Test Program j
4.0 Interface Requirements 4.1 Ultimate Heat Sink l
4.2 Offsite Power System (2.12.1) l 4.3 Makeup Water Preparation System
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4.4 Potable and Sanitary Water System (2.11.23) l 4.5 Reactor Senice Water System (2.11.9) 4.6
- Turbine Senice Water System (2.11.10) 4.7 Communication System (2.12.16) 4.8 Site Security l
4.9 Circulating Water System (2.10.23) l 4.10 Heating, Ventilating and Air Conditioning (2.15.5) 5.0 Site Parameters l
Appendices Appendix A Legend For Figures Appendix B Abbreviations and Acronyms l
Appendix C Conversion to ASME Standard Units l
1
- Underlined sections -Title only, no entry for design certification.
- Section number in parentheses - Section, under which the subject is covered.
Table of Contents VM 9406130024 940525 PDR ADOCK 05200001 A
r 25AS447 Rev. 4 ABWR certisedoesiga materier
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1.0 Introduction This document provides the certified design material for the Advanced Boiling Water l
Reactor (ABWR); U.S. NRC Docket No.52-001.
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l Introduction 1.0-1/2
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Table 2.2.4 Standby Liquid Control System b
10 d4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria t-Design Commitment inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
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1.
The basic configuration of the SLC 1.
Inspections of the as-built system will be 1.
The as-built SLC System conforms with Systern is shown in Figure 2.2.4 conducted.
the basic configuration shown in Figure E
2.2.4.
<n 3
A hydrostatic test will be conducted on 2.
The results of the hydrostatic test of the 3
System retain their pressure boundary those Code components of the SLC ASME Code components of the SLC integrity under internal pressures that will System that are required to be System conform with the requirements in be experienced during service.
hydrostatically tested by the ASME Code.
the ASME Code, Section Ill.
3.
3.
3.
- a. A test tank and associated piping and a.
Tests will be conducted on each a.
valves permit testing of the SLC division of the as-built SLC System System during plant operation. The using installed controls, power tank is supplied with demineralized supplies and other auxiliaries.The y
l water, which is pumped in either a following tests will be conducted:
g closed loop or is injected into the (1) Domineralized water will be (1) Demineralized water is pumped s
- reactor, pumped against a pressure with a flow rate greater than or E"
l greater than or equal to 8.72 equal to 189 L/ min in the closed MPaA in a closed loop on the test loop.
tank.
(2) Demineralized water will be (2) Demineralized water is injected injected from the test tank into the from the test tank into the reactor.
reactor.
- b. The SLC System delivers at least
- b. Tests will be conducted on the as-built
- b. The SLC System injects greater than l
378 Umin of solution with both SLC System using installed controls, or equal to 378 Umin into the reactor pumps operating when the reactor power supplies and other auxiliaries.
with both pumps running against a
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pressure is less than or equal to 8.72 Demineralized water will be injected discharge pressure of greater than or g
MPsA.
from the storage tank into the reactor eaual to 8.72 MPaA.
a.
with both pumps running against a S
discharge pressure of greater than or E-equal to 8.72 MPaA.
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- 6 Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria g
Design Commitment inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 23 c.
The SLC System delivers at least 189 c.
Tests will be conducted on the as-built c.
The SLC System injects greater than l
I/ min of solution with either pump SLC System using installed controls, or equal to 1891/ min into the reactor operating when the reactor pressure power supplies and other auxiliaries.
with either pump running against a is less than or equal to 8.72 MPaA.
Demineralized water will be injected discharge pressure greater than or from the storage tank into the reactor equal to 8.72 MPaA.
with one pump running against a discharge pressure of greater than or equal to 8.72 MPaA.
d.
The SLC System can be manually d.
Tests will be conducted on the as-built d.
Each division of the SLC System initiated from the main control room.
SLC System using the manual initiates when the manual initiation initiation switch.
switch for that division is actuated.
Upon receipt of a simulated ATWS e.
Both divisions of the SLC System are e.
Tests will be conducted on the as-built e.
y automatically initiated during an SLC System using simulated ATWS signal, both divisions of SLC E
ATWS.
signals.
automatically initiate.
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f.
Each SLC System pump has an f.
Tests will be conducted on each SLC f.
Each SLC System pump is prevented E'
interlock which prevents operation if System pump start logic using from operating unless signals
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both the test tank outlet valve and the simulated valve position signals indicative of one of the following pump suction valve are closed.
conditions exist:
(1) A suction path from the storage tank is available (the pump suction valve is fully open).
(2) A suction path from the test tank is available (the test tank outlet e
valve is fully open).
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2.2.8 Recirculation Flow Control System Design Description The Recirculation Flow Control (RFC) System controls reactor power by controlling the recirculation flow rate through the reactor core. This is achieved by modulating the recirculation internal pump (RIP) speeds using voltage and frequency modulation of adjustable speed drive (ASD) outputs.
The RFC System consists of redundant microprocessor-based controllers, adjustable l
speed drives, and motor generator (MG) sets. There are two MG sets, each of which supplies three of the ten ASDs which power the ten RIPS. The other four ASDs receive power directly from the power supply bus. No more than three RIPS are connected to any one power supply bus.
The RFC System operates in either manual or automatic control modes and has the controlinterfaces shown on Figure 2.2.8.
Except for the core plate differential pressure sensors provided for the Neutron Monitoring System (NMS), the RFC System is classified as non-safety-related. The four
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core plate differential pressure sensors for the NMS are classified as Class IE safety-related.
The RFC System has the logic to generate the following signals to mitigate an anticipated transient without scram (ATWS) event:
(1) A signal to open the alternate rod insertion (ARI) nives in the Control Rod Drive (CRD) System on a high reactor vessel pressure signal, a low reactor water level signal, or a manual RFC System signal.
i (2) A signal to the Rod Control knd Informatiora System (RCIS) to initiate electricalinsertion of all control rods on a high reactor vessel pressure signal, i
l a low reactor water level signal, or a manual control rod insertion signal.
(3) A signal to trip the fourRIPs not connected to MG sets on either a high reactor vessel pressure signal or a low reactor water level signal (the latter is not an ATWS mitigation feature).
(4) A signal to trip the six RIPS connected to MG sets on a low reactor water level signal.Three of the six RIPS are tripped after a preset time delay.
1 (5) A manual RFC System signal to Safety System Logic and Control (SSLC) to initiate the Standby Liquid Control (SLC) System and to initiate Feedwater
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Control (FDWC) System runback of feedwater flow.
