ML20071H998
ML20071H998 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | 05200001 |
Issue date: | 07/20/1994 |
From: | GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. |
To: | |
Shared Package | |
ML20070H967 | List: |
References | |
25A5447, 25A5447-R06, 25A5447-R6, NUDOCS 9407220189 | |
Download: ML20071H998 (18) | |
Text
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25AS447 Rev. 6 ABWR certisedoesienstuist f
3.0 Additional Certified Design Material 3.1 Human Factors Engineering 3.2 Radiation Protection 3.3 Piping Design 3.4 Instrumentation and Control j
3.5 Inidal Test Program 3.6 Design Reliability Assurance Program j
4.0 Interface Requirements 4.1 Ultimate Heat Sink 4.2 Offsite Power System (2.12.1) 4.3 Makeup Water Preparation System 4.4 Potable and Sanitary Water System (2.11.23) i 4.5 Reactor Senice Water System (2.11.9) 4.6 Turbine Senice Water System (2.11.10) 4.7 Communication System (2.12.16) 4.8 Site Security 4.9 Circulating Water System (2.10.23) i 4.10 Heating, Ventilating and Air Conditioning (2.15.5) 5.0 Site Parameters
)
Appendices j
Appendix A Leger.c',For Figures l
Appendix B Abbreviations and Acronyms Appendix C Conversion to ASME Standard Units
- i i
- Underlined sections -Title only, no entry for design certification.
Tabte of Contents vM i
25AS447 Rev. 6 ABWR certisedDesign Material I
)
M MUWP RCW RCW OTHERS OTHERS RCW 3
SPCU RCW 8
RHRHX
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l
~
3 (Reactor Builoing) 1 W
Q f
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(Reactor Building)
L (Reactor Building)
I W
~
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3 RCW l
l l
HECW y
y
' Fuel Pool Cooling HX and oom Coolers '
Y
~~
W L
TO (Reactor Building) 3 NNS 'I 3
HECW NNS 3
l i OTHER (SAFETY-RELATED) HXs l
l (Reactor and Control Building) j NN
NNS,
~
CRD AND CUW PUMPS
~
_j [NNS{",3
_ _ "lNNSj (Reactor Building) 3 l
C H,
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NON-SAFETY-RELATED HXs h
I (Control Building) 1 j
R s
---j
" "~**ITC"'B'*% "**
f------]
l y
DRYWELL EQUIPMENT COOLERS y_
"9 NNSl2 d
2 l NN$1 J NNS 2 2l NNS m
RCW HX R
FROM (Control Building) 3 RCW C
RSW W I
HSW p
RM TO RSW RCW PUMP (Control Building)
RCW HX r: :s (Control Building) 3 RCW i
RSw S
R TO RSW R
RCW HX C
W (Co,t ol Building) 3 RCW RCW PUMP FROM RSW M TO RSW>RSW I
(Control Building)
NOTES:
- 1. ALL ELECTRICAL POWER LOADS FROM THE CLASS 1E COMPONENTS SHOWN
q ON THIS FIGURE ARE POWERED FROM CLASS 1E DMSION I EXCEPT FOR THE OUTBOARD CONT AINMEN T ISOLATION VALVE, WHICH IS POWERED FROM DMSION 11.
)
Figure 2.11.3a Reactor Building Cooling Water System (RCW-A)
Reactor Building Cooling Water Systern 2.11.3 S
2SAS447 Rev. 6 ABWR certisedoesign uaterial O
MUWP RCW RCW OTHERS 8
SPCU RCW FE T
K" (Roactor Building) i J
l l
SURGE TANK
~~~~~~9 (Reactor Building)
L e
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~
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Fuel Pool Cooling HX and Roorn Coolers
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(Reactor and Control Building) f J
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r-- - - - - -
q c>
CUW PUMP q
(Reactor Building)
_ __ _.__ _ t _g g
- ______J, NS i
_______1 r-______,
p___
_q CUW Hx, HWH HX
___ l
( Reactor Building)
-i A
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R
. Control. Reactor, and Turbine Building) gM sgM gM ;
w_q ORYWEtt eouieueN1_:OtERS v
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2lNNS
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MS2 2lNNS c :n RCW HX e
R K3 (Control Buildin91 3RCW g
$h RSW R M TO RSW RCW PUMP (Control Building)
RCW HX m_z-(Control Building) 3 RCW RSW R
TO RSW R
RCW HX C
i E'
(Control Buildinci 3BCW bgn l SW ROW PUMP TO RSW (Control Duilding)
NOTES 1 THIS DIVISION IS POWERED FROM Ct. ASS 1E DIVISION 11,
- PRIMARY CONTAINMENT EXCEPT FOR THE CONTAINMENT OUTBOARD ISOLATION VALVE. WHICH IS Pr)WERED FROM DMSION Ill.
