ML20065Q366
| ML20065Q366 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oyster Creek |
| Issue date: | 12/07/1990 |
| From: | Fitzpatrick E GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20065Q371 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9012170166 | |
| Download: ML20065Q366 (13) | |
Text
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. -a GPU Nuclear Corporation 0 J Nuclear =e n:r 388 Forked River. New Jersey 08731-0388 609 971-4000 Writer's Direct Dial Number:
December 7, 1990 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Gentlemen Subjects Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Docket No. 50-219 Technical Specification Change Request No. 192 Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90, GPU Nuclear Corporation, operator of the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station (OCNGS), Provisional Operating License No. DPR-16,
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requests a change to Appendix A of that license. The attached technical l specification change request proposes to allow draining of the 15,000 gallon l Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) fuel oil storage tank for the purpose of internal inspection and, if required, replacement during the upcoming (13R) outage. Inspection of the tank internals cannot be accomplished while it is filled, and draining of the tank will cause the EDG's to become inoperable, which is in conflict with Technical Specification 3.7.
Based on the above, GPUN proposes that the Technical Specifications be revised as indicated in the attachment, to allow the temporary installation of tank trucks with a capacity of not less than 14,000 gallons of fuel oil, connected via the EDG fuel oil fill station. This revision will permit periodic inspection and/or repair as required during periods of cold shutdown.
We request that the NRC staff place an appropriate priority for a timely review of these proposed Technical Specification changes, such that the tank inspection / replacement can be scheduled and completed during the upcoming 13R outage, to begin in 2/91.
This change request has been reviewed in accordance with Section 6.5 of the OCNGS Technical Specification, and utilizing the standard in 10 CFR 50.92, we have concluded that these proposed changes do not constitute a significant hazards consideration.
9012170166 901207 PDR P ADOCK 05000219 PDR GPU Nuclear Corporation is a subsidiary of General Pubhc Utihties Corporation %f
,e m t.l JaJ ly a
- TSCR192 Page 2 Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.91(b)(1), a copy of the change request has been sent to
.the State of New Jersey, Department of Environmental Protection.
Very truly yours, E. E. Fitzpatrick Vice President & Director oyster Creek EEF/BMP/ pip (TSCR192) cc: Administrator Region I U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406 NRC Resident Inspector Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Forked River, N.J. 08731 Project Manager U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555
'j GPU NUCLEAR CORPORATION OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION Provisional operating License No. DPR-16 Technical Specification Change Request No. 192 nocket No. 50-219 Applicant submits, by this Technical Specification Change Request No. 192 to the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Technical Specifications, a change to pages 3.7-2, 3.7-3, and 3.7-4.
By E. E. Fitzp/ trick Vice President and Director Oyster Creek Sworn and Subscribe to before me this 7 day of , 1990.
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f UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In: the Matter of )
) Docket No. 50-219 GPU Nuclear Corporation )
QESTIFICATE OF SERVICE This is to certify that a copy of Technical Specification Change Request No.
192 for Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Technical Specifications, filed with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission on December 7,1990 has this day of December 7,1990 , been served on the Mayor of Lacey Township, Occan County, New Jersey by deposit in the United States mail, addressed as follows:
The Honorable Debra Madensky Mayor of Lacey Township 818 West Lacey Road Forked River, NJ 08731 _
By -
E. E. Fitzpathlck Vice President and Director Oyster Creek l
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E Nuclear GPU Nuclear Corporation
- str>a Forked River, New Jersey 087010388 609 971 4000 Wnter's Direct Dial Number:
December 7,1990 The Honorable Debra Madeneky Mayor of Lacey Township 818 West Lacey Rotid
~ Forked River, New Jersey 08731 De'ar Mayor Madensky:
Enclosed herewith in one copy of Technical Specification Change ReWest No.
192 for the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generation Station Operating Lico".se.
This document was filed with the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission on Decenber 7,1990.
Very truly yours,
(
E. E. Pitzp rick Vice President and Director Oyster Creek EEF/BMP/ pip Attachment GPU Nuclear Corporaton is a suosidiary of General Public Utiht;es Corporation
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. Nuclear GPU Nuclear Corporation '
- str388 Forked River, New Jersey 087310388 609 971-4000 Wnter's Direct Dial Number; December 7,1990
.Mr. Kent Tosch, Director Bureau of Nuclear Engineering Department of Environmental Protection CN415 Trenton, New Jersey 08625
Dear Mr. Tosch:
Subject:
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Provisional Operating License No. DPP-16 Technical Specification Change Request No. 192 Pursuant to 10CFR50.91(b)(1), please find enclosed a copy of the subject document which was filed with the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission on December 7,1990.