2.2.8-1 Recirculation Flow Control System
2SAS447 Re~s. 4 ABWR certisedoesiga material O
The RFC System logic issues a signal to the RCIS for selected control rod run-in (SCRRI) to provide stability control when the following conditions occur:
(1) Two or more RIPS are tripped, and (2) The reactor power is at or above the preset level, and (3) Core flow is at or below the preset level.
The RFC System has the logic to generate the following protective signals:
(1) A signal to reduce all RIP speed on receipt of a signal from the RCIS that an all-rod insertion condition exists (which includes conditions of high reactor vessel pressure, low reactor vessel water level or manual RFC System initiation).
(2) A signal to trip four RIPS when Reactor Protection System (RPS) provides an RIP trip signal.
When the RIP MG set's power supply breakers open, the MG sets are capable of holding the connected RIPS at their original speeds for at least one second and, after 1 second, assure the speed is at or above a speed coastdown curve dermed by a rate of speed decrease of 10% per second for an additional two seconds.
Each channel of the RFC System controller is powered by separate non-Class IE uninterruptible power supplies. Each of the four safety-related RFC System core plate differential pressure sensors is powered from its respective divisional Class IE power supply. In the RFC System, independence is provided between the Class 1E dhisions, and also between the Class IE dhisions and non-Class IE equipment.
l The RFC System digital controllers are located in the Control Building. The ASDs and core plate differential pressure sensors are located in the Reactor Building.
Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.2.8 provides a definition of the inspections, tests, and/or analyses, together with the associated acceptance criteria, which will be undertaken for the RFC System.
O 2.2.8-2 Recirculation Flow Control System
t 2SA5447 Rev. 3 ABWR cenisedoesign uateriai 1
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2.6.2 Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System j
Design Descripilon i
The Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup (FPC) System (Figure 2.6.2) removes decay heat generated by the spent fuel assemblies in the spent fuel storage pool. The system also maintains the water quality and monitors and maintains the water level above the spent fuel in the spent fuel storage pool. Figure 2.6.2 shows the basic FPC System configuration and scope.
The FPC System is classified non-safety-related, except for piping connections and valves for safety-related fuel pool makeup and supplemental cooling by the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System.
The safety-related makeup water source for the spent fuel storage pool is provided by the RHR System, which pumps suppression pool water to the FPC System.
The spent fuel storage pool has no piping connections (inlet, outlet, drains or other piping) located below a point 3m above the top of active fuel located in the spent fuel storage racks.
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The FPC System components, with the exception of the filter /demineralizer unit, are i
classified as Seismic Category I. Figure 2.6.2 shows the ASME Code class for the FPC System piping and components.
The FPC System is located in the Reactor Building.
The FPC System has parameter displays in the main control room for instruments shown on Figure 2.6.2.
t The check valves (CVs) shown on Figure 2.6.2 have active safety-related functions to open, close, or both open and close under system pressure, fluid flow, and temperature conditions.
The piping and components of the FPC System at the suction side of the RHR System l
from the upstream isolation valve have a design pressure of 2.82 MPaG for intersystem LOCA (ISLOCA) conditions.
Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.6.2 provides a definition of the inspections, tests and/or analyses, together with associated acceptance criteria, which will be undertaken for the FPC System.
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FuelPool Cooling and Cleanup System 2.6.2-1
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25A5447 Rev. 4 ABWR-certisedoasion materiar
"{v DIVISION A DIVISION B DIVISION C ROOMS WITH ROOMS WITH ROOMS WITH FLOOR DRAINS FLOOR DRAINS FLOOR DRAINS P
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DIVISION A DIVISION B DIVISION C SUMP SUMP SUMP AND PUMP AND PUMP AND PUMP O
CONTROL BUILDING NOTES:
- 1. THE SYSTEM HAS NO VALVES, PUMPS, OR OTHER ACTIVE COMPONENTS IN THE DRAINAGE PATHS.
Figure 2.9.1a Radioactive Drain Transfer System.
Radwaste System -
2.9.1-3
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l 25AS447 Retr. 4 ABWR certisedoesign uateriai O
DIVISION A DIVISION B DIVISION C ECCS PUMP ECCS PUMP ECCS PUMP ROOMS ROOMS ROOMS V
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DIVISION A DIVISION B DIVISION C SUMP SUMP SUMP AND PUMPS AND PUMPS AND PUMPS SECONDARY CONTAINMENT-ECCS AREAS DIVISION A NON-DIVISIONAL DIVISION B DIVISION C ROOMS WITH ROOMS WITH ROOMS WITH ROOMS WITH FLOOR DRAINS FLOOR DRAINS FLOOR DRAINS FLOOR DRAINS V V V V SUMP SUMP AND PUMPS AND PUMPS SECONDARY CONTAINMENT - OTHER AREAS NOTES:
- 1. THE SYSTEM HAS NO VALVES, PUMPS, OR OTHER ACTIVE COMPONENTS IN THE DRAINAGE PATHS.
O Figure 2.9.1b Radioactive Drain Transfer System 2.9.1-4 Radweste System
25AS447 Rev. 4 l
ABWR certisedoesignnesterier O
2.10.2 Condensate Feedwater and Condensate Air Extraction System The Condensate Feedwater and Condensate Air Extraction (CFCAE) System consists of two subsystems: the Condensate and FeedwaterSystem (CFS) and the Main Condenser Evacuation System (MCES).
Design Description Condensate and Feedwater System The function of the CFS is to receive condensate from the condenser hotwells, supply l
condensate to the Condensate Purification System (CPS), and deliver feedwater to the reactor. Condensate is pumped from the main condenser hotwell by the condensate pumps, passes through the low pressure feedwater heaters to the feedwater pumps, and then is pumped through the high pressure heaters to the reactor. Figure 2.10.2a shows the basic system configuration. The CFS boundaries extend from the main condenser outlet to (but not including) the seismic interface restraint outside the containment.
The CFS is classified as non-safety-related.
l The CFS is controlled by signals from the Feedwater Control Systext.
The CFS is located in the steam tunnel and Turbine Building.
. The CFS has parameter displays for the instruments shown on Figure 2.10.2a in the i
main control room.
l Main Condenser Evacuation System The MCES reinoves the hydrogen and oxygen produced by the mdiolysis of waterin the t eactor, and other power cycle noncondensable gases. The system exhausts the gases to i
l the Off-Gas System (OGS) daring plant opemtion, and to the Turbine Building compartment exhaust systera at the beginning of each startup. The MCES consists of redundant steamjet air ejector (SJAE) units for power plant operation, and a mechanical vacuum pump for use during startup. Figure 2.10.2b shows the basic system configuration.
The MCES is classified as non-safety-related.
l The MCES is located in the Turbine Building.
Steam supply to the SJAE provides dilution of the hydrogen and prevents the offgas from reaching the flammable limit of hydrogen. When the steam flow drops below the setpoint for stream dilution, the Off-Gas System is isolated.