Figure 2.11.3b Reactor Buil ding Cooling Water System (RCW-B) 2.11.3-6 Feactor Building Cocling Water System
l 2SA5447 Rev. 6 ABWR cenmedoesign mtenal r
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MUWP RCW a
3 RCW OTHERS OTHERS RCW SPCU RCW P
3 3
3 FE T
M R HX (Reactor Building) l SURGE TANK l
l (Rea:: tor Building) i
--1 3 RCW i
l V
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TO L
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__q
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~~
"l NNS I (Reactor Building)
NNSl 3 3
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L J
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h p__l NON-SAFETY-RELATED HXL (Turbine Building)
L V
ca RCW HX i
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-->J RSW M
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(Contml Building) 3RCW FROM RSW W L _ pBSW TO RSW i
RCW HX g
(Contml Building) 3RCW FROM RSW--
).1 Q SW RCW PUMP TO RSW (Control Budding)
NOTES:
- 1. ALL ELECTRICAL POWER LOADS FOR THE CLASS 1E COMPONENTS O\\
SHOWN ON THIS FIGURE ARE POWERED FROM CLASS 1E DMSION III.
Figure 2.11.3c Reactor Building Cooling Water System (RCW-C)
Reactor Building Coolong Water Systern 2.11.3-7
U N
c to LOCAL AREA l
MAIN CONTROL ROOM LOCAL AREA Plant Sensors Device Actuators RCW Manual Pu nd Vatve etrots 1r i
F l
l SSLC PROCESSING Automatic-RCW SYSTEM LOGIC
- Sensor Channel Trfp Dedslon l
-LOCA Alignment
- System Cotnddence Trip Dedston Is0W
- Sorge Tank Level Control P
- Control and Interiock Logic g
RCW Surge Tank Level N
- DMstonel-Sensors Bypass
- Stop Flow to Non-Safety-Retated
- Calibration, Self-Diagnosis Components
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RW WW % WNo-e
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d Notes; y
5
- 1. Diagram represents one of three RCW divisions.
a-U
- 2. See Section 3.4, Figure 3.4b for SSLC processing.
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Figure 2.11.3d Reactor Building Cooling Water System Control Interface Diagram g-O O
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j 25AS447 Rev. 6 ABWR certisedoesiga nsaterial 3.6 Design Reliability Assurance Program Design Description The Design Reliability Assurance Program (D-RAP) is a program that will be performed during the detailed design and equipment specification phase prior to initial fuelload.
The D-RAP evaluates and prioritizes the structures, systems and components (SSCs) in the design, based on their degree of risk significance. The D-RAP will identify t..e dominant failure modes for the risk-significant SSCs. The D-RAP will also identify the key assumptions and risk insights for the risk-significant SSCs.
The D-RAP scope includes risk-significant SSCs as determined by probabilistic, deterministic, or other methods used for design certification to identify and prioritize risk-aignific;mt SSCs.
The D-RAP purpose is to proside reasonable assurance that the plant design proceeds in a manner that is consistent with the original bases and design assumptions for the risk insights for the risk-significant SSCs.
The D-RAP objectives are to provide reasonable assurance that the plant is designed such that: (1) it is consistent with the assumptions and risk insights for these risk-significant SSCs, (2) the risk-significant SSCs will not degrade to an unacceptable level during their design life, (3) the frequency of transients that challenge these SSCs will be acceptably low, and (4) these SSCs will function reliably when challenged.
Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Table 3.6 provides a definition of the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria, which will be performed for Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR)D-RAP.
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Table 3.6 Design Reliability Assurance Program b
tg Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 1.
The Design Reliability Assurance Program 1.
Inspections of the design reliability 1.
(D-RAP) includes: scope, purpose, assurance program will be conducted.
Documentation exists that describes a.
objectives; the process used to evaluate the scope, purpose, and obj.ectives of and prioritize the structures, systems and D-RAP used during plant des _ign, and components (SSCs); and the lis* of SSCs conciudes that the detailed design of designated as risk-significant. For those nsk-s,ignif, cant SSCs is consistent i
SSCs designated as risk-signif: cant, the with the D-RAP Design Desenption.
process used to determine dominant failure modes considered industry
- b. Documentation exists and concludes experience, analytical models, and that the process (probabilistic, applicable requirements. Also, for those deterministic, or other methods) used SSCs designated as risk-significant, the to evaluate and prioritize the SSCs in key assumptions and risk insights the design is based on the risk-considered operations, maintenance, and significance of the SSCs.
monitoring activities.
c.
A list of SSCs exists that is based on the risk-significance of SSCs.
{
d.
For those SSCs designated as risk significant:
i) Documentation exists and concludes that the process to determine dominant failure y
modes considered industry experience, analytical models, and applicable requirements.
h ii) Documentation exists and y
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assumptions and risk insights E
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or other methods considered 2
operations, maintenance, and 2
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