Very truly yours, E. E. Fitzpatrick Vice President and Director Oyster Creek EEF/BMP/ pip Attachment GPU Nuclear Corporation is a subsidiary of General Public Utilities Corpora: ion
s OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR CENERATING STAT 80N
! PROVISIONAL OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPJt-16 DOCKET NO. 50-219 TECHdICAL SPECIFICATION CHANCE REQUEST NO. 192 ,
Applicant hereby requests the Commission to change Appendix A to the above captioned license as discussed belou, and pursuant to 10CTR50.91, an analysis concerning the determination of no significant hazards consideration is also presented:
1.0 SECTIONE TO DE Cf!AROFD Section 3.7 2.0 EFTENT OF CHANGE Revise the requirement that the Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG's) be declared inoperable with less than 14,000 gallone in the EDO fuel i storage tank. Section 3.7 is revised to gliow the EDO fuel storage tank to be drained for required inspection and/or repair provided that an alternate source of fuel oil is provided. This would apply only curing periods of cold shutdown / refueling with the reector cavity flooded und the spent fuel pool gates removed, or all fuel in the spent fuel pcci, with the spent fuel pool gates installed. The bases for Section 3.7 are revised to incorporate the allowance for temporary tank trucks to replace the EDO fuel storage tank to allow for repair and/or replacement of the tank.
3.0 CHANGES REOUEST(Q The requested changes are shown on attached Technical Specification Pages 3.7-2, 3.7-3, 3.7-4.
4.0 DISCUSSION System Description and Safety Function The function of the EDCs is to provide an onsite independent standby power source for essential bus sections 1C and 1D. These essential ,
busee provido power to plant equipment necessary to reach or maintain safe shutdown. "
l The design of the essential buses is such that a single failure will not disable both buses. At least one EDG will be capable of supplying power to its designated essential bus considering a Loss-of-Coolant Accident, loss of offsite power, and a single failure.
l Technical Specification 3.7 requires that at least one (1) active and one (1) standby source of power shall be available to maintain safe shutdown conditions. Normally there are six (6) independent sources of i power available (the two 230 KV lines, the two 34.5 KV lines and the two
- EDGs). However, during a shutdown, the 230 KV lines which are connected I to the generator cannot be readily used as a. source of power. i I
Therefore, during a shutdown, only the 34.5 KV lines (supplied to the startup transformers) and the EDGs are available to meet Technical Specification 3.7.
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j Power can be supplied from the 230 KV lines via the Main ta,c'. 4rs to 1 the Auxiliary Transformer by "back-feeding". However, tl -
at a preferred methoo of operation and is considered an emergency n~- re 4 only.
Technical Specification 3.7.C.4 states that for the EDGs to be i considered operable there shall be a minimum of 14,000 gallons of diesel fuel in the EDO fuel stort.ge tank. Per Technical Specification 3.7.C.4 basis, the required 14,000 gallons is based on a 3-day EDO operational requirement for a loss of offsite power event, or a loss of coolant accident coincident with a loss of offsite power event.
3 The Fuel Oil System to each generator includes an engine mounted pump j
which takes suction from an auxiliary fuel day tank located in the unit. The pump provides 4 GPM of fuel to the diesel. The day tank has a capacity of 130 gallons and acts as a reservoir.
The 15,000 gallon EDO fuel storage tank and fuel supply to each EDO meet
- seismic 1 Criteria and are Missile Protected.
l The 75,000 gallon fuel oil tank supplies fuel oil to the 15,000 gallon EDO fuel storage tank via a fuel transfer pump and the fuel transfer line. A Technical Specification required minimum level corresponding to 14,000 gallons ;s maintained in the 15,000 gallon EDO fuel storage tank by use of this line.
In addition, a tanker truck manifold is available outside the EDO
, compartment allowing direct fueling of the EDCs.
An alternate fuel oil supply path is provided via a connection off of the fuel oil transfer line from the 75,000 gallon fuel oil tank j (referred to as the alternate fuel supply line). This alternate fuel i
supply line was installed to meet Appendix "R" concerns. This separate l flow path permits fuel to be suppliod from the 75,000 .jallon fuel oil tank directly to each EDG. The purpose of this cor.nection is to provide a coarce of fuel in case of a fire in the 15,000 gallon diesel fuel oil compartment and a loss of of f site power. This aAternate nath does not raquire a pump since fuel can be supplied S the EDGs by ,ravity feed.