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The vacuum pump is tripped and its discharge valve is closed upon receiving a main steamline high radiation signal.
I Condensate Feedwater and Condensate Air Extraction System 2.10.2-1
25AS447 Rev. 2 ABWR certisesoesign aaterias j
9 The MCES has the following displays in the main control room:
(1) Parameter displays for the instruments shown on Figure 2.10.2b.
(2) Status indication for the vacuum pump and SJAE discharge valves.
Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Tables 2.10.2a and 2.10.2b provide a definition of the inspections, tests, and/or analyses, together with associated acceptance criteria, which will be undertaken for the CFCAE System, respectively.
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0 2.10.2-2 Condensate Feedwater and Condensate Air Extraction System
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- 1. RELIEF VALVE DISCHARGE AND VENTS ARE CHANNELED ThROUGH CLOSED SYSTEMS.
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- 2. FEEDWATER ANDCONDENSATE PUMP REDUNDANCY IS PROVIDED.
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25AS447 Rev. 2 ABWR certmedoesign uateriai r.
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TO RSW NOTES:
- 1. ALL ELECTRICAL POWER LOADS FROM THE CLASS 1E COMPONENTS SHOWN
- = PRIMARY CONTAINMENT g' ])
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ON THIS FIGURE ARE POWERED FROM CLASS 1E DIVISION I EXCEPT FOR THE OUTBOARD CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE, WHICH IS POWERED FROM DIVISION !!.
%J Figure 2.11.3a Reactor Building Cooling Water System (RCW-A)
Reactor Building Cooling Water System 2.11.3-5
i 25A5447 Rev. 4 ABWR Certi5edDesign Material O'
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- 1. THIS DIVISION IS POWERED FROM CLASS 1E DIVISION 11.
- = PRIMARY CONTAINMENT EXCEPT FOR THE CONTAINMENT OUTBOARD ISOLATION l
VALVE. WHICH IS POWERED FROM DIVISION lit 1
Figure 2.11.3b Reactor Building Cooling Water System (RCW-B) 2.11.3-6 Reactor Building Cooling Water System l
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Table 2.12.1 Electric Power Distribution System (Continued) b 2
ID g
inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria g
Design Commitment inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria al g
F g
6.
UATs power feeders, and instrumentation 6.
Inspections for the as-built UATs and 6.
As-built UAT power feeders are separated W
and contro! circuits are separated from RAT (s) power feeders, and from the RAT (s) power feeders by a 5
the RAT (s) output power feeders, and instrumentation and control circuits will minimum of 15.24m, or by walls or floors, k-instrumentation and control circuits.
be conducted.
except at the switchgear, where they are routed to opposite ends of the medium i
voltage M/C switchgear. As-built UAT instrumentation and control circuits, are separated from the RAT (s) instrumentation and control circuits by a minimum of 15.24m, or by walls or floors, except as follows: a) at the non-Class 1E DC power sources, where they are routed in separate raceways, b) inside the MCR, where they are separated by routing the circuits in separate raceways, and c) at the switchgear, where they are routed to s
opposite ends of the medium voltage M/C E"
switchgear and routed in separate raceways inside the switchgear.
7.
The MPT and its switching station 7.
Inspections for the as-built MPT and 7.
As-built MPT and its switching station instrumentation and control circuits are RAT (s) and their respective switching instrumentation and control circuits, separated from the RAT (s) and its station instrumentation and control from the switchyard (s) to the MCR, are switching station instrumentation and circuits will be conducted.
separated from the RAT (s) and its control circuits.
switching station instrumentation and control circuits by a minimum of 15.24m, or by walls or floors. MPT and its n
switching station instrumentation and E
control circuits, inside the MCR, are li separated from the RAT (s) and its l
switching station instrumentation and R
control circuits by routing the circuits in T
9 saparate raceways.
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t Table 2.12.1 Electric Power Distribution System (Continued) b N
123 s
inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria
%g Design Commitment inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria l
8.
Medium voltage M/C switchgear, low 8.
Analyses for the as-built EPD System to 8.
Analyses for the as-built EPD System exist voltage P/C switchgear, with their determine load requirements will be and conclude that the capacities of the respective transformers, and MCCs, and performed.
Class 1E switchgear, P/C transformers, their respective switchgear and MCC MCCs, and their respective feeder and feeder and load circuit breakers are sized load circuit breakers, as determined by to supply their load requirements.
their nameplate ratings, exceed their analyzed load requirements.
9.
9.
9.
a.
Medium voltage M/C switchgear, low a.
Analyses for the as-built EPD System a.
Analyses for the as-built EPD System voltage P/C switchgear, with their to determine fault currents will be exist and conclude that the Class 1E o
respective transformers, and MCCs, performed.
switchgear, with their respective h
are rated to withstand fault currents transformers, and MCC, current 5
capacities exceed their analyzed fault g
for the time required to clear the fault
- b. Analyses for the as-built EPD System cunents for the time required, as g
from its power soume.
to determine fault currents will be determined by the c,ircuit interrupt,ing performed.
device coordination analyses, to clear
- b. The PMG output circuit breaker, the fault from its power source.
medium voltage M/C switchgear, low voltage P/C switchgear and MCC feeder and load circuit breakers are
- b. Analyses for the as-built EPD System l
m rated to interrupt fault currents exist and conclude that the analyzed fault currents do not exceed the PMG E
output circuit breaker, and M/C, P/C l
j switchgear, and MCC feeder and load p
g circuit breakers interrupt capacities, 4
f as determined by their nameplating k
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2.12.10 Electrical Wiring Penetration Design Description l
Electrical penetrations are provided for electrical cables passing through the primary containment.
Electrical penetrations are classified as safety-related.
Electrical penetrations are protected against currents that are greater than their continuous current rating.
Electrical penetrations are classified as Seismic Category I.
Divisional electrical penetrations only contain cables of one Class 1E division.
Independence is provided between divisional electrical penetrations and also between divisional electrical penetrations and penetrations containing non-Class IE cables.
Electrical penetrations are qualified for a harsh emironment.
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i Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria
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t Table 2.1210 provides a definition of the inspections, tests, and/or analyses, together with the associated acceptance criteria, which will be undertaken for the Electrical Wiring Penetrations.
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[h Dectrical Wiring Penetration 2.12.10-1
d Table 2.12.10 Electrical Wiring Penetration b
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Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 1.
The basic configuration of the Electrical 1.
Inspections of the as-built Electrical 1.
The as-built Electrical Wiring Penetration Wiring Penetration is described in Section Wiring Penetration will be conducted.
conforms with the basic configuration 2.12.10.
described in Section 2.12.10.
2.
Electrical penetrations are protected 2.
Analyses for the as-built electrical 2.
Analyses for the as-built electrical against currents that are greater than their penetrations nnd protective features will penetrations and protective features exist continuous current ratings.
be performed.
and conclude either 1) that the maximum current of the circuits does not exceed the continuous current rating of the penetration, or 2) that the circuits have redundant protective devices in series and that the redundant protection devices are coordinated with the penetration's y
rated short circuit thermal capacity data 3:
l and prevent current from exceeding the
{
continuous current rating of the electrical penetrations.
R A
3.
Divisional electrical penetrations only 3.
Inspections of the as-built divisional 3.
As-built divisional electrical penetrations contain cables of one Class 1E division.
electrical penetrations will be conducted.
only contain cables of one Class 1E division.
4.
Independence is provided between 4.
Inspections of the as-built electrical 4.
Physical separation exists between as-divisional electrical penetrations and penetrations will be conducted.
built divisional electrical penetrations.
between divisional electrical penetrations Physical separation exists between these and penetrations containing non-Class 1E divisional electrical penetrations and cables.
penetrations containing non-Class 1E m
cables.
p
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p Table 2.12.13 Emergency Diesel Generator System (Continued) b 4
03 Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria 3(
Design Commitment inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria I
7.
A manual start signal from the MCR or 7.
Tests on the as-built DG Systems will be 7.
As-built DGs automatically start on 5
from the local control station in the DG conducted by providing a manual start receiving a manual start signal from the area starts a DG. After starting, the DG signal from the MCR and from the local MCR or from the local control station and s
remains in a standby mode (i.e. running control station, without a LOPP signal, attain a voltage and frequency in s 20
[
at required voltage and frequency, but not seconds which assures an operating 3-connected to its bus), unless a LOPP voltage and frequency at the terminals of g
signal exists.
the Class 1E utilization equipment that is 4
within the tolerance limits of the utilization equipment and remain in the standby mode.
8.
When a DG is operating in parallel (test 8.
Tests on the as-built DG Systems will be 8.
When the as-built DG Systems are mode) with offsite power, a loss of the conducted by providing simulated loss of operating in the test mode with offsite offsite power source used for testing or a offsite power and LOCA signals while po,wer and a loss of offsite power or a g
LOCA signal overrides the test mode by operating the DGs in the test mode.
LOCA signal is received, DGs g
disconnecting the DG from its respective automatically disconnect from their y
divisional bus.
respective divisional buses.
{"
9.
In the DG system, Class 1E DG unit 9.
9.
auxiliary systems are supplied electrical a.
Tests will be conducted in the as-built a.
The test signal exists in only the Class power from the same Class 1E division as DG Systems by providing a test signal 1E division under test in the DG l
the DG unit. Independence,s provided i
in only one Class 1E division at a time.
System.
between Class 1E divisions and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E b.
Inspections of the as-built Class 1E
- b. In the DG systems, physical l
equipment.
divisions in the DG systems will be separation or electrical isolction exists i
conducted.
between Class 1E divisions. Physical l
separation or electrical isolation exists l
between these Class 1E divisions and p
non-Class 1E equipment.
- 10. Each divisional DG (Divisions I,11, and 111)
- 10. Inspections of the as-built DG Systems
- 10. Each DG with its auxiliary systems is g
with its auxiliary systems is physically will be conducted.
physically separated from the other 3
separated from the other divisions, divisions by structural and/or fire barriers.
U N
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6 P
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7 l
t Table 2.12.13 Emergency Diesel Generator System (Continued) b tX3 g"
inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 23
- 11. MCR displays and controls provided for
- 11. Inspections will be conducted on the MCR 11. Displays and controls exist or can be the DG System are as defined in Section displays and controls for the as-built DG retrieved in the MCR as defined in Section 2.12.13 Systems.
2.12.13.
- 12. RSS displays provided for the DG System 12. Inspections will be conducted on the RSS 12. Displays exist or can be retrieved on the are as defined in Section 2.12.13 displays for the as-built DG Systems.
RSS as defined in Section 2.12.13.
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Table 2.12.15 Instrument and Control Power Supply (Continued) h E
ID a
inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria g
Design Commitment inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 23
- 12. The Class 1E Instrument and Control
- 12. Analyses for the as-built Class 1E
- 12. Analyses for the as-built Class 1E Power Supply system supplies an Instrument and Control Power Supply Instrument and Control Power Supply d
operating voltage at the terminals of the system to determine voltage drops will be system exist and conclude that the l?
Class 1E utilization equipment that is performed.
analyzed operating voltage supplied at l
within the utilization equipment's voltage the terminals of the Class 1E utilization p
tolerance limits.
equipment is within the utilization
{
equipment's voltage tolerance limits, as determined by their nameplate ratings.
- 13. Class 1E Instrument and Control Power
- 13. Inspections of the as-built Class 1E
- 13. As-built Class 1E Instrument and Control Supply system cables and raceways are Instrument and Control Power Supply Power Supply system cables and identified according to their Class 1E system cables and raceways will be raceways are identified according to their division. Class 1E divisional cables ara conductea.
Class 1E division. Class 1E divisional routed in Seismic Category I structures cables are routed in Seismic Category I g
and in their respective divisional structures and in their respective g
raceways.
divisional raceways.
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25A5447 Rev. 4 ABWR certisedcesign uaterisi
\\
The pneumatically-operated secondary containment isolation dampers, shown on Figure 2.15.5j, fail to the closed position in the event ofloss of pneumatic pressure or loss of electrical power to the valve actuating solenoids.
R/B Primary Containment Supply / Exhaust System The R/B Primary Containment Supply / Exhaust System removes inert atmosphere and provides air for primary containment prior to personnel entry, and consists of a supply fan, a filter unit, and an exhaust fan as shown on Figure 2.15.5j.
The R/B Primary Containment Supply / Exhaust System is classified as non-safety-related. The R/B Primary Containment Supply /Exliaust System is located in the secondary containment R/B Main Steam Tunnel HVAC System The R/B Main Steam Tunnel HVAC System provides cooling to the main steam tunnel i
and consists of two FCUs. Each FCU has two fans. The FCUs are started manually.
The R/B Main Steam Tunnel HVAC System is classified as non-safety-related. The R/B Main Steam Tunnel HVAC System is located in the Reactor Building.
1 R/B Non-Safety-Related Equipment HVAC System d
The R/B Non-Safety-Related Equipment HVAC System provides cooling to the non-safety-related equipment rooms. There are six fan coil units, and four air handling units in the system, each consisting of cooling coil and fans.
The R/B Non-Safety-Related Equipment HVAC System is classified as non-safety-related, and is located in the Reactor Building.