A level of B' in the 75,000 gallon fuel oil tank is capable of supplying one (1) EDO for a 24-hour period. At the end of the 24-hour period, the 1
75,000 gallon tank level would be down to approximath.ly 6'3".
Alternate Temocrary Fuel SuDolv Confiouration This Technical Specification change would allow use of tanker trucks capable of containing at least 14,000 gallons of fuel, as the source of fuel during plant shutdown or refueling. The tanker (s) would be connected with temporary flexible hosing to a' tee and to the EDG filling station. Valve alignment would allow a direct flow path from the tanker (s) to each set of EDG transfer pumps.
The tanker trucks fuel alignment up to and including the EDO filling station would not be seismically qualified nor missile protected.
This alternate comporary fuel supply configuration is applicable only during cold shutdown or refueling when the reactor cavity is flooded above elevation 117 feet with the spent fuel pool gates removed, or with
, all fuel in the spent fuel pool and the spent fuel pool gates installed. These requirements are necessary to ensure that either:
communication exists between the reactor cavity and the spent fuel pool with the reactor cavity flooded; or all fuel is in the spent fuel pool (thus allowing decay heat and spent fuel pool cooling). These two (2) conditions are bounded by the analysis in the FSAR which concludes that on loss of spent fuel pool cooling and an initial pool water temperature of 90*F, it would take 14.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> for the pool water temperature to reach boiling temperature.
In addition, the plant will be required to be placed in a configuration in which core spray system operability is not required.
Shutdown / Refuel Recuirements A review o* the oyster Creek Technical Specification shows the following systems or components require an active and standby source of power d" ring plant shutdown or refueling:
Two (2) separate and independent standby Gas Treatment Systems to maintain secondary containment (Technical Specification 3.5.B.2).
The Core Spray System shall be available (Technical Specification 3.4.A).
The Containment Spray System shall be available (Technical Specification 3.4.C) except when primary containment is not required.
Emergency service Water System shall be available (Technical Specification 3.4.C).
Offeite Power Loss Due to Weather or Seismic Event During a loss of offsite power event while the plant is shutdown or refueling the primary concern would be spent fuel pool heatup and decay heatup. On loss of offsite power the EDGs would start and supply power to essential bus sections 1C and 1D. The essential bus sections 1C and ID would supply power to the spent fuel pool cooling and RBCCW Systems to maintain spent fuel pool and decay heat removal. Offsite power must be regained er an CDG fuel oil resupply must be established within the 3 days in order to provide continued power to the essential buses and prevent spent fue. and decay heatup.
A tornado may cause a loss of offsite power event by dtmaging the startup transformers. In addition, the same tornado nay damage the '
temporary tankers, the hosing connection or the EDO fill station. Under.
these conditions.both offsite and onsite power may be temporarily lost.-
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This would result in a loss of ths spent fuol pool cooling oystem and loss of RDCOW. This would also result in a loss of availability of the a Core Spray System, Containment spray System, and the Emergency Service Water System. In addition, secondary containment will have been
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accidentally lost because of the unavailability of the standby gas treatment system.
Upon accidental loss of secandary containment, the plant will take action per Technical Specification 3.5.D.1.1 and place the plant in configuration in which environmental releases cannot occur. Therefore, under these conditions, the primary concern in terms of offsite and onsite power would be spent fuel heatup and decay heatup.
f A seismic event may cause a loss of offsite power event by damaging the startup transformers. The same seismic event may damage the temporary tankers, the hosing connectors Dr the EDG fill station. Under these conditions, both offsite and onsite power may be temporarily lost.
This would result in a loss of spent fuel pool cooling and loss of RDCCW. This would also result in a loss of availability of the Core Spray S/ stem, Containment spray System, and the Emergency Service Water System.
In addition, secondary containment will have been accidentally lost because of the unavailability of the standby gas treatment system.
Upon accidental loss of secondary containment, the plant will take action per Technical Specification 3.5.B.1.1 and place the plant in configuration in which environmental releases cannot occur. Therefore, under these conditions, the primary concern in terms of offsite and onsite power would be spent fuel heatup and decay heatup.
Puel Pool Heatuo Por FSAR chapter 9.1.3.3 if all fuel pool cooling is lost with the maximum abnormal heat load in the pool and an initial pool water temperature of 90*F, it would take 14.5 nours for the pool water temperature to reach boiling temperature. It would take an additional 83.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> before the top of the storage racks would begin to be uncovered.