Reactor internal Pump ASD HVAC System The Reactor Internal Pump ASD HVAC System provides cooling to the RIP ASD control panels. The system consists of a two recirculating air conditioning units with cooling coils and four supply fans.
l The RIP ASD HVAC System is classified as non-safety-related, and is located in the Reactor Building.
Turbine Island HVAC System The Turbine Island HVAC System provides heating, cooling, and ventilation for the Turbine Island. The Turbine Island HVAC System consists of the following non4afety-related systems.
(1) Turbine Building (T/B) HVAC System.
(2) Electrical Building (E/B) HVAC System.
w Heating. Ventilating and Air Conditioning Systems
- 2. h.5-9
25A5447 Rev. 2 ABWR certitietteasiususteriai O
Turbine Building (T/B) HVAC System The T/B HVAC System provides cooling and ventilation for the Turbine Building. The T/B HVAC System consists of:
(1) T/B supply system with an air conditioning unit and three supply fans.
(2) T/B exhaust system with three exhaust fans.
(3) T/B compartment exhaust system with two exhaust fans.
l (4) T/B lube oil area exhaust system with two fans.
(5) T/B unit coolers and electric unit heaters.
The T/B HVAC System is classified as non-safety-related. The T/B HVAC System is located in the Turbine Building.
Electrical Building (E/B) HVAC System The E/B HVAC System provides cooling and ventilation for the electrical equipment rooms. The system consists of two air conditioning units, supply fans, two exhaust fans, unit coolers and electric unit heaters.
The E/B HVAC System is classified as non-safety-related. The E/B HVAC System is located in the Electrical Building of the Turbine Island.
Radwaste Building HVAC System The Radwaste Building HVAC System provides a controlled emironment for personnel comfort and safety for the Radwaste Building areas. The system consists of:
(1) An air conditioning unit and two supply fans for the Radwaste Building control room (2) An air conditioning unit with, two supply fans, and three exhaust fans for the process areas of the Radwaste Building.
The Radwaste Building HVAC System is classified as non-safety-related, and is located in the Radwaste Building.
Service Building HVAC System The Senice Building (S/B) HVAC System provides controlled emironment for personnel comfort in the S/B.
The S/B HVAC Sptem consists of two non-safety-related systems:
(1) Clean Area HVAC System.
2.15.5-10 Hesting, Ventilating and Air Conditioning Systems
25AS447 Rev. 3 1
ABWR certisedcesignsterior (2) Contolled Area HVAC System.
i The S/B m%C System is classified as non-safety-related, and is located in the Senice Building.
Clean Area HVAC System The Clean Area HVAC System provides a controlled emironment for personnel comfort and safety in the Clean Area for the duration of a design basis accident. The system consisits of an air conditioning unit with two supply fans, two exhaust fans, and an emergency filtration unit with two circulating fans.The emergency filtration ait has at least 95% removal efliciency for all forms ofiodine (elemental, organic, particulate, and hydrogen iodide) from the influent system.
1 Toxic gas monitors may be required in the outside air intake of the Clean Area HVAC System; these sensors are not in the Certified Design.
The Clean Area HVAC System is classified as non-safety-related. The Clean Area HVAC System is located in the S/B. The Clean Area m%C System of the S/B sen>es the Technical Support Center (TSC) the Operational Support Center (OSC) and other clean areas inside the S/B.
s l
On receipt of a signal from the TSC or main control room (MCR), the normal air intake dampar closes, the minimum outside air intake damper opens and the ventilation air for the Clean Area is routed through the emergency filtration unit.
l In the high radiation mode, a positive pressure is maintained in the Clean Area relative to the outside atmosphere.
Interface Requirements Toxic gas monitors will be located in the ortside air intakes of the Clean Area HVAC l
System, if the site is adjacent to toxic gas sources with the potential for releases of significance to plant operating personnelin the Clean Area. These monitors shall have the following requirements:
(1) Be located in the outside air intake of the Clean Area HVAC System.
l (2) Be capable ofdetecting toxic gas concentrations at which personnel protective i
actions must be initiated.
Controlled Area HVAC System j
The Controlled Area HVAC System senes the controlled access area, excluding the p
clean areas, and it consists of two exhaust fans. The Controlled Area HVAC System obtains its supply air from the Clean Area HVAC System. The Controlled Area m%C System is located in the Senice Building.
i Heating, Ventilating and Air Conditioning Systems 2.15.5-11
+
25AS447 Rev. 4 ABWR cenwedoesign Materiat O
Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria For portions of the CRHA HVAC system within the Certified Design, Table 2.15.5a i
provides a definition of the inspections, tests, and/or analyses, together with associated acceptance criteria, which will be undertaken for the CRHA HVAC Systems.
Table 2.15.5b prosides a definition of the inspections, tests and/or analyses, together with associated acceptance criteria which will be under taken for the Control Building Safety-Related Equipment Area HVAC System.
Table 2.15.5c provides a definition of the inspections, tests, and/or analyses, together with associated acceptance criteria, which will be undertaken for the Reactor Building Safety-Related Equipment HVAC System.
Table 2.15.5d provides a definition of the inspections, tests, and/or analyses, together with a sociated acceptance criteria, which will be undertaken for the Reactor Building Safety-Related Electrical Equipment HVAC System.
Table 2.15.5e provides a definition of the inspections, tests, and/or analyces, together with associated acceptance criteria, which will be undertaken for the Reactor Building Safety-Related DG HVAC System.
Table 2.15.5f provides a definition of the inspections, tests, and/or analyses, together with associated acceptance criteria, which will be undertaken for the Reactor Building Secondary Containment HVAC System.
Table 2.15.5g provides a definition of the inspections, tests, and/or analyses, together with associated acceptance criteria, which will be undertaken for the Reactor Building Primary Containment Supply / Exhaust System.
Table 2.15.5h provides a definition of the inspections, tests, and/or analyses, together with associated acceptance criteria, which will be undertaken for the Reactor Building Main Steam Tunnel HVAC System.
Table 2.15.5i provides a definition of the inspections, tests, and/or analyses, together with associated acceptance criteria, which will be undertaken for the Reactor Building Non-Safety-Related Equipment HVAC System.
Table 2.15.5j provides a definition of the inspections, tests, and/or analyses, together with associated acceptance criteria, which will be undertaken for the Reactor Internal l
Table 2.15.5k provides a definition of the inspections, tests, and/or analyses, together with associated acceptance criteria, which will be undertaken for the Turbine Island H VAC System.
2.15.5-r2 Heating, Ventilating and Air Conditioning Systems
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- 1. CLASS 1E ELECTRICAL SUPPLY AND EXHAUST FANS SHOWN ARE POWERED FROM CLASS 1E DIVISION 1.
EXHAUST FANS TORNADO MISSILE f
- 2. FCU COOLING WATER SUPPLIED BY THE HNCW SYSTEM.
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Figure 2.15.5b Control Building Safety-Related Equipment Area HVAC System (Division A) g
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FIRE ZONE FIRE ZONE DAMPER DAMPER TORNADO MISSILE BARRIER B
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ARE POWERED FROM CLASS 1E DIVISION 11.
TORNADO O
h MISS:tE EXHAUSTFANS BARRtER
- 2. DIVISION B DUCT PENETRATIONS OF DIVISION IV g
FIREWALLS ARE PROVIDED WITH FIRE DAMPERS.
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,5 7 TORNADO MISSILE BARRIER "g
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DIV C RCW PUMP SUPPLY FANS DIV C AIR CONDITIONING UNIT ELEC EQUIP 4
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BATTERY DIVlil 5
-y NOTES:
4
- 1. CLASS 1E ELECTRICAL LOADS SHOWN ARE j
POWERED FROM CLASS 1E DIVISION lli.
- 2. FCU COOLING WATER SUPPLIED BY THE EXHAUST FANS TORNADO MISSILE g
HNCW SYSTEM.
BARRIER an.
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Figure 2.15.5d Control Building Safety-Related Equipment Area HVAC System (Division C) g.
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DIVISION A DIVISION B DIVISION C RHR-A RHR-B RHR C I FCU l l FCU l l FCU l RCIC-A HPCF-B HPCF-C l FCU l l FCU l l FCU l CAMS-A CAMS-B FCS-C I FCU l l FCU l l FCU l E
E SGTS-B SGTS-C h
l FCU l b
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NOTES:
- 1. FCU COOLING WATER IS SUPPLIED BY THE RCW SYSTEM.
- 2. NORMAL VENTILATION AND SMOKE REMOVAL IS PROVIDED BY 8
THE R/B SECONDARY CONTAINMENT HVAC SYSTEM.
g 2
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- 3. ELECTRICAL POWER LOADS FROM DIVISIONS A, B, AND C E
g ARE POWERED FROM CLASS 1E DIVISIONS 1,11, AND 111, RESPECTIVELY.
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Table 2.15.5j Reactor internal Pump ASD Control Panel HVAC System b
g-IX3 9
Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria g
5
- l33 g
Design Commitment inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 1.
The basic configuration of the RIP ASD 1.
Inspections of the as-built system will be 1.
The as-built RIP ASD HVAC System HVAC System is as described in Section conducted.
conforms with the basic configuration d
2.15.5.
described in Section 2.15.5.
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III l
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Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 1.
The basic configuration of the Turbine 1.
Inspections of the as-built system will be
- 1. The as-built Turbine Island HVAC System Island HVAC System is as described in conducted, conforms with the basic configuration described in Section 2.15.5.
Section 2.15.5.
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U Table 2.15.10 Reactor Building b
C tX3
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Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria g
N Design Commitment inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 1.
The basic configuration of the R/B is 1.
Inspections of the as-built structure will 1.
The as-built R/B conforms with the basic shown on Figures 2.15.10a through be conducted.
configuration shown in Figures 2.15.10a 2.15.100.
through 2.15.100.
2.
The top of the R/B basemat is located 2.
Inspections of the as-built structure will 2.
The top of the R/B basemat is located 20.2m i0.3m below the finished grade be conducted.
20.2m i0.3m below the finished grade elevation.
elevation.
3.
Inter-divisional walls, floors, doors and 3.
Inspections of the as-installed inter-3.
The as-installed walls, floors, doors and penetrations, and penetrations in the divisional boundaries and external wall penetrations that form the inter-divisional external R/B walls to connecting tunnels, penetrations to connecting tunnels will be boundaries and external wall penetrations have a three-hour fire rating.
conducted.
to connecting tunnels have a three-hour fire rating.
4.
The R/B has divisional areas with walls 4.
Inspections of the as-built walls and 4.
The as-built R/B has walls and watertight and watertight doors are as shown on watertight doors will be conducted.
doors as shown on Figures 2.15.10a
{
Figures 2.15.19a through 2.15.100.
through 2.15.100.
g 5.
Main control room displays and alarms 5.
Inspections will be performed on the main 5.
Displays and alarms exist or can be
[
provided for the R/B arc as defined in control room displays and alarms for the retrieved in the main control room as Section 2.15.10.
R/B.
defined in Section 2.15.10.
6.
A flooding event involving release of 6.
Inspections will be conducted of the 6.
Penetrations (except for watertight either the suppression pool or the CST divisional boundaries shown on Figure doors) in the divisional walls are at least water does not affect more than one 2.15.10c.
2.5m above the floor level of -8200 mm.
division of safety-related equipment.
7.
Except for the basement area, safety-7.
Inspections will be conducted of the as-7.
Except for the basement area, safety-related electrical, instrumentation, and built equipment.
related electrical, instrumentation, and n
control equipment is located at least 20 control equipment is located at least 20 E
cm above the floor surface.
cm above the floor surface.
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2SAS447 Rev. 4 ABWR certisedoesign unterial 2.15.11 Turbine Building Design Description The Turbine Building (T/B) includes the electrical building and houses the main turbine generator and other power conversion cycle equipment and auxiliaries. The T/B is located adjacent to the safety-related Seismic Category I Control Building. With the exception e instrumentation associated with monitoring of condenser pressure, r
turbine first-stage pressure, turbine control valve oil pressure and stop valve position, there is no safety-related equipment in the T/B. The electrical building houses various plant support systems and equipment such as non-divisional switchgear and chillers.
A tunnel connects the Radwaste Building, Turbine Building, Control Building and Reactor Building for the liquid radwaste system piping. The penetrations from the tunnel to the Turbine Building are watertight and have a three hour fire rating.
l Flood conditions in the T/B, except for the electrical building, are prevented from propagating into the Control Building (C/B) via the Senice Building. This is achieved by locatag the access from the T/B to the S/B at or above grade level and providing a flood control doorway at the access location.
The T/B is not classified as a Seismic Category I structure. However, the building is designed such that damage to safety-related functions does not occur under seismic loads corresponding to the safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) ground acceleration.
Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.15.11 provides a definition of the inspections, tests, and/or analyses, together with associated acceptance criteria, which will be undertaken for the Turbine Building.
.[
\\b Turbine Building 2.15.11 1
D Table 2.15.11 Turbine Building b
L" tg 5
Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 1.
The basic configuration of the T/B is 1.
Inspections of the as-built structure will 1.
The as-built T/B conforms with the basic described in Section 2.15.11.
be conducted.
configuration described in Section 2.15.11.