Mitiaatino Mcasures Power restoration via a 34.5 KV transmission line from JCP&L's Yard l Creek Pump Storage Station or Atlantic Electrics' Combustion Turbine can be restored within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. This is based on JCP&L's periodic Emergency Restoration Drills.
This time period is much less than the amount of time it would take (based on design basis heat loads) to heatup th+ '. pent fuel pool to boiling temperature (14.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />).
In addition, it is reasonable to assume that the oil truck manifold could be repaired and a fuel oil tanker truck obtcined within 6 to 12-hours. The tanker truck could then directly feed the EDos and power restored to essential loads.
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In addition, if the alternate fuel supply from the 75,0fl0 gallon fuel storage tank is undamaged and available, then this i.el supply vould be capable of supplying ono dies 6. fcr 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
In addition, if the 230 KV lines and main transformera are undamaged, the main transformers can be aligned to the auxiliary transformers and power would be "back-fed" to the essential buses.
Also, the fire system (if undamaged) may be available (powered by its own independent diesel) to provide a source of cooling water.
When power is restored to the essential buses, spent fuel pool cooling and decay heat cooling can be provided by the above systems.
A tornado may cause a loss of offsite powar and temporary loss of onsite power event. This may result in loss of power to the new refueling
- bridge and the fuel hoist while a fuel bundle is in transit.
l The fuel hoist is designed with a safety brake. The safety brake consists of a solenoid and pawl roller ratchet which on loss of power locks the fuel grapple in place. Therefore, the bundle cannot drop into the core or spent fuel pool.
In addition, the design of the new fuel bridge is such that the bridge and fuel hoist can ba moved manually without power. Therefore, following lost power a bundle in transit could be placed back into the spent fuel pool. Therefore, a tornado is not expected to cause a refueling accident.
5.0 DETERMINATION This proposed Technical Specification change will not affect nuclear safety nor safe plant operation. All required essential equipment will be aligned with an active and standby source of power. Safe shutdown conditions will be maintained as defined and described in the FSAR and Technical Specification basis. Therefore, the proposed amendment will not:
A. Involve a sionificant increase in the probability or consecuences of an accident previousiv evaluated.
The probability of occurrence of an accident previously evaluated is
, not affected.
The design basis events for which the 15,000 gallon tank was designed are loss of offsite power, a LOCA coincident with loss of offsite power, and a refueling accident. The probability of these events are independent of the changes allowed by this Technical Specification change.
The consequences of an accident previously evaluated remain unchanged.
Evaluation of the applicable Design Basis accidents result in no change in consequence to the public.
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B. Create the nossibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previousiv evaluated.
The possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated is not created.
The 15,000 gallon fuel oil tank and transfer system are designed to meet seismic I criteria and are tornado missile protected. With the Technical specification change in place, the temporary fuel truck configuration would not meet seismic criteria and would not be.
missile protected.
The loss of off-site power, initiated by either a meteorological or seismic event, which also causes loss of the temporary tanks, would result in a loss of t.ie spent fuel pool cooling system. The spent fuel pool has adequate voluma to serve as a heat sink for the resulting spent fuel heatup. With a start point of 90'F it would take approximately 14.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> for the pool to reach boiling temperature, assuming the maximum abnormal heat load. It would take an additional 83.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> for the top of the spent fuel storage racks to become uncovered.
This time frame is more than adequate to mitigate the event by restoring fuel oil supply by the repair of the manifold and/or by bringing another tanker truck on ette, as required.
An additional source of water, provided by the fire protection system, (if undamaged) is available to the spent fuel pool. Water flow is provided by a diesel engine, which is independant of off-site power.
C. Involve a sionificant reduction in a marain of safety.
The margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications remains unaffected.
The basis for the Technical Specification 3.7.C.4 which ensures that 14,000 gallons of fuel is available for the 2 Dos is documented on page 3.7-3 of the Technical Specifications as follows:
The loLd requirements for a loss of offsite power coincident with loss of coolant (LOCA) event would require 12,840 gallons of fuel oil for a 3 day supply.
The load requirement for a loss of offsite powe event would require 12,410 gallons for a 3 day supply.
The load requirement for a loss of offsite power event with one essential bus inoperable would require 9,790 allans for a 3 day supply.
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The 14,000 gallon requirement ensures margin to the above design basis events. With the Technical Specification change approved and if temporary tankers are utilized during plant shutdown or refueling, the 14,000 gallone would still be required.
This proposed Technical specification change will not violate other Technical Specification requirements nor their baces.
6.0 IMPLEMENTATION It is requested that the amendment authorizing this change become effective for operating cycle 13 (i.e. by February 15, 1991).
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