2.
The T/B is designed such that damage to 2.
A seismic analysis of the as-built T/B will 2.
A structural analysis report exists which safety-related functions does not occur be performed.
concludes that under seismic loads under seismic loads corresponding to the corresponding to the SSE ground SSE ground acceleration.
acceleration the as-built T/B does not damage safety-related functions.
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g Table 3.1 Human Factors Engineering (Continued) b 3
10 i
B inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria R
g Design Commitment inspections, Tests, Analyses Design Acceptance Criteria k
6.a. Continued 6.a. Continued 6.a. Continued (3) That evaluations of the HSI equipment shall be conducted to 1
confirm that the controls, displays, and data processing functions identified in the task analyses are provided.
(4) That integration of HSI equipment with each other, with the operating personnel and with the Plant and Emergency Operating Procedures shall be evaluated through the conduct of dynamic g
task performance testing. The g
dynamic task performance tests y
and evaluations shall have as their iP objectives:
[
(a) Confirmation that the identified critical functions can be achieved using the integrated HSI design.
(b) Confirmation that the HSI design and configuration can be operated using the established MCR staffing
- levels, g
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Table 3.1 Human Factors Engineering (Continued) b 3
15 E
Inspections Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment inspections, Tests, Analyses Design Acceptance Criteria M
6.a. Continued 6.a. Continued 6.a.(4) Continued (c) Confirmation that the Plant and Emergency Operating Procedures provide direction for completing the identified tasks associated with normal, abnormal and emergency operations.
(d) Confirmation that the time dependent and interactive aspects of the HSI equipment performance allow for task accomplishment.
t/,u (c) Confirmation that the
{
allocation of functionsis s
sufficient to enable task 2
4 accomplishment.
(5) That dynamic task performance test evaluations shall be conducted over the range of operational conditions and upsets.
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Table 3.2b Ventilation and Airborne Monitoring b
w j-Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria tl0g Design Commitment inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria D
g.
1.
Plant design shall provide for 1.
Expected concentrations of airborne 1.
Calculation of radioactive airborne
=
containment of airborne radioactive radioactivs material shall be calculated by concentration shall demonstrate that:
maternis and the ventilation system will radionuclide for normal plant operations a.
For normally occupied rooms and maintam concentrations of airborne and anticipated operational occurrences radionuolides at levels consistent with for each equipment cubicle, corridor, and areas of the plant (i.e., those areas personnel access needs.
operating area requiring personnel requiring routine access to operate access. Calculations shall consider:
and maintain the plant), equilibrium concentrations of airborne a.
Total ventilation flow rates for each radionuclides will be a small fraction area.
(10% orless) of the occupational concentration limits listed in 10CFR20 l
Appendix B, January 1994.
b.
Typical leakage characteristics for b.
For rooms that require infrequent g
equipment located in each area.
access (such as for non-routine b
equipment maintenance), the f
ventilation system shall be capable of
- p reducing radioactive airborne 5
concentrations to (and maintaining them at) the occupational concentration limits listed in 10CFR20 l
Appendix B, January 1994,during the periods that occupancy is required.
c.
A radiation source term in each fluid c.
For rooms where access is not system based upon an assumed anticipated to perform scheduled offgas rate of 3,700 MBq/s (30 minute maintenance or surveillance (such as decay) appropriately adjusted for the backwash receiving tank room),
p radiological decay and buildup of plant design shall provide 4
activated corrosion and wear containment and ventilation to reduce h
products.
airborne contamination spread to other areas of lower contamination.
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g Table 3.2b Ventilation and Airborne Monitoring (Continued) h (23 Inspections Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria g
Design Commitment inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 2.
Airborne radioactivity monitoring shall be 2.
An analysis shall be performed to identify 2.
Airborne radioactivity monitoring system provided for those normally occupied the plant areas that require airborne shall be installed as defined in this areas of the plant in which there exists a radioactivity monitoring.
certified design commitment.
significant potential for airborne contamination (greater than 0.1 per year).
The airborne radioactivity system shall:
a.
Have the capability of detecting the time integrated concentrations of the most limiting internal dose particulate and iodine radionuclides in each area equivalent to the occupational concentration limits in 10CFR20, j
Appendix B, January 1994, for 10 M
g hours.
b.
Provide a calibrated response, s
representative of the concentrations 2
within the area (i.e., air sampling monitors in ventilation exhaust streams shall collect an isokinetic sample).
c.
Provide local audible alarms (visua' alarms in high noise areas) with variable alarm setpoints, and readout / annunciation capability.
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i The plan is structured on the basis that EMC ofI&C equipment is verified by factory I
testing and site testing of both individual components and interconnected systems to meet electromagnetic compatibility requirements for protection against the effects of:
(1) Electromagnetic Interference (EMI).
(2) Radio Frequency Interference (RFI).
(3) Electrostatic Discharge (ESD).
i (4) Electdcal surge [ Surge Withstand Capability (SWC)].
To be able to predict the degree of electromagnetic compatibility of a given equipment design, the following information is developed:
(1) Characteristics of the sources of electrical noise.
l (2) Means of transmission of electrical roise.
(3) Characteristics of the susceptibility of the system.
i (4) Techniques to attenuate electrical noise.
After these characteristics of the equipment are identified, noise susceptibility is tested for four different paths of electrical noise entry:
(1) Power feed lines.
(?) Input signallines.
(3) Output signallines.
t (4) Radiated electromagnetic energy.
Instrument Setpoint Methodology l
Serpoints for initiation of safety-related functions are determined, documented, installed and maintained using a process that establishes a general program for:
(1) Specifying requirements for documenting the bases for selecsion of tdp setpoints.
{
(2) Accounting for instrument inaccuracies, uncertainties, and drift.
l (3) Testing ofinstrumentation setpoint dynamic response.
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(4) Replacement of setpoint-related instrumentation.
Instrumentation and Control 3.4-9
25A5447 Rw.2 ABWR cenisedoesinmeeriel 0\\
The determination of nominal trip setpoints includes consideration of the following factors:
Design Basis AnalyticalLimit In the case of setpoints that are directly associated with an abnonnai plant transient or accident analyzed in the safety analysis, a design basis analytical limit is established as part of the safety analysis. The design basis analytical limit is the value of the sensed process variable prior to or at the point which a desired action is to be initiated. This limit is set so that associated licensing safety limits are not exceeded, as confirmed by plant design basis performance analysis.
Allowable Value An allowable value is detennined from the analytical limit by providing allowances for the specified or expected calibration capability, the accuracy of the instrumentation, and the measurement errors. The allowable value is the limiting value of the sensed process variable at which the trip setpoint may be found during instrument surveillance.
Nominal Trip Setpoint The nominal trip setpoint value is calculated from the analyticallimit by taking into p
account instrument drift in addition to the instrument accuracy, calibration capability, l
and the measurement errors. The nominal trip setpoint valueis the limiting nlue of the sensed process variable at which a trip action will be set to operate at the time of i
calibration.
l l
SignalProcessingDevices in theInstrument Channel Within an instnunent channel, there may exist other components or devices that are used to further process the electrical signal provided by the sensor (e.g., analog-to-digital converters, signal condi'ioners, temperature compensation circuits, and multiplexing and demultiplexing components). The worst-case instrumeauuxuracy, calibration accuracy, and instrument drift contributions of each of these additional l
signal conversion components are separately orjointly accounted forwhen determining the characteristics of the entire instrument loop.
Not all parameters have an associated design basis analyticallimit (e.g., main steamline i
radiation monitoring). An allowable value may be defined directly based on plant l-licensing requirements, previous operating experience or other appropriate criteria.
The nominal trip setpoint is then calculated from this allowable value, allowing for instrument drift. Where appropriate, a nominal trip setpoint may be determined directly based on operating experience.
3.4-10 Instrumentation and Control
25AS447 Rev. 4 ABWR certisesoesinmeerisi l
Appendix C Conversion to ASME Standard Units l
From To convert to Divide by l
(1)
Pressure / Stress l
kilopascal 1 Pound / Square Inch 6.894757 l
l kilopascal 1 Atmosphere (STD) 101.325 l
kilopascal 1 Foot of Water (39.2*F) 2.98898 l
kilopascal 1 inch of Water (60 F) 0.24884 l
kilopascal 1 inch of HG (32 F) 3.38638 l
(2)
Force / Weight l
newton 1 Pound - force 4.448222 l
l kilogram 1 Ton (Shott) 907.1847 l
kilogram 1 Tons (Long) 1016.0047 l
(3)
Heat / Energy / Power k
l joule 1 Btu 1055.056 l
Joule 1 Calorie 4.1868 l
kilowatt hour 1 Btu 0.0002930711 l
kilowatt 1 Horsepower (U.K.)
0.7456999 l
kilowatt-hour 1 Horsepower-Hour 0.7456999 l
kilowatt 1 Btu / Min 0.0175725 l
Joule / gram 1 Btu / Pound 2.326 l
(4)
Length l
millimeter 1 Inch 25.4 l
centimeter 1 Inch 2.54 l
meter 1 Inch 0.0254 l
meter 1 Foot 0.3048 l
centimeter 1 Foot 30.48 l
meter 1 Mile 1609.344 l
kilometer 1 Mile 1.609344 l
(5)
Volume O\\
l liter 1 Cubic Inch 0.01638706 l
cubic centimeter 1 Cubic inch 16.38706 Conversion to ASME Standard Units Appendix C-1
25AS447 Rev. 4 ABWR certisedoesigo usterial O
l From To convert to Divide by l
cubic meter 1 Cubic Foot 0.02831685 l
cubic centimeter 1 Cubic Foot 28316.85 l
liter 1 Cubic Foot 28.31685 l
cubic meter 1 Cubic Yard 0.7646 l
liter 1 Gallon (US) 3.785412 l
cubic centimeter 1 Gallon (US) 3785.412 l
E-03 cubic centimeter 1 Gallon (US) 3.785412 l
(6)
Volume Per Unit Time l
cubic centimeter /s 1 Cubic Foot / Min 471.9474 l
cubic meter /h 1 Cubic Foot / Min 1.69901 l
liter /s 1 Cubic Foot / Min 0.4719474 l
cubic meter /s 1 Cubic Foot /Sec 0.02831685 I
l E-05 cubic meter /s 1 Gallon / Min (US) 6.30902 l
cubic meter /h 1 Gallon / Min (US) 0.22712 l
liter /s (101.325 kPaA,15.56 C) 1 STD CFM (14.696 psia,60 F) 0.4474 l
cubic meter /h 1 STD CFM (14.696 psia,60 F) 1.608 (101.325 kPaA,15.56 C) l (7)
Velocity l
centimeter /s 1 Foot /Sec 30.48 l
centimeter /s 1 Foot / Min 0.508 l
meter /s 1 Foot / Min 0.00508 l
meter / min 1 Foot / Min 0.3048 l
centimeter /s 1 inches /Sec 2.54 l
(8)
Area l
l square centimeter 1 Square Inch 6.4516 l
E-04 square meter 1 Square Inch 6.4516 i
l square centimeter 1 Square Foot 929.0304 l
E-02 square meter 1 Square Foot 9.290304
[
(9)
Torque l
newton-meter 1 Foot Pound 1.355818 l
(10)
Mass Per Unit Time l
kilogram /s 1 Pound /Sec 0.4535924 Appendix C-2 Conversion to ASME Standard Units
25AS447 Rev. 4 l
ABWR cersisedoesiersneateriar l
l From To Convert to Divide by l
kilogram / min 1 Pound / Min 0.4535924 l
kilogram /h 1 Pound / Min 27.215544 l
(11)
Mass Per Unit Volume l
kilogram / cubic meter 1 Pound / Cubic Inch 27679.90 l
kilogram / cubic meter 1 Pound / Cubic Foot 16.01846 l
kilogram / cubic centimeter 1 Pound / Cubic inch 0.0276799 l
liter /s 1 Gallon / Min 0.0630902 l
(12)
Dynamic Viscosity l
Pa s 1 Pound-Sec/Sq Ft 47.88026 l
(13)
Specific Heat / Heat Transfer l
joule / kilogram kelvin 1 Btu / Pound-Deg F 4186.8 l
watt / square meter kelvin 1 Btu /Hr-Sq Ft-Deg F 5.678263 l
watt / square meter kelvin 1 Btu /Sec-Sq Ft-Deg F 2.044175E+4 l
watt / square meter 1 Btu /Hr-Sq Ft 3.154591 l
(14)
Temperature l
degree celsius Degrees Fahrenheit T p = T.c 1.8+32 x
l l
degree C increment 1 Degree F Increment 0.555556 l
(15)
Electricity l
coulomb 1 ampere hour 3600 l
siemens/ meter 1 mho/ centimeter 100 l
l (16)
Light l
candels/ square meter 1 candela/ square inch 1550.003 l
lux 1 footcandle 10.76391 l
(17)
Radiation l
megabequerel 1 curie 37,000 l
gray 1 rad 0.01 l
sievert 1 rem 0.01 l
Note:
Rounding of Caculated values per Appendix C of ANSI /IEEE Std. 268.
l Conversion to ASME Standard Units Appendix C-N4
. _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _